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Title items-in-Africa - Question of Namibia - Secretary-General's meetings and notes for the file
Date Created 12/03/1979
Record Type Archival Item
Container S-0902-0001: Peacekeeping - Africa 1963-1981
Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit SG (2) RA (2) AR/GMM/MKP Note for the File
Security Council Consultations on complaint by Seychelles and the question of South Africa on Monday 14 December 1981 at 4.3O p.m.
With regard to the .draft resolution submitted by the Representative of Seychelles/, the Representative of the USA asked the following questions:
1. If the matter was an internal one, the Council should not take any action. 2. If there had been outside intervention, the Council should not prejudge the issue before evidence was established.
The President said that there was evidence of external elements according to the complaint made by Seychelles, and it was the task of the proposed commission of inquiry to confirm such evidence. He suggested that the Council let the proposed commission tell the world what the real issue was.
The Representative of the UK proposed that the paragraph in the operative part of the draft resolution be deleted because it prejudged the situation.
The members agreed to hold a formal meeting at 3.30 p.m. on 15 December and to delete operative paragraph 5 from the draft (annex I).
As regards the question of South Africa, the Representative of the USA said that she had some difficulties with the last paragraph of the draft of the presidential statement.
After discussions, the members agreed to make the following changes in the last paragraph of the draft: Instead of "urges - 2 -
the Gojvermments of Member States to take effective measures to prohibit all individuals, corporations and . ..", the statement should read: "urges Governments of Member States to take effective measures within their constitutional frame- work -bo discourage all individuals, corporations and ..." (Annex II) -
T3he members agreed to hold a formal meeting on the issue on the afternoon of 15 December, immediately following the meeting on the complaint by Seychelles.
TThey also agreed to hold informal consultations on Syria's request for an urgent meeting of the Council on the decision of the Israeli Government to apply Israeli laws to the Golan Heights on the afternoon of 15 December, following the formal meeting of the Council.
Lu-chih Chen 17 December 1981 UNITED s NATIONS
Seccurity CCouncil GENERAL
S/14793 14 December 1981
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
t
Draft resolution
The Security Ccrcouncil,
Taking note ofT t -the letrter dated 8 December 1981 from the Charge d'Affaires of the Permanent Missioron of thae Republic of Seychelles to the United Nations addressed to the President off t~the Security Council (S/14783) ,
Having heard tfaeie statement of the representative of the Republic of Seychelles,
Bearing in minded that &3.1 Member States must refrain in their internatinal relations from tine tirthreat c«r use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepemdencnce of amy State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Dnitr^red Naticons,
1. Affirms threat the ^territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Seycfiaell^ies must be respected;
2. CondemiDs trxhe recetnt mercenary aggression against the Republic of Seychelles and tfiae snsubsequesnt hijacking;
3. Decides to^o send & commission of inquiry composed of three members of the Security Council in e order to investigate the origin, background and financing of the 25 November 3L98I 1 mercenary aggression against the Republic of Seychelles, as well as assess amd e=evaluat& economic damages and to report to the Security Council with recommendationsi_3 no later than 31 January 1982;
4. Decides threat the members of the commission of inquiry will be appointed after consultations ni between the President of the Security Council and the members of the Security Ctoumzncil and the Republic of Seychelles;
5. Requestbs tirthe Secretary-General to provide the commission of inquiry with the necessary assistsxance;
6. Decides tozio remain seized of the question.
81-36523 0296Z ((E) UNITED NATIONS S
Security Council Distr. GENERAL
S/14794 15 December 1981 ENGLISH ORIGINAL: CHINESE/ENGLISH/FRENCH/ RUSSIAN/SPANISH
NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
After consultation with the members of the Council, the President of the 'Security Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at the 2315th meeting of the Security Council on 15 December 1981, in connexion with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The question of South Africa":
"The Security Council notes that on 4 December 1981, the South African regime proclaimed the Ciskei an integral part of South African territory, a so-called 'independent' State, in pursuance of its apartheid and bantustanization policy.
"The Security Council recalls its resolution 417 (1977), in which it demanded that the racist regime of South Africa should abolish the policy of bantustanization. It also recalls its resolution 402 (1976) and 407 fJ-977) , in which it endorsed General Assembly resolution 31/6 A of 26 October 1976 on this matter. The Council further takes note of General Assembly resolution 32/105 N of 14 December 1977 on the question of bantustans.
"The Security Council does not recognize the so-called 'independent homelands' in South Africa: it condemns the purported proclamation of the 'independence' of the Ciskei and declares it totally invalid. This action by the South African regime, following similar proclamations in the case of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, denounced by the international community, is designed to divide and dispossess the African people and establish client States under its domination in order to perpetuate apartheid. It seeks to create a class of foreign people in their own country. It further aggravates the situation in the region and hipders international efforts for just and lasting solutions.
"The Security Council calls upon all Governments to deny any form of recognition to the so-called 'independent1 bantustans, to refrain from any dealings with them, to reject travel documents issued by them, and urges Governments of Member States to take effective measures within their constitutional framework to discourage all individuals, corporations and other institutions under their jurisdiction from having any dealings with the so-called 'independent' bantustans."
(Bl-36707 0134h (E) TO: THE SECRETARY- GENERAL
tA- CONFIDENTIAL 25 September 1981
NOTE FOR THE FILE
1. George Moose, Adviser, US Permanent Mission, saw Mr. Urquhart at 1O.30 a.m. on 25 September 1981 in regard to Namibia. Mr. Dayal was present. 2. On a strictly confidential basis, Mr. Moose made available the "draft talking points" (attached) that US missions are to use in their conversations in African capitals in amplifying on the 24 September Joint Statement of the Five. 3. Mr. Moose also stated the following: (i) Prior to the recent meeting in Zurich between Mr. Crocker and Mr. Fourie, the Five had sent a message to South Africa seeking to define and limit the "issues" still to be resolved. Following the Zurich meeting, they had received an assurance from South Africa that the latter would adhere to the basic principles of resolution 435 and not seek amendments. (ii) The "issues" to be resolved are now stated to be limited to: (a) "constitutional principles", that need to be defined in advance of implementation; (b) "the future independent status of Namibia"; (c) UN "impartiality"; (d) the size and composition of UNTAG; (e) a phased timetable leading to implementation. (iii) The Five are preparing draft papers on these "issues". Item (a) above will reportedly comprise only general principles drawn essentially from the Charter and UN Declarations; item (b) will, among other matters, deal with the issue of foreign troops in Namibia after independence; as regards item (c), it appears that the effort will essentially be to revive the arrangements discussed in Geneva during the Pre-implementation Meeting (which related to action by the General Assembly once a date were set for implementation); as regards (d), the size and composition of UNTAG were to be discussed again - there was however no truth to press reports that the military component would be limited to contingents from the Five plus Nigeria. - 2 -
(iv) Mr. Moose added that South Africa had not suggested any changes in the arrangements already discussed in regard to UN monitoring and the DMZ (nor, contrary to press reports, had it insisted again on UN monitoring of SWAPO bases in Angola). The issue of Walvis Bay had also not been raised afresh. (v) In terms of further steps, the Five would - in Phase I - send a mission to the Front-line States and South Africa, at the senior-official level, in October 1981. During this phase, the Five would concentrate, essentially, on gaining acceptance for the "constitutional principles" referred to above. The other issues could also be discussed in a preliminary way, but the Five wished to follow-up more fully on them in Phase II - through the Contact Group in New York. Mr. Urquhart emphasized that, in any conversations relating to the size of UNTAG, the Five must remember that this must be clearly related to the functions of the Force. Mr. Moose stated that this was well understood, as also the fact that the Security Council would need to agree to the composition and related matters. 4. In the course of the conversation, Mr. Moose mentioned that Secretary Haig had met Foreign Minister Jorge in New York on 24 September. » v> RE0E4VED
(.tifj
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM TO THE UNITED NATIONS PH AIVOXX THl/ONG TRLfc CQNG HCJA XA HQl CHU NGHIA VIET NAM 20 Waterside Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10010 TAJ LIEN HOP QU6C (212)685-8001
No 150/81/HC New York,22 September 1981
Excellency,
I have the honour to forward herewith to Your Excellency the September 17,1981 Statement by the Spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam rejecting the U.S. charges against the alleged use by Viet Nam of Soviet-supplied toxic chemicals in Laos and Kampuchea and kindly request Your Excellency to have this note and its enclosure circulated as an official docu- ment of the General Assembly under item 42 of the Agenda of the 36t3a Session.
Please accept,Excellency,the assurances of ray highest consideration.
HA VAN LAU
H.E. Dr. KURT WALDHEIM Permanent Representative of the Secretary General Socialist Republic of Viet Nam United Nations to the United Nations New York STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM (September 17, 1981)
On September 13, 1981 in a speech reeking with cold war language made in West Berlin, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig unashamedly charged Viet Nam with using Soviet-supplied toxic chemicals in Laos and Kampuchea. Later, some high officials of the U.S. State Department took up this customary practice of the United States of making black white. The fact that the head of the U.S. diplomacy personnally made this slander a few days before the opening of the 36th Session of the U.N. General Assembly obviously aims to relieve the U.S. from its difficulties and isola- tion in the face of the strong wave of protest from the whole progressive opinion against the Reagan administration's rushing headlong in the arms race, provoking tension and reviving the cold war atmosphere, seriously threatening the independence and security of nations and world peace. The United States is increasing its nuclear arsenal and manufacturing more arms of massive destruction of extreme barbarity, including chemical weapons, bacteriological weapons and neutron weapons. The United States is stepping up the export of weapons and war equipment including the sales of arms to the reactionary ruling circles in Beijing. The U.S. has openly resorted to the threat of war, and brazenly used acts of international terrorism, crudely interfering in the internal affairs of other countries while encouraging its client countries or dependencies to toe its line. The U.S. is conducting a bacteorogical warfare against Cuba and is supplying toxic chemicals to the reactionaries to be used against the peoples of other countries as is the case in Afghanistan. The fact that the U.S. is rehashing their senseless slan- ders against Viet Nam also airns to plead for its policy of increasing collu- sion with the reactionary ruling circles in Beijing against the people of Viet Nam and other Indochinese countries, and for the time being to retain the seat of the genocidal Pol Pot clique at the United Nations. It is at the same time aimed at covering the crime of the United States of using toxic chemicals on a large scale and for more than ten years during their criminal aggression against Viet Nam. Its chemical sprays still leave serious consequences especially in the form of cancer and deformed and disabled children. However, all the slanders and odious distortions of the United States can deceive nobody. World public opinion, especially in Western Europe, Japan and Australia, and right in the United States, is vigorously condemning the - 2 -
Reagan administration and demanding it'to put an immediate end to the arms race which is jeopardizing peace. It holds the U.S. responsible for these criminal war crimes against the people of Viet Nam, and the other Indochines countries and against the American GI's who have suffered the atrocious consequences of the chemicals used by the United States during the Viet Mam war. The Foreign Ministry of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam completely rejects the above odious slanders of the United States and demands the Reagan administration to stop collaborating with the expansionists and hege- monists in Beijing against the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples. Together with all the peace - and justice - loving people throughout the world, including the progressive people in the United States, the Viet- namese people strongly denounce and are determined to check the criminal schemes and acts of the U.S. administration which is pushing mankind to the war disaster with the most barbarous and brutal lethal weapons including the neutron weapons, chemical weapons and bacteorological weapons produced by the United States./. , £r«,> r ."#-<•
Filie: Namibia MKP/JH ccrSGVX XRef: PATD b/f: AR/G|M
Mr. M. Minchin, Chief 21 September 1981 Secretariat Services Division, PATD
Rafeeuddin Ahmed Chef de Cabinet Transmission of General Assembly resolution ES-8/2 -
I return herewith the draft note verbale for the transmission to all states of General Assembly resolution ES-8/2 on the question of Namibia. It has been approved without change. UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES fttf INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR
TO: DATE: 16 Septemb 98l A: Mr. Raffeudin Ahmed Chef de Cabinet REFERENCE:
THROUGH: S/C DE:
FROM: M. Minchin, Chief DE: Secretariat Services Division, PATD
SUBJECT: OB JET-. Transmission of General Assembly resolution ES-8/2
1. A draft note verbale to all States of resolution ES-8/2 of 12 September 198l on the question of Namibia is herewith attached for the Secretary-General's approval.
2. In accordance with standing procedure, the text of the resolution is being transmitted by this Department to the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, as well as to the South West Africa People's Organization. 3. The text of the resolution is also being transmitted, on behalf of the Secretary-General, to the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations for the attention of his Government. TO: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL " *f
Present Internal Situation
In view of recent statements regarding the implementation of Security Council resolution V35, it seemed Appropriate to summarise a number of reports received during the past fev veeks concerning developments in Ilnnibic. from several independent sources having first-hand experience and normally excellent information.
1. General Situation - • -
This is"marked by six principal features:-
(a) an apparent entrenchment of the South African Defense Forces in the Territory; (b) a worsening economic situation brought about, in part, by severe drought, and having groving social consequences; (c) an acceleration in the devolution of povers to the DIA's "Council of Ministers" and parallel "Hamibianisation" of military forces, police, etc.; (d) a continuation of anti-UN propaganda; (e) an increased repression aimed at SWAPO's internal ving, and an apparently deliberate exacerbation of some inter-ethnic tensions; (f) despite these things, disillusionment among both vhites and blacks -irith the current DTA-di opens at ion, coupled, hovever, with despondency at the prospects for the implementation of resolution 435-
2. Entrenchment of the 3ADF
Even before the recent incursions into Angola, there had been numerous reports of a visible build-up of SADF forces in the Territory, especially the Ilorth, and of^ the "creatlorT of apporently_Jtonr,-te:rm logistical and other •miir^^^^^D^r^facilrSesT no""confirmed figures of SADF personnel~ih~ Ilrnibia have been obtainedT Hovever. it has been noted by several persons, both military and other, that the SADF is building permanent quarters_in thenorthj is buying much office and residential accommodation in central Vindhoek, ^nd is ^.ppprently replacing temporary military installations by those with long-term features; such as fortifications, air-strips, elec- tronic equipment such as radio ~.nd radar aids. These developments have coincided vith reports, principally emanating from South Africa itself, of a changed military strategy allegedly having the following elements:-
- (a) the need for the SADF to ready itself for a new conventional dimension to the var; (b) the desirability of achieving a military victory over SWAPO, this, possibly, being linked to implementation of ^35, - 2 -
(c) an increase in tho aid being provided to UTIITA, with u view to or.t-\bli.shing »• "buffer zone" in southern Angola, and, possibly, r. now po] i i.ie."L situation in Angola ;ii,r,olf r;lso, possibly, in connexion '.^ th of-l|-55 nt somo future do.tc.
>. ' orsenin." Sconoi.iic oituation -
\ number of factors are contributing to a major economic decline in ll-^nibi.".. They include a severe drought, which has adversely effected nil . aspects .of stock-raising and agriculture; the fell in the diamond price; the uncertain international metals market; a drastic decline in the in-shore fi shine; industry; a virtual halt to international investment, including r.in(jr"loGic"l exploration; r-'l.lin,- business coivridcnce: ;\nd the .n.!<".:ido;-!.i,;oiit of I-TCC 1'r.n.is in the central noVuhern region in part because of tiie military end security situation. Moreover, because of the impact of belligerent Activity in the north, M^JT;.' people from that area, especially, are moving into the towns, pn.rticul.irly T'indhoek, "nd -TJ.*G -^udinf: to ..rho.t even tlie D'i'A is describinc as an "alarminc" unemployment s-nd. consequent social situation.
Devolution of 'Governmental Po^rer
\ further devolution of governmental pover to the OTA' s so-c-?lled "Council of Ministers" hn.o recently br^on rnuoUiiced by the .Vu;iinistr"tor- ilcn'?:1-]., llr. Hou^h. Control over almost ."11 matters "with the exception of constitutional," security* end. foreign affairs" has now been granted to the various tiers of authorities in namibia. It seems to be generally expected that Mr. Hough '.'il] shortly return to the Republic, being replaced by a "figurehead" personality. The number of "ministers" is to be increased fron 12 to 15 and it is knovn that several prominent non-DTA and non-3WAPO individuals have been approached in this regard. Simultaneously, the number of members -of the "National Assembly" is to be increased from 50 to 72. 50 members of this "Assembly" are, for the future, to be appointed by ordinary (non-ethnic) election, and 22 are to be appointed by the eleven ethnic authorities. '. hilc some believe that the Territory is again moving in the direction of r. UDI, others identify two principal reasons for this continuing accession of authority :- (a) the uesire to create further politicrl and institutional I'r.lts jlccpmj\Lj._s prior to any future U3i? implementation; and (':•) the iesirc to build up, for electoral purposes, the stature of the V*\. • : "llicd to the second point is the continuing conflict bctvcen the left and right -.."ings of the formerly unified Nationalist Party, now led by Mr, Mudge (Republican p-rty) -and Mr. Pretorius (i;p-AICl1Jrv) , and the frequently alleged frustration of the DTA with the obstructionist behaviour of the largely
*A. number of security functions were in fact delegated during 1^80 "t • • .. ^vri\
A3 nun-dominated civil service, An aspect of "Ilamibianisation" is the •, build-up of Nomibian security force-, both military and police. Conscription ; (vhich Ivr., hovcvcr, much dividod the population) has beon in force for nomc. months. Ho reliable estimates' of the "liamibian" part of the armed forces basei in the Territory nre available, bub they must now number many- thousands; of 'f^!i v J personnel. A particularly troublesome aspect of conscription::is that, ' ' V^ excluding as it doc:1; Ovainbo, Kr.vango r,nd C'xprlviwi 1-IoiniMp.ns, it can create '& or ezp.ccrbp.te social tensions in the Territory, and zone have even suggested/ that e. civil var may "be in prospect in the coming years, having regard also ;'- to the oouth African/DTA constant propaganda theme that iiUAPO is an Ovambo -f'' orc-.nisp.tion, concerning the still' unexplained killing of Kerero Chief ...•*''' . ICapuuo, etc. .••;• *'-r:- ''?;,- ' *' •'•i^ -- - *-\ . ' ' ~- '^ ' ''$
5. ^iti-U:: Propr^cuda' ' b the United nations is constant in Namibia and, again, Rather, it is noir being presented as incontrovertible that the UII is "'-V"'"" incapable of exercising an impartial role under resolution ^35 because of ',-#'•••• the attitudes of virtually all of its members (including some among the ?. - -'^ "I'estcm Five). Lliile it is true that opinion in the "Territory .and the -• *>• Republic is used to being moulded by the media, the long-term effects of •>.. this stonding official cpnpaign may have several serious implications. (It is "Iso u-jiifc:.;t • in the activities of v-rious public relations firms operating abroad on behalf of the "Council of Ministers"; in come instances retained;^..;-- by .'South \frlcan Government officials in the "Council's" name). 'In this ??&; connexion it is paradoxical to observe that 1-Ir. Lludge lias recently publicly...^ endorsed his private statements in Gencvr (January 1981) to the effect that'"'-;? lie. has, hoircvcr, no difficulty r.n accepting tho impartiality arid -good faith, of Ilr. "htisr.ri-i:-?nd other senior UK.pcrsonnel assigned-to UI-JTAG. . -*•?-'. "
6. Increased Internal Repression *•' . •;. .'
•V .' 'fhougli y-'j Jvvc; log--1! in the Territory, internal J".flPO's politic'1!"•• «' •• "c-!-.iv:V,.y \\-s -Iv-.-yo ucan «li-__£r^J£. roi;\vosr:o--. Accoi-ui'.ng to-P. number of recounts; this roxJrecsion has in recent months become even more pronounced; -.•. at a time when (it is also reported) it vould Appear that J'.'APO's internal'- "^ politic?.! potential has been broadening (see also para. 7, bclov). An :-.v '• example, reliably reported, occurred in Uindhoek's black toxmship of ICatatura on liamibia Day, 26 August lOol. A peaceful meeting lield by ol/APOr:-''^''• vas encircled by r. dense ring of r-rmed police, T.:itli uogs. A d°jigcrous ;";';;'' v>j*ovoua-'c,ion of those p.'utcnd.'.ng then ocT-wro-l ''.;ith ". lorry aaid louclspcnker :-:... ..lilch pr.scod into the i.iocting tJii'ough the police lines. It seems that •".'• scriouo trouble -ras avoided "./hen the CJUAPO spealier, a clcrgyiian, urged caln on the audience and called upon it to kneel in prayer during the '* •"• ' Amplified provocation. A principal orgaiiiser of the meeting was shortly ^ - afterwards held for several days under administrative detention. JL'.ftPO is no'.y .?lt:ays •depicted ,as a Marxist ^terrori^t o^ani.siition ^, en aria_of the JJooli, in almost all the Ilamibian, and in the HP-supporting Jouth ."ifricaji press a again marking i'egrcssion from a more ineasui^ed official position during ,"y especially late, 19oO. •; .,;;•_ --.- . ••;':••-.:.. ' r-'*'- ;.:.; :..'--.;
' ^»::: • >-V ; :•-:>« •»'•."•' \ further feature of the pre::ent r-.nti-.-jUAPO line of the Uouth Africfm v *"" rxs -"V *, 7. Deports of Diminish'.ng Support for the Present Jouth ftfrican-backccl.'./ Politic"! Dispensation in I^mbia -•: . ..-.,, • .^v All reports, including Gone pro-DTA press analyses and editorials,"^.'. '.*•>• r have remarked in recent months on _the D rA's climinig_hinj^aujiporjx. At the ../*>"' G.?JIC tine, infoiT.ir.nts state that hopcs~"for a negotiated international ' V settlement are -?JLso decreasing. ' "' •'"- Jupport nriong the whites for Mr. Nudge's Republican Party is at present lessening. The political drift is both left and right. The right is "_.,..-' "'- retiu-ning to the I-IationnJ. Party. The,left has, at present, found no .'••;,:.- ';.__ effective home, the pressures against alliance with GWAPO still, we are ^ *' told, being overwhelming. The outcome, in tl:is case, is that several fornci* prominent Republican P?i'ty laer.ibcrs have abandoned politics altogether. Tl:a fooling r.pi)'2."jri; to be ?iuongst both groups th°.t the DTA 3ias f-ailed °.s' a •;.- politic"! c::pei-ii.ient, "Jid cannot succeed, whatever the tine-sppji r^iu howevcr itc po^rers be increased. ?or soue, the .?Aiswer is to return to. the \.hite i. ":*% I--,;cr; for others, to hope for p. diplomatic settlement before too r.mch •'•• dm?.ge is done to the potential fabric of the future new state. Both ps are surpri singly open in stating their viei-rpoints. A further elenent- in the disillusionment derives from'a"belief vhich is now iridespread in the Territory; that there, is in fact no genuine -Couth African concern for Hamibia or'its people at all, but, rather, that it has become a pa'.m in a serious •• political endfj.?ne nov beinc; played insi0.e the national Party in the Republic itself, vith pieces believed (in Cape To'.m and Pretoria) ^to be more r.i^nif- ic.?nt than Il/uiibia. ' oouth ."JTricn. is also jjcnerally believed to be concerned by the inpact on its ovn n^joritj' of the Mamibian outcone. Namibian sceptics believe that I!r. Ilud^e is bein^ penuitted only such reform possibilities in".-" • the Territory as './ill not vorsen r. dcop 0;vision in the Gouth '\fricrji •' ' Ilation-"! Party. (The nc'..r leader of the IIP in Ilcmlbia. 1-ir. Pretorius, is ''•*"'•'- said to be a close associate of'Dr. Trcurnicht. the Transvaal TIP leader and f- princip.nl vcrkrrrrotc in Jlr. Botha's Government). Thus, it is contended, the .supposed irnpcdiments to chnii^c posed by the coi.iplc;; structure of government ;• ir. I'mibir. r.nd by 1.rhitc civil Gcrv-^nts, bitterly complained of by llr. r.ad^c, •-i-e not fortuitous, and c-rc tolerated by the latter whose political base is .. steadily eroding and becoming more precarious. '•'-''•• , • . - ;' - '. .'.''•.:•:.-. .^s for the non-white majority, ".11 accounts f\gain suggest a growing • alienation from the FI1 \ sti*uctures of govcrraient and that pri-ty's leaders. .••••• Tojn^-;iy sections of tlic people, such le^/Tership ir, discredited, and it is ind-jc.l often remarked thr.t no clirrisraatic black leader has emerged from this grouping. For mojiy of its former supporters, the DTA has simply failed to . f :\ t •>•? ' v* j - •.-.." flolivoi* . In the wrr arena, the 3ADI1 r.ppcaro lru*£;cly to'havo abandoned ito * f "hearts r-nd minds" cwn^aign, The economic plight of th<^ country has hit ,,, •*-. ', at the poorest^,-:, ,, ,?;^/: p.. ^%: <.'- ^J^.^-ff ,.5^'- '•• •' ' ' ': ';" 0. In conclusion, it vould indeed seen that the situation inside •has entered a nc-.r phase in vhich the tactics both of oouth Africa and of the.;, ..^r; H2\ have, at least, changed direction. Miereas in the past it had seemed .'•' #*>• •': that both felt constrained by the inmincnt possibility of on election and , ." hy a j^iven international frar.Kr,;ork, .there is, today, little sicn of such • •. >,,f < irJiibitions. ;Jo:.ie Ilpmbians. blacl; and unite, until no\; resident in the' '''^--/r Tcirritory, have remarked on this chrn,^e. They state that what they call 'the'jf/;" ; cui'rcnt Jouth .Tricnai "arrogance" in Kainibir. has beco."nc intolerable, and J'"v^." ' has had no p"i%cJLlcl nince the demise of Portu^uccc colonial rule in 197^.^" '' They see little prospect of 'effective ch?:n£c for scversl years. Miile it has often cecn true in the last seven years that those in the Territory are the /v. '•' last to be a~,.rr?.r2 of the overall directions of chaivje in i c^cxd to ITrnibia.'_>;:"'',-.• it has also been found that oru- informants have Jbecn consistently accurate..V.K;.. in their previous observations. - ' .'• • • ;" '', ; •...„:,.•:'• • -'• : '•• ~ "• .": *••%.. ;.;'•%. • ; • •'': s ( ./-^N ' . » :.. 4' -.. - - .'. ..^1.7>'-'- -i . ;v*w . i CC: SG / NOTE FOR THE PILE On Tuesday, 8 September, I was informed by Mr. Ahmed that Mr. Steward (Mission of South Africa) had tried to reach the EOSG-duty officer on Labor Day, 7 September. Since I had been the duty officer that day and had not been contacted by him I called Mr. Steward to inquire what he had wished to discuss. He informed me that he wanted to bring to the Secretary-General's attention that South Africa had completed the withdrawal of its troops from Angola "a couple of days ago". He could not indicate a precise date and mentioned that the Mission had been informed of the completion of the withdrawal on Saturday, 5 September, without any further specification. He added that South Africa would reserve the right to again intervene in Angola if provoked by SWAPO. No official announcement of the completion of the South African withdrawal was intended since the commencement of the withdrawal had already been announced on 28 August. I informed the Secretary-General accordingly. Georg Mautner-Markhof 9 September 1981 (2) AR/GMM NOTE FOR THE FILE Security Council consultations on the complaint by Angola against South Africa on 31 August 1981 at 4.3O p.m. The President drew the attention of the members to the draft resolution issued as document S/14664 Rev. 1. The representative of Spain expressed concern that the resolution might not be adopted. If so, he said, the council should consider what to do next. He suggested that the members meet again in consultation after the vote at the formal meeting. The representative of France said that favourable changes had been made on the original draft. But he was still worried about whether a possible majority could be achieved. He hoped that some other changes in the draft could be envisaged. The representatives of Ireland and China said that they had no difficulty in accepting the draft resolution, but they shared the concern expressed by the representatives of Spain and France. The representative of the Philippines said that in conformity with the usual practice, the deliberations on an item would be considered concluded after a vote had been taken. The representative of Spain held that the resolution might be rejected, but the matter remained unresolved. He suggested that the council could adopt some other resolution if Angola considered that the council was still seized of the issue. - 2 - The representative of Uganda said that to talk about another resolution at this time would be "putting the cart before the horse". He would not support any time framework before the meeting was concluded. The Secretary-General gave his opinion that there was nothing wrong with taking up the issue again in another way. The problem was timing. Although he shared the concern expressed by the members, he would advise that the draft resolution be dealt with first. He expressed his hope that the council could achieve some results. The representative of the Soviet Union said that the vote on the draft resolution was the first thing today. As regards what the council should do after the vote, it would depend on what the member state concerned wanted. The representative of Niger said that if the decision of the council was in the negative, the council could consider some other way to (eWlp Angola, but Angola would like the council to take action today. The members finally agreed to adjourn the consultations and to take a vote on the draft resolution at the formal meeting. Lu-chih Chen 31 August 1981 >SG (2) RA (2) AR/GMM NOTE FOR THE FILE Security Council consultations on the complaint by Angola against South Africa on 27 and 28 Auaust 1981 The council met in consultation at 7.30 p.m. on 27 August on the complaint by Angola against South Africa. All the members agreed to accede to the request of Angola for an urgent meeting of the council. The Secretary-General stated that since his presence was necessary, he had cut short his vacation in Vienna. He briefed the members on his meeting with the Angolan Ambassador, who had told him that the South African forces had penetrated 1OO miles inside Angola. Since the situation was serious, he felt that the council should make it possible to call a meeting. A decision was made to hold the meeting on the afternoon of 28 August. Prior to the meeting on the afternoon of 28 August, the council met aqain in consultation at 4.3O p.m. that day. The President said that the serious situation called for prompt action by the council and proposed that as the first step, a presidential statement be inade, and that if the situation continued to deteriorate, a resolution could be adopted later- The Secretary-General informed the members that a message from South Africa had been received, saying that its security forces had completed their 'limited operation' and had started withdrawing. The Secretary-General added that in light of the new developments, a prompt action by the council was justified. - 2 - Most of the members agreed to issue a presidential statement to demand immediate withdrawal of South African troops, but there were different views on the contents of the statement. Some members suggested that the previous resolutions should be taken into account in considering South Africa's aggression, and that assistance, compensation and reference to Chapter 7 of the Charter should be included. The representative of the United States favoured two immediate expressions: (i) cessation of violence from all quarters; (ii) immediate withdrawal of South African forces. The members finally decided to go to the formal meeting straight away and to continue the discussion on the draft text in private consultations. Lu-chlh Chen 31 August 1981 RA (2) AR/GMM NOTE FOR THE FILE Security Council consultations on the death Sentences on three young men in South Africa, 25/26/27 August 1981 The Security Council met in consultation at 4.5O p.m. on 25 August to consider the Non-aligned Group's request for a presidential statement on the death sentences on three young men in South Africa. All the members agreed to the request, which was put forward by the Representative of Niger in his capacity as co-ordinator of the Non-aligned Group. They also stressed that prompt action should be taken, preferrably that night. Discussions took place on a draft (Annex I) prepared by the Non-aligned Group. The representative of the UK said that he would accept an altered version of the presidential statement issued in February this year when a similar case was considered by the council. As regards the text circulated by Niger, he had to refer it to his Government. The representative of the United States expressed the same view, and the representatives of Spain, Ireland and Japan thought that to use the February text was the most expeditious way of taking action. The representative of China said that he could go along with the Non-aligned draft and suggested that a different wording from the February statement be used so as to strengthen the appeal. The representative of the German Democratic Republic was of the view that since the situation was different from February, the present Non-aligned draft could be used as a basis - 2 to reach a consensus quickly. The representative of the Soviet Union suggested that the Non-aligned text be discussed paragraph by paragraph and sentence by sentence. The consultation were suspended for a while. When resumed, the representative of the United States said that his Government could only agree to the February text with minor changes and asked the members to permit him to consult his Government on the Non-aligned text. The President then adjourned the consultations until the morning of 26 August. When the council met again in consulta- tions at 5.15 p.m. on26 August, the President informed the members that a new text (Annex II) had been prepared, but problems still existed. The representative of the United States apologised for the delay, and added that after consulting the highest authorities of his Government, he had to go back to the February statement, which he thought was the best, and most suitable text for the council to adopt. The rperesentative of Spain said that he could fully support the new text and suggested that if no unanimity could be reached, a vote could be taken. The President, speaking in his capacity as representative of Panama, said that the difference was so slight he suggested that the council could discuss the matter in the open meeting. At the end of the consultations held at 7.3O p.m. on 27 August on the complaint by Angola against South Africa, the 5\ - 3 - representative of Niger, on behalf of the Non-aligned Group, suggested that a formal meeting be held immediately to hear members statements on this subject, to which the members agreed. Lu-chih Chen 31 August 1981 Draft Statement by the President of the Security Council The members of the Security Council have entrusted nc to express, on their behalf, their p,rave concern over the death sentences passed on August 19, 1981, by the Transvaal Division of the Supreme Court in Pretoria on Anthony Tsotsobe, 25, Johannes Shabangu/ 26, and David Moise, 25, the three African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) freedom fighters accused of involvement in the fipht against apartheid. I appeal to the South African novemment to spare the lives of these three younp, patriots. I believe that such action would help avert a further aggravation of the situation and would pave the way towards a just and lasting solution to the conflict, (^.-jj^~ in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the Council,Ain particular resolution 473 (1980), unanimously adopted, which recognize the legitimacy of the strup.p.le of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid and for the establishment of a democratic society in South Africa. Draft Statement by the President of the Security Council "The members of the Security Council have entrusted ne to express/ on their behalf, their grave concern over the death sentences recently passed by the Transvaal Division of the Supreme Court in Pretoria on Anthony Tsotscbe, 25, Johannes Shabangu, 26, and David Moise, 25 and which may be considered "» shortly by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Blce.-nf ontein. "Notinq that the death sentence has been passed for the second time within a few months, I strongly urge that the Government of South Africa, in order to avert further aggravating the situation in South Africa, should take into account the concerns expressed for the lives of these three young men." . • • / t ^'^C*'' • AR/GMM l NOTE POUR LE DOSSIER - Consultations tenues le 27 fSvrier 1981 a propos du rapport du Comite du Conseil de s£curit£ cree par la Resolution 421 (1977) concernant la question de 1'Afrique du Sud sur les moyens permettant de rendre I1embargo obligatoire sur les livraisons d'armes a 1'Afrique du Sud plus efficace (S/14179) Le President rappelle que le rapport du Comite des sanctions (Comite du Conseil de se'curite' cree en vertu de la resolution 421 (1977) a ete pr^sente au Conseil il y a d£ja quelques mois, et que le 19 decembre passe" le Conseil a decide de reprendre 1'examen de ce rapport dans un avenir proche. Certains membres ont estime1 qu1il etait temps que le Conseil precede a des consultations afin de determiner la pSriode a laquelle il devrait se rSunir a cet effet. Le Repr£sentant du Niger fait observer que sa delegation, ainsi que certains autres membres du Conseil commencent a s'inquieter du silence du Conseil depuis que le rapport a ete presente. Or, les conclusions auxquelles le Comite a abouti montrent bien que certains pays parviennent a se derober a I1embargo sur la livraison d'armes a 1'Afrique du Sud, et que par consequent il est urgent -d'examiner les moyens de combler; les lacunes qui existent. Il souhaite done que le Conseil se r^unisse le plus tot possible pour decider des mesures qui s'imposent. Il ne doute pas que tous les membres du Conseil veulent donneic une pleine signification a I1embargo decrete par le Conseil, LesRepresentantsde 1'Ouganda et de la Tunisie appuient les propos du Repr^sentant du Niger et se dedarent disposes ^ examiner le rapport du Comite des que possible. Us estiment que le Conseil devrait fixer la periode a laquelle le Conseil devrait reprendre ses travaux. Les Representants de 1'URSS. et de la Republique democratique allemande et de la Chine font egaleraent observer qu'il est temps que le Conseil examine le rapport et qu'ils sont prets a en discuter a tout moment. 2. Le President suggere que le 'Conseil reprenne ses travaux dans un avenir rapprochS.. Mais, il estime que le Conseil et I1Assembled ge'ne'rale ne devraient pas se r^unir simultane'ment. Son successeur devrait, par consequent, prendre contact avec les membres du Conseil lorsque 1'AssemblSe aura fini d1examiner la question de la Namibie, afin de fixer le moment ou le Conseil examinera le rapport de son Comite". MKP/JH Le 6 mars 1981 Note for the Pile 1. The Secretary-General spoke over the telephone with President Nyerere at 12.30 p.m. on 22 November 198O. 2. After once again congratulating President Nyerere on his re-election, the Secretary-General turned to the question of his forthcoming report to the Security Council on the question of Namibia. 3. The Secretary-General indicated that the Tanzanian Ambassador had informed him of President Nyerere's concerns and that he wished to discuss these personally with the President. 4. President Nyerere stated that if South Africa wanted a pre-implementation meeting, "we should give it to them". He added, "it may be that such a meeting could establish trust and confidence". However, it could also be the other way around. It was his fear that if we accede to South Africa's condition that everything depended on mutual trust, South Africa could use this later as an excuse not to implement resolution 435. 5. The Secretary-General stated that he well appreciated this concern. In order to meet it, he was considering adding his personal observations, at the end of the report, following on the "conclusions" that Mr. Ahtisaari had already shown President Nyerere. The Secretary-General read out the gist of these observations to the President. It was agreed that these observations would be cabled to Mr. Ahtisaari who would discuss them with the President on Sunday. 6. The Secretary-General added that the General Assembly would now open its debate on Namibia on Wednesday and he wished to issue his report, at the latest, on Tuesday. 7. President Nyerere asked what the Five, who were responsible for resolution 435 would do if South Africa said that no confidence had been created by the pre-implementation meeting. The Secretary-General said that IB understood that Botha* s meetings in London and Paris had been extremely tough and that if South Africa were to create further delays, this would not have the support or the understanding of the Western Five. Virendra Dayal 22 November 198O FOR AHTISAARI FROM SECRETARY-GENERAL I have today talked with President Nyerere personally and discussed with him the question of distrust and lack of confidence as in my report. I informed him that I proposed to add at the end of my report, after the conclusions, the following observations: QUOTE 25. In presenting the above ideas to the Council, I am fully aware of the widespread concern that if the time- frame for starting implementation is linked even indirectly to the issue of trust and confidence, we could face the risk of a further unacceptable delay. The position taken by my representatives is reflected in paragraph 11 above. I am also deeply aware of the concern of the international community over the all too long postponement of a solution to the question of Namibia. 26. I believe, however, that we may have reached a decisive phase in the long and difficult effort to resolve this question. I hope, therefore, that all concerned will now be prepared to move forward boldly, and in good faith, in order to ensure a sequence of events leading to the start of implementation of resolution 435 in. March 1981 and independence, on the basis of that resolution, by the end of 1981. UNQUOTE I expressed the hope to Dr. Nyerere that these observations will clarify the matter. It is my impression that he was receptive, although he wanted to see the full text of the observations before giving me a final answer. We agreed I would do this through you and that he would meet you tomorrow, Sunday, to discuss the matter. Nyerere* s preoccupation was clearly, as you had reported yourself, that the paragraphs in the conclusions dealing with distrust and lack of confidence would be used by South Africa later on as a pretext not to accept the implementation of resolution 435. I told him, in this connexion, that if South Africa wished to extricateTfrom the implementation of resolution 435 A-. - 2 - there were no doubt many other ways it could also choose to follow. In the meantime, however, South Africa had accepted the text of the conclusions as it was sent to you yesterday (for your information, it seems to be impossible to change this text). I hope that Dr. Nyerere will be able to go along with the observations given above. Should he suggest changes or amendments to these observations please report immediately. I informed the President that the debate on Namibia in the General Assembly will start next Wednesday and my report will have to come out latest Tuesday. Therefore the urgency of this matter and my gratitude to Dr. Nyerere for agreeing to discuss this with you on Sunday. 22 November 1980 Concluding 6 November 1980 is of vital importance that the independence of Namibia should be achieved in 1981 in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978). In order to achieve this aim a date for the cease-fire and a start of implementation should be set in the early part of 1981. One of the main obstacles to progress in the negotiations hitherto has been acute mutual distrust and lack of confidence. >thJLs--exte^ n* problem in itself affects the tting of a date for implementation. It was also informed that, i is obstacle can be overcome, M:he end of 1981 would be a realistic target date for the independence of Namibia. A means of facilitating agreement and of creating the necessary /~"~climate of confidence and understanding would be a pre- implementation multi-party meeting under the auspices of the United Nations, in which the parties concerned in the envisaged election would be included. There have recently been a number of initiatives and approaches from various quarters for such a meeting based on the United Nations plan, and other practical proposals in (Confomity with Security \ Council resolution 435 {1978).. Ingj^^i'SwTstoch a meeting \ / would facilitate the implementation of that resolution. It "~ would be understood that such a meeting would be held in the context of an agreed time-frame. Moreover, the meeting would enable the parties themselves to resolve difficulties created by distrust and lack of confidence, South Africa having reaffirmed its continuing role as the interlocutor under resolution 435. -2- In the expectation that the problem of confidence can be overcome by the holding of such a meeting, and subject to a satisfactory arrangement concerning the composition of UNTAG, I would, on the basis of the discussions recently held in Pretoria and after the necessary consultations, propose the date of 1 March 1981 for the commencement of implementation of resolution 435. Accordingly, f-propose=fchat a pre-implementation meeting be held in-Gaboroae from 1-6 December 1980 under the auspices and chairmanship of the United Nations. Within the frame- work of the United Nations plan and resolution 435 (1978) the meeting would discuss relevant aspects of implementation with the purpose of securing the cooperation of all concerned in the implementation process. In this connexion, it will be recalled that, under the settlement Proposal (S/12636, paragraph 12), the drawing up and adoption of a Constitution for an independent Namibia is the function of the Constituent Assembly. 'In- proposing tfhxs^ meeting, I intend to follow the formula agreed upon during bilateral discussions held earlier this year on the question of "direct talks". Accordingly, -**" intend to invite the attendance of the Government of South s* Africa and of SWAPO. It is understood that the Government of South Africa could include in its delegation representatives of the internal political parties from Namibia. JE^stiBO— intend to invite as observers the Governments of the Front-Line States and Nigeria, the OAU and the Governments of the Contact Group of Five Western States. BEU/jm SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS ON NAMIBL* - 29 OCTOBER 1980 Mr. President, I am glad to have this opportunity to give preliminary information to the council on the recent Secretariafs^nission to Pretoria. As you know, the United Nations team was instructed to discuss the modalities of proceeding -with the implementation of resolution 435, tho Central objective being the early implementation and the establishment of a time-frame for the cease-fire and emplacement of UNTAG. The team was also authorised to discuss certain matters raised in the letter of 29 August from the Foreign Minister of South Africa with a view to eliminating any outstanding obstacles to implementation. The talks in Pretoria commenced on Monday 2O October and concluded on Saturday October 25. On the basis of understandings reached in consultations here at United Nations Headquarters before its departure,, our team was able to state a position on all the matters raised in the letter of 29 August both concerning the demilitarized zone and on the question of so-called impartiality. in regard to the demilitarized zone the South African side raised certain further points, including questions which had been extensively discussed in previous missions. One of these related to the deployment of UNTAG in the entire demilitarized zone. The United Nations team made it clear that it had not come to Pretoria to re-negotiate^ understandings and arrangements previously agreed and^eferred repeatedly to the central objective of the establishment of a time-frame. The team pointed out that virtually all outstanding problems could be resolved within the context of establishing a date for implementation but that efforts to re-negotiate previous arrangements without establishing such a time-frame would create \ a very negative reaction at the United Nations. On the South African side the question of confidence and trust was frequently mentioned as the prior condition for resolving outstanding problems and in particular in relation to the establishment of a time-frame as repeatedly urged by the United Nations team. The South African side stressed that this problem needed to be addressed before it could agree to the implementation of resolution 435. The United Nations team pointed out that the establishment of confidence and trust were subjective and vague criteria, exceedingly difficult to define or quantify, and expressed South ^African the hope that the/1 point of view did not constitute a reservation on all that had been agreed before. Towards the conclusion of the talks informal soundings were made as to how the agreement of the South African Government to a time-frame and implementation could in practice be facilitated. in this connexion_therg_w.as an informal discussion of the usefulness of some kindoj pre-implementationmeetin^ under United Nations auspices along lines suggested in bilateral contacts earlier this year. It was stressed, however, that any such meeting would have to be within the frame-work of resolution 435 and could only take »"in .....aj ^^u<^«^ini«i»j|KfFa»«MCTi»''j«>^?ow^i^'a!»v^g«<>^^ place in the context of an agreed time-frame ^nd date for the commencement of implementation of resolution 435. Obviously such an arrangement would also have to have the consent of all the parties concerned. Throughout the discussions the United Nations team stressed that it was of vital importance that the independence of Namibia should be achieved in the year 1981 and that a starting date early in the year would therefore be essential. in the light of the i-aivef i».iii f™-™*! **A n- nf m-mai ^ in Pretoria I considered that a further exploration of some of the ideas discussed would be warj£an.tedt *£ it being understood that this -would not involve any considerable delay. I recalled in this context that prior to the Pretoria talks the Chairman of the Front -Line States informed me, in response to my enquiry concerning the so-called "dire'ct talks" which had been discussed bi-laterally during the summer, that the Front-Line . United Nations mission to proceed to Pretoria before any *-- jj -- -.m m ...... nn-n r " • • _r*\ I ••*"*••"•" ' • ' f V\ \ 7 1 " •"' u-r»a-T-^--| __ ^,^jiMHBi •nJ,^_|Lm,,M-1ia-_.^u-||Min--"-U-i-uiJ decision was taken concerning so-called direct talks. _ I therefore felt that it would be appropriate immediately to seek the views of the Chairman of the Front -Line States concerning the ideas put forward during the Pretoria talks, the main intention of which is to expedite the decision of the South African Government to agree now to an actual date for the commencement of implementation. I accordingly sent Mr. Ahtisaari to Bar es Salaam to consult president Nyerere in his capacity as the Chairman of the Front-Line States. Mr. Ahtisaari is at present holding consultations in Bar es Salaam. I wish to assure the council that I have no intention of being a party to further nrrtot-antii ail delays and I intend to report formally to the Council as soon as possible. However, I felt that in order to fully explore any possibilities we may have for an early implementation of resolution 435 I should enter into tfte consultations which I have described and which are now going on. I will, of course, keep the council informed promptly of further developments. 29 October 198O Tentative suggestion A/(mm< 1. in my opinion it is of vital importance that the independence of Namibia should be achieved in 1981 in accordance with Security Council resolution 435. in order to achieve this aim a date for the cease-fire and a start tw of implementation should be set i« the early part of 1981. 2. One of the main obstacles to progress in the negotiations hitherto has been acute mutual distrust and lack of confidence, •ber-lAttrT?H4fegd°-SafcLoa«^Ft^ej^) This problem in . affect»#. s* the/settin7 Ji. ... g2.3 .o f W-a/dat. ±e t fo**.***.*r implementationTTv^r* /iCaPiSJs-r-fj—JfiTtau^l^f —jN , rf^^^ ' 3. There have recently been a nuapbaiLof initiatives* /and- approache from various quarters for a meeting>Dased on the United Nations plan, in conformity with Security Council resolution 435, and.""d."""" / in connexion with any other practical pr opo sal s " of that resolution. A means of facilitating agreement and of creating the necessary climate of confidence and understanding would be a pre-implementation meeting under the auspices of Jbhe S^—r /• ill V * .United Nations in which the parties concerned in^ the nn-nrfeffir*>'i>^^***- •/ ft,*- • aTrso~~be included*J TM "iy ^jnfiyMif-Vi^h a meeting L .QoulA d facilitate the implementatio' n of Security council resolution 435. It would be understood that it would be held in the context S. In my opinion it is of vital importance that the independence of Namibia should be achieved in/ 1981 in accordance with Security Council resolution 435.; In order to achieve this aim a date for -the cease-fire .and a start of implementa- tion should be set in the early part of 1981. One of the main obstacles to progress in the negotiations hitherto has been acute mutual distrust and lack of confi- dence, extending even to the United Nations .itself. This problem in itself affects the. setting of .a date for imple- mentation. If it can be overcome, the end of 1981 would be a realistic target for the independence of South West Africa/Namibia. A means of facilitating agreement and of creating the neces- sary climate of confidence and understanding would be a multi-party meeting under the auspices of the Secretary- General of the United Nations, in which 'ther parties con- cerned in the envisaged elect j on would be included. There have recently been a number ot initiatives and approaches ^ftSJZcf -Cm from various quarters for such a meeting wlth^the United Nations plan,Yin conformity with Security Council resolu- tion 435, ahd_agy_ ' pjfacjtical proposals In my view, such a meeting would facilitate the implemen- tation of that Resolution. It would be understood that such a meeting would be held in the context of an agreed time-frame with_ja view_ tp_ these parties^themselves' respl- _ying the difficulties created "by distrust and lack of confi- dence. ? . If the problem of confidence can be overcome by the holding of such a meeting, and subject to a satisfactory arrange- ment concerning the composition of UNTAG, I would, on the basis of the discussions recently held in Pretoria and after the necessary consultations, propose the date of /I March 198JY for the commencement of implementation of Resolution 435 - '?*<'-£' AR/JEB CONFIDENTIAL b/ f : RA/GMM cc :Mr . Urquhart Mr. Far ah Mr.Ahtisaari , MEM File: Namibia NOTE FOR THE FILE The Secretary-General met with the President of the Security Council, Ambassador Troyanovsky, on 9 October 1980, at 4.50 p.m., in GA-20O. The President informed the Secretary-General that Ambassador Mills, speaking on behalf of the non-aligned countries, had asked him to schedule consultations of the Council regarding the question of Namibia. The purpose of the consultations would be to allow the Council members to receive from the Secretary- General some information concerning the forthcoming Secretariat mission to Pretoria. The Secretary-General pointed out that there was not much new information he could provide on the mission. The mission would go to Pretoria to discuss the modalities of the implementation of the UN plan but was not authorized to reopen negotiations on the substance of the plan. The Secretary-General added that he would, of course, be ready to have an exchange of views on the matter with the Council members. It was agreed to tentatively schedule the consultations for Tuesday, 14 October 1980. A. Rohar 10 October 198O AR/JEB CONFIDENTIAL b/f :RA/GMM cc : Mr . Urquhart Mr .Farah Mr.Ahtisaari MEM FilerNamibia NOTE FOR THE FILE The Secretary-General met with the President of the Security Council, Ambassador Troyanovsky, on 9 October 1980, at 4.50 p.m., in GA-2OO. The President informed the Secretary-General that Ambassador Mills, speaking on behalf of the non-aligned countries, had Basked him to schedule consultations of the Council regarding the question of Namibia. The purpose of the consultations would be to allow the Council members to receive from the Secretary- General some information concerning the forthcoming Secretariat mission to Pretoria. The Secretary-General pointed out that there was not much new information he could provide on the mission. The mission would go to Pretoria to discuss the modalities of the implementation of the UN plan but was not authorized to reopen negotiations on the substance of the plan. The Secretary-General added that he would, of course, be ready to have an exchange of views on the matter with the Council members. It was agreed to tentatively schedule the consultations for Tuesday, 14 October 198O. A. Rohai 1O October 1980 ECRETARY-GB1EEAL 0^ f] -""BEU/jra DRAFT September 198o Excellency, I should like to refer to your letter of 29 August 1980 (S/14139) in reply to the various clarifications I had communicated to you on 20 June 198o (S/14oll). After careful consideration, taking all factors of the situation into account as well as the great need to move forward without further delay, I believe that we should now proceed with the implementation of the United Nations plan contained in resolution 435 and related measures. For this purpose I would propose the initiation without delay of discussions with your Government on the modalities for such implementation including the setting of a time frame. As Your Excellency is aware, I have, on many occasions, expressed my deep concern at the cycle of violence resulting from the unresolved question of Namibia. I wish, therefore, to reiterate my view that the best way to stop such violence is by establishing, as soon as possible, the cease-fire which is the first step in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). Meanwhile, I shall continue to urge all concerned to exercise the maximum degree of restraint with a view to ending the bloodshed and facilitating the process of implementation. Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. Kurt Waldheim His Excellency Mr. R.F. Botha Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information of the Republic of South Africa Pretoria DRAFT 11 September 198O I have the honour to refer to the letter of 29 August 198O (S/14139) that I have received from the Government of South Africa on the question of Namibia. As Your Excellency is aware, the implementation of the settlement Proposal on Namibia (S/12636) has now been under intensive negotiation for two and a half years. I am anxious that there should be no further delay in this matter and have today proposed, in a letter to South Africa, that a United Nations team go to Pretoria to discuss the setting of a for the implementation of the United Nations plan. May I say that I am fully conscious of the active role played by your Government, as one of the authors of the settlement proposal, in the successive phases of the negotiating process. I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation for the support I have received from Your Excellency1 s Government. I have, moreover, had the fullest cooperation of the Front-Line States which have sustained our efforts at eac^stacfe of the negotiations. I am, however, deeply concerjg^ JfeeSTrtbie protracted nature of the discussions with South AfricaSt^Ll in question the credibility of the whole settlement process, particularly in view offactions of the South Africa Government in the Territory, Jfiiese Excellency, I should like to refer to your letter of 29 August 198O (S/14139) in reply to the various clarifications I had communicated to you on 20 June 198O (S/14O11). After careful consideration, taking all factors of the situation into account as well as the great need to move forward without further delay, I believe that we should now proceed wi±h the «impLamentatioi*- of th« plan.^^-For this purpose, I would propos^!#&. £iscusji5.oj£wit your Government oa-^fehe - setting—of a time-frame and othe: for sw:h imul'eTSgii'fea-teion. -T am i As Your Excellency is aware, I have, on many occasions, expressed my deep concern at the cycle of violence resulting / 1 from the unresolved naLure • of VLiI m U4UUllbJran question./^--^TC" 'IV**— wish-*-^-,7 therefore, to reiterate my view that the best way to stop such violence is by establishing, as soon as possible, the ceasefire which is the first step in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). Meanwhile, I shall continue to urge all concerned to exercise the maximum degree of restraint with a view to ending the bloodshed and facilitating the process of implementation. Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. Kurt Waldheim His Excellency Mr. R. F. Botha Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information of the Republic of South Africa Bretoria DRAFT 11 September 198O I should like to refer to your letter of 29 August 198O (S/14139) in reply to the various clarifications I had communicated to you on 2O June 198O (S/14O11). After careful consideration, taking all factors of the situation into account and the great need to move forward without further delay, I believe that we should now proceed with the implementation of the united Nations plan. To this end, I propose to send a team of senior united Nations officials to South Africa » /-» •ijLto discuss with your Government the setting of a^olte^orf ^^^(^(^y /Oimplementation nnri nthmr mJntarl ip-^fHT I would suggest that these discussions take place during the week from 22 to 29 September 198O. As Your Excellency is aware, I have, on many occasions, expressed my deep concern at the cycle of violence resulting from the unresolved nature of the Namibian question. I wish, therefore, to reiterate my view that the^Say to stop such violence is by establishing, as soon as possible, the ceasefire which is the first step in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). Meanwhile, I shall continue to urge all concerned to exercise the maximum degree of restraint with a view to ending the bloodshed and facilitating the process of implementation. CONFIDENTIAL I -I L! Note for the Ambassador Eksteen of South Africa called the Secretary- General at 12 noon on 30 August from Pretoria. On behalf of his Foreign Minister, he asked the Secretary-General to consider the letter addressed to him in a positive light, as the South Africans had viewed the Secretary-General's letter of 20 June in a constructive spirit. The Foreign Minister would like the Secretary-General to focus on paragraphs two through seven and twenty-two and twenty-three. The over-riding issue was contained in paragraph twenty-three, especially its last sentence, which referred to the most recent meeting between Ambassador Eksteen and the Secretary-General concerning the question of bringing the parties together. The Secretary-General should now proceed on this course. The Secretary-General replied that he was studying the Foreign Minister's letter carefully. His position on the substance of it would be made known in due course. However, he immediately wished to reject the accusations against him contained in the letter and expressed his surprise over its tone. The Secretary-General did not believe that it was a correct approach to include South Africa's objections to his public statements in a letter which dealt with the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The Secretary- General felt that South Africa had every right to make its views on his statements known but it was not helpful to combine them in the way which had been done in the Foreign Minister's letter. Ambassador Eksteen responded that, naturally, he could not tell the Secretary-General to ignore paragraphs eight through twenty-one, but he would ask that he not be too concerned by them. He added that the Secretary-General should have an understanding of their internal situation. - 2 - The Secretary-General said that he had taken note with interest of the points made by Ambassador Eksteen. He hoped that it would be possible to make progress towards the implementation of the Security Council resolution. He, however, remained convinced that accusations of the nature contained in the Foreign Minister's letter were not helpful, especially, for example, as regarded his statement at the OAU summit in Freetown, when he had used language that was almost identical to that of the British representative in the Security Council. Ambassador Eksteen did not respond directly but stressed once again the importance of the final paragraph and particularly its last sentence appropos the bringing of the parties together. The Secretary-General reiterated that the Foreign Minister's letter would be studied carefully and that he could not give a premature answer. He and his colleagues were doing thier best to assist in moving towards a settlement. The Secretary-General hoped that Ambassador Eksteen would return to New York soon. The Ambassador replied that he intended to return shortly. In the interim, there were three other matters to which the Foreign Minister had asked him to draw the Secretary-General's attention. First, the African National Congress had taken South Africa's seat at the meeting recently held on Namibia Day. The South African Mission had been in touch with the Legal Counsel on the matter and hoped that steps would be taken to avoid its recurrence. The Secretary-General stated that, upon his return to New York, he had been informed about the ANC's action and had asked the Legal Counsel to look into the matter. Second, the South African Government was concerned over the United Nations' participation in the conference being held in Paris on "Solidarity with the Struggle of the People of Namibia". If at all possible, the Secretary-General should not send a representative to that conference, or at least representation should not be at a high level. The Secretary- General took note of these views. - 3 - Third, the Foreign Minister was considering coming to New York for the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly but the exact timing had not yet been decided. It was hoped that the Foreign Minister's presence would not raise any complications in the Assembly and anything the Secretary- General could do to facilitate seating South Africa in the General Assembly would be of great importance. The Secretary-General welcomed the Foreign Minister's decision to come to New York as it would give them an opportunity to have consultations on the Namibian question. As regarded participation in the General Assembly, this was a matter for the Assembly itself to decide. He would inform the new President of this development in due course. The Secretary-General concluded by saying that he considered this to be the decisive moment for making progress towards a just and peaceful settlement of the Namibia question. He hoped very much that it would be possible to proceed with the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) without undue delay. Rafeeuddin Ahmed f tius and Nigeria,50 to extend an invitation to Mr. Sam 4. Welcomes the preparedness of the South West Nujoma under rule 39 of the provisional rules of Africa People's Organization to co-operate in the im- procedure. plementation of the Secretary-General's report, includ- ing its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from its President of 8 September 1978; At the same meeting, the Council further decided, 5. Calls upon South Africa forthwith to co-operate at the request of the representatives of Gabon, Mauri- with the Secretary-General in the implementation of tius and Nigeria,00 to extend an invitation to Mr. Edem the present resolution; Kodjo under rule 39 of the provisional rules of proce- dure. 6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of reso- lutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and the present resolution, are null and void; Resolution 435 (1978) 7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the of 29 September 1978 Security Council not later than 23 October 1978 on The Security Council, the implementation of the present resolution. Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976) of 30 Jan- Adopted at the 2087th meet- uary 1976 and 431 (1978) and 432 (1978) of 27 July ing by 12 votes to none, 1978, with 2 abstentions (Czecho- slovakia, Union of Soviet Having considered the report of the Secretary-Gen- Socialist Republics).6' eral submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolu- tion 431 (1978)61 and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 September 1978 (S/ 12869),82 Decisions Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government of South Africa to the Secretary- General, At its 2088th meeting, on 30 September 1978, the Council decided to invite the representative of Guinea Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the 1978 from the President of the South West Africa question. People's Organization to the Secretary-General,63 Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia, 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General At its 2092nd meeting, on 31 October 1978, the on the implementation of the proposal for a settlement Council decided to invite the representatives of Bu- of the Namibian situation0* and his explanatory state- rundi, Egypt and Ghana to participate, without vote, ment; in the discussion of the item entitled: 2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal "The situation in Namibia: of South Africa's illegal administration from Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia "(«) Report of the Secretary-General submitted with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance pursuant to paragraph 7 of Security Council with Security Council resolution 385 (1976); resolution 435 (1978) concerning the situa- 66 3. Decides to establish under its authority a United tion in Namibia (S/12903); Nations Transition Assistance Group in accordance "(b) Letter dated 24 October 1978 from the Per- with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary- manent Representative of Burundi to the General for a period of up to 12 months in order to United Nations addressed to the President assist his Special Representative to carry out the man- of the Security Council (S/12906)".68 date conferred upon him by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of its resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations; At the same meeting, the Council also decided to extend an invitation, under rule 39 of the provisional 3B/Wrf., document S/12866. rules of procedure, to a delegation of the United 1)0 Ibid., document S/12872. oi/iiW., document S/12827. Nations Council for Namibia, composed of the Presi- mlbid.. Thirty-third Year, 2087th meeting, paras. 11-22. dent and three Vice-Presidents of that body. "3 Ibid., Supplement for July, August and September 1978, document S/12841. 05 One member (China) did not participate in the voting. 04 Ibid., Supplement for April, May and June 1978, docu- «* See Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third ment S/12636. Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1978. 13 JfeU • . • BEU/jm 22 August 198O TO: The Secretary-General. Prime Minister Mugabe and Namibia On 21 August in a piece on Mugabe's imminent visit, the New York Times referred to his apparent intention to propose to you that talks on Namibia be held in Sjilisbury. As you know, the idea of some kind of "Lancaster House" talks has been circulating since early March and has been mentioned to you by Kaunda and other Front Line presidents. 2. In the Security council consultations of 17 June you mentioned the message on this subject which you had received from Ambassador Salim and other Front Line Ambassadors on 13 June. At that time Salim suggested that if South Africa continued to use dilatory tactics the Front Line States would propose to you a conference between SWAPO and South Africa to be chaired, at least in the initial stages, by you. This would be a conference between south Africa and SWAPO, it being understood that the Front Line States could attend as observers if the Secretary-General so wished, and the South African Government could include any elements it wanted in its delegation. 3. It has been pointed out by some of the Western Five that there are radical differences between the present Namibian situation under resolution 435 and the pre-independent^ Zimbabwe situation. 4. There have been some hints from South African sources of a possible constitutional conference before UNTAG takes place. This would be incompatible with resolution 435 which contemplates UN-supervised elections for a constituent assembly. What else might be on the agenda of such a conference is not clear, since serious technical difficulties concerning implementation of 435 have already been cleared up. 5. Another obvious difficulty is that none of the internal parties in Namibia (of which there are between thirty and forty at the last count) would be likely to accept being part of the South African delegation, whereas the Front Line States and SWAPO would certainly not accept them in their own right. 6. Another danger of a conference would be that it might legitimise further delaying tactics. 7. YOU have stated that in your view the South African reply, which is now due on Tuesday 26 August, should resolve all outstanding issues in the way of resolution 435. If the South African reply raises further complications it seems likely that in any case you would have to ask the Security council for its comments and advice before proceeding to any further steps. Brian Urquhart CONFIDENTIAL Secretary-General 1. When handing over South Africa's reply today, Mr. Steward expressed his Government1s concern regarding an "international Conference in Solidarity with the Struggle of the People of Namibia," being held in Paris between 11-13 September 198O. 2. Mr. Steward expressed the hope that the UN Secretariat would "distance" itself from the Conference and that you would personally not be associated with it. 3. We have gathered that the Conference is being held at the initiative of SWAPO and that participants will include leading non-governmental organizations. Invitations have, additionally, been sent to the President/Chairman of the Council for Namibia, Committee Against Apartheid, committee of Twenty-Four and the Office of the Commissioner for Namibia. It also appears that you have been invited and that Mr. Djermakoye plans to attend on your behalf. You may wish to consider the level at which the Secretariat should be represented. 4. We understand, in this connection, that the Council for Namibia is using the Fund for Namibia to provide some $5O,OOO for the Conference. 29 August 1980 iH^T Brian E. Urquhart Note for the File Strictly Confidential Meeting between the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representative of South Africa, held at the Secretary-General's Residence, New York Wednesday, 30 July 1980, 7.00 pm Present were: The Secretary-General H.E. Mr. Jacobus Adriaan Eksteen, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations Mr. Francois Giuliani The main topics discussed were: South Africa's reply to the Secretary-General's letter of 20 June 1980 concerning Namibia and possible ways to further negotiations. The Secretary-General said he wanted to review the situation concerning Namibia before leaving New York. No progress was being made and South Africa's reply to his letter of 20 June was not forthcoming. This had created disquiet among African delegations and there was talk of calling a Security Council meeting. Ambassador Lusaka of Zambia had told him only the day before that the Front Line states were suspicious of the Western Five's motivations and felt they were reluctant to put pressure on South Africa-. Yet South Africa's main objections had been met and the Front Line states had put a great deal of pressure on SWAPO to achieve this result. The Secretary-General felt that the Front.Line states were genuinely interested in a solution of the problem and it was up to South Africa to make a decisive move. There could be no question of re-negotiating the agreement backed by the Security Council and South Africa's reply should not raise substantial issues. Ambassador Eksteen said that his Government was fully aware of the importance of its reply. A decisive stage had been reached and South Africa's reply should be forthcoming before the end of August. In order to make sure that the reply was acceptable to the Secretary-General and could lead to a quick settlement, the South African Government was prepared to submit it to the Secretary- General in advance for his comments. • » • f • • • — "2. — The Secretary-General said that, although he appreciated the South African Governments's courtesy, there was nothing he would be able to say in advance about a draft reply that could be useful. It would be up to the Front Line states and SWAPO to decide, and he could not answer for them. Ambassador Eksteen recalled his Government's suggestion, conveyed confidentially by Francois Giuliani earlier, that the .Secretary-General should visit Pretoria in order to break the deadlock. The Secretary-General felt that such a visit would serve no purpose at this stage, although he did not rule it out in the future. If there were some details, however, that South Africa still wished to clarify, a meeting between representatives of South Africa and SWAPO could be arranged under the Secretary- General's auspices. The Secretary-General compared this to the Lancaster House Conference which resulted in an agreement on Zimbabwe, although he noted the differences between the two cases. Ambassador Eksteen mentioned his Government's difficulties in dealing directly with SWAPO. However, they were prepared to appoint a representative such as the Administrator General of Namibia. The Secretary-General felt that procedural matters could be overcome. It was up to South Africa to decide how it would be represented in talks with SWAPO. "But what about the participation of the Namibian internal "parties?" asked Ambassador Eksteen. The Secretary-General thought that the problem could be overcome by associating the internal parties with the South African delegation. When could such a meeting take place, in view of the forth- coming General Assembly which required the Secretary-General's presence in New York ? The Secretary-General said that the meeting could take place in a mutually agreed location, and he was prepared to convene it at any time during the General Assembly in view of the urgency of the situation. He was prepared to leave New York for a few days . after the General Debate in the General Assembly if a breakthrough could be achieved. _ Ambassador Eksteen said he would convey the Secretary-General's suggestions to his Government, which would study them with the greatest attention. He would keep the Secretary-General informed of all developments, since he was returning to Pretoria the following day. F. Giuliani -r 6-t A— 19 June 1980 CONFIDENTIAL R EC EfV'£ D Security Council Consultations; 17 June 1980. 1200 hours. JUN j 91980 On Namibia, at 1220 hours, the Secretary-General said that he had been informed concerning the outcome of the Lusaka Summit of Front Line States which had considered the South African letter of 12 May concerning Namibia. He was in the process of finalising his reply to South Africa. He said that on Friday 15 June he had received the Permanent Representatives in New York of the Front Line Governments. They had reported to him on the meeting of their Presidents together with Prime Minister Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Sam Nujoma. He had been informed that the position as reported to him by the Front Line Permanent Representatives was also that of SWAPO. It had been the position taken by all the parties at the Lusaka Summit. He added that he had seen Mr. Gurirab of SWAPO on Monday 16 June and that Mr. Gurirab had confirmed that SWAPO's position was the same as that of the Front Line States. The Summit had decided the issues raised by the South African letter were those contained in its paragraph U and that the other matters appearing in its later paragraphs were somewhat irrelevant. As regards paragraph It (a) of the South African letter, namely, the question of 20 South African selected locations in the SMZ, the Summit was prepared to be flexible. There was no opposition to this proposal, provided that the spirit and letter of the original settlement Proposal was also strictly adhered to. As regards paragraph k(c), dealing with the question of closure of SWAPO bases seven days after the certification of the election result, the Summit had felt that this was not an issue. It followed logically from the settlement Proposal that, once elections had been held under UN supervision and control, the SWAPO bases inside the Front Line States would be closed. It was also logical that appropriate arrangements would be made for the disposition of personnel and equipment in the former bases, following consultations between the Governments of the Front Line States concerned, and the newly-elected Government of independent Namibia. As regards paragraph Ij-(d), dealing with the question of SWAPO bases in Namibia, the Front Line States and SWAPO had made it very clear for quite some time that this was not a problem. In the spirit of cooperating with the Secretary-General for the implementation of the Plan, there was no insistence for the maintenance of SWAPO bases inside the Territory. The Summit had also taken the view that there was no real obstacle to the implementation of the Plan except South Africa's continued stalling and delaying tactics. The Summit hoped that with the clarifications which it had given, the Secretary-General would proceed to press for its implementation. The Front Line states stressed the urgency of proceedingwith implementation, - 2 - eind of leaving no room for further delaying tactics and manoeuvers. The Summit had pledged its continued support to the Secretary-General in his efforts to this end. As he had said, he was now in the process of preparing his answer to the South African letter, and would incorporate the very positive positions adopted by the Front Line States, in dealing with this particular paragraph. The Secretary-General said that he would now see Ambassador Eksteen and inform him of the situation. He would make it clear that South Africa should not use the exchange of letters as a means for further delay. He would stress that South Africa now had to take a political decision whether to go ahead. He would also stress the very cooperative attitude which had been taken by the Front Line States and SWAPO. The procedure which he would now follow would be that if his letter created a positive response from South Africa then the Secretariat would prepare for the implementation of li-35 according to the pre-existing plans. He would again mention the need for a run-up period of six weeks between the decision, to go ahead and the ceasefire. If the South Africans did not at once give a positive answer and if South Africa tried again to raise a number of replying technicalities, the Front Line had also considered this possibility before^to him. They had indicated to him that they would not exclude the possibility of a meeting chaired by the UN, and(to begin with at least;by himself, between South Africa and SWAPO.-. He himself felt that the question which would be raised in any such context would be that of the representation of theinternal elements in Namibia. The Front Line's suggestion had been that they should be incorporated in the South African delegation. They would not be acceptable as an independent negotiating entity. However, he emphasised that the UN had not reached that point. He wanted to make reference to this contingency merely because it had been referred to in the media. He wanted to inform the Council regarding the real situation. He would finally mention that it was his intention to send the letter to South Africa before the end of the week. Ambassador Troyanovsky expressed the Soviet Union's appreciation for the Secretary-General's briefing. It followed from what had been said that the Front Line and SWAPO had taken a most constructive attitude. This was quite a contrast to the South African letter which in tone and content had presented quite a challenge to the UN. It had contained issues which w ere quite unacceptable. For example, the reference to General Assembly resolutions, and to anti-governmental bands in Angola. These suggestions should be rejected. The Soviet Union had a feeling that South Africa was again stalling in order to bolster its puppets in Namibia. They felt that this activity would be continued. They felt that there should be some time limit as to how long the present procedure could go on. There could not for e xample be a delay of several months while the procedure went on. He wanted to emphasise, therefore, that some time frame ^ should be borne in mind. If there were further progress, then his government would want to have further consultations on how elections should be carried on, but he would not go into this at the moment. He would, however, want to raise it if there was a clear prospect of implementation. He would also want to refer to the composition of the civilian component and to some other matters. He thought it important that there had been the contact which had. been mentioned witii SWAPO and he hoped that the Security Council would be kept informed. The Ambassador of Niger said that he also wished to thank the Secretary- General for the briefing and to say that the African States fully supported the Front Line and SWAPO in the decisions which they had taken. For his part, he wished further to endorse what the Secretary-General had said regarding the positive attitudes of the Front Line Governments. The Secretary-General said that he would like to refer to the question of a time limit. It was clear that the present procedure could not go on forever. He intended to make that clear to South Africa. This could not be the beginning of another long phase of exchanges of notes. South Africa should be aware that the technical aspects had now been fully clarified as a result of the UN mission and the r ecent Front Line decisions. Now there was a solid basis for going ahead with UNTAG which should not be complicated by more technicalities being raised. The letter which he intended to send would reflect this position. When implementation was agreed upon then there could be more discussions on various matters and he would not hesitate to ask for further consultations with the Security Council. The meeting concluded at 1240 hours. Cedric Thornberry cc: Secretary-General Mr. Urquhart Mr. Farah . Mr. Ahtisaari Mr. Dayal Mr. Muganda 17 June 1980 CONFIDENTIAL NOTE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL Meeting with Ambassador Eksteen Wednesday, 18 June, lo am Additional to summarising the main elements of the proposed reply to South Africa, the following points could be made to Ambassador Eksteen : (1) I have been very much impressed by the co-operative attitudes shown by the Front Line States in order to meet the concerns of the South African Government* (2) The need for the earliest possible implementation of resolution 435. All the parties consulted have emphasised the necessity to proceed, without delay, to implementation. Further delays will only complicate and endanger the possibilities of a peaceful settlement* There is now a need for a political decision, as the outstanding matters will, in my opinion, be disposed of in my letter. An early decision by the South African Government to co-operate in the implementation of resolution 435 would create the necessary positive climate for implementation. 2. (3) impartiality For my part, I am entirely committed to ensuring the impartiality of UNTAG in Namibia and my letter will be explicit and forthcoming on this subject. However, I feel that I must, once again, reiterate my serious concern over reported internal developments in the Territory* As was pointed out by the UN mission in cape Town, the actions of the Government of South Africa in this regard could prejudice the implementation of resolution 435, which incorporates the provisions of the settlement Proposal* I wish to emphasise that, under the proposal, the Administrator-General is also expected to carry out his various functions with complete impartiality. On our part, it is intended that Mr. Ahtisaari «**•*•—-"" """ will resign his post as commissioner for Namibia once implementation commences. It seems to me that if there is a clear commitment to implement resolution 435 (1978) by the time that the General Assembly meets, this — more than any other factor - will influence the deliberations of the General Assembly and help to meet any residual preoccupations which South Africa may have in regard to the positions taken by the Assembly. in any event, DNTAG*s actions are being undertaken under Security council resolution 435. 6 June 198O Note to the Secretary-General Namibia (a) We have been in touch with Ambassador Salim and also with Bernard Huganda in oar es Salaam about the reply to your letter of 2O May to the Front-Line States. We have suggested, and Salim agrees, that there must be a written reply concerning the findings of the Lusaka summit meeting, more particularly since there are different versions of the outcome of the summit. (b) Salim told me that the summit agreed, with SWAPO's concurrence, that there would be no SWAPO bases in Namibia. As far as 2o South African locations in the DMZ were concerned, they were flexible on the number but wanted to know the nature and numbers of troops in the 2O locations. The meeting fully supported the Secretary- General in implementing the plan. (c) If necessary, as a further phase, the Secretary-General might convene a direct meeting between SWAPO and South Africa under his chairmanship. The Front-Line States might send observers to such a meeting which would be for the purpose of ironing out the remaining differences between South Africa and SWAPO. The South Africans could, if they wished, bring representatives of the internal parties as part of their delegation. "" »^ - ..— i (d) Salim1s account of the Front-Line summit is substantially different from Huganda's account, it is all the more necessary, therefore, to have a written response to your letter. (e) in the meantime, we have prepared a basic draft reply to the South African letter which may have to be adjusted in the light of the written response of the Front-Line States, which we hope to receive early next week. Brian Urquhart TW! Fs rSFCPjT/i fc'-Y'.A.t,B- VD/ns 28 May 198O Note to the Secretary-General Namibia 1. In the course of last week, the President of the Security Council met individually with Members regarding the possibility of informal consultations on Namibia. 2. Informal consultations with the Council have been requested by Ambassador Troyanovsky. When last they were held, on 26 March, you had indicated that you would consult again with Members upon hearing from South Africa. 3. As to the timing of the consultations, certain factors are relevant: (i) We understand that the Front-Line States will be meeting in Lusaka on 31 May to consider the South African letter of 12 May. They plan to adopt, if possible, a common position in replying to your letter of 2O May. (ii) The Council for Namibia is holding its session in Algiers till 31 May. Ambassador Lusaka and Mr. Ahtisaari are therefore out of town at present, (iii) The Angolan Permanent Representative has addressed a note verbale to you today, referring to the latest South African attacks on Angola. The Permanent Representative has also requested that this note be circulated as a Security Council document. According to the note, the South Africans used aircraft, armoured vehicles and heavy artillery in attacks on southern Angolan villages on 12 and 21 May, as a result of which - 2 - there were over 2OO Angolan casualties (press reports also indicate South African casualties). The Angolan note suggests that the attacks were undertaken with a view to making UNITA a party to the DMZ proposal. (iv) In a meeting in Dar-es-Salaam of the OAU Liberation Committee today, Peter Mweshihange, SWAPO's Secretary for Foreign Relations, rejected the terms of South Africa's 12 May letter. He appealed to the United Nations "to refrain from bowing to South Africa's blackmail" and called instead for sanctions. 4. In these circumstances, it might be more logical to hold consultations with the Council early next week, v —•*• .^». .,.—... j-mJrn rather than this week. However, Members may prefer to meet this week for preliminary consultations. This may be clarified in the Security Council consultations to be held this afternoon. /bu March 1980 QTEi TQ /ETHE /SECREJ^RY-GENERAL 1. Through U.S. channels, we have received the concluding statements made in Capetown today by Mr. Urquhart, on behalf of the UN Mission, and Mr. Fourie, on behalf of the South African Government (texts are attached as annexes I and II) . 2. I understand that Mr. Urquhart has urged the South African's not to leak to the press the contents of either statement. 3. Should there be need for Mr. Stajduhar to say anything to correspondents, I would suggest that he keep to the draft statement which is attached (Annex III). It was dictated by Mr. Urquhart over the telephone. 4. Also attached for easy reference is a copy of my note to you of 4 March, which lists the six points mentioned in Mr. Botha's letter of 5 December 1979, to which Mr. Urquhart refers in his concluding statement. Virendra Dayal Annex I CONFIDENTIAL 1. Following is text of Urquhart's statement: I am grateful to have this concluding meeting because I felt it was important to have an opportunity to sum up our discussions of the last four days as a basis for our talks in the capitals which we are now about to visit. As I said in my opening remarks, we had hoped to have your acceptance of the DMZ on the basis of our responses concerning points 1, 3,- 4 and 5 of Foreign Minister Botha's letter of 5 December 1979 as a basis for addressing the remaining outstanding issues* Although we have covered much ground since we have been here, especially on the practical side, I understand that you still require further time before you can give us a final response even as regards the four points I have mentioned. This, as I explained this morning, creates very grave^difficulties for us but we will do our best to overcome them. I feel I should urge you, however, to let us have your further responses in the minimum possible time and at the maximum within two weeks, since this further delay after the period spent by General prera Chand in Namibia anoTeven the week which the remainder of the mission has spent here in Capetown will certainly not increase our possibilities to find satisfactory solutions to the oustanding issues. May I also urge you, in your consideration of the military aspects of the outstanding matters, to bear in mind the special nature of United Nations peace-keeping operating procedures which have been explained to you very fully by General Prem Chand and Colonel Dibuama. We have tried to make clear the different nature of these operations, together with their special advantages. I hope that your judgment of the matters outstanding will therefore be formed in this light and not by the military procedures which pertain in a nati onal defence force. These are not strictly applicable in peace-keeping, especially in a demilitarized zone, as distinct from a combat zone. - 2 - I feel I should say that it seems likely that an approach on the outstanding issues can only surely be facilitated by a complete acceptance, on your side, of the situation which we have explained regarding points 1, 3, 4 and 5 as well as some reasonable expectation of the early implementation of the proposal as a whole. I do not wish to summarise here the points outstanding after our discussions. I feel I should mention, however, two points which seem to us to be of capital importance from WHMMMMM*tf» ""• .v^-«B^.«.*«TBUSt~*Tr*«rt»1-ter 1^, ~.,.y»—„ i^S1--*.--W-T H a* purely practical point of view-,namela y the?siz&/i ^—e of the UNTAG military component and the\ttumber of-"selected locations. I hope very much therefore that you will give the fullest recognition to the position which I have stated on these two points. As I said this morning, the Security Council and others who are deeply concerned with this question will be less interested in the details of our discussions, however practical and constructive these may be, than in the basic question of implementation and above all of a target jatgs for implementation. I mentioned this morning certain practical J J t *iw«irgi» iS.j« * "* "-*'"'-'^»!ajg W—M +fw~—•*• - *-*— •— -wjaw. — - —* •*• considerations which affect the process of implementation in regard to climate and other factors. In this respect a practical target date which would avoid yet another long delay in implementation would seem to be at the latest in the early part of June. I do not need to add that such a date would have to be tied in practice to the six week period^ which we estimate to be the minimum for effective mobilisation of the military component of UNTAG. I hope that your response may also deal with this vital matter. We have taken full note of the information and clarific- ations given to us concerning internal developments in the territory, and in particular the statement that the South African Government does not intend to transfer executive - 3 - authority once the implemtation of resolution 435 is underway. I wish to reiterate once again the concern which is manifest in the international community that any such transfer, at any stage, would be incompatible with resolution 435. We appreciate the progress made on the UNTAG status frva; •^aaf^i »x.-v -*• •* agreement and understand that there are no major obstacles. May I say once again that while we also are labouring under increasing pressures, we do understand and appreciate your difficulties. We hope, however, that after the very extensive discussions held both in the territory and here in Capetwon, you may be able to help us at the earliest possible date to go forward. Annex II CONFIDENTIAL Following is the text of the South African statement: The South African Government reaffirms its acceptance of the settlement proposal and its~~aecision to co-operate "* in implementing Security Council resolution 435(1978). As already indicated, the South African Government has accepted the concept of the DMZ provided agreement could be reached on certain aspects as referred to in its letter of 5 December 1979. Some of those aspects were fully explored during the present visits of the UN teams to South West Africa/Namibia and South Africa and progress has been made. To reach finality the co-operation of all parties is necessary. In respect of the discussions between the UNTAG military commander and the South African military authorities the position reached is as follows: A. A wide spectrum of natters was discussed and agreement reached on a significant number. B. The UN delegation described its concept of deployment and monitoring the DMZ. C. Furthermore it outlined the parameters according to which its resources would be employed. D. Based on the above the South African Defence Force will now test and evaluate the feasibility of the UN concept for presentation to the South African Government. The South African Government's conclusion will be transmitted as soon as possible. Annex III The United Nations mission has had four days of intensive and wide-ranging discussions with South African Government officials in Capetown relating to the demilitarized zone and the implementation of Security Council resolution 435. It is now continuing with its mission to the front-line states. (It will be recalled that a group under Lt. Gen. Prem Chand, responsible for the technical phase of the mission, had earlier completed its work in Namibia on 29 February). The mission, led by Mr. Brian Urquhart, which began its talks with the South African Government in Capetwon on 4 March, concluded them on Friday, 7 March. The mission will next hold discussions in Botswana. Leaving Capetown on the morning of 8 March, it will stop over in Windhoek. This will provide the opportunity for those members of the mission who have not yet visited Namibia to acquaint themselves briefly with the local situation. The mission will proceed to Botswana on 9 March. Transmitted by UK channels. 6 March 1980 V For information Urquhart from Dayal. Following is text of message addressed to Secretary-General by Savimbi: "Nous avons attendu que, dans votre souci de resoudre probleme Namibien, vous prendriez contact avec nous qui controlons la partie sud angolaise qui interesse la zone demilitarised. Comma j'ai ete a New York en novembre dernier et que je n'ai pas ete contacte et qu'il y a en ce moment meme votre de1 legation dans la region en question, il serait souhaitable que vous 1'autorisiez a visiter la zone sud de I1Angola et a prendre contact avec nous pour discuter de I1application de ce plan. Si 1'UNITA n'est pas tenue en consideration dans le plan de la creation de la zone demilitarisee, avec regret nous nous reservons droit de consid^rer toutes forces etrangeres intervenant dans le sud de notre pays comme des allies des envahisseurs cubains et traites comme tels. Les russes et les cubains ont assez aliene notre ind^pendance nationale par leur invasion. Nous restons en armes jusqu'au depart des cubains de notre pays. Nous vous prions. Excellence, que ce message soit aussi transmis aux cinq pays occidentaux engages dans le plan de la zone de'militarise'e au sud de I1 Angola. Nous vous informons aussi que notre representant H 1'extSrieur, M. J. Chitunda, est §. votre disposition pour un contact si vous le jugez utile. Respectueusement. (Signe) Jonas M. Savimbi, President, UNITA, Angola le 4 mars 1980. Transmis par J.K. Chitunda, 18 Av. Champs Elysges Paris Telex 1660492F." We are not taking any action on the message. CONFIDENTIAL I>TU\L / V 4 March 198° if / V ^ Note to th^e Secretary-Genera u. ^ 1. Attached is a cable addressed to you by Mr. Urquhart. It was transmitted through the British Embassy in Capetown. 2. In paragraph 2 of the cable (page 2), Mr. Urquhart refers to the points mentioned in Mr. Botha's letter of 5 December 1979. These points were: "1. The number of South African bases remaining in the DMZ; 2. Acceptable arrangements regarding the disarmament of SWAPO personnel on closure of bases, i.e. seven days after certification of the election; 3. The deployment of an acceptable percentage of UNTAG inside the DMZ in the light of practical requirements; 4. Agreement on practical arrangements between the UNTAG military commander and the South African military authorities; 5. Confirmation that the settlement proposal (S/12636) accepted by South Africa on 25 April 1978 remains unchanged; 6. Confirmation that the claim for SWAPO bases inside South West Africa/Namibia, which, in any case, is not provided for in the settlement proposal, will not be revived." 3. Mr. Urquhart has suggested to the South Africans that agreement first be reached on points 1, 3, 4, and 5. His reference to "outstanding issues" is, in essence, a reference to points 2 and 6 - on which the UN team will need to speak again with the Front-line States and SWAPO, if agreement is now reached with South Africa on the other points. i// V Vireridra Dayal TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL, NEW YORK INFO: DAYAL FROM: URQUHART DATE: 4 MARCH 1930 1. WE HELD TWO SESSIONS OF TALKS WITH SOUTH AFRICAN TEAM TODAY TUESDAY 4 MARCH. SOUTH AFRICAN TEAM LED BY FOURIE AND 1-NCLUDES VAN HEERDEN, EKSTEEN, GENERAL. GtLDh'k'HUYS, MR V1LJOEN, ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL, CHIEF OPERATIONS OFFICER AND CHIEF LOGISTICS OFFICER OF SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY. I MET BRIEFLY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA BEFORE MECTIKGS AND WE ARE SEEING HIM TOMORROW, WEDNESDAY. 2. FOURIE AND I MADE INITIAL STATEMENTS. FOURIE REFERRED TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN EFFORTS OVER SEVERAL YEARS TO REACH AN AGREED SETTLEMENT. HE DWELT UPON RECENT GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS WHICH IN -SOUTH AFRICA'S VIEW SEVEKl£LY UNOtRMl i!cu THE Uii-'S IMAGE OF IMPARTIALITY. HE ALSO SPOKE OF THE SITUATION I ti RHODESIA AND WHAT HE SAW AS ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR' HAM IBlA. IN PARTICULAR SOUTH AFRICA HAD BEEN UNHAPPY ABOUT WHAT HE CALLED THE FAILURE OF THE MONITORS TO CARRY OUT THEl'R TASKS EFFECTIVELY. I i) MY INITIAL STATEMENT I EXPRESSED NEED FOR URGENCY AND PROGRESS, NOTING THAT EVENTS IN RHODESIA WHICH ARE SOMETIMES ARGUED AS "/CAUSE CAUSE ['OR DELAY IN TACT INTENSIFIED NEED FOK PROGRESS OH NAMIBIA. (INCIDENTALLY, SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERPRETATION. OF RHODESIAN • ELECTION IS THAT RESULTS MERELY SHOWS THAT MONITORING INTERNA- TIONAL SUPERVISION DO NOT PREVENT MASSIVE INTIMIDATION.) 1 SUGGESTED WE SHOULD DISCUSS OUR PROBLEMS UNDER HEADING OF PO I fJTS 1, 3, 4AND 5- OF BOTHA'S 5 DECEMBER LETTER WHICH COVER MORE OR LESS ALL POINTS UNDER DISPUTE EXCEPT QUOTE OUTSTANDING ISSUES UNQUOTE. I SAID WE SHOULD ALSO DISCUSS STATUS AGREEMENT AMD INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN NAMIBIA. WHICH ARE DF CONCERN TO SECCO. I PROPOSED THAT IF WE COULD GET AGREEMENT FROM SOUTH AFRICANS ON WORKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEMILITARIZED ZONE AS A PRELIMINARY TO IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435, WE WOULD THEN BE IN POSITION TO TALK TO FRONT-LINE STATES. AND SV/APO ON MEANS FOR RESOLVING QUOTE OUTSTANDING ISSUES UNQUOTE, INCLUDING INTERNAL BASES AND ARRANGEMENTS IN REGARD TO CLOSURE OF SWAPO BASES. 3. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO PROTRACTED DISCUSSION ON NUMBER OF SOUTH AFRICANS MAINTAINING TWENTY WAS THEIR WWILE WE INSISTED THAT THIS "NUMBER WOULD CREATE GRAVE PROBLEMS OF ACCEPTANCE ON OTHER SIDE WHICH HAS ONLY ASKED F.OR SEVEEJ LOCATIONS IN ALL. WE SHALL RETURN TO THIS POINT LATER AND HOPE TCMfET SUITABLE "ADJUSTMENTS. 4. IN AFTERNOON MEETING WE HAD PROTRACTED DISCUSSION OF'ADEQUACY OF UNTAG DEPLOYMENT IN DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND RELATED MATTERS AND INCLUDING MEASURES TO BE TAKEN ON NORTHERN SIDE OF DMZ. 5. NEXT FULL MEETING I 8 AT 11 AM ON WEDNESDAY. FOURIE HOPES THAT WE CAN REACH A LIST OF AGREEMENTS AMD DISAGREEMENTS BY THURSDAY FOR SUBMISSION TO GOVERNMENT. IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY YET HOW POSITIVE FINAL OUTCOME IS LIKELY TO BE. i I ENDS: '• f*-i*&&'-\w.f&fr'^ V ?• £-;,..£ v->. •/•*-• ::•*.-•:.•>••''>>:-'•-;;«i:: ••'•'?'. *?e'vv;^K-*-^\v-'~ "^ >v ' r VD/bu 3 Marc Note to the Secretary-General Mr. Urquhart called from Capetown at 11.3O this ing. He is staying at the Heerengracht Hotel ephone No. 413151, Room 15O3). Official talks commence tomorrow, 4 March. Having consulted Mr. Farah, who fully agrees, Urquhart said that the provisional itinerary of the w«s as follows: 'alk in Capetown 4-7 March Visi; Windhoek 8 March Leave for Gaberone 9 March (morning) Leave for Luanda 1O March Leave for Lusaka 12 March Leave for Dar es Salaam 14 March 4. Thereafter Mr. Urquhart would leave for Beirut on 15 March. He would return to New York on 22 March. 5. Mr. Urquhart indicated that, given the delicacy of the talks in Capetown and the lack of UN communications facilities from there, he would not be sending written reports for the time being. Virendra Dayal J/f A^ (Twje. b/f: RA/AR/MKP CONFIDENTIAL = « * File: Zambia XRef : Namibia {extract! NOTES ON A MEETING HEED IN~THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OFFICE ON FRIDAY, 8 FEBRUARY 198O, AT 10 A.M. Present; The Secretary-General H.E. Mr. Paul J.F. Lusaka, Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations One aide Mr. Georg Mautner-Markhof The Secretary-General thanked the Ambassador for his co-operation in connexion with the recent Security Council debate on Rhodesia and enquired whether there had been any new developments. The Ambassador reiterated the general concern of his Government over the situation in Rhodesia. One of the main reasons for the present difficulties was, in his view, that the British Government had under-estimated the number of monitoring forces required. He expressed regret that the United Kingdom had not approached the United Nations for additional forces to secure stability in the country during the election period. He then informed the Secretary-General that he was on the point of leaving New York for Lusaka to be present during General Prem Chand's visit on Monday. He requested the Secretary-General to brief him on the situation in Iran and Afghanistan so that he could report to President Kaunda. The Secretary-General informed him that certain progress had been made in his efforts to contribute to a solution of the Iranian crisis. However, recent over-optimistic reports to the effect that the release of the hostages was imminent were not correct. On the other hand, it was certainly a positive sign that the new Iranian President was trying to clarify the power situation and that his position had been clearly supported by Ayatollah Khomeini, in particular in the following two ways: - 2 - By his formal institution as President before the parliamentary elections. By his nomination as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. This meant that he was now the number one executive officer of the country. At the same time, he could count on broad public support. It was significant to note that he had achieved the release of the Information Minister who had been arrested by militants (and had stopped the unlimited use of the television network by revolutionary groupsi One could only hope that he would succeed in establishing one power centre in the country. The Secretary-General then informed the Ambassador of his discussions in Teheran on the establishment of an enquiry commission and the repeated acceptance of this proposal by the Revolutionary Council and by Ayatollah Khomeini himself. The question as to at which stage the hostages could be released still remained open. Currently, a number of possibilities were being considered to take the hostages out of the Embassy compound, putting them under custody of a third party. Turning to Afhanistan, the Secretary-General informed the Ambassador of his talks with the new Indian Prime Minister and with the President of Pakistan, who had both expressed their strong interest in good neighbourly relations. He warned against the war hysteria created by sensational reporting in the news media, which he considered most unfortunate. He was convinced that the super powers were fully aware that a major confrontation in the nuclear age would leave no victors but only vanquished. There was, however, a danger that the powers could be drawn into a confrontation by influences beyond their control. The situation was certainly very serious and detente had no doubt suffered a great blow. - 3 - Turning to South Africa, the Secretary-General expressed the view that the outcome of the Rhodesian elections would have important repercussions on the chances for a settlement in Namibia. At this last remark, Ambassador Lusaka stated the strong desire of his Government to establish a lasting peace in the area. Two matters, however, had recently given new rise for concern. Firstly, according to confidential information he had received directly from President Kaunda, South Africa was preparing a military operation directed against Angola this coming May. This information was all the more alarming if seen in the context of the aggressive tone of Foreign Minister Botha's letter of 5 February concerning the possibility of a hot pursuit against SWAPO bases in Angola. Secondly, the preparations held in Namibia for a legislative Assembly were in clear contradiction to the various resolutions i on that subject. The Steering Committee on Namibia had requested him to bring this serious development to the attention of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General took note of this information and remarked that it confirmed his scepticism with regard to an early solution of the Namibia problem. However, he had no other choice than to continue his efforts. G. Mautner-Markhof 8 February 198O cc: SG's Office Mr. Ahmed Note for the Pile Subject: Detention of ANC refugee Victor Matlou by South Africa On the instructions of the Secretary-General I met today with Ambassador Eksteen in my office to convey to him the Secretary-General's concern over the detention of Victor Matlou, a South African refugee, who was detained while in transit from Mozambique to Lesotho. I explained to Ambassador Eksteen that the Secretary- General was first apprised of the situation by the Permanent Representative of Lesotho on 13 December 1979. The Lesotho Ambassador had complained that Mr. Matlou had been seized while travellinj as a passenger on a regular Lesotho flight from Mozambique to Lesotho. The plane was obliged to make a forced landing at Bloemfontein, South Africa, because of bad weather conditions0 The passengers were transported by South African Airways bus from Bloemfontein to the border where Mr. Matlou was detained by the police. The Lesotho Government contends that South Africa had no right, under international law, to seize the passenger„ I explained that the Secretary-General has since received telegrams from organizations and individuals protesting against the detention and asking the Secretary-General to secure Mrc Matlou's release. I also drew Ambassador Eksteen's attention to a press statement issued by the Chairman of the UN Committee against Apartheid. I added that the Secretary- General was of the view that the matter could have adverse political repercussions for South Africa particularly since Mr. Matlou was a registered refugee resident in Tanzania,, I also pointed out that the High Commissioner for Refugees had addressed a note officially to the Permanent Mission of South Africa in Geneva on 15 December confirming the refugee status of Mr. Matlou and requesting that he be permitted to continue his journey to Lesotho0 I recalled the recent incident in which a South African plane was obliged to make a forced landing in Ghana and that the authorities allowed all passengers to continue their journey. I said that the Secretary-General wished his concern to be conveyed to the Government of South Africa with the view to Mr. Matlou's early release. Ambassador Eksteen said that he had not been aware of the matter but would convey the Secretary-General's message to his authorities. A.A.Fzrrah/aa 21 December 1979 CONFIDENTIAL Note for the file The Secretary-General telephoned Ambassador Eksteen, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, and informed him of the content of his conversation with Ambassador Kikhia, who had come to see the Secretary- General earlier that day in his capacity as Chairman of the African Group to discuss the Namibia situation. The Secretary-General asked Ambassador Eksteen to convey to his Government that it is extremely essential to get a reply, which he hoped would in principle be positive, on the proposal for a demilitarized zone discussed recently in Geneva. The Secretary-General stressed that the African Group intended to call for an early meeting of the Security Council - but a final decision will be taken by them in the light of the answer given by the South African Government. Ambassador Eksteen thanked the Secretary-General for this information and promised to report immediately to his Government. Rafeeuddin Ahmed 22 November 1979 cc. Mr. M. Ahtisaari Mr. A. A. Parah Mr. B. E. Urquhart .;•.. f TO: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL \>^h ^ . e» (3onxOxjg--OT-v \ ' D \ V L, . UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM ~^" MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR TO: „._... „ /Is, DATE: 30 October 1979 Secretary-General REFERENCE: THROUGH1:: . V» \\ CONFIDMTIAL S/C DE: FROM: Martti Ahtisaari DE: SRSG (Namibia) SUBJECT: Proposed Consultations on DMZ and Implementation OBJET: of SC 455 (1978) 1. On 29 October I received from the Western Five copy of a series of preliminary questions raised by the Angolan Government in regard to the Working Paper "Monitoring and the Establishment of a Demilitarized Zone", transmitted on 1 October. Attached please find copy of this cable, (Annex l) which was delivered also to Mr. Urquhart by the Western Governments. The Five have emphasised that it is not a final Angolan response, and, in particular, that it is not a response to the United Nations. The questions presented seem to reflect some of the concerns of SWAPO as raised during my mission to the Front line in February 1979. In some respects they appear incompatible -with the agreement reportedly reached between the Front Line Governments and SWAPO in Lusaka in July 1979 - for example, on the question of internal bases. I annex copy of my cable to you on this subject of 13 August (Annex 2). 2. The United Nations have still received no formal reply'from the Governments of Angola, Botswana or Zambia, although we have been told that Botswana has expressed its verbal agreement to the Five. 3. The Five have now expressed their agreement to the holding of consultations conducted by the United Nations with the parties concerned at the earliest practicable date. The object would be to clarify questions dealt with by the Working Paper on Monitoring and a DMZ, with the implementation of SC 435 (1978) in mind. 4« At a meeting held this morning between Mr. Urquhart and myself and the Western Five, discussion centred on the modalities of such consultations. All present agreed that these were the only feasible means by which the matter could be further explored. Subsequently I agreed with Mr. Urquhart the attached draft of a letter of invitation to Consultations in Geneva between 12 and 15 November, (Annex 3). 5. The British this morning again raised the question of appointing, in advance of Consultations, a new commander of the military component of UNTAG. Mr. Urquhart and I set out a number of reasons why we felt this would be inappropriate at this time. 6. There have been some informal indications (Mr. Neil van Heerden, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, recently in New Tork): that the South - 2 - African Government will accept such an invitation and be appropriately represented. It is thought that the other parties will also attend although, as yet, no contacts have been made with them in this regard. 7. I understand that you will have a meeting tomorrow (?1 October) with the Front Line Governments. I suggest that you inform them regarding the procedure which you intend to follow in this matter. / 01 ui *:.i|f;'.t|.N ! T E p.: N A T I 0 N S NATIONS UNIES For use of drafter ~ A rcmplir par le redactcur Dat« :- . Drott«r — Redactcur : Room — Bureau Ext. - Poiio 13.8.79 Thornberry A-3165 2118 . . Allotment — Compte : File — Dossier : SRSG Namibia *•*'• • ''/™rf\:.-%>!£i£'$?-'- .T THEffi "REQUEST I MET ON 13 AUGUST WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE 1-.EKBERS OF ''•'-.CONTACT GROUP"JTOP THEY REPORTED THAT HURRAY HAD KET i'ilH-E KIKISTER BOTHA ON 11 AUGUST-f-'-•;':-; "• ' '•:-•: j ." ~jr;!5Jr » T-T. .- iTcONTACT* GROUP INDICATED'"TO ME THEIR RELUCTANCE TO ETER INTO TOO MUCH DETAIL l;'AS>raEY REGARDED IT AS ESSENTIALLY A LATTER FOR UN CONSIDERATION AND PROPOSAL STOP MURRAY//" Wlil/HAVE A FUFTHSR 1IEETING OH V.EDITESDAY 15 AUGUST STOP Tffi FIVE TOLD 1-2 THAT THEY ViOULD J./-;.. .LIKE;MUIiRAY TO" CONCLUDE HIS I-EESSION BY THE Eio) OF THE PRESENT V7EEK STOP . ;•';-•" 5.fS' AFTER CONSULTATION i'UTH URQUTIART AI® TAICIIC INTO ACCOUNT MURRAY'S PRESENCE IN '.'. ^fff 'PRETORIA^I'WOULO^ SUGGEST TFAT VE INFORl-i TIE VffiSiEIlN GOVERIfi-ilNTS THAT THIS l-ZiSSAGE HAS -BEEN'fe^: RECEIVED;BY YOU .:FROK TliE FRONT Lltffi STATES AND THAT^c'OU VjOULD MVE'NO OBJECTION TO SOUNDING.'OUT-THE'REACTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN HISSl-ZiETINGS ON THURSDAY - AND ^••- FRIDAY-16'.and\7/AUGUST El^iPHASISING THAT. THE MATTER SHOULD REI-'AIN COI-3JTDL3ITIAL STOP " i : REGARDS .:-$'l' .: $ .-.!-'.'*VVh-iv(-J-.: ^;>^r:|'v • - ••'/^'•'£ty?j:'' T iored by::( Authorized by: '.• por^i ^.v^-. *' ' •" F\ Autorise por : i ~Ahtisr.?.r~ i SRSG Ond 1ttle~fp/«~se 1ypc) — NornTV l quoTilo (5 dactyiograpkitr) • T «• . • . . '^i"Xf- • >c or cs-i-'e Opero. .•• ^ Uml only! ^^ '• 'r- \ $&$$ G'oup'oupe c/c /o corre.'ponJooce f e/« graph t I T E D '*!; N A T I 0 N S >&£$ NATIONS UNIES use o/ drafter — A remplir par le redacteur Dot* : Oroder — Redacteur : Room— Bureau Ext. — Posle . •irti.-ji-1 .'>• < ••4^.13.8.79* ''• Thornberry A-3165 Dept. »•£...-.., ,. ,;•;. • £' A. Allotment — Compl* : File — Douier : •J? -V.V- ' ' •-• f. SRSG'( Namibia)^ CODED UIODO •" PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOV/IKG FROM AHTIS/JulI TO SBCRSiVJIY GjLi-13li\L URGSIJTLY .. ,. . - ''C'lHV? ' AMBASSADOR UCKSISY G/u-E TO SliS ME OH SUtiDAYll£ AUGUST. IE GAVii 1-JS A 10S3SAGE FROM MI1; •"•' ' " •'• '.' '"- ' ' SPECIAL ASSISTANT 1-1UGATIDA T}IEKT ON IZAVZ 1H D/vR Eo SAUA1-I TRjU'SIilTTliD THROUGH '^v; ':• . ' ' . /•:-•- '?.'"^. ' .-« US : MISSION STOP' • •'•.:'-•. V.--.T;''.- . :yiCATSO TO 1-23 OH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF KIE3IDJHT NY2RSRE STOP THE ESSENCE '•.. .'CoF 'THE MESSAGE FROM HYERERE V/AS TWiT TT'S FRONT LIKE PRESIDENTS KiSTirG IN LUSAKA JUST BEFORE . i£.THENCra-2-iOM-/EALTH COlffERENCE HAD ESACHED A DEFINITE CONCLUSION ON IlAI-ilBIA STOP NYERERE WANTED- X-THE' SECRETARY GE1ERAL TO SELL THIS TO SOUTH AFRICA STOP IlYiPJSllS VilSffiS TIE SECRETARY .GENERAL <-vTO"SEEK AN BI-JEDIATE SOUTH AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE OF PRESIDENT I-STO'S PROPOSAL OF A DEt-IILlTARIZED -• ZONE 'IN 'RETURN FOR THE ABAimoi-n-iEHT BY SWAPO OF ITS CLAIIC TO BASES INSIDE NAI^IIBIA'STOP '.; •' .'; H"E? "SAID ' . THAT IF THE SECRETARY GEIJERAL COULD OBTAIN THE ACCEPTANCE OF TIE IDEA OF A IKZ : ^CO>ffiINED VttTH>FIRST, THE - MONITORING OF SVJAPO BASES BY. AKGOLA AIJD ZAMBIA AND SECOND, V.1TH -' ''UN 'LIAISON OFFICES, THSH THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD INFORM THE FROJIT LINE STATES (NYERERE) " WHO".V.OULD COI.FIRK THEIR Al-JD SVAPO'S AGREElffiNT STOP IT APPE-\RS FTtOH THE K23SAGE THAT'Si^APO; •!" ' . . •• i, A' • HAD AGREED TO THIS ABANDONMENT UNDER UliANIi-:OUS FRONT LINE PRESSURE STOP THE MESSAGE '"RECEIVED BY, THE us MSSION IN i-asw YORK LATE ON 9 AUGUST STOP fs.^'US AMBASSADOR IN DAR HAD LATER SEEN PRESIDENT NYERERE VJHO K/iD COHFEUIED THE * ABOVE 'STOP ';I'THE ''PRESIDENT' HAD STATED THAT HIS MESSAGE V;AS FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND AHTISAARICSTOP'.JV'-;. - LN'REGARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SIR JAKES KURRAY RAISIIK THESE ISSUES V.ITH THE SOUTH; AFRICANS ^NYERERE HAD DISPLAYED MILD SENSITIVITY STOP }ffi PAD EI-IPIL'iSISED THAT IT WAS FOR THE SECRETARY ,'J GENERAL TO DEJERl-lirffi THE. ACTION TO BE TAKEN STOP HOV.EVER HE HAD AGREED IN RESPONSE TO ''THE 2':' .-, US -AMBASSADOR'S DIRECT QUESTION THAT IT WOULD BE LEGITIl^TE F..R 1-iURiJAY TO ACT- VJITH vTHE v£^ ..,- "• • l ' ;v.-.. -v- "' •: SOUTH .AFRICANS ON THE BASIS OF THE MESSAGE STOP THE US AMBASSADOR HAD VOLUNTEERED THAT.^^jv •THE-CONTACT GROUP GOVERM-ENTS WOULD CERTAINLY NOT QUOTE NYERERE TO "THE SOUTH AFRICANS .STOP;;"-. •-'-' ' Cleared by: Authorized by: VI so par i '.•. Autorisc par : . Signature ^ ..... ; ^ •.-. ^ . v ' l ' ••.>>"''. I-fcrbbi Ahtisaari SRSG Namibia ' '- Nome and litlo (pVease fype7 — Nom eT quaTite (a c/acf//o graph ierj DRAFT 30 October 1979 Your Excellency, You will recall that on 1 October a Working Paper entitled "Monitoring and the Establishment of a Demilitarized Zone" was transmitted to yourGovernment in connexion with the question of Namibia. In view of the urgency of the situation I consider it essential to hold high-level simultaneous consultations with the parties concerned at the earliest possible opportunity. To this end, I should like to invite your Government to be represented at these consultations and would propose that they be held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, between 12 and 15 November. Invitations have been extended to the Governments of Angola, Botswana, South Africa and Zambia as well as to SWAPO. Invitations to be represented have also been extended to the Governments of Mozambique, Tanzania and to those of the Western Five. From the UN side, I shall be represented by Mr. Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, my Special Representative for Namibia, and Mr. Abdulrahim Farah, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, accompanied by senior military and political experts. It would be the purpose of the consultations to clarify questions dealt with by the Working Paper, with the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) in mind. / NAMIBIA : ANGOLAN PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO DMZ PAPER 4 1. THE LUANDA TV.'O'v.'ERE CALLED TC SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER YESTERDAY EVEN IMG. JORGE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS VICE MINISTER (DA MOURA). .' • . 2. HE BEGAN BY REMINDING 'US THAT HE HAD SAID IT V.'CULD EE NECESSARY TO CONSULT VERY CAREFULLY WITHIN HIS PARTY AND GOVERNMENT. HE WAS NOW ABLE TO PUT TO US SEVERAL QUESTIONS ON WHICH THE ANGOLAN AUTHORITIES WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE CLARIFICATION FROM THE FIVE AS SET OUT BELOW. QUESTIONS RESULTED FROM STUDY AT THE "POLITICAL LEVEL". HE HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY SPECIFIC COMMENT OR QUESTIONS FROM THE ANGOLAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. REFERENCES ARE TO PARAGRAPH NUMBERS IN THE PAPER "MOM' ITORING AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEM1L1T- ARISF.D ZONE" (1 E THE DMZ .PAPER). ' 3. DMZ'PAPER PARA 3, SECOND 'SENTENCE •" SINCE IT 1.S FORSEEN THAT THE CEASEF1RE. SHOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE. THE DKZ IS SET UP, WHY IS IT '-NECESSARY. FOR SWAPO COMBATANTS TO RETURN. "TO THEIR OWN ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED TERRITORY" DISARMED ? 4. DKZ PAPER"PARA 3, LAST SENTENCE IF THE .BASES TO WHICH THE SADF ARE RESTRICTED ARE UNDER UNTAG MONITORING, WHY SHOULD THIS NOT. APPLY ALSO TO SWAPO EASES ALREADY EXISTING INSIDE NAMIBIA ? 5. DKZ'PAPER PARA V FIRST SENTENCE IN THE ANGOLAN VIEV,1 THIS MEANS THAT SWAPO ARMED FORCES WOULD 5E PREVENTED FPOH-TAKIMG PART IN THE UN SUPERVISED ELECTION IN NAMIBIA, IF.RETURN WITH THEIR ARMS 1S CONSIDERED TO 3E NOT ''PEACEFUL". JORGE THEN MADE WHAT HE'DESCRISED AS A MAJOR OI;^ERVATIG:i •( ".';EMARr:lJE MAJEUTrF" ) AGKIJJG WHETHER THE FIVE 1 vnvU i•^< O iI T"iPiy£'~ IJ C i\ '— 'L > IITI '' uilK U OT I prv c1 1 rrv^^.> U i r< - jM/.• L. I. ~v /I > _p> L.» C . TA I vij t.icJ, ,i. wC TI -> TP/-I i .1T /- \ci.iAp I ^ itn H r v COMBATANTS SHOULD RE DISARMED GIVEN THE RECOGNITION ACCORDED TC SV.'APO. (BY THE'CAU., .\;0;-!-AL I G'ED l-'CVEKEr.T ([•-•AM), .'..'.^ THE U,\' CE::E^ AotUInfiLY) AC THE LLCITIMATE F:rrPF::^::TAT'i Vi Of TK~. S'ii.CrLE OF (,. DMZ PAPER PARA 6 --— ^~ KOW COULD ANGOLA ACCEPT THIS PROVISION AS A SOVEREIGN STATE ? 7. DMZ PAPER PARA 7, SECOND SENTENCE IN THE VIEW OF THE FIVE TO WHICH "PARTY" DOES UNITA BELONG ? BETWEEN THE PART 1-ES .^ir-^ii' THE AGGRESSOR AND WHO THE AGGRESSED ? A--'1 *'*> £-'-'V>':' '' ' - 3. ftMZ PAPER PARA 10 "" ' ------— GIVEN THE RIGHT OF UNTAG FORCES TO HAVE ACCESS TO- ALL PARTS-OF THE ZONE FROM THE MOMENT OF THE CEASEFIRES/ILL THE LIMITS OF THE DMZ 3E ESTABLISHED:..p^.V:.AFT£.R 14 DAYS ? WILL UNTAG FORCES BE IN PLACE BY THE TIKE £F Ui/f/^/^EF I RE ? \ 9. DMZ PAPER.PARA 11, 3RD AND 4TH SENTENCES JORGE DESCRIBED THIS AS "THE MOST DELICATE" PROVISION FOR THE ANGOLANS. WHAT IS A "SELECT LOCATION" ? THE ANGOLANS WOULD LIKE A CLEARER AND CLOSER DEFINITION. THE Dr'.Z IS DESCRIBED AS ."FREE OF MILITARY FORCES" HOWEVER THE SELECTED LOCATIONS W!LL PRESUMABLY (CNTAIN KILITARY FORCES." THE PAPER.XPARA 11, VTH SENTENCE) SPOKE OF THE AVOIDANCE OF "MASSING OF TROOPS". WHAT DO THE FIVE UNDERSTAND TO BE THE PURPOSE OF THE "SELECTED LOCATIONS" ? THE ANGOLANS NOTE THAT SIX LOCATIONS HAVE-BEEN PROPOSED FOR, SOUTH AFRICA AND. ONLY THREE FOR ANGOLA.'WHY THIS IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE AGGRESSOR AND THE AGGRESSED ? •'.*'' 10. DMZ PAPER PARAS 12 AND 13 ANGOLA ACCEPTED THE CONTENTION OF SWAPC'S MILITARY LEADERS THAT SWAPO FORCES HAD BASES ON THE NAMID I AN SIDE OF THE BORDER-AS . . .WELL AS THE ANGOLAN. WHY SHOULD 'NOT SWAPO.. BASES ON THE .NAK.I Bi AN . SIDE BE MONITORED BY UNTAG FORCES AS IN THE CASE OF SADF BASES ? (JORGE NOTED DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICAN ARI-'ED ..FORCES ("SADF") Iff PARA 12 AND "SWAPO FORCES" IN PARA 13. WURED HIM THAT THE WORD "FORCES" HAD SAME MEANING IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH _A.','D WAS INTENDED TO DENOTE ARiXED FORCES.) 11. DMZ PAPER PARA 13 .-•••• WIY SHOULD SWAPO FORCES BE EXCLUDED FRCv, SELilCTr.D LOCATIONS Tlir. ANGOLAN SIDE ? (JO^R S'XARKED TUAT THE FIVL". AP:-TARED TO f.'l !V~ I ur: TM? PO'::'l I"! .'.". C<<-''- :-"T'.T r'•'. ^f• ."I " '•• ' • •'':•"•' ' f "* ' '• • * p. . COriFIPKKTTAL 12. DMZ PA:>ER PARA 15 LAST SENTENCE TIMS PROVISION WAS CONTRARY TO PRESIDENT NETO'S PROPOSAL AS DISCUSSED WITH DR WALDHEIM. JORGE SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO THOSE ' WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT WHO WERE CONVINCED THAT METO HAD NOT FORSEEK THAT UNTA'G AIR PATROLS WOULD BE UNACCOMPANIED P,Y ANGOLAN PERSONNEL, ^ 13. DMZ PAPER PARA 18 FIRST SENTENCE JORGE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO UNDERLINE THAT IN THE ANGOLAN VIEW THERE WERE TWO CATEGORIES OF NAMIBIANS TO BE RETURNED : 1)REFUGEES, 2)3WAPO COMBATANTS. AS ALREADY EXPLAINED (PARA 5.' ABOVE) THE ANGOLANS QUESTION THE JUSTICE AND ADVISABILITY OF REQUIRING SV/APO. COKE AT ANTS TO RETURN TO THEIR OWN1 COUNTRY WITHOUT THEIR ARMS, (SIMILAR PROBLEMS AROSE IN THE CASE OF THE PF RETURNING" TO ZIMBABWE).'FURTHERMORE ALTHOUGH'THE ANGOLANS CAN SEE THAT. IT VX5ULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE DESI GMATED,, ENTRY POINTS, THEY WANTED TO KNOW WHAT-WOULD HAPPEN TO RETURNING NAMI3IANS ONCE THEY HAD CROSSED. COULD THEY KOVE FREELY WHERE THEY WANTED IN THEIR'OWN COUNTRY, RETURNING TO THEIR VILLAGES ETC 08 .WOULD THEY-BE TAKEN TO TRANSIT CAMPS OR EVEN SOME KIND OF CONCENTRATION CAMP ? iJtsJT—^ -• / .•.•-V;*.--"f5Sl! • *:^-v-&te- :-* '. W-f^pP$ teapaaflBfflSfe!!!!^•; ^-a <:1P^ : -: ;^-'--"" - >^^:^^,»i^^;--^^^i;-»,-;^;;.>>>J.ir-'-,- ?.:M' ,H-. - ••**,- -. ,'" • x- -MJ UNITED NATIONS ||p| NATIONS UNIES "**^^~r^*£** INTEROFFICE MEMORANMM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR TO: The SeoSdfitary-Gen'er DATE: 26 October 1979 A: REFERENCE: THROUGH: S/C DE: FROM: Brian E. Urcruhart DE: OSUBJECTB JET: : NatniDivr •,«,,• "K •? a^ 1. Our Working Paper on the Monitoring and Establishment of a Demilitarized Zone was transmitted to the parties on 1 October. We received the initial reaction of South Africa on 12 October. We have not yet heard from Angola, Botswana and Zambia. Both the Five and Mr. Ahtisaari's staff have been trying to encourage early replies. There have been indications that these might be forthcoming next week. 2. The replies of the African States will be critical to deciding whether or not to proceed with proximity talks. At present, this matter has not been raised with them in any formal manner, though they have certainly heard of the possibility. Depending again on the nature of the replies of the African States, the Western Five appear to favour such talks. Recent informal conversations with the South African Ambassador and visiting officials, suggest that South Africa too may be willing to attend, 3. Till we have the initial reactions of Angola, Botswana and Zambia, it is premature to try to identify with precision the issues that might need to be resolved during the talks. Certain preparatory ideas are, however, being worked on by my Office, in consultation with Mr. Ahtisaari. 4. Tentatively, we are contemplating talks of limited duration (some 3-4 days) starting around 12 November, possibly in Lisbon. It appears to me that their essential purpose must be to obtain agreement on arrangements for the Demilitarized Zone and, if possible, the setting of a time- frame for the emplacement of UNTAG - without getting enmeshed again in" the disagreements relating to paragraphs 11 and 12 of our report to the Security Council of 26 February 1979 (S/13120). 5. . Should it prove possible to arrange the talks, it is my view that, at this stage, the military aspects of the situation could well be handled by Col. Dibuama who could accompany me. The question of the Force Commander could be considered at a later stage. CONFIDENTIAL 20 November 1978 NOTE OF THE MEET BETWEEN MR. AHTISAARI AND MR. EKSTEEN, MONDAY, 20 OCTOBER 1978 Mr. Ahtisaari telephoned Mr. Eksteen to check on the arrival date of Mr. Brand Fourie, as had been mutually agreed last Friday. It was during this telephone conversation that Mr. Eksteen told Mr. Ahtisaari that there had been communications between Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance and Mr. Botha (Foreign Minister) last Friday. Mr. Eksteen was preparedon~confidentla£&aaS&SZ *V-"""""•»l rfwline" s to let the Secretary-General know the content of Mr. Botha's letter, because it gave the position of the South African Government. It was agreed that he would come to see Mr. Ahtisaari at 10.ko a.m. Present in the meeting also was Mr. Muganda, Special Assistant to the Commissioner. The main contents of the two letters which Mr. Eksteen let me read are as follows: I. Letter by Mr. Vance to Mr. Botha of 16 November 1978 Mr. Vance had learned that Mr. Botha is not able to come to New York to meet with the Secretary-General befor^ 27, November 1978. In view of the fact that the Secretary-General has to make his report to the Security Council b^^TJfovember 1978 could Mr. Botha dispatch Mr. Brand Fourie or any other" high official to have these talks started immediately. Mr. Vance was also not happy that Mr. Botha could not be in a position to reach the final agreement in New York. •fSare.vi&V-'i•"• '•' --••-• Mr. Vance was upset about the recent statements by Justice Steyn in which he is reported to have said that whoever is elected in k-8 December elections could form the Constituent Assembly. Mr. Vance was opposed to this idea because it went contrary to what they had agreed in Pretoria. He ended his letter with a veiled ,,tiiEe.a.t_to the South African Government with regard to the latter matters by saying that if this happened the United States Government would hold the South African Government res- ponsible and that could affect their bilateral relations. II. The letter from Mr. Botha to Mr. Vance of 17 November 1978 Started by quoting para. 3 of the "Jcdnt^^.S^.a^jment" (reference to M£_-_Ahtisaari's recommended trip to NamibiaT. He emphasized that nowhere in the Joint Statement is the South African . Government required to send^^paieone^t^. New^ York and that when they i* have agreed to do so on 27 November.,-197.8 in.jsjxLte of the pronouncements l\ of the Joint Statement, the Five still are not giving South African He reiterated that whatever happens in the New York discussions, it should not be expected to be a '^p^t-off date" session. He still has to have further consultations with Prime Minister, Government and other parties concerned. He was distressed with the criticisms and veiled threat contained in Vance's letter. He emphasized that the South African Government still wants to stick to letter and spirit of the Joint Statement. III. Afterwards, Mr. Eksteen posed the following questions for which he wanted answers. Since Mr. Fourie cannot make it to New York prior to Friday morning (6.00 a.m.) on _gU_ November 1978; is there still any point .. of .his coming to New York T^gSingHinto acepjjnt that the ^jrejDoxtLpf the i SecrTStary-General needs at least; 'kQ L hours ..to^be,..^ finalized? tHeTsaid Mr. Fourie would be available at 9^3,0. a.m. for talks on 2k November 1978). Is there still any point for their Foreign Minister to come to New York for the talks on \2J November 1978? "" If the answer to the first question is in the negative, then the response to question two has also to be in the negative - and vice versa. Or would the Secretary-General rather have both Messrs. Botha and Fourie come on 27 November 1978? *""" ..... " "J ' ""'"' '"*"""" ..... "ir Meeting between Mr. M. Ahtisaari and Mr. A. Eksteen 2 May 1979 SUMMARY In the attached full note of this meeting, the following principal points emerge: 1. The proposal for an interim government in Namibia was, at least, in abeyance, in favour of an extension of legislative authority to the "Constituent Assembly". 2. This body would be able to repeal remaining racially discrimina- tory laws in Namibia and would have the financial authority to do so. 3. The change could be effected within the framework of existing legislation (AG.63); which retains (in S.2(3)) the veto power of the Administrator-General, which would however probably not be used. h. South Africa expected the Assembly now to remove apartheid's vestiges altogether in Namibia without directly involving the South African Government. 5. The proposed "advisory committee" would not have any role similar to that of a "cabinet". 6. South Africa, through the Administrator-General, would retain full executive authority. 7. Eksteen did not think that SWAPO would at present be banned. 8. Eksteen did not know when his Government would finally reply in regard to the Secretary-General's report of 26 February. 9. The South African letter of 20 April had two particularly impor- tant elements - the acceptance of Security Council Resolution U35, and the acceptance of the outcome of free elections. 10. The idea of SWAPO internal bases was "totally unacceptable" to South Africa. 11. The question of monitoring in neighbouring countries could be worked out. 12. If the internal bases matter were removed, the ceasefire letters could go out at once. 13. If this were removed, Eksteen gave his view that no other problem would be presented by South Africa. 2. lU. South Africa felt that it was up to the Secretary-General to obtain a revision on this matter. South Africa wanted the plan implemented, without SWAPO internal "bases. 15. The idea of a "constellation of States" was not incompatible with an internationally-recognized Namibia. 16. DTA's failure to produce any concrete results since December undermined its political credibility. It also wanted Security Council resolution ^35 implemented. IT. It was unlikely that the 30 September date for elections would present any serious difficulty in view of the delays which had occurred. 18. The change among the parties, rei.the Secretary-General's Report had also delayed the South African reply by complicating matters. South Africa had to take all parties' views into account. 19. South Africa did not expect any "miracle" to occur if the Conservatives won the British elections. Note of Meeting between Mr. Ahtisaari^ and the South African Charge d'Affaires, Mr. Eksteen, on2 May^1979 i° Room A-3165 at 1100 hours Present: Mr. Ahtisaari Mr. Omayad Mr. Muganda Mr. Thornberry Mr. Eksteen Mr. Ahtisaari thanked Mr. Eksteen for coining to see him and said that he felt it desirable to enquire where the Namibia settlement proposal nov stood. Mr. Eksteen recalled his previous meeting with Mr. Ahtisaari on 6 April and said that he felt the best thing might be for questions to be put to him which he would try to answer as best he could. He said that during his recent visit to Namibia he had seen the four main political parties - N1TF, SWAPO-D, AKTUR, and the DTA. Most of the dis- cussion had related to the possibility of an interim government. The Constituent Assembly, or DTA, motion was now not for an interim govern- ment but more for a question of an internal rearrangement in the territory itself. One of the difficulties had been that the Constituent Assembly, or a group inside that body, had felt that the Assembly did not have any legislative powers. South Africa did not want to become involved in the changes which they wanted to effect in the territory. The changes which they wanted related to the improvement of race relations within the territory and the removal of the remaining discriminatory laws and practices there. A body which, the proposal said, would be called a Legislative Assembly, would be in a position also to obtain control over finances to fund any changes on which they had decided. As matters stood, the Constituent Assembly needed to obtain financial authorities from the white legislative assembly. This was controlled by AKTUR which did not favour the changes which the the DTA wanted to make. There was, therefore, at the moment a deadlock. By the action proposed, the Constituent Assembly would now get control of finances. Mr. Ahtisaari asked what would happen to the white legislative assembly? Mr. Eksteen replied that this would be representative only of whites but would not at present disappear. Thus the main aim of the new assembly would be to remove discrimination. The first thing they would like to do was to open the various suburbs for all races to live in, but AKTUR opposed this. The South African Government had a very difficult cc: Secretary-General Mr. Urquhart Mr. Farah Mr. Ahtisaari - 2 - decision in this respect. AKTUR had a considerable lobby in South Africa and with the South African Government. By giving the DTA any kind of interim government, this would complicate matters for South Africa on the international front. The Government had therefore decided that if the Constituent Assembly asked for these powers, they would be granted. However, all executive functions would remain in the hands of Mr. Justice Steyn. Mr. Ahtisaari asked what legal changes were in contemplation? Mr. E. said that once this new national assembly decided on something then instead of the proposal going through the Administrator- General to Cape Town, after which the AG would sign if Cape Town approved, the AG would now almost automatically endorse the legal changes proposed by the new assembly. The powers of disallowance would be very limited. Mr. Thornberry asked whether the AG would therefore become just a kind of rubber stamp? Mr. E. said yes, this was so. Mr. Omayad asked whether the change that had been proposed in the organisation of the AG's office some months ago was in any way connected with the proposed new regime? Mr. E.indicated that there was no connection. Mr. T. asked whether the proposed advisory committee from the assembly for the AG would have any particular powers? Mr. E. said that it would not be the same as a cabinet or anything like that. Mr. T. asked whether the proposed changes would require new legislation or a new proclamation by the AG? A.E. said that this would not be necessary; it could be done within the framework of the existing Section 2 of AG.63. C.T. pointed out that Section 2(3) gave the South African Administrator General absolute discretion whether or not to accept proposals from the Constituent Assembly. Was Mr. Eksteen saying therefore that this power of veto in the original proclamation was going to become a dead letter? A.E. said that he thought this was so. M.A_. asked whether it was being said that the form of changes proposed was to satisfy the internal South African scene? A.E. said that he could not say such a thing aloud, but that Mr. Ahtisaari very well knew South Africa's difficulties both internally and externally. : B.M. asked Mr. Eksteen to comment on widespread rumours that SWAPO might be banned. - 3 - A.E. said that there vas always a possibility that the assembly would ask for such a banning. He himself did not know, but did not think this would happen. Something had however to be done. There was sufficient proof of internal SWAPO people supporting the external organisation in its various violent actions. B.M. asked what lay behind the proposal to extend membership of the assembly from 50 to 65? A.E^. said the DTA had the idea of trying to get the other parties to Join this national assembly so that they could voice their views. He wanted to emphasise that there was no intention of drafting a constitution. The intention was to effect various changes inside the territory. He said that he looked on this change personally - and, he said, he knew that it was a lot to ask of Mr. Ahtisaari to accept this view - as being a move to have the changes made in the territory that the UN had been demanding all the time. They were going to do away with apartheid. He felt that nobody should find any fault with what they were doing. The methods and circumstances were no doubt open to discussion but the objective should not be criticised. B.M. asked whether the DTA thought that the 15 members would be enough for the NNF and SWAPO-D? A.E. said that the DTA was under no illusion about the difficulties in this regard. The MF and SWAPO-D, for their part, had made it very clear that any action which they took was not to be regarded as giving any form of recognition to the Constituent Assembly. M.A.referred to a previous statement made by Mr. Steyn in which he had contemplated two Constituent Assemblies and asked whether those ideas bore any relationship to what was now in comtemplation. A.E. said that they were quite unrelated. M.A. asked when the UN could expect the South African Government's answer in regard to the Secretary-General's report of 26 February? A.E. referred in this connection to Mr. P.W. Botha's letter of 20 April. He thought that the two quotations in that reply should be fully considered. He could not say that there would be any reply within a particular period of time. He drew attention to what his Prime Minister had written regarding SC ^35 and regarding the outcome of an election. He said that South Africa was being told every day that it would not respect the outcome of an election. In his letter the Prime Minister had made it clear that he would accept such an outcome. He had made that point in his press conference at Pretoria on 19 October 1978 and had now reiterated it in Parliament and to the Secretary-General. "On the question of the implementation of the western proposal and of resolution 1435 we are indeed sincere and willing to implement that proposal. But for us to accept that paragraph on bases inside the territory, that is not possible. I want to - k - "repeat what I said to you here last time we met. We cannot accept that paragraph. On the other paragraph on monitoring outside, we can work something out, you can work out something with the Front line. There can be some modus vivendi; this won't stand in the way of implementing U35. The other is a non-starter. This is quite impossible". M.A. said that it was the widespread impression that if the two issues referred to by Mr. Eksteen were solved, then something else would pop up. Would Mr. Eksteen give an assurance on that point. A.E. said that "from outside nothing else remains. If we can get the removal of that idea then we can move ahead to the implementation of 1*35". As he understood the other paragraph (paragraph 12) something could be worked out whether with the liaison offices, with the frontline govern- ments doing the monitoring on their own or however. Something could be worked out. M>A. said that what was holding up developmen ts in regard to liaison offices was the view that the South African Government was not willing to move ahead with implementation. C.T. said that he wanted to be quite clear on what Mr. Eksteen was saying. Was Mr. Eksteen saying that if by some chance paragraph 11 of the report of 26 February was removed, then so far as South Africa was concerned, the ceasefire letters could be sent immediately and the fifteen- day period prior to the emplacement of UNTAG could begin to run forthwith? A.E. said "yes". C.T. said that what Mr. Eksteen had been saying was, as he himself acknowledged, largely a repetition of what he had said at his previous meeting with Mr. Ahtisaari on 6 April. That was now nearly four weeks ago. The issue seemed to be a very simple one. Why, then, was it impossible for South Africa to answer the Secretary-General's report in writing and say what Mr. Eksteen had been saying these past four weeks? Why, also, was Mr. Eksteen not able, even, to say when South Africa would say it in writing? JV.IS. said "We do want to see this implemented. We want to see if it is possible to get some removal or adjustment". South Africa could not cooperate on this single point. All that was necessary was the removal of that paragraph and some adjustment or clarification of the other paragraph relating to neighbouring countries. They felt that it was up to the Secretary-General to obtain that removal or that adjustment. C.T. referred to the existence to what he called widespread suspicions as to South Africa's motives and objectives in regard to Namibia at this time. There was discussion of "a constellation of South African states", and the much publicised proposal that South Africa would seek to defend itself from the frontier extending from the Cunene to the Zambesi; Whatever one might think of these suspicions the effect was that they did exist. If South Africa wanted to see the settlement proposal implemented, then wouldn't it be in South Africa's interest to clarify its position. In other words, - 5 - •would it not be in South Africa's interest to say that the sole issue remaining vas that of the proposed SWAPO bases inside Namibia? A.E. said that all sides had suspicions in this matter. The "constellation idea" did not, of course, exclude the possibility of the implementation of 1*35• Tng idea of the constellation vas not one which was constituted by the idea of the various countries which might fit into such a constellation being internationally unacceptable. He said that the various countries also had varying international status. He referred to Rhodesia, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Transkaii. B.M. asked whether the recent reference to the use by the US of so called "spy plane" had any relationship to South Africa's thinking on Namibia. A.E. said that he felt that the bad timing was not that of the South African Government but of the US Government. M^A. said that he was still rather puzzled by what Mr. Eksteen had been saying. Some of the regional groups in the UN might well want to know quite soon what the position actually vas. He wanted to be quite sure that he could report on this authoritatively. A.E. said that the proposal on internal bases vas totally unacceptable to South Africa. C_._T_. said that he much appreciated the frankness of many of Mr. Eksteen*s replies and perhaps he could be frank also about one matter which seemed to be much discussed inside Namibia. This was, that it was alleged that the DTA was shoving considerable possibilities of falling apart and that it vould not be possible for it to stand any reasonable chance in any free and fair elections that could be imminently held under UN supervision and control. Could Mr. Eksteen comment on this? A.jS. said that he had heard many reports on virtually all the political parties inside Namibia falling apart at the seams. He had heard this also of SWAPO in Lusaka. He felt that there was a sense in the DTA that the party had not seen any fruits of its victory at the polls in December. There was no doubt that the failure to deliver on various fronts had affected DTA's credibility. M..A. referred to the seven-month period prior to UN supervised elections after emplacement. He recalled having read that the South African GovErnment appeared to have accepted this time period. He vanted to be quite sure that the formally advanced date of 30 September was not in the future going to present itself as an issue. A.E. said that he could not officially say that one should forget about 30 September but, he felt, any person looking at the matter realistically vould agree that this date was "not on". If, say, one arrived at some point at atdate of 1 June for implementation, then he did not think that anyone would seriously try to stick on 30 September date for elections. He vould like to say something further regarding the DTA and resolution 1*35. When he had spoken to SWAPO-D they said that they vanted an internationally - 6 - acceptable solution and they would not stick on the two controversial paragraphs. They had said that the DTA did not want a solution according to resolution 1*35. He would like to emphasise that the DTA had not rejected ^35. The DTA had rejected paragraph 11 and wanted monitoring in the neighbouring countries. C.T. said that the South African Government had recently gone on record on several occasions that it would be guided by the response of the internal parties. Mr. Eksteen was now saying very firmly that paragraph 11 was totally unacceptable. However, it appeared that not only SWAFO-D but also the Namibia Churches, and also the NNF in some measure, did not share this approach. The NNF had produced tentative proposals for some kind of clarification or compromise. Was there not an inconsistency between the position adopted by Mr. Eksteen now and what his Government had been saying about guidance from the internal parties? A.E. said that he did not know why SWAPO-D had changed its position. Nor did he know why the Churches had done so. It was inconsistent with what those bodies had previously told South Africa. The NNF was, however, still very much opposed to the idea of internal bases. M.A. asked whether this situation was delaying the South African answer by complicating matters? A.E. said that it was complicating the matter. South Africa had to take into account all views not merely those of the DTA and AKTUR. H.O. asked whether UN documents including the Secretary-General's reports were readily available in Windhoek? A.E. said that they were; the AG's office had them and they were available on request to the various parties. Mr. Eksteen asked Mr. Ahtisaari for his view of the situation in the UN vis-a-vis Namibia. M.A. said that people were becoming very restless. No reaction had occurred despite many months having passed. It seemed possible that the General Assembly would meet in resumed session possibly on 23 May. A.E. asked what the five Western Governments were doing? M.A. said that he did not know. He had been told that they had not seen Mr. Eksteen for quite some time. He thought that they were waiting for him to get in touch with them. He added that he thought that there might be demands quite soon for a Security Council meeting. People were becoming very uneasy about the whole matter. He then referred to the reports of arrests of SWAPO members. He said that he seriously doubted whether such a move would facilitate the possibility of a settlement. He felt that it was most unfortunate that this should happen. It was not at all help- ful. A.E. said on this matter that the reverse was also true for SWAPO. What SWAPO was doing in the territory was not helpful at all. There was much suspicion on all sides and that suspicion attached also to SWAPO. - 7 - There was widespread feeling in the territory that SWAPO was just not interested in a peaceful solution but would prefer an armed solution. This was shown also by their conduct in the territory and by their grouping outside it. M.A. referred to reports that one SWAPO member had been interrogated by the police regarding his reported contact with Mr. Ahtisaari in Gaberone. A.E. said that he had not been arrested because of any contact with him. B.M. asked whether the assembly could now also effect the release of political detainees inside the territory and referred to Mr. Ja Toivo. A.E. said that the assembly could no doubt do this but that it was very unlikely because releases were supposed to be simultaneous of detainees held by South Africa and elsewhere. B.M. asked what was happening on the military front? A.E. said that matters were much as before. He said that what /not had/been improved from their standpoint regarding monitoring by the neighbouring countries was the recent raid by sixty armed men in Lusaka. He added that there seemed to be an impression in the US that South Africa's conduct was much affected by the so-called information scandal. But this was not the case. Regarding the British election, Mr. Eksteen said that if Labour won South Africa could know where it stood. If the Tories won South Africa would not be overjoyed because it did not, in the circumstances, expect any miracle in that quarter. M.A_.thanked Mr. Eksteen for coming and said that he appreciated the very frank atmosphere in which Mr. Eksteen had conducted the discussions. The meeting closed at 1228 hours. RECEIVE UNITED NATIONS mSjffl NATIONS UNIES -, ^ INTEROFFICE MEMORAiNDUM^x"' MEMORANDUM 1NTERIEUR TO: The Secretary-General DATE: 9 flpr-i 1 1970 / X*~N. B REFERENCE: THROUGH-. , CONFIDENTIAL FROM: M. Ahtisaari DE: SRSG (Namibia) Note for Secretary-General regarding present state of affairs on Namibia A South African response to your report was said by Mr. Eksteen on 6 April to be likely on 10 or 11 April. This afternoon in Windhoek the DTA held a press conference at which they said that they proposed to adopt a resolution on Tuesday 17 April in the so-called Constituent Assembly - aimed at establishing an interim government in Namibia in mid-May. They intended to continue their discussions with the other parties (excluding SWAPO) with a view to offering them participation in such government - especially NNF and SWAPO-D. According to Mr. Dirk Mudge of E5EA there would "not be time" to hold new elections. The door was not being shut to an internationally-recognised settlement. The reasons for this action were said to be (a) the people had waited too long; (b) there were deviations from the settlement proposal in the last Secretary-General's report; (c) it was necessary to have a lawmaking body in the territory; (d) the deteriorating security situation. In answer to the question "Are you going to ban SWAPO?", Mudge replied: "The banning of SWAPO will come up for discussion. We have not taken a decision on that as yet". On 6 April, Eksteen told me that the basic problem was that of the restriction of SWAPO to bases in Namibia after the ceasefire. He indicated that only if SWAPO said that it would make this part of the report a dead letter, or if it were withdrawn, could there be any further progress. He added that, regarding external monitoring, some kind of modus vivendi could be worked out and expressed as a clarification. The NNF issued a statement on Friday 6 April calling for more precision and detail on the question of monitoring in neighbouring countries. It remains opposed to the idea of internal bases but it is not clear whether these are to be rejected outright or whether it is prepared to consider an accommodation on this point. The proclamation (AG.63) setting out the powers of the assembly (the so-called 'Constituent Assembly') elected in December 1978 provides - 2 - that that body will have power to make recommendations to the Administrator- General as to any course of action it desires to "be followed and as to any law which it wishes to have enacted amended or repealed. It explicitly states that the Administrator-General shall not be obliged to give effect to any such recommendation. You will recall that on 2 December the South African Foreign Minister confirmed that it would retain authority in Namibia pending the implementa- tion of the proposal (S/12950, para. 8). cc: Mr. B. Urquhart Mr. A.A. Farah < '/I,- i.' -r V--' II«te »f fleeting between Mr. Urquhart and Representatives of the Five _Western_£,ov eminent s on _3_ April 1919 at 1651F hours in Room 3850 Present: Mr. Urquhart Mr. Ahtisaari Mr. Lansky Mr. Liu Mr. Omayad Mr. Muganda Mr. Thornberry Ambassador Barton, Mr. Thompson, Col. Gallagher (Canada); Mr. Lefon (France); Mr. Vergau (FRG); Mr. Fyjis-Walker, Ms. Fort (U.K.); Ambassador MeHenry, Mr. Blacken, Mr. Miller (U.S.A.). Mr. Urquhart welcomed the representatives of the Five Western Governments and said that he had felt it might be useful to review the present situation relating to Namibia. Mr. Blacken said that the two Bothas had made a" neutraipresentation to the internal political parties the previous day in Windhoek. They had, however, previously restated South Africa's position regarding monitoring in neighbouring countries but, he noted, theyseemed,at the moment, to be"fading away"on internal bases. However, simultaneous to this fading away, the internal parties were coming increasingly strong on the idea of an armed SWAPO presence inside the country. He remarked on the fact that SWAPO-D had, on this, taken a quite different position before leaving New York. There was, he said, a feeling that a charade was being played. He thought that a "third solution" was in contemplation. The UII proposals would not be rejected; but movement was being angled towards a DTA/NHF/SWAPO-D joint solution. Ambassador MeHenry said that he had spoken to Mr. Kirkpatrick of the IIHF earlier that day. Mr. Kirkpatrick had felt very strongly that by Monday of the following week the "Consultative Assembly" was going to go ahead on some form of interim Government. He had said that the NNF did not like this, but felt that there was not much they could do about it . South Africa's statement indicated that they hoped to use various objections that had been raised by the internal parties to lend some form of respectability to what they were about to do. It would look better that way than for it to be merely a South African/DTA action. He said that there seemed to be some belief among the NNF that there could still be some kind of negotiations on the Uil proposals. However, he f^1+. that the end of this had probably been reached. Regarding SWAPO bases inside Hamibia, he said that he doubted, given the bad blood between Nujoma and Shipanga, that any such kind of cc: Secretary-General Mr. Urquhart Mr. Ahtisaari - 2 - presence would "be well received. Mr. Urquhart asked the representatives of the Five Western Govern- ments what they felt could be done to prevent what he called "this steady surge towards an. internal settlement"? Ambassador McHenry said "we and the UN need to make it very clear to the South Africans that any attempt to hide behind the internal groups as if South Africa is not responsible is unacceptable". Beyond that, he doubted whether very much could be done. He said that it had always been a very fine balance in the South African Government between those who wanted the international settlement and those who were prepared to go it alone. Mr. Vergau said that it was very important to make it very clear where responsibility lay. Discussions in Hew York, in Bonn and in Windhoek had made it apparent that the DTA would not go along with the UII plan. He felt, secondly, that the proposed election date should be emphasised. The South Africans had said that 30 September was a deadline; they had used it as a kind of ultimatum. The DTA had taken this over. South Africa's silence on the date in recent times was tactical. If a question later arose regarding the date South Africa could then say that it was a surprise, a new element. He felt that the UN should contemplate making it clear that the date was no longer practical. South Africa was awaiting the African States' assertion that the date was no longer possible and that the UN should withdraw from the present discussions. South Africa, he said, would then become flexible again. He was worried about the tactical situation. Ambassador McHenry said that the South Africans had been putting out "so much junk" that the outside world tended to ignore their state- ments. Prime Minister Botha had made much of a discussion with General Philipp (in which the General was alleged to have made remarks about "pulling; the UN military oul;'). However, the Secretary-General's report of 29 August last made it quite clear that force could be used in self- defence and gave a clear meaning of that term. These assertions had not been responded to. The West's Ambassadors said that the internal groups now believed this and took it as the given truth. Mr_. Urquhart said that it was very hard to answer this kind of assertion when one did not know the context in which it was said to have been made. It was quite clear that in certain ultimate circumstances General Philipp's statement was an accurate prognosis. However, was it possible without "getting into another byzantine rigmarole" to deal with this? Ambassador McHenry said that even if the truth could catch up with this misrepresentation something else would start up. Mr. Ahtisaari said that he doubted whether one could go beyond what was in the report, which was already quite specific. The report was self- explanatory on this point. - 3 - Mr. Blacken said that if any statement vere to come it ought to be during the present veek. Ambassador Barton contemplated "somebody making a speech which got quoted.^ Mr. Vergau said that one must stop addressing the groups inside Namibia. One must address the South Africans. Mr. Ahtisaari quoted from a cable just received from Gaberone indicating the possible coalescence of the internal groups. Ambassador MeHenry said that this was part of the South African strategy. South Africa had for the first time in the whole process seen a way of exploiting the internal groups so that it did not seem as if it vas just South African action. Mr. Vergau referred to the statement of the Protestant Church leaders in Geneva the previous week. He said this vas a very important statement. He reiterated that the South Africans were trying to hide behind the Consultative Assembly. Mr. _Fy_j is-Walker said that one reason why South Africa could use the internal groups was because they could play on the various fears of these groups. He thought it very hard to see which hole to pluor first. He noted that one hole was the Angolan one. Ambassador McKenry said that the. supposed outstanding issues were in fact quite insignificant. How, he asked, could the presence of UN observers in the neighbouring countries provide any significant additional security? Mr. Urquhart asked whether anything could be done to prevent something irreversible happening? Was a UH reaction on electronic devices required? Mr. Blacken said that this was not a big issue. Mr. Ahtisaari said that Angola would not change its position until South Africa had answered in regard to the recent report of the Secretary- General. He referred to the suggestion made by Foreign Minister Mogwe and gave his opinion that the kind of mission contemplated by Mr. Mogwe would not be appropriate at this time. Ambassador McHcnry said that after the Luanda summit meeting Zambia had tried to speak to President Ileto in regard to these various matters without success. Ms. Fort said that the problem was not all on the South African side. Angola had refused to participate in the proximity talks and was now refusing to speak to the UN. - U - Mr. Ahtisaari said this was neither accurate nor fair. He noted that the Angolan Government had been represented at the Secretary-General's meetings during the week of the proximity talks. He said the onus should be placed and left where it belonged. Mr. Blacken emphasised the content of the Luanda communique. He said that the Front Line Governments had said repeatedly that they had made a commitment at the highest level. Angola had of course been a party to the Luanda communique. It followed from that that the host Governments would monitor SWAPO's restriction to base. MB. Fort said that the Luanda communique had not referred to monitoring. She would re-emphasise that the Angolans had not been at the proximity talks. Mr. Fyj is-Walker suggested the possibility that the Secretary- General could put the points which seemed to be in doubt into a speech. He referred also to the continuing question of the impartiality of the U1I in the eyes of the internal parties. Mr. Ahtisaari said that there could be no end to the exercise of clarification. He said in regard to the question of the UII's impartiality that such comments were becoming ridiculous in view of the published information that South Africa had given £6"00,dOO to the DTA. Mr. Urquhart said that he had the impression that one was dealing with a large inanimate object which one could not get hold of. How could one get a grip on the present situation? Perhaps one might take hold of the question of dates. One might say to South Africa that it was allowing the clock to tick on. Mr. Ahtisaari said that there might be an interim government in Namibia by the end of the week. What, he asked, would happen then? Ambassador McHenry said "you're in the Security Council". Mr. Ahti^saari said that he rather agreed with Mr. Vergau. It might be necessary now to put the hard facts of life before South Africa. Ambassador McHenry thought that South Africa might not do anything decisive enough for it to be clearly said that the door had been closed. He said that he sometimes felt that the South African approach to Namibia was that of slicing salami. The process was gradual but continuous. Mr. Ahtisaari said that he felt that some of the professed fears of the internal parties were nbt realistic. The parties now had enough facts to know better than they were at present asserting. He wondered whether their positions were not those of political expediency. Ambassador McHenry said that this was in part true,in his opinion. However,the fears were in part genuine. The fear was based on the idea that the military presence of SWAPO after a ceasefire would be translated - 5 - into political power by then. But they had to recognise that SWAPO would not put itself into a less favourable position after the ceasefire than it had been in before it. Ms. Fort said that the real fear in this vhole situation was the fear of the present South African Government of Treurnicht. Amba_ss_aj3pr_ Me Henry said that he felt more and more that the South African military had decided that it was going to fight its inevitable battle as far away from home as possible. Mr. Ahtisaari asked the representatives of the Five V/estern Governments what they were planning to do now»so that the UN could consider what it could do. He asked them what they intended doing apart from praying. Ambassador McHenry said that he did not know whether much could be done except to point out to all the parties concerned that if they had the will one could have a settlement. He said "we have done all we can". Mr. Blacken said that all these matters had been talked over many tiroes with the internal groups. Some of them had said that they under- stood. Even the 1IHF had said that they saw the question of internal bases as a non-issue. He agreed that the whole matter cane down to one of political will. Ambassador McHenry said that the analogy of Rhodesia should be borne in mind. There could be no settlement in Rhodesia which did not take into account the army of the Patriotic Front. In Namibia, the same situation would in due course arise even if the military threat was, in comparison to that in Rhodesia, at present a snail one. Ambassador Barton said that he felt that the Five must consider that there were going to be two possible replies in the next few days. There could be a hedging answer or there could be a no answer. Could one not, he wondered, indicate to South Africa now that they either accepted or rejected ;and that the Five Governments would then be guided by that response in the Security Council? Ambassador McHenry said that South Africa had discovered that sanctions would not work. One of the threats hanging over it for sometime, namely, an embargo on Iranian oil, had been experienced and had been found not to be frightening. South Africa had learned in the last few weeks that one could get all the oil that one could pay for. Ambas sjKJor^ Barton said that the difference after sanctions would be the pressure on the international oil market. The situation would be vastly different. - r, - Mr. Fyjis-Walker suggested a further alternative which was to re- emphasise the irapracticality of the present election date and then to talk to whatever came out of the present process at the end of the week. Ambassador McHenry said that as a result of the long drawn out process, the Five Western Governments might now be exhausting the support or tolerance of the other African countries. He referred to Angola, to Tanzania (which, he said, at present had its hands full), and to Nigeria which, he said, had become'very reluctant" over the last month. Mr. Blacken added that it would now be very difficult for other governments to assume a basic South African willingness as had been possible at the time of the unilateral elections in December. He said that the Western Governments could no longer credibly argue that an internal settlement was not what South Africa was in search of. Ambassador ?TcIIenry said that he would like to reply to Mr. Ahtisaari's question. He said that perhaps one had to look at what Ambassador Barton had been saying. It might be tine for a pretty clear-cut statement from the Secretary-General of the kind which had once been talked about in the context of a message to the Five and the Front Line. South Africa should be told that it was time either to fish or to cut bait. They should be told that there was no perfect solution. What was on the table was however a reasonable way of proceeding. But it was for Couth Africa now to decide. Basically, he said, such a statement would be the same as one which they might make. Mr. Vcrgau said that one could not discuss sanctions just now. One had to try to force South Africa into a positive position. There should be an intensification of political pressure. South Africa would not want to bear the exclusive burden of accepting responsibility for a breakdown. It also continued to want to obtain some kind of international acceptance for its settlement. South Africa was clearly labouring under the delusion that in Namibia, as also in Rhodesia, it could somehow muddle through. Ambassador Me Henry said that the South Africans were grabbing at any straw. They must be told that there was no way peace could come in Rhodesia or in Namibia without an internationally recognised settlement. Mr. Urquhart said that perhaps he could sum up by saying that there was a general feeling that not much could be done before there was a South African response. However, he said, possibly the whistle should now be blown regarding the date for elections. Mr. Ahtisaari said that he thought that it would not be a bad idea to consider some kind of reminder to South Africa at this time of the onus which lay upon it. The implications for South Africa should be spelt out. Ambassador Mclienry said "we do not have too much clout". - 7 - Mr. Ahtisaari said that if one were now afraid of reminding South Africa that it would be held responsible for a breakdown, then one might as well forget the whole exercise. Ambassador McIIenry said that such a reminder could come from the UN as well as from the Five Governments. He said there was dual responsibility in these matters. He gave as an example the fact that the Five Governments could not say what the UN was going to do during the transition period. Ambassador Barton suggested that it should be spelt out that the date was already impractical and that the lonper the delay the longer it would be before elections took place. Mr. Ahtisaari said that South Africa mif*ht say that there would be no response until a clarifying statement was Riven by the Secretary- General . Mr. Blacken said that they would have no basis for such a position. The Five had told them otherwise. The internal parties had also been told otherwise. There should be no more documents until South Africa agreed. He said that the African Governments were concerned that the Western Governments were renegotiating as the salami slicing proceeded. Mr. Liu suf^ested that the Secretary-General could not do anything until there had been a South African reply. Mr. Ahtisaari said that the Five could however act in advance of any reply in a manner which would be compatible with what they would do afterwards. Ambassador McIIenry said that, of course, if the Secretary -General were now to send the ceasefire letter then the onus would be seen to rest quite clearly on South Africa. Mr.^Blacken recalled that SWAPO had said that they were ready to accept a ceasefire. Ambassador McHenry said however that such a course of action would not brinf* a. settlement closer. He said that he suspected that even a. "yes but" answer would brinf; the natter back to the Security Council. Mr. Urquhart asked the Five when they expected answers from the South Africans. Ambassador McHenry said that he thought they mie;ht come about next Tuesday or Wednesday. Mr. Urquhart said that he would consult with Mr. Ahtisaari to decide - 8 - vhat might be done in advance of the Secretary-General's report. Other- wise some kind of precipitating action might be considered. The meeting concluded at 1803 hours. Hote of Consultation Meeting of the Security Council held on Monday, 12 March 1979. The President having opened the meeting, the Secretary-General informed members of the current state of events in regard to Namibia. The Representative of Zambia referred to the communique issued after the Luanda summit and to SWAPO's response to the Secretary-General's report. He said that his Government now felt that it was for the Western Five to ensure South Africa's compliance with resolution ^35 and its acceptance of the Secretary-General's proposals. His Government felt that the Front Line had done all that was necessary and required of them in the matter. Regarding SWAPO bases in neighbouring countries, he said that his Government had given its word of honour that the ceasefire would be complied with. What his Government would not agree to was UNTAG monitoring of SWAPO bases in his country. It had, however, agreed to the establishment of UN offices by way of compromise. The Representative of Jamaica said that his Government believed that the problem regarding the Secretary-General's proposals lay exclusively with South Africa. He said that his Government would not accept any attempt to put South Africa and SWAPO on the same level in the matter of Namibia. South Africa was in illegal occupation of that country. SWAPO, of course, had considerable responsibilities in assisting the realization of a settlement. He referred to the South AFrican communications over recent days and said that the UN was not accustomed to being lectured by South Africa on self-determination. He deplored the tone which South Africa had been taking and associated himself with the Secretary-GeneralJs firm response on the matter. His Government fully accepted the decisions taken by the Secretary-General regarding bases in Namibia and monitoring in the neighbouring states. They had full confidence in the assurances given by the neighbouring states. His Government saw a deeply disturbing pattern emerging involving both the Rhodesian and Namibian situations. He felt that considerable efforts would be required to dislodge the illegal regimes existing there. He said that there should, in any proximity talks, be no erosion of the basic positions adopted in the Secretary-General's report. Nor, he said, should there be any yielding on the question of elections. South Africa's threats in this regard should be firmly dealt with. He felt that the basic position should be that additional pressure should be mounted on South Africa which should be informed that clear consequences will flow from any failure on their part to comply with with international expectations. The Representative of Bangladesh felt that it was. important to determine what would be the real status of the discussions in proximity talks. He felt that in examining the relevancy of such talks, South Africa's attacks on Angola and Zambia and also on the Secretary-General should "be borne in mind. He felt that there was a danger of an attempt to bypass the UN. His Government joined in strongly rejecting the South African allega- tions against the Secretary-General. He felt that a pattern of events k I - 2 - should be taken into consideration involving attempts to discredit the UN; to discredit the Western Five and SWAPO and then to tailor internal elections to South Africa's own ends. South Africa would very much like to obtain its purposes under the authority of the UN. He felt that the Security Council, whose authority was under challenge, should expose South Africa's motives and strengthen the Secretary-General's hands. He said that the cardinal issue was related to monitoring and in cgard to this the Secretary-General's report constituted maximum compromise. The Representative of Gabon also thanked the Secretary-General for his introductory communication which explained a great deal. He felt that South Africa was seeking a pretext to delay the implementation of resolution U35. The Five Western Governments should exercise maximum pressure on South Africa to review the position which it was taking. The Front Line had done their best to persuade South Africa to accept con- cessions on its part. South Africa and SWAPO were not on the same footing; SWAPO was fighting for its own country whereas South Africa was in illegal occupation. He would urge the Five Western Governments to do their duty. The Represent at ive of Kuwait said that the crux of the matter was how to obtain genuine and pure independence in Namibia of which South Africa was in illegal occupation. The Secretary-General's proposals were a constructive compromise. He said that his Government's fear was that if the Council now pronounced itself on the proximity talks, it might subsequently find itself confronted "by a new set of propc sals. He was concerned that the Secretary-General's proposals might be amended by such proximity talks. Were "new efforts" aimed at getting South Africa to accept or were they instead aimed at obtaining some amendment of the Secretary-General's proposals? The Secretary-General replied that the talks should not lead to new proposals but vould instead be intended to convince the parties to accept what had already been proposed. The President said , that Mr. Nujoma had recently been in Nigeria. His Government had been trying to estimate what more SWAPO was expected to do. SWAPO had accepted that the Front Line Governments would monitor its troops and had accepted also the idea of UN liaison offices. The Nigerian Government was not against proximity talks. But, he said, the South African Government had now become abusive to the Secretary-General, to Mr. Ahtisaari and to the Western Five. Should not, he asked, all efforts now be centered on South Africa? The Representative of the United States said that-the Secretary- General had correctly identified the problems with which they were now confronted. The first matter was the intangible one of trust. Here there were the South African statements in letters to parliament and in the press; but, he recalled, there were also the statements of Mr. Nujoma in, for example, Addis and in Nairobi. The situation had come to be one in - 3 - vhich there was an absence of trust on the part of both parties. Any rational analysis of the situation would now show that the issues actually separating the parties were not very substantial. But,he said,if South Africa suspected that there had been much more agreed of which it was not aware - for example, if it believed that various deals had been done - then those minor and unsubstantial issues would take on much greater importance in its eyes. There werethus the two kinds of problem - the intangible and the substantive. He said that the Five had invited Governments to proximity talks in the firm belief that this was in accordance with resolution U35 and with the remarks made by the Secretary-General in his clarifying remarks at that time relating to the continuing good offices of the Five Western Governments. The object of the talks would be to facilitate implementation of the resolution and to try to get the parties to see that their concerns were less great than they thought. The object would also be to try to get South Africa to sit down and discuss matters in a rational climate. Two substantive issues were now being talked about by South Africa - that of restriction to base in neighbouring countries and that relating to bases in Namibia. In regard to the latter, if there were no bases, the issues did not arise; if there were bases, then it would be in the interests of South Africa and of UNTAG to have them monitored. He said that if he were SWAPO he would not want his bases to be identified and for them to be monitored. He said that in regard to the Secretary-General*s proposals on these matters, the Five thoroughly supported him. He said that he wished that he could accept that there were no SWAPO problem; but for instance, President Nujoma's letter did not specifically accept restriction to bases in the neighbouring countries. It would also be useful if SWAPO would make some specific acceptance of the Secretary-General's proposals on the logistical matters or, alternatively, give a. clear indication that he.was wrong in the state- ments which he made about logistical availability. He said that it was necessary to obtain categorical statements from the parties. He said that allusions had been made to South Africa's "friends" bringing pressure to bear upon it. He said that in the present climate of opinion he gravely doubted whether South Africa regarded any of the countries represented in the meeting as its friend. The Bolivian Representative said that the Council must make South Africa accept that it could no longer accept any deal on its part. The impatience in the international community must be expressed. His Govern- ment felt that monitoring of SWAPO forces in neighbouring countries was the responsibility of those countries. South Africa must accept the premises of the Secretary-General's proposals and implement resolution 1+35. Any attempted revision of the premises of the Secretary-General's proposals could lead to a comprehensive proposal for revision of the settlement proposal. The Secretary-General's report contained a maximum compromise that could be afforded. The Representative of France thanked the Secretary-General for convening the meeting in order that members could take stock of the situation onvNamibia. He would congratulate the Secretary-General on his recent correspondence with South Africa. Otherwise, he found himself in full agreement with what had been said by the Representative of the United States. The Representative of Zambia said that he wished to ask the representative of the United States a specific question. That question was, what had the Five Western Governments done since South Africa had sent its letter to the Secretary-General? He said that he shared Mr. McHenry's disappointment regarding the South African press campaign. He would point out, however, that Mr. McHenry could well consider the various attacks on himself as being a considerable compliment. However, he agreed that the South African press behaviour was not at all helpful; but, he emphasised, it was not anything new. Though the proposal for proximity talks was merely a proposal, he noted that there had already been much press discussions of such talks. He said that he felt that it had been shown in the discussions in the Council that there was no major /the problem onXSWAPO side. He felt that one must not give the impression that there were problems on both sides of equal magnitude. The difficulties on/(SWAPO side were now quite insignificant. To suggest that they were on a par with those created by South Africa was to dilute the dimension of the difficulties with South Africa. He re-emphasised that SWAPO's reply to the Secretary-General must be read in conjunction with the Luanda communique . If SWAPO had not referred to the question of restriction to base in neighbouring countries then, he said, it was right to accept this omission as being consent on its part. Had SWAPO disagreed on restriction to base, then it would have said so. The President reiterated that SWAPO appeared to have been moved on virtually all the outstanding matters. The Representative of the United States said in answer to the question which had been put to him that the Five Western Governments had made constant efforts with SWAPO and South Africa. The fact that these efforts were not being highly publicised did not mean that they were not being made. He added that one object of trying to get people to New York would be to help them to get off the limb on which they found themselves. It would provide some opportunity to resolve the various unsubstantial issues to which he had referred. He said that it was too easy for countries represented at the meeting to speak as if the problems were created only by one side. The Council should be looking at problems on both sides of the matter. Having read all the documents, he said, including the Luanda communique and SWAPO's letters to the Secretary-General, he hoped that the representative of Zambia was right in what he said about SWAPO's agreement to be restricted to bases. He would merely reassert that it was time for both parties to get away from their equivocal statements. For SWAPO, it was necessary that it should clarify its position on logistics and on confinement to bases. For South Africa, it was necessary for it to cease its press campaign, to accept SWAPO bases in the territory at the time of the ceasefire and to accept monitoring by the neighbouring countries. The Representative of the USSR said that he felt that it had been a useful meeting and that it had shown that the prevalent view in the Security Council was that the sole obstacle was now being caused by the South African authorities. Thus the object of any further consultations must be to get South Africa's agreement on the Secretary-General"s proposals. It would not be at all acceptable to seek any further ^concessions on the part of SWAPO. However, there were further matters for clarification - 5 - regarding the proposed Namibia operation. Perhaps such clarifications could be provided in the next few days , perhaps in documentary form and possibly in a further report to the Council by the Secretary -General. The matters related to:- the civilian component of UWTAG; how to define whether or not the ceasefire had been broken; how the elections were to be managed and monitored; what UN machinery was proposed for the super- vision and control of such elections; and whatlwere to be the role and functions of the SRSG - how would they interrelate with those of the South African Administrator-General. Representative - of Czechoslavia said that he was in agreement with what had been said by the Representatives of Zambia and Jamaica. He felt that there was a number of questions to which his Government would like to have answers. He was very grateful for the clarifications so far given by the Secretary-General. The additional questions related to the nationality of persons included in the UWTAG operation in regard to the various civilian functions including the police; how much progress had been made on the composition of the military component and in regard to logistics; and, in regard to the ceasefire, the nationality of the military observers. He felt that the Council should meet for consulta- tions on these matters as soon as possible and that it would perhaps be helpful to have the information in writing. The Secretary-General said that it was his intention to keep the Council fully informed in these matters. No decisions had been taken in regard to the questions raised by the representative of Czechoslavia. He was, of course, in contact with various Governmer.ts regarding, for instance, the question of police monitors. The President suggested that the Council should meet for further consultations of the question of Namibia towards the end of the week. The meeting adjourned at 1300 hours . cc: The Secretary-GeneralK Mr. Urquhart Mr. Ahtisaari Mr. Thornberry