DOCSLIB.ORG

Semantic Scepticism and the Possibility of Meaning Alexandra Olivia Sultanescu a Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Gradu

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Semantic Scepticism and the Possibility of Meaning Alexandra Olivia Sultanescu a Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Gradu View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by YorkSpace SEMANTIC SCEPTICISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF MEANING ALEXANDRA OLIVIA SULTANESCU A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY YORK UNIVERSITY TORONTO, ONTARIO APRIL 2019 © ALEXANDRA OLIVIA SULTANESCU, 2019 ABSTRACT Nearly four decades ago, Saul Kripke articulated a semantic version of scepticism, according to which no finite goings-on, either mental or behavioural, can establish what someone means by an expression. The semantic sceptic reveals, among other things, the hopelessness of a deeply tempting—and widely made—assumption, to the effect that we must be able to articulate what it is for a subject to use expressions meaningfully by appealing exclusively to explanatory resources that do not presuppose meaningfulness. A radical reconceiving of our approach to meaning is required. According to a strain of thinking that is influential in contemporary philosophy, this reconceiving must amount to the denial that there is a general story to be told about what it is for expressions to be used meaningfully. If we accept that we cannot explain in more basic terms what it is for someone to mean something by an expression, we must also accept, the thought goes, that no general elucidation of meaning can be had. This dissertation seeks to contribute to the project of undermining this strain of thinking. It seeks to reveal that the dichotomy between reductionism and quietist non-reductionism about meaning is a false one. It does this in the first instance by examining, and ultimately rejecting, a range of views offered in response to the challenge: Kripke’s own sceptical solution, semantic Platonism as well as views articulated in opposition to it, and Hannah Ginsborg’s conception of meaning. Then, it proceeds to extract from the later writings of Donald Davidson a version of semantic non-reductionism that provides an answer to the challenge of the semantic sceptic. At the core of his view is the idea that we cannot shed light on what it is for expressions to be used meaningfully without shedding light on the special sort of active engagement characteristic of the simultaneous interaction of two subjects with each other and their shared world. Meaningfulness is grounded in such triangular transactions. ii This dissertation also illuminates the connections between the philosophical conceptions, or some aspects thereof, of two thinkers who have made an enormous contribution to the project, central to analytic philosophy, of making philosophical sense of meaning. Davidson seems never to have been genuinely gripped by Kripke’s challenge, and Kripke seems never to have engaged in any substantive way with Davidson’s views on triangulation. And yet, Kripke’s challenge about meaning and Davidson’s overall conception of meaning can each be seen as lending support to the other. Furthermore, what Davidson’s writings show is that endorsing semantic non-reductionism need not be the desperate move that Kripke takes it to be, for it does not force us to give up on the distinctively philosophical search for generality. iii DEDICATION For my parents iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Six years ago, Claudine Verheggen agreed to be my supervisor. I cannot imagine what sort of student of philosophy I would have been now if she had not. As this dissertation reveals, her writings and teachings have deeply influenced me, and I thank her for that. I am also immensely, unspeakably grateful for her unwavering commitment to my philosophical development, for her willingness to read and comment extensively on countless drafts of my work, for her rigorous and penetrating criticisms, which are always accompanied by suggestions of how I might make progress in light of them, and for everything else. A better supervisor and teacher is inconceivable. I am thankful to Henry Jackman and Kristin Andrews for serving on my dissertation committee, to William Child for serving as my external examiner, to Gabriela Alboiu for serving on the examining committee, and to Christopher Campbell for chairing it. I am particularly grateful to William Child for his thorough and illuminating engagement with my work, to Henry Jackman for many fruitful conversations, and to Christopher Campbell for discussing the manuscript with me after the defence. I would also like to express my gratitude to Robert Myers for his comments on several portions of this dissertation and for innumerable helpful discussions. Being a part of the Philosophy Department of York University has been wonderful. I thank my fellow graduate students and friends, especially Alex Leferman, David Rocheleau- Houle, and Ali Karbalaei Mahdi. Ben Winokur, who read and commented on the entire dissertation, is owed special thanks, and so is Bogdan Florea-Alexandru for conversations while the project was taking shape. Thanks are also owed to the participants in the PhD seminar during the academic years 2015-2016 and 2016-2017. Last but not least, I thank my many teachers, v especially Christopher Campbell, Muhammad Ali Khalidi, Alice MacLachlan, and Robert Myers. Anandi Hattiangadi and Alex Miller read and offered valuable feedback on parts of this dissertation, for which I am thankful. I am especially grateful to Alex Miller for our correspondence. Finally, I am grateful to Sam Steadman, my companion in philosophy and in life, and to my patient and supportive parents, to whom this dissertation is dedicated. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................... v Table of contents ........................................................................................................................... vii Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 I. The challenge of the semantic sceptic ....................................................................................... 10 1. The sceptic’s query ............................................................................................................... 10 2. The first condition: standards of correctness ........................................................................ 15 3. The second condition: guidance............................................................................................ 19 3.1. The guidance conception of understanding ................................................................... 21 3.2. Two conceptions of guidance ........................................................................................ 26 3.3. Bridges’s interpretation of the sceptical challenge ........................................................ 30 3.4. Does meaning something by an expression serve as a reason for use? ......................... 35 3.5. Zalabardo’s interpretation of the sceptical challenge .................................................... 37 3.6. Reason explanations of meaningful uses of expressions ............................................... 41 4. The Platonist answer ............................................................................................................. 48 5. The dispositionalist answer ................................................................................................... 49 6. The non-reductionist answer ................................................................................................. 52 7. Are the two conditions distinct? ........................................................................................... 54 II. The sceptical solution ............................................................................................................... 57 1. Two interpretations ............................................................................................................... 57 2. The alternative picture of meaning ....................................................................................... 58 3. The alternative view of meaning ascriptions ........................................................................ 65 4. The collapse into nihilism ..................................................................................................... 70 5. A reinterpretation of the sceptical solution ........................................................................... 73 III. Semantic Platonism ................................................................................................................. 78 1. The Platonist conception of meaning .................................................................................... 79 1.1. The metaphysical problem with semantic Platonism ..................................................... 83 1.2. The epistemological problem with semantic Platonism ................................................ 89 vii 1.3. An attempt at amending Platonism ................................................................................ 92 2. Resisting semantic Platonism ..............................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Mind and World: Beyond the Externalism/Internalism Debate
    Research Proposal Mind and World: Beyond the Externalism/Internalism Debate Sanjit Chakraborty Research Scholar Department of Philosophy Jadavpur University Background For the last few years the concept of the natural kind terms has haunted me. My main concern has been regarding the location of the meaning of these terms. Are meanings of the natural kind terms in the head or in the world? This question has been the most pressing in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Language. I have realized that we cannot separate mind from the world. I had in the beginning only a layman‟s conception regarding mind, meaning and the world. When I entered the field of philosophy inspired by Hilary Putnam, I found that semantic externalism is a vexing issue involving a vast area. The location of content is at the core of the metaphysical debate regarding internalism and externalism in the sense that internalists believe that mental proprieties are intrinsic only if they preserve across world identity of internal replicas. Externalism is opposed to this thinking. For externalists, mental properties are in many cases dependent on physical or social environment. The linguistic strategy also maintains a difference between internalism and externalism regarding the mental content. Descriptivism focuses on general terms that consist in descriptive content and leads to mode of presentation of reference through sense. Besides, the causal theory of reference refutes descriptivism to ensure that there is a causal chain of reference between words and 1 objects that help us to identify agent‟s thought through an identification of its relation with external environment.
    [Show full text]
  • The Book of Chuang Tzu Free
    FREE THE BOOK OF CHUANG TZU PDF Chuang Tzu,Zhuangzi,Martin Palmer | 352 pages | 01 Dec 2007 | Penguin Books Ltd | 9780140455373 | English | London, United Kingdom Zhuangzi (book) - Wikipedia READ as many books as you like Personal use. One of the great founders of Taoism, Chaung Tzu lived in the fourth century BC and is among the most enjoyable and intriguing personalities in the whole of Chinese philosophy. The Way of Chuang Tzu Book Summary : Chuang Tzuu considered, along with Lao Tzu, one of the great figures of early Taoist thoughtu used parables and anecdotes, allegory and paradox, to illustrate that real happiness and freedom are found only in understanding the Tao or Way of nature, and The Book of Chuang Tzu in its unity. The respected Trappist monk Thomas Merton spent several years reading and reflecting upon four different translations of the Chinese classic that bears Chuang Tzu's name. The result is this collection of poetic renderings of the great sage's work that conveys its spirit in a way no other translation has and that was Merton's personal favorite among his more than The Book of Chuang Tzu books. Both prose and verse are included here, as well as a short section from Merton discussing the most salient themes of Chuang Tzu's teachings. The Inner Chapters are the only sustained section of this text widely believed to be the work of Chuang Tzu himself, dating to the fourth century B. Witty and engaging, spiced with the lyricism of poetry, Chuang Tzu's Taoist insights are timely and eternal, profoundly concerned with spiritual ecology.
    [Show full text]
  • 'Putnam on Bivs and Radical Scepticism'
    For Putnam on Brains in Vats, (ed.) S. Goldberg, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ‘PUTNAM ON BIVS AND RADICAL SCEPTICISM’ DUNCAN PRITCHARD & CHRIS RANALLI University of Edinburgh & National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to explore Putnam’s influential ‘BIV’ argument against radical scepticism, both as he presents this argument and as it has subsequently been reconstructed. §1 explores the BIV argument as Putnam presents it and the anti-sceptical morals that he extracts from this argument. §2 examines a core critique of the argument, so conceived, from Anthony Brueckner. §3 then critically evaluates an influential reconstruction of Putnam’s argument, due to Crispin Wright. §4-5 explores the idea that Putnam’s argument is best thought of as a transcendental response to radical scepticism, and accordingly applies Stroud’s challenge to transcendental arguments to this proposal. Finally, §6 examines an influential criticism of Putnam’s argument which is due to Nagel. 1. PUTNAM’S BIV ARGUMENT A familiar way of arguing for radical scepticism is by appeal to radical sceptical hypotheses, such as the hypothesis that one might be a brain-in-vat (BIV) which is being radically, and undetectably, deceived about its environment. Roughly, the sceptical argument goes that since such sceptical hypotheses are by their nature indistinguishable from normal experience, so one cannot know that they are false. Furthermore, if one cannot know that they are false, then it follows that one can’t know much of what one believes, most of which is inconsistent with radical sceptical hypotheses. This last step will almost certainly require some sort of closure-style principle, whereby knowledge is closed under known entailments.
    [Show full text]
  • Kant and the Problem of Experience Hannah Ginsborg
    Kant and the Problem of Experience Hannah Ginsborg (Version for Phil. Topics: September 16, 2006.) As most of its readers are aware, the Critique of Pure Reason is primarily concerned not with empirical, but with a priori knowledge. For the most part, the Kant of the first Critique tends to assume that experience, and the knowledge that is based on it, is unproblematic. The problem with which he is concerned is that of how we can be capable of substantive knowledge independently of experience. At the same time, however, the notion of experience plays a crucial role in the central arguments of the Critique. For, again as most readers of the Critique know, Kant aims to show how we can have synthetic a priori knowledge by showing that the categories, or pure concepts of the understanding, are conditions of the possibility of experience. This means that, whether or not Kant is concerned with the notion of experience for its own sake, his account of a priori knowledge carries with it at least some commitments regarding the character of experience. If the account of a priori knowledge is to be successful, then experience has to be the kind of thing for which the categories can, in principle, serve as conditions of posibility. More specifically, experience must involve not only the senses, but also thought or understanding, for otherwise the claim that it presupposes a certain specific set of concepts is simply unintelligible. And indeed at least some parts of the Critique, in particular the so-called subjective deduction in the first edition, and the briefer passages which correspond to it in the second edition, seem to be intended to show how this requirement is met.
    [Show full text]
  • Externalism and a Priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access Is Not the Issue Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
    Externalism and a priori knowledge of the world: Why privileged access is not the issue Maria Lasonen-Aarnio This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2006), Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access is Not the Issue. Dialectica, 60: 433– 445, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01086.x/abstract Abstract: I look at incompatibilist arguments aimed at showing that the conjunction of the thesis that a subject has privileged, a priori access to the contents of her own thoughts, on the one hand, and of semantic externalism, on the other, lead to a putatively absurd conclusion, namely, a priori knowledge of the external world. I focus on arguments involving a variety of externalism resulting from the singularity or object-dependence of certain terms such as the demonstrative ‘that’. McKinsey argues that incompatibilist arguments employing such externalist theses are at their strongest, and conclusively show that privileged access must be rejected. While I agree on the truth of the relevant externalist theses, I show that all plausible versions of the incompatibilist reductio argument as applied to such theses are fundamentally flawed, for these versions of the argument must make assumptions that lead to putatively absurd knowledge of the external world independently of the thesis of privileged access. 1. Michael McKinsey has argued that semantic externalism is incompatible with the thesis that subjects have privileged, a priori access to the contents of their own thoughts.1 The incompatibility is supposed to result from the fact that the conjunction of the two theses leads to a putatively absurd conclusion, namely, the possibility of a priori knowledge of the external world.
    [Show full text]
  • 3 Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self-Knowledge
    3 CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM, CONTENT EXTERNALISM, AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE Anthony Brueckner* SÍNTESE – Há um argumento cético clássico ABSTRACT – There is a classical skeptical derivado das Meditações sobre a filosofia primei- argument that derives from Descartes’s ra. Este artigo oferece uma formulação contem- Meditations on first Philosophy. This paper offers porânea padrão do argumento, pretendendo a standard contemporary formulation of the mostrar que ninguém sabe qualquer coisa sobre o argument, which purports to show that no one mundo extramental. A obra de Hilary Putnam na knows anything about the world that exists filosofia da linguagem e da mente parece fornecer outside our minds. The work of Hilary Putnam in uma resposta a uma versão atualizada do argu- the philosophy of language and mind seems to mento cético cartesiano. Em sua maior parte, afford an answer to an updated version of the este artigo é dedicado a uma análise e crítica das Cartesian skeptical argument. The bulk of this meditações anti-céticas de Putnam. paper is devoted to an analysis and critique of PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Descartes. Putnam. Ceti- Putnam’s anti-skeptical meditations. cismo. Cérebros em cubas. Externalismo de KEY WORDS – Descartes, Putnam, Skepticism, conteúdo. Brains in vats, Content externalism. 1 The Cartesian Skeptical Argument Let us start by considering an updated version of the skeptical concerns that Descartes raised in the first Meditation.1 Imagine a living brain floating in a vat of nutrient fluids while attached to a supercomputer. The computer is programmed to provide electrical stimuli to the brain that are just like those a normal brain receives due to input to the sense-organs connected to the normal brain.
    [Show full text]
  • Semantic Externalism and Self Knowledge: Privileged Access to the World
    3 Semantic Externalism and Self Knowledge: Privileged Access to the World Submitted for the degree of PhD Sarah Ann Sawyer King’s College London September 1997 3 Acknowledgements I would like to thank David Papineau for a multitude of comments and suggestions on all aspects of the thesis. I would also like to thank Christoph Hörl and Mark Sainsbury for comments on the final draft, and Sean Crawford for extensive discussion of the nature of de re thought. Special thanks go to my parents for providing a solid basis from which to work. 3 Abstract The thesis is concerned to defend the compatibility of two plausible claims about the mind; semantic externalism and privileged access. It is further concerned to demonstrate one important implication of the conjunction of semantic externalism and privileged access, an implication which forces the rejection of the dichotomy between knowledge of one’s mind and knowledge of one’s world. Chapter one is a presentation of semantic externalism. Chapter two is a presentation of the claim of privileged access. The claim of privileged access is formulated in response to the following question. How can a subject have privileged access to the contents of her thoughts given that her thoughts depend essentially on contingent facts about her world of which she could have empirical knowledge only? Chapter three is concerned with the following implication, the consequent of which is prima facie absurd. If the contents of the mind depend essentially upon contingent facts about the world, knowledge of the semantic contents “within” can yield knowledge of the world “without”.
    [Show full text]
  • UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Beauty, Art and Testimony: Subjectivity and Objectivity in Aesthetics Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0gd4w6z8 Author Klempner, Erica Diane Publication Date 2018 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Beauty, Art and Testimony: Subjectivity and Objectivity in Aesthetics by Erica Diane Klempner A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Hannah Ginsborg, Co-chair Professor Barry Stroud, Co-chair Professor John MacFarlane Professor Line Mikkelsen Spring 2018 Copyright © 2018 by Erica Diane Klempner All rights reserved Abstract Beauty, Art and Testimony: Subjectivity and Objectivity in Aesthetics by Erica Diane Klempner Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy University of California, Berkeley Professor Hannah Ginsborg and Professor Barry Stroud, Co-chairs We acquire beliefs on the basis of what others tell us all the time. If you tell me that your house is painted red, chances are that I will simply believe you without question; and if someone asks me what color your house is, I will simply tell her that it is red. Yet we do not seem to accept others’ testimony about beauty and art in the same way. If you tell me that the Taj Mahal is beautiful, or that Middlemarch is a great novel, it would be strange for me simply to adopt your view, even if I have a lot of confidence in your judgment. In order for me to be in a position to believe or to claim that the Taj Mahal is beautiful, or that Middlemarch is a great novel, I must experience these things myself—by going to Agra, or by reading the book.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding Meaning and World
    Understanding Meaning and World Understanding Meaning and World: A Relook on Semantic Externalism By Sanjit Chakraborty Understanding Meaning and World: A Relook on Semantic Externalism By Sanjit Chakraborty This book first published 2016 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2016 by Sanjit Chakraborty All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-9103-7 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-9103-5 To my Gurudev Hilary Putnam, Who taught me how to love philosophy a little more... Without whom not! CONTENTS Acknowledgements .................................................................................... ix Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Chapter One ................................................................................................. 7 The Internalism-Externalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy of Language and Mind Introduction (1.1) Contemporary Debate: Internalism Verses Externalism (1.2) Descriptivism of Frege and Russell (1.3) Putnam’s and Kripke’s Theses on Reference (1.4) Putnam on Externalism Concluding Remarks Chapter Two .............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Westphal Says That His Exhibition of Two Sources of a Commitment in Kant to Mental Content Externalism Ought to Be Understood
    Can Mental Content Externalism Prove Realism?1 (Axel Mueller, Northwestern University) Recently, Kenneth Westphal has presented a highly interesting and innovative reading of Kant's critical philosophy.2 This reading continues a tradition of Kant- scholarship of which, e.g., Paul Guyer's work is representative, and in which the anti- idealistic potential of Kant's critical philosophy is pitted against its idealistic self- understanding. Much of the work in this tradition leaves matters at observing the tensions this introduces in Kant's work. But Westphal's proposed interpretation goes farther. Its attractiveness derives for the most part from the promise that it permits an internal critique of Kant's transcendental idealism (TI), that is, a critique that is based on the very resources of Kantian transcendental philosophy.3 In contrast to these resources, which currently seem to go through a sort of revival in an enormous array of fields, TI is notorious for dismaying even sympathetic interpreters. How attractive and needed such an internal critique of TI would be becomes all the more patent when we place such a promise in the context of some of the contemporary discussions about TI after Allison's famous defense of it. Before directly engaging with Westphal's interpretation, I would therefore like to quickly sketch on what background it acquires its force (I). After characterizing the main features of Westphal's view (II), and supporting it in more detail by an account of Kant's theory of cognitive significance (III), I then want to review the extent of its success to present Kant as issuing an anti-skeptical argument (IV.1), or semantic views that are incompatible with TI (IV.2), or a 'proof of not merely empirical realism' (IV.3).
    [Show full text]
  • The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings
    Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication Volume 5 MEANING, UNDERSTANDING AND KNOWLEDGE Article 10 2009 The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings Panu Raatikainen University of Helsinki Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/biyclc This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Recommended Citation Raatikainen, Panu (2009) "The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings," Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication: Vol. 5. https://doi.org/10.4148/ biyclc.v5i0.287 This Proceeding of the Symposium for Cognition, Logic and Communication is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings 2 The Baltic International Yearbook of whether or not the meaning (or a central component of the meaning) Cognition, Logic and Communication of a declarative, indexical-free sentence can be taken to be the condi- tions in which the sentence is true—where truth is understood as being October 2010 Volume 5: Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge at least potentially verification-transcendent (i.e. correspondence to re- pages 1-13 DOI: 10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.287 ality). The semantic
    [Show full text]
  • Why Externalism Is Not Part of Cognitive Science
    Why Externalism is not part of Cognitive Science Eran Asoulin ([email protected]) Program in Cognitive Science School of History & Philosophy of Science University of New South Wales Sydney, NSW, 2052, AUSTRALIA. Abstract I will compare the Internalist and Externalist approach to Internalism meaning, and show that, given empirical scientific Internalism is not so much a particular thesis or a specific inclinations, the Externalist approach is somewhat misguided claim as it is a research program that articulates a certain and that parts of it can be reinterpreted via Internalism. I give conception of the study of language, language use, and the a brief overview of the nature of the problem of meaning or structure of the representations of linguistic objects inside intentionality; I then sketch out the nature of Internalism and how it deals with meaning, and conclude with a discussion of the minds of competent users of a particular language. Externalism and the ways in which Externalism can be recast Those who adhere to Internalism hold that, for the purposes in terms of Internalism without loss of explanatory power. I of scientific inquiry into the aforementioned areas of will argue that the foundations of Externalism and Internalism language, the internal properties of the human brain are are similar, and it is the Externalists, contrary to the overwhelmingly the ones that are the relevant and fruitful Internalists, who feel that these foundations are not sufficient areas of scientific research. Internalism has thus recast the for explaining meaning and intentionality. ordinary everyday notion of language, a notion that is Keywords: Philosophy of Mind; Semantics; Internalism; arguably at the core of Externalism, into a form that Externalism; Linguistics.
    [Show full text]