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Disruptive Regulation: a Secular Investment Opportunity
FEATURED SOLUTION PIMCO Alternatives Disruptive Regulation: A Secular Investment Opportunity AUTHORS It’s been nearly a decade since the global financial crisis Christian Stracke prompted an onslaught of regulations intended to Managing Director Global Head, Credit Research abolish excessive risk-taking and make the financial Tom Collier system safer. Yet the implementation of reforms – and Executive Vice President their disruptive effect on financial business models – Product Manager will peak only over the next few years. As Dodd-Frank and Basel regulations come into force and a further wave of regulatory reform is announced, we believe banks will exit more non-core businesses, specific funding gaps will become more acute and dislocations between public and private markets will become more frequent. Each will create investment opportunities for less constrained and patient capital to capture economic profits being ceded by banks. The lengthy process of financial sector reform is not a surprise given its complexity. Passed in July 2010, for instance, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act runs to more than 350,000 words. Many details were left to administrators to define – and at the end of 2015, fewer than 60% had been implemented. Basel III regulations, intended to increase liquidity and decrease leverage at banks, were published in late 2009, but will not be fully implemented until 2019. Bankers are already fretting over “Basel IV,” a collection of rules being contemplated that would tighten the screws even further. 2 Featured Solution August 2016 For banks, the cost of Although most banks have increased their capital significantly, they face intense shareholder new regulations is high pressure to improve returns on capital. -
APFC Fund Managers
Board of Trustees Annual Meeting September 26-27, 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS Tab No. Title 1 Agenda 2 Approval of Minutes Memo a) May 23-24, 2018 b) July 24, 2018 3 CEO’s Reports a) Pending Board Matters b) Trustee Education c) Disclosure Report d) Travel e) Due Diligence Log f) Staff Education & Training 4 Communications 5 Financials 6 Cash Flow 7 Monthly Performance Report 8 Strategic and Tactical Moves 9 Investment Management Fee Report 10 FY19 Budget Report a) Capital Project Appropriations Report 11 Chief Investment Officer’s Report 12 Report of Annual Audit Memo a) Presentation: KPMG Annual Audit 13 Callan APFC Performance Review Memo a) Presentation: Callan APFC Performance 14 Risk Overview Memo a) Presentation: Risk Dashboard 15 Asset Class Updates: Public Equites Memo a) Presentation: Public Equities 16 Asset Class Updates: Fixed Income Memo a) Presentation: Fixed Income 1/462 17 Asset Class Updates: Private Equity & Special Opportunities Memo a) Presentation: Private Equity & Special Opportunities 18 Asset Class Updates: Asset Allocation Strategies Memo a) Presentation: Asset Allocation Strategies Review 19 Asset Class Updates: Real Assets Memo a) Presentation: Real Assets: Infrastructure, Special Income, Real Estate, Absolute Return 20 Strategic Plan Review Memo a) Strategic Plan Review 21 FY20 Budget Approval Memo a) Presentation: FY20 Proposed Budget b) FY20 Proposed Budget Request 22 Legislative Requests Memo 23 Investing in Global Real Estate Memo a) Presentation: RCLCO b) Presentation: CBRE c) Presentation: Brookfield 24 Investing -
PIMCO Total Return Fund Institutional Class
PIMCO Total Return Fund Institutional Class AS OF MARCH 31, 2012 TICKER: PTTRX FUND INVESTMENT OBJECTIVE ASSET CLASS The investment seeks maximum total return, consistent with preservation of capital and prudent investment management. The fund normally invests at Taxable Bond least 65% of its total assets in a diversified portfolio of Fixed Income Instruments of varying maturities, which may be represented by forwards or derivatives such as options, futures contracts, or swap agreements. It invests primarily in investment-grade debt securities, but may invest up to 10% of MORNINGSTAR CATEGORY total assets in high-yield securities ("junk bonds"). The fund may invest up to 15% of its total assets in securities and instruments that are economically Intermediate-Term Bond tied to emerging market countries. FUND VOLATILITY (RISK) Beta (3-Yr.): 0.84* Standard Deviation (3-Yr.): 3.72% PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION *Calculated against BarCap US Agg Bond TR USD. Beta is a means of measuring the volatility of a TOP HOLDINGS (12/31/11) ASSET TYPES (12/31/11) security in comparison with the market as a whole. FNMA 4.5% TBA 8.41% Stocks 0.45% | Bonds 153.93% | Cash -52.71% | Other -1.67% A beta of 1 indicates that the security’s price has moved with the market. A beta of more or less than 1 FNMA 4% TBA 7.70% indicates that the security’s price will be more or less PIMCO Short-Term Floating NAV Fund 7.06% CREDIT QUALITY BREAKDOWN (03/31/12) volatile, respectively, than the market. Fin Fut Us 5yr Cbt 03/30/12 6.63% Breakdown is not available for this fund. -
Form ADV Part 2A – Disclosure Brochure
Prosperity Advisory Group LLC Form ADV Part 2A – Disclosure Brochure Effective: October 12, 2020 This Form ADV Part 2A (“Disclosure Brochure”) provides information about the qualifications and business practices of Prosperity Advisory Group LLC (“PAG” or the “Advisor”). If you have any questions about the content of this Disclosure Brochure, please contact the Advisor at (585) 381-5900. PAG is a Registered Investment Advisor with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The information in this Disclosure Brochure has not been approved or verified by the SEC or by any state securities authority. Registration of an investment advisor does not imply any specific level of skill or training. This Disclosure Brochure provides information about PAG to assist you in determining whether to retain the Advisor. Additional information about PAG and its Advisory Persons is available on the SEC’s website at www.adviserinfo.sec.gov by searching with the Advisor’s firm name or CRD# 310720. Prosperity Advisory Group LLC 50 Square Drive, Suite 220, Victor, NY 14564 Phone: (585) 381-5900 * Fax: (585) 381-0478 https://prosperityadv.com Item 2 – Material Changes Form ADV 2 is divided into two parts: Part 2A (the "Disclosure Brochure") and Part 2B (the "Brochure Supplement"). The Disclosure Brochure provides information about a variety of topics relating to an Advisor’s business practices and conflicts of interest. The Brochure Supplement provides information about the Advisory Persons of PAG. PAG believes that communication and transparency are the foundation of its relationship with Clients and will continually strive to provide you with complete and accurate information at all times. -
Inprs Cafr Fy20 Working Version
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORREPORTT 2020 For the FiscalFiscal YearYear EndedEnded JuneJune 30,30, 20202019 INPRS is a component unit and a pension trust fund of the State of Indiana. The Indiana Public Retirement System is a component Prepared through the joint efforts of INPRS’s team members. unit and a pension trust fund of the State of Indiana. Available online at www.in.gov/inprs COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 2020 For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2020 INPRS is a component unit and a pension trust fund of the State of Indiana. INPRS is a trust and an independent body corporate and politic. The system is not a department or agency of the state, but is an independent instrumentality exercising essential governmental functions (IC 5-10.5-2-3). FUNDS MANAGED BY INPRS ABBREVIATIONS USED Defined Benefit DB Fund 1. Public Employees’ Defined Benefit Account PERF DB 2. Teachers’ Pre-1996 Defined Benefit Account TRF Pre-’96 DB 3. Teachers’ 1996 Defined Benefit Account TRF ’96 DB 4. 1977 Police Officers’ and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund ’77 Fund 5. Judges’ Retirement System JRS 6. Excise, Gaming and Conservation Officers’ Retirement Fund EG&C 7. Prosecuting Attorneys’ Retirement Fund PARF 8. Legislators’ Defined Benefit Fund LE DB Defined Contribution DC Fund 9. Public Employees’ Defined Contribution Account PERF DC 10. My Choice: Retirement Savings Plan for Public Employees PERF MC DC 11. Teachers’ Defined Contribution Account TRF DC 12. My Choice: Retirement Savings Plan for Teachers TRF MC DC 13. Legislators’ Defined Contribution Fund LE DC Other Postemployement Benefit OPEB Fund 14. -
Geographic Diversification Can Be a Lifesaver, Yet Most Portfolios Are Highly Geographically Concentrated
Geographic Diversification Can Be a Lifesaver, Yet Most Portfolios Are Highly Geographically Concentrated FEBRUARY 2019 MELISSA SAPHIER KAREN KARNIOL-TAMBOUR PAT MARGOLIS © 2019 Bridgewater Associates, LP he best way we know to earn consistent returns and preserve wealth is to build portfolios that are as resilient as possible to the range of ways the Tworld could unfold. To uncover vulnerabilities that are outside of investors’ recent lived experiences, we find it valuable to stress test portfolios across the various environments that have cropped up across countries throughout history. One common vulnerability is geographic concentration. dominant economic force and keeper of a stable global In the past century, there have been many times when geopolitical order. Looking ahead, China’s ascent as an investors concentrated in one country saw their wealth independent economic and financial center of gravity wiped out by geopolitical upheavals, debt crises, monetary with an independent monetary policy and credit system reforms, or the bursting of bubbles, while markets in is highly diversifying, making the world less unipolar other countries remained resilient. Even without such and less correlated. At the same time, the rising risk of extreme events, there is always a big divergence across conflict within and across countries also increases the the best and worst performing countries in any given chances of divergent outcomes. Additionally, geographic period. And no one country consistently outperforms, as diversification felt less urgent during the recent decade outperformance can lead to relative overvaluation and a of great returns for most assets and portfolios. Low asset subsequent reversal. Rather than try to predict who the yields going forward make diversification and efficient winner will be in any particular period, a geographically risk-taking all the more important to investors. -
Career Services Surveys the College of Arts and Sciences Graduating Class to Gather Information About Their Post-Graduation Plans
College of Arts & Sciences Undergraduate Class of 2013 Career Plans Survey Report Each year Career Services surveys the College of Arts and Sciences graduating class to gather information about their post-graduation plans. This report summarizes the responses from December 2012, May and August 2013 Bachelor of Arts degree recipients. CONTENTS Section Page Summary 2 Salary Information by Student Demographic 3 Signing Bonuses and Relocation Expenses 3 Interviews, Offers, and Top Employers/Graduate Schools 4 Geographic Locations for U.S. and International Students 5 Undergraduate Salaries by Industry 7 Undergraduate Salaries by Job Type 8 Full-Time Employment & Graduate Studies by Major 10 Employers Hiring Graduates by Industry and Major 42 Methodology Students were asked via several e-mail requests during Spring 2013 to complete an online version of the Career Plans Survey. Follow-up emails were sent between May and November 2013 to those students who had not responded or had previously indicated they were “still seeking.” A total of 1,216 surveys were returned, resulting in a 76% response rate. Prepared in December 2013 by: Claire Klieger, Senior Associate Director Tatiana Vasilikioti, Student Assistant Career Services. McNeil Building. Suite 20. www.vpul.upenn.edu/careerservices/ 1 CAREER PLANS SURVEY College of Arts and Sciences - Class of 2013 PRIMARY POST -GRAD PLANS, 201 3 Primary Post-Grad Plans, 2013 College of Arts & Sciences Seeking Full-Time Employed 60% 731 Seeking Grad Employment School Intern/Short-Term 7% 89 5% 2% Part-Time Employment 2% 21 Graduate School 20% 248 Education Other Education 2% 27 2% Seeking Graduate School 2% 25 Graduate School Seeking Employment 5% 63 20% Other/Travel 1% 10 Full-Time Employed Number of degrees awarded: 1,597 Other 60% Number of surveys returned: 1,216 1% Response Rate: 76% Of students who reported they were full-time employed, 73% Part-Time received guidance from a Career Services Advisor. -
Can Policy Makers Actually Get What They Want?
Can Policy Makers Actually Get What They Want? MAY 28, 2020 GREG JENSEN JASON ROGERS © 2020 Bridgewater Associates, LP he pandemic and the shutdowns that followed have opened two distinct but related holes—a hole in incomes (the real economy), and Ta hole in asset markets. If left unfilled, these holes would produce a self-reinforcing collapse and intolerable economic and social outcomes. The longer they persist, the greater the accumulated problems and the higher the likelihood of prolonged economic weakness as households and businesses sell assets and eat through cash balances until more and more entities are bankrupt. Faced with this, the main policy choice is whose balance sheets will bear the losses, which will determine to some extent how the economy rebounds after the health emergency eases. Many policy makers are now attempting to use government balance sheets to fill these two holes through coordinated monetary and fiscal policy (MP3)—filling the gap in markets with the central bank balance sheet through QE, and filling the gap in incomes with the government balance sheet through fiscal stimulus monetized by that QE. The intent is to avoid a collapse in markets and to bridge the gap in incomes so that when the pandemic is over companies are still intact, workers can get back to work, and the economy can quickly get back on its feet. In other words, policy makers hope to reduce the impact of the pandemic to a short- term interruption in activity and avoid long-term economic problems. While this approach makes sense to us, it is far from assured that policy makers will be able to get what they want. -
Oundtable Reenwich
The Education Committee of reenwichThe oundtable G Knowledge,R Veracity, Fellowship 2010 In This Issue The Art of Asking Questions Best Practices in Hedge Fund Strategies Alternative Investments: DUE DILIGENCE Private Illiquid Strategies The Final Analysis The Greenwich Roundtable One River Road Cos Cob, Connecticut 06807 Tel.: 203-625-2600 Fax: 203-625-4523 www.greenwichroundtable.org Best Practices in alternative investments: www.greenwichroundtaBle.org due diligence Research About the Greenwich Education Council Roundtable Committee Tudor Investment Corporation The Greenwich Roundtable, Inc., is a not-for- BEST PRACTICE MEMBERS Blenheim Capital Management profit research and educational organization located in Greenwich, Connecticut, for investors Robert M. Aaron Bridgewater Associates, Inc. who allocate capital to alternative investments. Gilwern Investments, LLC It is operated in the spirit of an intellectual BlackRock, Inc. cooperative for the alternative investment Benjamin Alimansky Moore Capital Management community. Its 150 members are comprised of Glenmede Trust mostly institutional and private investors, who The Lumina Foundation collectively control $4.5 trillion in assets. Edgar W. Barksdale Federal Street Partners The purpose of the Greenwich Roundtable is to discuss and provide current, cutting-edge Ray Gustin IV information on non-traditional investing. Our Drake Capital Advisors, LLC mission is to reveal the essence of both trusted and new investing styles and to create a code of Damian Handzy best practices for the alternative investor. Investor Analytics Brijesh Jeevarathnam Commonfund Capital, Inc. Jennifer Keeney Tatanka Asset Management, LLC The Research Council enables the Jeffrey P. Kelly Greenwich Roundtable to host Summit Rock Advisors the broadest range of investigation that serves the interests of the Russell L. -
Europe's Largest Single Managers Ranked by a Um
2013 IN ASSOCIATION WITH IN ASSOCIATION 5O EUROPEEUROPE’S LARGEST SINGLE MANAGERS RANKED BY AUM EUROPE50 01 02 03 04 Brevan Howard Man BlueCrest Capital Blackrock Management 1 1 1 1 Total AUM (as at 30.06.13) Total AUM (as at 30.06.13) Total AUM (as at 01.04.13) Total AUM (as at 30.06.13) $40.0bn $35.6bn $34.22bn $28.7bn 2 2 2 2 2012 ranking 2012 ranking 2012 ranking 2012 ranking 2 1 3 6 3 3 3 3 Founded Founded Founded Founded 2002 1783 (as a cooperage) 2000 1988 4 4 4 4 Founders/principals Founders/principals Founders/principals Founders/principals Alan Howard Manny Roman (CEO), Luke Ellis (President), Mike Platt, Leda Braga Larry Fink Jonathan Sorrell (CFO) 5 5 5 Hedge fund(s) 5 Hedge fund(s) Hedge fund(s) Fund name: Brevan Howard Master Fund Hedge fund(s) Fund name: BlueCrest Capital International Fund name: UK Emerging Companies Hedge Limited Fund name: Man AHL Diversified plc Inception date: 12/2000 Fund Inception date: 04/2003 Inception date:03/1996 AUM: $13.5bn Inception date: Not disclosed AUM: $27.4bn AUM: $7.9bn Portfolio manager: Mike Platt AUM: Not disclosed Portfolio manager: Multiple portfolio Portfolio manager: Tim Wong, Matthew Strategy: Global macro Portfolio manager: Not disclosed managers Sargaison Asset classes: Not disclosed Strategy: Equity long/short Strategy: Global macro, relative value Strategy: Managed futures Domicile: Not disclosed Asset classes: Not disclosed Asset classes: Fixed income and FX Asset classes: Cross asset Domicile: Not disclosed Domicile: Cayman Islands Domicile: Ireland Fund name: BlueTrend -
Patient Capital Outperformance
Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment Skill of High Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently Martijn Cremers Ankur Pareek University of Notre Dame Rutgers Business School First draft: December 2013 This draft: September 2014 This paper documents that among high Active Share portfolios – whose holdings differ substantially from the holdings of their benchmark – only those with patient investment strategies (i.e., with long stock holding durations of at least 2 years) outperform their benchmarks on average. Funds trading frequently generally underperform, regardless of Active Share. Among funds that infrequently trade, it is crucial to separate closet index funds – whose holdings largely overlap with the benchmark – from truly active funds. The average outperformance of the most patient and distinct portfolios equals 2.30% per year – net of costs – for retail mutual funds. Stocks held by patient and active institutions in general outperform by 2.22% per year and by hedge funds in particular by 3.64% per year, both gross of costs. JEL Classifications: G12, G24 Contact info: Martijn Cremers: 264 Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, Phone: 574‐631‐4476, Email: [email protected]. Ankur Pareek: Rutgers Business School, 1 Washington Park, Newark, NJ 07102, Phone: 973‐353‐1646, Email: [email protected]. We thank the Q‐Group for financial support. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2498743 Introduction Which, if any, actively managed portfolios can outperform passive benchmarks? The previous literature has documented that, on average, the long‐term net performance of actively managed mutual funds is similar to the performance of their benchmark (with actively managed funds generally underperforming their benchmarks but without strong statistical significance on average). -
The JOBS Act at Year One: a Changing Hedge Fund Communications Landscape
The JOBS Act at Year One: A Changing Hedge Fund Communications Landscape The private world of hedge funds is looking more like Madison Avenue. Hedge funds today are everywhere – in daily headlines, social media, public web sites, live TV coverage, and even highly visible Las Vegas bashes. They are also increasingly in the portfolios of institutional and retail investors. Once a shadowy, inaccessible and little understood part of the asset management world, hedge funds are growing, diversifying, extending product lines, acquiring competitors, targeting new markets, stepping up client relations – in short, acting more and more like the large, sophisticated businesses they’ve become. Driving and supporting this business transition is a changing attitude toward and approach to marketing communications. As hedge funds have grown to $2-trillion-plus in assets, they are tackling issues and opportunities like brand, visibility and reputation, all in the face of stiff competition. September 23, 2014, marks the first anniversary of the enactment of the Jumpstart Our Businesses (JOBS) Act, and provides an opportunity to look at how hedge fund communications have evolved. The JOBS Act was designed to spark U.S. economic growth in part by allowing hedge funds to solicit accredited investors. As a result, hedge funds are now allowed to employ tactics such as engaging the media, building accessible web sites, advertising and even social media. And while neither we nor others point to the JOBS Act as the sole driving force behind the implementation of new communications strategies by hedge funds in recent years, no one denies that these changes are taking place.