Arnold Geulincx: Scepticismand Mental Holism

José María Sánchez de León Serrano Arnold Geulincx: Scepticismand Mental Holism

1Introduction

The Flemish thinker Arnold Geulincx (1624–69)isknown among historians of philos- ophyasone of the founders of modern occasionalism, the view that God alone, not creatures, exerts causal efficacy.¹ Being counted among the modern occasionalists, Geulincx has alsobeen associatedwith awide variety of philosophical tendencies. Whereas for some, he is merelyaminor disciple of Descartes, for others, he is the missing link between Descartes and Spinoza.² Acertain line of interpretation (nota- blyrepresented by Cassirer)sees Geulincx as aprecursor of Kant.³ Accordingtode Vleeschauwer,Geulincx is the first thinker who explicitlyequatedknowing and doing,thus paving the wayfor the constructivism of Giambattista Vico and Benedet-

 Comparethis brief characterisation of occasionalism with that of Clatterbaughinhis TheCausation Debate in Modern Philosophy 1637–1739 (New York: Routledge,1999), 97.The other founders of modern occasionalism wereLouis de La Forge(1632–66) and Géraud de Cordemoy (1626–84), although Geulincxdeveloped his own occasionalistic conception independentlyofthem. See Jean-Christophe Bardout, “Occasionalism: La Forge, Cordemoy,Geulincx,” in ACompanion to Early Modern Philoso- phy,ed. Steven Nadler (Boston: Blackwell Publishers,2002),140–51.Modern occasionalism would reachits apex with Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715); regarding the affinities and divergences between Geulincx’sand Malebranche’soccasionalism,see Steven Nadler, “Knowledge,Volitional Agen- cy and Causation in Malebranche and Geulincx,” BritishJournal for the HistoryofPhilosophy 7, no. 2 (1999): 263–74.Ihave explicitlysaid “modern” occasionalism, for avariation of this view (or group of related views,asoccasionalism is not ahomogeneous trend or school) alreadyexisted in medieval Muslim philosophy. See Ludwig Stein, “Antikeund mittelalterliche Vorläufer des Occasionalismus,” Archiv fürGeschichte der Philosophie 2, no. 2(1888): 193–245; also Dominik Perler and Ulrich Rudolph, Occasionalismus:Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-islamischen und im europäischen Denken (Göt- tingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht,2000). Forathorough reconstruction of the emergenceofoccasion- alism after Descartes, see Rainer Specht, Commercium mentis et corporis.Über Kausalvorstellungen im Cartesianismus (Stuttgart-BadCanstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag [Günther Holzboog], 1966).  This is BernardRousset’smain thesis in his posthumous work Geulincx entre Descartes et Spinoza (Paris:Vrin, 1999). In the earlyeighteenth century,Geulincxwas accused of Spinozism by Christian Thomasiusand Ruarda Andala. His philosophyhas been suspected of Spinozism ever since. See H. J. de Vleeschauwer, “Three Centuries of GeulincxResearch: ABibliographical Survey,” Mededelings van die Universiteit vanSuid-Afrika 1(1957): 1–72, and especiallyHan vanRuler, “Geulincxand Spinoza: Books, Backgrounds and Biographies,” Studia Spinozana 15 (2006): 89–106.  However,Cassirer also stresses the large gapbetween Kant and Geulincx. See Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit,3rd ed. (Berlin: VerlagBruno Cassirer,1922),1:552.

OpenAccess. ©2020 José María Sánchez de León Serrano, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-009 126 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

to Croce.⁴ Despite these multiple affiliations and fatherhoods—or perhaps because of them—Geulincx’sphilosophyhas rarelybeen studied for its own sake and remains widelyunknown.⁵ With the exception of de Lattre’sseminal work,⁶ we are still await- ing athorough studyofGeulincx’smultifaceted thought. Without pretending to fill this lacuna, the present studywill focus on Geulincx’s remarkable approach to human cognition and its extent,which constitutes the basis of his entire philosophy, includingthe occasionalism for which he is known. Geu- lincx’sposition in this regard is at first glance extremelyambivalent,ifnot incoher- ent.Onthe one hand, he seems to denythe possibilitythat the human mind may attain genuine knowledge and to embrace ahopeless scepticism. On the other,he presents his own philosophyasatrue metaphysics,which he defines as knowledge of thingsasthey are in themselves, independent of our consideration. Moreover,in his metaphysics,heendorses aquasi-pantheistic conception—quite reminiscent of Spinoza’s—that prima facie is the antipode to scepticism. Iwill try to make sense of these disparate claims and arguethat they actuallyform acoherent whole. In particular,Iwill show how Geulincx’ssceptical distrust of our cognitive powers leads him to embrace aform of mental holism, accordingtowhich the human mind is just aparcel or sub-region within an infiniteintellect.Furthermore, Iwill examine how our containment within God’smind enables us to grasp necessary truths but prevents us from understandingthe created world, whose existenceisacontingent fact that is unaccountable by reason. The example of Geulincx will thus reveal that afecund scepticism can, by discardingcertain objects as unknowable, open up areas of exploration that were hitherto considered impenetrable. Iwill structure my exposition as follows. In the next section, Iwillexamine Geulincx’sgeneral position on human cognitionand its apparent inconsistencies. In the third section, Iwill reconstruct Geulincx’sreasoning process in the first part of his True Metaphy- sics (Metaphysica vera), which seamlessly moves from an initial scepticism to ascer-

 See H.JdeVleeschauwer, “Lesantécédants du transcendentalisme. GuelincxetKant,” Kant-Stud- ien,45, 1–4(1953): 246–47.  Geulincx’sonlysignificant follower was RichardBurthogge(1637/38–1705), whostudied at the Uni- versity of Leiden in 1661and almost certainlyattended Geulincx’slectures. Geulincx’sinfluence is clearlyrecognisable in his Essay upon Reason and the NatureofSpirits (London: Dunton, 1694), which he dedicated to John Locke. Regarding Burthogge’sthoughtinconnection with Geulincx’s, see Cassirer, Erkenntnisproblem,1:543–53;Michael R. Ayers, “RichardBurthoggeand the Origins of Modern Conceptualism,” in Analytic Philosophy and HistoryofPhilosophy,ed. TomSorell and G.A.J.Roger (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), 179–200. Furthermore, scholars have unsuccessfullyattempt- ed to establish alink between Geulincxand Leibniz, mainlydue to Leibniz’ssimile of the two clocks, which also appears in Geulincx, despitethe fact that Eduard Zeller conclusively demonstrated in 1884 that thereisnosuch influence. See Eduard Zeller, “Über die erste Ausgabevon Geulincx’ Ethik und Leibniz’ Verhältnis zu Geulincx’ Occasionalismus,” Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preußischen Akade- mie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin 29,no. 2(1884): 673–95.  Alain de Lattre, L’occasionalisme d’Arnold Geulincx (Paris:Éditions de Minuit,1967). Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and MentalHolism 127

taining our containment in God’smind.⁷ In the fourth section, Iwill examine Geu- lincx’sdemonstration of the existence of acorporeal world by means of the notion of time. In the fifth and final section, Iwill focus on some aspects of Geulincx’scri- tique of Scholastic philosophywhich indirectlyilluminatehis own philosophical approach.

2Scepticism and the Priority of the Knower over the Known

Geulincx’sepistemological position is summarised in an explanatory note from his short treatise Metaphysics according to the Peripatetic Mind (Metaphysica ad mentem peripateticam).⁸ Neither the nature of this treatise (whichIwill brieflydiscuss in the last section) nor the context in which Geulincx inserts this explanatory note is impor- tant for us now.The text in question reads as follows:

We should not consider things insofar as they aresensible (i.e., insofar as they enter into the senses under acertain aspect), nor insofar as they are intelligible (i.e., insofar as we think of them in acertain way). Yetwecannot consider them as they areinthemselves[ut suntinse], from which we see our great imperfection. Therefore, it onlyremains for us to do (which we can and must do) that in the judgment of the mind, whenever we apprehend something under acertain mode of our thought (which we always do, and we cannot do otherwise while we arehuman beings), we always keep in mind that the thingisnot in itself as it is ap- prehended by us.Evenifwealways attributethe appearancesofthe senses and the intellect to the things themselves, thereisnevertheless something divine in us that always tells us that it is not thus,and onlyinitdoes our wisdom [sapientia]consist,insofar as we arehuman beings.⁹

This passagedistinguishes threewaysofconsideringthings: as sensible, as intelligible, and as they are in themselves. The first two ways show how thingsare in relation to us,both to our senses and to our intellect.Due to their relative character,these two ways of consideringthingsdonot count as real knowledge.Onlythe third waycan

 All references to Geulincx’sworks arefromthe standardedition: Arnoldi Geulincx Antverpiensis OperaPhilosophica,ed. JanPieter Nicolaas Land, 3vols (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1891–93); henceforth OP.The English translations of Geulincxinthis paper aremine.  OP 2:300–301;adpag.200.  OP 2:300–301;adpag.200: “Nos non debemus res considerare prout sunt sensibiles(id est,sub certa specie incurrunt in sensum); neque ut sunt intelligibiles (id est,sub certo modo anobis cogi- tantur). Sed ut sunt in se, non possumus eas considerare; unde videmus magnam nostram imperfec- tionem. Hocunum igitur restat nobis faciendum (quod et possumus et debemus facere), ut judicio mentis,quotiescunque rem aliquot sub modo aliquot cogitationis nostrae apprehendimus (quod equidem semper facimus,nec possumus aliterdum hominessumus), semper hoc teneamus,rem non esse ita in se, ut apprehenditur anobis.Etiamsi nos semper phasmata sensus et intellectus ipsis rebus tribuamus; tamen est aliquid divinum in nobis, quod semper dicit nobis, non esse sic; et in hoc unicoconsistit nostra, quatenus hominessumus,sapientia.” 128 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

rank as knowledge proper,insofar as it apprehends thingsasthey are in themselves; i.e., independent of our consideration. Yetthis description alreadyshows that knowledge is out of our reach, for we cannot,asitwere, go beyond ourselvesand consider thingsfrom astandpoint thatdiffersfrom ours.We seem, therefore, to be trapped in a deadlock and to be unable to overcomeour distorted view of things. In view of this predicament,Geulincx argues, there is onlyone thing that we can (and must) do; namely, to always bear in mind that thingsare not the waythatweperceive and con- ceptualise them. This awareness (or scruple) is the onlyknowledge available to us and is something divine in us (aliquiddivinum in nobis), for in away,itraises us aboveour cognitive imperfection, yetwithout thereby remedying our condition. Judging by this passage, Geulincx’sposition can be described as a resigned scepticism. Yethis statements in other passages, as well as his attempt to develop amet- aphysical system, seem to contradict the epistemological stance described above. In another explanatory note, he affirms that atrue metaphysics considers thingsasthey are in themselves, independent of us.¹⁰ Moreover,hetitles the exposition of his own philosophy True Metaphysics,thus suggesting that he is in possession of the knowledge that—accordingtothe passagequotedabove—human beingsare constitutively unable to attain.Does this mean that Geulincx’sviews concerning human knowledge are simplyinconsistent?Inwhat follows, Iwill show that this is not the case and that Geulincx’smetaphysical endeavour is actuallyasagacioussolution to the predicament described above. Between the mere consideration of thingsasthey appear to us and the (unattainable) apprehension of thingsasthey are in themselves, there is, for Geulincx, athird possibility.This third wayrefrains from considering things and focuses on the consideration of ourselves, i.e., of our minds regardless of their particularcontents. Giventhe general uncertainty of our knowledge,our only certainty is the mere fact that we think and perceive,irrespective of the objects that are thought and perceived. Geulincx calls this fact the “prerogative of the knower over the known.”¹¹ Certainly, knowledge requires bothaknower and aknown thing.Yet whereas the latter can somehow be absent—for instance,when we err— the former must necessarilyexist.Therefore, the onlypossible wayofexpanding our knowledge,once we realise that thingsare not the wayweapprehend them, is by taking our own thought as the point of departure for our philosophical inquiry. ForGeulincx, sceptical doubt is thus the negative flipside of the knower’spriority over the known things. Knowledge does not have its sourceinthe known objects, but in the knower’s self-certainty. Thus, our entire knowledge of the world must ex- clusively derive from acareful inspectionofourselves, without(unjustifiably) assign-

 OP 2:287.  OP 2:267. Arnold Geulincx:Scepticism and Mental Holism 129

ing anyreality to our perceptions beyond our consciousness.¹² This will be Geulincx’s strategyinhis True Metaphysics,asIwill show in the next section. Before examining Geulincx’sself-explorative approach more closely, we must clear up apossible misunderstanding.Byproposinganexploration of our own thought, Geulincx might seem to be engaginginthe second kind of consideration of the three listed above; i.e., the consideration of intelligible things. YetGeulincx does not simplydismiss sensibleknowledge in favour of intellectual knowledge,understandingthe latter as aknowledge by means of concepts. Forhim, both of them are equallyunreliable, insofar as they are concernedwith particularcontents—be they sensibleorintellectual—thus giving precedence to the known over the knower. Therefore, the self-inspection thatGeulincx proposes does not have the meaningof an inquiry into our basic set of categories or our conceptual apparatus. Forthe same reason, for him, the phrase “self-inspection” does not designate an investigation of the human soul as aspecific object among others or as aspecific realm of reality differentiated from others, for such an investigation would presuppose aprior classification of beings, apreexistent map of reality,asitwere, which we uncritically take for granted before exploring our ownthought. This kind of implicit assumption is preciselywhat Geulincx’s “prerogative of the knower over the known” calls into question.¹³ Hence, the onlyvalid starting point of knowledge is the consideration of our thought simpliciter,without further qualifications. One might rightlyobserve that if we put aside our entire set of basic concepts, the philosophicalinvestigation is left with nothing.Ifour onlycertainty is the mere fact that we think, regardless of what we think and how we think, we can justifiablyclaim that our initial certainty is almostnil. Yetthis objection, far from undermining Geulincx’sendeavour,actually strengthens it.Atthe beginning of the philosophical inquiry,Geulincx demands: “Be- fore enteringmetaphysics, youmust consider yourself empty of all knowledge.”¹⁴ The knowledge that Geulincx is seeking cannot depend on aprior knowledge,for that would contradict the prerogative of the knower over the known. Therefore, and in

 In Geulincx’s Ethics,self-inspectionis—together with self-contempt—one of the constituents of humility,which he views as the most importantofthe four cardinal virtues (that is: diligence, obe- dience, justice,and humility). Self-inspectionthus constitutes the foundation of both true cognition and ethics.See OP 3:30–37.Regarding the ethical significanceofself-inspection in Geulincx, see An- drea Sangiacomo, “Defect of Knowledge and PracticeofVirtue in Geulincx’sOccasionalism,” Studia Leibnitiana 46,no. 1(2014): 46–63.  One might wonder to which extent Geulincxcan actuallycarry out this questioning of givencat- egories,for he presupposes the real distinctionbetween the corporeal and the mental, in which respect he still moves within aCartesian framework. See the conclusion to this paper.For athorough comparison between Descartes and Geulincxregarding their criticism of receivedcategories and notions,see Mark Aalderink’s Philosophy, Scientific Knowledge,and Concept Formation in Geulincx and Descartes (Utrecht: Zeno, 2010).  OP 2:140: “[…]necessum est,utante ingressum in Metaphysicam consideres the ipsum ut vacuum ab omni scientia […]” 130 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

order to attain indisputable certainty,the philosophical inquiry must start from a zero-pointofknowledge.

3Geulincx’sAutology: Self-Inspection and Mental Holism

Geulincx’smain philosophicalwork, the treatise True Metaphysics,¹⁵ begins with an Autology (or self-knowledge), continues with a Somatology (or knowledge of the corporeal world), and concludes with a Theology (or knowledge of God).¹⁶ In this chap- ter,Iwant to focus on the first sections of his Autology and show how Geulincx’s initial scepticism seamlesslyexpands into the affirmation of an all-encompassing mind, of which the human mind is alimited parcel or sub-region. As already noted, the priority of the knower over the known dictates that atrue metaphysics cannot be derivedfrom aprevious knowledge.Thus, in asimilar waytoDescartes in his Meditations (and obviouslyfollowing his example), Geulincx establishes that we must doubteverything before enteringthe path of true knowledge.Yet he in- sists that this procedurehas nothing to do with the usual attitude of the sceptics, who do not aspire to knowledge and are content with remaininginpermanent doubt.Incontrasttothe sceptics, Geulincx intends to attain genuine knowledge while at the sametime remainingwithin the limits of the sceptical scruple described above. Therefore, the general doubtthatheproposes at the beginning of his True Metaphysics is onlythe threshold to afundamental, radical knowledge.¹⁷ Geulincx looselyadopts Descartes’smeditative approach in the first reflections of his Autology,onlytoderivequite different conclusions from Descartes, as we will soon see. Thus, he starts by observing that even if Iconsider myself empty of knowledge and uncertain of everything,itisindubitable that Iexist as athinking being.Therefore, cogito,ergosum. Even the stubbornest sceptic would have nothing to counter this certainty,which Geulincx calls the “prima scientia” (i.e., first discernment or first knowledge)ofhis Autology.¹⁸ Allfurther knowledge thatwemight attain must entirelyderive from this first certainty,without surreptitiouslyintroducing foreign elements. It is noteworthythatGeulincx avoids—as much as he can—using the word “res” with respect to the ego,for the fact that Ithink does not entail that Iama self-sufficient thing or asubstance. To draw such ahasty conclusionwould be are- lapse into the “reifying” thinkingthat Geulincx is trying to overcome and to privilege known thingsoverthe knower.Aswewillsee, it is preciselythis strict adherenceto

 OP 2:139–98;annotationsinthe same volume, 266–310.  The treatise also contains an introduction in which Geulincxelucidates, among other things,the relationship between metaphysics and the rest of the sciences.  See Rousset, Geulincx entre Descartes et Spinoza,50.  OP 2:147. Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and Mental Holism 131

his methodofself-inspection and the refusaltoreify thoughts that will enable Geu- lincx to overcome the limited scope of the ego. In anycase, having ascertained that Iexist as athinking being,Iobserve an infinitevariety of thoughts or modi cogitandi in myself. Iamaware that Isee,touch, hear, etc. Besides these kinds of sensations, Ialso observefeelings in myself such as love, fear,and hatred, as well as mental op- erations such as affirming,associating,denying,inferring,and the like. All these thingsare modes of my thoughtofwhich Iamaware and certain. We can thus establish asecond discernment,immediatelyderivedfrom the first,towit: Ihaveanin- finite variety of modes of thought.¹⁹ Geulincx observesthat the ascertainment of this truth does not commit us to affirming the existenceofthingscorresponding to these diverse modi cogitandi. If Iperceive alight,for instance, that does not mean that there is indeed alight beyond my perception, or,inthe event that there is, that the thing in question is the wayIperceive it.The sameapplies to all the things Ihear,smell, touch, etc. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that Ihavesuch perceptions, which are nothing but modes of my thought. Having established that Ithink and thatIcontain an infinite variety of modi cogitandi,Geulincx goes astep further by observing that despite the plurality of thoughts Ifind in myself, Iamsomething (quaedam)thatissimple, undivided, and devoid of parts.²⁰ Imay have abodythat is divisibleinto parts—which is still uncertain—but as athinkingbeing,Ihave no parts. Certainly, Ithink and perceive amultitudeofdiverse things, yetthe one that thinks and perceivesthis diversity is one and the same,and hence simple. When Isee, touch, and even when Iphiloso- phise, Iam, in all these different actions, the same “I.” Iwill return to the simplicity of the ego in the next section, when Iexamine Geulincx’sdemonstration of the ex- istenceofacorporeal world. The ascertainment of my simplicity leads to the next, decisive discernment; namely, thatthere are manythoughts in me that do not depend on me (multae suntinme, quae amenon dependentcogitationes).²¹ Iobserve aplurality of thoughts and sensations in myself that do not arise whenever Iwant. The simple act of observing the world around me fills me with impressions that take place in me independentlyofmywill. ForGeulincx, the given or found character of these thoughts is incompatible with the possibility of my mind being the author of them. “Givenness”²² and efficacy exclude each other,for efficacy bringsinto exis- tencesomething that was not therebefore, i.e., that wasnot given. Now,Geulincx argues, if Iamnot the cause of these thoughts,something other than me must cause them,for it is impossiblethat they come from nothing or merelyhappen spon-

 OP 2:148: “Varios habeocogitandi modos in infinitum.”  OP 2:149: “Egosum res una atquesimplex.”  OP 2:149.  Iemploy the notion of the “given” here in asimilar waytohow Salomon Maimon would charac- terise it acentury later in his Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie (Berlin: C.F. Voss,1790), 203: “Eine Vorstellung, deren Enstehungsartinuns, uns unbekannt ist” (“arepresentation whose means of origination in us is unknown to us”). 132 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

taneously.Itmight seem at first that they come from my body, but Istill do not know whether abodycan produce such sensations in me and, if so, how. We thus arrive at the central insight of Geulincx’sself-explorative approach, the one thatwill enable him to go beyond the limited scope of the ego. We have just seen that the infinite variety of thoughts in me that Ihavenot produced must come from something otherthan me. Now,the othernessthat causes all these thoughts in me must be aware that it causes them and of how it causes them; knowledge must nec- essarilyaccompanythe production of all these modi cogitandi. Geulincx observes that this requirement—i.e., no causation without knowledge—is actuallyaself-evident principle, which we onlyfail to grasp due to deeplyentrenched prejudices. Forinstance, we are used to thinking that when we approach afire and feel warmth, the fire produces that warmth. In like manner, we assume that the sun produceslight and that awaterfall produces aparticular noise. Put differently: we unjustifiablyas- sume that thingsthat are devoid of thought can be efficacious and bringabout certain effects. Yetthis prejudice dissolvesassoon as we payheed to the following self- evident truth: “That which youdonot know how to do, youdonot do” (“quod nescis quomodofiat,idnon facis”;henceforth, the quods nescis principle).²³ To make this principle clearer,recall that consciousness is the onlymeasuring stick or valid crite- rion in Geulincx’sinquiry and that we are not allowed to illegitimately introduce extra-mental elements. Since we do not know of anyefficacy except the one we im- mediatelyexperience in ourselves—i.e., one accompanied by knowledge—the notion of efficacyonlyhas meaning within the mental sphere.²⁴ From this,itfollows that the

 OP 2:150.Concerning the historical rootsofthe principle quod nescis,which go back to Galen’s De Foetus Formatione,see Emanuela Scribano, “‘Quod nescis quomodo fiat,idnon facis.’ Occasionalism against Descartes?,” Rinascimento 51 (2011), 63–86;see also AndreaSangiacomo, “Geulincxand the Quod Nescis Principle,” in TheOxford HandbookofDescartes and Cartesianism,ed. Steven Nadler, TadM.Schmaltz, and Delphine Antoine-Mahut (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2019), 450–64.In his illuminatingstudy, Sangiacomo shows that the quod nescis principle is alien to Cartesian philosophyand rather has its rootsinlateScholastic thought. According to Sangiacomo,this principle can equallybeused to support the autonomyand efficacyofnatural agents vis-à-vis God (namely, by at- tributingknowledge to them) and to restrict causal efficacytoGod alone (bydeprivingnatural beings of knowledge). Geulincxisclearlyinterested in the seconduse, and he thus attempts to integratethe principle intoDescartes’sdualistic framework, which reducesthe natural world to mereextension (deprivedofthought). This operation enables him to philosophicallyunderpin the Calvinistic view according to which God alone governs all events. Thus,Sangiacomo argues,Geulincx’sendorsement of the quod nescis principle serves aspecific agenda dictatedbyhis Calvinistic creed. Concerning Geulincx’sattempt to elaborate an ethical system (based on Cartesian premises) consistent with Cal- vinism, see van Ruler, “Geulincxand Spinoza: Books,Backgrounds and Biographies.”  Regarding Geulincx’s “subjective” or “mental” approach to the idea of causation—which distin- guishes him from the rest of the occasionalists—see Ursula Renz &Han van Ruler, “Okkasionalimus,” in Enzyklopädie Philosophie,ed. Hans JörgSandkühler (Hamburg: Felix Meiner,2010), 2:1843–46. Hume’srejection of volitional efficacyfeatures strikingparallels with Geulincx’suse of the quod nescis principle. Regarding the possible connection between the twothinkers, see Jason Jordan, “Voli- Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and MentalHolism 133

othernessthat producesall these modi cogitandi in me cannot be something that is brutishand devoid of thought.The fire cannot produce the feeling of warmth in me, just as the sun is per se unable to illuminate. The cause of all these effects must be abeing endowedwith consciousness and will, which knows exactlyhow to produce them. We must thus conclude (fifth discernment): “There is someone who knows and wills who is different from me” (“est sciensaliquis et volens diversus ame”).²⁵ Aside from my own existenceasathinking being,Imust admit the existenceofanother thinking being that induces those perceptions in me for which Iamnot responsible. This fifth discernment is full of consequences and contains Geulincx’sentire phi- losophyinembryonic form. Let us brieflyconsider some of its far-reaching implica- tions. We have seen that the “givenness” of certain thoughts excludes the possibility of me beingtheir cause. If Iweretheir cause, Iwould know how to produce them, and thereforeIwould not merely find them in myself, independent of my will. Thus, the givencharacter of certain thoughts in me indicatesthe limitation of my intellect,which would be perfect if it werethe cause of all its thoughts.Aperfect mind does not find anything—i.e., it is not passive or receptive—and thereforeitisthe only author of its thoughts and perceptions. Iamthereforelimited and imperfect,insofar as Iampassive and receptive.Yet Iamnot passive with regardtosomething that is not,inturn, amind. Something devoid of thought—such as abody—cannot act upon me, for,asrepeatedly observed, there is no causationwithout knowledge.Behind the impressions Ihavenot produced, there is not an unknown thing,but the unknown action of another mind. Therefore, if Iamlimited and passive, it is so necessarily with regardtoanunlimited mind. Anotherway of saying this is that Iamalimited intellect within an unlimited,all-embracing intellect,and my being part of it accounts for both my thinking power and my cognitive imperfection.²⁶ Guelincx can thus affirm: “We are from God and belong to God; we are not God Himself, because of our limitations and imperfections, with respect to which we do not belong to God,

tional Efficacyand the Paralytic’sArm: Hume and the Discursus of Occasionalism,” Intellectual His- toryReview 25,no. 4(2015): 401–12.  OP 2:150.  We find asomewhat similar explanation of our cognitive imperfection in Spinoza. See his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect,inOpera,editedbyCarl Gebhardt(Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925), 2:28;TheCollected WorksofSpinoza, edited and translated by Edwin Curley (Princeton:PrincetonUni- versity Press,1985–2016), 1:33: “But if it is—as it seems at first—of the natureofathinkingbeingto form true, or adequate, thoughts, it is certain that inadequateideas arise in us onlyfromthe fact that we arepart of athinkingbeing, of which some thoughts whollyconstitute our mind, while others do so onlyinpart” (“Quod si de natura entis cogitantis sit,uti prima fronte videtur,cogitationes veras sive adaequatas formare, certum est,ideas inadaequatas ex eo tantum in nobis oriri, quod pars sumus alicuius entis cogitantis,cuius quaedam cogitationes ex toto,quaedam ex partetantum nostrum mentem constituunt”). 134 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

for they do not belong to our being, but to non-being.”²⁷ Observethat just as our limitations and imperfections do not belong to God, nor do they belong to us, for limitation is simply alack of being,and hence our being is not different from God’s. Geu- lincx illustrates this point immediatelyafterwards with the following simile (which drew him accusations of Spinozism): just as avast prairie is divided into parcels, our minds can be considered parcels or sub-regions of God’sunlimited mind.²⁸ If youremovethe parcels—i.e., the limitations—there remains onlyacontinuous and unlimited space. Similarly, if youremoveour cognitive limitations, thereisonlyan infinite mind.²⁹ We can thus see how Geulincx’sself-explorativeapproach, together with the quod nescis principle, enables him to reestablish the continuity between the infinite and the finite and to embrace aform of mental holism. It is noteworthythat Geulincx arrivesatthis bold conclusion without ever abandoningthe element of thought; i.e., by focusing on our consciousness alone and without presupposing anything previouslyknown.³⁰ Iobserved in the previous section that for Geulincx, scepticism is the negative flipside of the knower’spriority over the known. Now we can affirm that mental holism is the positive flipsideofGeulincx’sscepticism. YetalthoughGeulincxadvocates mental holism—i.e.,thatall mindsare butone mind—he does notthereby advocate idealism;i.e., that thewhole of realityisofa mental nature.AsIwill show in thenext section, he contends that Godcausesanin- finite variety of thoughts in me throughthe mediationofthe body.Hence,there is after allsomething external to themind, whichisnot just anothermind, butsomething cor-

 OP 2:269: “Nos sumus ex Deo et pertinemusadDeum; non sumus tamen ipse Deus, propterlim- itationes et imperfectiones nostras, respectu quarum ad Deum non pertinemus, quia non pertinent ad nostrum esse, sed ad non-esse.”  OP 2:269; also 293. Rousset argues (Geulincx entre DescartesetSpinoza,86) that our mind’scon- tainment within God’smind is not to be takenliterally, but rather in the sense that our minds are imperfectinstantiations of God’sperfect mind. Rousset’smain reason for rejecting mental holism in Geulincxisthe fact that Geulincxstill conceivesthe relationship between God and His creatures in terms of “creation,” anotion that in Rousset’sopinion is clearlyincompatible with holism or mon- ism. Against Rousset,itmust be notedthat Geulincxexplicitlyequates “creation” with God’s “self- limitation.” See the followingpassagefromhis Annotata latiorainPrincipiaPhilosophiaeRenati Des- cartes (OP3:381): “Quod Deus creare possit,abaeternitatesua habet; cum enim inde primus sit, atque ideo etiam illimitatus,potest etiam ille aliis quibusdam, quod in se eminentissime et illimitate habet, limitatecommunicare, dando illis portionem istius naturae, quam ille sibi totam et illimitatam vindicaverat. Limites enim ponendo certis suis perfectionibus, eas quodammodo alienat et extrase ponit,easdem tamen sibi retinens quatenus illimitatae sunt.” Regarding Geulincx’saccount of creation as self-limitation, see Brian Cooney, “Arnold Geulincx: ACartesian Idealist,” Journal of the His- toryofPhilosophy 16,no. 2(1978): 167–80.  OP 2:239: “Removeenim atelimitationem illam, qua intellectus tuus ita circumscriptusest,utin futurum prospiciat nihil, de praeteritis pauca recolat,depraesentibus non multa sciat,multa de rerumnatura ambigat, multa ignoret; his omnibus limitationibus […]ablates, quid nisi Deum ipsum, infinitam mentem aqua praecisus fueras,apprehendis?”  He himself stresses this (OP2:239;italics mine): “Et certecum bene hanc remperpendimus, nos ipsos examinando,cum id quod ad praecisionem, abstractionem, limitationemque pertinet,anobis removerimus, clarissime Deum ipsum in nobis agnoscimus et nos in illo.” Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and Mental Holism 135

poreal anddevoidofconsciousness.Yet this does notchangeany of theimplications just drawn concerningthe fifthdiscernment.Since causationrequiresknowledge, Icannotproperlysay that fire causes warmth in me,but ratherthatGod uses fire as an instrument to producewarmthinme. Here,wecan recognise Geulincx’soccasionalism;i.e., theviewthatonlyGod hascausalefficacy. By establishing that there is no efficacy withoutconsciousness, Geulincx is committedtoaffirming theexistence of an omniscient beingthatconcentratesall efficacy in itself.Certainly,the mere prin- cipleofquod nescis does notdeprive me of allefficacy: although Iampassive regard- ingcertain thoughts,Iam theactualsourceofothers, such as my intentions,volitions, consents,denials,and thelike. Yet, in anycase, Icannotbring aboutanythingbeyond my ownmentalsphere withoutthe assistance of another(knowing) being. Forin- stance,Icannot move my ownlegs solely in virtue of myself,for Icannotexert an action on athing that Ihavenot produced,suchasmybody, even if Ifeelittobe“mine.” My body is something giventome,and thereforesomethingthatisforeigntomy knowledgeand as such asignofmymentallimitations.Inevery action of mine in whichsomethingforeigntomymindisinvolved, Icannotbethe only cause, and theconcurrenceofanother knowingbeing thereforeisindispensable.Considernow theentire createdworld as an infinite aggregateoffinitebeings—be they mindsorbod- ies—interactingwithone another. Theirinteraction is inconceivable withoutGod effect- ingit, forbodiesare devoid of efficacy andparticularminds do notcause anything beyond thesphereoftheir consciousness. Hence, we must conclude that an unlimited omniscient beingconnectsall particular things with oneanother andconstitutes their unifying principle. Thewords of theapostle thus receivetheir proper philosophical meaning(Acts 17:28): “Forinhim we live,and move,and have ourbeing” (“in ipso enim vivimus, et movemur, et sumus”).³¹

4Multiplicity,Time, and Corporeality

After demonstrating that an infinite mind causesthose thoughts in me for which Iamnot responsible, Geulincx goes on to demonstrate that it produces these thoughts by means of abody, not immediately. To show this is the purpose of the sixth and seventh discernments of the Autology,inwhich Geulincx’sreasoningbe- comes somewhat obscure. His argument,inbroad strokes, runs as follows. Recall that the human mind is something simple and undivided: Iamone and the same throughout my various mental states.God is also amind, and hence is equallysim- ple and undivided. Now,since variety cannotemanate from something simple (at least directly), the variety of thoughts Ifind in myself cannot emanate either from me or from God. Such variety is onlyexplainable by means of something intrinsically multiple or susceptible to multiplicity.Such is the case with matter (or extension),

 OP 2:239; also 293. 136 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

which—in contrast to the mental—admits division and multiplicity. Yetthe mere notion of extension does not entail division, but merelysusceptibility to being divided. Considered in itself, extension is something homogeneous and uniform.Inorder for multiplicity to emerge from mere extension, there must also be motion, which, together with matter, generates the diversity of figures we encounter in the corporeal world.³² Since mere corporeality is unable to generate motion, God must be the one who—by acontingent decree of His will—introduces motion, and hencevariety, into the corporeal world.³³ The diversity of my thoughts is thus duetothe diversity introduced by God in inert extension. It might seem here thatGeulincx betrayshis own self-explorativeapproach by surreptitiouslyintroducing an unjustified assumption; namely, the existence of acorporealworld besides the mental.If, up to this point,Geulincx has remained within the limits of amere self-inspection, the sudden talk of corporeality in the sixth and seventh discernments seems to violate this re- striction.Atfirst glance, it is alsounclear whyGeulincx needstointroduce corporeality (and motion) in order to account for the diversity of our thoughts.Wehaveseen that the “givenness” of our thoughts indicates the existenceofanother mind, which —in contrasttoours—is unlimited and able to generate impressions in us without our will. If our containment in God’smind alreadyaccounts for our limitation and pas- sivity,and hence for the existenceof“given” thoughts in us, whydoes Geulincx addi- tionally need to invoke something extra-mental? Whycan he not attribute the variety of our thoughts directlytoGod’sefficacy?Clarifying this question is the goal of the following considerations. Despite appearances, the introduction of the corporeal in this context is far from gratuitous (although its actual justification appears much laterinthe text,inthe So- matology).³⁴ The keytothe present difficulty lies in the notion of time. Time and succession presuppose motion, for if everything wereatrest,itwould make no sense to talk about time.Motion, in turn, presupposes corporeality,for onlybodies are susceptible to motion. Now,Iam conscious of time and there is acertain succession of mental states in me. Hence, since time presupposes motion, there must be bodies in motion, and thereforeaphysical world! Note thatGeulincx is not saying thatphys- ical motion (from which time derives) causes avariety of mental statesinme, but rather that God uses physical motion as ameans to produce this variety of mental states.Asalreadynoted, entities devoid of thought such as bodies are unable to pro- duceanything by themselves, either among themselvesorinmeasathinking being. God is therefore ultimatelyresponsible for the succession of mental states in me. Yet since time is inconceivable without physical motion, the temporality of my mental states necessarilyrequires the mediationofthe corporeal. The gist of Geulincx’sargu-

 ForGeulincx, division and motion arethe same thing. See OP 2:279, ad pag.176.  The idea that physical motion can onlybecaused by amind would reappear,outside of occasion- alist circles, in George Berkeley’sessay De motu,written and published in 1721.See TheWorks of George Berkeley,ed. Alexander Campbell (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1901), 1:487–527.  OP 2:176–77. Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and Mental Holism 137

ment is the following:ifthe mind werethe onlyexisting reality,therewould be neither plurality nor mutability,onlyarigid and undifferentiated simplicity.³⁵ Difference and mutability are foreign to pure thought,which—as the third discernment has alreadyshown—is one and simple. Therefore, besides pure thought, we must assume the existenceofabeing capable of being modified, differentiated and divided, in order to account not onlyfor the temporality of mental states,but also for the exis- tenceofdifferenceand multiplicity as such. We onlyfind such susceptibility in the corporeal. Certainly, God’screation of acorporealworld and the suffusion of motion in it are incomprehensible events for us. Theemergence of multiplicity and mutability from the divine mind, although an undeniable fact,isamystery beyond our cognitive grasp.³⁶ Iwill return to this point in the next section. The demonstration that God acts on us by means of the corporeal allows Geu- lincx to explain other things, such as the union of my mind with aparticularbody —i.e., “my” body—as wellasthe dissolubility of such aunion (which opens the door to aproof of the mind’simmortality). Moreover,the introduction of the corporeal into the philosophical inquiry sets the basis for aphysical doctrine of aCartesian nature, which Geulincx presents in his Somatology and develops in his True Physics (Physica vera).³⁷ However,dealing with these issues would go beyond the boundaries of this paper.Inany case, Geulincx’sdemonstration of the existence of acorporeal world by means of the notion of time appears to be if not forceful, then at least plau- sible. As agood Cartesian, Geulincx takes extension and thought as the most funda- mental notions and the supreme generaofthings.³⁸ Just as the mental is aprimary reality,unexplainable by something other than the mind itself, the physical has es- sentialfeatures thatcannot be deduced from the mental alone.³⁹ In this respect,

 Here, Geulincxtouches upon adifficulty that would become cruciallyimportant in German Ideal- ism; namely, the origin of differenceand non-identity.Whereas thinkers likeFichte would take non- identity as external to thought, Hegelwould attempt to conceive non-identity as intrinsic to thought (i.e., identity) itself.  We should not forget, however,that Geulincxattempts to provide arational account of the idea of “creation.” See note 28 above.  OP 2:368–457.  See Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy,§48, in ŒuvresdeDescartes,ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris:Vrin, 1974–1989) 8:23; Philosophical Writings of Descartes, ed. and trans. John Cotting- ham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch(vols.1and 2),and AnthonyKenny(vol. 3) (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,1984–1991), 1:208: “But Irecognize onlytwo ultimateclasses of things:first,intellectual or thinkingthings, i.e. those which pertain to the mind or thinkingsub- stance; and secondly, material things,i.e.those which pertain to extended substance or body” (“Non autemplura quam duo summa genera rerum agnosco:unum est rerum intellectualium, sive cogita- tivarum, hoc est,admentem sive ad substantiam cogitantem pertinentium; aliud rerum materialium, sive quae pertinent ad substantiam extensam, hoc est,adcorpus”). On this point (as in manyothers), Spinoza also appears to be very close to his contemporary and compatriot Geulincx, as they both en- dorse aholism with respect to both the mental and the corporeal.  It should be clarified that the irreducibility of the corporeal to the mental onlyholds for us (quoad nos), finiteminds,insofar as the infinite’smind creation of extension is beyond our comprehension. 138 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

for Geulincx, thought and extension are—as de Vleeschauwer fittingly puts it— “transcategorial realities” independent of our knowledge.⁴⁰ Note that thatwhich ini- tiallylooked like an unattainable goal—i.e., knowledge of thingsasthey are in themselves—now appears to be the necessary outcome of aself-inspection that is distrust- ful of our cognitivepowers.The initial scepticism has thus developed into alimited, yetindisputable knowledge.Fromthe objectivevantage point thus attained, it is now possibletolook at the common misconceptions of philosophers and unmask the mechanism behind them. As Spinoza repeatedlystresses, “veritas index sui et falsi”:the true accounts for itself and for its opposite, the false.Inaccordance with this principle, Geulincx attaches to his True Metaphysics an annex entitled Met- aphysics according to the Peripatetic Mind,⁴¹ wherehecriticallyexamines the basic notions of Scholasticism, which for him is the philosophicalexpression of common sense. In order thus to completeour brief exposition of Geulincx’sepistemological views, it is pertinent to take abrief look at this work.

5Anti-Dogmatism andthe Critique of Scholasticism

In his Metaphysics according to the Peripatetic Mind,Geulincx declares Peripatetic philosophyfalse from the very outset.⁴² In accordance with the classification present- ed in the second section, this kind of philosophyisaconsideration of things relative to us,hencedevoid of objective validity.For Geulincx, the falsity of Peripatetic phi- losophycomes from its naive pretension of directlyexploring thingswithout previ- ouslyexploring the knower itself.Peripatetic philosophybarelyproblematises our cognitive access to reality,and thus it takes mere appearances—both sensitive and intellectual—for the thingsthemselves. Insofarasitassigns to the thingsthemselves that which is onlyrelative to us, this kind of philosophyisdogmatic. Geulincx’smain purpose in this text is thus to surmount dogmatism from within by showing the de-

Quoad se,however,the corporeal entirelyderivesfromthe mental, for the corporeal is passive,and the passive is necessarilyposterior (not in temporal terms, but ontologicallyand conceptually) to the active.See OP 2:160–61.  H.J. de Vleeschauwer, “Lesantécédants du transcendentalisme.” Thus,Geulincxclaims (OP 2:240): “Videmus itaque duas res singulares, menteminquam atque corpus,creditas hactenus ut uni- versales: illam Deum […], hoc vero creaturam.” As alreadyindicated in the previous note,weshould avoid construing the distinction between thoughtand extension as arigid dualism, for Geulincx equallymaintains that extension is “eminently” contained in God (see OP 2:300). In this regard, Coo- ney convincinglyargues (see “Arnold Geulincx: ACartesian Idealist”)that extension is only “external” to finiteminds,not to God, whocomprehends everything.  OP 2:199–265.  ConcerningGeulincx’scriticism of Aristotelianism in conjunction with that of Baconand Des- cartes, see Aalderink, Philosophy,Scientific Knowledge,and Concept FormationinGeulincx and Des- cartes,17–64. Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and Mental Holism 139

ficienciesofits conceptual apparatus. Iwant to focus on Geulincx’scritical exami- nation of two conceptual pairs thatare characteristic of Scholasticism: universality and singularity on the one hand and essence and accidentonthe other.The upshot of Geulincx’scritical assessment will roughly be the following:thatwhich is the most impenetrable and obscure for Scholastic philosophyisactuallythe most knowable for the human mind. Conversely, that which Scholasticismtakes as the most knowable is actuallythe most obscure.Thus, for Geulincx, God’sintellect before creating the world is the most accessible for the human mind, whereas the createdworld is the most impenetrable. In the section dedicated to universality and singularity,⁴³ Geulincx focuses his attention on the main intellectual operation of Scholastic philosophy: abstraction.⁴⁴ It is through abstraction that Peripatetic thoughtgenerates its basic concepts, such as being,substance,the one, etc. Abstraction consists in separating by means of the intellect aparticular content from the integral whole to which it belongsand considering it in an isolated manner.When the separated content is afeature common to various individuals,the product of abstraction is auniversal concept.Inthe case of the most general concepts, such as being or substance, the common feature is not a particularcontent (for such concepts are devoid of content), but an objectified mental operation.⁴⁵ There are cases in which abstraction does not separate something common to many, but instead simply one thing from another,such as when we abstract apoint from aline or aline from asurface. In anycase, abstraction is nothing but amental operation thatdoes not changeanything in the natureofthings. Yet Geulincx alsoobserves—quoting Aristotle—that “thosewho abstract do not lie” (“ab- strahentium non est mendacium”).⁴⁶ That is, we must concede that universals exist in the thingsthemselves, for abstraction selects “something” existing in reality (otherwise it would not be something). However,weshould not thereby assume that the thing thus abstracted exists in exactly this way;i.e., differentiated from the rest.Thus, the actual risk of abstraction consists in attributing aseparate and independent ex- istencetosomething that can onlyexist as part of something else. To illustratethispoint,take, forinstance, thenotionofbody. Particular bodies are finite andhaveaspecific shape. If we select thesefeaturesand universalise them,we mighterroneously conclude that thebodyorthe corporeal as such (simpliciter)ises- sentiallyfiniteand hasashape. Yetcorporealityinitselfisnot theresultofartificially separating (orabstracting) certainfeaturescommontoparticularbodies; rather, par-

 OP 2:235–40.  Regarding Geulincx’stheory of abstraction in the contextofseventeenth-century debates on abstraction, see againAalderink, Philosophy,Scientific Knowledge,and Concept FormationinGeulincx and Descartes,323–49.  Gabriel Nuchelmans traces Geulincx’sreflections on this issue back to the scholastic distinction between actus exercitus and actus significatus. See Gabriel Nuchelmanns, Judgment and Proposition from Descartes to Kant (Amsterdam:North-Holland Publishing Company, 1983), 100–104.  OP 2:236. 140 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

ticularbodiesare abstractionsofthe only existing body—i.e.,extension—whichas such is unlimitedand without shape. As we cansee,the validity of abstraction de- pendsonhow we applythe distinctionbetween theabsoluteand therelative. Since abstractionartificiallyseparates things that originally belong together,the abstracted contentisnecessarily relative to theintegral wholefromwhich it hasbeenseparated. Abstractioncan thus neverprovide access to an absolute andself-containedreality. Putdifferently:wedonot know what corporeality as such is by isolating features from particular bodies,but by removing allparticularities anddelimitations that we have superimposed onto thecorporeal.The corporealnaturemanifestsitselfwhen we eliminateits finite appearances. Thesameapplies to themind: particular minds arelimited andimperfect, butifweremoveall particularity, we will grasp themind as such,which is unlimitedand perfect(recall theanalogy with theprairie andits parcels in thesecond section).Inthisrespect, Geulincx observes that properly speaking, we should nottalkabout bodies andminds,but aboutcorporeal things andmental things.⁴⁷ In sum: abstractionseparates thefinitefromthe infinite,whereas in fact thefinite—i.e.,the delimited, theabstract—exists only within theinfinite andmust be conceivedthrough it. Note that theremoval of allparticularity that Geulincx com- mendsasthe rightway of graspingreality—as opposedtoabstraction—coincideswith thescepticalscruple discussedinthe second section. Only thedistrusttowards our ownsubjectiveforms and modi dicendi (“ways of speaking”)enables us to examine thought as such—i.e.,inanabsolutemanner—thus transcendingall relativity. Let us now pass to the notionsofessence and accident.⁴⁸ Essential is apredicate that necessarilybelongstoathing,sothat it is impossibletodenyitofit. Thus, the essence of the bodyistobeextended,and the essence of the mind is thought.There are also certain “secondary” properties that we can deducethrough reasoningfrom a thing’sessence, such as infinity from extension, its infinite divisibility,etc. There are, furthermore,predicatesofathing that do not necessarilybelong to it,sothat we can conceive the thing without them. Motion, for instance, presupposes extension, but does not immediatelyderive from it,asthe fact that we can conceive of extension without motion makes clear.The connection between these two notions is contingent—we could also say “accidental”—for we cannot movefrom the one to the other through an interrupted reasoning.For Geulincx,there cannot be anysci- ence of the contingent due to this gapinthe reasoningorscala rationis. The existence of contingent thingsdepends solelyonGod’swill, which Geulincx—following Des- cartes—clearlydistinguishesfrom God’sintellect.Tothe classofcontingent things belong the world, the sun, the earth and its parts, human beings,etc. Allthese things fall outside of the realm of the rational, for no demonstration can explain why they exist.Yet the impossibilityof“deducing” the contingent is not incompatible with tracing the root of contingent things. As alreadyshown, Geulincx can demonstrate

 OP 2:286–87.  OP 2:261–65. Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and Mental Holism 141

the existence of acorporeal world by virtue of the notion of time, which presupposes motion, which in turn presupposes extension. Although the upwards reasoningfrom time to extension is valid, the downwards reasoning from extension to time is not. From the existenceofcontingent things, we can inferthe existenceofacreator, but the existenceofcontingent thingsassuch is rationallyunaccountable, for it ex- clusively depends on God’sdecree. If we now connect these considerations with Geulincx’sreflections on abstraction, we can see that in away,the contingent and the finite (or abstract) coincide. As alreadyobserved in the previous section, motion generates the variety and multiplicity of thingsinthe corporeal world. Moreover,particular things—be they minds or bodies—are abstractions from unlimited realities without which they cannot be properlyconceived, yetfrom which they cannot be deduced. Thewhole realm of the finite and contingent is thus rationallyunaccountable for us. Thisrealm constitutes the point of departure of Peripatetic philosophy, from which it attempts to as- cend to the apprehension of the absoluteand unconditioned. Yetwehaveseen that the particularcannot provide access to the absolute. Forthis reason, Geulincx affirms thatScholastic philosophyhas an obscure notion of infinite realities.Bycon- trast,for Geulincx,infinite realities—such as thoughtand extension—are the only ones that are transparent to the human mind, as long as it refrains from grasping the particularand focuses on the inspection of its own self. Whereas Scholastic phi- losophyremains imprisonedinaworld fashioned by our subjective view of things, the intellectual itinerary proposed by Geulincx elevates the mind to the “transcategorial,” yetatthe cost of alienating it from the existing world.

6Conclusion

Geulincx’srich thought comprises further aspectsthatrequireaseparate examina- tion, such as afull-blown ethical system,⁴⁹ arelatively innovative logic,⁵⁰ and an out-

 See Ethics (Ethica)inOP3:1–271. The first part of Geulincx’s Ethics appeared in 1665under the title De Virtute et Primis Ejus Proprietatibus. Tenyears later (six years after Geulincx’sdeath), the complete Ethics was published.There is an English translation (which includes Samuel Beckett’snotes): Ethics, with Samuel Beckett’sNotes,trans. Martin Wilson, ed. Han van Ruler,AnthonyUhlmann,and Martin Wilson (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006). Geulincx’sethics features strikingparallels with Stoicism that have been explored by Ruben Buys, “Between Actorand Spectator: Arnout Geulincxand the Sto- ics,” BritishJournal for the HistoryofPhilosophy 18, no. 5(2010): 741–61.Regarding Spinoza’sand Geu- lincx’srespective approaches to human passions,see Mark Aalderink, “Spinoza and Geulincxonthe Human Condition,Passions,and Love,” Studia Spinozana 15 (2006): 67–87.  His main works in this area are Logica fundamentis suis restituta (OP1:165–454) and Methodus inveniendi argumenta (OP2:1–111), the first of which appeared the same year as La logique ou l’art de pensar by Arnauld and Nicole (1662).For instructive accounts of Geulincx’slogic, see Nuchelmans, Judgment and Proposition from Descartes to Kant,99–120; also Karl Dürr, “Arnold Geulincxund die klassische Logik des 17.Jahrhunderts,” Studium Generale 18 (1965–68): 520–41. 142 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

dated yetquite elaborate physics.⁵¹ In this paper,Ihave confined myself to what Itake to be the coreofhis philosophy; namely,the self-explorative approach developed in his Autology. This approach is afine example of how scepticism, farfrom hin- dering philosophical inquiry,can in fact significantlyexpand its scope. Hegel fa- mouslystated thatscepticism is “the free side of every philosophy,” insofar as it raises the mind abovethe limitation and one-sidedness of common sense.⁵² In Geu- lincx’scase, scepticism presumably liberatesthe mind from its subjective forms and its modi dicendi,thus revealing that the mind is one and infiniteand thatour finite mind is just aparcel of it.Furthermore, the temporality of our mental statesindicates the existenceofbodilymotion—without which there would be no temporality—and hence the existenceofaphysical realm beyond the mind itself.Geulincx’sself-inspection thus results in the attainment of two “transcategorial” realities, the mental and the physical. One could justifiably ask here whether these realities are indeedas “transcategorial”—i.e., independent of our knowledge—as Geulincx pretends. Just as Geulincx sharplycriticises the conceptual apparatus of Scholasticism for beingmere- ly “subjective,” he could equallyhavequestioned the objectivity of the (Cartesian) distinction between the mental and the corporeal and subjected it to acritical exami- nation. Yethere we encounter—as Cassirerrightlyput it—“the inner limit” of Geu- lincx’santi-dogmatism.⁵³ Despite his effortstodisembarrass himself from uncritical assumptions, Geulincx stillthinks in Cartesian terms, even if he departs from Des- cartes in crucial respects.Thus, he cannot be critical of Cartesian philosophyto the sameextent thatheisofScholasticism, preciselybecause Descartes provides him with the conceptual resources to rebut Scholasticism. Thisdoes not mean, however,thatGeulincx accepts the Cartesian understandingofthe mental and the physical without further ado. As has been shown, he attemptstopurify these notions of all traces of “reifying” thinking, apurification that results,among other things, in the de-substantialisation of the human mind and its localisation within the divine intellect.Spinoza arrivedatthe same conclusion, based on the sameCartesian premises. Aseparate studyisrequired to show the differences and similarities of their re- spective approaches.

 See his Physica Vera (OP2:368–446) and his Physica Falsa s. ad mentem Peripateticorum (OP 2:313–67). Foragood summary of Geulincx’sphysics, see Rousset, Geulincx entre Descartes et Spino- za, 101–28.  GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie,inJenaer Schriften 1801–1807,ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), 229.  Cassirer, Erkenntnisproblem,1:540–41. Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and MentalHolism 143

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