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The Great Deposit Insurance Debate

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The Great Deposit Insurance Debate Mark D. Flood Mark D. Flood is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. James P. Kelley provided research assistance. The author would like to thank Bob Eisenbeis, Mark Flannery, Carter Golembe, and George Kaufman for many helpful com- ments. All remaining errors are the author’s. The Great Deposit Insurance Debate In the stress of the recent banking crisis ... there was a very definite appeal from bankers for the United States Government itself to insure all bank deposits so that no depositor anywhere in the country need have any fear as to the loss of his account. Such a guarantee as that would indeed have put a premium on bad banking. Such a guarantee as that would have made the Government pay substantially all losses which had been accumulated, whether by misfortune, by unwise judgment, or by sheer recklessness, and it might well have brought an intolerable burden upon the Federal Treasury. —Sen. Robert Bulkley (n-OH), Address to the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, May 4, 1933.’ The only danger is that having learned the lesson, we may forget it. Human nature is such a funny thing. We learn something today, it is impressed upon us, and in a few short years we seem to forget all about it and go along and make the same misiakes over again. —Francis M. La~•v(1934), p. 41. p A. HE ONGOING PROLIFERATION of bank and ance Corporation (FSLIC) was so deeply overex- thrift failures is the foremost current issue for tended—on the order of $200 billion—that only financial regulators. Failures of federally insured the U. S. Treasury could fund its shortfall. The banks and thrifts numbered in the thousands significance of insurance is seen elsewhere as during the 1980s. The problem is especially im- well: economists are quick to point to flat-rate portant for public policy, because of the poten- deposit insurance as a factor in causing the high tial liability of the federal taxpayer. For example, failure rates. Flat-rate deposit insurance is said by 1989, the Federal Savings and Loan Insur- to create a moral hazard: if no one charges ‘Quoted by Sen. Murphy (D.IA) in Congressional Record (1933), p. 3008. 52 bankers a higher rate for assuming risk, then capital requirements for new national banks, bankers will exploit the risk-return trade-off to among numerous lesser provisions. It also estab- invest in a riskier portfolio. lished a temporary deposit insurance plan lasting from January 1 to July 1, 1934, and a perma- Why, then, do we have taxpayer-backed, flat- nent plan that was to have started on July 1, rate deposit insurance?’ A simple answer would 1934.’ Although this paper focuses on deposit be that the legislators who adopted federal de. insurance, it is important to bear in mind that posit insurance in 1933 did not understand the both the deposit insurance provisions of the bill economic incentives involved. This simple answer and the debate that surrounded them each had seems wrong, however, it has been pointed out a larger context. The various provisions of the that certain observers articulated the problems Banking Act of 1933 constituted an interdepen- with deposit insurance quite clearly in 1933. In dent package. this view, the fault lies with the policymakers of 1933, who failed to heed those warnings. The deposit guaranty provisions of the bill were initially opposed by President Roosevelt, This fails to answer why policymakers would Carter Glass (Senate sponsor of the bill and Con- ignore these arguments. Moreover, it does not gress’s elder statesman on banking issues), Trea- explain why it should have taken almost 50 sury Secretary Woodin, the American Bankers years for the flaws in deposit insurance to take Association (ABA), and the Association of Re- effect. This paper examines the deposit insur- serve City Bankers, among others.~Despite this ance debate of 1933, first to see precisely what opposition, on June 13, 1933, the bill passed the issues and arguments were at the time and, virtually unanimously in the Senate, with six secondarily, to see how those issues were treat- dissents in the Rouse, and was signed into law ed in the legislation. Briefly, I conclude that the by the President on June 16.’ Not surprisingly legislators of 1933 both understood the difficul- then, the public debate preceding and surround- ties with deposit insurance and incorpot-ated in ing the adoption of federal deposit insurance the legislation numerous provisions designed to was active and far-reaching. mitigate those problems. This paper is organized around the major The Banking Act of 1933 separated commercial themes of the debate: the actuarial questions and investment banking, limited bank securities concerning the effects of deposit insurance, the activities, expanded the branching privileges of philosophical and practical questions of fairness Federal Reserve member banks, authorized fed- to depositors and of depositor protection as an eral regulators to remove the officers and direc- expedient means to financial stability, and the tors of member banks, regulated the payment political and legal questions surrounding bank of interest on deposits, arid increased minimum chartering and supervision. Much of the debate 2 5 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has re- The Senate did not record a vote, although even Sen. cently announced a move toward risk-adjustment of its in- Huey Long (D-LA), who had been a flamboyant detractor, surance premia. rose to speak in favor of the bill. Cummings (1933) claims 3 that the Senate vote was unanimous. The House dis- The Act is often called the Glass-Steagall Act. It is senters included Reps. McFadden (R-PA), McGugin (R- referred to here as the Banking Act of 1933 to avoid con- fusion with the separate Glass-Steagall Act of 1932. Sig- KS), Beck (R-PA) and Kvale (Farmer/Labor-MN). See nificantly, it also has the longer official title: “An Act to “Congress Passes and President Roosevelt Signs Glass- provide for the safer and more effective use of the assets Steagall Bank Bill as Agreed on in Conference” (1933), p. of banks, to regulate interbank control, to prevent the un- 4192. Rep. McGugin’s request for a division revealed 191 due diversion of funds into speculative operations, and for ayes and 6 noes; a quorum of 237 was reported present; Congressional Record (1933), p. 5898. other purposes.” The temporary plan was later extended, and the perma- nent plan delayed, for one year (to July 1, 1935) by the Act of June 16, 1934. The Banking Act of 1935 substantial- ly emended the permanent plan to resemble closely the temporary plan. See the shaded insert on page 72 for fur- ther details of the various plans. 4 The Federal Reserve did not adopt an official position, although there is some evidence of opposition: “Deposit guaranty by mutual insurance is not part of the Presiden- tial program, nor is it favored by Federal Reserve authori- ties,” “Permanent Bank Reform” (1933); see also Kennedy (1973), pp. 217-18. Comptroller O’Connor favored deposit insurance; tormer Comptroller Pole opposed it. 55 was motivated by economic and political self- October 29, 1929. The stock market crash was interest and was structured rhetorically in popularly recognized as the start of the Great terms of morality and justice. Considerable at- Depression. The remainder of the Hoover ad- tention is paid here to rhetorical detail.” As ministration’s tenure witnessed historic declines much as possible, I have attempted to report in national economic activity. By the beginning the debate in its own terms—liberal use is made of 1933, industrial production and nominal GNP of quotations and epigraphs—rather than risk had both been cut in half; unemployment had misconstruing the meaning through inaccurate topped 24 percent. Bank failure rates, which paraphrase. had already been high throughout the 1920s, had increased fourfold, while both money sup- ¶1 15 1 15 (21 2T fl r~tp .oj:.i flzt.~..r. ply and velocity had plummeted. The price level TO 2 fell accordingly. The banking debate in 1933 covered not only deposit insurance and the separation of com- For contemporary economic commentators, mercial and investment banking, but the full the stock market crash was more than a mar- catalogue of financial matters: the gold stan- ker between historical eras. For many, there dard, inflation, monetary policy and the contrac- was a causal relationship between the stock tion of bank credit, interstate branching, the market’s collapse and subsequent real economic relative merits of federal and state charters, activity. in most cases, this causality was more holding company regulation, etc. By 1933, nearly elaborate than post hoc ergo propter hoc. A pre- anything to do with banks or banking was an scient Paul Warburg, for example, warned in important political issue. March 1929: T’h.r.~Grs~~.a.t(]o.n.t;rar.I~1ic’n If orgies of unrestrained speculation are per- mitted to spread too far, however, the ultimate The people know that the Federal Reserve octopus collapse is certain not only to affect the specu- /oaned .. to the gamblers of this Nation in 1928 lators themselves, but also to bring about a gen- some sisty billion dollars of credit money—bank eral depression involving the entire country.’ money—hot air ... and then when the crisis came in the last 3 months of 1929, cut that credit The logic was that stock market speculation “ab- money—bank money—hot air—down to thirteen sorbs so much of the nation’s credit supply that billion. it threatens to cripple the country’s regular bus- No nation, no industry, can survive such an iness.”9 A more radical theory was advanced by espansion and contraction of money and credit.
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