The. Indecisiveness of Modern War the Indecisiveness ·Of Modern War and Other
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THE. INDECISIVENESS OF MODERN WAR THE INDECISIVENESS ·OF MODERN WAR AND OTHER. ESSAYS BY J. HOLLAND ROSE, LITT.D. FBLLOW OP CHRIST'S OOLLBOB, CAJIBRIDGB; VBRB BABIIBWORTB P&OrEBSOB OW li'AVAL HISTORY, UJJIVBRBITY 01' CA.MBRIDOB; BON. LIT!'. D., lJ"NIVBRBITY OJ' .II.&JrCBI:&TBR: BON. LL.D•• UNIVICRSITT 01' NBBBABKA AND OV AKBII:RS'l' OOLL.BO&. liARS. LONDON· G. BELL AND SONS, LTD. 1927 Prillled ;.. Cn~~t Brilt~is ~ R. & R. CLARK, LtMtT&D, EJi"""rr"- PREFACE THESE essays are the outcome of many years of study of the problems of war and national policy. The first two set forth the conclusions to which, I 'believe, every open minded student must come if he contrasts the prolonged deadlock in the North Sea and on the Western Front in 1914-18 with what was achieved by the weak, slow fleets and small professional armies of earlier times. This strange contrast has lo:t;!g impressed me ; and, at the risk of seeming to exaggerate its import, I have felt impelled to point it out. History would abdicate one of her functions if she did not examine the causes of the mass-wastage into which mass-warfare has degenerated. It is also demonstrable that the study of Admiral Duckworth's expedition to Constan tinople in 1807 should have saved England from the glorious but disastrous venture of 1915. His final decision, which I have quoted (pp. 177, 179), stated emphatically the condi tion on which alone success could reasonably be expected; and the advent of the mine, torpedo and machine-gun ought to have added point to his warning. Why was not that warning taken into account at Whitehall early in 1915 1 The other essays deal with subjects bearing on national safety,and expansion, the balance of power in the Medi terranean, the ultimate dependence of India on Sea. Power, certain aspects of the careers of Napoleon and Nelson, the well-being of the fleet in 1805, our acquisition of Malta., and, finally, the comparatively recent growth of the spirit v vi PREFACE of comradeship at sea. For permission to re-publish Nos. V., VI., VIII. and XI., I am indebted to the editorial committees of The Indian Historical Journal, The Oamhridge Historical Journal, The Mariner's Mirror, and the Royal Society of Literature. On the topics treated in Essay I. I have received valuable advice from Admiral Sir William Henderson ; and on those of Essay II. from Lieut.-Colonel F. Moloney, R.E., and Major G. K. Rose, M.C. Other friends have read and criticised the remaining essays. One and all 'I thank them ; but mine alone is the responsi bility for the opinions finally expressed. J. H. R. CAMBRIDGE, January 12, 1927. CONTENTS PAGB I. THE INDECISIVENESS OF MODERN NAVAL WAR 1 II. THE INDECISIVENESS OF MoDERN LAND WAR 29 III. PLANS OF lNvASION OF THE BRITISH ISLES 49 IV. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY • 68 V. THE !Nn.uENCE OF SEA PoWER ON INDIAN HisTORY (1746-1802) 81 VI. NAPOLEON AND SEA POWER 98 VII. THE PROPHETIC INSTINCT IN NELSON • 125 VIII. THE STATE OF NELSON'S FLEET BEFORE TRAFALGAR 134 IX. THE BRITISH TITLB TO MALTA • 142 X. ADMIRAL DucKWORTH's FAILURE AT CoNSTANTINOPLE IN 1807 • 157 XI. CHivALRY AND THE SEA • 180 INDEX. 197 vii I THE INDECISIVENESS OF MODERN NAVAL WAR 1 I should say the majority of our naval peraonnel entered upon the Great War with a sort of general impression, with no historical backing, that a war at sea opened with a decisive battle in which both sides fought to a finish.-" The Times," liiarch 4, 1926. HE term "indecisive" as applied to modern warfare T is, of course, relative. I use it here to indicate the comparatively slight result that was achieved by the naval and military operations in the last war, when we measure that result against the enormous mass of the forces set in motion and the losses in life and treasure sustained by the chief combatants. Omitting all reference to the financial waste of the World War, which is incalculable, we may note the tale of sacrifice in lives; for that is now known with something like accura"Cy, except in regard to Japan and Turkey. It appears that the other belligerent nations (inclu sive of the U.S.) lost nearly 8! million sailors and soldiers killed dead or of illness. So far as is known, this total exceeds any that is recorded in history. Perhaps it is nearly equalled in proportion to population by the losses sustained in the Thirty Years War; but those losses are conjectural, and were due largely to disease and famine among the civilian population, whereas, owing to the growth of medical science and the spread of philanthropic agencies, the number of deaths of that description among civilians and soldiers in wartime is now far smaller than in the Thirty Years War. Certain it is that the number of nearly ' Read to the Royal Institution, London, on :!\larch 18, 1926. B 2 INDECISIVENESS OF 1\IODERN NAVAL WAR 8} million casualties in 41 years far exceeds the wastage ever before recorded among combatants. If, on the other hand, we measure this appalling total against the results actually achieved by direct naval and military operations, the contrast is startling. Experts at the Staff Colleges are investigating this phenomenon, and are trying to account for it on technical grounds. In this paper I shall avoid technical questions, so far as possible, and try to throw the light of history upon the problem. But the inquiry will lead us inevitably to the question whether recent scientific and mechanical inventions have not largely contributed to the present singular situation. Indecisiveness is, of course, no new feature in battles at sea. It characterised earlier periods, especially that from 1690 to 1779, which was dominated by the tactic of line acting against line. This formation was the outcome of the great development of gun-power in a broadside ; for it enabled all the ships' broadsides, without blanking each other, to bear on the enemy. Therefore it marked an advance on the earlier custom (perhaps reminiscent of the galley age) of a series of groups charging the enemy, gener ally with very confused results. But when, early in the eighteenth century, the line tactic was pushed to a pedantic extreme, it proved to be fatal to all initiative, the outcome being those typical battles of slow attrition and meagre results, Beachy Head (1690), Malaga (1704) and Toulon (1744). Rodney, Duncan, and Nelson successively modified or even broke up the long unwieldy line with the view of effecting a concentration on part of the hostile array ; and their efforts (curiously parallel to those of Frederic and Napoleon on land) led to brilliant, victories. Nelson's famous memorandum of October 9, 1805 testifies to his anxiety to discover a method of approach less slow and cumbrous than that of the line ; and though in practice he modified that plan at Trafalgar, yet his supreme tactical effort on October 21 (his nautical will and testament) seemed to challenge his countrymen to further develop ments in this direction. INDECISIVENESS OF :M:ODERN NAVAL WAR 3 It was not to be. The introduction of steam-power of course facilitated the formation of a. line of battle and perhaps furnished the reason why that tactic became stereotyped. On the other hand the armouring of ships, the contest between the gun and armour, and consequent enormous growth of tonnage increased the length of the line of a modern fleet. The result is that no fleet normally cruises in that formation; and if an enemy approaches, the problem of quickly forming line ahead for battle becomes one of vital importance, on which the fate of nations may turn. 1 Consider the case of the Russian fleet before the Battle of Tsushima on May 27, 1905. In more ways than on~ it bears on our inquiry ; for it shows that a meeting between two hostile fleets of approximately equal strength may lead to the utter overthrow of the one which on paper appears to have a slight advantage in gun-power; Rojdestvensky's fleet, which leftCronstadt in two sections, comprised five first class, three second-class, and three third-class battleships, in all mounting 41 heavy guns; while his opponent, Admiral Togo, marshalled only four first-class battleships, none of the second and third classes, but eight very efficient armoured cruisers as against one Russian. The Japanese fleet, therefore, carried only 17 heavy guns, but had a great superiority in 8-inch and 6-inch weapons, viz. llO to 49. It also steamed 15 or 16 knots to the enemy's 10 or l1; t and the Japanese crews far excelled the Russians in skill, gunnery, and moral. The evidence presented in that pathetic book " Rasplata " (" The Reckoning ") proves that the Russian officers knew that they were sent out to certain defeat. As they neared Japan one of them, point ing to their course on the chart, exclaimed "Via dolorosa.";2 the captain of the "Ural" wanted to disarm'her;a and all of them cursed the over-confident bureaucrats of Peters burg who sent them out to what seamen knew to be 1 H. W. Wilson, "Battleships in Action" (1926), vo1. i. p. 244. 1 Semenofl, "Rasplata," p. 471. 1 Politovsky, "From Libau to Tsushima," p. 297. 4 INDECISIVENESS OF MODERN .NAVAL WAR disaster. Then, too, on the dayof battle, Togo, already in single line, came upon them while still formed in two nearly parallel columns, which hindered each other's fire.l In vain did Rojdestvensky seek betimes to form a single line ahead.