Arnold Geulincx: Scepticismand Mental Holism
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José María Sánchez de León Serrano Arnold Geulincx: Scepticismand Mental Holism 1Introduction The Flemish thinker Arnold Geulincx (1624–69)isknown among historians of philos- ophyasone of the founders of modern occasionalism, the view that God alone, not creatures, exerts causal efficacy.¹ Being counted among the modern occasionalists, Geulincx has alsobeen associatedwith awide variety of philosophical tendencies. Whereas for some, he is merelyaminor disciple of Descartes, for others, he is the missing link between Descartes and Spinoza.² Acertain line of interpretation (nota- blyrepresented by Cassirer)sees Geulincx as aprecursor of Kant.³ Accordingtode Vleeschauwer,Geulincx is the first thinker who explicitlyequatedknowing and doing,thus paving the wayfor the constructivism of Giambattista Vico and Benedet- Comparethis brief characterisation of occasionalism with that of Clatterbaughinhis TheCausation Debate in Modern Philosophy 1637–1739 (New York: Routledge,1999), 97.The other founders of mod- ern occasionalism wereLouis de La Forge(1632–66) and Géraud de Cordemoy (1626–84), although Geulincxdeveloped his own occasionalistic conception independentlyofthem. See Jean-Christophe Bardout, “Occasionalism: La Forge, Cordemoy,Geulincx,” in ACompanion to Early Modern Philoso- phy,ed. Steven Nadler (Boston: Blackwell Publishers,2002),140–51.Modern occasionalism would reachits apex with Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715); regarding the affinities and divergences be- tween Geulincx’sand Malebranche’soccasionalism,see Steven Nadler, “Knowledge,Volitional Agen- cy and Causation in Malebranche and Geulincx,” BritishJournal for the HistoryofPhilosophy 7, no. 2 (1999): 263–74.Ihave explicitlysaid “modern” occasionalism, for avariation of this view (or group of related views,asoccasionalism is not ahomogeneous trend or school) alreadyexisted in medieval Muslim philosophy. See Ludwig Stein, “Antikeund mittelalterliche Vorläufer des Occasionalismus,” Archiv fürGeschichte der Philosophie 2, no. 2(1888): 193–245; also Dominik Perler and Ulrich Rudolph, Occasionalismus:Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-islamischen und im europäischen Denken (Göt- tingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht,2000). Forathorough reconstruction of the emergenceofoccasion- alism after Descartes, see Rainer Specht, Commercium mentis et corporis.Über Kausalvorstellungen im Cartesianismus (Stuttgart-BadCanstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag [Günther Holzboog], 1966). This is BernardRousset’smain thesis in his posthumous work Geulincx entre Descartes et Spinoza (Paris:Vrin, 1999). In the earlyeighteenth century,Geulincxwas accused of Spinozism by Christian Thomasiusand Ruarda Andala. His philosophyhas been suspected of Spinozism ever since. See H. J. de Vleeschauwer, “Three Centuries of GeulincxResearch: ABibliographical Survey,” Mededelings van die Universiteit vanSuid-Afrika 1(1957): 1–72, and especiallyHan vanRuler, “Geulincxand Spinoza: Books, Backgrounds and Biographies,” Studia Spinozana 15 (2006): 89–106. However,Cassirer also stresses the large gapbetween Kant and Geulincx. See Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit,3rd ed. (Berlin: VerlagBruno Cassirer,1922),1:552. OpenAccess. ©2020 José María Sánchez de León Serrano, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110618839-009 126 José María Sánchez de León Serrano to Croce.⁴ Despite these multiple affiliations and fatherhoods—or perhaps because of them—Geulincx’sphilosophyhas rarelybeen studied for its own sake and remains widelyunknown.⁵ With the exception of de Lattre’sseminal work,⁶ we are still await- ing athorough studyofGeulincx’smultifaceted thought. Without pretending to fill this lacuna, the present studywill focus on Geulincx’s remarkable approach to human cognition and its extent,which constitutes the basis of his entire philosophy, includingthe occasionalism for which he is known. Geu- lincx’sposition in this regard is at first glance extremelyambivalent,ifnot incoher- ent.Onthe one hand, he seems to denythe possibilitythat the human mind may attain genuine knowledge and to embrace ahopeless scepticism. On the other,he presents his own philosophyasatrue metaphysics,which he defines as knowledge of thingsasthey are in themselves, independent of our consideration. Moreover,in his metaphysics,heendorses aquasi-pantheistic conception—quite reminiscent of Spinoza’s—that prima facie is the antipode to scepticism. Iwill try to make sense of these disparate claims and arguethat they actuallyform acoherent whole. In par- ticular,Iwill show how Geulincx’ssceptical distrust of our cognitive powers leads him to embrace aform of mental holism, accordingtowhich the human mind is just aparcel or sub-region within an infiniteintellect.Furthermore, Iwill examine how our containment within God’smind enables us to grasp necessary truths but prevents us from understandingthe created world, whose existenceisacontingent fact that is unaccountable by reason. The example of Geulincx will thus reveal that afecund scepticism can, by discardingcertain objects as unknowable, open up areas of exploration that were hitherto considered impenetrable. Iwill structure my exposition as follows. In the next section, Iwillexamine Geulincx’sgeneral po- sition on human cognitionand its apparent inconsistencies. In the third section, Iwill reconstruct Geulincx’sreasoning process in the first part of his True Metaphy- sics (Metaphysica vera), which seamlessly moves from an initial scepticism to ascer- See H.JdeVleeschauwer, “Lesantécédants du transcendentalisme. GuelincxetKant,” Kant-Stud- ien,45, 1–4(1953): 246–47. Geulincx’sonlysignificant follower was RichardBurthogge(1637/38–1705), whostudied at the Uni- versity of Leiden in 1661and almost certainlyattended Geulincx’slectures. Geulincx’sinfluence is clearlyrecognisable in his Essay upon Reason and the NatureofSpirits (London: Dunton, 1694), which he dedicated to John Locke. Regarding Burthogge’sthoughtinconnection with Geulincx’s, see Cassirer, Erkenntnisproblem,1:543–53;Michael R. Ayers, “RichardBurthoggeand the Origins of Modern Conceptualism,” in Analytic Philosophy and HistoryofPhilosophy,ed. TomSorell and G.A.J.Roger (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), 179–200. Furthermore, scholars have unsuccessfullyattempt- ed to establish alink between Geulincxand Leibniz, mainlydue to Leibniz’ssimile of the two clocks, which also appears in Geulincx, despitethe fact that Eduard Zeller conclusively demonstrated in 1884 that thereisnosuch influence. See Eduard Zeller, “Über die erste Ausgabevon Geulincx’ Ethik und Leibniz’ Verhältnis zu Geulincx’ Occasionalismus,” Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preußischen Akade- mie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin 29,no. 2(1884): 673–95. Alain de Lattre, L’occasionalisme d’Arnold Geulincx (Paris:Éditions de Minuit,1967). Arnold Geulincx: Scepticism and MentalHolism 127 taining our containment in God’smind.⁷ In the fourth section, Iwill examine Geu- lincx’sdemonstration of the existence of acorporeal world by means of the notion of time. In the fifth and final section, Iwill focus on some aspects of Geulincx’scri- tique of Scholastic philosophywhich indirectlyilluminatehis own philosophical ap- proach. 2Scepticism and the Priority of the Knower over the Known Geulincx’sepistemological position is summarised in an explanatory note from his short treatise Metaphysics according to the Peripatetic Mind (Metaphysica ad mentem peripateticam).⁸ Neither the nature of this treatise (whichIwill brieflydiscuss in the last section) nor the context in which Geulincx inserts this explanatory note is impor- tant for us now.The text in question reads as follows: We should not consider things insofar as they aresensible (i.e., insofar as they enter into the senses under acertain aspect), nor insofar as they are intelligible (i.e., insofar as we think of them in acertain way). Yetwecannot consider them as they areinthemselves[ut suntinse], from which we see our great imperfection. Therefore, it onlyremains for us to do (which we can and must do) that in the judgment of the mind, whenever we apprehend something under acertain mode of our thought (which we always do, and we cannot do otherwise while we arehuman beings), we always keep in mind that the thingisnot in itself as it is ap- prehended by us.Evenifwealways attributethe appearancesofthe senses and the intellect to the things themselves, thereisnevertheless something divine in us that always tells us that it is not thus,and onlyinitdoes our wisdom [sapientia]consist,insofar as we arehuman beings.⁹ This passagedistinguishes threewaysofconsideringthings: as sensible, as intelligi- ble, and as they are in themselves. The first two ways show how thingsare in relation to us,both to our senses and to our intellect.Due to their relative character,these two ways of consideringthingsdonot count as real knowledge.Onlythe third waycan All references to Geulincx’sworks arefromthe standardedition: Arnoldi Geulincx Antverpiensis OperaPhilosophica,ed. JanPieter Nicolaas Land, 3vols (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1891–93); henceforth OP.The English translations of Geulincxinthis paper aremine. OP 2:300–301;adpag.200. OP 2:300–301;adpag.200: “Nos non debemus res considerare prout sunt sensibiles(id est,sub certa specie incurrunt in sensum); neque ut sunt intelligibiles (id est,sub certo modo anobis cogi- tantur). Sed ut sunt in se, non possumus eas considerare; unde videmus magnam nostram imperfec- tionem.