Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: ’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

Index

Abramson, Paul, 19, 174 authoritarian regimes. See fully closed Abreu, Jogin, 27 authoritarian regimes; activists, 141, 184. See also party elites one-party regimes Adams, James, 26, 50, 52, 54, 65 authoritarian tools, 14, 15, 34, 57–59, Aguilar Zinser, Adolfo, 230, 238 259, 306. See also electoral Aldrich, John, 11, 121, 122, 129, 133, fraud; individual country cases; 136, 159, 184 repression Aleman,´ Miguel, 74, 79–81 Avila Camacho, Manuel, 74, 77, 79 Alliance for Change, 221 Almazan,´ Juan Andreu, 78 Bahamas, 256 Alvarez, R. Michael, 246 Bailey, John, 46, 80, 85 Alves, Maria Helena Moreira, 44 bank nationalization, Mexico, 92 Ames, Barry, 46 Bank Savings Protection Fund Amigos de Fox, 114, 214, 231–32, (FOBAPROA), Mexico, 112, 242, 253 222, 238 Angola, 13 Banquet, the, Mexico, 105 Antorcha Popular, 203, 214 Barisan Alternatif (BA), Malaysia, Arap Moi, Daniel, 7 271 Arce, Rene,´ 205 Barisan Nasional (BN), Malaysia, 37, Argentina, 83 269. See also United Malays Arian, Alan, 10, 16, 46, 276 National Organization Arredondo Ramırez,´ Pablo, (UMNO) 110 Barnes, Samuel, 10, 16, 46, 276, Arrellano, David, 99, 100, 213 287 Arriola, Carlos, 9, 87–90, 166 Bartels, Larry, 244 Aspe, Pedro, 101–3, 105 Bartlett, Manuel, 214 Assembly of Neighborhoods (AB), Bartra, Roger, 45, 73 199, 204 Basanez,˜ Miguel, 88, 89, 173, 233 Authentic Revolutionary Party of BDP. See Botswana Democratic Mexico (PARM), Mexico, 94 Party

333

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

334 Index

Beck, Thorsten, 15, 18, 23, 24 campaign finance. See also dominant Bejerano, Rene,´ 190 party resource advantages; Berton, Peter, 278, 279 patronage Besley, Timothy, 130 in Mexico, 107–14, 149, 212, 231 Bianco, William, 11, 121, 133 equality of, 213, 215 biased party competition. See government donations, 111 dominant party resource illegal funds, 113, 114, 213 advantages; party competition, and party competitiveness, 107 spatial theories of; patronage; private donations, 111, 212 repression in Taiwan, 266, 268 black-gold politics, Taiwan, 266, 268 campaign restrictions, Japan, 283 Blondel, Jean, 10, 15, 16 campaigns. See Cardenas´ Solorzano, BNF. See Botswana National Front C.; Fox, V.; Labastida, F. Boix, Carles, 12, 22, 158, 299, 308 Campbell, John, 282 Borjas Benavente, Adriana Leticia, 9, Candiani, Mauricio, 201, 202 154 Cardenas´ Solorzano, Cuauhtemoc,´ 7, Bortolotti, Bernardo, 293 93, 95, 154, 189, 196, 198, Botswana, 17, 22, 37 199, 203, 211, 221–53 passim, Botswana Congress Party (BCP), 38 301 Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), campaign strategy of, 234, 253 17, 38 campaign style of, 239 Botswana National Front (BNF), 37 centrism of, 240–44 Bouton, Lawrence, 272 competence ratings of, 238, 252 Brandenburg, Frank, 4, 76, 299 defection from, 245, 249, 251 Bravo Mena, Luis Felipe, 232 electoral coalition of, 233 Brazil, 44, 85, 104, 302 nomination of in 2000, 229–30, Brody, David, 243 267 Brooker, Paul, 10, 44 noncentrism of, 252 Brownlee, Jason, 62 viability assessments of, 250, 252 Bruhn, Kathleen, 8, 9, 73, 74, 81, 86, voter defection from, 240 93, 94, 106, 107, 144, 152, Cardenas,´ Lazaro,´ 73–94 passim 154, 160, 177, 227, 230, 232, Carey, John, 61, 266 235, 237, 239 Carothers, Thomas, 14 Bruno, Giovanni, 294 Carr, Barry, 9, 79–82, 85–87, 152 Buendıa,´ Jorge, 20, 174 Case, William, 269, 272 bureaucracy. See public bureaucracy Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Italy, 289, Business Coordinating Council (CCE), 293 Mexico, 88, 89 Castaneda,˜ Jorge, 7, 94, 95, 230 Butler, Kimberly, 15 Castillo Peraza, Carlos, 202 Castillo, Heberto, 84, 235 cacique, 203 Castles, Francis, 286 Calder, Kent, 281 catchall parties. See also individual Calderon´ Hinojosa, Felipe, 124 party names Calderon,´ Luisa Marıa,´ 207 definition of, 37 camarillas, 99. See also Institutional extensive expansion of, 191 Revolutionary Party (PRI) organizational profile of, 179 Cameroon, 13 recruitment style of, 183 Camp, Roderic Ai, 99, 233, 299 voter communication style of, 184

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

Index 335

Catholic Church, 111, 191 in Taiwan, 267 CD, Mexico. See Democratic Current public goods taregting and, 283 Centeno, Miguel Angel, 101, 106 Cline, Howard, 4, 299 Cervera Pacheco, Victor, 214 CNC. See National Campesino Chand, Vikram, 9 Confederation, Mexico Chandra, Kanchan, 276 CNOP. See National Confederation of Charlesworth, James, 18 Popular Organizations charro, 79. See also authoritarian Coate, Steven, 130 tools Coleman, James, 15 Chaudhry, Kiren, 307 Collier, David, 45, 76, 77, 80 Chen, Shui-bian, 267, 268 Collier, Ruth Berins, 45, 76, 77, 80, Cheng, Tun-jen, 10, 45, 262, 264 91 Chhibber, Pradeep, 276 Colosio, Luis Donaldo, 105 Chile, 7, 44, 87, 104, 134, 299 command economy, 307 Chong, Dennis, 122–24 competitive authoritarianism, 11, 14, Christensen, Ray, 276, 278, 280, 15, 307, 308 282–84 conceptual stretching, 260 Christian Democratic Party (DC), Conchello, Jose´ Angel, 87, 165 Italy, 276, 285, 300. See also Confederation of Industrial Business dominant party systems; Chambers (CONCAMIN), dominant party democratic Mexico, 89 regimes (DPDRs) Confederation of Mexican Workers alternative arguments for (CTM), 75, 77, 100, 104, 105, dominance, 285 212 as catchall party, 285 Congress Party, India, 258, 276 end of dominance, 294 congressional gridlock, Mexico, 8, parliamentarism and dominance, 302 287 Conover, Pamela Johnston, 243 resource advantages, 285, 288 Coordinator of University Students control of public bureaucracy by, (CEU), Mexico, 190 290–91 Cornelius, Wayne, 50, 72, 81, 98, 102, decline of, 292–94 111, 203, 214, 215, 233, 299 origin of, 289–91 costs of participation. See opportunity types of, 289–91, 294 costs; party elites; repression Chu, Yun-han, 38, 45, 122, 261–64, Coteˆ d’Ivoire, 13 266 Cotton, James, 122, 264 Chua, Huat Beng, 37, 38, 271, 273, Coulon, Christian, 37 274 Cox, Gary, 11, 15, 16, 18, 23–26, 48, Civic Alliance, Mexico, 111 52, 62, 70, 121, 127, 133, 177, Civic Union of Iztapalapa (UCI), 245, 257, 262, 263, 266, 277, Mexico, 204 278 civil service. See public bureaucracy Craig, Ann, 50, 72, 81, 98, 102, 299 Clark, Peter, 123, 125 Crespo, Jose´ Antonio, 195 cleavages. See partisan cleavages Cristero Rebellion, 76 clientelism. See also patronage Mexico, 78 as compared to patronage, 40 Cross, John, 104 in Italy, 289 Crouch, Harold, 45, 50, 269, 270, in Japan, 278, 281, 283 272–74

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

336 Index

CTM. See Confederation of Mexican 307. See also individual party Workers names and countries Cuellar,´ Angelica,´ 199 dominant party democratic regimes Curtis, Gerald, 277, 279, 281–84 (DPDRs), 258, 259, 275–95. See also individual party names Dalton, Matt, 97, 156 and countries DAP. See Democratic Action Party, dominant party equilibrium, 16, 306 Malaysia in Botswana, 37 Davis, Otto, 48 formal model of, 47–59 DC. See Christian Democratic Party, in Italy, 285–88 Italy in Japan, 278–81 de la Madrid, Miguel, 91, 166, 199 in Malaysia, 37, 268–71 de Palma, Andre,´ 26, 177 in Mexico, 37, 71, 72 debt crisis. See economic crisis, in in Senegal, 37 Mexico in Taiwan, 38, 261–62 dedazo, 77, 236 dominant party resource advantages, Deininger, Klaus, 22 5–6, 298, 306. See also della Porta, Donatella, 285, 291, 294, individual party names; 295 patronage Democratic Action Party (DAP), control of public bureaucracy, 41 Malaysia, 38, 270 effects on political parties, 39 Democratic Current (CD), Mexico, measurement of, 149–50 93, 154, 190 and probability of victory, 47–52 Democratic Mexican Party (PDM), 86 types of, 39–42 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), dominant party systems. See also Taiwan, 38, 261–63, 267, 268 dominant parties; dominant democratization. See transitions to party authoritarian regimes democracy (DPARs); dominant party di Palma, Guiseppe, 285 democratic regimes (DPDRs); Diamond, Larry, 14, 267, 268 individual party names and Diaw, Aminata, 20, 37 countries; resource theory of Dıaz-Cayeros,´ Alberto, 106 single-party dominance Dillon, Samuel, 98, 99, 212, 235, 237 authoritarian tools and, 34, 42–45 dinosaurs, 236. See also Institutional case selection for comparison, 256 Revolutionary Party (PRI) compared to fully competitive Diouf, Mamadou, 20, 37 democracies, 17 doctrinarios, 166. See also National compared to predominant party Action Party (PAN) systems, 259 dominant parties. See also dominant cultural theory of, 10, 257 party systems definition of, 12–16 centrism of, 45, 309 dominant party’s policy appeals defection from, 61–62 and, 45–47 legitimacy of, 10, 46 DPARs compared to DPDRs, origins of, 10 258–60 and turnout, 46 economic crisis and, 21 dominant party authoritarian regimes examples of, 16, 37, 258 (DPARs), 14, 16, 258, 261–76, existing theories of, 10, 17–27, 257

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

Index 337

institutional theory and, 22–24, 257 Eckstein, Susan, 183, 203 in Italy, 284–95 economic crisis, 174 in Japan, 277–84 effects on party elites’ policy in Malaysia, 37, 268–75 preferences, 159 modernization theory and, 21–22, in Malaysia, 274 257 in Mexico, 8, 74, 89–91, 94, 102, neutral models and, 24–26 115, 166, 173 non-neutral models and, 26–27 effective number of parties, 17–19 opposition coordination in, 308 Egypt, 13, 62 opposition party types in, 35–38 Eisenstadt, Shmuel, 50, 158 parliamentary systems, 15, 220, Eisenstadt, Todd, 7, 59, 95 257, 276 ejidos,80 patronage. See patronage elections presidential systems, 15, 219, 257, fraud. See electoral, fraud 302 in Italy, 285, 292, 294 proto-dominant party systems, 14 in Japan, 277, 284 rational choice theory and, 24–27 in Malaysia, 269 regime classification, 12 in Mexico, 2. See also Cardenas´ regional dominance, 17 Solorzano, C.; Fox, V.; repression. See repression Labastida, F. resource advantages. See dominant 1976, 86, 89, 165 party resource advantages; 1988, 7, 93, 95, 196, 203 resource theory of single-party 2000, 210–54 dominance fairness of, 150, 210–15 retrospective voting theory and, freeness of, 71 19–21, 308 meaningfulness of, 2, 71 role of the state in, 22, 149, 307 other elections, 91, 94, 195, 198, social cleavages theory and, 18–19 200, 202, 203 in Taiwan, 38, 261–68 in Taiwan, 2000, 266–68 Domınguez,´ Jorge, 95, 143, 144, 160, meaningful competition, 13, 14, 173, 174, 176, 177, 233 259, 269 Dow, Jay, 246 electoral authoritarianism, 14. See also Downs, Anthony, 48, 178, 306 competitive authoritarianism DPARs. See dominant party electoral fraud, 14, 15, 34, 35, 42, authoritarian regimes 259, 300, 306 DPDR. See dominant party with certainty, 42 democratic regimes compared to resource advantages, DPP. See Democratic Progressive 43, 58 Party, Taiwan effects on opposition parties, 42, 58 Dresser, Denise, 106 evidence of, 43 Duverger, Maurice, 10, 16, 22 in Kenya, 13 Duverger’s Law, 22, 23 in Malaysia, 269 in Mexico, 4, 7, 72, 73, 86, 91–95, Eastern Europe, 301 174 Ebenstein, William, 100 requirements for success of, 43 Echeverrıa,´ Luis, 74, 84, 85, 87–89, in Taiwan, 263 165 with uncertainty, 14, 43

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

338 Index

electoral law firefighting strategy, 73, 75, 95, 114, in Japan, 283 159. See also Institutional in Mexico, 86, 98, 107–14, 165, Revolutionary Party (PRI) 168 Fischer, Bernhard, 77 electoral management bodies, 41, 309 Fish, M. Steven, 44 electoral system Fitzgibbon, Russell, 4, 299 effect of district magnitude, 22–24 FOBAPROA, See Bank Savings in Italy, 257 Protection Fund in Japan, 257, 278, 285 Fox, Vicente, 2, 29, 38, 97, 114, 202, in Malaysia, 24, 257, 271 210–53 passim, 268, 301, 302, in Mexico, 24, 177, 257, 271 325, 326 single nontransferable vote (SNTV), Amigos de Fox. See Amigos de Fox 262, 266, 278, 280, 284 campaign strategy of, 234–43, 253 in Taiwan, 24, 257 campaign style of, 239 electoral-professional parties, 37 centrism of, 240–44, 252, 253 elite activists. See party elites competence ratings of, 238, 252 Endersby, James, 246 distance from PAN, 242, 253 Epstein, Leon, 4, 52, 60, 121 electoral coalition of, 211, 233 equilibrium dominance. See dominant independent resources of, 229, 231 party equilibrium nomination battle in 2000, 230–33, Estevez,´ Federico, 106, 233 267 ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 18 Freedom House scores, 44, 96–97, European Manifestos Project, 73, 144 261 European Union, 292 FSTSE. See Federation of Public Sector expressive incentives. See party elites Unions externally mobilized parties, 11, 122, Fuentes-Berain, Rossana, 27 303 fully closed authoritarian regimes, extremism, definition of, 33 307, 308 as compared to dominant party Farneti, Paolo, 285 systems, 134 FDN. See National Democratic Front, as compared to Mexico, 96 Mexico definition of, 4 Feddersen, Timothy, 24, 48 examples of, 13 Federal Elections Institute (IFE), fully competitive democracies, 304 Mexico, 110, 113, 114, 212–14 Federal Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE), Gabon, 13 Mexico, 114 Gambia, 16, 256 Federation of Public Sector Unions Garcıa´ Cervantes, Ricardo, 232 (FSTSE), Mexico, 100, 104, Garreton,´ Manuel Antonio, 44 212 Garrido, Luis Javier, 80 Feher,´ Ferenc, 44 Geddes, Barbara, 16, 21, 98, 105, 120 Feldman, Stanley, 243 Gerken, Egbert, 77 FEP. See People’s Front Party, Mexico Gerschenkron, Alexander, 271, 292 Ferdinand, Peter, 122, 263 gestion´ social, 201, 202, 207 Fernandez´ de Cevallos, Diego, 230, Gibney, Mark, 97, 156 232, 233 Givens, Terri, 11, 122 Fields, Karl, 264, 265 Golden, Miriam, 285, 286, 289–91, Fiorina, Morris, 20, 174 294, 295

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

Index 339

Gomez´ Mont, Esperanza, 206, 207 hyper-incumbency advantages, 39, 63, Gomez´ Morın,´ Manuel, 188 98, 119, 297, 300, 309. See Gomez, Edmund, 122, 269, 273, 274 also dominant party resource Gomez,´ Leopoldo, 46 advantages; individual party Gonzalez´ Casanova, Pablo, 4, 88, names; patronage 299 Gonzalez´ Morfın,´ Efraın,´ 88 Ibarra, Rosario, 235 Gordillo, Elba Esther, 214 Ibarrola, Christlieb, 87 green parties, Western Europe, 41, IFE. See Federal Elections Institute 122, 303 Imaz, Carlos, 190 Green Party (PVEM), Mexico, 114, import-substitution industrialization 214, 221, 235 (ISI), 101, 104, 307 Greenberg, Joseph, 25 inchoate party systems, 302 Greene, Kenneth F., 8, 10, 143, 196, incumbency advantages, 39. See also 199, 213, 302 hyper-incumbency advantages Grindle, Merilee, 99 independent left, Mexico, See Party of Grofman, Bernard, 50, 52, 54, 65 the Democratic Revolution Groseclose, Timothy, 50, 51, 57 (PRD), predecessors to Grzymala-Busse, Anna, 301 India, 258, 276 Guerrero Castillo, Augustın,´ 190 Indonesia, 13 Guerrero, Juan Pablo, 99, 100, 213 informal sector, 92, 104, 214 Guillermoprieto, Alma, 203 Inoguchi, Takashi, 276, 281, 282 Gutierrez,´ Gabriela, 207 Institute for Industrial Reconstruction Guyana, 13 (IRI), Italy, 289 Guzzini, Stefano, 285, 294 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), Mexico, 16. See also Haber, Paul, 106, 183, 199 dominant party systems; Haggard, Stephan, 21, 22, 159, 174 dominant party authoritarian Hartz, Louis, 18 regimes (DPARs) Hechter, Michael, 124 authoritarian preceptions of, 237 Heller, Agnes, 44 authoritarian tools and, 72 Hellman, Judith Adler, 45, 75, 81, 83, candidate launch 2000, 140, 267 85, 87, 93, 183, 299 compared to other dominant Hellman, Stephen, 288 parties, 255–96 Hidalgo, Javier, 198–200 defeat of in 2000, 44, 210, 267 Hiemenz, Ulrich, 77 historical relationship with Hine, David, 285 opposition, 75–96 passim Hinich, Melvin, 26, 48, 50 identifiers, 215, 233, 248, 250 Hirschman, Albert O., 129, 130, legitimacy of, 165 305 nomination politics in 2000, 232, Holm, John, 38 267 Howard, Marc Morje,´ 7, 62, 308 performance evaluations. See Hrebenar, Ronald, 277, 279, 282–84 retrospective voting Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng, 20, 21 policy position of, 72, 73. See also Huang, Teh-fu, 264 firefighting strategy Hug, Simon, 12, 303 centrism, 73, 164 Hugo, Victor, 205 effects on party elites’ policy Huntington, Samuel, 10, 45, 73 preferences, 159

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

340 Index

Institutional Revolutionary Party Johnson, Kenneth, 78, 83, 84 (cont.) Johnston, Richard, 219 shift to left, 75–77, 84–87 Jones, Claudio, 107 shift to right, 77–82, 91–92 Jones, Mark, 192 post-democratization survival of, 8, Jowitt, Ken, 44, 45 301 as pragmatic party, 10, 46, 73 Kalyvas, Stathis, 292 predecessors to, 80 KANU. See Kenya African National prospective evaluations of, 21, 174 Union recruitment into, 77, 138 Karl, Terry, 11, 14 repression and, 75–97, 168. See also Katz, Richard, 304 repression Kaufman Purcell, Susan, 4, 299 resource advantages, 34, 75–96 Kaufman, Robert, 21, 22, 159, 174 passim, 102, 185 Kenya, 7, 13 control of public bureaucracy, Kenya African National Union 99–101 (KANU), 7 decline of, 105, 114, 173, 211–15 Keohane, Robert, 16 origin of, 97–99, 101–107 Kessler, Timothy, 85, 87, 106, 112 sectoral organizations, 75, 80, 104, Key, V.O., 18, 20, 174 105, 188, 214 King, Gary, 16, 220, 247 voter dissatisfaction with. See Kirchheimer, Otto, 37 retrospective voting Kitschelt, Herbert, 11, 37, 50, 122, voter identification with, 173 129, 136, 158, 279, 283, institutional theory, 22–24, 71, 72 305 interest groups, 124 Klesner, Joseph, 86, 107, 176, 213, Internal Security Act (ISA), Malaysia, 233 275 KMT. See Kuomintang, Taiwan internally mobilized parties, 11 kaenkai¯ , Japan, 283 Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), 38, Kollman, Ken, 178 270 Komeito/Clean Government Party Israel, 258, 264, 276 (CGP), Japan, 279, 280 Italian Communist Party (PCI), Krauss, Ellis, 278, 281, 282 286–88 Krauze, Enrique, 1 Italian Social Movement (MSI), 286 Kuo, Chengtian, 264, 265 Italy under the DC, 255, 257–59, 276, Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan, 16, 38, 284–95, 300 261, 264–65, 300. See also Iztapalapa, , 195, 196, dominant party systems; 203–8 dominant party authoritarian regimes (DPARs) Jackson, John, 129, 130 as catchall party, 262 Japan under the LDP, 255, 257–59, centrism of, 262 276–84, 295, 300 defection from, 267 Japanese Communist Party (JCP), institutional argument for 278, 280 dominance, 262 Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), 279, performance of, 263. See also 280 retrospective voting Jennings, Kent, 148 prospective evaluations of, 21 Johnson, Chalmers, 282 resource advantages, 263–64

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

Index 341

control of public bureaucracy, Liberal Mexican Party, 88 264 Liberation Theology, 84 decline of, 265–67 Lichbach, Mark, 12, 122 origin of, 264–65 Lien, Chan, 267, 268 Kuran, Timur, 174 Lin, Oliver, 263 Lin, Tse-min, 26, 177 Laakso, Markku, 18 Linz, Juan, 61, 219 Labastida, Francisco, 211, 233, 235, Lipset, Seymour Martin, 18, 38 236, 239, 243–45, 247–52 Lipson, Leslie, 18 campaign strategy of, 234, 253 Liu, I-chou, 261, 262, 264 competence ratings of, 239, 252 Loaeza, Soledad, 9, 37, 77, 78, 87, 88, democratic credentials of, 236 166 electoral coalition of, 233 Locke, Richard, 293 Lacy, Dean, 20, 21 Lombardo Toledano, Vicente, 77 land redistribution, Mexico, 77, 79, Londregan, John, 50 85 Lopez´ Obrador, Andres´ Manuel, 124, Langston, Joy, 80 229 LaPalombara, Joseph, 285, 289, 290 Lopez´ Portillo, Jose,´ 74, 86, 89, 90, Latin America 166 compared to Mexico, 7, 44, 87, Lujambio, Alonso, 90, 91, 112, 213 104, 299 Lustig, Nora, 85, 91, 102, 103 rise of the left across, 210 Laver, Michael, 15, 62, 276, 277, 286 Mabry, Donald, 9, 76–79, 191 Law of curvilinear disparities, 228, machine politics. See patronage 305 MacLeod, Dag, 101–4, 106, 107 Lawson, Chappell, 94, 110, 176, 213, Madagascar, 13 233, 244 Madrazo, Roberto, 236, 237 leaders. See party elites Magaloni, Beatriz, 9, 20, 21, 62, 106, Leftist Democratic Faction (CID), 143, 144, 174, 217, 233 Mexico, 190, 205 Magar, Eric, 110 Lehoucq, Fabrice, 43 Mahathir, Mohammad, 275 Levite, Ariel, 10 Mainwaring, Scott, 193, 302 Levitsky, Steven, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 48, Mair, Peter, 193, 286, 304 302 Malaysia under UMNO, 16, 37, 50, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 122, 255, 257, 258, 268–75, Japan, 276, 277, 280, 300. See 295, 296, 300, 307, 308. See also dominant party systems; also United Malays National dominant party democratic Organization (UMNO) regimes (DPDRs) as dominant party authoritarian as catchall party, 281 regime, 269 end of dominance, 284 as fully closed authoritarian regime, existing explanations for 269 dominance, 277 economic crisis, 274 resource advantages National Economic Plan (NEP), control of public bureaucracy, 272–73 282 Mandela, Nelson, 236 types of, 281–83 Manikas, Peter, 266 as rightwing party, 278 Markus, Gyorgy, 44

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

342 Index

Martınez,´ Omar, 110 advantages; electoral fraud; Martınez´ Valle, Adolfo, 78, 87, 88 National Action Party (PAN); Martınez´ Verdugo, Arnoldo, 86, 152 Party of the Democratic mass media, 94, 184 Revolution (PRD); repression May, John, 129, 130, 136, 148, 159, compared to fully closed 228, 305 authoritarian regimes, 7, 44, McCann, James, 95, 143, 144, 160, 134, 299 173, 174, 176, 177, 233, 244 in comparative perspective, 299 McDonald, Ronald, 15 as a democracy, 4, 72, 299 McKelvey, Richard, 26 as a dominant party authoritarian meaningful electoral competition. See regime (DPAR), 299 elections as a fully closed authoritarian Means, Gordon Paul, 269 regime, 4, 72, 299 Medina Placencia, Carlos, 230 history of party competition, 75–96 medium N analysis, 256 Middlebrook, Kevin, 75, 79, 81, 83 Meguid, Bonnie, 303 Miguel Hidalgo, Mexico City, Merino, Mauricio, 100 195–202 Merrill III, Samuel, 50, 52, 54, 65 Miller, John, 178 Mershon, Carol, 292 Miller, Warren, 148 message-seekers. See party elites Mizrahi, Yemile, 9, 78, 90, 124, 166, Mexican Communist Party (PCM), 188, 189, 232 13, 80–82, 84–86, 92, 93, 152 MLN. See National Liberation membership of, 80, 82 Movement registration of, 71, 80, 86 Moctezuma Barragan,´ Esteban, 99, Mexican Democratic Party (PDM), 76 100 Mexican Employers’ Association, 88 modernization theory, 21–22, 71, 158, Mexican left. See Party of the 308 Democratic Revolution (PRD), Moe, Terry, 123, 124 predecessors to Molinar, Juan, 13, 71, 80, 81, 106, Mexican Revolution, 73, 76, 125 107, 110, 144 Mexican Revolutionary Party (PRM), Moore, Clement, 10 75, 80 moral authority, 175, 229, 305 Mexican Socialist Party (PMS), 86, Moreno, Alejandro, 27, 143, 174, 93, 152, 165, 204 176, 233 Mexican Unified Socialist Party Mozambique, 13 (PSUM), 86, 92, 93, 151, 152, MRM. See Revolutionary Teacher’s 196, 204 Movement Mexican Worker-Peasant Party MRP. See People’s Revolutionary (POCM), 82, 152 Movement Mexican Workers Party (PMT), 84, MSI. See Italian Social Movement 86, 152 MT. See Territorial Movement, Mexico Party Personnel Surveys Mexico description of, 27, 140–42 multi-method approach, 27 sample sizes, 141 Munger, Michael, 26 stock versus flow, 142 Munoz˜ Ledo, Porfirio, 93, 154, 190, Mexico under the PRI. See also 229, 230 dominant party resource Munro-Kua, Anne, 269, 272, 275

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

Index 343

Muramatsu, Michio, 278, 281, 282 National Chamber of Transformation Industries, Mexico, 89 NAFTA, 177 National Confederation of Popular Nagler, Jonathan, 246 Organizations (CNOP), National Action Party (PAN), Mexico. Mexico, 80, 81, 90, 104, 106, See also Fox, V.; opposition 203 parties; party elites National Coordinator of Urban activist recruitment, 182–84, Popular Movements 188–89 (CONAMUP), Mexico, 204 adherentes, 232 National Democratic Front (FDN), and, 76, 77, 90, Mexico, 93, 94, 110, 154 144 National Economic Plan (NEP), Catholic humanism and, 77, 88, Malaysia, 272–73 165 National Liberation Movement as Christian Democratic party, (MLN), Mexico, 152 87 National Reconstruction Cardenist core constituency of, 37, 181–82, Front Party (PFCRN), Mexico, 202, 206 94 cost of participation in, 79 National Revolutionary Party (PNR), economic liberals and, 76, 78, 90, Mexico, 75 165, 166 National Solidarity Program existing descriptions of, 9 (PRONASOL), Mexico, 94, extremism of, 164, 165, 177, 301 106, 203, 212 feeder organizations, 191 National Workers’ Union (UNT), formation of, 76 Mexico, 105 history of, 75–96 passim Nationalist Society Party (PSN), identifiers with, 177, 215, 223, 233, Mexico, 221 248 Nava, Salvador, 235 limits of expansion, 202, 207 Needler, Martin, 72 membership, 192–95, 201, 206 neopanistas, 166. See National Action moderation of, 165, 166 Party (PAN), economic liberals National Assembly, 141 and National Council, 150, 230 New Party (NP), Taiwan, 262 National Executive Committee, 232 niche parties, 175. See also opposition as niche party, 37, 189 parties; individual party names nomination politics in 2000, definition of, 35 227–33, 267 intensive expansion, 191 organization of, 188–90 organizational profile, 179 platform of, 177 recruitment style, 182 prospective evaluations of, 174 voter communication style, repression of, 78 184 social conservatives and, 76, 88, Niou, Emerson, 20, 21 165 nomination theory, 228–29 National Autonomous University of non-neutral entry models. See party Mexico (UNAM), 83 competition, spatial theories of; National Campesino Confederation resource theory of single-party (CNC), Mexico, 75, 104 dominance

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

344 Index

O’Donnell, Guillermo, 11 opposition alliance. See office-seekers. See party elites opposition alliance oil, 76, 90, 307. See also PEMEX organization of, 188–90 OIR-LM. See Revolutionary Leftist party-building case studies, Organization-Proletarian Line 187–208 Olson, Mancur, 122, 304 poverty of, 102, 122, 184 Olukoshi, Adebayo, 20 recruitment into, 182–84. See one-party regimes, 26, 44, 301 party elites OPEC, 91 repression of, 96–97 Oppenheimer, Andres,´ 105 strategy options in 2000, 215–19, opportunity costs, 60, 120, 131, 133, 267 137, 148, 155, 183, 259, moral authority and, 60, 175 297 party-building problems, 11, 59–63 opposition alliance, Mexico, 219, 220, path-dependency in, 62 223–27 policy motivations of, 52–55 failure of, 75, 221, 227 poverty of, 122, 297 negotiations over, 221, 227 recruitment into. See party elites opposition parties. See also individual spatial strategy of, 55–57, 60 party names in Taiwan, 261 collective action problem in, 62, in United States, 41 122–24 in Western Europe, 41 coordination failure, 62, 270, opposition party elites. See party 278–81, 308 elites defection from dominant party and, Ordeshook, Peter, 20, 48 61–62 Ortiz Pardo, Francisco, 231 form of, 35, 37 Ortiz Pinchetti, Francisco, 231 founder’s problem, 53, 66–70 Ortiz, Francisco, 231, 236, 239 information asymmetries and, 59 Osborne, Martin, 25, 130 in Italy, 286–88 Osei-Hwedie, Bertha, 17, 38 in Japan, 278–81 Otake, Hideo, 279 in Malaysia, 269–71 in Mexico. See also independent Padgett, Leon, 45 left; National Action Party Padierna, Dolores, 190 (PAN); Party of the Democratic Page, Benjamin, 243 Revolution (PRD) Page, Scott, 178 candidates for executive office Palfrey, Thomas, 25, 303 and, 302 PAN. See National Action Party collective action problem in, 175, Panebianco, Angelo, 37, 124, 129 178, 210 parallel demonstration of theory, 255 coordination failure between, 7, Paras,´ Pablo, 233 9, 147, 210, 300, See also PARM. See Authentic Revolutionary opposition alliance Party of Mexico historical opportunities for partisan cleavages. See also development, 73–96 retrospective voting; voters incentives for centrism, 176 in Italy, 285 legality of, 71 in Japan, 281 new parties in 1990s, 142 in Malaysia, 270 as niche parties, 6, 71 in Mexico, 142–46, 215–19

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

Index 345

in Taiwan, 261 adverse selection into opposition party activists. See party elites parties, 149 party affiliation. See party elites careerism, 298 Party Building Index, 179 costs of participation, 43, 120, party competition 133–35, 148, 155–56, 175 adaptive party theory, 177 dominant party elites’ centrism, 148 neutral models, 3, 7, 24–26, 48, 56, effects of probability of victory on, 71, 72, 176 148, 164 non-neutral models, 3, 26–27, 72. in Italy, 288 See also resource theory of in Mexico single-party dominance cooptation of, 183 and resource advantages, 303 generational conflicts, 175 spatial theories of, 175, 303 party-building preferences, Party of the Democratic Revolution 179–87 (PRD), Mexico, 93. See also perception of core constituencies, Cardenas´ Solorzano, C.; 181–82 opposition parties; party elites political associations and, 151 activist recruitment practices, quality of, 183 189–90 year of affiliation, 150–55 core constituencies of, 37, 181–82 in Taiwan, 264 defectors from PRI and, 152 message-seekers, 120, 126, 130, electoral performance in 1990s, 94 148, 156 existing descriptions of, 9 affiliation decisions of, 131–37 expansion of, 38 description of, 125–27 factions in, 190 empirics of party affiliation, family tree, 152 160–68 formation of, 94 measurement of, 156 identifiers with, 177, 215, 223, 233, party-building preferences of, 248 179–89 limits of expansion, 200, 205 support for opposition alliance, membership of, 192–95, 200, 205 223–27 moderation of, 165, 166, 168 utility functions of, 129–30 National Convention of, 141 office-seekers, 120, 148, 156 National Political Councilors, 155 affiliation decisions of, 131–37 as niche party, 37 description of, 125–27 nomination politics in 2000, empirics of party affiliation, 227–33, 267 160–68 organization of, 188–90 measurement of, 156 platform of, 177 party-building preferences of, predecessors to, 75–96 passim, 179–89 150–54, 165, 190 support for opposition alliance, prospective evaluations of, 174 223–27 reliance on social movements, 200, utility functions of, 127–29 204 opposition party founders, 124 repression of, 95. See also party affiliation decisions, 59–62. repression; party elites See also party elites, costs of party elites (leaders and activists) participation activists, definition of, 141 abstention from activism, 134

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

346 Index

party affiliation decisions (cont.) turnover and, 41 existing theories of, 120–23 unavailability to opposition parties, formal model of, 119–38 48 incentives for, 5, 11, 52, 53, voter response to, 49 120–24, 128 PCI. See Italian Communist Party policy preferences and, 146 PCM, Mexico. See Mexican party personnel, defintion of, 141 Communist Party policy preferences of PDM. See Mexican Democratic Party hypotheses for, 147–48 PEMEX (Petroleos´ Mexicanos), 90, measurement of, 142–47 101, 221, 237, 240. See also office-seekers vs. message-seekers, oil 125, 148, 157 PEMEXgate, 113, 114, 214 sincere preferences, 131–35 Pempel, T.J., 10, 15, 16, 33, 258, 276, statistical model of, 148–62 281 repression of. See repression pendulum theory, 72, 73, 95. See also similarity of opposition candidates Institutional Revolutionary and activists, 59 Party (PRI) socialization of, 149, 305 People’s Action Party (PAP), utility functions of, 129–30 Singapore, 16 party financing. See campaign finance People’s Front Party (FEP), Mexico, 84 party identification. See voters People’s Progressive Party (PPP), party leaders, 141. See also party elites Gambia, 16 Party Nationalization Score, 192 People’s Revolutionary Movement party platforms, 144 (MRP), Mexico, 152 party-owned businesses, 40, 264, 271, PFCRN. See National Reconstruction 309 Cardenist Front Party PAS. See Islamic Party of Malaysia Pierce, Roy, 287 Pasquino, Gianfranco, 292 Pignatelli, Andrea, 290 patronage. See also dominant party Plaza de Tlatelolco, 83 resource advantages; individual PMT. See Mexican Workers Party party names PNR. See National Revolutionary definition of, 40 Party, Mexico effects, compared to electoral fraud, POCM. See Mexican Worker-Peasant 58 Party in Italy, 288–94 Poire,´ Alejandro, 176, 233 in Japan, 281–83 polarized pluralism, 23, 286 in Malaysia, 271–74 political economy of single-party marginal effects of by SES, 50 dominance, 6, 34, 212, 297, in Mexico, 75–107 passim, 111, 307 114, 173, 211–15, 245, 249 political recruitment. See party elites modeling effects on party Pomper, Gerald, 124 competition, 47–59 Popular Defense Committee (CDP), modeling magnitude of, 64–66 Mexico, 106 modernization and, 50 Popular Front policy, 77 networks for distribution, 49, 283 Popular Socialist Party (PPS), Mexico, origin of, 40–41 82, 94, 152 in Taiwan, 263–66 Popular Union New Tenochitlan´ theoretical distribution of, 48 (UPNT), 190

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

Index 347

populism, Mexico, 74–79 Rahim, Lily, 122 conservative reaction to, 77–79 Ramanadham, V.V., 272 neopopulism, 84–91 Ramırez´ Saiz, Juan Manuel, 92 pork-barrel politics, 39 rational choice theory, 24–27 poverty-alleviation programs, Mexico, rebel’s dilemma, 12, 122 107 Reed, Steven, 284 PPS. See Popular Socialist Party rentier state, 307 PRD. See Party of the Democratic repression, 57–59, 120, 133–35, 148, Revolution 155–56. See also authoritarian Prescott, Edward, 25 tools Preston, Julia, 98, 99, 212, 235, 237 in dominant party authoritarian PRI, Mexico. See Institutional regimes, 44–45 Revolutionary Party (PRI), in Malaysia, 269, 272, 275 Mexico in Mexico, 4, 72, 75, 78, 81, 83, 92, priming of voters, 219, 235, 237 95–97, 231 privatization. See state-owned in Taiwan, 261 enterprises theoretical role of, 43 PRM. See Mexican Revolutionary resource advantages. See dominant Party party resource advantages; PRONASOL. See National Solidarity patronage Program resource theory of single-party PRT. See Revolutionary Workers Party dominance, 5–6, 34–59, 260 Prud’homme, Jean Francois, 183 adding authoritarian tools, Przeworski, Adam, 12–14, 16–18, 21, 57–59 22, 158, 259, 299, 308 comparative evidence for, 255–96 PS. See Socialist Party, Senegal formal model of, 47–59 PST. See Socialist Workers Party founder’s problem, 66–70 PT. See Workers Party generalizability of, 255 public bureaucracy, political control modeling patronage, 64–66 of, 290–91, 307, 309. See also political economy and, 6, 34, 212, public sector; state-owned 297, 307 enterprises probability-maximizing party utility in Japan, 282 functions, 51 in Malaysia, 272 resource-poor parties, 303–306 in Mexico, 85, 99–104, 213 retrospective voting. See also partisan in Taiwan, 264 cleavages; voters public sector. See also public in Japan, 278 bureaucracy; state-owned in Mexico, 8, 9, 19, 20, 71, 72, enterprises 94, 166, 173, 174, 210, 252, in Italy, 290 300 in Malaysia, 271 in Senegal, 20 in Mexico, 85, 92, 212 in Taiwan, 20, 263 Punto Crıtico,´ 190 in the United States, 19, 174 Putnam, Robert, 287, 288 theory of, 19–21, 175 PVEM. See Green Party, Mexico Reveles Vasquez,´ Francisco, 88 Revolutionary Leftist radical rightwing parties, Western Organization-Proletarian Line Europe, 122, 303 (OIR-LM), Mexico, 152

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

348 Index

Revolutionary National Civic Schlesinger, Jacob, 281, 282 Association (ACNR), Mexico, Schlesinger, Joseph, 11, 121, 124, 83, 190 304 revolutionary nationalism, Mexico, 73 Schmitt, Karl, 71, 80–82, 84, 85 Revolutionary Popular Union – Schmitter, Philippe, 11 Emiliano Zapata (UPREZ), Schofield, Norman, 15, 62, 276, 277, Mexico, 204 286 Revolutionary Teacher’s Movement Schumpeter, Joseph, 14, 307 (MRM), Mexico, 152 Scott, Robert, 4, 76, 299 Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT), secret budget, Mexico, 111 Mexico, 84, 86, 92, 93, 190 Secretary of the Interior, Mexico, 83, Reyes Heroles, Jesus,´ 86 86, 109 Reyna, Jose´ Luis, 4, 45, 72, 299 Secretary of the Treasury and Public Richardson, Bradley, 259, 276, 281, Credit (SHCP), Mexico, 100 282 Segreto, Luciano, 294 Rigger, Shelley, 38, 261, 263, 264, selection bias, 16 267, 268 Semo, Enrique, 81, 92 Riker, William, 7, 8, 34, 57, 62, 219, Sened, Itai, 24, 48 276, 277, 298 Senegal, 17, 37 Rimanelli, Marco, 286 Shadlen, Kenneth, 89 Rivera Rıos,´ Miguel Angel, 82 Shalev, Michael, 276 Rocha Menocal, Alina, 107 SHCP. See Secretary of the Treasury Rodrıguez´ Araujo, Octavio, 13, 71, 86 and Public Credit Roeder, Philip, 18 Shefter, Martin, 11, 99, 122, 158, Roemer, Andres,´ 99, 100 285 Roessler, Phillip, 7, 62, 308 Shepsle, Kenneth, 25 Rogozinski, Jacques, 106 Shirk, David, 9, 78, 79, 87, 88, 165, Rohde, David, 11, 121 166, 220, 230–32, 237, 239, Rokkan, Stein, 18 242 Romer, Tom, 50 Shugart, Mathew, 23, 61, 266 Roniger, Luis, 50, 158 Shvetsova, Olga, 25 Ross, Michael, 307, 308 Singapore, 16, 22, 122 Singh, Hari, 38, 270 Saldierna, Georgina, 124 single-party dominance. See dominant Salinas de Gortari, Carlos, 7, 93–95, parties; dominant party systems 103, 105, 106, 156, 166, 203, Sirvent, Carlos, 13, 71, 86 212, 230, 235 Skocpol, Theda, 255 Samuels, David, 302 Slivinski, Al, 25, 130 Sanchez,´ Marco Aurelio, 9, 190 Smith, Benjamin, 22 Sanderson, Steven, 101 Smith, Peter H., 72, 99, 299 Sartori, Giovanni, 10, 15, 16, 19, 23, Snyder, James, 178 42, 259, 260, 285–87 Snyder, Richard, 101 Saucedo, Francisco, 190 social choice, 306 Schattschneider, E.E., 124 social cleavages theory, 18–19, 71, 72 Schedler, Andreas, 14, 45, 108 social movements, 92, 124. See also Scheiner, Ethan, 61, 276–78, 281–85, independent left; student 295, 298 protest

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

Index 349

Socialist Alliance Party (PAS), Mexico, Taiwan under the KMT, 16, 38, 122, 221 255, 257, 258, 261–68, 295, Socialist Party (PS), Senegal, 17, 37 296, 300, 308 Socialist Workers Party (PST), as dominant party authoritarian Mexico, 151 regime (DPAR), 261 sociological theory of party as fully closed authoritarian regime, competition. See social 261 cleavages theory tangentopoli, Italy, 292 Soka Gakkai, 279 Tanzania, 13 Solid South, 17 Tarrow, Sidney, 10, 124, 276, 277, Solinger, Dorothy, 45, 122, 285, 287–89 264 Teh, Yik Koon, 274 Somers, Margaret, 255 TELMEX, 101 Soong, James, 267, 268, 275 TEPJF. See Federal Electoral Tribunal sottogoverno, 289 Territorial Movement (MT), Mexico, Spotts, Frederic, 285, 286, 288, 106 290–92 third parties, United States, 41, 303 Squire, Lyn, 22 Thornton, Laura, 266 state, economic role of, 149, 307. See threshold of representation, 24 also public bureaucracy; public Tien, Hung-mao, 262–64, 267 sector; state-owned enterprises Tomz, Michael, 220, 247 state-owned enterprises, 6, 33, 40, transitions to democracy 295, 307, 309 via elections, 2, 11, 301, 308 in Italy, 289–90, 293, 294 from fully closed authoritarian in Malaysia, 272 regimes, 253 in Mexico, 8, 98, 100, 105, 109, Trejo Delabre, Raul,´ 110 149, 182 Trejo, Guillermo, 107 compared to other countries, Trinidad and Tobago, 256 104 Trisecta, 190 privatization of, 94, 106, 166, Tsebelis, George, 228 173 Tucker, Robert, 10, 44, 45 as proxy for resource advantages, Tullock, Gordon, 122, 304 160, 185 Tunisia, 13 relationship between PRI and, turnover, 41, 98 101 size of, 85, 100–107, 111, 212 UMNO. See United Malays National types of, 101 Organization in Taiwan, 265 uncommon democracies. See Stokes, Susan, 22, 48, 302, 308 dominant party democratic STPRM, 214 regimes (DPDRs) strategic voting. See voters Unified Coordinating Committee of student protest, 83, 85, 89. See also Earthquake Victims (CUD), repression 199 Sumlinski, Mariusz, 272 Union for National Order (UNS), Superbarrio Gomez,´ 199 Mexico, 78 Union of Mexican Petroleum Workers Taagapera, Rein, 18, 23 (STPRM), 113

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-87719-0 - Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective Kenneth F. Greene Index More information

350 Index

United Malays National Organization party identification. See PAN, (UMNO), 16, 37, 38, 50, 268, PRI, PRD 270, 296, 300, 307. See also priorities of, 238 dominant party systems; projection, 243–44 dominant party authoritarian regime opposition voters, 217, regimes (DPARs) 219, 222, 237 as catchall party, 269 rigid opposition voters, 217, 219, repression and, 275 223 resource advantages voting behavior in 2000, 244–54, control over public bureaucracy, 267 272 retrospective voting. See decline of, 274 retrospective voting origins of, 271–73 strategic voting, 240, 245, 249, types of, 271–74 252, 267 United States, 41 UNS. See Union for National Order, Walesa, Lech, 236 Mexico Ware, Alan, 16, 276 UNT. See National Workers’ Union, Warner, Carolyn, 285, 286, 290 Mexico Way, Lucan, 6, 11, 12, 14, 15 Weiner, Robert, 15, 61 Valenzuela, Arturo, 61, 219 Weinert, Richard, 4, 45, 72, 299 Vallejo, Demetrio, 84 Weldon, Jeffrey, 106, 302 Van Biezen, Ingrid, 193 White, James, 279 Van de Walle, Nicolas, 7, 14, 15, 17, Wieser, Theodor, 285, 286, 288, 62 290–92 Vannucci, Alberto, 285, 291, 294, 295 Wilson, James Q., 123, 125, 192 Vatican II Council, 88 Wittenberg, Jason, 220, 247 Velazquez,´ Fidel, 77 Wittman, Donald, 50, 56 Venezuela, 104 Woodall, Brian, 281, 282 Verba, Sidney, 16 Workers Party (PT), Mexico, 106, Visscher, Michael, 25 221 vote buying, 40, 75. See also Wright, Stephen, 24, 48 patronage voter dissatisfaction. See retrospective Xu, Dianqing, 264 voting voters. See also partisan cleavages; Yu, Ching-shin, 264 retrospective voting dealignment of, 19, 21, 173 Zambia, 13 in Mexico Zarembo, Alan, 83 campaign effects, 233, 245, 246, Zedillo, Ernesto, 98, 107, 236, 252 248 Zermeno,˜ Sergio, 89 centrism of, 176 Zimbabwe, 17 economic policy opposition Zimbabwe Africa People’s Union voters, 217, 219, 223, 251 (ZAPU), 17 independents, 196, 208, 216, Zimbabwe African National Union 219, 231, 233, 242 (ZANU), 17 issue voting, 177, 244–46, Zolberg, Aristide, 45 249–50 Zuckerman, Alan, 285, 286, 289–91

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org