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“The Best School” RIGHTS Student Violence, Impunity, and the Crisis in Côte D’Ivoire WATCH

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“The Best School” RIGHTS Student Violence, Impunity, and the Crisis in Côte D’Ivoire WATCH Côte d’Ivoire HUMAN “The Best School” RIGHTS Student Violence, Impunity, and the Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire WATCH “The Best School” Student Violence, Impunity, and the Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire Copyright © 2008 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-312-9 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org May 2008 1-56432-312-9 “The Best School” Student Violence, Impunity, and the Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire Map of Côte d’Ivoire ...........................................................................................................2 Glossary of Acronyms......................................................................................................... 3 Summary ...........................................................................................................................6 Recommendations............................................................................................................ 10 To the Presidency ..........................................................................................................10 To the Ministry of Justice................................................................................................10 To the Ministry of Interior...............................................................................................10 To the Ministry of Higher Education ...............................................................................10 To all Political Parties .................................................................................................... 11 To the National Bureau of FESCI..................................................................................... 11 To Local Human Rights and other Civil Society Organizations ........................................12 To the United States, France, the European Union, and other International Donors........12 Methodology.....................................................................................................................13 General Background on the Military-Political Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire ...................................15 Battle for Succession.....................................................................................................16 The 1999 Coup and 2000 Elections ...............................................................................17 The 2002 War ................................................................................................................18 Peace Agreements.........................................................................................................19 The Human Rights Fallout from the Crisis...................................................................... 20 Student Activism in the 1990s; from Clandestinity to Political Schism ..............................22 A Tumultuous Birth....................................................................................................... 22 FESCI is Driven Underground ........................................................................................ 23 Continued Clashes in the mid-1990s ............................................................................ 24 Internal Schism in the Late 1990s..................................................................................25 The Crisis Erupts, the University Shaken, 1999-2002 .................................................... 26 FESCI and the Rise of Pro-Government Youth Groups and Militias ......................................31 FESCI’s Structure and Organizational Culture ................................................................... 34 Why Students Join FESCI Today......................................................................................37 FESCI Activities and Violence Perpetrated Since 2002....................................................... 39 Activities and Violence on Campus............................................................................... 39 Murder, Assault, and Torture of Fellow Students..................................................... 39 Sexual Threats and Violence................................................................................... 46 Intimidation and Attacks on Professors and Teachers............................................. 48 Effect on Freedoms of Speech and Association....................................................... 50 Criminal Control by FESCI of Key University Facilities and Services...........................52 Activities and Violence off Campus............................................................................... 59 Blocking the Peace Process through Violence and Intimidation .............................. 60 Attacks on Members of the Political Opposition...................................................... 64 March 2004 Attack on the Judiciary ........................................................................ 66 Intimidation of and Attacks against the Press......................................................... 69 Attacks on Human Rights NGOs...............................................................................71 Student Groups in Rebel-controlled Bouaké ..................................................................... 75 Efforts to Curtail University Violence................................................................................. 78 Impunity and the Need for Justice ..................................................................................... 81 Direct and Indirect Support by Government ...................................................................81 A State within a State ................................................................................................... 82 Why Little is Done to Hold FESCI Members Accountable................................................ 84 FESCI Crimes are Well-Known to Both the Government and the Public .......................... 87 Relations with the Police .............................................................................................. 88 Legal Responsibility of the Government ........................................................................... 91 “Generation FESCI”: Implications for the Future................................................................ 93 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................96 Acknowledgements..........................................................................................................98 “FESCI is the best school for leaders there is. You come out battle hardened and ready to do politics. Ours is a generation that had to come to power one day, so if you see members of FESCI rising up, our view is that it was inevitable and came later than it should have. The arrival of this class will change politics.” —Former leader of the Student Federation of Côte d’Ivoire, interviewed by Human Rights Watch, October 2007 1 Human Rights Watch May 2008 Map of Côte d’Ivoire Courtesy of The General Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin. “The Best School” 2 Glossary of Acronyms AGEECI Association Générale des Élèves et Étudiants de Côte d’Ivoire (General Student Association of Côte d’Ivoire). APDH Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme (Actions for the Protection of Human Rights). CECOS Centre de Commandement des Opérations de Sécurité (Security Operations Command Center), an elite rapid-reaction force charged with fighting crime in Abidjan whose members are drawn from the army, the gendarmerie, and the police. COJEP Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes Patriotes (Panafrican Congress of Young Patriots), commonly known as the Jeunes Patriotes (Young Patriots). CROU Centre Régional des Œuvres Universitaires (University Accommodations Center). FANCI Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire). FDS Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (Defense and Security Forces), a term used to refer collectively to the army (FANCI), the gendarmerie, and the police. FESCI Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire (Student Federation of Côte d’Ivoire). FN Forces Nouvelles (New Forces), alliance of three different armed movements that initiated the rebellion in the north of Côte d’Ivoire in 2002. 3 Human Rights Watch May 2008 FPI Front Populaire Ivoirien (Popular Ivorian Front), the ruling party of President Laurent Gbagbo. JFPI Jeunesse du FPI (Youth wing of the FPI party). JRDR Jeunesse du RDR (Youth wing of the RDR party). LIDHO Ligue Ivoirienne des Droits de l’Homme (Ivorian League for Human Rights). MIDH Movement Ivoirien des Droits de l’Homme (Ivorian Movement for Human Rights). MJP Movement pour la Justice et la Paix (Movement for Justice
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