View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by YorkSpace SEMANTIC SCEPTICISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF MEANING ALEXANDRA OLIVIA SULTANESCU A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY YORK UNIVERSITY TORONTO, ONTARIO APRIL 2019 © ALEXANDRA OLIVIA SULTANESCU, 2019 ABSTRACT Nearly four decades ago, Saul Kripke articulated a semantic version of scepticism, according to which no finite goings-on, either mental or behavioural, can establish what someone means by an expression. The semantic sceptic reveals, among other things, the hopelessness of a deeply tempting—and widely made—assumption, to the effect that we must be able to articulate what it is for a subject to use expressions meaningfully by appealing exclusively to explanatory resources that do not presuppose meaningfulness. A radical reconceiving of our approach to meaning is required. According to a strain of thinking that is influential in contemporary philosophy, this reconceiving must amount to the denial that there is a general story to be told about what it is for expressions to be used meaningfully. If we accept that we cannot explain in more basic terms what it is for someone to mean something by an expression, we must also accept, the thought goes, that no general elucidation of meaning can be had. This dissertation seeks to contribute to the project of undermining this strain of thinking. It seeks to reveal that the dichotomy between reductionism and quietist non-reductionism about meaning is a false one. It does this in the first instance by examining, and ultimately rejecting, a range of views offered in response to the challenge: Kripke’s own sceptical solution, semantic Platonism as well as views articulated in opposition to it, and Hannah Ginsborg’s conception of meaning. Then, it proceeds to extract from the later writings of Donald Davidson a version of semantic non-reductionism that provides an answer to the challenge of the semantic sceptic. At the core of his view is the idea that we cannot shed light on what it is for expressions to be used meaningfully without shedding light on the special sort of active engagement characteristic of the simultaneous interaction of two subjects with each other and their shared world. Meaningfulness is grounded in such triangular transactions. ii This dissertation also illuminates the connections between the philosophical conceptions, or some aspects thereof, of two thinkers who have made an enormous contribution to the project, central to analytic philosophy, of making philosophical sense of meaning. Davidson seems never to have been genuinely gripped by Kripke’s challenge, and Kripke seems never to have engaged in any substantive way with Davidson’s views on triangulation. And yet, Kripke’s challenge about meaning and Davidson’s overall conception of meaning can each be seen as lending support to the other. Furthermore, what Davidson’s writings show is that endorsing semantic non-reductionism need not be the desperate move that Kripke takes it to be, for it does not force us to give up on the distinctively philosophical search for generality. iii DEDICATION For my parents iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Six years ago, Claudine Verheggen agreed to be my supervisor. I cannot imagine what sort of student of philosophy I would have been now if she had not. As this dissertation reveals, her writings and teachings have deeply influenced me, and I thank her for that. I am also immensely, unspeakably grateful for her unwavering commitment to my philosophical development, for her willingness to read and comment extensively on countless drafts of my work, for her rigorous and penetrating criticisms, which are always accompanied by suggestions of how I might make progress in light of them, and for everything else. A better supervisor and teacher is inconceivable. I am thankful to Henry Jackman and Kristin Andrews for serving on my dissertation committee, to William Child for serving as my external examiner, to Gabriela Alboiu for serving on the examining committee, and to Christopher Campbell for chairing it. I am particularly grateful to William Child for his thorough and illuminating engagement with my work, to Henry Jackman for many fruitful conversations, and to Christopher Campbell for discussing the manuscript with me after the defence. I would also like to express my gratitude to Robert Myers for his comments on several portions of this dissertation and for innumerable helpful discussions. Being a part of the Philosophy Department of York University has been wonderful. I thank my fellow graduate students and friends, especially Alex Leferman, David Rocheleau- Houle, and Ali Karbalaei Mahdi. Ben Winokur, who read and commented on the entire dissertation, is owed special thanks, and so is Bogdan Florea-Alexandru for conversations while the project was taking shape. Thanks are also owed to the participants in the PhD seminar during the academic years 2015-2016 and 2016-2017. Last but not least, I thank my many teachers, v especially Christopher Campbell, Muhammad Ali Khalidi, Alice MacLachlan, and Robert Myers. Anandi Hattiangadi and Alex Miller read and offered valuable feedback on parts of this dissertation, for which I am thankful. I am especially grateful to Alex Miller for our correspondence. Finally, I am grateful to Sam Steadman, my companion in philosophy and in life, and to my patient and supportive parents, to whom this dissertation is dedicated. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................... v Table of contents ........................................................................................................................... vii Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 I. The challenge of the semantic sceptic ....................................................................................... 10 1. The sceptic’s query ............................................................................................................... 10 2. The first condition: standards of correctness ........................................................................ 15 3. The second condition: guidance............................................................................................ 19 3.1. The guidance conception of understanding ................................................................... 21 3.2. Two conceptions of guidance ........................................................................................ 26 3.3. Bridges’s interpretation of the sceptical challenge ........................................................ 30 3.4. Does meaning something by an expression serve as a reason for use? ......................... 35 3.5. Zalabardo’s interpretation of the sceptical challenge .................................................... 37 3.6. Reason explanations of meaningful uses of expressions ............................................... 41 4. The Platonist answer ............................................................................................................. 48 5. The dispositionalist answer ................................................................................................... 49 6. The non-reductionist answer ................................................................................................. 52 7. Are the two conditions distinct? ........................................................................................... 54 II. The sceptical solution ............................................................................................................... 57 1. Two interpretations ............................................................................................................... 57 2. The alternative picture of meaning ....................................................................................... 58 3. The alternative view of meaning ascriptions ........................................................................ 65 4. The collapse into nihilism ..................................................................................................... 70 5. A reinterpretation of the sceptical solution ........................................................................... 73 III. Semantic Platonism ................................................................................................................. 78 1. The Platonist conception of meaning .................................................................................... 79 1.1. The metaphysical problem with semantic Platonism ..................................................... 83 1.2. The epistemological problem with semantic Platonism ................................................ 89 vii 1.3. An attempt at amending Platonism ................................................................................ 92 2. Resisting semantic Platonism ..............................................................................................