Military Revi w December 1973 . -US ~RMY COM~"AND AND GENERAL STAff COLLEGE, fORT LEAVENWORTH, UNSA$

COMMANDANT

DEPUTY COMMANDANT IBrlgwJJier (i1(!w.rmJJR llJeuaillJliiBloa lL. llil€llV"rl80fil

Editor in Chief Production Editor co/[, o. W. r.Jar&. 111. Helen f,§.HaU

Associate Editor Spanish-American Editor co/[, Allred I. !,jeer: LTC Neator IL. Bevvloo Army Wall" Colleoe

Assistant Editor Brazilian Editors LTC R. GleliEl l4eCue COIL 1000 OliliilJ4o lfUho LTC Hm:lle Ii'lIkllerlo

Features Editor Publication Officer /IfAI louph B. lihirkw /If/U Steven B. Bortelo

Managing Editor Art and Design CPT Ref;ei'S C. ClI/I!IJonalt'J lerome Po Seheele I MilitaryReview Professional Journal of the US Army

ARTICLES Logistical Base for the West • • • • . • COL Forrest R. Blackburn, USAR 3 Division Defensive Operations • • • • •• MAl Michael A. Molino, USA 13 Commitment, Disengagement and the Nixon Doctrine .• Donald Kelly Jones 27 Historic Barracks Restored • • . • •• •••••.•• '39 Yugoslav Totallllational Defense • • • • • • A. Ross Johnson 40 The Multinational Phenomenon • • • • • • . LTC Harold L. Jones, USA 47 LiteralY Leanings • • • • . • • • . • . . • • John OnSlow 55 Southeast Asia: New Perspective • • • • WG CDR M. K. Chopra, Indi~n AF, Ret 60 L~adership • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . 69 New Warrant Officers for the Soviet Armed Forces • • • '. • John Erickson 70 Middle East strategic Factors • . • • • • ~,1A1 Melvin J. Stanford, USAR 78 IJEPAR1ifiim'll'S Reader Forum • 2 Articles of Interest 92' PIIilitalY Notes 94 Military 800ks • 101 COVER Stotsenburg Hall, Fort Leavenworth, about 1870 befora the second story was added to the center section. Built in 1859 as an ordnance arsenal worksbop, this building later served as quartermaster shop, barracks, officers' quarters and now finance offices. READER fORUM

~111taryIPollticai OffIcer

After reading Captain Walter "R" Thomas' srtl· He was a political/military officer, but, when cle, "And Another Thing I'U Say After I Rellre," the time ceme for advancement, he was passed In the Juno issue of the I.tliHaly 110111l1l1I, I am ovar....probably in favor of those with "command prompted to air my thoughts Cl\ tha pressing re­ lime." He has retired and is now thlt vice presi· qulrament to get more military officers Into the dent of a large civilian flrm doing business not area of mllitary/politlcel reporting. Naturally, my only with the country where he had served as at· views have been Influenced censlderably by two tscM but worldwide. The business world recog· tours of allach6 duty and, in addition, by service nized his worth but the Army did not. with a, military assistance advisory group. If we, the military, want our voices heard In Can the military learn from past mistakes? the making of foreign policy, wa must have of· VIetnam, Laos and cambodia should have taught ficers trained in both military and political report· us that combat In an Insurgency situation is not ing. These officers must heve a chanco of advanc­ merely taking ground and killing the enemy, but ing to fiag rank. Some have in the past, bul this is also e polilicel war for the minds and gcodwill has been exceedingly rare. of the population. The Anny still insists on com­ The State Department has taken over the po­ mand ss the criterion of the bed officer. If this litical/military reporting, and It should not always Is not so, then why Is tho term "command se­ be so. Embassies that have pollticel(military sec· lecled" used? ObviouslY, if you are not nominated tions structure the sections so that they are al· for a command job, you are not in the select few. ways headed by a civilian 1If at least First Secre­ I am convinced that a few good officers trained tary rank. Why has the military allowed the State in both political and military sciences would be Department to preempt this Important part of the worth many times over the same number of of· Country Team? Is It that 1'18 do not have the ex· flcars trained primarily for command positions pertlse and/or tho qualified personnel to do the with a few years of staff duty in between com­ job? Is it because of a lack of appreciation for mand assignments. Unfortunately, your chances the importance of this type of reporting? Or is it for advancement are drastically lowcred if you that the military is 50 years behind the limes and devote more than ono tour in tho politlcal/mlli· stili believes that military officers should do mill· tary field. tary reporting only? Granted thai In the old na­ I refer specifically to the military attach6 field tions with stable governments such as England, in this context. As an example, almost everyone Australia, Canada and Sweden, the civilian politi· connected with tho military ettach6 field knows cal officer is more al home and at ease with his the following case history. An officer who was counterparts and shOUld do the major part of the acknowledged to be one of the best military at· political reporting. On the other side of the coin tacMs and with more influence in hIs country of are the newer countrias (emerging nations if you accreditation than thO ambassador was never will) which often have a military government. In promoted to brigadier goneral. A lieutenant gen­ those casas, the US military officers should be the eral of the nation concerned lold me that this contact and the heed of any military/pollticel attacM knew more generals and had been to section. moro military installatlon$ in the country than he The military has a buUNn vehicle to do this (the general) had. He said the man was the most Job-the Defense Attech6 Offica. But the military trusted Amerlcen in his country. This attecM aIIncb4's training is to report on the mll,ltary of studied and knew the polltlcel situation and did the host country. Little If any time is spent on not confine himself to military reporting. My the more important part, tha political side. Much knowledge of this officer Is sach that I am con­ bas been written in military joumals about tinder­ vinced he could have dona the'same in any coun· try to which he would have been nsigned. lcontlnued on __ 111) 2 flllllbI7 RevieW ( READER fORUM

(continned ,..... P.... 2) Since optimistic projections of t~e speed of standing the people and that military victories armor adVance were peoh-pOohed in the 20s and will not always win the countryside. But it seems 30s by the defenders of 'orthodoxy, it seems that this is es far as It gets. worthwhile to consider new technIques. The air­ The number of rifles, artillery pieces and air­ cushion vehicle mode In armor bas been evolving craft are the least important reports of these new unevenly in the last few years, but the Soviets military governments. More important are'atti­ have been worldng in the area since the late tudes, political leanings andfulure plans. Mllitary 195Ds. officers can talk to each other comfortably be­ Even foreswearing such an exotic new vector, cause of mutual interests and similar backgrounds. is it not true that the motorized armies of the Thus, in any country with a government in Which Second World War and even today ignored J. F. C. military men predominate, the Army/Air Force/­ Fuller's insistence that all elements of 8 truly Naval Attachb should be a prima source of p0­ mobile army would flave to be tracked to avoid litical reporting. But they must have the training the inertia of road-binding? A good part of the to do this reporting. Where we now get this type German end Russian Armies were horsedrewn. of reporting, this can be attributed to the ap. Perllaps the Soviets have wOrked out a leapfrog titude, interest and self Instruction 0' the officers or rolllng system of atteck and logistical followup. involved. Their skills at aerial resupply suggest closer ex­ With the drawdown of our military forces, the amination of that mode. : mood of Congress, and the concern of the people Most conspicuous in Mr. Record's analysis was in the United States over the high cost of the an omission of Soviet armor operatiOns during military, we must be in a pOsition to Interpret 1942-45. But let me adcfthat I thInk this kind of foreign governments' intents and purposes cor­ article Is extremely valu3ble in its attempt to rectly in order to keep -our military spending in analyze configurations and look at military prob­ the correct priority. lems from a hardheeded and quantified aspect. The quest/on comes down to this-Do we want It underlines how much is not known about basic to accept the judgment of civilians in the State military dynamics. I hope Mr. Record keeps slug· Department, or do we want trained military offi­ ging in this dimension since there are far too cers to give us the benefit born of their military many assumptions made on a weak data base. and their pOlitical training? I contend that we lIegor A. Beaumont must have the latter not only for the benefit of ASSIlelm Profemr of Orplllulieft· SclaDca the Armed Services but for the Government of the University of WiSCInsiR United States. To get the needed outstanding officers into the system, we must make this sort of career more fill The final footnote to Jeffrey Record's "Armored worthwhile. We must show that attach!! duty is Advance Rates: A Historical Inquiry" in the Sep. not a dead-end street. tember issue of the Mllitery lIewlsw refers to the If we continue as we have in the past, we will Red Army's "Iighlning occupation of Manchuria" always be dependent upon Ii strictlY civilian view as meriting detailed investigation. The Soviet. of the political thought of foreign governments. book Flul. edited by Marshal M. V. Zakharov de- I If Vietnam is of any value, wa must leern that scribes the entire campaign and is worth reading. combat command does not necessarily make the The main effort in the campaign was Imede by most effective officer at this time in history. A the 6th Guerds Tank Army supported ~ fighter well·trained milltary/politicol officer could be and transport planes of the 12th Air !Army for much more valuable. protection and for fuel and water resupply after COL Archio W. Summors, USA the Great IOPghm Mauntalns had been trussed. The atteck began on 9 August 1945. It advanced over' extremely broken and forested terrain and Al'mored Advance Rates was oPposadbj' the Jepanesa Kwantung Army. In respect to Jeffrey Record's "Armored Ad­ By 12 Audus!, the 6th Querds Tank 'Army had vence Rates: AHistorical Inquiry" in the Septem­ split, part turningsouthwaril to Mukden and part ber 1973 Militaly Review, several thoughts come movinR on to Changchun. Mukden was .-:bed on to mind. 19 August, end the campaIgn was practically over. Dec.er -1973 111 READER FORUM

The advance had taken 10 days to cover some proved situation, the author states, would be 800 kilometers against strong opposition. created by building a force of special purpose Perllaps this high rate of advance of some 50 (and inexpensive) lightweight fighters designed to miles a day may justify, in part, "the extraordi­ do nothing more than defeat enemy aircraft over nary optimism on the part of Soviet military the battlefield, and close air support aircraft pianners" today. designed to deliver a high concentration of fire· COL Robert J. leks, USA·Retired power against the enemy's forward combat forces. The author's view of air superiority and ground support is an excessively narrow one. The US ground forces and their alUes have not faced serious enemy air opposition in 30 years (Salerno in September 1943), Perhaps this is why many NATO's Tactical Nuclear Option have forgotten most of the techniques for gaining Mr. Gormiey's article "NATO's Tactical Nuclear air superiority. To grant Warsew Pact air forces Option: Past, Present and Future" (Military Re· virtual immunity from attack on their airfields view, September 1973) was well written and docu· simplifies their air defense problem. While the mented~ He builds a sound case for redesigning development of hardened aircraft shelters and the NATO tactical nuclear stockpile and placing dispersal techniques have greatly increased tar­ increased reliance. on conventional forces. How­ geting considerations confronting NATO air forces, ever, there are two points, that I must question they have also caused the Warsaw Pact difficul­ seriously. ties, particularly by compounding the complexity The first is his comment that it is no longer of their command and control network and making valid to assume that Warsaw Pact forces are it more susceptible to electronic countermeas· trained, organized and equipped primarily for taco ures. Air superiority is seldom won over the bat­ tical nuclear warfare. Mr. Gormley appears to base tlefield. It is usually, and most ideally, won be­ this contention on Marshal Vakubovsky's comment hind the forward edge of the battle area. The that the Soviet Armed Forces "must be ready for author does not consider that while these great combat operations without the use of nuclear air battles are tailing place over the battlefield means, using the conventional, regular, claSSiC the effective employment of close air support will armament of troops." Admittedly, Soviet ground prove to be impOSSible. forces possess a formidable conventional capa­ The creation of a short-legged ground support bility which they have been steadily improving in force also leaves much to be desired. It com· recent years, but to draw from this the conclusion pletely ignores the immense value of air Interdic· that the Soviet Army's primary function is now to tion. As Royal Air Force Wing Commander O. C. G. operate in a conventional environment is totally Brook pointed out ·in his tecent article "Close Air erroneous. As' pointed out in another article in Support" lAir Clues, April 1973): the September FIII/ltall' lievillW-"One of the most "An important advantage of air interdiction is remarkable tenets of Soviet military doctrine is that from an air weapons effectiveness point of the rate of advance postulated for armored forma­ view, it is more profitable to attack enemy land tions. . . • Guidelines established by the Soviet forces before they have deployed in the I!.attle General Slaff for continental conflict call for a area. Beyond the battlefield the enemy may be sustained advance of 70 miles a day." While this moving non-lactically in close column and may be may very well be an overly optimistic goal, the bunched up on roads. Such targets are easy for only possible way to achieve such sustained ad· pilots til see and hit." vance rates, when NATO's antitank defenses are 10 eliminate air interdiction from the inventory considered, is by the use of nucleor firepower. of resources available to NATO tactical air forces To believe otherwise is highly suspect. will undoubtedly enable the Warsaw Pact 10 bring The second point that must be seriously ques­ much more pressure to bear on NATO's ground tioned is Mr. Gormley's contention that it is forces. This could increase the pressure on ,deci­ desirable for the US to "eliminate the deep pene­ sionmakers to commit NATO tactical nuclear f tration requirements associatedl with the inlerdic­ forces which Mr. Gormley and both believe is tion and air superiority missions of Its NATO land very undesirable. . and carrior-based strike aircraft." A much 1m· CPT William II. Creamer. USAI' 112 Military Review FOR COMMANDBRS' BYES ONLY

Military Review Reader Surveys which appeared as a blue pull-out in the September isslle have been coming in completed at a gratifying rate. Most are from subscribers. We wish more taken from official distribution copies would arrive. We would appreciate it if you would encourage your people to £ill in and mail any they nnd lying about. Reproduced copies are nne too. We are analyzing those received and will report on the results later. But one comment really grabbed our artention immediately. A young officer subscriber writes "not many officers that I have talked to even know that the Military Review exists." Others have made similar statements. ' Official distribution is based roughly on one copy per five field and general officers. But students at the Command and General Staff College, the Army War College and Army students at tother staff and war colleges each get a copy. This somewhat c.1istorts distribution to the rest of the Army. But, even so, co~sidering this distribution, and the greater number of copies going to subscribers, we just sort of thought that every Army officer had at lease heard ofthe Military Review and had probably seen one. But obviously they have not. Please help us. Tell these aspiring professionals about the Military Review and let them look over your copy. It should sell itself. Inc doesn't •... , , , -hi Fort Leavenworth: logistical base for the west

Colonel FOff'e!)t Fl. Blecklmm United States Anny Ressrve

NITS early years, Fort Leavenworth was a base for the military protection of travelers and freight on the Santa Fe Trail. In more recent years, the post ihas been a center of military education. Between these two periods that brought fame to her, Fort Leavenworth performed II less glamorous and less well·known, but still important function. For more than 30 years. Fort Leaven· worth was a principal supply point for other forts and for Army operations across the Plains and mountains to the wast coast. The Mexlcail, War. beginning In the spriqg of 11146. marked Leavenworth·s initiation ,as a supply base. Neinly 1700 troops under Colonel Stephen W. Kearny. known as the Army of the West, assembled' at Fort Leavenworth, and marched out late in june ·11146.· They were soon followed by some 1200 reinforcements under Colonel Sterling Price. All these troops had to be equipped and provided with rlltions lind means of transportation at Fort Leavenworth. Time did oot,allow for the sbipment of supplies from the east. They had to be prOCllred from Missouri and other nearby areas.' Major Aeneas Macliey, quartermaster at·St Lwis, sent available equipment to Fort Leavenworth by steamboat. There. Captain William McKiSSack, assistent quartermaster at the fort, and Major Thomas Swords, quartermaster of the Kearny expedition; took charge of the supplies. Dlclillber 1113 LOGISTICAl. BASE

Keamy demanded that supplies for II year accompany his army. This was an impossibility, but a provision train was on the road by 20 June and ad· ditional wagons were being loaded every day. Ascarcity of grain in New Mexico, and the difficulty of freighting over 800 miles to Santa Fe through country in· habited by hostile Indians, added to the urgency that supplies accompany the Army of the West. . The decks of' $teamboats arriving at fort leavenworth were covered with wagons. 'RIousands of barrels of pork arrived on the steamers. Army agents scoured the countryside for mules, paying $100 each for them. Provisions accumulated on the riverbank at Fort leavenworth. They arrived faster than the wagons could haul them away. Soldiers not yet dispatched for Santa Fe did fatigue duty in loading the wagons. Getting the supplies from Fort leavenworth to Santa Fe was a problem of monumental proportions. Not only were wagons needed, but also teamsters. This need was largely met by hiring young men who were applying for enlist· ment in the Army where there were few openings. Teamsters eamed $25 to $30 a month compared to $7 for private soldiers. Sometimes soldiers did extra duty as teamsters, receiving extra pay for it. Troops were continually being outfitted at Fort Leavenworth. In 1847, a regiment from Illinois was sent to Santa Fe to relieve Colonel Price, a bat· talion from Missouri left to aid in the construction' of forts along the Oregon Trail, and Major William Gilpin's battalion of Missouri volunteers left to main· tain communication through the Indian country to New Mexico. The Mexican War -ended early in 1848, but Fort Leavenworth remained an important depot. The frontier had been extended and into this vast area traders, miners, settlers and others were pouring. They all looked to the Army for protection, and by 1850, there were 67. Army posts west of the MiSSissippi River. Fort leavenworth was the supply depot for many of these, especially those on or near the Santa Fe and Oregon Trails. The Quartermaster General reported in 1~53 that:

Our te:rritorill8 are now 80 6a:tended that S6fJeral permanent de­ pots for the concentration of supplies for the troops hafJs become nec­ 68sa'l'1/. [Including]' • •• one at Fort LeafJenwortk. . Major E. A. Ogden, assistant quartermaster at Fort leavenworth, in his report dated 4 October 1851, described the depot and its actiVities in some detail. He stated that the fort had "become the depot for the chain of posts on the Oregon route and throughout New Mexico." fIlo landing bad beiln available for unloading the steamboats and no proper storage existed. Supplies had been unloaded on the rocks along the river, then haUled up the steep bank to be stored' in stables, company quarters, leaky blockhouses 8~d othet place~. By late in 1850, however, neW storeh,ouses had f been completed.. . . \ One of these new buildings was at the riverside. Steamboats unloaded MI_ievisw il!to the first fioor of the building and wagons were loaded from the third story on the opposite side. The other storehouse Ogden described as 39 by 100 feet, with three stories llnd a cellar. The first fioor. WllS used for general storage, the second for harness, and the third for clothing. Ogden reported the cost of the two buildings as $13,973, and that the funds'came from the sale of unserviceable horses and mules, worn-out wagons and other property left oller from the MeXican WaF. 1 One unmilitary activity carrie4 on by.the quartermast\lr at Fort Leavenworth was a farming operatilln.·Ogden reported that 3332 acres were under cultivation. Crops harvested an~ expected to be Ilarvested in 1851 included com 18,000 bushels, oats 8000 b~shels, lIotatoes12OQ bushels and hay 528 ~ns. The farm had made anet profit of $6300 in 1850 and was \lXjlected tt) exceed ~hat in 1851. 2 Some of. the, distanees$upplies bad to be freighted from Fort leavenworth were: to Fort Larami~ 637 miles, to Fort Union 728 miles an~ to Santa Fe 821 miles. Although the. ~y had begun to operate its own wagon ·trains during the Me~ican War, this proved disastrous. Among the probl~ins, were the repair and replacement of equipment ~nd the careohnim~ls durillg theY/inter months. For example, during the winter of 1ll48Jl9, Captain ~,C. ~ton, assistant quartermaster:!t Fort!l.eavll~rth, con~ted fl!rJhe~re.~f'3&62~xen, 2762 mUleS and .. i95 horses, MJlny.of th~ :s.oldiers 'a.nd others working as,tellmsters were not experienced in han~ling mules and oxen and. djd.~not·bow ;howto care,Jor~ anL roperiy. Consequently,BS OIIe.tlbsel'llsl':putit,··tl1e road to,sal\ta.fe:'viaswitl) about $5 mlDionworthof ,Govepiment..supplles. Deee_ "13 As early as 1847, War Department officials recognized the inability of the Army to freight its own supplies. Consequently, the quartermaster at Fort Leaven· worth was instructed to contract with eillilian freighters. The first contract, dated 18 May 1848, was made with James Brown of Independence, Missouri. The contract called for Brown to transport 200,000 pounds of goods to Santa Fe at the rate of $11.75 per hundred pounds. Within two years, a large portion of the military freight from Fort Leaven· worth was moving by civilian carrier. In 1850, 6600 oxen and 180 men were used to move 1500 tons of supplies..The wagons used were usually of 2¥z·ton capacity and drawn by 12 oxen. Later, S-ton wagons became common. a By 1855, a freighting firm operated by William H. Russell, Alexander Majors and William B. Waddell had become the leading freighter on the Santa Fe and Oregon Trails. In exchange for receiving II monopoly on military freighting, the firm offered more favorable rates. The rates were a fixed amount per 100 pounds per 100 miles. This allowed more flexibility. In the case of shifts of troops from one area to another, new contracts would not have to be made. Contracts were signed with the company in 1855 for that year and 1856. They were renewed each year, except 1859, through 1860. In arranging for the contracts, the quartermaster advertised for bids in the local newspapers. In a proposal dated 29 December 1856, for· instance, the amount the contractor would be required to transport was from 50,000 to 2.5 million pounds on each of the two routes. Provision was made for the notice of Impending shipment of supplies to be given the contractor, ranging from 10 days for less than 200,000 pounds to 40 days for more than 1 million pounds. A single contract was to cover the whole· operation• .Another thing the· Army advertised· for was bacon and beans. The Leaven· worth newspaper, 15 November "1856, carried an ad signed by First lieUtenant il9nilaiy levIGw LOIlISTiCAL BASE

J. E. B. Stuart, offering to buy 37,000 pounds of bacon at 10 cents a pound, and 375 bushels of beans at $3 a bushel. . In 1857, the quartermaster at fort leavenworth and the freighting con· tractor were agaln~utto a test The War Department ·1ssued orders in May that some 2500 tro~s assemble at fort leavenworth for a march to Utab where there was trou~'e with the Mormons. The Quartermesblr Department would transport all supplies to acconipany the troops; thecontractlirwould haul all other supplies. Captain Thonias L Brent, assistant quartermaster at Fort Leave~ worth; notified Majo~ and Russell, as the firm was then called, that they would have to transport 3 million pounds to Utah. The contractor'~ trains wera already on the road to various forts with required provisions. W/ajors· and Russell protested but went ahead and assembled wagons, oxen and milO. The firm dispatched 41 wagon trains to Utah, carrying over 4 million pounds~ In addition, the company under the name of Russell and Waddell contracted with the Subsistence Department to deliver 2000 head of cattle to Salt Lake City. 4 . In the meantime, the quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth handled supplies arriving by steambo~t and scoured the country for wagons, oxen, mules and horses, competing in: some degree with Majors and Russell for stock and thus pushing up prices. An item in the local newspaper the following spring stated that the quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth had no funds with which'to purchase stock, and, in addition, the seller was required to pay to the quartermaster 10 percent of the sale price. The seller then received a "due bill" for the amount of the sale plus 10 percent The editor speculated that the purpose of the 10 percent was to get cash to pay employees and take care of small bills. 6 Another force of over 3000 troops was ordered to Utah in the $pring of 1858. These sOldie~ with those already there, plus civilian employees and servants would have made a total of 8000 for whom supplies would be needed from fort Leavenworth. The troops were to carry with them the three months' rations needed en rOllte and a year's supply for the whole Army in Utah. Plans also called for eight months' reserve rations to be shipped to Fort laramie. The transportation of the supplies required 3982 wagons, 46,896 oxen and 33 mules. 6 However; before the iarrival of this relief force in Utah, ,8 settlement with the I

7 LOGlSnCAL BASE

Mormons was announced, with the result that some of the troops were reas­ signed and some returned to Fort Leavenworth. In addition to handling quartermaster supplies, Fort Leavenworth served as an ordnance depot and arsenal. Adepot was first established during the Mexican War but was discontinued in 1849. In 1855, the Chief of Ordnance recommended that an arsenal be, established at Fort Leavenworth, replacing the one at Liberty, Missouri. An ordnance officer was detailed to inspect the fort with the view of opening an arsenal. All a result of his report, an ordnance depot was establiShed in 1858. This was enlarged in 1859 and the following year it became an arsenal. There were 138 acres in the southeast corner of the reservation turned over to the arsenal. Part of this area had been used as a cemeterY which was abandoned with the establishment of the arsenal. Alelter to the editor of the Leavenworth newspaper from an officer invol d in the construction of the arsenal described the location as a "remarkab handsome plot." He went on to say the arsenal storage building w ich under construction was 120 by 45 feet and the magazine was to be y 22 feet. The storage building was to have a basement of stone and two upper floors of brick. liThe surface of the building will be heavily plastered, the cellar windows ironed, and those of the first storY iron shuttered," the officer said. 1 Actua"y, two such buildings were erected in 1859 and used for storage and shops for the arsenal. These buildings are now known as Sherman and Sheridan Halls. I , The magazine was placed:

••• back and low, out of harm's wa,y; Tuz8 a,n a,Teh of brick 01leT it and 8% feet walls. The lightning TOds mn up trelJ8 sta,nding oller it. Its roof will be prettily arrayed with digeTently coloTed sla,tes. 8 Another arsenal building, erected in 1861, was the residence of the arsenal commandant Today. this building serves as the residence of the Com· mand and General Staff College commandant and post commanding general. . The arsenal manufactured and repaired small ordnance items. For instance, in 1869, the Chief of Ordnance reported that in the year past the arsenal had fabricated 400 cartridge boxes, 10,274 cartridges filled for field guns, 350 pounds of paint and other items. Articles repaired included 2784 carbines, 100 muskets, 240 Spencer rifles, 648 revolvers, and 2714 sma"·arms appendages. The report stated that "a large amount of ordnance stores" had been issued to troops operating against the Indians on the Plains. 9 During the Civil War, the Fort Leavenworth depots were busy. Due to the lar.g e quantities of ordnance stores 8.nd. the small number of troops at ~', there was· considerable concern in 1861 that' it migllt. be an obia' of Confederate foices. An. attIIck on the U~erty, Missouri. depot heightened II' prehension. It hasty withdrawal of· troops from Fort Keamy and other forts farther west was orderadto bolster the fort's defenses.· II MIlItaIJl 1I0yli. I According to the! Leavenworth Times, 22 April 1861, the arsenal at the fort furnished 2000 stands of arms for the citizens of the town and, in tum, 300 volunteers from t~e town assisted in guarding the arsenal. The depots not o~ly supplied forts and troops in the west and southwest, but the Leavenworth ;newspaper reported on 25 January 1862, that "supply trains are almost d8i1J on the move south from the Fort, to the regiments of the Kansas Brigade stlltioned along the border." The extent of th~ operation of the quartermaster depot is indicated by the report of the Quartermaster General which stated that Captain H. C. Hodges, assistant quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth, handled more than $4 million in 1864. The report said ~e Fort Leavenworth, depot was the base of supplies for all troops in the "dep~rtment of Kansas and New Mexico, and those operating on the Great Plains." r Another indication' of the volume of supplies handled by the quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth d~ring the Civil War is that contracts were made in 1863 and 1864 for the purllhase 'of nearly 5000 horses and mules. n The excitement of the Civil War reached its peak at Fort Leavenworth in the autumn of 1864 ~hen General Sterling Price's Confederate Army marched across Missouri towar4 Kansas City and Fort Leavenworth. Fortifications were thrown up and guns emplaced to protect the fort, but Price was defeated in the Battle of Westportland retreated south through eastern Kansas. . . With the ending of the CMI War, activities at Fort, Leavenworth settled into a more relaxed pattern. Indian uprisings on the Plains tended to keep the troops busy and suppli~sconseqUently continued to move through the fort. DecBmlter '913 II Feltlftcetlaos at tile Fort In tile 11170s

Over the years, a number of attempts had been made to abandon Fort Leavenwortll and to sell the reservation. In 1872, James A. Garfield remarked that, during the time he had served in Congress, six attempts had been made to dispose of the post. In the early 18705, one of Leavenwortll's strongest de­ fenders was Brigadier General John Pope, commander of the Department of Missouri. Among his remarks in support of the post were these: The military reseMlation of Fort Leavenworth is one of the most valuable and most useful p08ses8ed by the Government. It embraces about 6000 acres of good land . .. . ,It lies on the Missouri River, at a point where steamers can reach it for eight or nine months of the year. .•• It is altogether the most clmvenient and suitable place for deipots of supplies for troops seMling throughout tlutt great region, and as a depot at which to recruit animals intended for public use• ••. I believe that every interest of the Bef'viee would be promoted by a very large itlCf'ease here of accommodatilmll for troops and public store8 • ••• It is destined in the futuf'6 to be the main station for the Army and the depot for the supply of the larger part of the military forces . .•• 18 Pope's vision of the future of Fort Leavenwortll proved only partly cor· rect While it would continue to be an important Army installation, leavenworth's usefulness as a logistical base for the Wesl wss soon to. diminish and finally cease altogether. The building of railroads across the Plains and lIlountains and the abandonment of many small posts ss the' Indian troubles. lessened were 10 MilltaiJ ReVIew , factors in bringing abbot the demise of the depots at Fort leavenwortll. Early in 1874, orlfers were received disClilitinuing the arsenal. Its stores were transferred to t"e Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois. However, the post was not yet through with ordnance affairs. Aboard of officers'met at the instiga­ tion of the Chief of Ordnance at Fort leavenworth, beginning 1 July 1874, for the purpose of detennjning the proper equipment for the infantry soldier. When it b8ceme apparent that facilities for constructing equipment were lacking, the board adjourned on 18 July 1874 to meet later at Watervliet Arsenal in New York. 1 ~ An ordnance dep~ was re-established at Fort Leavenworth in the late 18705. Its function, however, was apparently limited, as the report of the Chief of Ordnance stated:

The principal object of these depot8 is to p/4e1l G 'l'e8e7'118 8'11llYply of 8t0'/'8S in G cont)enient moality, under the immediGte control Gnd comma,nd of the aepartment commande'l', fO'/' the swpply of hill own troops • ••• " I I The quartennaste~ depot continued to operate routinely through the 18705. The locetion of the ~epot was changed when the new military prison was located in the old qu~rtennaster buildings in the north part of the post. The depot moved into the buildings previously occupied by the arsenal. In the years that followed, the prison was in some measure a source of supply for the depot. For example, in !1877, it wes reported that 1800 pairs of shoes completed at the prison had bee~ turned over to the depot. LOGISTICAL IIASE

In the 1870$, supplies were still .purchased as near the depot as possible for convenience and economy. In 1870, it was reported that wagons were con· tracted for in the town of Leavenworth for $92.50 each. About the same time, the Commissary General reported that one of the main purchasing depots was at Fort Leavenworth. The coming of the 1880s brought the era of the Leavenworth supply depots to an end, and with the establishment of the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry at the post in 1881, Fort Leavenworth entered into a new phase of its history.

Colonel Forrest R. Blackburn, US Army Reserve, is a mobilization desig­ nee to the MILITARY REVIEW. A mem­ ber of the staff of the Kamas State Historical Society, Topeka, he holds a J.D. from Washburn University Law School, Topeka, and is a graduate of the USACGSC. He serosd with the 99d Infantry Division and the 522d Field Artillery Battalion during World War 11. His article "Military Reriew, 1922-1972" fJ/PPGared in the February 1972 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.

NOTES

1 "Report of the Quartermaster General," HOlUJe EZCCUtiv6 Document Number 2 (Serial 634), 82d Congress, Firat Session. 1851--52. pp 289..92. 2 Ibld.. p 292. 8 James A. Huston, The Sin6wB oJ War: Ann.lI LoowtitD. 1815..1963, Offiee. Chief of Mlli.. itary HlstQnr, ~artment of the Anny. Washington. D. C•• 1966, PJ) 166-6: Raymond W. nnd ~~~\lftt3t~cl:ia~ fu:e~ :~1~;I;'TWia~~,s::fC~~~~75.~9~~~90l flee of the Quartermaster General, WcsJdngton. D. C., 1962. P 309. 4 Rlstb. op. ciC.. pp 828·24. -5 Leavenworth Times, Leavenworth, KanSllS. 10 April 1868. 6 RIoeb. op. cit-. pp 82G47. 1 Thc Daily Times. Leavenworth, Kansas. 10 September 1869. Slbid. o"Report of ChIef ot Ordnance,'· H0146C B$C!CUUt76 Document Number 1 (Serial 1412)_ 41Bt Conlf1"e88, Seeond BeestOD, 1869--10. P 451. 10 ""Report of the Quartennuter General:' H0fJ,86 B~Cfdi'6 Document Number RS (Sf'-' rial 1230). B81l1 Congm,s, Seeond Seoslon. 1864-6&. pp 143-44. 11 "Contracts Made bt the Quartermuter Department." HOUSB Eceeutive Dowmeut Hum.. ".,. 8~ (Serial 1280). B81l1 Con_. Seeond Session. 1864-65. pp a_. 71, 88. Z:! ",Re'pori ot General ,Job» POJ)e/' R0UI8 E~oeutitl. Dotut#t'nt NutrWsr 1 lSerial lUG), 8 :!:~C:~~i~!;::o~, (~~~lifo8\~; 4·;~8::g:!s~ri.fh~rS::f::,a'lrrl~~: :0::. E:c.. 18 "Report of the Cblef of Ordni\Pce:' HOWle Et:SC14tivo Document Numbsr 1 (Serial 1847). 45th Conaress, Third Seuafon, 1818·19. p Iv. 12 MIlitary IIovlol'l I Division Defensive Operations for Nuclear and Nonnuclear Environments

Major MichaelA. Molino, United States Army

N THE nearly three decades since clear war to a scale of nuclear weapon I the first and only employment of use so high as to preclude significant nuclear weapons, many students of ground maneuver. tactics have offered'different answers The war in Vietnam drew attention to the question of how tactical nuclesr away from the study of nuclear war­ weapons will affect the conduct of war. fare. However, the policy of flexible The official US Army position on this response has remained the national issue has beenretrised several times. strategy. The tactical doctrine based In eadt retrision, the proposed tactical on these strategies has undergone doctrine has been based on the an­ some significant changes; the tactics nounced strategy of the nation. of the 1950s differed greatly from the Under President Eisenhower's pol­ tactics of the 19608. icy of massive retaliation, "nuclear As national strategy influenced tac­ warfare conditions [were] assumed to tical doctrine, it also influenced tacti­ be the normal battlefield entriron­ cal organization. The pentomic divi­ ment." So stated Field Manual (FM) sions of the 19508 were developed for 17-100, The Armored Division. in the an assumed battlefield on which the May 1958 edition. use of nuclear weapons was the norm. The flexible response strategy of Although criticized because it had se­ President Kennedy, caused some vere limitations in a nonactive nuclear change in Army doctrine. The Presi­ entrironment, the pentamic organiza­ dent announced his policy before Con-. tion seemed ideal tor the nuclear bat­ gress on 25 May 1961, the identical tlefield for which it was deaigned. date'of Cliange 2 to tFM 17-100, which When the assumed environment was introduced the theory that nuclear en­ changed by the policy of flexible re­ trironments may range from nonnu­ sponse, the Reorganization Objective Decelliber 1973 13 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Army Divisions (ROAD) were soon block, or to restore the position by developed. Patterned after the ar­ counterattack. mored divisions of World War II, the That manual then discussed the se­ ROAD divisions were designed to be lection of type defenses. It stated that capable of fighting at all levels of nu­ the mobile defense is the "normal and clear conflict from all-out nuelear to preferred type defense of the' armored nonnuclear. division." The selection should be In both the pentomic and World made when the mission permits the War II organizations, the armored di­ battle to be fought in depth; when the vision retained the three intermediate terrain favors maneuver; when rela­ maneuver headquarters (combat com­ tive mobility is at least equal; when mands/brigades) and used the battal­ the air situation does not preclude free ion as its basic fighting element. Be­ movement; when reserves at higher cause of this similar, although not echelons are limited; and when the identical, organization, change in doc­ enemy possesses a nuclear ~pability. trine is more apparent in the armored All conditions did not have tQ exist in division than in the infantry or mech­ order to conduct a mobile defense. The anized divisions. manual further stated that the posi­ tion defense is less desirable and Doctrino of 1110 1950s should be employed when ordered by Doctrine for the armored division higher headquarters or when the mis­ of the 1950s, prescribed two types ot sion and terrain preclude the use of defense-the mobile defenoe and the the mobile defense. position defense. FM 17-100,1958, de­ In organizing for both types of de­ fined the mobile defense as the: fense. the division commander used . • • defense of an area or position security forces forward of the forward in which maneuver ill used with the edge of the battle aree (FEBA), organization of fire and the utilization forces across the FEBA and a reserve. of teTrain to dootroy the enemy. [In The security forces warned of the en­ the position defense,] the bulk of the emy's progress and delayed and dis­ defending force ill dillposed in 8elected organized his approach. The functions tactical Idealities to maintain various of security forces were similar for po8itions and controE the gronnd be­ both forms of defense. tween them. The reserve ill smaUer In a mobile defense, the forces along than the striking force in a mobile de­ the FEBA were called fixing forces. fense and is used to add depth, to These forces, under the control of one

Major Michael A. Molino is as8igned to US Army. Europe. He recsived G B.s. in History from St. Peter8 Col­ lege, Jer86yCity, New Jer8ey, and is a 1970 graduate of the USACGSC. He has 8erved in the Republic of Viet­ nam, and, before his-· I:Urrent assign­ ment, hlf was o,~ the stall end fczculty at the USACGSC.

14 or two combat comtnanda (brigades). ing defended. but it wes oriented on warned of impendiJlg attack; delayed. the enemy force and was limited only disorganized. and, infticted punish­ by the range of supporting artillery. ment; and canalized the enemy into Orientation on the enemy force was a areas where the reServe strike force characteristic of the mobile defense. or nuclear weapons! could be used to The timing'of the counterattack was destroy him. The mobile defense of tuned to the enemy's vnlnerability; At­ the 1950s was designed to kin the en· tempts were made to catch him in his emy by maneuveri*g and attacking. attack posi~ions; to destroy his re­ The fixing forces co)lsisted of a series serves and supporting weapons; or to of strongpoints occupied by combined destroy him in penetrations within the arms teams varying in size from pla­ battle ares. Thus, the strike force in toon to battalion. $trongpoints were the mobile defense was prepared to located across the )i'EBA and some­ launch preemPtive attacks across the times in depth. BetWeen strongpoints, FEBA as readily as it was prepared the fixing force cc/mmanders estab­ to counterattack enemy penetrations. lished listening and :obscrvation posts-. If the position-type defense were The forces which! occupied strong­ selected, the division was organized pointa were organized for all-round with two combat commands along the or perimeter defen$e. However, they FEBA to occupy positions and to con­ did not remain static. Strongpoint tro) the terrain between these posi­ forces maneuvered in the form of de­ tions. The division reserve, the third laying actions and ~imited attacks to cqmbat comtnand, was much lighter punish and canalizf the enemy into tllan in the mobile defense. Each of killing zones so tluit he i:Ould be at­ the forward conWat commands was tacked by nuclear weapons or the allocated sufficient forces to maintain striking force. ' a reserve. The division reserve in the As stated earlier, lilting forces could position defense was very mobile. be controned by oJte or two combat When the security forces, similar to commands or brigades. Therefore, the those in the mobile defense, were possible formations: for a mobile de­ driven in. the forces on the battle po­ fense were two combat commands up sition (along the FEBA) employed and one back. or onel combat command both organic and supporting fires to up and two back. mImY case. the com­ stop the enemy at the FEBA. If the mander (or commanlIers) maneuvered enemy penetrated, the forward forces the forces a g a hI s t the enemy's attempted to block him with forces strength. Plans co~tained provisions located in depth or with local reserves for alternate or s~tch positions to used as blocking forces. When the force the enemy to present a lucrative penetration was stopped or slowed. the target for counter~ttack by nuclear division reserve was employed -to eut fires or by reserve ,if.orces. oft' the enemy and re-establish the bat­ Thei:Ountcrattscking force was the tle area. key to the mobile dbfense. Supported Both type. defenses of the 19508 by ,an avaiillble fires~ the, reserve task were characterized by dispersion to forces moved rap~dly from their avoid undue vUlnerability to nuclesr widely dispersed as$eJnblyareas and attack and by the maneuvering of massed on tbe move ~or the attack. The forces against theanemy in'uch eche­ attack was not limii to the area be­ lon of·defense. The nucl~ policies I ~1!I'1"3 I DEFENSIVE OPERAlIONS and philosophies of the 19508 are ap­ rent instruction at the US Army Com­ parent in both types of defensive tac­ mand and General Staff College, active tics. The use or threat of using nu­ nuclear environments are the excep­ clear weapons was ever,present, hence tion rather than the rule. The two the emphasis on dispersion. The slow­ types of defense were replaced by two ness of the process of target analysis forms of defense. On close comparison, an:! the lengthy preparations required the differences between the forms of to launch and fire a nuclear device defense of the 19608 and the types of were characteristics of the nuclear defense of the 1970s are quite obvious. battlefield, hence the emphasis on The two forms of defense are the area rapid movement and continuous ma­ defense, which replaced the position neuver. defense, and the mobile defense,' which The basic limitation of these tactics has undergone some subtle changes. was that they depended on the use of The mobile defense is defined as a nuclear weapons for success. The dis­ combination of offensive. defensive, persed formations were easily de­ and delaying actions to seize the ini­ feated by forces which massed on a tiative from the enemy in order to narrow front to penetrate the FEBA destroy him. In the area defense, the quickly and exploit their successes. retention of specific terrain for a Without nuclear weapons to plug the specified period is attempted in order gaps or support the counterattacks, to prevent the enemy from penetrat­ the defender found himself at a dis­ ing the battle area. The reserve in the advantage. In brief, the tactics re­ area defense is used to eject the en­ quired significant modification for emy, whereas the reserve in the mobile nonnuclear environments because an defense is employed to destroy the enemy which massed its power could enemy. overwhelm these "strongpoint" de­ To determine the proper form of fenses and defeat them in detail. defense, the seme basic factors of the 1950s-that is, mission, enemy, ter­ Doctrlno for floxlble lIosponso rain, relative mobility, nuclear activ­ The strategy of fiexible response ity and air situation-are used. The brought with it the requirement to preferred form of defense for a type fight in a wide spectrum of nuclear division is not stated in the current environments from nonnuclear to un­ manual (FM 61-100, The Division). restricted nuclear war. All army divi­ However, It is commonly assumed that sions were reorganized to a configura­ the mobility and tank strength of the tion of three brigade headquarters armored division suit it to a mobile similar to the combat commands of defense. The size of the reserve of arm 0 red divisions of the 1950s. higher echelons is not mentioned as a Strengths were increased. The ar­ consideration in determining the'form mored division grew from eight to 11 of defense in the current division battalions, while the infantry divi­ level manual although it remains a sions, many mechanizeG, changed from factor in the basic doctrinal manual. five battle groups to 10 battalions. FM 100-6, Opeflttion8 of' Army Force8 Nuclear weapons seem to have had a in the Field, and the larger unit man­ lessening effect on the -tactical doc­ ual, FM 100-15, Larger Units ThlJftter trine for the employment of these dF' Army-Corps. visions'to the point that, in the cur­ In the current version of the mobile

18 DEf£NS~ OPERATIONS defense. the diViSiO~ will normally be through the containing force, the di­ disposed with two 1 brigades forward vision in the mobile defense would along the FEBA aM one brigade in seem to be extremely effective against reserve. The org~zation and func­ a significant enemy force. The. field tions of security forces are similar to manual /!tates that a mobile, defense the doctrine discussed earlier. The is favored in a nuclear environment. forward brigades Iare given tasks This statement seems correct if one which will cause tile enemy to mass considers the alternate form of de­ and form a penetration which. al­ fense, the area defense. though not preconqeived, is at least In the ~rea defense, the division is envisioned by the dilJision commander. also deployed with two brigades along To cause the enemr to react in this the FEBA. in the forward defense manner. o,ne brigale is normally di­ area (FDA) and' one brigade in re­ rected to delay and ontain the enemy serve. The forward brigades are di­ forward of some p edeterroined line. rected to defend in their respective The other brigade i~ normally told to sectors. Each of these brigades is pro­ defend. The defendIng btigade is al­ vided adequate maneuver forces to rll­ located sufficient cOlpbat power to en­ tain a significant local reserve. The able it and its suborllinate elements to reserve brigade is highlY mobile•.but retain a significant ~ocal reserve. The , quite light, normally consisting of delaying brigade h.ls minimal forces three or fewer battslion-sized units. and no SignifiCan 0cal reserve. The The reserve brigade is directed to pre­ reserve brigade is k heavy and com­ pare to counterattack to restore the posed of four or1 fi, e battalions and FEBA. the armored cavalryl squadron if there As in the position defense, the area are no other missions for the squad­ defense is.designed to stop the enemy ron. Thll reserve bripde is directed to at the FEBA. If a penetration devel­ prepare to counterafCk with priority ops, the reserves at each level attack to the delaying brig de's sector. the forces in the penetration in an, at­ Again, the counte attack is the key tempt to eject the enemy and restore to the success of t e mobile defense. the FEBA. However, current octrine does not The area· defense requires a large seem to emJ;lhasize ~e dispersion and concentration of forces along the rapid massing high ighted in earlier FEBA. It has little provision fot' dis­ doctrine. Also missi g is the emphasis persion and, although extremelY ef­ on preemptive attac\ts and counterat­ fective against an attacking enemy in tacks which did not atop at the FEBA, a nonnuclear environment, it seems but were oriented' on the enemy's re­ easily defeatable by nuclear weapons. serves and supporti~g fires. The cur­ In fact, the, manual atates that a 1I..u­ rent mode of offenSive action is a clear environment favors the adoption counterattack which: destroys the en­ of a mobile defense. emy in the ,penetration and also en­ What is, the reiationship between ables the divisi~n tol resume its orig­ the level of nuclear activity and the inal postu,re or a mbdified version of form or type of defense? This ques­ that pos.ture. ,As. a rl!sult of the tech­ tion; seems critical to our discuesion. niqUes of containing! the canalized en­ Although the field manuals of the emy and the massing. of a rather large 1960s declare that they are furnish­ counterattacking force which attacks ing guidance,for aU types of war, the December, fi73' - I 17 DEfEISIVE OPERATIONS theory of the range of nuclear envir­ analysis is speeded and the prepara­ onments, outlined in Change 2 to FM tions required to launch a nuclear 17-100, May 1961, and in paragraph weapon are reduced. Technology is 6-4 of FM 100-5, September 1968, making obsolete the assumption that seems to have been ignored. Both ref­ you cannot engage moving targets erences state that there will be sev­ with nuclear weapons. Thus, contrary eral levels of nuclear activity from to current doctrine, the mobile defense none to the unrestricted use of nuclear seems to become less desirable as the weapons. At the upper or unrestricted level of nuclear activity increases. In end of the spectrum. the effectiveness a level of nuclear activity which re­ of ground maneuver may be degraded stricts maneuver, the current mobile or preCluded. and firepower will be­ defense seems impotent. come the dominant expression of com­ The dispersion of the position de­ bat power. Short of this extreme is fense of the 19508 permits the de­ the level of nuclear activity which per­ fender to survive on the nuclear bat­ mits' effective maneuver of combat tlefield. However, there is little use units, and. even ·within this level, there made of the mobility and shock effect secm to be varying degrees of nuclear of the armored division, and, hence, a activity. As the extreme of nonnuclear force so disposed seems vulnerable to activity is approached, maneuver dom­ defeat by an enemy whicb is able to inates and fires support. In moving mass. In a nonactive nuclear or non­ toward the opposite extreme, fires be­ nuclear environment, the strongpoints gin to dominate. and maneuver sup­ of the position defense could be de­ ports the fires. feated in detail. In attempting to find a form or type The mobile defense of the 19508 of defense best suited to each level of seems to provide adequate dispersion nuclear activity, it would seem that and sufficiently rapid movement to be the tactics which provide the greatest extremely effective in a nuclear envi­ dispersion are best for active nuclear ronment in which maneuver is dom­ environments, while those which pro­ inant. Eliminate the large strike force vide the most mass are best for non­ -the massed counterattack by ma­ active nuclear environments. The neuver forces. and replace it with a tightest or most massed form of de­ reserve of nuclear weapons only­ fense is the area defense of the 1960s. counterattacks by nuclear fires; then, This type defense seems best Buited this type defense would seem to be to environments in which nuclear effective on the battlefield in wJUcb weapons are neither used nor threat­ firepower is the predominant expres­ ened. provided the other factors which sion of combat power. However. in any influence the choice remain neutral. configuration, this defense would also The mobile defense of the 19608 be defeated by a massed enemy in an seems to provide sufficient mass to environment in which the defender enable the defender to contain and could not use nuclear weapons. destroy a relatively large enemy foree The defenses of both decades have without the aid of nuclear weapons. their applicability in varying nuciear However, this same characteristic, environments: No one form or type of mass, makes the defender quite vul­ defense seems best suited to all levels nerable to nuclear attllck. Vulnerabil­ of nuclear activity. ity increases as the process of target A fresh approach to tactical nuclear 18 MIlItar!I Review warfare was introduced in FM 100-80 be incorporated into the tactics fOil" (TEST), Tactical Nuclear Qpemti0n8, nonnuclear warfare as much as poe.. August 1971, which discusses the ef­ aible. When incorporation of these ac­ fects of nuclear weapons on tactical tive nuclear characteristics would operations. Th~ basic premise of this make the nonnuclear tactics infeasible, manual is that "tr~p dispositions will separate doctrinal principles should be not be optimum for either conven­ adopted. These differences should be tional or nuclear combat," This seems minimized, but never compromised. to be a logical, although significant, The characteristics of the nuclear bat­ departure from the, doctrines of both tlefield are dispersion; redundancy, the 19508 and the 19608. In the psst, especially of command and control while one form of nuclear activity headquarters; and the employment of may have been more influential on the small. highly mobile tactieal elements. tactics. the manuals have stated that In defensive operations, it seems tbat the doctrine applied to both nuclear all but "dispersion" can easily be in­ and nonnuclear environments. It corporated into the doctriae of the would. however. seem logical that the nonnuclear battlefield. In the case of introduction of matls destruction nu­ "redundancy," it would seem that any clear weapons would have a rather commander at any level must have significant effect on the disposition and contingency plans for the replacement maneuver of tactical units. The basic of headquarters elements and the con­ difficulty with FM 100-30 (TEST) is tinuation of the battle when these that it deals in lofty principles. As a headquarters become ineffective. A result. it may be interpreted as the change ot emphasiS may be necessary. reader desires. This is an eltcellent but the principle of "redundancy" will situation for an academician or philos­ not change tsctics in nonnuclear en­ opher, but it is a difficult position for vironments. Incorporating the employ­ an army which must organize, equip, ment of small, highly mobile tsctical and train its' forces. The need for a elements may be a bit more compli­ body of tactical doctrine for various cated. However, our current doctrine levels of nuclear activity seems ob­ states that "rarely will tank elements vious. operate without infantry for extended The critical characteristic of this periods"-FM 100·5, paragraph ~26. tactical doctrine is that it must be Therefore, the mobility aspect of the sufficiently fleJtible to permit a rapid nuclear battlefield is inberent to the transition from nonnuclear to each of current doctrine. The idea of using the various levels of nuclear activity. small forces is closely related to dis­ Upon what principles should the persion. and the two should be dis­ new body of tactical doctrine be cussed together. based? Obviously. those characteris­ Dispersion is that charact'i!ristic tics common to both, nuclear and non­ which differentiates ,nuclear opera­ nuclear activity should be emphasized. tions from nonnuclear operations 'in Where commonality, does not eJtiat, a the defenee. As stated ,above. the use determination of vulnerability must of small units in independent actions is be made. Because the chance of losing closely related to dispersion. The con­ life and combat power is greater in a cept of empl0yinlf amell units includes nuclear environment. the characteris­ the deploynient of field artillery bat­ tics of the nuclear battlefield should teriea in two separate firinJr elements

IIl1Celll~er 11173 19 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS and in considerable depth, even to the ning depth is about 2500 meters per point that ~me firing elements may battalion, while FM 100-30 (TEST) not be able to fire in'support of the planning depth is 10,000 to 12,000 forces in the FDA. meters. The frontages for current doc­ The impact of dispersion is high­ trine are based on a platoon's capa­ lighted by the frontages and depths bility to defend on 400 meters with on which units will be expected to de­ intervals of 250 meters and 200 meters fend. Current doctrine prescribes 3000 alternating between platoons. (See meters as the optimum frontage for a Figure 1.) The 400-meter frontage US battalion on ideal terrain. The doc­ for a platoon seems reasonable and trine in FM 100-30 (TEST) describes could easily be retained in an active battalion fronts as from 10,000 to nuclear environment. However, it 15,000 meters wide. The present plan­ seems that the intervals between pla-

UNIT FRONTAGES FOR CONVENTIONAL (LIMITED NUCLEAR) DOCTRINE PLATOON COMPANY BATTALION FRONTAGES FRONTAGE FRONTAGE ~~~ ~-- cop COP

t Z E 01­ l!l OZ E'" 1-0 «a: COMPANY 8 -'u. BATTALION FRONT CI; IL FRONT 0 ~ 1500'-+1l4+----3000--~_t_n I meters± mIt FEBA FEBA 0°100 t+l ~ ~ I E 0 0 In )( N )(

BRIGADE FRONT BATTALION REAR BOUNDARY

BRIGADE FRONTAGE FIGURE 1

211 l'ililllllll1lluvlew DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

COMPANY FRONTAGE, TACTICAL NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT I MAXIMUM DISPERSION BElWEENPLATOONS F~~:"-:=cr~

1800 METERS FOXHOLE TO FOXHOLE

FIGURE 2; toons must be idcreased. The 250­ dealing with frontages or gaps, we meter interval is a: function of the ef­ will address each aspect separately. fective range of s~!all arms weapons For example, the platoon is assigned and is prescribed for both mounted a frontage of 400 meters; the company and dismounted ri e units. The addi­ commander in the defense will space tion of tanks and armored personnel his platoons so that there is a 1000­ carriers increases the unit's firepower meter interval between platoons. The capability significantly. The machine­ total frontage of the company will be guns and tank gUljs on these vehicles addressed as 1800 meters in this ar­ must be integratell into the defense ticle. As we have seen, there will be plan, and this cons,deration alone will a 500-meter area on either flank of the permit significant iincreases in inter­ company which can be covered by or­ vals between pla~ons. In a nuclear ganic fires. This area will be included environment, atomIc demolition muni­ as part of the gap or interval between tion (ADM) and .small-yield nuclear companies. Therefore, while the com­ weapons could be; employed in these pany is covering 2800 meters as shown areas. In addition, sensor devices, in Figure 2. the distance from the minefields and ot~er means may be right flank foxhole in the right pla­ employed in bot~ environments to toon to the left flank foxhole in the deny the enemy th use of an area be­ left platoon is about 1800 meters. The tween platoons. T erefore, the inter­ areas between companies will not be vals can be larger In both nuclear and covered by direct fire weaIions al­ nonnuclear environments. For this though provisions must be made for article, let us use 'a constant interval surveillance and responsive indirect of 1000 meters betWeen platoons. This fires. This distance should be based distance seems compatible with the on the capabilities of surveillance de­ firepower capabilities of both mecha­ vices available and the minimum sep­ nized rifle and tank platoons. When aration distances for specific yields of the intervals betw'1en platoons are in­ enemy weapons. These yields are de­ creased to 1000 meters. the width of termined by the type weapons that coverage for a defending company in­ the enemy is most likely to employ in creases from 150(1 meters to about sufficient quantity to impact on our 2800 meters. (See Figure 2.) defense. If this weapon were a 10 To avoid or minimize confusion in kiloton, the distance between compa- December 1973 21 DEFENSIVE OPERAl'IONS

SEPARATION DISTANCES FOR 10·KILOTON WEAPON MAXIMUM PROTECTION MINIMUM PROTECTION

FIG~RE3

nies would be 3200 or 2300 meters ton weapon dropped exactly between depending on the degree of protection companies would cause casualties to desired. At 3200 meters between com­ only one-third of each company. (See panies, a lO-kiloton weapon dropped Figure 3.) exactly between companies would not Using gaps of 2300 meters between damage either company. At 2300. companies, a battalion would occupy meters between companies, a to-kilo- 5900 meters. With 3200 meters be-

MINIMUM PROTECTION 10·KILOTON WEAPON BATTALION COVERAGE 8200 METERS

1151C803[230°-r~IQ1150 --:- I -...... ,....GAP _ ~8.-1 =====---­ FOXHOLE TO FOXHOLE 8ATTALION FRONT = 5900 METERS

MAXIMUM PROTECTION 10·KILOTON WEAPON . BATTALION COVERAGE 10.000 METERS f~=~~ FOXHOLE TO FOXHOLE BATTALION FRONT = 6800 METERS

FIGURE 4 DEFENSM: OFEIiATIONS

M~XIMUM PROTECTION 30·KllOTON WEAPON BATTALION COVERAGE 11.720 METERS ""13" ! FOXHOLE TO FOXHOLE 7660 METERS FIGURE 5 tween companies,' a battalion would cussed above may be achieved. First, oecupy 6800 meters. Gaps between bat­ let us modify the area defense. If a talions equal to the separation be­ type defense were adopted in which all tween companies would permit cov­ units were expected to defend-that erage of the assigned 10 kilometers is, configure themselves with a sig­ or more only in the esse where a 3200­ nificant reserve at each level-an ar­ meter or more separation is used. (See mored division could control a front­ Figure 4.) age of 07 kilometers for a lO-kiloton From this analysis, we can conclude threat. (See Figure 6.) However, even that a 10-kilometer sector (as pro­ with what is normally considered sig­ posed in 'FM 100-30 (TEST» is too nificant sized reserves, this configura­ great for a battalion to control effec­ tion seems to Jack strength in depth. tively and that the sector is greater Attacks by small units on narrow than necessary for protection from a fronts could easily penetrate the first lO-kiloton threat. Moreover, even line of defense. The reserves of each when a 30-kiloton weapon's effects are level would block and launch counter­ considered, the frontage of the bat­ attacks against these attacking units. talion will be a maximum of 7660 The reserves may be adequate within meters, and the battalion would be each battalion, but the brigade re­ able to control 11,720 meters of front­ serves of one battalion each seem in­ age. (See Figure '0.) It would seem sufficient to cover the extended inter­ that the parametllr in FM 100-30 vals and gaps between battalions and (TEST) should be modified to indi­ retain the ability to launch counter­ este that a batta~on can defend a attacks. This adaptation of the area frontage of up to 12 kilometers. Any defense to a nuclear environment attempt to prescribe frontages and seems less than optimum. However, depths for unita o$ter than battalions by making some adjustments in the seems fallacious. :Frontages are in- . brigade reserves, this form of defense fiuenced as much iby tactics as the could bridge the gap between nonnu­ tactics are infiuenceciby frontages. clear and 'unrestricted nuclear en­ Both the area I\'Dd mobile defense vironments. For example, if one bat­ as prescribed in current doetrine esn talion is taken from the FEBA of the be adjusted so that: the dispersion dis­ right brigade and added to that bri­ DIlC8lIIber 1!l73 23 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

AREA DEFENSE IN NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT WITH MINIMUM PROTECTION AGAINST A 10-KILOTON WEAPON

24,600 32.800

S2 Q t °1 8 0 ­ -U e X S Q 0 0___ 'k X= ;;;::: i )( X )( 0 )( 0 ~

57,400

FIGURE 6 gade's re;erve, and one battalion is above for platoons and companies, we taken from the division reserve and could easily develop a form of defense added to the left brigade's reserve, which will enable us to launch a the defense gains greater depth and massed division-level counterattack flexibility. By reducing gaps, it could when the nuclear situation permits be used in nonnuclear and in very and also use small unit actions when limited nuclear environments. The maneuver is restricted_ This adapta­ characteristics of this type defense tion of the mobile defense is termed are that it counters the enemy's at­ the "flexible defense." In this form tacks with attacks by small mobile of defense, the forward brigade com­ reserves from platoon to multi bat­ manders would be directed to delay talion size and that ita level of ma­ and canalize or fix the enemy for de­ neuver activity can be increased or struction by a highly mobile division decreased depending on the nature of counterattack when the nuclear en­ the nuclear conflict. vironment is either nonactive or at With the basic frontage as discussed an extremely low level of usage. If

24 Military lIeviow IlEfENSIVEOPEMl1l1HS

DIVISION SECTOR FLEXIBLE DEFENSE ,1 I I I I I I I I 1­ ! I I x I II• - X -8~ 8 X X I fiaf 10 QQ X X X ~ 0 C) 10 0 XX c:J FIGURE'7 maneuver became restricted, or if the on the enemy's capability to employ massing of a I a r Ii e counterattack nuclear weapons in terms of both would create an excessive risk, por­ yield and quantity. The forward bat­ tions of the large division reserve talion in Figure 8 is in a delay posture. could be attached to the forward bri­ However, the unique aspect of this gades to be used in the small unit ac­ scheme is that the companies are de­ tions described above. A typical dis­ ployed in the Bame manner as in III position of forces for the "flexible de­ defend posture. Since the battalion fense" is contained in Figure '1. commander does not retain a reserve, The width of sector aSsigned to each he will retain control over the pietoon forward battalion will range from the which each company has in reserve. 4500-meter tight formation of a con­ The reserve pietoons may be used to ventional environment to as much as counterattack for the company or may 15,8000 meters in a nuclear environ­ be used to assist in blocking, contain­ ment. The actual frontage will depend ing the enemy, and in extricating BATTALION SECTOR FLEXIBLE DEFENSE 1001001001 lOI~'OI

FIGURE 8 lJ.ceill~er 1117$ DEfENSIVE OPERAnDIiS units which have become decisively in the same manner in any environ­ engaged. No company will commit its ment. Alternate and supplemental p0­ reserve platoon without permission of sitions are prepared, and, if the the battalion commander. The bat­ battalion's scheme is to delay, the pla­ talion commander may design contin­ toons are pulled back to these posi­ gency plans which cause the reserves tions. The company commander em­ of each company to mass into a rela­ ploys his platoons in the same basic tively large resel'1(e force under bat­ defensive configuration no mattar talion control. what the mission of higher headquar­ Normally, each brigade in the FDA "ters may be. The onlY difference is the will not be allocated a battalion for a distance between platoons and adja­ reserve. The brigade commander will cent units. The battalion commander control a maneuver reserve of at least becomes the tactician; he must be one company. If the brigade sector is concerned with formations and contin­ extremely wide, he may require a re­ gencies. The company commanders serve' of two companies. These ele­ will execute the orders and plans. Ac­ ments will be taken from the battal­ tions at brigade and higher are aim­ ions along the FEBA and will, neces­ illll' to those prescribed in current sarily, reduce the frontages of these doctrine. However, the development of battalions. (See Figure 7.) contingency plans becomes increas­ This tactical concept provides extra­ ingly important. The defending divi­ ordinary flexibility. By varying the sion commander must have all units intervals and gaps betwOOll elements, prepared to respond to a variety of the defenders can adapt themselves to contingencies on short notice. His varying degrees of nuclear activity. "wait and see" attitude depends not Even after the sector is organized for onlY on the maneuver of the enemy, a specific environment, the conduct of but also on what degree of firepower the battle may be adjusted as the sit­ will be employed. uation develops. When the nuclear sit­ While this proposal may not be the uation permits, the large division re­ answer to the problems presented by serve may be employed in a massive the threat or use of nuclear weapons, counterattack to destroy the enemy in it is hoped that it will generate dis­ and beyond penetrations. If nuclear cussion and thought which may lead activity precludes the massing of to those solutions. The challenge of forces, the reserve may be employed the nuclearIllonnuclear battlefield will in battalion or smaller size forces to not be met by one man or one study. block or counter enemy thrusts; this As do all complex problems, it requires may be accomplished under the con­ the efforts of many. The US Army trol oj the division, the reserve bri­ has reorganized to enable more of its gade, or by attachment to the forward members to participate in the develop­ brigade. If maneuver is restricted se­ ment of doctrine. The faculties and verely, the reserve battalions block in student bodies of all our service depth while the division counterat­ schools and colleges should nqw con­ tacks by fire only. sider themselves doctrinal deielopers In addition to the fiexibility which as should those assigned to u¢te in it possesses, the concept also aimpli- , the field. Each bas the right aDd the fles the training tasks for smaller responsibility to submit his considered units. A platoon defends on 400 meters ideas. 26 Donald Kelly Jones

HE. Vietnam War has provided resents an interest considered vital, T the oeeasion for a general de­ and to the extent that an American bate on the scope and range of Ameri· presence is already established in the can commitments around the world. area (e.g., eid m is B ion s, bases, The outcome of that debate must nee­ troops), thechoice may not be between essarily remain inconclusive, clouded honoring or defaulting, but. rather, as it is by the uncertainty of a rapidly at what levei to honor the commit­ evolving international environment, by ment. the outcome of events in Southeast It is assumed that cooices of this Asia, and by the vagaries of domestic nature will continue to confront politics in the United States. There American policymakers, but that these is simply no way to predictwhethar choices will bave to be made in the there win be a sudden and substantial context of a domestic environment reduction in the level of American ef. which is less supportive of an active fort overseas and hence a major foreign policy and less tolerant of pol­ change in the conception of American icies whieh entail the sustained use of obligations, or whether, as is more force overseas. Thus, controlling the likely, a series of incremental steps risks of commitments win be 8 major wm produce a gradual shift to a more tesk for future administrations. How limited, if stin extensive, American to honor an obligation without incu!'­ world role. . ring unwanted burdens and, more Whatever eventually comes about, important, how to get out of commit­ for the present, the United States re­ ments which have become too burden­ mains committed in varying degrees some are questions with which Ameri­ to the defense of 44 nations. While the can policymaker& are likely to struggle existence of these obligations does not -at least until the time when a rela­ guarantee that the United States win tively enduring consensus is reached be forced into confticts, the multiplie­ over the prioritieS of American inter­ ity of American commitments does ests around the world. In short, while mean that, in the case where deter­ much dehate and discussion in sehol­ renee fails" the clloiee·either to honor arlY journals has pointed to the need or default on former pledgas will have to "reorder prioritieS" .and to "lower to be faced. To tbadegree that the out profile oversees," little b.ss been particular obligation in question rep.. said that indicates mueh awaraness of NIXON DOCTRINE

the complexities of that undertaking. poses and circumstances of the speci­ That the United States should disen­ fied military cooperation. Moreover, gage itself from some overseas com­ even in the absence of formal con­ mitments is almost always conceded; tracts for military cooperation, uni-, how this is to be accomplished is a lateral declarations of intentions can' question which is rarely addressed. go far to commit states to use force on behalf of other states. Indeed, the The Nature 01 Commitments importance of such declarations has The structure, scope, and range of probably increased, given the sig­ a nation's foreign commitments are nificance that the communication of an integral part of its foreign policy. military intentions has assumed for The set of commitments which a na­ purposes of deterrence. Their impor­ tion undertakes is the primary indi­ tance is indicated by their elttensive cator of the interests it seeks to pro­ use to reinforce and refine formal re­ tect and advance. In the absence of a ciprocal agreements. But military more orderly world environment, com­ commitments need nQt depend even on mitments serve to impose a degree of unilateral declarations. They are often certainty and stability upon the con­ established and conveyed by countless figuration of power that affects the official and unofficial words and actions vital interests of states. which create understandings and ex­ Of the various forms of commit. pectations that are no less significant ments, the alliance is clearly the most for being implicit. 1 prominent. The alliance differs from The idea of commitment, then, is other more informal pledges and un­ broader than the simple contractual dertakings by virtue of its binding­ pledge of a formal alliance. The altPec­ that is, contractual-nature, the alt­ tation that force will be used on be­ tent to which it curtails the freedom half of another nation can arise from of maneuver of the partners, and by a variety of pledgee of which the al­ the degree it impinges upon high­ liance is simply the most formal. As priority interests. As a formal con­ used here, the term commitment must tract for military cooperation, how­ be defined as including a\1 a govern­ ever, an alliance may be difficult to ment's foreign pledgee, undertakings, distinguish from other kinds of com­ and contracts that establish some ex­ mitments such as military subsidies, pectation or obligation that said gov­ military assistance agreements, or ernment will use its military power­ basing rights. Most alliances specify, overtly or by threat-or help other ,if only in a general sense, the contin­ countries to use theirs for specific pur­ gencies under which force will or will poses. 2 Thus, a commitment is a kind not be used. But, these may be worded of promissory note that is directed to­ so broadly that the particulars can ward certain futUre hypothetieal sit­ only be inferred. uations in which the promise is to be Conversely, other kinds of military fulfilled. Paradoxically, a commitment contracts may contain explicit provi­ cannot be wholly credible until those sions concerning the use of weapons future conditions arise or, tQ, put it and facilities; And, like' alliances. they another way, until that moment at are based on definite understandings which deterrence fails. : and eltpeCtations, whether shared by , Historically, the ideal of commit­ both partners or nQt. ahQut the pur­ ment has develQped a]Qng two conflict­

23 ing lines. The first might be ealJed a moved irom the situation with which situational concept of commitment. It the commitment is concerned. bolds that commitments are inherent In short. a situational concept of in the situation, their verbalization is commitment focuses on the rationality basically unimportsnt, and their ful­ of the specified course of actions in fillment is contingent upon whether light of the requirements of the situa­ they still serve national 'interests in tion; a nonsituational view sees the situation in which the casua loe­ mainly the need to keep commitments deris arises. A government that bas a in order to achieve goals outside the situational view of its commitments context of the immediate situation. A will come to the aid of an ally less be­ situational commitment is simply a cause it is pledged to do so than be­ statement of a nation's present view cause its own interests in the situa­ of its interests i a nonsituational com­ tion clearly dictate that such a course mitment is in the form of a binding be taken. Recognizing clearly that an and permanent pledge. These concepts ally's response may range from non­ deserve further treatment hecause the support to backing of a verbal, logis­ view a nation's leaders take of their tic, limited military, or totslly mili· commitments bears directly upon the tary nature, a government with a sit­ freedom that a nation feels it has to uational view tends to regard both its terminate a commitment short of ful­ own commitments and those of its al­ filling the formal obligations which lies as transitory, reflecting little more the commitment entails. than the distribution of international Most commonly. the stsndard writ­ power at the moment. ings on the nature and functions of In contrast stands the nonsitua­ alliances have implicitly assumed that tional view of commitment. Here, the aU commitments are of the situational primary impetus for a commitment's type. Thus, most scholars assert that fulfillment does not necessarily arise an alliance must be understood to from a continuing reassessment of na­ masn that, in the event of Bome stated tional interests in any given situation, contingency, the joint pursuit of a but from a conviction that, a govern­ specified course of action would en­ ment . must keep all its commitments able the partners to complement one even though, if it could reverse the another's capabilities and thus would clock, it might not so commit itself be to their mutual advantage. The again. This view lays great stress on commitment is regarded as a sign that the fact that a verbal commitment has the specified action will be taken. but, been given, and. in SO doing, it gen­ as most writers have asserted. the ac­ erates strong, self-perpetuating pres­ tual fulfillment of it depends on how sures for the' commitment's full1l1­ the partners evalUate their interest ment. A nonsituational commitmen~ when, the CG8U8 loederis arises. 8 tends to acquire a lIubstantial life of The'assumption that commitments its ·oWll, taking onsigniftcance as a are necessal'ily forged with a concern symbolic demonstration of a country's for proximate. interests in specific sit­ dedicatlon to principles,' security in­ uations .(as opposed to long-range in­ terests; or other, considerations re- terests that transcend the particular

D"8I!Ib~r ··1813 211 NIXON DOCTRINE situation) can easily be demonstrated The original intent of the alliance had historically. The period of the 18th clearly been altered, but Germany still Century balance of power system was considered its obligations binding and clearly one in which the situational thus supported Austria-Hungary in concept of commitment prevailed. exerting pressure on Serbia, setting Each commitment was the result of an into motion a train of events leading ad hoc combination devised to dcal >to World War I. Referring to the ays­ with a specific issue. The making of tem of secret alliancea as the "grestest a commitment reflected a belief that single underlying cause" leading to common action to forestall the threat the outbreak of war in 1914, Sidney B. of an antagonistic power was in the Fay has written: immediate national interest. Commit­ Members of each group felt bound ments were constantly revised to deal to 8U'P1lO1't each other, even in matters with the latest and most immediate where they had no direct interest be­ threat. 4 Alliances were normally con­ cause failure to give t would cluded only after the balance had been have weakened the olidarity of the upset, and they were confined to ac­ group." tions needed to restore equilibrium to Similarly, the rench and British the system.5 The Bismarckian system, decision to aid T rkey in its war with too, was dependent upon a reformula­ Russia in 1853 is an example of com­ tion of alliances when crises arose, mitment-fulfillment for rassons largely with temporary connections estab­ unrelated to the importance of the lished to meet each problem. 6 Accord­ local situation. Although the Concert ingly, a commitment had little mean­ of Europe had nearly arrived at a s0­ ing beyond the specific crisis with lution satisfactory to Franee and which it had been devised to deal, and, Great Britain, the Turkish provoca­ even in the specific crisis, a good deal tion of war with Russia led to French of uncertainty attended its fulfill­ and British involvement in the Cri­ ment.7 mean War despite thefact that neither Yet, it is not difficult to find ex­ power had compelling proximate in­ amples of commitments that appear to terestS in the situation. I) have been kept despite the calculation that proximate n,ational interests Co_lime",,.: The American Case would not be served by doing so. The As a result of the sustained Ameri­ desire to maintain an existing alliance can effort to prevent the extension of system as such has sometimes led na­ politieal and territorial control by tions to fulfill commitments they Communist powers during the past 25 might otherwise prefer to abandon. years, American statesmen have la­ Whereas in Bismarck's era, alliances bored to construet a set of commit­ had been reshuffled to deal with each ments which are global in scope and succeeding crisis, in the ensuing pe­ interdependent in function. Not only riod, two relatively permanent alliance have they served as the major means Systenls predominated: the Triple En­ of projecting American power, they tente and the Triple Alliance. Al­ have also been the most prominent though the Triple Alliance origiruilly means by which the nation has related had been purely defensive. influential itself to a. vastly expanded' role in the groups in Austria-Hungary later came intemational arena. As BUch,· their to see it as a means of self-extension. purposes have been multiple-that i~, they have served to project and ag­ order; History offers no useful anal­ gregate military power, to restrain ogy to the American commitment sye. , and inhibit. disruptive allies, to pro­ tem although somewhat strained:com­ vide internal security to unstable re­ parisons have been made between gimes, and, most important, they have Washington's position in NATO, the served to provide the framework for Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, an international order congenial to and Rio Pacts and, on a smaller scale, American interests. Thus, in hundreds the position of Athens in the Delian of pronouncements, official and unof­ League. 18 However, the uniqueness of ficial, American spokesmen have hailed the American commitment system con­ the 44 allies of the United States as structed after World War II can be symbolic links in a collective system seen in the following combination of of deterrence which departs from old­ qualities: its hegemonial nature (the fashioned alliances and provides a immense power of the United States , barrier to world anarchy. Secretary of made it primUll inter par6B): its plu­ State Dulles spoke of "the free-world rality (being not one but several secu­ network of collective security . • • a rity systems, each playing itself out nearly world-wide system of regional in a different region of the world collective security rwhich] has • • • among a different east of characters) ; deterred aggression." 10 Secretary of and, finally, its ultimate reliance on State Rusk said: American military power (providing Tke integrity of tk6Be aUianc6B ill the interdependent linkage among the at tke heart of tke maintenance of regional systems). But the central peace, and, if it slwuld be dilleo'l1ered role of the hegemonial power has al­ t1l4t tke pledge of tke United Stat6B ways raised troublesome questions: ill meaningless, the sfJrucf:lIIl'e of peace Under what set of circumstances would crumble, and we would be well would the honoring of one set·.of com­ 1m our way to (/, temble catastroplUl. 11 mitments enhance the credibility of And, President Richard Nixon, in another? Under what circumstances an explanation of the Nixon Doctrine, would the dishonoring of one weaken promised that: the others? We will re8'jJut the commitments In part, these questions have been we inkeritBlf,-bQth becaUlls of their answered-albeit implicity-by the intrif!.llic merit, and beeaUBe of the geopolitical rank ordering within4the impact of Budden tthiftB on regional or American commitment system. Cer­ worM st4biUty. To d6Bert those who tainl),. there are few reasons to doubt M'I1e come to depend on'f!B would _e the . primacy of the West European­ disruption and in'l1ite aggression. 18 Mediterraneen commitment In the hi­ " Such statements ofofficial American erarchy of US interesta or the mag­ spokesmen are not idle words. Behind nitude of resources made avail~ble to the;rhetoric lies the reality of a set it.'Yet, while the United, States might of commitments the concept, of, which set priorities among· its regional al­ is clearly nonsituational and the func­ liances,' ,the nonsituational concept of tiOJlll of which are directed toward American, commitments has created the maintenance of a system of world conditions in which, all commitments

~'1i13 HIXOH 1I0CTIIlNE

are important since each of them re­ mitment has been fulfilled. that. in­ flects interests that are removed from deed, "we have done all we can." While the specific commitment. To rank ob­ this is a promising escape hatch, it ligations in some descending order of places great burdens on future events priority presumes that some commit­ to prove that "all we have done" was ments represent proximate, short-run in fact sufficient. It carries the further interests that can be sacrificed if the risk of domestic repercussions shOUld need arose. That hllS not been the ease events not turn out as hoped for. Yet in the past. nor does the Nixon Doc­ a third mechanism might be to pro­ trine presume to estsblish such a mote consciously an open break with ranking. 14 Secondly. even if a rank an ally. perhaps by accusing the aided order could be agreed upon, it could party of corruption. incompetence and not predict with any certainty the a host of other sins. The risk here is sequential order of commitment-ful­ that more valued commitments to fillment. Since World War II. the other countries with few claims to American commitment to Western probity and effectiveness are imme­ Europe has been fundamentsl; yet diately brought into question. only in Asia have American pledges Further, the past offers little guid­ required participation in combat sit­ ance to the problems of disengage­ uations. Thus, the nonsituational sys­ ment. Traditionally. great powers that tem of commitments creates problems have undertaken either to reduce or that are unique. Once the system is shift the burdens of their obligations challenged. the hegemonial power have done so by transferring tssks to must decide whether to honor, or dis­ other nations whose interests are at honor. a particular commitment even least congruent with their own. As the though. in a geographical sense, it European situation worsened at the may not have high priority. beginning of the 20th Century. for ex­ ample. the British sought to enlist The Straleuu of Disengagement Japanese support in the protection of The above considerations are suffi­ their Far Eastern holdings by means .;eient to demonstrate that disengage­ of the Anglo-Japanese alIiance of ment in the American case involves 1902. thus allowing for a more for­ considerably more than a decision to midable concentration of the British get out. If disengagement entsiled no Fleet in the North Sea and the Medl. more than that, any number of pana­ terranean. The Open Door notes were ceas could have been. and could be. likewise an attempt to promote Ameri­ suggested. One mechanism would be can interest in pursuit of the same ob­ to deny the existence of the commit­ jective. And it need· hardly be men· ment in the first place in the manner tioned that American willingness to of Bismarck when he was faced with shoulder former British responsibili­ the prospect of war between his two ties in Greece and French responsibili­ allies. Russia and Austria. each of ties in· Indochina allowed for a .more whom expected German support. But graceful retrenchment from .imperial this "bones of a Pomeranian grena· obligations than might otherwise have dier" solution is extremely difficult to been the case. bring about without appearing capri- . While Instructive, these examples cious or cowardlY. A second mecha­ provide few parallels with the present nism would be to claim that the com­ American case. In the first place. al­ though the international environment what many parties have come to see as is more fluid than at the height of the the normal flow of events. The aUy Cold War period. it has not evolved to directly on the receiving .end of the a point of sufficiently cooperative re­ commitment can be expected to engage lationships . among the great powers in any number of maneuvers designed that would permit ad hoc adjustments to subvert the movement toward dis­ of the commitments and obligations of engagement. More importantly for the the major powers according to shift­ American case is consideration of the ing interests. That process is limited probable effects that disengagement both by the persistence of ideological from one commitment win have on factors which are not amenable to other, and presumably more vital, com­ drastic change and by the presence of mitments. While reactions will vary nuclear weapons which, as Raymond depending on the locale, the actors in­ Aron contends, has conferred a kind volved. and the perceived importance of historical immobility on the present of the commitment, at the minimum, era. Secondly. and of particular rele­ allies can be expected to question vance today. is the question of pre­ whether disengagement from one com­ Cisely to whom are the commitments mitment presages a general reorienta­ the United States sheds to be trans­ tion of foreign policy goals and pri­ ferred? There is nothing in the pres­ orities or whether it signifies merely a ent system which is in any way ana­ tactical shift of emphasis that would logous to the relationships of the have little impact on their own future United States to Britain and France prospects for support, or might even in the late 1940s. And, finally, with operate to their benefit. the pOssible exception of the European Similarly. the domestic repercus­ Economic Community. there simply sions of a decision to disengage pre­ are no regional' groupings in conftict­ sent problems of no less megnitude. prone areas of the world with suffi­ The extent of these repercussions will cient cohesiveness and unity of pur­ obviously vary with the importance pose to hold out much optimism for the original commitment has assumed the prospects of regional political and in. the domestic political life of the military cooperation. nation. The greater the resources in­ For all these reasons, disengage­ vested, the higher the level of public ment in the American case is, and will involvement, the more the prestige of continue to be. a dangerous and deli­ the nation has been invoked in official cate task. It requires unusual political statements, the more difficulties the skill to pick the right time and the disengagement process is likely to en­ right way out, for there is always the counter. Conversely, the less resources, risk of major embarrassment and loss will, and prestige that have been de­ of. prestige-the repercussions of voted to the commitment. the ,easier which have.both national and interna­ disengagement should prove to be. tion.t\l implication. Internationally, the Within the political-bureaucratic sys­ decision. to dillengage from a commit­ tem' itself.' organizational intereets, ment· or Ilet of commitments repre­ careers, and. personal egos. may well sentll a fundamentsl interruption ·in be tied to the maintenance of previOUS

December 1973 NIXON DOCTRINE level8 of support for the commitment. tions may arise. Should the pattern Clearly, the prospects of a polley re­ of disengagement in a given case re­ versal will affect various bureaucratic semble the "deescalation ladder"­ interests differently. In some cases, that is, an incremental, but steady, the very continuance of the life of an reduction of resources that are to be organization may be at stake. At the committed to the objective? Or do the very least, confusion is likely to result circumstances in the specific case seem as organizations seek to adjust their best suited to a tactic that combines roles and missions·to the requirements both escalation and deescalation strat­ of the postdisengagement period. egies in some appropriate mix? Can In sum, particularly intense pres­ local or regional forces provide ade­ sures and demands from both foreign quate substitutes for previous mili­ and domestic constituents can be ex­ tary support that now is to be with­ pected in the course of disengagement. held? Can disengagement be achieved The President win clearly be the focal through a negotiated lIettlement, per­ point for these pressures. It is there haps in a multilateral setting in which that contradictory demands wiIJ be ul­ several nations share responsibilities timately felt, that domestic and for­ for policing an accord or, negatively, eign audiences must be conciliated and share responsibilities should the ac­ bureaucratic struggles resolved. The cord break down? importance of these considerations cannot be stressed too much. The de­ Toward New Stralegleo cision to disengage is above al1 a polit­ Clearly, any critique of current US ical problem, involving the political foreign policy must await the passage interests of the withdrawing nation. of time and the testing of events. of its allies, of internal organizational Moreover, the present administration structures and of the articulate public confronts the delicate task of formu­ and its representatives. To put it lating policy in a period of transition simply, the level of ''noise'' and the during which relationships with both number of interested partiCipants in allies and potential adversaries are in the policymaking process will increase fiux. Nevertheless, despite the una­ as past policies are either modified or voidable ambiguity of official state­ abandoned. ments of policy principles, the admin­ The wider repercussions of a de­ istration has been unusually candid cision to disengage from a commit­ and articulate in framing the basic ment will undoubtedly consume much guidelines and rationale of its foreign time and energy. But equal1y im­ policy. portant is the consideration of the The essence of the Nixon strategy tactics and strategy that wil1 best fa­ is not to be found in the largely de­ cilitate disengagement. Obviously, the claratory pronouncements embodied in options available will vary from one the Nixon Doctrine. The three ele­ case to the next depending on the level ments of the doctrine-the retention of support for the commitment, the of inherited treaty commitments, the extent to which the original objectives reaffirmation of the nuclear guarantee were fulfilled, the locale, the partici­ to nonnuclear states, and the promise pants involved and on allied and en­ to assist, short of the direct introduc­ emy responses. But, despite varying' tion of Ameriean forces, countries ciroumstances, similar tactical quea~ threatened by other forms of aggres­

34 flJi_Revlow sion-aN ,aU longstanding tenets of among the great powers can be sup­ America's postwar conceptions of its planted by more cooperative relstion­ interests. They are intended to indi­ ships. Potential adversaries are stin cate that, even as we move fr()m a expected to compete and to exert in­ period of confrontation to an era of fiuence on behalf of their specific in­ negotiation with adversaries, the in­ terests, but they are to do so in ways terests of allies are not to be sacri­ that do not either directly or indi­ ficed. The Nixon Doctrine might, rectly threaten the security of nations therefore, be best described as a cover allied to the United States or nations for what is in fact a more subtle and whose stability and independence are complex strategy of disengagement. deemed vital to AmeriCan security in­ There seems to be no acute aWare­ terests. Thus, the administration," ness of the risks and dangers involved while disengaging from some of its in disengagement. At the seme time most forward positions, has sought to that the administration seeks to re­ moderate the behavior of both China duce the burden of American involve­ and the Soviet Union through a net­ ment, it has taken special care not to work of interdependent agreements undermine the Nation's most vital and understandings. In turn, the con­ commitments or to reduce the confi­ solidation of detente with both Com­ dence of its allies in American willing­ munist adversaries is seen as the ness to fulfill those commitments. In­ essential condition that permits disen­ deed. commitments, both formal and gagement without jeopardizing the se­ informal, have been reinforced in a curity or confidence of America's al­ number of critical areas. ThUB, the lies. The success of this strategy, then, United States has bolstered its posi­ obviously rests on its continued abil­ tion in the Mediterranean and the ity to induce restraint on the part of Persian Gulf-in the former ease, by potential adversaries. the acquisition of home-porting IOOIi­ Consistent with the cutback in gen­ ties in Greece and, in the latter, by eral purpose forces and the lowered new material pledges of support to assessment 0 f the Soviet-Chinese Saudi Arabia and Iran. In short, the threat, there appears to have been a extrication from Vietnam and the con­ development of more discriminating comitant reduction in general purpose criteria to determine whether Ameri­ forces to the 1964 level are not to be can forces win intervene to fuum seen as the harbingers of yet further pledges and commitments previously disengagement in other. and perhaps incurred. While the commitment tot more vital, areas of the world. At Iasot protect nonnuclear states threatened' that is the message that these moves by aggression from a nucelar state re­ seem designed to eonvey: mains, in other cases of direct or in­ The problem of reassuring allies is' direct aggression, the United" ~tates but a part of,the strategy of disen­ will assume the major burden of pro­ gagement. The success of that policy viding economic and military assist­ is' clearlY dependent' upon the foster­ ance in the expectation that the ing of a more moderate international threatened government win provide environment in which the tensions the manpower for its own defense. In NIXON DOCTRINE cases of insurgency, even amed gov­ Some SuggestlolllJ ernments are expected to handle the Walter Lippmann. in his book, U.S. internal threat without large-scale Foreign Policy: Shield of the Repub­ American assistance. lic, constructed a set of guidelines by These measures would seem to con­ which the viability of a nation's for­ stitute a significant departure from eign policy might be judged. Writing the nonsituational view of America's in 1943, he argued that a balanced commitments that has prevailed since foreign policy required that a nation's the onset of the' Cold War. Yet it foreign commitments must be com­ would be premature to conclude that mensurate with that nation's re­ the current strategy represents a sources to fulfill them. When commit­ drastic revision of America's Interests ments are extended beyond available and commitments. In the first place, resources, then a nation has no for­ there is the evident clear wish to avoid eign policy. The skill of a statesman sudden shifts in policy which would lay in his ability to bring commit­ undermine the confidence of ames and ments and resources into balance, which could be misinterpreted by ad­ while seeking to acquire a comfortable versaries. The continued vitality and surplus of power to back up the na­ solidarity of the American amance tion's security obligations. network is viewed as remaining as Lippmann's advice is as wise now compelIing a goal in an era of negotia­ as it was when it was written. Few tion as it was in an era of confronta­ would disagree that a nation's foreign tion. Indeed, it is precisely that vital­ policy ought to be "in balance." But ity and solidarity that is given credit such general guidelines as these are for the cut-rent stability and is counted not likely to be particularly helpful in upon to produce future restraint in policymaking circles when, in the at­ the behavior of the major powers. mosphere of crisis, decisions must be There are, to be sure, risks. Success made on how to treat an ally's request is predicated upon the fulfillment of for military aid. Nor could Lippmann two hopes: have anticipated the special problems e That the moderation in outlook accompanying disengagement in the and policy on the part of the Soviet context of the global American com­ Union and China is a long-term phe­ mitment system. This. a8 discussed nomenon and not a temporary adjust­ earlier, transcends the importance of ment of strategy. local interests, giving the American • That allies will be capable and security network its nonsituational willing to contain both direct and in­ character. Finally, Lippmann, con­ direct threats to their security short cerried as he was with a hroad historic of direct American involvement. overview of 20th Century American Whether these assumptions are foreign policy, did not deal directly valid in the long run can only be with the political-bureaucratic impli­ judged in the light of future events. cations of disengagement. But unforeseen contingencies eould What, then, can the policyanalyst arise in a number of critical areas of suggest to the policymaker in coping the world. This could once again raise with such problems as these-prob­ the question of what action to take lems which are likely to persist in the with respect to a commitment or set era of the Nixon Doctrine? The fol­ of eommitments. lowing suggestions are simply that­ lIuggestions. They do constitute gUide­ nified- if the importance of the original lines that can be -llpplied in specific commitment has been publicly over­ instances, at specific times, or in spe­ sold in, advance. In any esse, disen­ cific areas of the world. Nevertheless, gagement in any particular instance they comprise at least partial anllwers will require the careful orchestration to what seems to- be an enduring di­ of opinion as the President Will be lemma of American foreign policy. placed in the awkward position of • III Most generally, disengagement sending contradictory signals to allies, from commitments which are links in enemies, and domestic audiences. Dis­ the American security system requires engagement is, therefore, as much a a convincing set of actions that dem­ problem of public relations as of poli­ onstrate that the unwanted commit­ tics. ment (a) is against our interest, or e The third suggestion is in the (b) is no longer deemed vital, but (c) realm of tactics. Military actions that that neither of these conditions apply are undertaken on behalf of an ally to other, more valuable commitments should be those that are most easily that one intends to keep. In turn, this reversible in the event that the pro­ would imply that measures be taken posed effort does not achieve its to reassure nervous allies that disen­ purpose. The ease with which a partic­ gagement in one instance does not ular action can be reversed will ob­ foreshadow further disengagements viously depend on whether the Ameri­ elsewhere. Indeed, disengagement in esn people and the rest of the world one area may require more extensive continue to view the contest as another efforts in others, if only for psycbo­ country's (struggle in which we are logiesl and morale purposes. Thus, a assisting, or, instead, our own esuse warning: disengagement, in the most in which the ally is participating. general sense, may not resemble the It is obviously easier to offer a "deescalation ladder." Rather, the promissory note to an ally than it is to course of disengagement may more ac­ fulfill the pledge once the CMUS foe­ curately have its ups and downs, its deris arises. Thus, an: essential ingre­ hillR and valleys. dient of political-military planning III A second suggestion is a corol­ ought to be careful consideration of lary of the first. The administration, precisely what actions are to he taken and most importantly, the President, in the event that fulfillment of the will feel most directly the costs and commitment is deemed too risky or burdens in the process of disengage­ burdensome for whatever reason. Con­ ment. The President may well be tingency planning, in other words, forced to say one thing to reassure ought to include a strategy of disen­ nervous allies and something quite gagement should events not evolve as different to potential opponents and favorably as originally anticipatejl something quite different yet-to mol­ when the commitment was extended, lify public opinion.and dampen politi­ or, again, should deterrence fail. Cer­ esl~b\lreaucratic squabbling at home. tainly, planning for the process of This would suggest -that -the Presi­ getting out ought to receive as much dent's problems- are likely to be mag- attention as planning for getting in.

Dacemb.r:1913 37 This phinning ahould be undertaken enranCeB it would like to maintain, al­ as part of the decision to undertake though in practice, there is normally new commitments; it should not wait some wiggle room for maneuver. until the pressure of events forces a Given the scope and range of the hastily implemented withdrawal. American commitment system, Ball's George Ball, in his book The Disci­ pessimism is justified. But it is pre­ pline of Power, has written that: cisely this "wiggle room" which, given No oie has yet devised a; graceful political finesse, can be exploited to means by which a' great nation can allow for disengagement without pro­ disengage from as8urances it Ita8 voking severe repercussions interna­ given without undermining other as­ tionally or domestically.

Donald KeUy Jones is with the Depart­ ment of Political Science, Queens College of the City University of New York. He reccived a B.A. from Stanford University, an M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and is a candidate for a Ph.D. fro'lIl Columbia Uni­ versity. During the summer of 1968, he was an intern at the US State Department.

NOTES 1 For examples of the variety of forms com.. mitments eEU'J take. nee US Depariment of State. United Statu De/en86 Commitments and &SUf'-­ ancu. Auguot 1967. 2 The National Commitments Resolution, Senate Resolution 8&. adopted by the Senate on 25 .lune 8 Sidney B. Fay. The On9ifUJ 01 World War 1. 1969. defines a national commitment as: ..~ • • the The Macmillan Co.. N. Yo, 1928, pp 84-86. use or the Armed Forces bf the Untted States on foreirrn territory. ot" a promise to atUJiat a foreign eountt'Y.

Uianeeo 1'...... 10 The D.....nm.n, of State Bulletin, 19 May 1958. ~W;·itJ:~·..~'\y stems • 1:O=:; normal coul'8e of events. it aimply t'e ec the-ex­ 11 -Adtlrus to the United Statel Chamber 01 pediential calculations at the root of nearly all Com...... 1 May 1931. decfsione. • • :. 12 HI.bani M. Nixon, United States 11'.,..;"" .. Richard Boseeranee. AeUon ami Reaction In PolicrJ lor u... J9ro'g: llulldl"l1 I.. p_. Harper W.,.,., PO/me8, Little. Brown 4; Co.. 800_, M...., &'0 Row PubH.h.... N. Yn 1971. "p 3-4. 1966. p 29. .ie:~fT.:r.-~~.I".r.1':~~~::r. ~ ibid., pp 142. 167-58. veruity Press, Baltimore, Md., 1968. pp 268-69­ 61614.. "" 165-66. 14 Nixon, 07'0 cit., P 4. HISTORIC BARRACKS RESTORED·

The' Australian Army became a leading exponent of heritage preservation.when the historic Victoria Barracks military complex was opened to the public in August to celebrate its 125 years of use by army troops. The bmacks. now headquarters of the army's Eastem Command, is Australia's biggest complex of historic buildings. Built in the 1840s to accommodate a British regiment of 1000 soldiers, the bmacks are valued not only for their historical significance, but also for their architectural stYle. They have been restored with such close attention to historic detail that they have become a model for other heritage preservationists. The' completed restoration work is' clearly a source of niore than a little satisfaction to military personnel at Victona Barracks. VisitorS readily concede that this feeling is truly justified and that .the army is. a worthy custodian of the historic buildings in its care. December J91S 39 from 8 Vugoslav otal ational afense

A. Ross JoluWln

UGOSLAVIA conducted the Free­ sistance 'from secret locations. The Y dom-71 maneuvers in October enemy's efforts to control occupied terri­ 1971-the flfSt large-scale military maneu­ tory were frustreted. vers held there since 1953. Freedom-71 A year later, Yugoslavia organized simulated a thrust from the northeast by another large-scale maneuver, Podgom-72. a powerful, highly mobile enemy into the Again, territorial and irregular forces hilly region' southwest of Zagreb. The joined regular personnel, this time to defending forces' regular units slowed simulate successful resistance against an down the advance of the enemy's tanks, amphibious and airborne assault 'On the amphibious carriers and helicopter-borne Adriatic coastline. troops and then withdrew to avoid a disastrous frontal battle. As the enemy Vupdav tiJoctnn9 pushed farther into the interior, however , Freedom-7i. Podgora-72 and a score they were resisted by a combination of of smaner exercises demonstrate the prog­ regular, territorial and irregular forces ress made by Yugoslavia Since 1968 in which, attacking from the flanks and the organizing for defense fonowing the prin­ rear as wen as the front, reversed the ciple of total national defense (opften­ attack after the enemy had advanced 30 arodna odbrana). The distinctiveness of kilometers in two days. The political the approach is apparent ifcurrent Yugo­ I authorities operated under simulated war­ slav defense preparations are compared time conditions, directing total local re- with those of the early 1950s. Then,

Condensed from SurvlvallGreat Britain) March·Aprll 1973. 40 Milltalll RevIew fearing a SOviet invasion, Yugoslavia car­ alaviabeen lIble, both econoMically and, ' ried out a massive conventional militlllY politically. to alford .:large conwntional buildup of aIJIIost a half-million men force, Yusqslav miJitaor pJanneta lUlUed under arms, with a correspondilig1noblli·' ~t. this Would be inad.teto meet,the zation capacity. At its peak in 1952, 22 threat of a highly mcbDe jII'eet-power percent of national income was devoted jnilitary establishment in the 1910LThis to defense. Yugoslavia received American waS true' because, .in' terIIIS' ,of. conven­ military assistance of three-fourths' of a ~nal militlUY streJlSth, Yugoalavia WOuld billion dollars in the 195011. But the always be, oU_nn¢~Jl(L outgunned. improvement of SOviet-Yugoslav relll· The new threat posed by a-bigbly mobile tions after 1955 resulted in II gradual enemy tequired 'an effective ,mObilization de-emphasis of defense in Yugoslavia so eapabillt)', of, hours, not weeks. On the that, by 1968, less than six percent of other hand,' the plaDnll{S argued, a mod­ national income went into defense ex­ ern conventional ~ is iitadequately penditures and the Yugoslav People's equipped for the controlling of territory. Army (YPA) had been reduced to AcCepting these arauments from the plan­ 200.000 men. ners, Yugoslavia's politjcal leadership After August 1968, Yugoslavia's lead­ turned to the concept of total national ers found this defense capability quite , defense and IlCcepted ~ proposal publicly inadequate. The invasion of Czechoslo· sired earlier in Croatia for the organiza­ vakia by the Warsaw Pact countries was tion ,in peacetime of a large·scale terri­ viewed in Belgrade as evidence of a Soviet torial defense for~ (TDF)-in effect. determination to subjugate wherever pos­ territc)ria1 armies of citizen-soldiers orga­ sible independent Communist states and, nized by the political authorities in the consequently. as an indirect attack on mious repUblics. Yugoslavia; Moreover. the Tito lea«ership The new doctrine, I!IId the military clearly !1Ppreclated, that the buildup of organization and tactics designed to im· Soviet military power in the Meditel13' plemc\lt it. are still being worked out by nean now, made Yugoslavia of greater the Yugoslav political and military au· geostrategic importlUlce to the Soviet thorities. Nevertheless, the major features Union and increased the possibility of of Yugoslavia's new approach to defense great power conflict in the Balkans.1 IIl8 already dear.2 Total national defense Determined to defend its position lIS an rests on the premise that small I!IId independent, nonalignlld Communist medium-size states must be self-reliant in state, Yugodavla sought to make this deCease if they are to maintain their threat er~ble. and hence deter Soviet sovereignty. They can, if they have the political pressure or .in~on, by inereas­ national will a,nd, appropriate institutions .ing its defensiVe capabilities. involviJIg the entire citiZenry in national A renewed massive conventional miIi· defense. successfully, resist-and thus tary buildup was out of the question. quite llkllly deter-extemat attack. This Cunent economic difficulties imposed an philosophy underlies amendment 39 of upper limit of six percent on the,share of the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution expressly the regular ~tary .in national 'income. forl!idding ,military capitulation or S\Il" The·lIIIIWliilability and :Political undesir­ rendllJ' ,of territory. under any ~ircu.m­ ability'of outside assistance plus the stances. The .prohibition is restated.in the decentraliZe~, political system .of the late revised National 'Defense, Law of'1969 19605' . also" precluded therevtwi of a which pro,vides,. furthllJ', .that it is the large.e standing army. Even had Yugo­ right and duty of·every citizen to partici·

4t Since lallHCale evaceatlon of cilies Is D9 !oager envisaged, tile Yugo­ slav People's lInny will defend to\YQ$ and cllles

pate in national defense and the right and land invasion, and to attempt quickly to duty of the local political authorities ''to seize Belgrade. Zagreb and other key organize total national defense and to cities with parachute and helicopter­ command the battle directly." borne troops. In this scenario, the first In theory a Gaullist-like dl/ense (; tous task of the VPA, employing frontal tac­ azimuths, total national defense has in tics but avoiding heavy casualties, would practice been adopted by Yugoslavia in be to delay enemy penetration suffl· order to deter or, if necessary, resist an ciently (a matter of hours) for the coun· attack from the East. As described by try to carry out total mobilization. yPA Yugoslav military Writers,3 this might units, withdrawing from border areas, take the form of an attack by a neighbor· would wage active defense in depth along· ing country(e.g.,Bulpria) supported only side the mI". The expected consequence indirectly by the Soviet Union. In this would be a merging of front and rear, the scenario, the VPA itself would engage the transformation of the entire country into enemy in frontal warfare and drive it a "hedgehog." Having turned a blitz from the country. The TDF in the invasion into a protracted conflict. yPA affected border region would selectively and TDF units would tight on, using a assist the VPA; elsewhere, the mF would mixture ofcombined and partisan tactics. remain on alert in case of an increase in the military threat. In "occupied" territory, both urban Far more likely, according to Yugoslav and rural, mF and paramilitary forces military Writers, is a massive blitz attack would fight II guerrilla War. Only if an led by the Soviet Union. In this case, the entire region of the country were occu­ enemy would enjoy overwhelming mili· pied, however. would YPA and TDF units tary superiority in traditional terms. He. revert exclusively to partisan"tactics, liS in could be expected to achieve general air World War II. By foHowing such II strat· supllriority; to mount a massive armored egy, Yugoslav military writers argue that an occupying force ill excess of 85 the p1mt in the event ofdirect lIISIultby . soldiers per square kllometer. or. two airbOrrIe or >other eJlent)' troops. and milIion.men, would be re~ tOe.com­ me_· with the COJIIIIIUII8llDF if the pletely subjugate the country.4 Given the factoty is· captured.Yupl~·s con­ Central European balance of' lW'Wer, the sti~nt republics haw also formed SG.IIIh Yugoslavs assume the enemy is most baUaliCIn-siZe.. highly ntobil~· lDl1 unitS uuJikely to deploy such a force in South­ capable- of combat thfougIiout each ie­ eastern Europe. . public; tile·desirability of'fOlllling more unill of this type WASqgesled by Tito at tile conclUsion orFreed""..11. lDF uni~ !lfe Placed under newly The national defense law of 1969gave established defense commands. staffed by legal sanction to territorial!iefense units reserve'YPA officers. at tile .communal created ad hoc in the autumn of 1968. and rejmblic:an lewis. respectively. While Legally and doctrinally coequal to the precise data are lacking. the total ,of 'YPA, the TOF has expanded to a force of full-time headquarters personnel through­ 600.000, plus 300.000 members ofyouth out the country is estimated at 3000-the Wlill. The TDIF is to expand to three TOP's only penJIIlnent c:ad!'e. The com­ million (IS percent of1I1e total popula­ munal commander is responsible both to tion) ill the next few years. It is financed the communsl political authorities and to at the local and republican levels by the higher. republican territorial defense allocations from the respectiVe assembly command. The republican commandshave budget and enterprise funds. The current considerable autonomy. but ultimately five-year projection postulates raising they are subordinsted to the federal one-half to one percent·· of national Supreme Commend. Consequently, the income for defense, in addition to the TOP is not part of the State Secretariat nearly six percent of national income for National Oefense-'YPA cl!ain mcom­ devoted to the 'YPA budGet through these mand. Local TOP units fall under 'YPA subfederal channels.s tactical command only when engaged in In building up the TOF, the main joint operations with 'YPA units. In occu­ emphasis has been on company-size units pied territory, the TOF units remain at the commune level. organized by SOme under the republican defense commands. 500 urban and rural communal author­ If an entire Yugoslav republic should be ities according to standards drawn I1p at overrun by the enemy, the republican the republican and the federal levels. defense command would assume control These TOF companies are intended for of all military units in ill territory-VPA defense within the boundaries of the as well as TDF units. Reverting, in part, commune. Many of the units are en­ to their World War U experience, the trusted· with primlIry responsibility for Yugoslavs ha",e constructed a command­ initial defense against airborne assault. In and-control meclJanism intended. to addition. defense units have been orga­ ensure that large-seale military resistance nized on a production basis in some 2000 will continue even if 'the top of the large factories and other economic enter­ military command structure is destroyed. priaes, each of which is required, by law, Training for total national defense is to draw up peacetime and wartime plans carried out in coJlll!lunsl training centers for local defense. Factory defense units where reserve 'YPA officers instruct TOF have .the responsibility for perforining units.· Active officers instruct the .tocal some civil defense functions, defending command staff. Regular training activities are supplemented by full-dress maneu­ de-emphasis of civil defense as conceived vers. TDP personnel spend about 100 in the early 1960~. Large·scale evacuation hours yearly in training. of cities is no longer enviseged. According TDP units are armed primarily with to the new doctrine, since half the Yugo­ loca1ly produced Jight antitank and anti­ slav population now live in towns and personnel weapons supplemented by cities, they too must be defended. Fur­ heavier mobile antitank and antiair­ thermore, the TDP has taken over certain craft weapons for battalion·size TDP activities, such as intelligence and warn­ units. Yugoslav military writers stress the ing, which forlmlrly were the responsibil­ value of sophisticated weaponry fori the ity of the civil defense organization. On TDP. including infrared and laser­ the other hand, the doctrine of total targeting devices. sensors and commlll\ica· national defense envisages an important tions, for they expect the enemy to be role for civil defense forces. incorpo­ prepared for counterinsurgency. rating, in one form or another. the entire Until the TDP can be well supplied able-bodied population not included in with modern weapons, however, the util­ the VPA or TDP. At present, the civil ity of even obsolete weapons captured in defense organization numbers 1.3 miI1ion. World War n is emphasized. Weapons are The national defense law of"1969 stored in mobilization centers. Personal stipulates thet each commune must form equipment is kept at home. Dispersal of a civil defense organization, subordinate light .weapons on the Swiss pattern has to the communal defense command. The been discussed but not carried out. Based civil defense organization is. subdivided on the experience of recent maneuvers, into engineering, sanitation. radiation­ the Yugoslavs claim that half the existing chemical·biological defense, fne-flghting, TOF can be mobiJized in three to silt veterinary. evacuation lind security units. hours; the other halfin a day or two. The primary functions of the civil defense organization in the new system are fire­ CMlUGfeIl$8 fighting, public health, shelter. -and The post-1968 attention to territorial . limited evacuation of the wounded chil­ defense in Yugoslavia has resulted in a dren and the aged.

MilitaIJ Rovlow Role ohllo Armed F_ Yugoslav military writings, the VPA will undergo soma further redllCtion in size, The acceptance of total national de· while being turned into-a more mobne, fense has resulted in 11 profound change in better armed force. The major goal- of the iole of the regular armed, forces. One continued modernization of the VPA is would expect ,such far-reaching change to the development of modern mobne infan· generate tensions within the professional try, well equipped with antitank and military, and some ,evidence of this has antiaircraft weapons. As in the past, most come to light. Post-19M professional weapons will be locally manufactured. At discussions on total national defense reo the same time, both milital)' and political vealed two lines of criticism. A romantic leaders insist that it would be futne for partisan element advocated an even more Yugoslavia to attempt to compate with a radical return to the decentralized orga· great power in tanks. sophisticated air· niZation and small-scale tactics of the craft, or other heavy modem weaponry partisan war. Its spokesmen were usually and that ,modernization of the VPA must identified with the cause of republican not delay the arming of the TDF. and national self'assertion in Croatia' and Secondiy, the buildup of the TOP has Slovenia and sometimes advocated the meant a sharp lowering of VPA reserve formation of full·fledged republican levels. At present, 80 parcent of VPA armies. The other conservative element conscripts ire su;qUentlY assigned to resisted de-e~phasizing the VPA and the the TDF; 20 parce t to the VPA or its territorialization of national defense.6 ft is active rese~The inactive VPA reserve a clear indication of both the flexibility has,in effect, beeh'aboJished. of outlook of the VPA senior officer Thirdly. the nature of military maneu· corps, and the VPA's institutional sub· vers has been drastically changed. In the ordination to the League of Communists early, 196Os, WA maneuvers usually and to Tito personally. However, it has simulated conventional defense of cities, apparently adapted ~o the new system of including tha mass evacuation of non· national defense without undue friction. combatants. In the past fow: years, mao The fundamental departure from neuvers have involved jOint defense by earlier practice is shown by the fact that YPA and TDF units against large-scale the VPA is no longer the Yugoslav mili· armored invasion or airborne assault. tary institution but is complemented by Freedom-71 was the fust mass test ofthe the larger TDP which is doctrinally and new defensive system. As indicated by legally on an equal footing and not Podgoro..72, Yugoslavia now intends to subordinate to the WA. On the other schedule such large-scale war games regu· hand, Yugoslav doctrine does notinvoive, larly. as in the Swiss pattern, the transforma· Fourthly. the \'FA has begun to trans­ tion' of the WA into a professional fer SQme support functions-eXlllllples are training corps-for a single militia of medical care, food supply and some citizen-soldiers. The active VPA must be engineering services-to the TOP or the able on its own both to resist a limited civilian sector. incursiOn and to delay' a massive attack long enough for the country to carry out T!ltd NIItIIlI1IR fI&fea IS DilSmmca total mobiliZatioil. This'fundemelltal change in the WA's Yugoslavia - has made considerable role 'h8s,given rise, to speeific challge$ in progress in elaborating detaHs· of the the VPA organization. First, judging-by doctrine of total national defense and YUI'IDSIAV DEfENSE tr8nslatiRg doctrine into organizational industrialized state faced with the possi. and institutional change. The viability of bility of external aggression from a much total national defense will depend on the stronger enemy and taking into account successful continuation of this process domestic and international political and and ultimately. of course. on the health economic realities. and the state of con­ of Yugoslavia's political and social order. temporary military technology. The new doctrine is in line with the More specifically, Yugoslavia seeks to post-l96S economic decentralization in deter Soviet political threats or invasion, providing for the marshalling of funds for now and in the post-Tito period, by defense at the local and republican. as demonstrating that a Czechoslovak-style well as at the federal. level. It is in road march into Yugoslavia is not possi· harmony with the parallel political decen· ble; that an invasion would have unpre· tralization or ''tepublicanization.'' The dictable consequences; that an attempt at new territorial forces constitute a poten­ occupation would be bloody,prolonged, tial politicel counterweight to the yPA. and expensive in terms of manpower and although this factor should not be over­ materiel; and that, ifa blitz invasion were stated. While the YPA remains the strong­ indeed transformed into a protracted est aU·Yugoslav institution, in the latter conflict in which Yugoslavia would seek 19605 its exclusMst and supranational assistance from outside, then it would character was mitigated substantially. The involve a risk of superpower confronta· VPA is at the moment greatly concerned tion. with improving the proportional represen· tation of aU of the country's ethnic Mr. Johnson is II Senior AnaJ;yst with groups in the officer corps which is still tile RIlnd COYpOl'Iltion. Simta Monica. dominated at lower levels by Serbs. Ob­ Cali/omill. servers who are pessimistiC about Yugo· s1avia's future internal cohesion interpret the adoption of total national defense as, in effect, arming the country for future civil war. More optimistic observers point 1S.. Leo Mates. "The Balkans and Euro­ to the self-confidence of the political pean Security ," Su",/va~ May·Jun.1972. leadership in arming the country for ~ajor sources are the VPA journals 8!\ defense a positive omen for the future. Narcdna arm/itt and VDJno Delo; Majpr Genetlll However one may judge these internal DI1san Dozer, Dn3l!1ene DmOlle Dp'itenarDdne considerations, the doctrine is a prudent odb,,,,,e (Belgrade, 1969); Op!!tenarodna response to Yugoslavia's felt external cdl",m" JUgDslall/je (Belgrade. 1971); Odb,,,,,,, threat. It takes into account both .",,/jallst/!!k. JUloslalllje (Belgrade, 1971); Teri­ torijaJfItIJ odl",,,,,, (B.lgracIe,1970). strengths and weaknesses of a potential superpower invasion force and makes a 31'or example. Colonel General S. Drljevil. Iletired. in Soclializam (Belgrade). April 1969; virtue out of economic and political M. Drobac. in Vojno Dew (Belgrade). May-June necessity. Total II!ltional defense, while 1972­ incorporating aspects of the Yugoslav "M.uor Genetlll D. Dozet. opo cit., p 59. Communists' partisan experience, repre­ SMajor General D. Dozel, Kom.mlst, 13 Jan· sents more than a nostalgic revival of uary 1972. successes now 2S years old. It is an effort 6aoth currents were alluded t~ by Colonel to apply principles of "people's war," General OJ. LonWevil. addressing a ....eting of which Tito pioneered, no less than Meo, the Serbian Party Central Commiuee. as lie' Giap or Guevara, to a consolidated, semi: poned by Tanjugon 30 June 1972.

Military Review The Multinational Phenomenon

LJeutenant Colonel Harold L. Jones, United States Army

N THEIR 1972 book, Things to virtually assured. Their continuing I Come-Thinking About the Seven­ growth is equally certain and it may ties and the Eightie8, Herman Kahn be taken for granted that they will and B. Bruce-Biggs state that, de­ become increasingly internationalized spite the regional and national polit­ -more and more multinational in ical multipolarity that may be pre­ character. dicted for the coming period, the The multinational corporations have world's economy will become increas­ been and will continue to be very suc­ ingly interdependent. The multina­ cessful for many reasons. They have tional corporation (MNC) will play the unquestioned ability to raise and the central role in this international­ invest capital. They can create and ization. manage organizations to fulfill prac­ There can be little doubt concerning tically any imaginable function. They the continuing growth in size and build factories, provide the most ad­ numbers of what has come to be vanced technology available, and hire known as the multinational corpora­ and train employees, including a grow­ tion. A glance at the list of the ing number of .managers. In accom­ world's 50 largest mining and manu­ plishing ., th!lse functions; multina­ facturing corporations in 1971 in tionals not only raise locsl and· na­ terms of sales reveals the names of tional educational and technical skill some of the most respected corpora­ levels-and with them the host na­ tions in the world. With annual aales tion's total productivity-but. they and asaeta amounting to several bil­ also increase the potential size of the lions of dollars, their surVival seema world market for their own prodUct. Ilsclllllber 1813 47 MULnNATIONAL PHENOMENON

THE WORLD'S LARGEST COMPANIES-lOll' corporations at least nominalJy sup­ port policies calling for promotion ...... Sako IAElUtona us " from within, based on merit. Over the 1. Oerwal UGtors 28)114 Z. SU.... 011 UI_J&nayl 10.101 long run, such policies will effectively 1 F... 16,433 dilute existing social stratification 4. R.yalDIrtdl/SWOroap 1UM 6.0man1EIIdric 9.426 patterns. 0,274 8.''''7.UIIIIUOil 0)411 Having a plant, branch or subsid­ 8.C_ ,.ssa iary in a foreign country means O. TIiIUCO ',520 10. UDiIsvu 7.4a3 visits, both from and to the home 11. ITT office. The travel and communication 12. WeatmEbc:trlt '0.M5.... 13.llldfOiJ U411 that takes place serves to broaden the 14. BftusbPtllroloum 6.191 1&. PtilipJGlMBIIrnponfchrbbn 6.108 cultural and international understand­ '1. SUI.-.Oil {C&liI'Gmb' 6.143 ing of both the visitor and the visited. n.vG~ 4~07 lD. USS. 4,04' As an incidental benefit of the 19, WOStiaaboul$ 4,433 ZOo flfppaaStsd 4,1)37 growth of mUltinationals, for those ZI.s.._OIl(I"''''''' 4~54 of us whose only language of profi­ U. SheIIOIl 3~ 21 E,l.dcPcmtNcmmm 3~ ciency is English, it is interesting to 24.S1emw 3.815 Zii. lmtmCd c:tam=IlllidmlJt::;l 3.711 note that English is being adopted as 211 RCA 3.711 the official company language of many 21. Hitxbl 3.633 D. OHllycrTirla Rcbtcr 3~ corporations, including many non-US 211. hatb 3,641 m. F~.ltaacbU and non-British companies. The long­ 31. Daimb-8t1!1 '.'"3.4Il:l term effects of this policy may prove 3Z.. LiDltTcmco-VOlJDht ',31\) 33. Teyota .,... interesting. 34. Uoat2dbon 3,270 While many nations actively seek 35. BrltbbSUd UtS all. IlASF 3)CJ investment by multinational corpo­ 11. AtlillstitRiddidtI 3.135 38. Mftmbhhl 3.120 rations, mostly to gain the benefits a I\Usml'ih:crs 3.120 discussed ahove, the corporations 40. CoIltilwnDJOil 3..G:il 41·_1 3~ themselves are not necessarily driven 4Z. UaJaltCstll:lo 3~2Il 43. hneretfoCllI Htmttu 3.016 by such noble concerns. That is not 2,9flS to say that multinational corporations ...45. Eutaw:! UtWk 2,916 43.~temStctJ- 2.1100 are lacking ideas, but it is generaIJy 41._ 2,!l'" 411. Fin 2.0132 accepted that business enterprises (I)._T-...6lI.lDekI:

Mlmngmd r7IIII1l1lacturinga1lflPiN'w.only~tlf Ijrr.t/. generate profits. A listing of 22 such Saurt:tl~ Fonuns Mo1ln:J Md Tba Official ADD­ QIrtOdPrtssAlmaMC-1973, companies produced profits of over $200 million each in 1971. Many factors are involved in deter­ Simultaneously, they are providing mining a company's profitability. But, the impetus for social and cultural in the case of most multinational cor· growth. By hiring members of local porations, there are a number of com­ elites (largely as managers, nor­ mon factors which contribute signifi· mally) they provide an effective way cantly to their profits. One of these for these elites to spend their time. common factors has to do with labor Use of elites in managerial roles may costs; A company which operates in

be seen as temporarily reinforcing < an area where labor is expensive and some possibly undesirable social struc­ in short supply may seek to relocate tures.However, most multinational to an area, or to a nation, where labor MilitarY lIevlol'l is abundant and less expensive. An­ other inducement to internationalize, 11171 CORPORATE PROFITS ,to go multinational, is tied to taxes. I_IIS$,"",...... Foreign governments seeking ec0­ I.U__-. $1.11311 nomic eJtP8nsion will normally offer 2.S_0DIlI",./moy1 1.462 very favorable tax arrangements to 3. IBM 1.1179 4.T_ 004 the companies or industries which II.O.".D..-O.... 00% they are particularly interested in at­ 8. Fm IlS7 7. Gull 051 tracting. Even without special In. 1.08._0SICIiIL'ool!oI__ Iill ducement tax concessions, the varia­ 18. __ 47Z 419 tions in tax laws between nations will 1I.1IIII&lI_"'" m often make it more advantageous for 12.011_ 359 13._0D{tt&rW 34Z a company facinl!' an expansion to 14.'" 337 decide to expand internationally rather II1._E_ ZiiII 111. UlIIIml 24S than within the bounds of their own 17._09 Z45 10._60_ Z3Il country. 19. II.LIIayodd: 228 The availability and proximity of ax.... 211 2t.I\1_M_a~ Zli raw materials is another factor which 22.1....,w_IIIII_ zoo often increases profitability and causes SoUI't$: Fortune- Megszlna IJfId The Qfflcltll AutJ­ a company to internationalize. It is clatcdPnl#AI~l913. often more profitable to transport, distribute and market a finished prod· uct than it would be to bring all of the necessary raw materials together most likely nation in which the parent at a more distant plant. company would locate its most profit­ Another, more subtle advantage of able operating subsidiary-or, at any internationalizing a company's oper· rate, for the company· to show the ations is tied closely to the tax situa­ largest profit, whether that profit tion. Many multinational corporations was actually achieved there or was are vertically structured. For example, achieved there by manipulating trans­ an auto manufacturer may own iron fer costs. ore and coal fields, its own steel mill, Certainly, all governments recog­ and factories to produce and assemble nize the motivations and the methods all of,the components needed to manu· used by multinational corporations. facture its automobiles. If these,oper­ Furthermore, many nations are con· ating elements are located in different cerned over certain specific practices countries, the company can take ad­ of some of the multinationals. The vantage of the variations in national Chilean Government's recent national­ tax laws to add to thelr profitability. ization of $158, million of ITT prop­ By adjusting costs. and the prices erty, olltsnsibly prompted by ITT's at­ charged succeeding' company-owned tempts to interfere with the Chil\l8n elements' for products, profit ma~gins Government, "has caused worldwide can often be altered very favorably. concern. . The country with the, hilthest tax Further evidence of. concern over rates would be the most b'kely, to have the presence of, multinational corpo­ the least profitable llubsidiaryof this rations is easny found.' The Wall parent company. The nation wit!:/. the St"6l1lt JoumoJ. ran a series .of five most.Ji,b.l!raitax laws would be the articles on multinationals in April 1l!lCllil/lor tll73 4!1 MULTIHATIOrw. PHENOMENON

1973. The articles dealt with their .dominance of world production; with the fear of the power of the MNCs; nATIONAL AND COMPAflY PRODUCTS· with the role of MNCs in recent mone­ 10700NP 1071Scict NatIonIComl*lV (Mlnlorl,UStll tary crises; with Europe's fear of 1. UotltdSUtas 1914,101) IBM dominance of the World com­ 2. kpm 197.180 3. GmmllY 10..... puter market; with the growth of 4. Fnr:co 14U34 6. UnltldlUllgdom lZ1,oztJ multinational lab9r unions; and with a.ltaIy 93,190 the likelihood of some form of anti­ 1. "'- 80,3811 8, lade ..~.. trust action against certain MNCs. g, Australif 30,100 to. Brazil 34.1lQ!l Books on multinational corporations 11. Mulco 33,180 are becoming more and more promi­ 12.S'MIdon 32,68. 13. Spain 32~" nent. Basic Books Incorporated is pub­ 14. Ni'Wrf4nds 31 .... IS. Gr.::tdlbtGn $20.... lishing a series of three books in the lB."""" Z5.lGiJ Harvard Multinational Enterprise Se­ n. Arplltlrm 25ilZD llJ,SWIturt;ttd ...... ries' including S01Iereignty at Bay: 19. Stanlfud all (I'lm.&my' 18.701 20. Paldstao n,lico The Multinational Spread of u.S. En­ 21. SouthAItica 18,£:10 22. Ford terprises by Raymond Vernon who is U.Dcnmuk 16,5l0 ".... also the author of Multinational En~ 24. Atmrb 14.311t 2&. Ron) DutdlJS;bdl GrOllp 12.734 terprise and National Security, Adel­ Ze.lcdolHlSb 12.G1l. phi Papers, Number 74. In The Com­ 21. fJor=y 11,lSO "."1_ ' • .230 ing Clash: The Impact of the Inter­ 2D. Fitlllld lC,2CO lao Iran to,IUD national Company and the National 31. Vmzl.-efa 9,5110 3Z. tlr=co 9,600 State, Hugh Stephenson, an English 33. GcCMt Eimir: 9.... 30, Turby ..... economist and newspaperman, sug­ 35, IBM gests that the basic concept of the na­ ...," ·On')' nQ"communin &tWntrm ~R!- 11'=' funh", tion-state might be chaJlenged by the CDfflJ»ttin Imcd.,., Iim,rtJd to tflOltI ~{n mlnlntl lUld~nul.x:tu''''fI fndunmr.. multinational corporations of the fu­ &111'1:0'. 1M OffICIal AuocIJItCd Press Alm/l:l'1ac-1913 ture. Other books include J. J. Sarvan­ Schreiber's The American Challenge, which started the recent interest, and Invisible Empires: Multinational Com­ April 1973, stated that: panie8 and ·the Modern World by •.. if a corporation's sales were Louis Turner. to be equated with a nation'8 out­ One of the reasons for the current put of goodB and services [the na­ interest in multinetional corporations tion's GNP], then 51 of the world's is probably the sense of awe that 100 biggest mousy powers would be comes from examining the sales fig­ international CorporatiOO8 and only ures of these companies. It is an easy 49 would be countries. step to jump to a comparison of cor­ Other startling "facts" ean be gar­ porate sales against a· nation's gross nered from such comparisons: Gen­ national product (GNP). A nation's eral Motors is "more powerful" than GNP is a value-added computation, Belgium, Argentina, or Switzerland; where corporate sales figures are gross Ford has more resources than Den­ figUres, without regard to' myriad mark and Austria and is nearly four operating costs and expenslls. Never-. times as "powerful" as Israel (GNP: theless, this comparison is a common $4.394 billion). one. The WaU street Journal, on 18 These are some real reasons for lUI nations to be concerned over the tinationals $3, hostages. It is not in­ growth of multinational corporations, conceivable that a BOVe~t-or a however, reasons which are much terrorist faction within a country­ more concrete than meaningless com­ would use ~ threat of takeover .01' parisons-no matter how awe-inspir­ destruetjon of a company's property ing' those comparisons may be. For to attempt'to ensure .that the com­ example, it is often stated, when dis­ pany's home &'OvermneJ!t acted in a CUssing MNC's and natiollll, that cor­ desired lIWllIer. In this regard. ex­ porations do not have armies 01' police ample set by Palestinian and other powers, except to provide security for Arab elementa with respect to US oil their own property. This is, of course, companies (and the Jordanian and true. Nonetheless. many MNCs do Lebanese Govemments) comes quickly have the resources to hire a small to mind. foree should they see the need to do In today's world, teclmology is vi­ so. Many probably have already in talJy important. For a country which being intelligence-gathering capabili· is emerging, or d,eveloping. 0:li,'any ties. They would be foolish not to category other than that of one 0 the have them. It may be true that these most ,technologically develo na­ intelligence etrorts are directed pri­ tions, there are three ways to obtain marily to flo-caUed industrial espio­ the latest technology without, steal­ nage, but, before a company invests ing. The first is to develop the tech­ large SUDlfl of money in a new nation, nology independently. This alternative it is only lOgical to expect it to know is eltPensive and time-consuming, how­ 8fI much about that nation 8fI it is ever, and there is no guarantee of sue­ pOflflible to leam. Much of what a cess. The second is to buy the tech­ company Imows initiaUy and learns on nology. Even though this is often ex­ a continuing basis might be considered tremely expensive, it is a favorite sensitive or militarily significant by tactic of Ilome nations, ·most notably the host- country. Even though this Japan. Decrying the loss of jol)s practiee is quite normal and the in­ and of US-talqIayer-bought technol­ formation is essential to the eompany's ogy, Andrew J. Bi~\Ier of the AFL. operations, the host nation can only CIO is quoted in 'I'M Kansas City conclude that the information has been 8tar of 20 May 19'13 8fI having told passed to the company's home ollice a Senate committee that: and possibly also to the govermnent McDonnell Dougla.8 CorpOf'ation is there. When situations such as the selling the entire Tkor Delta rocket recent ITT-cJA consultations come to 8jJstem to Jalpaf/,.,-lOkich un'll use it to light, obviOUSly it becomes more dif­ compete with tke U. S. commercial ficult for other MNCs to convince satellite launching busifl688. host nations of the purity of their J'he same eomPIUIY is alleged to operations. Raymond Vemon termed have given Japan permiflflioJl to build this-that is businesses acting as 91 FJ, fighter bombers, and Northrop agents for their home governments­ is reportedly &'Ofng to permit produc­ the '~Trojan Rorsl)" Ed'ect" in his tion of F5,1lg~ters in Taiwan. . Adelphi paper lIIvlti'lllltional Enter­ The third et¥caIIy 8Cl:eptable way prise GM NlJtional Security. to obtain the Ja:tes~ ~~ogy is to Morll9ver, Vernon noted one other invite a m)o1ltinational -l:Ol'pOratiOll strategically significant faetor--mul­ which has such expertise to enter.

~1873 II~ ~ULTIflATlOIW. PHENOMENON

This is not always a foolproof method ment or other use outside the corpo­ of getting exactly what may be needed. ration's home country. Generally, moat home governments Multinational corporations have an will not object to a eompany's efforts obvious need to deal in foreign cur­ to use the most advanced technology rencies. If they should be caught in in its newly established foreign sub­ the unfortunate position of holding sidiaries. Many governments, in fact, large amounts of a currency which is exert very little eontrol over the spe­ devalued internationally, they would cific technology to be used by their lose a considerable amount of money. MNCs in foreign operations. Though The Hoover Corporation is reported the praCtice of exporting technology by Hugh Stephenson as having lost has the effect of diluting the tech­ $6.9 million in the 1967 devaluation nological superiority of an MNCs flurry: Eastman Kodak lost $9.5 mil­ home country, it is usually justified in lion, and Firestone Tire lost a total at least two ways--it broadens the of about 1,'110.7 Dlillion in' 1966 and world's technological base as a whole, 1967. Conversely. Xerox collected a and it enables the MNC to obtain windfall profit of over $4 million by better profits; Iioth in terms of the having its assets in the right cur­ amount of profit and of the time re­ rencies in 1967. quired to produce that profit. With such dramatic results of cur­ There is one other consideration rency revaluation being the fule, it that bears mentioning in considering is no wonder that multinational cor­ the strategic importance of multina­ porations have begun to take an ac­ tional corporations. It may be gen­ tive, though usually defensive, role erally assumed that relations between in international money markets. They the MNC's home- nation and the na­ cannot afford to do otherwise; their tion to which the MNC is expanding stockholders demand profits and divi­ are somewhat amicable. However, if dends; $10.7 million losses must be those relations ahould deteriorate, it avoided. Simultaneously, the lure of is not inconceivable that a company $4 million windfalls can be attractiVe. would find itself supporting a war Almoatcertainly, this has led some against 'its own nation. General Elec­ mUltinationals to speculate actively in tric facilities were used in just that the money market, even if it meallS fashion by Germany in World War II. ultimately weakening their own na­ The eeonomlcs of multinational eor­ tional currency. porations are interesting, even to the The total magnitude of this situ­ layman. The techniques of adjusting ation has - economists seriously con­ the transfer prices charged to succeed­ cerned over the future of the interna­ ing subsidiaries in a eorporation'l! pro­ tional monetary system. The Bretton duction chain have already been de­ Woods system which served the world scribed. Many multinationals carry effectively from the sndof World War that process one step further. They II to the late 1960s has been effectively establish a "holding company" in a scrapped, -and it may not have 'been country which offera specific advan­ the proverbial "Gnomes of' Zurich" tages, the most common of which are who scrapped Bretton Woods. Many very low taxes and attractive interest eeonomlsts believe that it was the rates•. All profits are then transferred "Gnomes of Bayonne, New Jersey," to that holding company for invest­ the treasurers of multinational COr- 52 MIlItmJ IIwa MULlIlIAlIlINALPllfOmOIl J porations. The US Tariff Conunission mythical hard·headed businessmen of has estimated that private interna. the world. tional institutions controlled .Bome HUgh Stephenson, in The Coming $268 billion in short-term liquid as­ Clash. outlines ·'Very similar situations sets at the close of 19'11. Perhaps and goes even further into the mul. significantly. the fiow of only $6 to 8 tinational's enCroachment into· tradi­ billion into Germany in early 1973 tionally political areas of· national in· was sufficient to cause a 10 percent terest.· He cites the impact of a deci­ devaluation of the US dollar. US mul­ sion made in Dearborn, Michigan, on tinationals reportedly resisted aban­ the economy of Great Britain as a doning the dollar for some time but particularly frustrating experience for eventually some had to take action to the unconsulted national government; protect themselves from pos!,ibly se­ the effect. on natibnal elections in vere losses. France of a plant locstion decision The influence of. the financial (which may have been politically mo­ strength of multinational corporations tivated, since it was Servan.Schreiber, is awesome. Even The Wall Street the- author of The American Chal· Joumal apparently has some reserva· lenge who was defeated in the elec­ tions. On 19 April 19'13, the paper tion); and the unsuccessful efforts noted that "it is increasingly argued of an American manufacturer to en­ that no nation nor any international able one of its foreign subsidiaries monetary system can withstand the to build a plant in the Soviet Union multinationals' financial power." Cor. -after the parent company had itself porate capabilities to influence na· been refused permiesion to build the tional balance of payments positions plant by the US Government. He con­ are equally impressive. tends that politicians, international As The Wall Street Joumalsketches hankers and industrialists are engaged the situation: in a conspiracy of sorts being reluc­ Great Britain in one recent month tant to admit that the power of busi­ had ~ort-an4-import.peyment j!rYW8 ness is "growing at the expense of totaling $.6.9 billion aM a trade defteit governments in fun\lamental questions of $$69 millioo. If. because of doubts of national economic policy." Of poli­ about the pound, British importers ticians, he says that "theirs ill the un­ hastened payments aM e:zporters 'l'e· gainly posture of responsibility with· speetitlely delayed coUection by 10% out power." -which is weU within the realm of Whether Stephenson is correct and possibility-the nation: s trade deficit whether The Wall Street Joumal and would katie widened to $699 million. other publications are being fairly One may well wonder how much of objective, or are feeding a solllewhat the $269 nu1lion deficit was caused disturbed business community much by the same leading and lagging of the Iiame as Stephenson might be, re­ payments and collections, ·or how much mains to be seen, If theee sources are of the deficit· was real or imagined. correct in theirappraisale,then, it is Furthermore, how much "doubt of the fairly· evident that sOme fundamental strength of the pound" did the· $269 changes have been made in the world's million deficit cause the following economic structure and that other month. The effects of intangible fac­ changes win necessarily come about tors appear to profoundly intiuence the ill individual nations. in their econ­ Docaar 11)73 lIS MULTlMDOIIAI. PllElOMEHON omy, their political machinery and We can look for increasing interest their strategic outlook. The ways that in the aft'airs of multinational cor­ they see, regulate and control them­ porations in the near future. The selves and their businesses-and other United Nations has begun an exami­ governments and their businesseB­ nation of multinational corporations. are very likely to change significantly Legislation is already pending be­ in the coming few years. fore Congress which, if adopted, will For the present, US policy, as greatly change many of the tax bene­ stated by Secretary. of State William tits which now are allowed to compa­ P. Rogers in Mexico City in May 1978, nies which operate in foreign nations. supports both international business In short, the US Government is very and the rights of foreign govern­ much concerned with the operations of ments. Obviously referring to the re­ the multinationals-and so are many cent ITT-Chile situation, he said that other governments. The multinational the US Government has "no objections corporation is in the spotlight-Ste­ at an'~ to expropriation of US bus!­ phenson's "unspoken conspiracy" be­ ness-owned property if the business tween business and government is go­ interferes with the politics of the ing public-perhaps in time to avert host nation. his "coming clash."

Lieutenant Colonel Harold L. Jones ill with Headquarters, US Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia. A 1970 graauo,te of the Uni­ versity of Nebraska at Omaha, he has 1utd three tours in Vietnam with the 1st Aviation Brigade and Headquar­ ters, US Army, Vietnam. He was grad­ uated from the USACGSC in June 1978.

CORRECTION

In tile Gl'ticlo "rho Powor Veeuum in tile Persian Gulf" by Major John J. RUllZkiewicz In tIlo October 1973 iaue of Mill,.,,,, Rtwlew, tho last til"", full sentences on P\lIIII91 should have read: .•• Tho "have" countries in the region are, for tI!a moot pan, tnldftlonlll monarchies clssiroue of a S1lIble political situation and ovolutionsv change. They are supponed by tile west. With the exception of Jordan, the ''hIM! nor' COUR1l'ies, thoUllh not ~ily bordering the Gulf, era "Socialist" and in fovor of revolutionary change. "I watched a crusty old major reading my story ..."

Literary Leanings By John Onslow

SEE in the Writers and ArliBtB wrote an article about army training Year Book that The Army Quar­ for Blaekwooa'8 Magazine. When the terlyI and Defence Jou'l"ltal is devoted relevant number of that journal ap­ to all 'matters connected with the peared on the anteroom table with army and Imperial defense, and, other periodicals, I brushed my bow­ among other things, articles from the ler hat and awaited events. I had younger generation of Officers are thought that my nom de plume would particularly welcome. So here I go, atrord me cover from the ire of my but, to include myself in the category seniors, but somebody bad sneaked. mentioned at the end of the previous I watcbed a crusty old major read­ sentence, I find it necessary to turn ing my story, his face becoming more back all cloeks and calendars through purple as he turned the pages. I ~eared some 47 years; an onerous task. In for his health. No one could be as the Twenties and Thirties, there were purple as that and live. He began to a few of us fighting for the better­ cry into' his handkerchief, snorting ment of the army. Among them I in­ like a warhorse, heaving in his chair. clude :Major General J. F. C. Fuller, He glared at me, and stopped crying. :Major General Sir Ernest D. Swinton, He let out a spluttering croak of Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart and, laughter. . of course, myself. I think I had four "Is-is that me 1" he said, stabbing years of peacetime service when I at the page with a finger.

Reprinted from lite Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (Great Britain! AllIn 1973. CoPYIight ~ 1973. U1WRY WNIHGS

"Sorry, Sir," I said innocently, condign punishment to the animals. "What?" They never again killed a major gen­ "Me and the Mess cart," he said. eral's chickens. "Ohl No, Sir," I said. "All char­ A few weeks later, I was bidden to acters are imaginary." dine with the Commanding General, "Funny thing," said the major. Aldershot Command. This time I was "This character used my words. and detennined to be tactful, and under anyhow it was your' bloody fault." examination, when the port was cir­ "Yes, Sir," I said. culating, I told the famous soldier In those far-oll days. there was no that I did not blame him personally safety for a junior subaltern in Alder­ for the inadequacies of the service. He shot. The next day I was ordered to thanked me courteously for my con­ report to the Commanding General, sideration. 2d Division, at his residence at 1800. At that time, Ramsey MacDonald After several gins, he asked me why was Prime Minister with a govem­ I had written the article. It was ment totally incapable of governing. bloody libelous. Hesitantly, I said They certainly would not entertain that I thought we ought to be able to the idea of allotting sufficient money move faster. My beloved and respected for the maintenance of the armed Divisional Com man d e r, who had forces. Some of my readers will re­ fought against the Mahdi in 1885, member that there was a financial de­ was a horse gunner and a forthright pression at that time. In my battalion, man of great courage with an unex­ we did our best to alleviate the situa­ ampled vocabulary. Patiently, he ex­ tion by cutting "angels on horseback" plained to me that speed of movement from the menu on guest nights. I was was provided by the cavalry. Inex­ largely responsible for this brave deci­ perienced in diplomacy. I suggested sion. I had the well-being of the na­ that horses had been found to be vul­ tion at heart. Meanwhile, in Germany, nerable when faced with barbed wire, General Guderian unobtrusively was machineguns and other warlike con­ paying attention to the matter of the traptions, and that we needed tanks; concentration of armor as employed masses of them with lorried infantry. in the Battle of Cambrai. In France A long time elapsed before his beau­ they built fortresses in the wrong tiful wife and daughters could calm place, and a young fellow by the name him. Three days later, my two Alsa­ of De Gaulle was rapidly becoming as tian puppies killed 52 of his precious unpopular as was General Fuller in chickens. The Commanding General the eyes of the military hierarchy. helped me to tie several of them to my My first introduction to mechaniza­ dogs, and together we administered tion was not encouraging, I was or­ dered to take my platoon. which con­ sisted of 11 NCO's and men, to Lower Star Post via Frimley Green, Cam­ The author, a retired major resilUng berley and the Jolly Farmer. We trav­ in Stl8l1ere, WM commisswned in the eled in a canvasoCOvered lorry. When Duke of COf'fIwall'1I Light InfantT7/ I gave the order to disembark. there from SaMhurst in 1986 and served was no response from my gallant with the Iraq Levies before World' troops. They were semiconscious, not War 11. from indulgence in strong liquor as I first suspected, but from carbon mon­ was surrounded by fir trees. As Mecca oxide poisoning. Their faces were is to Moslems, so Lower Star Post was strangely pink. The Royal Army Serv­ to the soldier. ice Corps driver and I puned them out I would not like it to be thought of the lorry, and in a cold, driving that the division to which I had the rainstorm they slowly recovered. We honor to belong was never in a state marched many miles back to Marl­ of preparedness for war. There was borough Lines. i{y faith in mechani­ one momentous year in which a divi­ zation was shaken. sional exercise was held at full war In my four years in the Aldershot strength. To achieve this admirable Command, I saw one tank. Once, while state of affairs, we borrowed horse, acting as liaison officer between the foot, -guns and all ancillary troops 6th and 6th Infantry Brigades, I re­ from the 1st Division. Luckily for me. ported to Brigadier Wavell that I had I had risen to the position of brigade heard tanks approaching, but they transport officer. This was in the days were the 2166 train from Farn­ when we foot-slogged to Salisbury borough to London. as my distin­ Plain via alI the Wallops, Upper, guished vis-A-vis was quick to explain. Nether and Middle. I had done the There were. however. some delightful journey, -on foot, several times on little tracked vehicles made of tin, the previous occasions, but soap my socks forerunners of the Bren gun carriers. though I might, I had suffered. This They were known as CardeR Lloyds time I bestrode a delightful mare by and put the fear of the devil into our kind permission of the Royal Horse draught horses, mules and officer's Artillery. If memory serves me right, chargers. It may be seen that coopera­ she came from the Chestnut Troop. tion with armor wall not looked upon She was of the correct color if such as of paramount importance. was the case. Her rightful owner was I cooperated. with the Royal Air my mounted groom wile entertained Force in a half-hour flight in a Bris­ us in the evenings by putting the little tol fighter. The pilot was of a sportive mare through a series of gentle circus disposition and I enjoyed it. There tricks. was also an airplane calIed an AtlaB. The younger generation of officers This cooperated with the Royal Corps in these days will have a good idea of of Signals on special occasions, by the appearance of an infantry divi­ throwing out little bags enclosing ur­ sion on the move in the late Twenties gent messages. The bags had red if they have studied the photographs streamers attached to them so that of the 1914-18 war. There were $till they could be seen in the topmost the overloaded and underhorsed Gen­ branches of unclimbable trees. If the eral Staff limber wagons. Since the signlliers were required to send a mes­ day of their invention. they had never sage by Atlas, they erected two poles been big enough to carry all that was with a string between them to which required of them, so some person or the message was attached. The Atlas, persons unknown had with perspicac­ at great risk, would then dive and ity decreed that wooden superstruc­ pick up string oand message with a tures be fitted to them, thus the load trailing fishing line. I believe that the could be considerablY augmented. Atlas at the best of times was an un­ When traveling in hilly terrain, it stable machine, and Lower Star Post was frequently found necessary to 57 LITERARY WNINSS double the horse or mule power. This deflected to the clouds by spotless nap­ necessitated unloading until the short ery. Flying beetles 'and moths hung traces could be found among the con­ about us, sometimes to be joined by a tents of the limbers, unhooking a pair hostile Carden Lloyd, the two occu­ of animals from another vehicle, and pants of which would call upon us to then with our shoulders to the wheel surrender, instantly. After some ar­ we pushed the blasted limber up the gument, the various umpires would bloody hill. This type of performance decide that the Carden Lloyd would did not increase the speed of the col­ have been shot up by our outposts, umn, and in no time at all an adjutant and, therefore, it was not present in on a lathered horse would come flying reality. The umpires then returned to over the crest of the hill inquiring their port or Marsala. with acerbity as to the whereabouts Cleanliness and smartness were, of his precious "B" Echelon. quite rightly, the order of the day. To It was precious because it included this end all vehicles, with the excep­ the mess cart. This outlandish vehicle tion of the cookers, were painted in was the pivot of all tactical considera­ high-gloss green paint, their bronze tions, and is worthy of a brief descrip­ hubcaps polished and repolished to en­ tion. It had two wheels, and some of sure that they reflected light from the my readers will remember their youth sun or moon more efficiently than the when the necessity of balancing the mirrors of the heliographs with which governess cart, which was similarly our signalers were equipped. The equipped, was of importance. The traveling cookers advertised their mess cart was drawn by a fat and presence with plumes of viscous black comfortable old horse between the smoke from their tall chimneys and shafts. This small vehicle, with its the dreadful smell of seething stew. Cape cart canvas cover, contained all The art of camouflage was unknown the delicacies and drink which were or forgotten. When approaching the deemed necessary if the officers of a enemy, we took all necessary precau­ battalion were to survive the ardors of tions-two scouts marching down the mock warfare. The mess silver was center of the road followed by a com­ not earried, but there was sufficient pany headed by its commander on an culinary 'equipment, glassware and indescribable infantry charger. A Di­ crockery, white linen tablecloths and visional Commander traveled swiftly napkins, tables and chairs to satisfy in true Peninsular manner, with his the most fastidious. The driver sat, staft' and horse holders clattering be­ head bowed, on the front of the load hind him, his divisional pennon flut­ like a gypsy in a battle bowler. Some­ tering from a lance. times, the shafts were pointed to the "You can't get sore feet on an skies at an angle of 40· from the 'orse. horizontal, and the horse tried to keep HoI You can't get sore feet on contact with the ground by walking an torse." on its toes. At other times, it stag­ Battalion after battalion took up the gered along, knees, hocks and back ironic song as the cavalcade clattered bent by the full weight of the over­ past them. I am probably the only liv­ loaded cart. ing person to have seen the Duke of At night, behind the "frontline," Welllngton pursued by a troop of Hus­ the pressure lamps roared, their light sars. That is the picture I have re­ tamed in my mind when I saw our were identical to those used in the 'Commanding General being chased. Crimea War. The tan barrel-like; coal­ He cleared a post and rails with the burning inventions of Monsieur Soyer greatest of ease, but alas most of his had not changed by a jot or a tittle staff were captured. I scuttled away since 1854. In barracks, the food for to the safety of the mess cart which the troops was usually edible. Once was hidden in a wood. the stew. potatoes and cabbage had Our dress for battle had changed been sloshed onto every man's plate, little from that worn in the 1914-18 the orderly sergeant hit the nearest war. Other ranks still wore the high­ table with a resounding whack of his necked tunic with shining buttons, cane and roared. "Orderly officer." The their trousers swathed in thick pu~ men then sat silently while the orderly tees below the knee. An officer wore officer progressed from table to table his second-best uniform with Sam inquiring as to whether there were Brown belt to which had been added any complaints. The food congealed a second cross-belt. The breeches of quickly. Woe betide the young officer unmounted officers had been replaced who accepted a complaint as being by voluminous plus fours. A junior genuine! lance received complaints officer was a veritable walking Christ­ from the first few tables, and on test­ mas tree on which wes hung an enor­ ing the stew I found that it was made mous .45 revolver, haversack, map from putrid meat. I immediately or­ case, a compass. waterbottle, ammuni­ dered an issue of bully beef, bread and tion pouch, and groundsheet. On cor­ margarine and reported the ma~r to rectly fitted web equipment, this load the messing officer. He was a good! sol­ would not have been exceptional, even dier to whom complaints smacked of with respirators continually in the mutiny. He was explicit in his criti­ alert position, but the narrow leather cism of Sandhurswaised pups who cross-belts of the Sam Brown caused were not yet dry behind the ears. considerable discomfort, and, unless In those far-off days, drill was not one was careful when in a hurry, the looked upon as a means to an end. It roDed groundsheet on an officer's back was an end in itself. and we were would flip upward thereby knocking judged by our appearance in line, col­ the front edge of his steel helmet umn and close column, and our feu de onto the bridge of his nose. While on joie would send our mounted officers the subject of battle bowlers, I re­ scampering for the stables, that is, if member my Commanding Officer's dis­ they were still mounted. It was an solving in a rainstorm. It was. made of great fun, but Churchill's voice was as papiermacM. He was a stickler for one crying in the wilderness. Guderian personal comfort. was working quietly. We were within In camp, our cooking arrangements 10 years of another war.

THE MILITARY REVIEW MAKES AN EXCELLENT GIFT FOR THOSE INTERESTED 11'11 MILITARY AFFAIRS. A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Wing Commander Maharaj K. Chopra, Indian Air Force, Retired

fter the damage of World War ing environment, the individual coun­ A. II, Southeast Asia set on a tries involved and the intraregiona\ course of recovery and reconstruction. relationships. An examination of' the The process has been painful and un­ more significant forces in action is even; yet there has come about a necessary. Note must be taken of the remarkable change for the better. In­ nexus of alliances that came into being deed, an era of transition is over, in the wake of World War II. From and another of consolidation and ad­ all these, perhaps we can discover new vancement appears to be in the ofi:ing. trends for another kind of nexus. This development is a part of the A preliminary observation about the momentous happenings the world over. identity of Southeast Asia is neces­ Thel'e is a spirit of detente in the West sary. and in the East, the United States has By definition, the region comprises revamped its foreign policies, China 11 countries: Burma, Cambodia, Laos, is seated in the United Nations, coun­ North Vietnam, the Republic of Viet­ tries of Europe and Asia are conduct­ nam, Thailand, the Philippines, Malay­ ing dialogues. and one of the longest sia, Singapore, Indonesia and Austra­ wars of history is on its last leg. lia. That it has a personality of its There has come into being a new con­ own is evident. The greater part of figuration of forces which would make its popUlation is highly distinctive, its mark on the Southeast Asian land­ inhabiting an area which straddles the scape. equator, lies within the tropics and is To scan this landscape, we must marked off from that of India or have a bird's-eye view of its envelop­ China. The northern mountain barrier 00 Mllilaly lIeviGw SOUTHEAST ASIA separates it from the continental ropolitan state. Political, economic heartland and has rendered it a demo­ and diplomatic chores would come to graphically low-pressure area. More­ the fore; and the emphaSis would be over, World War II underlined its on security of communication lines, strategic unity which has been rein­ open seas, full opportUnities for trade forced since. and. prevention of the dominance of a Nonetheless, one must not underrate single power. its large dimension and diversity. The The opening of the liaison office in region has a combined population of Peking is an importsnt measure in a little under 300 million which is as this connection as furthering l'ccon­ large as that of Western Europe. In­ ciliation with China. Besides the Stra­ donesia is half the size of India, Laos tegiC Arms Limitations Talks, a num­ is as large as Britain, Burma is larger ber of agreements have been concluded than France, and Australia is a con­ with the USSR embracing science and tinent by itslllf. The region has four technology, use of outer spece, and widely accepted religions interspersed maritime affairs, and the way is open with a medley of beliefs, seven distinc­ for the exchange of American know­ ti've languages jostling with a multi­ how and capital with Soviet raw ma­ tdde of dialects-and distinctive na­ terial and energy. The security treaty tional problems. A certsin strategic with "Japan has been renewed, and a division of the zone is also noticeable. ,number of agreements have been con­ Indeed, Southeast Asia possesses a cluded which presage continuance of striking personality with a baffling set friendly ties. of multiple facets. These are the contours of America's fresh look, and Southeast Asia would ~~aI9r I'ower latGrostll bear their impress. The United States In . addition to its great size and would regard the region as falling diversity, Southeast Asia is unusually within its strategic interests, but the exposed and is sited at an interna­ accent would be on economic and po­ tional juncture where routes take oft' litical aspects and promotion of sta­ to all the continents. Hence, the stra­ bility and advancement. It would seek tegic environment of Southeast Asia to prevent aggression and, posaibly, involves many peoples and the inter­ hold out a kind of widely covering play of numerous intereats. The more umbrella, but would cut down its mili­ significant of the "interests would no tary presence drastically and expect doubt include the United States, the each eountry to be self-reliant. USSR, China, Japan and India. What The Soviet Union. Apart from up­ are their new postures, individually, holding ita status as a superpower, as well as in relation to one another, it would be closely concerned with the and with what effect? security of its Far East. The run­ The United State8. As a superpower, down of American military presence I its frontiers of nationaisecurity would would-be a plus factor in this connec­ continue to be "far.flung and extend tion, but is not likely to let Moscow to the Pacific-Asian region. But, in relax, thanks to hostility with Peking. consequence of a low profile posture In any flareup, the Far East is bound and the running down of the forward to be vulnerable which is an impor­ bases; military power would" be pre. tant reasOn why.the USSR "is mak· dominantly deployed closer to the met- ing up with Japan. The USSR-Japan DeCember 1913 &1 SOUTHEAST ASIA

Economic Cooperation Commission, a region passes 90 percent of its oil. standing body, has cleared the ground Japan is interested in the stsbility of considerably for forging links which the region and enhancement of ca­ might lead to large-acale joint efforts pacity for mutual exchanges. in exploiting Siberia. China. Not yet a superpower, China! Southeast Asia would be an impor­ is well on the way to becoming one; . tant linkage between the Soviet Fleets the present detente would be a help. in the Far East and the Indian Ocean. It would also enable China to project Moscow has been Ilnhancing its pres­ its presence into the West Pacific ence in the latter, but, after its disas-! from which it has been barred for a trous experience in Indonesia, whethe~, quarter of a century. Thanks to rap­ it would seek permanent focal points port with the United States and Japan, is doubtful. Short of this, it is likelyl from this direction at least it might to extend its influence in the region not be unduly plagued by the old bug­ by trade, economic aid and infrastruc­ bear of containment. This, however, tural : facilities as in Singapore. Both would not be the case with respect to China and Japan would be its rivals. its border with Russia and possibly Japan. The political and strategic with Indochins. In many respects. environments of Japan have under­ compared to the past, Chins's power gone a metamorphosis. It has stepped relationships in this part of the world into an era of good neighborly rela­ are likely to become more complex. tions with the states of mainland Because of the turnabout in foreign Asia. Its gigantic economic achieve­ policy in a changed climate, Southeast ments provide an impetuB for a new Asia would now appear difi.'erent political image featured by self-reli­ through the Peking glasses. No longer ance and national independence. Se­ would it be deemed ss a hotbed of curity interests demand aeceleration thrusts, real or imaginary. Here, Pe­ of defense reconstruction which in king would be concerned with govern­ fact is taking place under the five­ ments rather than rebels, hard reali­ yearl defense plans. To go or not to ties rather than ideological myths. It go nuclear has become a matter of would look for secure sea lanes, op­ serious na~ional debate. portunities for trade and political Japan's foreign relations would stability in place of the old goals of henceforth take China and the Soviet tension and conflict. But rivalries are Union into their stride in addition likely to grow rather than diminish 'to the United States, both from se­ and, vis-A-vis Russia, might be ac­ curity and trade angles. And, in the centuated in Indochina and its en­ midst of bonhomie, rivalries among virons. them could not be ruled out. Japan India.. With the breakup of Pakistan, is on the threshold of becoming a India emerges as South Asia's fore­ regional power although, territorially, most power and now visualizes a it would be a pigmy among giants. larger sphere of security for itself. Southeast Asia is important for This would be of a regional dimension Japan for communications and trade at present in an environment where, outlets. Of its one dozen largest sup­ in sharp contrast to the West Pacific, pliers of raw material, four-Malay­ the power confrontati()ns are mini­ sia, Indonesia, the Philippinea and mum. Its proximity to many South­ Australia-lie here, and through the east Asian Istates from the forward

U MII_II~ SOlJlIIWT ASIA

Andaman base, now being reinf~rced, its coal, 90 percent of its iron, besides and its position on the western flank a great variety of exports, and has and also along the communication lines made heavy investment in its industry. of the region, provide' it a peculiar With the inauguration 'of a new geographical advantage. India would government in December 1972 and like the zone to be stable, free from under the impact of external events conflict and fit for substantial eco­ such as the enlargement of European nomic exchanges. Economic Community, Australia is likely to become more "white Asian." Local Conditimns Its gigantic si~ and rapid growth Shifting sights to the region's in­ have already made it a regional power ternal scenario, one is struck by situa­ in its own right which, with its gross tions of contrast between one part national product already greater than and the other; in fact, Southeast all the Southeast Asian neighbors com­ Asia would be aptly reviewed in three bined, can be enormously effective. The distinctive sectors. tendency is to funnel, this power into At the southern end is Australia. economic and political channels, and It has developed a marked orientation this envisages Southeast Asia as a toward Asia, and particularly South­ zOne of peace. east Asia. Typical of this is its in­ 1'J the nortbern tier is Ind.ochina, creasingly close relationship with In­ an appalling mess. The Paris agree­ donesia, highlighted' by standing ma­ ment signed January 1978 has marked chinery to promote joint enterprises. the opening of a new chapter: But EVIlD more typical is the linkage with hostilities perSist, and, indeed, one Japan which absorbs 95 percent of may visualize that stability may elude IImlllllar 1973 lIS SOUTHEAST ASIA this area for a considerable time and external favorable factors. Like the disengagement of major powerS may rest of the states, they look forward be a prolonged, complex operation. to peace and security in the region. Inevitably, reconstruction necessitated by large-scale wreckage would con­ Adverse Faclors sume an enormous amount of patience The above scenario, rosy f01· the and resources. Indochina poses a ques­ greater part of Southeast ASia, is tion mark and casts a shadow of un­ marred by black patches. certainty over the entire zone. In regard to Indochina, all agree­ In between are the remaining six ments signed for the cessation of states of Southeast Asia. Indonesia, hostilities clearly indicate the creation the largest, has been under a realisti­ of multiple authoJ."ities in the states, cally minded government, headed by between whom perfect reconciliation General Suharto, rooting out the sub­ in the near future is not likely. Nor versive elements, engendering condi­ is the traditional hostility among the tions of stability, inviting foreign Laotians, the Vietnamese and the capital and harnessing efl'orts to the Cambodians likely to evaporate. This exploitation of its rich resources. oil sector is thus destined to be a theater in particular. It wants zonal peace of cold war, with chances of sporadic and bas made concrete efforts to pro­ conflagration. mote regional cooperation. Singapore There are cl·acks also in the struc­ is the best example of a booming tures of the mid-Southeast Asian economy as testified by the Asian De­ states. One notices that the govern­ velopment Bank. Malaysia is well be­ ments of four out of the six states­ hind. Burma continues to be the most Burma, Thailand, the Philippines and inward looking of the Southeast Asian Indonesia_fe the outcome of coups states, but has done well in deflating which have enabled an individual, a conditions of civil war, keeping tribal junta Of a party to seize power. Even rebellions under leash and inaugurat­ if necessitated by cil·cumstences, the ing social harmony. While not par­ authoritarian regimes would. iii the ticularly rosy, the economy shows long run. have to deliver the goods signs of resilience to sustain stability to secure a popular base. Whether and could be in the upswing with a this is fOl-thcoming would have to be more liberal stance toward foreign watched. aid. . Insurgency. the bane of Southeast Unlike Burma, which has remained Asia. has not been liquidated •. In totally aloof from the Indochina wars, Burma, it is rampant among the pow. Thailand and the Philippines have erful frontiersmen and the racial mi­ been participants, howsoever indirect. norities. In Thailand. the Meo tribals, What happens to Indochina and the Muslim recalcitrants. and Communist support which it bas been receiving bands continue to be defiant. Subver­ from the Communist powers would, sion is a feature of Malaysia's Sa. therefore, cause them continuing con­ rawak Province, while the Mindanao cern. But their stability, despite p0­ region of the Philippines has been in litical upheavals. could be assumed, revolt to the point of autonomy. Com­ their economy is sound, and both are plete territorial integrity is still a reinforcing indigenous production to dream of the island-studded state of offset the diminishing returns from Indonesia. li4 Throughout the region, racial an­ SEATO was established to contain tagonisms continue,to form a powder communism,' keep anreSslon at hay keltapt to explode now and then, as has and assist members in the task of re­ happened in the case of the Muslims construction. While it has done com­ in the Philippines and the Malays and mendable work, it has also been &lib­ the Chinese in Malaysia. There are ject'·to the changes around. France 20 million ,Chinese who inhabit the became indifferent early, Britain be­ zone, forming resourceful minorities gan losing interest on retirement from in most of the states and targets of east of Suez. and Pakistan pulled out recurrent attack on the score of sus­ completely. After detente, Australia, pected loyalty or excessi17e share of New Zealand and the Philippines want economic power. And, finaUy, no coun­ to look at the arrangement for what try is completely self-reliant and can it haa become, a "ghost alliance." dispense with foreign aid. Economies SEATO Secretary-Genersl Sunthorn of some of them--8ingapore for in. Hongladarom has in fact suggested' a stance--are tied up with uternal new role for the organization; to act situations and are liable to collapse as a deterrent against subversion and if the situations are ad17erse. It is insurgency. to serve as a clearing doubtful if most of them would ever house for intelligence information for be able, to look after their security the benefit of member countries. and entirely on their own. to play an effective role in assisting in In a speech made early this year, economic development. the Foreign Minister of Singapore Unlike SEATO. the Geneva accords. summed up the position thus;, which concerned only the Indochina In post-Vietnam SoutkOOllt Asia, states. never got off the ground. Their tkreats to our security and integrity premises of establishing proper gov­ are unlikely to come through opm ago ernments, regional peace and instru· gression and occupation. IftBtead, sub· ments of reconstruction remained only version from witkin, ezploitation and on paper. Barring one of their mecha· manipulatiOft of indigenous eOftili-ets nisms-the Control and Supervisory and frustratiOftB will become tke weap. COmmission at Laos-all arrange­ 0ftB for cOfttrol by ezternal pOW8f'8. ments made under them are dis· mantled. and they will not play any A1l1anclill , further role; Thanks to internal and external The Five-Power Defense Pact be· factors, governments have all along tween Britain. Australia, New Zea· been at pains to devise means for land. Malaysia and Singapore made makinlt order prevail in this most a good start and brought reasonable sensitive part of Asia. These have assurance' of secUrity in the region borne the impress of circumstances after the British withdrawal. This, as is clear from the variety of ar­ too. is now being buffeted by the winds rangements that eame into being in of change. Australia, New Zealand. the postwar period. One may specifi. and the United Kingdom· forcj!8 are callai mention the Southeast Asia being thinned out, while Malaysia is Treaty' Organization (SEATO). the on record declaring that the pact ·i8 Geneva aceords and the Five-Power an anachronism. Defense Pact which are typical. How There have been other arrangementa do they stand now? too-between North Vietnam and Il~GttIl7! GS SOUTHEAST ASIA

China, Russia and North Vietnam, One emerges from the Paris accords The United States and Australia and on Indochina. Their short-term objec­ New Zealand, and Thailand and the tive was to end hostilities, establish United States. They are all allected Joint Military Commissions and the to varying degrees. International Commission of Control It is not difficult to see why these and Supervision (ICCS), facilitate alliances have begun to exude a musty release of prisoners of war, ensure air. The erstwhile enemies are becom­ withdrawal of foreign troops and pre­ ing friends. Once'the prime objective pare the ground for a peace settle­ was to stem aggression, but now it ment. is to develop areas of peace. The al­ But they also have a long-range liances had the use of force in the objective. The ICCS would stay on forefront; restraint is the keynote of until elections in Vietnam are through present relationships. In the eyes of and a new government is in the saddle the "malIer nations, part of the credi­ to decide the future. The International bility and utility of the old ties is Conference of 12 states and the UN lost. But the desire for "togetherness" Secretary General is a live body, likely is, interestingly, more pronounced to continue "to contribute to and than in the past. guarantee peace in Indochina." Mean­ while, steps will be taken to heal the $Iamb I'or Altomatlvos wounds of war and undertake post­ & the old chores lose ground, South­ war reconstruction. east Asia gropes for new ones. For The Paris accords have pitfalls­ instance, Japan would like to have the mechanism is weak. animosities a large regionsl organization, pri­ are deep-rooted and the contending marily on an economic basis, into postures are unpredictable. But the which it could funnel its assistance hopeful features are the participation more scientifically and liberally, but of all the msjor powers, peripheral the suggestion has made little head­ involvement of the United Nations way. A widely representative associa.­ and an international guarantee of re­ tion for Asia and the Pacific has been straint. proposed ,by the Australian Prime The second is contained in the joint Minister, but "we don't expect it to body formed by Indonesia, Malaysia, be brought to fruition overnight." The the Philippines, Singapore and Thai­ USSR has been mooting the idea of land, called the Association of South­ an "Asian. Collective Security System." east Asian Nations (ASEAN). Es­ But, when this system is linked with tablished in 1967, its objective is "inviolable frontiers," to which Japan twofold: one is to end mutual confron­ objects with an eye to its northern tation sparked oil during President islands under Soviet occupation, or Sukarno's regime-in this, ASEAN with "the social liberation of Asian has succeeded; the second is to pro­ countries and the liberation of.their mote regional cooperation. economies from the overlordship of In this connection, there has been foreign monopolies," its motivations some cooperative ellort il[ the sphere become controversial. ' of railways, aviation and telecom­ Apart from these rather nebulous munication, but not much bas been proposals, two conc'ite propositions achieved. ASEAN has no headquar­ stand out which might be explored. ters, hence little continuity and coor- G6 1\filitGlYllev/1lW dination. Four of its members are major powers. Who are the powers linked with alliances which, in the and how they participate would pose prevailing'cllmate, is not a help. And difilcUlties, but the International Con­ mutual rivalries have sometimes been ference as provided for in the Paris acute 'enough to cause estrangement agreament could be a model. The body ..,.-having broken off into separate came into being without·any of Its states, Singapore and Malaysia have members abandoning their well.known also split their common airline and orientations or aftIliations. While not ended interchangeability of currency. constituting itself as a super wa,teh­ ASEAN has not taken off the dog, it, nevertheless, did establish its ground, and yet it is the only body ~esence which can be activated by which has seriously mooted a sug. a Simple procedure prescribed in the gestion of far-reaching import, the agreement. Its promise to "contribute ''neutralization'' of Southeast Asia. to and guarantee peace" in Indochina This implies the establishment of a has a moral backing of positive value, "zone of pesce, freedom and neutral­ even if it does not have a formal sanc­ ity," Pesce is defined as a condition tion. under which harmonious relations ex­ A conference of this type for South­ ist among the states and between the , "east Asia could be considered. It would states and outside powers, Freedom be a forum for the sizing up of in­ would be the condition in which the terests, development of a common states could conduct their national and language and formulation of consen­ international policies without foreign sus. One of its most important func­ interference. And neutrality would tions would be to enjoin restraint on mean the maintenance of impartiality the score of military involvement, par­ in regard to external conflicts. An ticularly supply of arms. This would ASEA:N committee is going into the be a difficult, deft balancing feat, but propossl although, it must be ad­ not impossible. Another would be a mitted, it would have an uphill task broad declaration on its part for up. of reconciling the ideal with realities holding an environment of security in of life. the region. This would engender con­ fidence and allay apprehensions which 'l'ewllfll !l ~1lW lI'loillilo undoubtedly prevail at present. It To look for anew·mossic of South­ could also facilitate 'concerted drive east Asia is like trying to scan beyond toward the tasks of progress. the edges of a horizon, but"fortunately Rapid development in political, ec0­ perhaps, One does not lose the object nomic and social fields would indeed of exploration. The aim is to establish be the immediate /loal. A strenuous conditions of peace, harmonize ex­ national effort by each country would teraa,l and internal environments, and be a prerequisite in this connection. promote stability and,advancement of The pooling of,re.ilources on a regional the states in aecordance with their basis would also be ,usef\ll, and there legitimate national' "aspirations. could, be. an enlarged' ASEA:N or All· propossls made 0," institutions more.' than one ABEAN. But, as'ex­ eatablished so far''point to the con­ perience shows, .national and regional clusion' that any serious effort in this endesvors could be· not enough; be­ direction would require participation sides, groupings of this sort need a' by a number of states, particularly the certain amount of maturity. It is here Ilscelilller 1873 ft1 SOUTHEAST ASIA that the more developed, resourceful There are no completely happy blue­ countries come into the picture. prints yet for Southeast Asia, but In view of the ditrering conditions there have come into being the right from sector to sector, flexibility in climate and proper attitudes. In the mutual exchanges would be desirable long run, these may be more effective. which, therefore, would have to be on bilateral as well as multilateral bases. Over the years, a good deal of the ground has been prepared in this re­ spect, and a number of channels have been established; even the old military alliances have developmental content which might prove handy. But this is the time to take up seriously Article 52 of the UN Charter which envisages rapid development of the regions of East Asia and the Pa­ cific. The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East has been there for a considerable time, and, mean. Win g Commander Mahara; K. while, the Asian Development Bank ChO'pra, Indian Ail' Force, Retired, is has come into being. One might also a military correspondent for the Eng­ have an Aid-Southeast Asia Consor­ lish-language Indian newspaper, The Indian ExPress, and, holds an M.A. tium of Nations, like the Aid-India from the Indian Univerllitll. A fre­ Consortium, for specific purposes. Per­ quent contributor to the MILITARY haps some method could be devised to REVIEW, he is the author of "India's coordinate their work, maybe under Strategic Environment" which ap­ the United Nations. peared in the June 1973 issue. LEADERSHIP

s a squad leadet"and'platoon sergeant illWorld War Ii,William .\. Craig A learned about leadership eady. By the time be was promoted to sergeant major in 1959, he bed learned a lot more. On 30 June 1973, Command Sergeant ~or Craig ended his 34-year Army career retiring as CSM of the Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. . In a final after.:action report to his conunander, Major General D. P. McAuliffe, CSM Craig set down some of his vie.ws on the growing role of the noncommissioned officer in today's Army.

"..•.The Noncommissioned Officer can nei longer be solely specialized; be must be able to perform a variety of duties an4 he must be mission-oriented. :. " ••••The NCO's personal attitudes are extremely important. A primary goal of leadership is to orient elUlh soldier's thinking to the point where he truly feels, 'I beve an opportunity ..• .' and 'I have the responsibility and duty ••• .' to contn"bute to my unit's mission. The squad leader, section leader and platoon sergeant must recognize individual performance with personal touches such as a sincere and cheerful word of commendation or appreciation personally expressed or a hel1dshake or pat on the back for a job weUdone.

".•..He must strive to instill the esprit that encourages the volunteers not o!!1y to perform their duties but to perform them in a manner above and beyond that expected. These soldiers must be assured that their intelligent and appropriate, suggestions, comments and efforts wiD be accepted, recogniZed and implemented. The Computer can offer no substitute, nor is one desired.

" ••••The man who accepts the demanding and insistent position in an organization as its 'prime mover' must be reasonably courageous. posseSs insight, intelligence and good horse sense. Above all, he must be'genuinely interested in his men, be flexible and must accept the rigorous responsibility ofleadership as a personal and moral obliption. .

"••• .As the 'prime mover.. the individual often must let the success oftile organization transcend his personal ambitions,teJationships and interests. He holds.key position that demandshis coll$tant attention andconcem. He mUst be rum but sympathetic and be able to keep his' wits'about biIil in timeS of stress or crisis. A truly professional NCO must be secure enough in his poSUion that he can confidently delegate ~t respolliibility· to his subordinates who probably can perform the assigned duty better than he can. from

New Warrant Officers for the Soviet Armed Forces

John Erickson

T THE end of January 1973, is important and Soviet comment a meeting of some significance leaves no doubt over that matter, convenedA in Moscow. This was nothing hence all the publicity and the'staging less than a full-dress review of the in January of the "All-Army Assembly worltings of the new institution and of Warrant Officers" which met in rank structure for warrant officers the presence of the Defense Minister in the Soviet armed forces-namely, and where each section was presided the praporakchik (a revival of the over by the particular Commander in old Imperial Army title of "ensign") chief of the arm involved (Pavlovsltii and mickman (a corresponding rank for the ground forces and so on).!! for the Soviet NavY).l For reasons In the senee of concentrating at­ of general convenience, I have used tention and focusing publicity, this the term "warrant officer" to cover this assembly of warrant officers bears category, which is clearly intended to comparison with that other unique be distinguished from the sergeant gathering of Soviet military person­ or the chief petty officer and the com­ nel, 'the conference of junior officers . missioned officer as such-indeed, this held in the autumn of 1969. Nor is is the whole object of the recent S0­ this connection wholly coincidental: viet enactment which brought the new having thereby started on stabilizing structure into being. The innovation the junior levels of the officer Corps,

Digested from the Journal of tile Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (Great iJritaln) June 1973. Copyright @ 1973.

711 WARRANT :OFfICEIIS the next imperative move could only able to enforce discipline and unlikely be some reorganization ~f the corps to impart any appreciable tactical of NCOs, for both these trends-at­ skill. tending to the turbulence among the Subunit leadership fell with a junior officers and improving the lot thump on the junior officer who could of the NCO-are vitally connected. complain (and did complain) with The innovation of the 'Pf'apO'I'shckik/ much jU9tiftcation that he was, in mickman thus marks the culmination many instances, little better than a of an important phase in restructur. sergeant doing what amounted to a ing an entire segment of Soviet mili· sergeant's job. At the same time, this tary manpower. unsatisfactory state of affairs mili­ The intensification of trouble at this tated al!'lilitst retaining personnel on level can be traced directly to the in· a career basis. True, the enlistment troduction of the revised Law On Mil­ DlaYKet in the Soviet Union does as itary Service, formally enacted in Oc· elsewhere oifer more in the way of tober 1967 and promulgated as from available skills, but the retention of January 1968, though this is not to men even as first-term regulars was say that difficulties had been lacking made moredimcult by the lack of any before. Nevertheless, the reduction in real career prospects, to say nothing the period ofcompulsory military serv· of attracting them in the first pIece. ice (from three to two years, with The·regular Soviet NCO was a poor the exception of the Soviet Navy) cut devil of a fellow in many respects, training time but threw a correspond­ being neither well paid, lacking status ingly heavier burden on the training and any real prospect of a career, how­ machine-staff and equipment alike­ ever that term is understood. There and affected the performance of sub­ was little if any inducement for the units where the junior officer and the skilled tradesman or technician to sign NCO had a crucial part to play. 8 on and the existing system of re.en­ There were immediate difficulties with listment--Bverkhsrocknaya siuzklJa­ the conscript NCO, who would epend could in no sense be called a career 10 months or so on his NCO course structure, save perhaps for the "old at a regimental. school and then have sweat" who served out his time. Thus, only littie more than a year left with whereas in the French Army the aver­ his unit. In any event, he was some. age age of the NCO hovers about the what younger than his predecessors 27-year-old mark and in the British (the 1967 Law having lowered the Army it rests in the region of the callup age) and this lack of maturity :J4..year-old, in the Soviet armed forees and experience could well mean that this disparate body of men could mean he simply became one of the lads, un­ anything from the 19 to 20-year-old conscript sergeant to veteran soldiers, grizzled perhaps but lacking any real education, or nnfitted for a role as P'I'ofeJlllO'l' E'l'ic~on is with the De­ instructors: the technician elements partment of Politics, Edinburgh Uni­ could find no reel place, or "only a versity, 8cotlend. His article "Soviet haphazard one at that, ,all at a time Oommand and Oont'l'oi" appea'l'ed in when the Soviet· armed forces need tAil J/UI,'IMI/I'fI 1.976 is!JUfl of the MILl­ urgantly to conserve and even to ex­ TAllY lUMEw. pand this pool of skills. 11__&1'11173 11 WARRANT OFFICERS

The new proviaions for warrant of­ period of service but who possess ficers were formally approved by the either higher or secondary school edu­ Supreme Soviet on 18 November 1971, cation, or a corresponding trade or and the new rank structure-inatitut technical qualification. Thill bridges praporshchikO'lJ i michmanO'lJ-became the gap between the old system and effective as of January 1972. 4 From the new. On reaching the age of 45. that month, the new warrant officers the warrant officer will normally be could put up their shoulder boards, transferred to the reserve, though the pogon. which signified their neW there is provision for extending his status and their general affinity with service for another five years. Again. the officer corps. Indeed, their role is this corresponds to the standard age depicted specifically as being that of level (45 years) for other ranks to be the officer's right-hand man. The ordi­ transferred to" the reserve (second nance covering the new rank structure category) and an upper age limit of for these men is a complicated docu­ 50 for final retirement (third category ment, but then it covers a complicated of the reserve). 3 situation. Enlistment is for fivl! years For those warrant officers who have initially. with further enlistment for served for 10 years or more continu- -_F three or five years Bubject to the ap­ oU81y in this rank (as praporllhchik or proval of regiments!, brigade or divi­ michman). transfer to the reserve will. sional commanders (or their naval with proper attestation. be aecom­ equivalents). Enlistment is open to panied by the award of -the rank of ') soldiers, sailors, sergeants and sta,... reserve lieutenant. Warrant· omeara shiny who may be completing their who aspire to become commissioned 72 officers are at liberty to pursue this reserve forces with men who still have course, provided they have served not a useful sllan of. service left, to ,them. less than fWe '/Iears as pt'a/porshchik/ Of course,' one of the /jurest tests of michman, posseas higher or secondary how well, the system is Working will school educational qualifications and be whether or not it succeeds in re­ can pass the extramural examina­ taining those men fqi whom the initial tions of the lower category of officers' training investment is the highest­ school, the VUZ1l (as opposed to the for eXample, in ~ Soviet Navy, or "higher military schools" with their the specialist technicians of the Air 4 to 5-year course of study). On pass­ Defense Forces or in'the armored ing these examinations, the warrsnt forces. Equally" it is impossible not officer will duly become an ofiIcer with to see a certain rank infiation in this the rank of lieutenant. There is, ad~ process of building up the warrant of­ ditionally, another avenue of advance­ ficer echelon and advancing him into ment to officer status. For those with the officer corps proper. The very the requisite minimum educational brief period-little more then a year qualifications and with not less than -during which the new institut bas 10 years' service as a warrant ofiIcer been operating makes assessment dif· behind them, the promotion boards can ficult, but it is worth looking a little recommend appointment "M ofits6'l'­ more closely at some Soviet comments skie dob:hnoBti"-to the junior ranks to discern what is happening on tJle of the officer corps. Such appointments ground. will be confirmed by those command authorities Who are normally invested CmllllllllodatlGll I!lId Criticism, with the right to post or place officers SlIme Recent Obs61Y1ltlllns as such. More of the decree is taken The pyaporskchik (or michmttn) has up with regulations covering trans­ been clearly identified as the most im­ fers, leave, premature release (due to mediate assistant to the officer, and his ill health or changes in establishment) appointed place is "I) b06vom stf'OYu" and the privilege of wearing uniform -in the combat ranks. He is also in­ in recognition for long service. 6 tended to carry on the work of political Even at first glance the scheme is a education as well as combat training, major improvement on what had ex­ all the while shOWing a good lloldierly isted previously. The elements of a eXample. In addition, he has an im­ career structure in place of, re-enlist­ portant place in maintaining military ment are plain to see and the' induce­ life and a vital part in contributing ments to sign on beyond the. first to technical efficiency, In the pastlYear, regular engagement are considerable, the new warrant officers resplendent not the least being the,JlfosPect of in their shoulder boards have taken attaining full commissioned rank with over as section commanders in grolllld all its separate attendant privileges. forllcs units and are engaged in train­ The Soviet command stands to save ing junior sergeants. as well as rank­ money (re-enlistment in this struc­ and-file soldiers. It is clear that ~a.­ tured fashion is much cheaper than porshchiki are involved in party and recruitment and initial training), K071I8omol activities. as, for example, stabilize the somewhat shaky struc­ secretary of. a ,battalion Komaomol l' ture·atNCO.junior officer level, con· organization or secretary of the party r serve it!! poOl, of skill 'and increase its entity within' a section. On the tech- ~ Dacmbet 1973 13 WARIIAMT OFFICERS nical side, the praprw8kckik. becomes prw8kchik involved-namely, whether deputy company commander for tech­ he was a veteran ("pr:aprw8kckik­ nical affairs. veteran"), a relatively recently joined It comes as no surprise to learn soldier or sergeant and, finally, a prod­ that the praprw8kchiki in the Strategic uct of the equally new schools for Missile Forces, the Air Defense Com­ warrant officers. mand (PVO Strany) and the Soviet One such school for praprwahckiki Air Force include a large proportion was run by Lieutenant Colonel V. of qualified technicians and skilled Fialkov and was staffed with experi­ tradesmen. Among the Soviet Air enced officers. The praprw8kckiki are Force praprwBkckiki present at the taught pedagogics, psychology and January meeting, every fourth man methods of instruction, as well as was involved in flying duties as, wire­ improving their military knowledge less-operator/air gunners or ffight and specialist training. But, in the engineers or technicians. One pro­ , units, things seemed to vary consider­ prw8kckik connected with the Air De­ 'ably. In some, special two-day semi­ fense Command had already served nars held each month were designed as a sta,skina (first sergeant, or staff to improve the warrant officer's knowl­ sergeant) with a radar unit for 15 edge of instructional methods. In years, and he pointed out that all the others, officers stood by during in­ praporskckiki in his unit were well­ structional periods. In others, com­ qualified tradesmen or technicians and mand, personnel and political officers 70 percent of them singled out for an seemed to be at something of a loss excellence rating in military and po­ to know how to fit their new-found litical training. 7 Among present war­ praprw8kchiki into the general scheme. rant officers, more than 50 percent Most of the officers, however, agreed have secondary or higher educational that the main problem was improving qualifications, and 60 percent belong the theoretical grasp and background either to the party or to the Komso­ of the prapor8kchiki. A case in point mol.· On the other hand, this does was one "mechanic-instructor" prfllo leave rather a large proportion with a prw8kchik, a wizard with any me­ lowly or even insignificant level of ed­ chanical trouble and with 10 years ucation, and here one difficulty imme­ of tank driving behind him, but un­ diately presents itself-the selection able to cope with the theoretical as­ and training of piaprw8kckiki. This, pects of questions put to him by men among other things, no doubt accounts training to be sergeants who had a for the rather cautious and restrained higher education of some kind. 9 tone of reports from military units A similar note is struck in Lieu­ and military districts on the workings tenant Colonel O. GrigoI:'ev's account of the new scheme. from the Far Eastern Military Dis­ Writing from the Baltic Military trict, though he castigated the officers District, Lieutenant Colonel Bryuk­ who have not bothered to exploit the hanov and Major Shevchenko pointed possibilities of these new junior com­ to BOme of the complications arising manders. Many do not know the pro­ from the induction of praprw8kckiki. prw8hckiki, save as names on Bome In particular, they suggested that as­ nominal roll and take no interest in signments for these men should be these men or their lives. Obviously, graded in the light of the type of prfllo and Dot unexpectedly, it is taking some 74 Military lIevlew time for the prapo'1'shckik to work his elsewhere, the emphasis is on im­ way into the System, a process which proving both the competence of the must be retarded by the residue of prap0f'8hckik in perty political matters "old soldiers" who will have to be and his trade or technical qualifica­ brought up to some reasonable educa­ tions. In the Urals, for example, all tional level. prapOf'shckiki who were driver-me­ A somewhat more abstract assess­ chanics third grade were pushed ment is offered by Lieutenant General through special courses to bring them I. Repin, First Deputy Chief of the to second grade for this trade. 10 Grqund Forces Political Administra­ There are, however, problems with tion. The prapO'1'8hckik or mwkman is the special schools for warrant officers again described as the officer's right­ which also tum on the question of hand man in combat !md political selection. Obviously the policy of training, responsible for good military "catch 'em young" is both appealing order and for speeding up the young and in its own way sensible, though soldier's entry to operational units. this leads to some neglect of existing General Repin singles out the Group old soldiers and a reluctance to train of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) men soon to be transferred to the re­ as an 'example of where good work is serve. Command stails and party or­ being done with the new junior eam­ ganizations have not paid enough at­ manden-and it is true that the prlJJ. tention to the question of selection, ponhcltiki have fairly sprouted. within and the military commissariats have the Soviet forces in Gemllmy; No also been gUilty of inefficient seleCtion. doubt this is due to YakUshin, Chief AU this has shown up in tliefirst of Stail/GSFG, who seems·well aware graduation from the warrant officer of the .importance' and the potential schools. Long-serving soldiem were of the new arrangement. Here. as sent on such courses when theYeOuld lImIIIbIwtll7J is WAIII'WiT OffiCERS have been given the rank without ist training with the emphasis on further ado. while men were selected theory and practice. In addition, the as pr4pot'8hckik-political w 0 r k e r s party organization in the school and when they were manifestly unBuited distributed throughout the subunits for this demanding role. General seems to keep a tight control over al­ Repin. nevertheless. is confident that most all aspects of instruction. The these gross blunders will be eliminated instructional stsff is young and set by the time the second graduation­ at the senior lieutenant-captain level. later in 1973-takes place. 11 The object is to give the student a UnderstandablY, General Repin is good grounding in tactical training. concerned about his own side of the his own specialization and, at the same house-party political work in the time, to widen his ideological/intel­ armed forces. Great care must be lectual-theoretical horizon. the idea taken in selecting praporshcki1ci for being no dOUbt to turn out men capa­ the politsoBw,'O, those who will be con­ ble of undertaking effective work as cerned with party political work. The instructors. 18 Even so, this hardly type of post they will take up includes seems to solve the present problem. acting as instructor with political or­ that the men with experience lack the gans engaged on Komsomol work. sec­ educational background to instruct retaryships of Komsomol organiza­ effectively while those with the educa­ tions and chiefs of clubs, thus bring­ tion lack the experience. Some con­ ing them into close contact with maDf siderable time must elapse before this of the young soldiers. Quite a number imbalance is corrected. of these praporshckiki are young fef­ lows themselves-the average age of II i'relllllln21ll CDDClllllloo the students in one of the warrant of­ With this scheme so recently stsrted. ficers school was around 22-and thus it would be folly to attempt more they lack both experience and quite a than a tentative judgment. Neverthe­ bit of military know-how. For this less, it is clear that this is a major reason, both the command staff and program designed to implant a career the political organs must see to it structure at a level where none had that they are properly kitted out and previously existed and within an eche­ housed, as well as arranging frequent lon where the pool of skills must be consultation to see that the prapor­ first conserved and then expanded. It shckiki know how to plan their work­ will also give the Soviet armed forces ing day to maximum effect. 12 a certain continuity of manpower of Lieutenant General (Tank Troops) this type and, at the same time, ensure B. Likbachev. First Deputy Com­ a flow of men to the reserve with suit­ mander of the Baltic Military Dis­ able skills and experience who have trict. makes more or less the same not expended all their utility. There . point in discussing the organization is, as has been seen, the inducement of Iwarrant officers school in his dis­ to go for fully commissioned rank, triclr-the need to inculcate Bound though it could be that the whole working principles and habits. The scheme. might work in the direction school possesses a good training base, of rank-inllation with many chiefs and the students carry out tactical and few lxidians. Already it looks as exercises with a Guards motor-ritle if the olderlijld soldiers afe not getting regiment, together with more special­ their full share of the scheme, but 711 fIInltary 1l1vi$'" the preference for the younger man skckik/mickman has been identified is readily comprehensible. There is as a junior commander, which puts certainly ammunition here for those him on his own as opposed to being who argue against any scheme on the a junior officer or a seJlior NCO. He is lines of direct entry to sergeant-that somewhere in between and intended is, bypassing the normal promotional to be definitely a singular type. line for NCOs, but training costs and It is certainly conceivable that the educational requirement alone argue proporskchik/mickman will contribute in its favor. The Soviet solution is to improving the throughput ot men; a compromise, though even· at this thus maximizing their shortenednserv­ very early stage it seems to be mov­ ice with units, but even this may not ing toward a mode of direct entry, stave oti' an inevitable alteration to leaving behind it a kind of Lumpen­ the system as a whole-namely, the proletariat of lowlier NCOs. elimination of the· b~nnual canup, In practical terms, the new scheme with Us subsequent timetable of ro­ is designed not only to facilitate the tations and shifts. 15 In either event, throughput of trained men by stiti'en­ whether the system remains intact or ing the instructional/training side, is altered, the Soviet command cannot but is also configured to improve sub­ ati'ord to let this new scheme fail. It unit performance and leadership-in is a "once and for all step," quite short, to enhance that combat readi­ properly hailed as a major ,reform ness which is at the heart of present­ with interesting innovations, but, hav­ day Soviet military practices. 1. Here ing ripped up the old system, this is the nub of the matter, and it is cer­ new one has to work in the best p0s­ tainly neither by accident nor through sible fashion. Meanwhile, it is worth mere exaggeration' that the propor­ watching to see how it settles down.

NOTES

GenemJ N. Rozbkov, uNcdczAnlls ~s1u:hf1ri oJit­ ::0:: ~~'ola=f:~:' .~ci!iJ'~·!~l!: aI.tles). o "Slu=1uJe 11' eluuJU pNJHm'hcAlkl. '" •• •" KftUI-o ""U<' Z...da, 8 A_ 1912. 100.. tho ... uPNpo pp 216id. 8-12; also 'tIt&imanie i Il Repl.., ibid. eA!~PJ:Eu ib:C~~wr=,:~~ ;;t~ 161. 1&78, Pit 16-19. 18 Lieutenant General B. Llkhacb.ev. ··Xommu­ nistl/ r.'lkcIV1m>pon/Idllsl>melItr 11 Strategic Factors Within the Middle East

rJlsjor Mlllvin J. Stanfom. United Status Army R_

he strategic importance of the Mid· the United States.,,2 The direction of T dle East in world affairs has histori· such analyses often tends to imply that cally been based primarily on its geo­ the !IIlIjor powers control the situation in graphic setting as a land bridge, a water the Middle East. Militarily. it has even gateway and an air corridor. In more been suggested that the USSR, in order to recent times, while the water gateway is move in and gain a more influential unussble so long as the Suez Canal position in Middle Eastern affairs, remains closed, crude oil production has planned Egypt's defeat in the June 1967 increased so rapidly that its value has war and that th~ USSR did in fact gain become strategically very promment. To­ from that war.' While Egypt did appear day: to be dependent on the USSR for some time afterward,'" the expulsion of the The military and strategic significance Soviets from Egypt in July 1972 showed of the Middle East is the result of two that the situation had changed consider­ major geographiCllI factors: its location abl]/,. linking the three major continents of the Politieal advantages for the major Eastern Hemisphere, and its fabulously powers have received attention by other wealthy deposits ofoil. 1 writers as being the primary motives for Middle East influence although the politi­ Strategic analyses of the Middle East eaI and military cannot be entirely sepa­ tend to focus on the interests of the rated. major world powers. Consideration at this major power level is certainly appropriate By demo1l8troting the erosion of us for the Middle East has been lICCII1"Dtely fnIInel4l1embility lind providing tllngible described as ".••11 segment of the balance evidence of Soviet IfUpport for proxy of power between the Soviet Union and force8. Moscow could gaill lIignifiCllnt

78 STllAT£GIC fACTORS

inroads into Arab politics. including pow­ lies in their prominence compared to lack erful leverage against pro-Western re­ of sufficient attention to other important gimes. S factors. World interests in the Middle East, as wen as national interests of the The same writer recognized, however, major world powers and other countries, that ..... Western economic aid to the cannot and will not be overlooked. {t Middle East since 1955 exceeds Commu­ does not necessarily follow, however, that nist donations by over 10 times.,,6 those outside interests will dictate the Soviet motives in the Middle East are future affairs of Middle Eastern coun­ more complex than simply military or tries, as some have suggested,9 nor even political. ''The more critical [Soviet moti­ have as strong an influence in those vations) are generally agreed by Soviet affairs as the prominence of attention to analysts to be security, ideology7eco­ them would imply. Even some who recog­ nomic and great power status." US nize the power of the "attitudes of the motives, on the other hand. may be seid local states" (in the Middle East) often to be the prevention of war through a lend emphasis to the concept of outside balance of power among Middle East intervention and control of that part of nations, economic (access to oil). promot­ the world.10 ing the rights of national self-determina­ The United Nations has also received tion, and the prevention of dOmination of considerable attention in what is written the area by the Soviets or any other about the Middle East; in the eerly days power. of the UN, President Truman believed it could be astabilizing factor in that ares.n The primary {USI interest in the But the UN has not been very successful Arab-Israeli conflict lies in its contain­ either in preventing war (for example, ment. and in the avoidance of a possible withdrawal from Gaza at Nessefs request nuclear confrontation with the Soviet in May 1967) or in settling war (for Union over isuUea or developments arising example, Israel's general refusal to abide from that conflict.8 by Security Council Resolution 242). Despite the lack ofits political or military The difficulty with these kinds of achievement in the Middle East, the UN analyses, useful and necessary as they are, must be given credit for humanitarian

Mlljor Melvin J. Stanford. US Army Reserve. is Auociate Professor of Busineu Management at Brigham YO,ung University. Provo, Utah. With a Reserve background 411 a fleld artillery officer. he is cu"ently Commander of the 698th Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic. Re8earch and Analysis), 96th US Army Reserve Command. Dr. Stanford lived in Saudi Arabia for several years , while employed' by the Arabian American Oil Company. He is a graduate of the USACGSC and is also a member of the Consulting Faculty. His atticle. .~ Basic Sttategy Framework." appeared in the Augu8t 1972 issue of the Military Review. STRATEGIC FACTORS service there in caring for the Palestinian 2. Modernization-raise standard of refugees whose important role in the living for Egyptians. future of the Middle East will be con­ 3. Regain territory lost to Israel in sidered later in this article. 1967. The failure of outside countries to 4. Leadership in Arab world. bring peace to the Middle East has re­ sulted in considerable frustration and Iraq anxiety for those countries and for others 1. Independence-maintain own as well: The Arab states and Israel con· course. tinue along their own uncertain courses 2. Political stability-control the despite what others plan for them. We Kurds. can understand the situation better, and 3. Economic development. perhaps relate to it more effectively, ifwe will emphasize more in our scope of Jordon attention some analysis of the Middle I. Maintain intemal stability-keep Eastern countries in their own setting and Palestinian guerrillas under control. what Causes their people to act as they 2. Economic survival and develop­ do. With such analysis will come a greater ment. recognition of the degree of self-determi­ 3. Regain territory lost to Israel. nation those countries are capable of 4. Achieve a settlement for Palestin. exercising and intend to exercise. ians. The "strategy framework" which I described in this journal last year12 can Kuwait be useful for this kind of analYsis which 1. Preserve own wealth and independ· will be limited here to eight Arab states ence. (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 2. Help develop other Arab states by Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria), Israel, means of loans and investments. and the Palestinian refugees. Algeria, Mo­ rocco and Tunisia are excluded because Lebanon they are North African countries and are 1. Independence and neutrality. not directly involved in the conflict in the 2. Maintain center of comlmrce and Middle East. Ubya is included because it culture. is thus involved even though it is also a 3. Achieve a Palestinian settlement. North African country (as is Egypt as well). Iran and Turkey are Middle East Libya countries and Muslim, but are neither 1. Remove backwardness of country primarily Arab nor involved in the con· andpeoplll. flict and are, therefore, excluded. Yemen 2. Active role in Arab course in Pales­ and the small Gulf Trucial States, while tine. involved to some extent, are not of 3. Promote Arab unity. significant size or influence for this analy­ 4. Domestic and social justice and sis. equitable distn'bution ofwealth. Objectives are the logical starting pouit and can be summarized as: 13 Saudi Arabia 1. Maintain holy Islamic shrines at Egypt Mecca and Medina, with eminent religious 1. Maintain independence; freedom position for the 500 million Muslims in from outside influence. the world. SiRATiGIC fACtORS

2. Keep country free from degrading partially related to their objective of social influences of the world. getting back the Sinai territory. 3. Economic development-modern­ ReiiOurces available to a country play ization. . an important part in the selection and attainment of objectives. For strategic SyriIJ purposes, resources can be dermed as 1. Independence-freedom from out­ those elements over which the country side influence. has direct control and can employ. Human 2. Control internal and poliijca1 insta­ resources in the Middle East are illustrated bility. .~. by the peP,llliUon data shown. 3. Regain territory lost to Israel in Except for Egypt, the population of 1967. most of the Arab states is relatively low. The above are genetally the.objectives All of the countries except lebanon and stated by the govemnients or rulers and Israel have low overall population den­ do not necessarily represent the desires of sity, but there are vast uninhabited desert the peoples in all respects. Moreover, the areas in Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia in objectives are not necessarily liSted in contrast with the high density around the order of relative importance. relatively few cities in those states. Literacy of the people, which is one Israel useful measure of their capability. is low 1. Survival of paramount importance. for all the Arab states except Kuwait 2. Economic development. (with low absol\lte population and exten­ 3. Sovereign recognition. sive free schooling) and lebanon (with a weU-developed educational and cultural Palestinians system). Jewish IsraeliS have the highest 1. Restoration of the country of Pal· literacy in the Middle East, and Arab estine in the area now occupied by Israel. Israelis have higher literacy than the other 2. Other objectives such as employ­ Arabs except in Lebanon and Kuwait. ment, education and personal dignity are The longer life expectaney of the Israelis seen by the Palestinians as being attain­ suggests a more Vigorous and healthy able through the paramount objective of population than in the Arab states with returning to what they consider to be their shorter life expectancies. their rightful homeland. Economic resources, or total goods and services produced, can be measured The above summary of objectives as "gross national product (GNP)," The clearly shows the predominant interest of relatj.ve average wealth of the people from each state in its own internal affairs. Two such production is expressed as GNP per of the states most interested in a Pales­ capita. Both of these factors are shown tinian settlement-1ordan and lebanon­ along with other economic data. are those in which most ofthe 1.5 million Most of theArah states have a low per Palestinians live, principally as refugees capita income and thus a. relatively low rather than as citizens.. The expressed average. standard of living. But there are interest of the third state, Libya. stems some jl'cat disparities among the Arabs, mo~ from, idealism. at this point than based principally on who has oil"31\d who from'any.direct action toward'or relation­ does .not. These disparities are increasing ship with the Palestinian problem. Egyp­ as oil proouction in,creases in the states tian leaders havll.expressed strong support With, large oil reserves-KUWait, Libya and for the. palestinian· cause, but it may be Saudi Arabia. ilacember 1973 STRATEGIC FACTORS

POPULATION DATA-1970 EIGHT ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

Average Area R4teof Literacy Life (Tlwusondsof Density Populotion Increase3 R4te Expectancy Squore (Per Square (MilliQns) (Percent) (Percent) (Years) Kilometers) Kilometers) Egypt 33.30 2.5 35 53 1,001 11 33 Iraq 9.44 3.2 20-40 52 435 22 Jordan 2.30 3.4 30 52 98b 24 Kuwait .76 10.0 49 64 16 47 Lebanon 2.79 2.9 86 NA 10 268 Libya 1.94 3.7 35 52 1,760 1 Saudi Arabia 4.00d 2.7 15 42 2,150 2 Syria 6.25 3.3 40 53 185b 34 Israel 2.91 2.9 88 Jewish 71 21 c 141 48 Arab

3Annual average, 1963-70. blncludes Israeli-occupied territories seized in 1967. cDoes not include occupied territories of Sinai, West Bank of Jordan, and Golan Heights. dUS Ambassador's estimate. UN estimate of 7.74 million is highly uncertain.

Sources: United Nations, StatistiCll/ Yearbook (except Literacy Rate column). US State Department, Background Notes (Literacy Rate column).

The Pale~inians have virtually no eco­ tariiy the strongest. Israel is generally nomic resources as a people and are considered to hold a decisive edge in dependent upon limited individual em­ military capability against the Arabs in a ployment and the living needs provided short war, but not in a prolonged con­ by the UN and host countries. flict. The military capability of the Arab Military resources are indicated, to a states besides Egypt is not of great degree, by the amount ofmoney spent on significance in comparison with that of them. No Middle East country can pro­ Israel. duce its needed military equipment al· The environment is a key element in though Israel produces some of its own. the assessment of strategic capability or Egypt, with the largest total GNP, bas the national power; it is defined as those most military equipment and, with the factors over which a country does not largest population, the largest anned have control and includes both external forces of the countries under considera­ and internal considerations. The enViron­ tion here. Of strategic significance, how­ ment external to the Middle East, namely ever, is the fact that Egypt is not mili­ its relationship to world powers, receives 112 lIfilitary tleviel!l extensive attention as we have seen. it is The significance ofthe foregoing gene­ the internal environmental. factors. espe­ alogy lies. for strategic purposes, in the cially the cultural forces which underlie effect it has on the attitudes and under­ people's beliefs and behavioi, which need standing of the inhabitants of the Middle more analysis in order to understand the East today. Arabs, in general, regard rest ofthe strategic picture. Ishmael and Abraham as having central The culture of a people hasits roots in prominence amoJlg their progenitors. their Origin. The Israeli state origin is Thereby. they also recognlze their rela­ relatively well-known, and so is the JUs.. tionship to the Jewish people whose main tory of the Jewish people generally. The progenitor, Judah, was a great.gr.mdson Arabs are: not so weJl.known although of Abraham. In the Western world, it is their Semitic relationship to the Jews is frequently assumed that, because of the often mentioned. It may be helpful to Arab-lsrseli confJict, Arabs and Jews hate take a closer look at thatrelationsbip. each other as peoples. However, while The genealogy ofthe Arabs. Egyptians living amoJlg the Arabs for several years, I and Jews is recorded in the ~"le. in never met one who felt that way, there or Arabic tradition, and in the writings of in other parts of the world since. Arabs JOsephUll. speak of lews as their brothers, but they This diagram is ovemimpJified and has hate the political state of'Israel beeause it some inconsistencies. ior example. the has displaced the Palestinians, with whose Bible says that l~l's mother (Ha. cause most Arabs everyWhere identify to gar)"..• took him: a wife out of the land some extent. Jewish people throughout of Egypt."14 However, that wife might the world, on the other hand, tend to not have been the only one Ishmael had. identify with the state of; IsrseL From According to Washington Irving, who, su$ personal identifications with oppos­ while he wss in Spain early in the 19th ing political causes have come the polar­ Century. studied Arab origins extensively, ization that is frequently mistaken for Ishmael married a daughter of Modad, a persqnal animosity between the peoples prince of JurlIamic descent, and by that ~lves. While there is doubtless some union came the 12 princes who rose to o~p of POlitical hatred into the per­ the ruJi.ng power on the Arabian Penin­ so~ireaJm. the common origins ofthose sula and were prominent in the lineage of peoples offer a basis for future peaceful Arabs both living there today and who relations in personal harmony if the spread to surrounding countries in early political end ofthe problem can be solved IslaJJlW conquests. Irving also says that in some way. the name, "Arab" was said to be derived The Arab culture has long been family from that ofYamb, son ofJoktan.15 and tn1lal Oriented, much more than state Despite the inconsistencies and the oriented. A scholar at the tum of the lack ofpositive records, Irving's work still century observed that: "The Arab mind generally coincides with Arab traditions loves units, not unity; ••• each man lives held today. The Encydotmedia Btittmnica for himself.•• .'>17 Today. it would be mentions a tradition of 27 generati~ns more accurate to say that"•.• each man linking Mohammed and Ishmael and indi­ lives fot· himself and his family." This cates that there is impressive consistency local and personal orientation js strong in some of the Arab traditions on this and will likely ehange only slowly. subject even though there is not enough . The Islami.c religion has great influ­ evidence to support any finn conclUsions ence on the Arabs who are cousequently abOut Arabgenealogy.f'6 fatalistic and tend to accept whatever

~,1m STRATEGIC fACTORS

GENEALOGY OF ARABS AND JEWS

Soun:es: Boob or Genesis. Jodwa lnd U Otronlclea. WasJungton Itving, MAlwmtt IPId lib Sucmson, G. P. Putnam', Sons. N Y.~ 1849, Volume I. Flavius Joo:phus. Anl/qulltu oflht Jewl, Hunt PublbhingCo.lne..N. Y"n.d.,Dookl.OUlpterVIl. " occurs as "Allah's will." Islam is a great Department, " ... is acknowledged as the stabilizing force among the Arabs. The leading state in the Amb world.,,1a Its Koran also helped spread and teach the history is among the oldest recorded by Arabic language which is another com­ mankind. Egypt has some great cultum monbond. and literary tmditions. In seeking leader· An Arab cultural factor of major ship of the Arab world, Nasser empha­ significance is what might be called their sized Egypt's Arab nature, while Sadat subjective nature. We in the Western has put more emphasis on the country's cultures are relatively objective in our Egyptian character. Despite the problems attitudes, and we tend to perceive others of following Nasser's strong leadership in reference to our "objective" norm. The role, Sadat has shown remarkable Arab subjectivity does not fit an objective strength himself as a national leader. norm. Arab subjectivity is relatively una· Although Egypt has the largest popula· ware of the vemcity, accuracy and preci­ tion of the Arab states, the people are sion which Western cultures either take also the, poorest on a per capita basis. It for gmnted or comciously deal with. has depended prirnarily on limited agri· Most Westerners do not understand this cultural production and foreign aid and important difference. and, until you has no oil to speak of. Low productivity understand it, you cannot begin to under· and social problems also detract from its stand the thinking or even the spoken national power. expressions of the Arabs. It can be very unnerving, for example, to have an Arab The root of Egypt's problem goes friend look you in the eye and tell you deep: it is the absence of a sense of something that you know is not true in commitment capable ofenergizing youth, terms of objective fact. If a Westerner did revitalizing the bureaucracy and stimulat· that, you would conclude he was lying to ing productivity and production. 19 you. But the Arab is not conscious of objective fact or vemcity in the way we .Iraq has moderate oil production and are. He is subjectively conscious of cour· reserves and the second largest population tesy and expediency. Thus, he will tell of the countries considered here. It is you what he thinks will please you at the beset with political instability. The gov· moment. Once you understand how this ernment has difficulty in both maintain· phenomenon functions, you

ECONOMIC DATA-l 97 1 EIGHT ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

Petroleum GNP GNP GNP/or Production (Billions Per Capita Military (Millions 0/ Trade Surplus (S) ofDollars) (Dollars) (Percent) Metric Tons) or Deficit (D) Egypt 6.43 188 23.30 12.97a D Iraq 3.12 337 14.00 74.45 Varies Jordan .64 284 14.10 D Kuwait 2.20 3,000 2.86 129.40 S Lebanon 1.56 562 3.28 D Libya 4.00b 2,000 2.10 149.20 S Saudi Arabia 4.10 1,020c 9.34 176.10 S Syria 1.46 235 12.10 1.10 D Israel 5.40 1,764 27.40 .21 D

aExciudes Israeli oifproduction in Sinai. bAnother estimate is nearer $3 billion. cAdjusted for four million estimated population. Other per capita figures are based on 1971 estimates which are slightly above 1970 data.

Sources: The Almanac of World Military Power. Edited by T. N. Dupuy and Wendell Blanchard. Second Edition. R. R. Bowker Co.• N. Y .• 1972. US State Department. Background Notes.

Kuwait:S wealth as II state stems cosmopolitan environment. Lebanon is almost entirely from oil. The country has politically one of the more conservative used that wealth to provide an extensive ofthe Arab states. welfare environment for its citizens. Aside from some financial .support to Libya illustrates some great extremes. other Arab states, Kuwait's national The recently found oil wealth has not yet power is quite limited. been used much to improve the standard of living of the Libyan people. Colonel Lebanon is not so much an Arab state Qaddafi, the country's youthful and inex­ as is generally supposed. The religious perienced premier, is a political and reli­ affiliation of the population is about gious idealist who aspires to prominent evenly divided between Christian and leadership in the Arab world. The favor­ Muslim, with some minor sects also repre­ able response he has received from Sadat sented. Beirut is the imancial and c0m­ of Egypt, however, has not been forth­ mercial center of the Middle East, and coming from other Arab leaders. Without European influences of the past have oil, Libya had practically a subsistence­ provided a rich cultural heritage and level economy. -I' i STRAT£tlIC FACTORS

Saudi Arabia is considered to be the looking leadershlPi it is capable of con­ most conservative of the Arab states and structive progress. 3 is one of the most stable, both socially and politically. King Faisa! is regarded in Syria. "Among the most politically his own country as a wise and just ruler. unstable of the Arab countries, Syria js It is said of him by his people that he is one of the most unrelenting ~roponenis capable of "bearing offense without giv­ of animosity toward Israel." 4 Despite ing offense." Outside his country, King this animosity, which possibly comes Faisa! has perhaps the greatest personal more from the emotional invective of the prestige of all the Arab lea'ders. ". _. Saudi leaders than from the people in general, leaders have come to view their land as Syria is relatively an economically poor the last bastion of religious and economic and politically weak country; As for the freedom.,,2o The rapid rise of national political leadership, "The regime is income, based on the wealth of the plagued, like all regimes before it, with largest oil reserves of any country in the factionalism.,,25 Middle Bast and perhaps in the entire world, has created the beginnings of imzel is well known to the Western social change in that country. The former world in comparison to the Arab states. US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, quoted The determination to survive as a people above, further observed that: and to build a national homeland for the Jewish people, as well as Israeli military The winds of change do not yet gust prowess, have attracted widespread admi­ in Saudi Arabia, but waft they do. ration, while its occupation of Arab Through a happy combination of strong territories and its failure to help solve the leadership and the basically good sense of Palestinian refugee problem has inten­ its people, the country h{JS to date been sified Arab bitterness toward it. For spared the oftentimes destructive convul­ many years after the war in 1948, the sions that haue attended the trauma of Arab states tried to pretend that Israel modernization among some of its imme­ did not even eltist. In recent times, diate neighbors. 21 however, "For the flISt time, there is recognition among the Arab pOllulation The development of a societal middle that Israel exists and will exist." 6 While class has been observed, but its effect on Israel has not abided by world opinion in Saudi life is as yet, ..... not precisely the matter ofoccupied Arab territories, it measurable."h The outside world does is not insensitive to that opinion, but not-yet have general access to the coun· seeks its support for the Israeli position try. Tourist visas are not given, and only where~r possible. An observer in the Muslim pilgrims, educators, businessmen Orient recently commented that. "Israelis and government representatives are ad­ look at UN votes in the way people in mitted as visitors or temporary residents. Hongkong study the stock-market in­ Concerning the future of Saudi Arabia, dex."27 Ambassador Eilts has accurately ob­ Israelis have a certain sense of destiny served: which stems, in part, from scriptural prophecy in which the Lord save Abra­ The public qialogue remains muted. ham the land from the river of Egypt to but it will grow in !lolume. Th.eye is the _river Euphrates.28 Arabs tend to nothing 8tallc about SaUdi 80ciety. It i3 wony about this prophecy, and even dynamic (/nd~ with continued forward­ Westemers haVe interpreted it in Israel's , ~197Il' I ~ f STRATEGIC FACTORS

favor.29 It would be well to keep in and intelligence coUection within Is­ mind, however, that, first, Israel is a rael.34 However, the outside support for political state and not a religious organi­ Palestinian guerrilla activity has been zation as such; second, Jacob (Israel) had waning, and: 12 sons, and the patriarchal blessings were passed along to various of those Despite lip service to the aims and sons, with Joseph being among the more Ideals of the fedayeen, no Arab govern­ prominent;30 and, third, the Arabs are ment has given them unqualified support partly descendent 'of Abraham through nor. indeed. any freedom of action other Ishmael just as the Jews are through than that it could not prevent the feda­ Judah (and Simeon, Levi and Benjamin), yeen from taking.35 Jacob and Isaac. I Palestinians are a people without a Moreover, Palestinian guerrillas have home at present, but their situation is the stirred up active oppositio~ from some central issue in the Middle East conflict, Arab states. Lebanon has put them down in order to avoid Israeli reprisals, and There is little doubt that the key to King Hussein defeated them in open peace in the Middle East must now combat in order to prevent them from depend on whether or not Israel will taking over Jordan. The guerrilIas have handle the Palestine refugee problem also failed to gain enough internal sup­ better than the Arab states and the port for their own cause: No mass upris­ United Nations have done over the past ing of the refugees has occurred, nor does 20 years. 31 it seem likely. There is an old Eastern saying: "If you have two heads and one The Arab states have given Palestinians hat, don't cut off one head, make another temporary residence and some employ­ hat." However, the Israelis and Palestin­ ment, But little has been done to inte­ ians both want the same hat-the land of grate Palestinian refugees into other Arab Palestine. populations. King Hussein has generally In reviewing -the foregoing objectives, obtained the allegience of those living in resources and environmental factors, both Jordan. where they are becoming a part unifying and disunifying influences can of that country's population, even though be seen among the Arabs. Unifying influ­ they still inaintain their Palestinian iden­ ences include common ethnic back­ tity, The refugees in Lebanon have largely ground, the Islamic religion, thll Arabic remained in refug~e camps, and President language, geographic proximity of the Suleiman Franjiehhas stated that ", .. the Arab states, and oil wealth (for those that Lebanese owe the Palestinians residence have it). The lslainic religion is a strong and hospitality as a duty, not as a force to be reckoned with, and it is favor."32 The Kuwaiti Government, opposed to atheistic influences, especially which employes some Palestinians, ltas communism. Qaddafi and Sadat both stated that it " •.. would not permit Pales­ came to the aid of President Al-Nimeu-y tinians to settle in Kuwait permanently of the Sudan in July 1971 and helped and expected to see all Palestinians 're­ him overcome the Communist insurgents turn horne eventually.' "33 and regain his government.36 Economi­ Palestinian guerrillas initially received cally. the oil-producing nations have their support from Egypt when President shown strong unity as members of the Nasser in 19550rganiZed/edayee,runits. Organization of Petroleum Exporting for the purposes of terrorism, sabotage Countries. S'QIAJEllfC FACTORS

Disunifying influences among the Another alternative for the Pafestin­ Arab states are primarily their individual ians would be to integra~e them into concern with their own internal problems other Arab states. Presumably, they and interests, cultural orientation to could, over time, forget about their com­ family and tribe more than to state or pulsion to live in formE!r Palestine, eSpe­ union, and economic disparity. Political cially if they could achieve economic alignments have also been suggested, security. and persoual dignity elsewhere. grouping Saudi Arabia, Oman and Iran ~. Yet the'Arab states have not integrated with England 'and US interests, and Iraq the Palestinians in 25 years so it is and Southern Yemen with Soviet and questionable whether they might do it Communist Chinese interests.37 How­ now. ever, there is no indication that any such Can peace be achieved in the Middle alignments would prevail over individual East? state interests. The possible union of Egypt and They told him it couldn't be done. Libya leaves room for considerable doubt He smiledand went right to it. that it will succeed any better than the He tackled the thing that similar attempt by Egypt, Syria and Iraq couldn't be done, IS years ago. Even ifthe merger bl!tween and couldn't do it. Egypt and Libya were to take place in any more tangible form than outward The above expression would seem like declaration; what will happen when the defeatism to our typically decisive US Egyptian leader (of a nation of 34 million national style. We tend to want to get in population compared to Libya's two mil­ and settle things conclu~vely wherever lion) attempt to draw in any real way on we can. We perhaps think that we must the funds provided by Libyan oil reve­ settle things in the Middle East in order nues? to preserve our access to the oil there What are the strategic alternatives for although some very competent anafyses the Middle East considering the foregoing have shown that, while that source ofoil analysis? On the one end of the scale is important to the West, our dependence would be indefinite status quo which on it may be overestimated.39 would be unlikely because it would not Israel does not want its affairs settled settle the Palestinian problem. On the by outsiders, and neither do the Arabs. other end of the scale is renewed war or a Intervention in the Middle East cannot series ofwars. be ruled out if a situation there were to In between these two extremes, some pose a serious threat to major world kind of settlement of the Palestinian powers. Neither can more of war be problem must be reached. King Hussein's ruled out. Those interested in Biblical solution had some very workable features prophecies on this subject will want to when, in March 1972, he proposed the consider both some additionaf Old Testa­ establishment of an autonomous Palestin­ ment,40 as well as some from the New ian state federated with Jordan in a Testament.41 United Arab Kingdom which would cover A political scholar of the Middle East {taza, the West Bank and Jordan under has suggested that asettlement n ••• put Hussein's Hashemite throne. However, forward by the major powers would be the Israelis rejected the idea because it hard [for the Arabs and Israel] to tum involved Jerusalem and for other rea­ down."42 Whether peace there will come sons.38 in that way, if it comes at all, or by

Deeemller 1973 811 STRATEGIC FACTOIIS actions of the Middle East countries 10 See John C. Campbell and Helen Caruso, "The West and the Middle East," MiUto.ry themselves, cannot be determined at this Review, October 1912, pp 75-83. time. It seems clear, however, that any meaningful analysis of strategy or na· 11 Howard. op. cit., P 68. tional power in that area should avoid the 12 Major Melvin J. Stanford, "A Basic assumption that only the major powers Strategy Pramework," MiUtary Review, A"Il"st can settle the matter and should recog· 1972, PP 23-27. nize the strong force of internal objec· tives, resources and environmental factors 13 Compiled from Background Notes, US as elements of strategy. Whatever the Srate Department, Washington, D.C. outcome, the countries of the Middle 14 Genesis 21:21. East will have a great deal to do with their own future. IS Washington Irving, Mahomet lind His Successors, G. P. Putnam's Sons, N.Y., 1849, Volume I.

16 Bncyclopaedia Brlto.nnica, Encyclopae­ dia Britannica Inc., William Benton, Publisher, Chicago, m., 1971. Volume 2, p 163A. NOTES 17 S. M. Zwemer, Arabia: The Credle of 1 The Aim"""" of World Military Power, Islam, Pleming H. R.evell Co., N.Y., 1900. Edited by T. N. Dupuy and Wendell Blanchard, Second EdItion, R. R. Bowker Co., N. Y., 18 Background Notes (Arab Republic of 1972,p 157. Bgypt), US Srate Department, April 1972.

2 Howard C. Reese, "The Arab-Israeli Con· 19 Alvin Z. R.ubenstein, "Bgypt Since Nas­ flict: Interval ofUncertainty," Military ReView, ser," Current History, January 1972, p 13. June 1969, p 12. 20 The Honorable Hermann Pro Bilts. "So­ 3 Alvin J. Cottrell, uSovi.et.Egyptlan Rela­ cial Revolution in Saudi Arabia. Part I," Para­ tions," Military Review, December 1969, pp merers, Spring 1911, P 11. 69-76. 21 Ibid., P 6. 4 Ciro Zoppo, "Soviet Ships in the Medi­ terranean and the U.S.-Soviet Confrontation in 22 William Rugh. "Emergence of a New the Middle East." Orbls, Spring 1970. Middle Class in Saudi Arabia." The Middle Bast Journal, Winter 1973, p 20. 5 Lawrence L. Whettl!D, "Strategic Parity in the Middle East," MiUto.ry Review, Septem­ 23 The Honorable Hermann Pro Bilts, "S0­ ber 1970, p 30. . cial Revolution in Saudi Arabia, Part I.," Parameters, Pall 1971, P 32. . ! 6 Ibid., p 28. 24 Gordon H. Torrey, "Instability m 7 Major Jay C. Mumford, "Soviet Motiva· Syria," CUTTent History, January 1970, p 13. tion in the Middle East," Military Rev/ew, September 1972, p 40. 25 IbId.

8 Harry N. Howard, "US Interest in the 26 Wing Commander Maharaj K. Chopra, Middle East," Military Review, January 1910, p "Israel Beyond Cease-Pire," Military Relliew, 75. April 1971, p 15. 27 James Morgan, "Israel Looks East," Far 9 See, for example. David G. Nes, "The &stem I1conomic Review, 21 May 1973, P 22. Soviets in th. Middle East," MiUtary Review, June 1912, pp 84-85. 28 Genesis 15:18. S1iIATEGlC fACTORS

29 See, for example, Major Generaill. L. Guerrilla Ptoblems," Milltmy Bellis..., October Shoemaker, "The Arab·Israeli Wsz," MIUtmy . 1972,p28. RIWIe..., August 1968, pp 57-69. 36 George Lenczowski, "Egypt and the 30 Genesis 49:26. Soviet Exodus," C.. ""nt Hutory, January 1973,p 14. 31 Lieutenant Colonel James B. P""body, "Nationalism: Curse or Cure for the MicIcIIe 37 Roy E. Tbomen, ''Iraq and the Persian East," MIUtmy RIWIe..., November 1972, P 16. Gulf," Current Hutory, January 1973. P 38.

32 "Battle in Lebanon Grows in lntensity," 38 "'FuJI Peace Pact' by Jordan, Israel," The Kmuas City StdT, 31 May 1973, pl. The Kmuas City StdT, 14 Much 1972, pl.

33 CbronoloBY, The Middle East Joumal, 39 See MUor John A. Berry, "The Growing Autumn 1972, p 438. Importance of Oil," MIUtary Rellis ..., October 1972, pp 2·16, and ''Oil and Soviet P.oUcy in 34 Colonel Selby F. Little Jr., "Fedoyeen: the Midclle East," Th. Middk East Journal, Palestinian Commandos," Military RlWIew, No­ SPMK 1972. vember 1970, p 49. 40 See Ezekiel 38 and 39. 41 See Revelation 12 ud 20. 35 Major Edgar O'Bsllance, "Some Arab 42 Psomiades, op. cit., P 54.

From time to time, we receive requests from universities, colleges, public libraries, and so on, for reference sets of the Military Review. Happily, we occasionally receive also oliers of sets of back issues. We then do our best to marry up potential donors with deserving recipients.

At this time, our lists of each are short indeed. Those desir­ ing reference sets of the Military Review and those wi1Iing to donate such sets are asked to let us know.-The Editor.

91 ER T

Command Today-A Statement of Position By Divisional Commander Jorg Zumstein ASMZ, November 1972 (Switzerland)

Command is• defined as "that creative show them effectively the goals and act which subordinates people, technical general rationale behind national defense. means and procedures to a centralized Motivating members of the younger goal and coordinates them in time and generation to do their part for nati,onal place until the desired effect is achieved." defense is probably the most impow.nt But what role does creativity play in the duty of a commander today. The first act of commanding? . step in achieving this is to ensure that Choosing the goal requires creatiVity. they are properly informed. The goal must be set high e!,o~ to Commanders may be tempted to require real effort, but not so high as to succumb to the motto "we aim to please" produce a lack of confidence in subordi­ as far as the press is concerned. A further nates. The goal itself must be carefully temptation is to make concessions in the defined because ideas often get badly area of discipline in order to lure the muddled going through the chain of younger generation. These techniques command. Moreover, the main points invite disaster. must be stated in such a way that There are current attempts to modify subordinate leaders are free to use their the military approach to command to own initiative and judgment. correspond with civilian styles of com­ Problem~ arise in leaving room for mand-namely, industrial models. It is creativity within established procedures. false to say that the army is in the same Since increasing technology makes the sitoation as a civilian enterprise. Civilian commander dependent on specialists, the and military leaders definitely differ in act of command limits itself essentially to the significance of decisions and in the the basic decision and to carrying out this extent of responsibility. No demythologi­ decision. In an emergency, since things do zation of the army can camouflage the not always go as they have been planned, fact that the price for efficiency in adequate creative capability and initiative military national defense represents being must be ready to meet the contingency. prepared to make the highest sacrifice. For commanders, the matter of today's youth has the most significance. (Dillisional Commander Zumstein is the The commander's most earnest concern Commander of the 3d Field Division in must be to get to know the young people the Swiss Army and holdt a Doctor of and to understand their thoughts, then to Economics degree.)

Military Raview Soviet and Western Military Science tary writer in his definition of military science. By J. Kirschin, Soviet Officer The general aspects of~tary science DMZ, No.2, 1973 (Austria) as seen in the USSR are fundamental and guiding concepts of otganization, com­ mand and training of the armed forces, Soviet military science is based on methods of armed combat and universal Marxist-Leninist views. War is a continua­ security. Military science translates these tion of politics, a means of the class ideas into precepts and determines the struggle. War is more comprehensive than concrete forms of their use by com­ armed conflicts led by armies as it is manders. Use of these principles is a waged by the country as a whole. War creative process. However. the most includes the economic, ideological and important component of Soviet military diplomatic forms of conflict, as well as science is the theory of the art of war. competition of scientific potentials. This aspect encompasses the methods and Quotes from Western sources are used to forms of warfare according to strategic, exemplify tqe proposition that Soviet operational and tactical criterin. The military science includes mote than some border sciences which interact with vari­ imperialistic definitions of military ous phases of Soviet military science science as "the art of war." This is a include military technical sciences, mili­ plausible comparison because some areas tary social sciences and military natural which are included in Soviet military sciences. ' science are handled by civilian decision­ Soviet and Western military sciences making authorities in the West. differ from the ground up, for Soviet Much emphasis is placed by the military science serves the interests of Soviets on military science as a specific socialism and is an extension of politics. study. Although it encompasses more Soviet military science is developed by than just the art of war, it does not the Communist party to fortify the include the areas of military politics, defense !=2pabilities of the Soviet coun­ military sociology or military geopolitics tries against the aggressive imperialistic which are included by the Western mili­ forces.

These synopses are published as a service to the readers. Every effort is made to ensure accurate translation and summarization. However, for more detalled accounts, readers should refer to the orlghtal articles. No official endotseml>nt of the views, opinions. or factual statements in these items is intended or should be inferred •.,- The Editor.

December 1!l73 I

UNITED STATES

UTTAS REVIEW

The MILITARY REVIEW end the U.S. Army Command and Genaral Staff College assume no responsibility for accuracy of information contained in the MILITARY NOTES suction of this publication. Items am printad as Dsurvi.CB to the madell. No official endorsement of .the views, opinions, or factual statements is intended.-The Editor.

94 Military Review ~Ir NOTES

MILITARY HISTORY SYMPOSIUM NEW TANK REFERENCE

The United Stetes Air Force Acad~my will The US Army Armor School has published a hold its sixth Military History Symposium on 94·page reference bopklet entitled Comparative 9-11 October 1974. The symposium thame Characteristics of MSin Battle Tanks. In addi· will be the Military History of the American tion to several pagas of photographs, specifica· Revolution. tions and an overall evaluation of each tank, For resarvations or additional information,O there is a very usaful foldout summary chart write Major {Jary Anderson, Depanment of with vinually complete mechanical and opera· History, United States Air Force Academy, tional data. The pamphlet is unClassified despite Colorado 80840. its comprehensive coverage.

NCO CORPS HISTORY VETERANS' BENEFITS

The United States Army Sergeants Major Vietnam era veterans who were discharged Academy at Fon Bliss, Texas, is seeking source prior to 1 June 1966 have until 31 May 1974 to material dealing with the role of the noncom· complete their education under GI Bill benefits. missioned officer in US history. Information on Veterans using the GI Bill for job or farm how and why the NCO Corps was formed, training, apprenticeship or flight training will development of the corps, the beginning and continue to get benafit~ sinca they ara coverad development of the grade structure and posi· under a different bill. ! tions, plus general historical information on the Vietnam veterans discharged after 1June American noncommissioned officer, is desired. 1966 ara also affected. The 1966 law allows Anyone with material on this subject should each veteran eight years to complete his educa· contact: United States Army Sergeants Major tion. The time is computed from the date of Acadeniy, Human Relations Division, AnN: discharge or from the date of the bill, which· SGM W. B. Parson, Fon Bliss, Texas 79918. ever is later.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

HIGHER EDUCATION Among the entrance requiraments for the The German Democratic Republic has issued colleges is a high school diploma or cenificate new guidelines on higher ~ducation for officer of completion from a HI·year polytechnical candidates. According to' these guidelines, 27 sacondary school. Outstanding athletes and subject areas can be pursued at one of the four techniCal personnel are praferred. colleges administered by Volksarmee. Graduates receive diplomas which corre· The coursa lasts four years for the navy and spond to those awarded by civilian institutions. air force candidatas and thrae years for those of They also raceive preference for pro'motion and the army. get extra pay in cenain functional areas. Students are paid 300 Eastmarks a month Despite this new program, East German for the first year, 350 the second year, 400 the Armed Forces ara still experiencing an acute third year and 500 the founh year. Room, shonage of caraer volunteers and officer candi· board and clothing ara frae. dates.-Oie Bundeswehr.

December 1973 95 lit NOTES

FIELD JACKET FOR.WOMEN Officer cendidatos got 30 days'lem rogllfd· IfIU of length of service. while fim·yoer officers gat 36 days' leeve. Maximum leeve of 46 days psr veer Is authorized beginning with 16 YORI'S' service. Soldiers with 30 days or more 1811'18 are chargsd for four Sundays or holdiays. Soldiel'S with lass than 30 days are chargsd with three. leave schaduln follow the calendar veer and 11lIIV8 may not bu camed over from one Veer to tile next.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHIIVA

NUCLEAR POWER

According to Germsn sources. the Peoplo's Republic of China Is the third strongest nuclear power in tile world today. Western experts believe thot Moscew. Leningrad and Kill'l now lie within fange of Chieeso modium-range rockets which hll1/8 en effective IlIRga of 411110 A nuw field jacket was mently introduced for kilolmltel'S (about 2485 mllll$). female members of the People's Army of the The fim test of e Chinese intercontinontel G81'11!11n Democratic Republic. The .,;ind· rocket with 8 fIlnge of 0000 kilolmlters (about breelter, mIIde of synthetic metllrial, il!lS an 3728 miles) appesm to be nearing. Accerding to inten:hangeeble well for lining and a button-on Garlll!ln inforlmltion from Pakino. the launch for coller. The picture moW;! III 3tIIff mgllsnt of ramps em located in the steppe em of Lop Nor the Notional People's Army with II winter fur in Sinkiang while the Indian Oceen is the liflelv cap end thil fl~d jacket. tal'flet slIla.-ASMZ, © 1973.

LEAVE SCHEDULES NORWAY

How don 48 days'lllllVo per yeer,lncluding NATO MEMBERSHIP Onlyfouf Sundays und/or legal holidays, . sound? East German officers end noncommis­ slonad officers with liver 16 yeers' SIIrvice lite According to a recant public opinion poll, entitled to thllt. Any additlona' Sundays and/or B4 peMnt af tile Norwegilll! JIlIPulation fever legal holidays fllllnulllltilin an Individual'slall'lB continllGd memli6l$billln HATO. ' period are not counted lIS IGII'I9. .Only aix percent said that memborship FlfItotarm enlistlid soldlslS gat ~ days' increases the danger of war, while 11 percent 188V8, including three Sundavs and or .legal bsUeved thet m~mbership played no fQ'a In holidays, thair fim yeer. MalClmum leova time increesing .'f'. ~eCreesing the probability of for imlbtod 10ldl3l$ below tile \\ICO 111'101 is 32 lli'ined conflict, There wsm 13'percent with no daV. bll!llnnlng with their sixth yalli' of $9IVlce. opinion on the quenio'!.;Offiserblldet.

Military IlevlGI'I IIlII01ES USSR I T5&s FOR NAVAL BRIGADES

The Soviet naval infantry brigades ""equipped just aftar they hm left the nOSlHllmp of the whit modem tanks. In addition to armored lending craft. Both ships visible in the picture scout CIlIS and armored penonnel carriGi'll, T55 blllol!lJ to the Alligator cl..-Sllldst und tanks am nt their dlIPOJIII. Here am two T55s Teehnlk, @)1973.

SWITZERLAND

NATIONAL SERVICE FOR WOMEN lIstsbIishe!f Slirvice oblll!lltiDn far women stends little chance of success. ,Acconlingta 11iSP0n­ Discussions on nlllionel Slirvice for woman sible Circles, the cost connected with the centinu8 in Switzerland. The civilian defanSli program could not be justifieIJ.-Sllldllt und cerps, woman's auxiliarY service lind the army Teelin;k, (5)1973. madlcel Slirvice nead additlonel pel'llOnnel. The requirement<' for 'th$' madlcel service DENMARK currently runs lit 8600 aldas. HOW8V8r, only HERCULES ORDERED 38111hre faadily aveileble::Govwnmont author· , ' itilt'llCpressad thillopcl cof 118lng'.1t to train Th. Danish Air Forne bas ordered three aboilt4000 \'OIunfil8l"nU":, 'lillds, yGatly Ct30 HII1:IJIIII traRSjlOrIS from' Lockhead Air­ begianillt in 191ti; 'hl8loR1O- IIlQ1l1iary SiJrv. craft Corporlrtion. Delivery It achetlultd ,for 1cii'l*'.IlInolll'lcad 1I':lI8Id ifor, 4(IIIIr 'women. 1975­ HIiwMr, onlv 100II hM' IIlIiIn reglltered:and Denmark is 1he 30th country til buy the trainai!,; . ' Locklleed turboprop 1nInsport.-Weh, und Introducing nationel service llllith 8 legally WiTllChaft. '

Oecatlller t!lla III NOTES

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

M17 MOTORiZED GLIDER

This two-$9tl1lJll motorized gilder from CzedlDIIIMlkla is CIIlled II1II M11 tlnillenal. Jt Is uUId In basic tnlining of young pilots to get IIIIIm IISIId to motorized flying. It is also ueed by the CzaclJlIlIIlMlldan mlliwy sport o!pliz&. tionSVAZARM. TheM17 lias lIw1nllilJlllI of58 foot. is 26 foot long Mil WllgIIt 1278 pounds. " With tho engine, the glidsr adlluves 112 mllas .l! par hour and a maximum llltituda of 16.11110 .ft~ feet. At II cruising speed of 93 mph. It hes II ~ rangs af 21!0 mil.. A 45 hOl$llpo\'/er Willtr1r MiklOn III motor provides the poWllr. ~

BRAZIL MILITARY CIVIC ACTION The Militmy Command of the Amazon tssting. In addition, tIIllI'O ",,-are tllroa li-ton Ragion buHt and now wppom eight slaman­ trucks and two Iii-ton trellm tested. tl!ry schools, thrae junior hieh schools and Dna Tho automotiw industry plans te 0l!port professionel treining centar. ThGSll era situatlld thllSS vehicles IlIling its l!1Ow"ing production in differsnt cities and vUlalra along the noi'lli· capecity which is up more tIIen 35 percant for ern Bmilian flordar. Tha schools GrG fimmccll tIIo tim fiva months of 1973.-lVoticilrio do by the Minlsuy of Educetion; the Army cdmin­ Exlrcito. /stenthem. • There erG 1118 officials !ll1d over 32GD studanu in tilllSS naw alltllblishmsnts.--fJoti­ cilrio do Exlrcito. UNITED KINGDOM

ARMY TeSTS MILITARY VEHICLES ASSISTANCE TO KUWAiT

The Comissao do Esrudos do R.fateriol ~e IlritGln i$ 0SSI$tIng the lItetG of KUWllit in MoromeuniZlNfio (Automotiva Vehicles el\,\l embIlshlll!il a SIlI!IIIIlIIlIV. Officers truinllll by equipment Studies Bonl tllStGd IIS\'erGI mili· the floylll N&vy will command tile 12-ship Hoot. tl!ry vehielllS and tmilelS which Mre dediJllad The fllIVV collSl$ti primorily of 36-foot 1111­ by the Bmilian automotive industry in ecoord­ wi bomfluilt In Sil1!lllporo lIy Votper Thorny­ anco with Bmllian Army technical specifica­ croft Private Umlted. Powered by diaesl tiOIll!. . cng!RIIS. tIIass clllft 'achlwe speeds up to 25 Fivo finm submlttad 2)!,.ton trucks for knots. IiI NOTlS

ISRAEL GAUL ASSAULT WEAPON

CoW'teD7 ofJac Weller

This new 5.5&aliber 8IaIII1t weapon Galil bottle opener. It is RIpened to be eKtRll1lllly dmloptid In lnet weighs 11 pounds. It can durable and Incansltiva to etmolflllmc candl· tlke12 dlffemlt kinds of IIlIImunltion and can tions. be used lIS II machine platol, light grenade It is named Galil after its builder. Imwl IlIUnllber,lIIItitllnk weapon, wire cutter and , Galili.-Soldllt und Technik, @1973. , FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AN UNCONVENTIONAL

Buggies IIRI leisuRl time, youtll. beach, msintain. It is a complille car with II CI'IID­ IlfCISIoCciuntrv. fun ears.'They 111'0 hilt 111' owr cauntry capability uliRlJ special tlRIL The roll . the .,rld today as • finfllhad product or as II ber can b8 used as the main IIUjiport for e dIJ.it.ylIullllllf project With plastic. In West lIImple IlI-weather canepy. Thera Is MD II Garmafty,. theY lit mid&'by the Karman body IIardtop for IIIIIl8 IIuII!IY modals. The," plarit ilJ'Ollllilltiidcwlth • Vollicwagen motor sIt_. IIuII!IY tail. by Bartone IIIId and Vellciwliarm pans. eqlirppad,1NIth II Flit" 128 anglna end otller The IluIlllY Is limpllllllld cheap to buUd and pamfrom tile Fist850.

1Iecmer 1913 ~It NOTES

Thu question arises of why no ona hIlS ITALY thought of painting the body NATO olivo, building In II few military options and thereby AMPHIBIOUS TRUCK emtlng 8 military bug. ArmlllS complain about the em explo$lon and tho 8xcouIva weight of spacial vehlclllS. Wouldn't a modiflGd, possibly floatable Karlll!ln CfOSHOun1ry bug with II Volkswagon motor and parts be ado­ quat8 for IOI11!1 communication, carrier and messengor missions in NATO? The bu!lllV's low profile, Simple construction, 10\'11 price and simple logistical requirements are advantllfllls which cannot be overlookod.-&oldet und Teehnitr, @1973. An ltelian amphibious truck with Il 2·ton load capacity has baan developad by fiot. This NEW DRESS UNIFORM four-wltaal driva, unarmored truck haa e 120 horaapewar dlasBI motor which enablllll the vehicle to echill1l9 speads up to 90 kilometers par hour (about 56 milaa per houri on the read Gnd up to 10 kph (about 6.2 mph) in still wam. This floatable truck may bu used for amphibious opsrations.-$oldat und Technik, @ I1973 •. INDIA

WARSAW PACT EQUIPMENT

The Bund_uh, hopes to improvo its imugs at social and public eppllllrancas with a nsw In recent years, the Indian Army has lIean dress uniform for offical'S. equipped with an increalling number of WIlap· This uniform is standard for all blllnchllS of 0118 lind tnllteriel from Wersaw Pact sourcllS. the service, including ~ jaekat without mila­ During the.lndia-Pekistan conflict. CZGcholllo­ referred to as 8 mess i*ket or ''Spancer''-with valdan OTM armored psrsonnel corriers, buttons and chain closure. Acummarbund will SKOTt/As (lIS shown llllove' and Soviet Mi-8 be worn with It. The jacket COIII!IS in black for medium triinsPllrt helicopters (MR, Apr 1973, the army, blufl1i/llY for the l.uftwaffe and blue p 100) were used.-$oldBt und TBchnik, @ for the nevy.-OiB Bundeswehr. 1973.

100 MilitD" Reviaw BOPKS

THE MILITARY AND AMERICAN SOClm, Essays military projects which injure the en­ and Readings. Edlte_ by Stephen E. Ambrose and vironment, but, in a later essay, he James Alden Barber Jr. 322 Pages. Free Press. asserts that surelY the military is not 1912. $10.00: solely to blame for all domestic and foreign problems. There should be "a AMERICA'S ARMY IN CRISIS: A Study In Clvil-MliJ. tIllY Relations by William L. Hauser. 242 Pagss. period of respite from criticism," a Johns HDpklns University Press. 1913. $8.50. period for healing "psychic wounds" and restoring "the shaken standards The most intriguing issue raised by of military professionalism." King's these two books is the art of construc­ X on the ecology. tive criticism by loyalists. The more William L. Hauser wants a respite conservative approach belongs to Ste­ too. Do not, he tells the "media and phen E. Ambrose and James Alden j)academia, ••. press too hard for im­ Barber Jr., two men who treat the .~ mediate and radical reform." Like armed forces sympathetically (Am­ i Ambrose and Barber, however, Hauser brose, a history professor at Louisiana I demonstrates a desire for change. He State University, writes frequently -.::-has even boldly supplied the chapter about the military; Barber, a career' :1' missing in so many critiques, "What naval officer, formerly held the Ste­ To Do and How To Do It." Undoubt­ phen B. Luce Military Chair of Naval edly, that chapter-specific, sensible, Strategy at the Naval War College.) mildly radical-will command the most In their book, any unadorned hostility attention within the Army establi~­ toward the military comes from au­ ment. It has something for eve!'on,,\ thors of the readings, a disparate to argue about. group ranging from Elizabeth Drew Hauser's tone, though, is not h sh. and I. F. Stone to the essential infield A colonel who will clearly exert a g~­ combination of every military-social eral officer's influence on civil-milita~ all-star array, Huntington to Janowitz relations soon, he is far too circum:' to Moskos. spect to jeopardize the harvest of his \ Ambrose and Barber synthesilile and past accomplishments or the bloom of mediate in their own well-written es­ his future. He will criticize the Army says and dispel any notion that the with care: . book is meant to be an anthology. 1 am an Army officer and am 1/JeU Furthermorl!, despite the many sub­ aware that internal criticism must be jects mentioned and the few pieces loyal. The book is written in tk4t reprinted, there is no bibliography Bpirit--not to ezpo8e the faulta and pointing a reader to other documents. troubles of the Army but to note such Such a deficiency intimates that Am­ shortcoming8 Its are aweady public brose and Barber want to have the last knowledge, and to 8Uggest how profes­ word. sional soldier8 and other men 'of good Yet the role of ultimate conciliator fOill might build a better Army for the can lead to wanting matters both future. ways. For instance, Barber suggests Moving from the overgenerous im­ that America should r~ly on Congress plication that all professional soldiers and the press to blow the whistle on are men of good will, Hauser deco­ Decembor 1973 1111 Ilf BOOKS rously invokes the muse of history fREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, Historlao, Scholar, with three short chapters on Bome fea­ TeS1llillr by Ray ill/en Billington. 589 Pll!les. Ox· tures of the transitional experience of fGrd University Press. 1973. $17.50. the German, French and British Ar­ mies in the post-World War II period. This is the first full-length biogra­ He uses those accounts to show by phy of an American historian and comparison that our Army is behin.;t university professor. There are a few and should be un'dergoing fundamental disappointing autobiographies, but social change now. Hauser's argument, this well-written and well-researched although too brief and selective to be biography is unique in Its portrayal wholly persuasive, permits him, never­ in depth of the life and intellectual theless, to set down a method for an­ development of such a person. alysis. Pick the critical areas named Frederick Jackson Turner's career by history, review the' American spanned from the 1880s to the 19808. Army's experience in those are8.8 8.8 He asked important, original questions reported by the press, and propose the about American history and advanced changes dictated by historical impera­ explanatory theories which still eause tive. It is by design a scrupulously heated controversy. His most famous bloodless process. theories were, in his biographer's Still, Hauser yearns for the mav­ words: erick's scar. He cannot resist borrow­ ... that the frontiering experience ing a currently well-known technique: helped 8hape the character of the It would be comforting at this point American people and their institutions to say that the fundamental strengths . . . rand] that sectional conflicts un­ of the military profession are reas­ derlay much Of the political deeision­ serting themselves and that every­ making of the nineteenth century. thing will be all right. It 71~ight alBo He went to great lengths trying to be more prudent, for an in-house prove his ideas, and, in the process, critic. However, ignoring the existence he pioneered the interdisciplinary ap­ of the Army's problema or the diffi­ proach to historical study (branching culty of finding solutions for them into economics, SOCiology and geogra­ 1vould be a.false Bort of royalty. phy), as well as quantitative methods But Hauser's judiciouB prudence of research. Ray Billington, a distin­ carries him through his duel un­ guished historian in his own right, wounded because he is a IOY!l1 officer, describes and analyzes Turner's in­ albeit one dedicated to changing and tellectual development and the contro­ improving the Army. While the Army versies about his theories. even now in its moment of crisis needs The biographer is well aware, how­ the attention of reporters with more ever, that minds are not disembodied. distant perspectives to scrutinize what He describes Turner's life as a pro­ it is doing to all environments which fessor at the University of Wisconsin it touches, the Army also needs, now and Harvard. He was involved in both more than ever before, friends who university and professional controver­ like Hauser, Ambrose and Barber are sies. In March 1906, at the University willing to think and are able to put of Wisconsin, a mob of students those thoughts intelligently before the marched to hiB home and threatened Army and the nation. him because of his efforts to abolish LTC PETER L. STROMBERG, USMA big-time football. Undergraduates

102 Militsy RovIl!w gave bim mixj!d reviews as a lecturer, AMERICAN HISTORY IN AMERICAM TROUM. CIIrI. but graduate students raved about IIpbar Colulllllus II RelllJ AdDIs by Bert _as him. Given the relatively small num­ Lae.enberg. 131 Pages. Simi. " Icbm.... -1172. ber of professional historians in Tur­ $14.95. ner's era, one is amazed by the large number he taught. Several became Professor Loewenberg has written noted historians: all spresd his fame. "a history of ideas," the purpose of Turner enjoyed food and a good cigar which is ''to trace the development of and loved fishing and camping. Bil­ historical scholarship in the United lington meticulously described the States from the European sources of lifestyle in such ways 88 salary and its origin.••." American History in cost~f-living expenses, 88 well 88 in American Thought -is the first of a his depietion of the atmosphere in series of four planned volu!Des to be Madison and in the Boston area. No called Historical Writing in American one could be as inventive as Turner in Culture. The present work carries the thinking up ways to avoid putting storyifrom Columbus' first voyage to words on a blank page. The author World War I. 1 discusses this' inability to do sustained The coverage of major historians work and the constant worry it caused over the span of 401) years is virtually Turner who only produced two books complete. For the most part. Loewen­ in his lifetime. berg has succeeded in creating a Billington makes it clesr that he is graceful blending of historiography very favorable toward his subject al­ and intellectual history. The chapters though he does point out weaknesses on Jared Sparks, Herbert Baxter and failings of his hero. For those Adams and Henry Adams are espe­ who cannot debate the validity of cially well done. For the resder who Turner's theories (and I include my­ is substantially ignorant of the scope self in that group), there still remains and development of the writing of the fascination of reading about them American history before 1900. Loe­ and the related controversies. For wenberg would be a fine introduction. anyone interested in life in the mis­ No other single volume has Loewen­ named "ivory tower," this book is an berg's blend of the cultural back­ excellent introduction. As I resd it, 1. ground and the writing of history, nor was struck by the similarity of i88Uef does any other book provide so com­ and situatio~ in Turner's day with prehensive a trestment of the histo­ those university professors have had rians of the earliest period of Ameri­ to face within the last 10 years. can history (1492-160'1). Finally, Billington provides a thor­ But Loewenberg may have under­ ough description and analysis of how taken to do ~oo much. In trying to mix one great historian worked and, :88 historiography and intenectual his­ part of the background, what is in­ tory, he may not have done full justice volved in writing history-e benefit to either. The brilliance of some of the to anyone who reads history. chapters, the smooth integration of This is an excellent biography and the two aimi!, is offset by the' failure will be a contender, I feel sure, for of others. notably those of the Ameri­ prizes this year. can Revolution and the Civil War. In EDW.utn M. CoFFMAN, the earlier parts of the book, this dif­ University of Wisconsin ficulty is compounded by a rambling DIeaar 11173 1113 lit BOOKS and discursive style. The better chap­ authors of some of the essays have ters are much tighter and smoother­ updated their work to take into ac­ perhaps because Loewenberg is writ­ count events which have taken place ing about periods more familiar to since they were initially prepared in him-or perhaps because Loewenberg 1968 and 1969. Some selections have does not make clear what he means by not been updated. The general con­ "culture." clusions of all remain essentially valid American History in American in either case. I Thought is ani impressive work-fully In the lead article, "Economic Fac­ and earefully, researched and docu­ tors in European Security," Klaus mented (545 pages of text, 111 pages Knorr concludes that economic fac­ of notes, plus a bibliography) and tors will not be compelling, but that well-indexed. The main difficulties are political factors will shape the future minor when compared to the solid organization of European security. In merits of this important book. Its use­ his article on technology and Euro­ fulness is such that most students of pean security, Victor Basiuk argues American history will want to own it. that military stalemate may well ad­ JOSEPH M. HAWES, vance the ability of nonmilitary tech­ Kansas State University nology to affect changes in the dis­ tribution of world power. He further argues that the United States must take the lead in developing policy for EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE ATLIlNTIC SYSTEM cooperative technological growth with by William T. R. Fox and Warner R. Schilling. 276 Western' Europe. The alternative; he Pages. Columbia University Press. 1973. $10.00. feels, is a growing technological «pm­ petition and a resultant negative '~m­ This book is one of a series of pact on the security of Western Eu­ studies sponsored by the Institute of rope. -, War and Peace studies of ¢olumbia The chapters dealing with 1mtain, University. It is one of two: volumes France and Germany all suggest, in which are an outgrowth of; a study different ways, a growing Europeani­ project on problems of European se­ zation of European security issues. curity. . \ I Britain has clearly committed itself Two of the essays deal with Western as a European power; France is tak­ Europe's pro s pee t for industrial ing on a lower profile internationally growth and technological advance in and acting more European. Germany relation to its eapability to organize is pushing its contacts to the east. It and defend itself without military all suggests less precise ties with the support and guarantees from the United States in the i m m e d i ate United States. Three of the selections . future. deal with the policies of Britain, The final two chapters address the France and Germany and their rela­ role of NATO, as well as the domestic tionship to European security in the pressures in the United States and immediate future. The final two es­ Canada to reduce the commitment to says deal with the contribution of Western Europe. The future of both North Ameriea to European security is seen as questionable. While, it is and the relationship of North Ameri­ argued, domestic pressures will per­ can security to that of Europe. The sist and possibly result in some with- 104 Military Rellisl'l drawal, it is unlikely that the United era more demanding rather tIum more States or Canada will disengage to­ cooperative.' He gives high marks to tally from Europe. On NATO, it is Fl>R for striking a balance between suggested that some sort of a Euro­ ihe competing demands without im· pean security system may eventually pairing the military effectiveness or replace NATO and that It is the task the political cohesiveness of the war­ of NATO to facilitate its eventual time coalition. creation. Dr. Herrilig is more critical of With the winddown of operations in . evente relevant to the evolution of Asia, American defense planners are . American aid policies after FDR's turning their attention toward Eu­ death. His interpretAtion of post-FDR rope. This book serves to' point out the developmente leaves no doubt that the important issues relating to the policies secured no advantage for the United States and Western European United States but aggravated tensions security. The military planner looking with the Soviet Union. toward Europe would do well to read The author's comments indicate this collection of thoughtful essays. that American assistance played only COL DONALD F. BLETZ, a small part in Soviet war operations Department of National and Inter­ up to the summer of 1943. And, while national Security Studies, USA we the lend-lease policy may have seemed to be a serious and major commitment by the White House, it was not a AID TO RUSSIA. 1941-1946, StrateiY, Dlplsmaey, major element in Kremlin strategy. tile Orlslns of tile Gild War by lIeolll0 C. Herring In attempting to evaluate the ef­ Ir. 385 Paps. CBIIIlIlbia Unlvorslty Press. 1973. fecte of aid policies on relations with $15.00. the Soviet Union, Dr. Herring con­ cludes that the aid program was not Dr. George C. Herring Jr., Associ­ an effective tool of diplomacy•. How­ ate Professor of History at the Uni­ ever, he does not discuss FDR's stra­ versity of Kentucky, has documented tegic miscalculations which were par­ well the evolution of American poli­ amount in shaping the basic power cies for erous wartime .aid to the configuration within the anti-Axis USSR fro 1941 to 1945, and for eeo­ coalition. The overriding interests of ce afterward-mo r e the coalition surely would have been than $10 billi before shipments were served better by giving top priOrity terminated in mid-194'1. to mobilizing all available resources Dr. Herring points out that, as of for opening the second front on the 30 August 1941, Franklin D. Roose­ Continent of Europe. Instead, FDR velt deemed aid to the. USSR as of and Winston .Churchill repeatedly paramount importance for the safety postponed the second front. That delay and security of America, giving it a not ol\ly incrcmsed str;dns aqd stresses unique status and top llriority with on AJlied ~alition politicc! during no expectation of a quid pro quo. 1942-44, but. also grea,tly fweakened 'In. his chronicle of subsequent. the US bargaining position! with the evente, the author defends the wisdom " Soviet Union concerning' political set­ of uncondii\onal aid, while conceding < tlement of the liberated areas. that the generous and conciliatory at- In ierins of ..the overall strategic tl~udesof ·FDR· made the Soviet lw- objectives, the'shipinents of militery DIIIi••III, .1113 105 ~Bt BOOKS

and economic aid to the USSR were no SITTING DULL. An Epic of tile PlaIns by Alosender effective substitute for prompt mili­ II. Adams. 448 Pagas. G. P. I'ntsam'u Sans. 11173. tary action on the Continent. The $1l.95. poorly conceived and executed post­ FDR aid policies for Soviet recon­ Here, told simply, is the panoramic struction could not have altered the sweep of a short threescore-year pe­ basic lines of military and political de­ riod in the history of the Western marcation in Europe even had they plains, a time of cataclysmic change. been conceived and executed more It begins with the 1881 birth of Sit­ prudently. ting Bull, during the presidency of DR. JOSEPH HAJDA, Indian-hating Andrew Jackson. It Kansas State University ends with his death in a sordid shoot­ out at his cabin in 1890 during a THE ORIGINS OF PEACE. A Study of Pascemaklnll badly bungled arrest scene. and tb, structul'll of Peace Settlements by Robert Interwoven with the historic tap­ F. RanUls. 550 Pages. Frau Press. 1913. $12.95. estry are the threads of tne famous warrior's life, few at first-the record The Origins of Peace is one of a is sparse-more numerous later as he series of studies sponsored by the In­ matures, assuming first a stature and stitute of War and Peace Studies of importance among the HunkPapa Columbia University. The author is Sioux and, eventually, a place in the an Assistant Professor of Political written history of the white man. Science at Columbia. With the hindsight of history, we This work presents a systematic see him as the classic figure of Greek study of the ways foreign and civil tragedy, doomed by forces he cannot wars end. In so doing, he investigated control or even understand. For that wars waged between 1500 and 1971. was the brief span which saw the He classifies these as: simple external steadily rising tide of encroaching wars, simple internal wars, complex white settlers from the East, a seem­ external wars, complex internal wars ingly inexhaustible supply of them; and multilateral wars. the sudden intrusion of gold-seekers; The geljeralizations made are based the coming of the bluecoats and their on the study of past wars to include chain of forts protecting the trails the diplomatic' aspeCts of the peace West; the new plowshare invented by settlements, as well as the treatiea John Deere which made possible the concluded and other related docu­ plowing of the Great Plains, and Mc­ ments. Cormick's reaper which made the Professor Randle correlates the harvesting possible; and always more various political factors bearing upon land-hungry white men; and the end­ the peacemaking process. less perfidy of dishonored treaties. The book is valuable for its focus on That brief period saw the dwindling the major peace settlements since and, finally, the extinction of the 1500. The principal features of these great herds of buffalo, the Indians' settlements are covered in detail. This commissary. That short span of time work is a good reference for anyone marked the end of a unique way of studying modern European history. life: the nomadic, mounted plains LTC WALLACE P. FRANZ, warrior, who was brought to birth Consu~ting Faculty, USACGSC with the arrival of the horse, was lOS &llIitaJy Review doomed with the appearance of the "always a return to what they con­ iron horse. sidered traditional principles of Brit~ Author Adam~ewsman, lawman, ish ruIe"-Dr. Maier utilizes letters, banker and biographer-scotches the pamphlets and newspaper articles to popular misconception of Sitting Bull show how resistance to exeessive im­ as more medicine man than war chief, perial domination brought rational citing testimony of Frank Grouard, and dispassionate Americans to en­ Sioux captive and later adoptive gage in the first war for colonial inde­ brother of Sitting Bull. First and al­ pendence. ways a warrior of renown and of un­ Dr. Maier perceives a genuine ideo­ paralleled bravery, Sitting BuIl was a logical consensus among colonials who war chief with a reputation for dar­ accepted the "commonwealthinen" or ing and successful raids, for courage "Real Whig" radical thought of the age in battle, and for always being in the rather than the Tory or conventional forefront of any action. Whig tradition. While such radicalism Adamant almost to the end against affected only a tiny vocal minority in tamely settling on a reservation, he the mother country, it dominated took refuge in Canada after Little American political thought and led to Big Horn. However, the decline of the an unbridgeable intellectual gap be­ buffalo there, and impending starva­ tween the colonial and imperial leader­ tion, forced him to return to the ship. United States to take up the reserva­ The width of this chasm only became tion life he abhorred. His last years apparent when British reassertions of were bitter years of defeat. imperial control replaced years of Well-indexed and extensively anno­ salutary neglect. Ms. Maier pains­ tated, Adams' book includes a credit­ takingly traces the escalation of able assortment of contemporary pho­ radical thought-the utilization of tographs. While the book has nine restrained violence; the petitioning of pages of bibliography and 88 pages of the Crown, the boycotting of mer­ notes, strangely, it has no map what­ chants, the coercion of fellow colonists soever, an unfo~ate omission in an through extralegal associations, the otherwise readable. and useful work. belief that a ministerial conspiracy LTC FIELDING L. GBp.VES. against American liberties was afoot, USA-Retired \ the implication of the King in. the plot, and the final disillusionment about FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION, Colonial RIIIII­ many Briton's willingnees to main­ cals and DevGlapmeGt of American Opposition til tain their traditional liberties-all of Britain, 1185-1178 111 Pauline Maler. 318 Pages. which eventually eroded American af­ Alfred /I. Kngpf. 1972. $10.00. fection for the imperial connection. Little of what the author says is Professor Pauline Maier of the Uni­ new to scholars. However, she S/lYS it versity of Massachusetts, Boston, ex­ well, and her book brings to mind a pands upon the theme of the American number of issues relative to 'the con­ Revolution as an inteIlectual move­ temporary world. Did the activities ment. Concentrating on the American of the Sons of Liberty constitute a "radicals"-that is, those "men who conspiracy· against the Crown along most thoroughly criticized British gov­ the'lines of argumentation in the re­ erning practices" and who sought cent Chicago ·Seven Trial? How· does Dlcamt.er 1873 107 ~IR BOOKS one maintain political stability when nized army, increased emphasis on divergent intellectual opinions wrench tanks and creation of an air force a society apart7 What happens to re­ were not fully realized because of do­ spect for authority when corruiltion mestic political and economic consid­ and misuse of power in high places erations. allegedly occurs? These questions are The discussion of World War II is raised, but not answered. The reader of interest because Collier concen­ is given new reasons to contemplate trates on the lesser known operationa modern America when finishing this of the war. Major events in Europe fine historical analysis. and the Pacific are only summarized. MAJ DAVID C. SKAGGS, USAR, More significant attention is devoted Co1l8tllting Faculty, USACGSC to operations in Europe prior to the US entry into the war, the Middle lHE LION AND lHE EABLE: British aD~ AllgllI-lIl!ier· East and North Africa, and Southeast iean Strategy, 1Il00-1950. lIy Basil Collier. 499 Asia. Pages. \I. P. Putnam's Sons. II. Y~ 1972. $12.95. MAJ JOHN A. HARDAWAY, Department of Strategy, USACGSC Basil Collier, noted British military historian, has written an interesting UNITED STATES MILITARY SIIIlDW, 1812·1943 by survey of the period covering the de­ Ranliy Stellon. 158 PIIgas. University of Oklahoma cline of the' British Empire. Unfor­ Press. 1973. $7.95. tunately, the title leads one to expect a thorough: examination of British This is a great book. Specialized. and Anglo-American strategy from and a bit esoteric perhaps, but a great 1900 to 1950. Whft actually emerges book. The United States Army doubt­ is a pro-British vrfw of the principal less developed and issued to its Cav­ military and, to I'n extent, political alry. Field Artillery. Quartermaster events involving j!:ngland and other and other mounted units the best mili­ nations during this period. tary saddles of any nation at any Using the British abandonment of given time. This is principally because the two-power naval standard as his these saddles were designed primarily starting point, Collier outlines the to keep the horse or mule in good significant lIecisions and policies prior shape for long, arduous marches. As to World War I. Approximately one­ veterans of riding a McClellan know, half of the book is devoted to Ithe the man came second. But seats could immediate prewar period, the wrur it­ be conditioned to this excellent saddle self and the peace settlement. Again, much as heads can be to a steel hel­ the discussion is concerned primarily met. with British strategy and operations. Historian and artist Randy Steffen There are excellent chapters on the has described and illustrated skillfully major military and political person­ and accurately every known US mili­ alities of the war. tary saddle. Not only are his drawings Two chapters detail the major attractive. but they are highly de­ events between the wars. The descrip­ tailed. This volume is a must for any­ tions of the vision of British military one interested in mounted warfare. leaders in planning modernized armed the Civil War or the Indian Wars. It forces make for fine reading. Unfor­ will long remain the definitive work tunately, sound plans for a mecha- on US military horse furniture and I 108 Military Review ~It lOOKS

how the mounted soldier and his this seriea, an analysis is first made equipment, really !oQked.-OWM, Ja. of the overall issue. This particular The' rlJ1Jiewer proudly laYB claim to analysis is four-sided; deaHn!r witb being the last mounted Armor officer the Kremlin's View of convergenCe, on aCtive duty---o.nd that in the 85th the Soviet treatment of specific cOn­ QM Pack Company. vergence theories, and the main tar­ gets of the official attacks, but also COIlVERGENCE OF COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISlib with the Soviet "use" of the conver­ Tbe SeYlet VI.w by leta aluff, foy D. Kubler. gence theory to achieve their own ob­ Rlcllard Soli and ,Annette Stiaflloill. 168 Pages. jectivea. The second portion of the UnivarsHy of Miami Press. 1973. $4.95 paper· text contains the supporting documen­ lIound. tation for the analysis. However, this material is presented without annota­ This brief documentary text focusea tion or comment! ' on the published Soviet p!>sition to­ The preface an,(i the 3S-page analy­ ward the concept of convergence­ sis are worthy 9f study and contem­ Western speculation that: plation. In view of both the apP!,rent • • . the differing societies of the shifts toward "European socialism" United States .and the Soviet Union within the United States and the an- ' are destined to move closer and closer Dounced economic reorganization and together until they finaUy converge'at reform,within the USSR, it is worth­ Bome in-between point; neither capi­ while to stop and to analyze the pat­ talist nor BociGlist but a hybrid of the tern that is apparently evolving, two. To many Americans, "convergence" The 92 citations provided span the implies a symmetrical blending of the time period from 1963 to late 1972 two systems, reaulting in a traditional and are from a wide variety of compromise. Whereas. according to sources. Soviet sourcea. any convergence. will Simply stated, the Soviet view is -by definition-h;.ve to be so as~­ that the convergence cannot take place metrical as to b~' a virtual victoty as long as the capitalist society con­ "under the banner of the lIIlarxi~t­ tinuea to foster elFPloitation-in the Leninist'ideology." name of private profit-of man by The value of this book lies within man. Thus, the most polemic verbal the authors' attempt to remiJid the attacks quoted in this collection are , reader that, as with Humpty Dumpty directed against Weatern economists in Alice in Wonderland. the USSR can and ideologistS such as Galbraith, Bos­ define words-to include "peacef.ul ~o­ tow, Founce, lIIlareuse and Daniel Bell. existence"-in any way that it dtosea. If the Sovist writers quoted are rep­ However, as with other docuiDeDtary resentative of the spectrum of views textS, the procedure'of selectivelY edit­ currently held. it is apparent that the ing quotes and announcements serVea Soviete have either overlooked the only to provide the,writer·or the stu­ xnodei'n-day prognoSticators of tech­ dent witb an initial research:entry noeraCysqch,8.s,011VIIU and Toftler, or and does not necessarily, give the'gen­ have not ecinaiaer.edtheirposltions eral reiuIer either'a balanced, or an wort]), the time' aita; effort requir.ed' to introspective view of the queation at fannulate, a specliiC' wunterposition. hand. Ali wi~ ,the Other monogloa}lbs of MAl WILLIAM G. HANNE, DLIWC Ilecllllller' 1873 1119 ~II BOOKS

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