Recent Work on 17th Century Continental Philosophy Author(s): Edwin Curley Source: American Philosophical Quarterly , Oct., 1974, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Oct., 1974), pp. 235-255 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/20009541 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms and University of Illinois Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to American Philosophical Quarterly This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Tue, 28 Jul 2020 22:55:38 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms American Philosophical Quarterly Volume ii, Number 4, October 1974 I. REGENT WORK ON 17TH CENTURY CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY EDWIN CURLEY HPHE decade just past has been a fruitful It andis doubtful whether many of the positive sug? -* exciting one for those interested in the history gestions Hintikka makes will survive critical of continental philosophy in the 17th century. scrutiny, Not but there is no doubt that the discussion only has there been a great deal of work published he provoked has been extremely helpful. on that period, but an encouragingly high pro?The puzzle with which Hintikka is primarily portion of it has proven to be well worth publish? concerned is this : Does Descartes regard his knowl? ing. We have good, new translations and critical edge of his own existence as intuitive or as based editions of many works of both major and minor on an inference ? Both alternatives can be supported figures, new bibliographical guides to the litera? textually and both alternatives present philo? ture on them, and a growing body of instructive sophical difficulties for the Cartesian system. secondary works. The history of philosophy Descartesseems does say in the Regulae (Rule 3) that now to be attracting, with much greater frequency everyone sees by an intuition that he exists, that he than was the case, say, 20 years ago, writers thinks, who and many other things. And in the Second combine a sympathetic and scholarly approach Replies to he seems to say again that his existence is the philosophers they study with genuine philo? known intuitively. But this approach invites em sophical competence of their own in sorting out harassing the questions about the reliability of our issues raised and saying something about thoseintuitions and about Descartes' right to assume issues. While there is still much that needs totheir be reliability at the stage in the Meditations when done to improve our understanding of the period, he puts the cogito forward. Again, in most of the record of the past decade has been a hopeful Descartes' presentations of the cogito he certainly one. makes it look as though he is inferring existence Under these circumstances, one can hardly from thinking.ex? Except for the Regulae, which is an pect to do more than give a brief indication earlyof some work, and the Second Meditation, the standard of the highlights of recent work. I shall concentrate formula tends to be "I think, therefore, I exist." on studies of the philosophers whom I regard But how asis this compatible with the apparent status major and central?Descartes, Spinoza, of "I Male exist" as a first principle? And how would branche, and Leibniz?leaving it primarily Descartes to the justify his reliance on the premisses bibliography to provide some guide to the which, often prima facie, are involved ? very interesting work on philosophers who Hintikkamust be offers us the notion of "I exist" as regarded as comparatively minor or peripheral something (e.g. like a performative utterance, rather Bayle, Gassendi, Galileo, and Pascal), and than to ansuch inference. Contrary to the suggestion of aids to scholarship as translations, editions, his title, and he does not regard the alternative he sets bibliographies. Aids to scholarship which before are us ofas an exclusive one. We need not choose special interest will be starred items in thebetween bib? inference and performance. The cogito is liography. both. But Hintikka prefers to emphasize the per formatory aspect, partly because he thinks that, I. Descartes viewed as an inference, it is not a very good argument. Recent English work on Descartes has con? As an inference, Hintikka contends, the cogito is centrated on certain classical cruxes of interpreta? an instance of modus ponens, with a suppressed tion?the cogito, the circle, and the ontological conditional premiss of the form : argument?and has done a great deal to clarify the (i) Ba => (3x)(x = a) problems these topics involve. A good example is provided by Hintikka's article on the cogito (6). While Hintikka concedes that this conditional is 235 This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Tue, 28 Jul 2020 22:55:38 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 236 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY provable in standard systems of predicate logic, he Standard purposes of uttering a declarative sen? thinks that in the sense in which it is true it is of no tence, that of making the hearer believe what one use to Descartes in proving his conclusion. The says. If the hearer identifies the man speaking as systems of logic in which (i) is provable all tacitly the man the sentence is about, he will recognize assume that the singular terms employed really re? that the statement is false. But the hearer might fer to some actually existing individual. If we make understand the sentence without identifying the this assumption, then before we can assert the speaker as the man the sentence is about. Hence, categorical premiss of our argument, existentially inconsistent statements are not in? (ii) Ba evitably self-defeating. "I do not exist" is a special case in two respects. the " I think," we must be in a position to assert the conclusion, First, since the function of e I ' is simply to refer to the speaker, the sentence is existentially inconsistent (iii) (3#) {x ? a) for anyone to utter. Secondly, here it is a necessary the "I exist." The argument will be formally valid condition of the hearer's understanding the sen? and its premisses will be true, but it will be tence that he identify the speaker as the man question-begging, since establishing the truth of the spoken about. Unless he does make the identifi? conclusion will be a necessary condition of estab? cation, he does not understand the use of CI'. So lishing the truth of the categorical premiss. "I don't exist" is inevitably self-defeating for any? But if we drop the assumption that all singular one to utter assertively, and therefore, absurd in a terms designate actually existing individuals, then, very special way. Conversely, "I exist" is self though we shall be able to determine the truth of verifying. our categorical premiss without first determining One problem for any interpretation along these the truth of our conclusion, the conditional premiss lines is to explain why Descartes so often gives the will be false. Ba will be true where Bx is read "x illusion that he is inferring his existence from his thinks" and a designates Hamlet, but {3x){x = a) thought, when really he is recognizing the self will be false for that interpretation of a and so evidence of his existence. What are the words Ba => {3x){x = a) will not be a logically true for? cogito and ergo doing in the cogito ergo sum ? mula. Hintikka has other, textual objections to Hintikka's claim is that the "I think" expresses reading the cogito as an inference, but he is well the performatory character of Descartes' insight. aware that the textual evidence points both ways. It is from an act of thought that Descartes comes to This is the difficulty he treats as most serious. recognize the indubitability of his own existence, So he proposes to regard the cogito as a per? viz., the act of trying to think the contrary. formance, though this is held to be only the better Descartes cannot think that he does not exist, in the half of Descartes' insight. Descartes should be sense of making himself believe it. The attempt to viewed as recognizing the absurdity of performing make himself believe that he does not exist is a certain kind of action, denying his own existence. necessarily self-defeating. So the relation of cogito to The sentence "I don't exist" though formally con? sum is more a causal one than a relation of in? sistent, and therefore not logically false, is neverthe? ference. A certain (attempted) thought act neces? less existentially inconsistent, and hence, impossible sarily produces a conviction of existence. It would to defend or believe. Its contradictory, "I exist," be more accurate for Descartes to say "By thinking is therefore self-verifying. This is a sophisticated I perceive my existence." But the thinking part is modern version of the view that " I exist" is certain quite essential. Not just any action will do. It must on intuitive grounds. be an act of thought, specifically, an act of trying A sentence, p, is existentially inconsistent for a to to persuade myself that I do not exist. utter (assertively) if and only "p and a exists" is Hintikka's interpretation has a certain philo? inconsistent (in the ordinary sense).