Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input

Change of regulatory framework to temporary, rural‐urban migration in :

A case study of System in China

Prof. & Dr. Zhang Jijiao Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Chair, Commission on Enterprise Anthropology, IUAES

Background

In most developing nations, economic development has promoted massive and uncontrolled migration from the countryside into urban areas (Kasarda and Crenshaw 1991). Rural‐urban migration is a pervasive feature in the developing countries. In general, urban areas are centers of development. Incomes tend to be higher and economic opportunities greater. Driven by real or perceived differentials in economic opportunities (Lee 1966; Todero 1976), the needs of families to diversify risk in the absence of formal insurance mechanisms (Portes and Böröcz 1989), and social network connections with others who have preceded them (Massey et al. 1993), peasants flock to the cities in search of better lives. Rural‐urban migration is thus an important channel of social mobility.

China's Hukou1 (household) registration system, set up in 1958, divides the population into rural households and non‐rural households, and individual interests and rights, such as education, healthcare, housing and employment, are linked to the household registration. Under the system, rural citizens have no access to social welfare in cities, even though they may live and work there.

The hukou system has had its intended effect, severely restricting rural‐to‐urban migration

(Johnson 1994; Yang 1993). The central mechanism regulating population flows was Hukou system, which, until the onset of the reforms in 1978, effectively tied Chinese citizens to their place of residence.

The time for fundamental reform of the registration system seems to have arrived.

1 "Hukou" has been adopted by English-language audiences to refer to both the huji system and an individual's hukou. 1

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input

1. What is the household registration

A Hukou or huji refers to the system of residency permits which dates back to ancient China, where household registration is required by law in mainland China and . A hukou can also refer to a family register in many contexts since the household registration record is issued per family, and usually includes the personel information of all members in the family. In China, family registers were in existence as early as the Xia Dynasty (BC. 2100 ‐ 1600). In the centuries which followed, the family register developed into an organization of families and clans for purposes of taxation, conscription and social control.

A similar household registration system exists within the public administration structures of Japan

(), , and (). In the Hoju system was abolished on 1

January 2008.

A householder has two pages: One page (the first page) for the whole family in the booklet.

Another page (the second page) is his/her personel information. Every other family member has one page to record his/her personel information. A household registration record officially identifies a person as a resident of an area and includes identifying information such as: (1)name, (2)relation with householder, (3)former name,(4)gender, (5) ethnic group, (6) birth date, (7) birth place, (8) native place, (9) blood, (10) ID Number, (12) marriage, (13) education, (14) occupation, (15) working institution, (16)religion,(17) stature, (18) military service, (19,20) when & where move from and move to. In the booklet, there some pages for recording changes and correction. Every family member has another page for change record and error correction.

The ‘place of birth’ and ‘permanent residence’ items in the household booklet may seem fairly innocent, but in fact they were the cornerstones of rural‐urban migration control. All people were assigned a registration status as either ‘agricultural’ or ‘urban’. Newly‐born babies were registered at the place of permanent residence of the mother, even if they were actually born at a different location. This meant that the ‘agricultural’ or ‘urban’ status of individuals was inherited through the mother. The rationale for passing the rural/urban status along maternal lines was that men generally tend to be more mobile than women; inheritance of status from the father would therefore add more children to the urban population.

Through , the system can help uphold citizens' civil rights and can also provide basic information when the government is drawing up national economic and 2

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input social‐development plans and arranging the rational distribution of the workforce. The household‐registration system is an important part of ‐‐ as well the basis of ‐‐ the State administration.

For public security departments, such a system plays a major function in safeguarding public security and fighting against crime.

2. Hukou System before economic reform (1958‐ 1978)

In 1958, the Chinese government began using the family register system ‘PRC Regulations on household registration’of 1958 (Regulations, 1958) to control the movement of people between urban and rural areas. Individuals were broadly categorised as a "rural (agricultural )" or "urban

(non‐agricultural )". It supported by the employment, rationing, and housing systems, these regulations effectively constrained rural‐urban migration until the early 1980s.

The first of these was central control over employment. After the introduction of communes in the countryside, work (and income) was allocated by the production team (or sometimes the brigade) to its members, thereby effectively tying the peasants to their home villages. With its commitment to full employment, the socialist state controlled all urban employment.

A second factor related to the enforcement of the registration rules was the supply of daily commodities, especially staple foods. Over the course of the 1950s, the state monopolized the distribution of virtually all goods, and most free markets disappeared. The peasants grew their own food, of course, but state procurement left them with little more than a bare minimum, and that again was allocated on the basis of team membership. The food products procured from the peasants served to feed the urban population. The state supplied the cities with grain and other foodstuffs at low prices.

At that time, Hukou was extremely important. People were required to stay at the small area they were born (where the Hukou is), and stay there until they die. They cannot move around. They can travel, but there was no access to job, public services, education, or even food in other places. It is just like visiting other places with a B‐1 (business) type of American visa ‐ you can visit, but cannot work there (it is illegal), cannot go to school (not accepted), cannot go to hospital (without a hukou, you are not treated). For food, in those old days, you cannot buy food no matter how much money you have. You need to use grain coupon (“Liangpiao”, The currency for food) with money together to get food. 3

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input

So basically, at that time, without Hukou, people cannot move. There were very few people move around in the country, but their status was practically the same as illegal immigrants in U.S.

Two other factors that contributed to the effective enforcement of the registration regulations were the severe shortage in and public allocation of urban housing, and a climate of strict social and political control.

Under the system, rural citizens have little access to social welfare in cities and are restricted from receiving public services such as education, medical care, housing and employment, regardless of how long they may have lived or worked in the city.

To move Hukou from one place to other is very hard ‐ just as hard as getting for U.S. It is even harder to move from rural area to city. To move from rural to rural was easier, but to move from rural to city was very hard.It took many years. Only in very few situations it had happened.

The household registration system did not only preclude official migration from the countryside to urban areas. For all practical purposes, the entire country was divided into a hierarchy of places:

The resettlement of people, be they cadres, workers, military personnel, family members, or

some other category, is permitted if they have certification of movement. This certification is the

only acceptable criterion to be used in determining the permissibility of the following types of

movement (migration): in cases involving persons moving from the countryside to the city, from

town to city, from small city to large city, or from normal‐sized city to one of the three centrally

administered cities of Shanghai, Beijing, or Tianjin. As well as this, it also covers those who wish

to move from rural regions to the city outskirts, or to the outskirts of a town located in a rural

region, or near state farms, vegetable teams, or economic crop regions. In dealing with such

people there is but one rule, and that is that procedures for resettlement must be based on the

certification of migration. (Zhang 1988: 78)

Thus, only moves between communities of the same rank or to communities of a lower rank were permitted without going through special procedures.

Migrant workers would require six passes to work in provinces other than their own. People who worked outside their authorized domain or geographical area would not qualify for grain rations, employer‐provided housing, or health care (David Pines et al 1998). There were controls over education, employment, marriage and so on. 4

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input

The registration system must be viewed as playing three interrelated roles: it is an instrument of development policy, aimed at keeping urban populations small while fostering industrial development; a social institution which rigidly divides Chinese society into a rural and an urban segment; and an instrument of state control, which the state employs to cultivate client groups.

Table 1. Non ‐agricultural population 1949‐1990 (1000s)

Year Total NAP Percent Year Total NAP Percent

population NAP population NAP

1949 541,670 94,410 17.43 1970 829,920 126,600 15.25

1950 551,960 91,370 16.55 1971 852,990 133,500 15.65

1951 563,000 86,740 15.41 1972 871,770 136,320 15.64

1952 574,820 82,9 10 14.42 1973 892,110 139,920 15.68

1953 587,960 87,290 14.85 1974 908,590 140,790 15.50

1954 602,660 92,290 15.31 1975 924,200 142,780 15.45

1955 614,650 93,350 15.19 1976 937,170 145,170 15.49

1956 628,280 100,020 15.92 1977 949,740 146,740 15.45

1957 646,530 106,180 16.42 1978 962,590 152,300 15.82

1958 659,940 122,100 18.50 1979 975,420 161,860 16.59

1959 672,070 135,670 20.19 1980 987,050 168,000 17.02

1960 662,070 137,310 20.74 1981 1,000,720 174,130 17.40

1961 658,590 124,150 18.85 1982 1,015,410 179,100 17.64

1962 672,950 112,710 16.75 1983 1,024,950 183,780 17.93

1963 691,720 115,840 16.75 1984 1,034,750 196,860 19.02

1964 704,990 116,770 16.56 1985 1,045,320 210,540 20.14

1965 725,380 121,220 16.71 1986 1,057,210 209,030 19.77

1966 745,420 123,400 16.55 1987 1,080,730 215,920 19.98

1967 763,680 126,370 16.55 1988 1,089,780 225,5 10 20.69

1968 785,340 125,540 15.99 1989 1,106,760 233,710 21.12

1969 806,710 124,030 15.37 1990 1,133,680 222,740 19.65 Source: Population Almanac 1991: 79, 95, 96.

Hukou System became the main management method for rural‐urban migration in China since

1958. After decades of development, the two‐tier system now fails to reflect the real process of urbanization in the country and is throttling the healthy development and rational flow of China's labour market. The household registration system, or hukou, has become an obstacle to the development of market economy.

With its large rural population of poor farm workers, hukou limited mass migration from the land to the cities to ensure some structural stability. The hukou system was an instrument of the 5

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input planned/command economy. By regulating labour, it ensured an adequate supply of low cost workers to the plethora of state owned businesses. For some time, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security continued to justify these hukou system on public order grounds, and also provided demographic data for government central planning ( Aprodicio A. Laquian 2005).

From around 1953 to 1976, would periodically round up those who without valid residence permit, place them in detention centres and expel them from cities (Jeremy Waddington 1999).

China's household registration system is the central element in a policy of rapid industrialization with low urbanization. Administration regulations issued in 1982 known as "custody and repatriation" authorized police to detain people, and "repatriate" them to their permanent residency location.

The hukou regulations institutionally divided China into two systems, with an “invisible wall” between the urban and rural sectors (Chan 1994). Social welfare benefits, including food rations in the not‐so‐distant past and even now access to subsidized housing, education, medical care, retirement benefits, and the right to employment in all but menial jobs, are available mainly to those with local urban hukou. Thus, an urban hukou confers great advantages in life chances and the hukou system created two classes of citizens differing sharply in living standards and income (Chan 1994;

Knight and Song 1999). These disparities cannot be attributed to the difference between the agricultural and non‐agricultural sectors. Even within the non‐agricultural sector, returns to human capital are much lower in rural than in urban China. The institutional boundary between rural and urban China created by the household registration system seems to prevail over other institutional distinctions in the Chinese social stratification system.

Before economic reform in the early 1980s, China's urban dwellers enjoyed a range of social, economic and cultural benefits, while China's 800 million rural residents were treated as second‐class citizens.

For stratification and mobility studies, the very fact that urban hukou status is so difficult to achieve for those of rural origin, and is so selective of the best and the brightest of the rural population, provides a possible explanation for the weak association between parents’ and children’s occupational status in urban areas. A high rate of inter‐generational mobility and a weak zero‐order association between parent’s and offspring’s occupational status found in early studies of social mobility and status attainment in urban China (Bian 1994; Blau and Ruan 1990; Parish 1984; Whyte and Parish 1984) led some scholars to claim that China was an exceptionally “open” society in which 6

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input state egalitarian policies effectively eliminated inherited class privileges. An important message from our analysis of hukou mobility is that status attainment and social mobility research based on urban samples (or rural samples, although this is uncommon) makes little sense, since it is likely to be subject to severe selection bias (Winship and Mare 1992). The urban population includes both those who were born into urban families (or whose villages were incorporated into towns and cities) and those from peasant origins who acquired urban status through their own efforts and hence achieved extremely high‐status urban occupations. The extreme upward mobility of the latter group clearly has the effect of reducing the inter‐generational occupational status correlation.

The effectiveness of the hukou system in restricting internal migration relied on two other administrative systems, through which rationing was carried out. On the rural side, the commune system enabled local governments to bind peasants to the land. All adults had to participate in agricultural production to receive food rations for their households (Parish and Whyte 1978) and migration was generally prohibited except with the permission of the local government. On the urban side, the principal administrative units for most urban residents were the workplace organizations (danwei), which administered most social services for their employees (Bian 1994;

Naughton 1997; Walder 1986, 1992). Without a work unit, it was very difficult to survive in a city because housing, food, and other social services were unavailable through the market. Moreover, because employment quotas in all urban work units were tightly controlled by the government labor administration (Walder 1986), even rural residents willing to risk losing food rations by leaving their home villages would have little chance of getting a job in a city. This tight administrative control on both sides virtually eliminated unauthorized rural‐to‐urban migration in the pre‐reform era.

3. Hukou system after China’s reform (since 1978)

There can be no doubt that population mobility in China has increased tremendously since the

Third Plenary Session of the Central Committee in late 1978 signalled the beginning of the reforms.

After Chinese market reforms, it became possible for some to unofficially migrate and get a job without a valid permit. In practice, Hukou was not enforced as strong as before. The starting point was that grain coupon (Liangpiao) was not required to buy food. This made it possible for many migrant workers to leave their land and go to cities to seek for labor‐intensive work. Typical works were workers in texile factory, consitruction workers, and nannies. 7

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input

Economic reforms also created pressures to encourage migration from the inland areas to the coast areas. It also provided incentives for officials not to enforce regulations on migration. Economic reform during the three decades relaxed this administrative control. The abolition of the commune system, starting in 1978, freed peasants to seek work in the industrial and service sectors. At the same time, both push and pull factors increased the propensity to migrate from the countryside into the cities. First, the introduction of the “family responsibility system,” which made individual families responsible for particular plots and allowed producers to sell on the open market any surplus remaining after paying the grain tax, greatly improved the efficiency of agricultural production, thus creating a large worker surplus in rural areas. Since the late 1980s, the rush of millions of peasants from other provinces to Guangdong after the Chinese New Year Festival, creating massive traffic congestion and turning open spaces in Canton into large squatter and slum areas almost overnight, has become something of a seasonal feature of national life. Second, erosion of the rigid danwei‐based rationing system in urban areas created social space for rural migrants (Liang and

White 1997:322). To enhance the development of the service sector in cities, the government allowed peasants to enter cities and establish small urban businesses such as shoe‐repair shops, barbershops, and restaurants. Further, millions of young peasants were hired in the growing market sector outside the redistributive system. Even some state‐owned work units preferred to hire rural peasants because they had no obligation to provide housing and other social benefits for peasant‐workers or because the jobs were unattractive to urban workers.

It should be stressed, however, that the largest part of this increased mobility is due to

‘temporary migration’, i.e. migration without transfer of hukou. Permanent or official migration has not shown any revolutionary changes. In the censuses of 1982 and 1990, people were enumerated as permanent residents of the place they were staying when the census was taken if they had their hukou in that place, or if they had been away from their place of registration for over one year. In

1982, this second group, which can be regarded as long‐term unofficial migrants, comprised 66 million people or 0.65 per cent of the total population; in 1990 their number had grown to about 200 million (1.8 per cent), indicating that in only eight years, long‐term migration without hukou transfer had more than tripled. No national figures are available for mobility in periods of less than one year, but this group is no doubt several times larger than the group of long‐term migrants.

Since the 1980s, an estimated 220 million Chinese live outside their officially‐registered areas, 8

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input with much less access to education and government services, and in several respects occupy a social and economic status similar to illegal immigrants. Since then, the nation has adopted many reforms on population migration, which enable rural residents to settle in towns more freely. The reforms also introduced an identity‐card system, speeded up the development of small cities and towns and perfected the rural household‐registration system.

Although geographic mobility and employment change have become relatively easier, the social concomitants of hukou status still persist. No matter how similar their jobs are to those held by urban workers, employees with rural hukou status are still classified as “peasant workers” (workers who come from rural areas) and thereby are not entitled to the many labor rights and benefits enjoyed by employees with urban hukou. As Chan (1994:135) asserts, “Chinese reform socialism has created, structurally, a sizable ‘second class’ of urban citizens without permanent urban household registration status. This informal segment of urban labor and population is an extension of the rural segment, which was largely bottled up in the countryside under Mao.” In the reform era the hukou system has remained largely in force and still greatly shapes socioeconomic status and life chances.

For example, the kids of " peasant workers" are not allowed to enter city schools with their parents, even now they have to live with their grandparents or uncles in order to go to their local hometown schools in rural areas. They are called home‐staying children by Chinese governments.

Chinese researchers reported that there are about 130 millions home‐staying children without parents year by year.

The policy requires migrants to get city with three things: temporary residence registration, employement permit, and family planning (Birth control). Hukou, a resident permit given by the government restricting people from changing their permanent place, has been causing migrants endless troubles. People had to apply for a temporary living permit issued by the local government to stay in the area. This controversial system stirred fierce debate again when Beijing published its new regulations on Aug. 21,2008 that stated migrants whose monthly income was lower than 1,600 yuan will not be issued a Living and Working Permit, which is for those with diplomas and or with specialized skills in necessary industries. The Beijing Living and Working Permit allowed bearers the same rights as Beijing residents. Those who cannot meet the new demands will only get Temporary

Dwelling Cards with restricted rights. The primary purpose of the living permit is population control.

The government is aiming to keep the population of Beijing under 16 million until 2010 in order to 9

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input achieve a gradual increase in population so as not to overload the city's already stretched resources.

Other major cities in China also impose strict living permit systems to control migrant living, working and welfare conditions. In Guangzhou, capital of south China's Guangdong Province, where there are no Living and Working Permits, all people who have migrated from other parts of the country hold the same Temporary Dwelling Card, no matter how long they've been living there or how much tax they pay to the city. A large number of migrants cannot enjoy the same rights as

Guangzhou citizens, even though they are leading luxurious lifestyles in the city.

4. Hukou system reform since the 1990s

There are a number of practical circumstances which have made the emergence of this temporary migrant population possible. With improved supplies and free markets, rationing has lost much of its former importance and most products can now be bought with money. Following good harvests and dietary changes, many provinces did away completely with grain coupons in the early

1990s. In order to boost employment, collective and private enterprises are not only allowed but are actively ericouraged. Peasants can go to cities to sell their surplus products, and after decades of socialist neglect, the service sector is expected to grow, both reducing unemployment and improving the quality of life. The reforms have led to an enormous construction boom, both in cities and in the countryside, and most of the physical labour is done by peasant workers. A number of branches of industry find it increasingly difficult to recruit urbanites for heavy or dirty work and have resorted to hiring peasants.

The system has undergone further relaxation since the mid 1990s. On the one hand, the first relaxation allowed rural residents to buy a temporary urban residency permits, meaning they could work legally; fees for these decreased gradually to a fairly affordable level. On the other hand, people from rural areas can buy urban residents’ registration in many township levels around China.

The discrimination against rural women has been alleviated from 1998, when hukou became inheritable through either the father’s or the mother’s line (Au Loong‐yu et al 2007).

5. Hukou system reform since enter WTO, 2001

Although the Hukou system in operation was widely regarded within the PRC as unfair and inhumane, Reforming the residency system has been a very controversial topic within the PRC. 10

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input

There has been recognition for some time that hukou is an impediment to economic development (Calum Macleod 2001). China's accession to the World Trade Organisation has forced it to embrace this reform to liberalise the movement of labour, speeding up its economic reform (Yao

Shunli 2000).

From 2001 onwards, hukou controls were weakened. In 2003, after the uproar surrounding the death of Sun Zhigang alarmed the authorities, the laws on Custody and Repatriation were repealed(Au Loong‐yu et al 2007); By 2004 the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture estimated that over

100 million people registered as "rural" were working in cities.

In 2006, six groups with members from 14 central departments, including the Ministries of

Education, Health, Labor and Social Security, were dispatched to 12 provinces to research how best to implement such a significant reform process. At the meantime, 12 provinces, including Hebei,

Liaoning, Shandong, Guangdong provinces, the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and Beijing,

Shanghai and Chongqing Municipalities, had launched pilot programs to experiment with a system that narrowed differentiation between rural and urban residents.

In some provinces, such as the economically well‐developed Jiangsu Province, governments allow migrants with stable jobs and fixed residences to register where they live and work rather than in their birthplaces, so that they can enjoy the urban welfare system. Gansu Province in western

China(underdeveloped area) also allows migrant rural workers who have lived in a stable city residence for three years to register as non‐rural citizens. However, the central government has not set a time frame for national reform.

It has been reported that Beijing is to remove the limitation stating that only people with a

Beijing hukou (residence permit) can buy cars. In future, non‐locals will also be able to purchase automobiles in Beijing. It should be good news for non‐locals who want to buy a car. Now they do not have to buy cars using the name of some other Beijing local or company.

Examples of lifting hukou limitations for the sake of market development were actually not rare in the recent past, for instance the lifting of restrictions on home buying when the housing market was depressed. It seems non‐locals will not have access to all the usual resources and services until they are abundant in the market. For example, migrant workers used to be required to use "employees cards" until the floating population was brought under greater control. Migrant workers construct and contribute to our city. The taxes they have paid go into the government's public finances. 11

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input

Therefore, the migrant workers should be treated fairly and equally with the locals.

The household registration system, though it played a positive role in the past, now to some extent stands in the way of the country's urbanization, which is essential to China's modernization. In the past 30 years, the evidence of China's economic success is clear for anybody to see, with a forest of construction cranes permeating almost every major city. This however, has only exacerbated the problem of urbanization, by drawing more and more rural dwellers off their farms and into the city in search of a better life. The subsequent expansion of the service industry in the cities, in line with the expanding middle class, has created a vacuum in the secondary sectors that rural laborers hope to fill.

In our 2007‐2008 survey, the total valid samples were 573 urban migrants. In general, 52.6% of them stayed in the four cities over 3 years. For example, Qingdao (81.2%), Shenzhen (79.4%), Huhhot

(34.9%), and Kunming (31.9%). General speaking, 26.5% of them gained urban Hukou in the four cities. Of which, Shenzhen (66.7%), Qingdao (15.2%), Kunming (12.8%), and Huhhot (6.8%). 58.6% of them only had temp registration Hukou. For example, Kunming (77.8%), Qingdao (70.7%), Huhhot

(65.0%), and Shenzhen (21.0%). Over 65 percent bring the whole family in the four cities.2 Our researhc showed that a growing number of migrants who relocate to find better jobs in cities tended to stay longer or even resettle with their entire families.

A survey showed, 92 per cent of the 11,168 respondents said that the system was in need of reform. More than 53 per cent said restrictive policies attached to the system, such as limits on access to education, healthcare, employment and social insurance should be eliminated. More than

38 per cent called for the system to be scrapped entirely.3

Since the adoption of the policy of reform and opening up, China has witnessed bursting migration of rural labor to urban areas in search of work opportunities. More than 220 million migrant rural workers have moved to cities in search of work.

Conclusion

As China is struggling with the social effects of a widening rural‐urban divide, there have been

2 The 2007-2008 survey in four selected cities ---- Shenzhen (South), Huhhot (North), Qingdao (East), and Kunming (West) in four different directions of China, which directed by Prof. Dr. Zhang Jijiao, Academy of Social Sciences, China. . 3 Source: A week-long poll conducted in March 2007 by website Sina.com and Social Survey Center of China Youth Daily. 12

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input growing calls to reform the hukou system, owing to the fact that millions of farmers have illegally started moving to towns and cities in order to find work. Hukou has played an important role as a basic data provider and for identification registration in certain historical periods, but it has become neither scientific nor rational given the irresistible trend of migration. China need to propose a way to deal with the inequalities across Chinese society and bridge the divide. Many scholars have suggested to eliminate the two‐tiered household registration system and to allow freer migration between the cities and the countryside.

The government will adjust its policies on the settlement of rural residents in cities based on legal and permanent residence, stable occupation or income. China’s government should gradually change the current system to a unified household registration system, which eliminates the rural and non‐rural division.

Reform of the Hukou system began in 1992, and to this day, has not reached a satisfactory conclusion, largely because it has many complicated policies attached to it, and any missteps in the reform could result in some social problems.

The hukou system may have served its time as an effective policy instrument, but it is far from dead. Reform of the hukou system will be continued. Future research on both spacial and social mobility in China would do well to attend to the hukou system as a central stratifying agent in contemporary Chinese society.

13

Conference Urban‐Rural Linkages and Migration September 17th 2009, Workshop Input

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