“ONE TO THE HEAD, TWO TO THE HEART”: THE FAILURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DOCTRINE AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE VIETNAM WAR

Kyle K Rable

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

May 2021

Committee:

Benjamin Greene, Advisor

Dwayne Beggs

Walter Grunden © 2021

Kyle Rable

All Rights Reserved iii

ABSTRACT

Benjamin Greene, Advisor

As the American presence in Vietnam grew in the early 1960s with the introduction of full combat troops in 1965, it became evident that this American War in Vietnam was not like that of World War Two or even Korea. The enemy that American service members fought in

South Vietnam was a mix of a tough guerrilla force and regular North Vietnamese soldiers. They controlled the countryside and the local populations of the villages scattered in the jungles and hills. The Vietnamese guerilla tactics required that the American military attempt to pacify the rural countryside and influence guerrilla and regular soldiers to lay down their weapons. The tool to influence the enemy was the psychological operations (PSYOP) units attached to maneuver units. However, the intricacies of the requirements from MAC-V on combat commanders to produce measurable data led to an overall failure to properly use this vital asset.

This thesis examines the doctrine, training, and equipment shortages of the PSYOP units in Vietnam. By examining these aspects of PSYOP while using case studies of Operation

Junction City and Operation Apache Snow, this thesis suggests that the PSYOP assets on hand for combat commanders were misunderstood and misused. Arguing that the failure of the U.S.

Army to provide adequate doctrine and training for its combat commanders led these commanders to equate the effort of PSYOP missions to the effectiveness of it. This narrow understanding of PSYOP damaged its chances to affect the outcome of the war adequately.

This work uses Field Manuals, Standard Operating Procedures, After Action Reports, and other primary sources to examine the doctrine and use of PSYOP during the course of the war. iv

While examining the scholarship of other authors, this work expands the current studies to add examples and analysis of PSYOP use in a setting ruled by conventional forces.. v

For Gary vi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are many people to thank that helped or supported me throughout this project.

First, I would like to thank my thesis advisor Professor Benjamin Greene. Professor Greene provided unlimited support in every way possible, and this thesis would not have happened without his belief in me or my topic. While he did have a knack for emailing at the exact wrong time, his feedback on my chapters always pushed me to think more in-depth about my subject. I would also like to thank the other committee members, Professor Walter Grunden and Professor

Dwayne Beggs, who took time out of their schedules to participate in this project. A huge thank you to the Bowling Green History Department, who took in a Toledo Rocket and made me feel at home.

A huge thanks is owed to Julian Gillilan, who helped proofread anything I have ever written, including much of this thesis, and had to deal with many late-night text messages about it. Another thanks go to Jacob Mach, who always offered kind words and an ear to hear to listen to me talk about my thesis or any other work. Without these two, I am not sure that this project would exist or that I would graduate. A thank you also goes to Gabby Mickel, whose desire to learn matches my own and always listens to my many ideas on what to study. I also want to thank the archivists at Texas Tech’s Virtual Vietnam Archives. Many of the primary sources for this project came from this extensive digital archive, and without the ability to find them, this thesis does not exist.

Lastly, I would like to thank my partner Kristen Murray. Without her, I would have had no one to turn to complain about not finding a source or no one to hear me talk about doctrine not making sense. She has dealt with late nights, taking our dog on walks without me, drill weekends, and my constant anxiety throughout this process. Kristen, thanks for being the best. vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER 1. BY THE NUMBERS: THE INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE OF PSYOP ...... 12

Organization and Chain of Command: Who’s In Charge? ...... 13

Doctrine and the Army’s Professional Education System: Read this Doctrine take this

Class, it Might Help ...... 18

Effort over Effectiveness: Misapplied Metrics of Success for PSYOP ...... 25

Personnel and Equipment Shortages: Make it Work, It’s All We Have ...... 30

Racial Prejudice: Being Racist Doesn’t Help ...... 32

Conclusion…...... 34

CHAPTER 2. A TOOTHLESS COMB: PSYOP IN OPERATION JUNCTION CITY ...... 37

The Horseshoe, a Jungle, and Walking ...... 39

Paper in the Sky ...... 45

Analysis……...... 49

Conclusion…...... 54

CHAPTER 3. DIFFERENT COMMANDER, IDENTICAL OPERATIONS, SAME

OUTCOMES: A CASE STUDY OF OPERATION APACHE SNOW ...... 57

The Valley…… ...... 60

Loudspeaker in the Air ...... 64

Going to need more numbers and more than numbers ...... 66

Conclusion………………………………………… ...... 73

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………..…….. 76

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 84 1

INTRODUCTION

With the introduction of U.S. combat troops in 1965, what had been a colonial war, then a civil war, became the American war in Vietnam. It was different from the great wars fought in the first half of the 20th century. In Vietnam, the U.S. fought a limited war against an enemy that blended in with the civilian population with no “front lines” to be distinguished. The

Vietnam War was the climax of Cold War ideology and rhetoric that ignored strategic logic, and instead relied on ill-informed political dogma. Containing the communist threat and fighting it abroad was the United States’ goal in South Vietnam, drawing upon the underlying assumptions of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s domino theory.1 It posited that if Vietnam fell to the communist North Vietnamese and guerrilla Viet Cong, all of Southeast Asia would soon succumb to communist control as well. The United States slowly started to engage itself into the already complicated civil war that had begun as an anti-colonial struggle from France. It failed to recognize how to fight the war it encountered in South Vietnam. In Vietnam the U.S. Army did not find great plains for tank battles and a recognizable front to entrench soldiers.2 Instead, it found villages of impoverished farmers and an enemy that easily blended in with the civilian population fighting more for freedom from another outside power than for communist ideals.

The enemy attacked and vanished into the jungle, which left American soldiers in confusion and

U.S. Army combat arms commanders frustrated with fighting against elusive enemies who limited their ability to employ superior firepower, mobility, and technology.

1 The war in Vietnam is a part of a wider array of Soviet and Western battles in the anti-colonial struggles that came out of the end of World War II. The Cold War doctrine of the East and the West were to persuade these emerging countries to partake in their systems of government and support the cause. Vietnam itself was remote to the actual national security of the U.S. For a thorough analysis of the U.S. role in the French Indochina War, See Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2014). 2 This thesis necessarily limits the focus of its analysis to the U.S. Army in Vietnam. 2

When the American advisory effort, the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), stepped in to fill the void left by the departing French colonial military forces, they began training and equipping the South Vietnamese army called the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).

While these American army officers and senior non-commissioned officers had great experience in the tactics of medium and large-scale warfare, they were woefully unprepared for the challenges of Vietnam. The enemy was very rarely enticed into large scale battles, they preferred to conduct small unit ambushes and surprise the American advisors and their ARVN counterparts who often possessed greater mobility and firepower. Not only were these American officers not prepared for this type of war, they also did not know the country. They lacked education in Vietnamese history, culture, and most importantly, language.3 This lack of education on the population of Vietnam is one of the major errors of the war and had a lasting effect on all aspects thereafter.

The advisory effort eventually proved to be insufficient in suppressing the Viet Cong and

North Vietnamese Army (NVA), and in 1965 President Lyndon Johnson committed conventional combat troops to fight in South Vietnam. These full-sized combat battalions began to conduct large scale operations on their own, rather than just advising the ARVN on operations. President

Johnson’s decision “Americanized” the war.4 Conventional troops means soldiers of typical combat or support jobs in the army (i.e. infantry soldiers), the introduction of these prompted a change and an expansion of the American military command in South Vietnam from MAAG to the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MAC-V). In the ensuing ten years, the Vietnam

War marred the American psyche and created a military/civilian divide that persists today.

3 Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 1998), 54. 4 For a thorough analysis of Johnson’s decision to escalate, see Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 3

General’s William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams both held command of MAC-V and continuously attempted to create a positive outcome of the war.5 From troop increases to large scale offensives, both generals attempted to gain better control over the situation in Vietnam.

The short and relatively violent deployment cycles of both units and men also meant there was no ability to truly establish trust with the local population. Additionally, this led to a distinct lack of command cohesion in the country.6 Vietnamese villagers saw new American soldiers rotate through the area every few months and thus the relationship needed to be continuously rebuilt and was easily lost. The issues that plagued the American effort in South

Vietnam are well written.7

The historiography on the American war in Vietnam is robust. The purpose, prosecution, and conclusion of the war itself is a point of major contention in American national memory as well as within historical scholarship. Through the vast number of monographs, articles and papers emerges different interpretive views on the origins and outcome of the war. In order to explore these theories, this work draws from the work of Gary Hess’s book Vietnam: Explaining

America’s Lost War.8 Using the framework developed in Hess’ book, this thesis situates itself into a broad framework of arguments and critiques pertaining to the war. The broadest level of the historiography of the Vietnam War is the debate between Orthodox and Revisionists

5 There were all together for commanders of MAC-V, however Westmorland and Abrams were the commanders when there were large numbers of ground combat forces in country. 6 The U.S. Army would launch a study program entitled Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam (PROVN) that researched the reason for the issues in the war and pointed out many of the issues said above and gave suggestions on where to focus time and energy. 7 See Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam. 8 Gary Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War, 2nd ed. (West Sussex, John Wiley & Son, 2015). Although Justin Hart has appropriately argued that recent scholarship on the international aspects of the conflict has rendered this framework as reductionist, it remains useful for categorizing the earlier scholarship on the conflict. See Hart, “The New International History of the Wars for Vietnam,” Reviews in American History 42:4 (December 2014): 739-745. 4 interpretations of the war. Orthodox writers contend that the U.S. oversold containment in secondary interests, that the “nation-building” mission in South Vietnam ignored the history of the region and stood no chance of success, and lastly that total miscalculations and ignorance brought the U.S. into an unwinnable war.9 In contrast, Revisionist theorists argue that there was a

“lost victory”. Revisionists contend that prior to major U.S. involvement, the South Vietnamese government held strongholds in the expansive countryside, and that the inept polices of

President’s John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson paved the way for failure.10 In this broadest part of the interpretations of historiography of the Vietnam War, this work falls under the

Revisionist theory of a winnable war.

Conversely, this work concurs with the Orthodox view that the war was unnecessary; it was immoral and defending South Vietnam was not essential to U.S. national security objectives.

However, this thesis concurs with aspects of the Revisionist critique of how the war was waged.

The Revisionist theory also contains within it two schools of thought on how the war was

“winnable”. One of these schools of thoughts is Clausewitzian revisionism.11 Clausewitzian

Revisionists argue that General Westmoreland squandered the war by focusing on search-and- destroy missions and not mobilizing a massive force to fight North Vietnam. Clausewitzian

Revisionists believe that the center of the conflict in Vietnam was the North Vietnamese Army and its logistical support. For them, the conflict was primarily a war of external aggression from

9 Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War, 16-18. See also: Daddis: No Sure Victory and Westmoreland’s War. 10 Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War, 12-16. See also, for example, Krepinevich: The Army and Vietnam, Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York, Harcourt, 2000) and Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), and Michael Lind, Vietnam: The Necessary War (New York, Simon and Schuster,2002). 11 See, for example, Lewis Sorely: Westmoreland: The General Who Lost the War, Sharp, Strategy for Defeat (Novato, Presidio Press, 1978) and Harry Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Presidio Press, 1995). 5

North Vietnam.12 The other school of thought in the Revisionist camp is “Hearts-and-Minds”

Revisionism.13 “Hearts-and-Minds” Revisionism differs from the Clausewitzian mindset in where it locates the enemy center of gravity. “Hearts-and-Minds” Revisionists believe that the war was primarily against an internal insurgency. In their view, the primary enemy was the communist-backed guerillas in South Vietnam, that protecting the population of South Vietnam was the “center of gravity” of the war, and that the pacification programs eventually launched were too little and too late.14 This work adds an additional factor to the “Hearts-and-Minds” school of thought arguing that Psychological Operations (PSYOP) was an underused tool for pacification of rural South Vietnam. This thesis suggests that PSYOP efforts may have produced a different outcome if efforts were focused more keenly on the pacification efforts than search- and-destroy missions.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) is meant to influence the enemy not to fight, along with (in the instance of counter insurgency) convincing the population through propaganda to not support the enemy and work with friendly forces.15 However, it is apparent that this tool was misunderstood and the training for both PSYOP operators and the combat unit commanders they supported was minimal at preparing them for the intricacies of their jobs in achieving lasting victory in South Vietnam.

12 Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War, 84-108. 13 See, for example, Krepinevich: The Army and Vietnam, and Larry Cable, Conflict of Myth (New York, New York University Press, 1986), and Unholy Grail (New York, Routledge,1991). 14 Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War, 111-130. See also Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005). 15 PSYOPS Standard Operating Procedures; Annex F to Advisory Team 52 SOP. Vietnam Center and Archive. 3590110001 No Date. Box 01, Folder 10. Gary Gillette Collection. The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 16 Apr. 2019.

6

By examining Army PSYOP, this thesis argues that there is a plethora of glaring shortcomings in the practice and its implementation: 1) there was little training on the subject for combat arms commanders/officers; 2) there was a lack of coordination and collaboration on objectives between Army PSYOP operators and civilian ones; 3) there was a dearth in education on Vietnamese history and language for operators; 4) there was an absence of resource support for PSYOP operations; and 5) there was a distinct lack of care shown for PSYOP and propaganda usage by tactical level combat arms officers. Not only was PSYOP plagued by these five distinct shortcomings, but the missions also suffered from the same flaws as the conventional Army units; quick deployment cycles and measuring success in quantifiable numbers. Altogether, these issues compounded to hinder the PSYOP capabilities of the United

States Army in Vietnam and therefore rendered it less effective.

This work argues that PSYOP effectiveness was directly impacted by the failure of the

U.S. Army and MAC-V to instill in its combat arms commanders the practicality of using

PSYOP assets in tactical situations, and this lack of proper care and understanding of PSYOP negatively impacted the effectiveness of pacification. In turn, this work focuses mainly on the doctrine of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. While focusing on the doctrine, this thesis will also explore the understanding and implementation of PSYOP by divisional commanders and their staffs in South Vietnam. The divisional level is scrutinized in this work because the divisional command was the lowest level unit at which PSYOP companies were attached and because they had direct influence and control over large areas.16

This thesis challenges and builds upon three significant studies of PSYOP in Vietnam.

One is Robert Kodosky’s Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States

16 Mervyn Edwin Roberts III, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2018), 252. 7

Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond. Kodosky’s monograph critically examines how

PSYOP was used by the United States in Vietnam. He argues that the United States was looking for a quick and measurable way to validate the use of PSYOP in the war. In doing so, unit commanders discredited the United States military command in Vietnam not only in the minds of the Vietnamese but also to American reporters and press. Also, he explains that America did not want to stray from the preferred way of waging total war (finding, fixing, and destroying an enemy of equal strength and goal). The commanders instead searched for a way to fit PSYOP into the tactical war. This hampered the effectiveness of PSYOP and was a contributing factor to the failure of the war. Kodosky discusses the lack of language skills of PSYOPs professionals

(and soldiers in general) and how that directly influenced the lack of cooperation from the rural

Vietnamese. He also discusses the racism and general disregard throughout the military command in Vietnam for the people and their ARVN counterparts.17 Kodosky found many of his primary sources in the Texas Tech Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, the Lyndon Baines Johnson library, newspaper collections, and many of the doctrinal manuals and guides published by the government printing press. While Kodosky’s work has contributed to this thesis’ concepts on

PSYOP, this work will differ from his by focusing on how PSYOP was (or was not) used during major operations during the war. While Kodosky argues that PSYOP should not be primarily used as a tactical weapon, it is important to show in a military aspect how commanders chose to use their assets.

Another study that this work closely aligns with is a Command and General Staff College

(CGSC) thesis written by Major Michael Barger. Barger’s thesis, “Psychological Operations

Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam,” is very similar to this thesis.

17 Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond (Lanham: Lexington Books 2007), 48-53. 8

Barger argues that PSYOP suffered from a lack of understanding from combat arms commanders, a flawed system of communication and command, and doctrinal failures.18 He discusses that the measure of effort became and measurement of effectiveness, and the flaw of trying to quantify much of the PSYOP effort. His thesis is supported by archival documents readily attainable to him at CGSC and provides a similar argument to this work. However, this work does differ in argument that JUSPAO still did not make for a properly unified command of

PSYOP assets no matter the effort given. Barger writes his thesis without situating himself in direct conversation within the established historiography on the Vietnam War, and his conclusions seem to refrain from hard criticisms of the command in Vietnam.

The third major study on PSYOP that this work challenges is Mervyn Roberts’s The

Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968. In his recent book, Roberts investigates the years leading up to the full commitment of U.S. military troops to Vietnam and ends just before the Tet

Offensive. He provides an exhaustive investigation not only into what the American military and civilian operators were doing, but also insight into the actions and plans of the Vietcong and

North Vietnamese. While his research is commendable, his overall conclusion is unconvincing.

He argues that from the onset of U.S. intervention, American PSYOP had been used effectively and was making significant progress in defeating the enemy.19 He contends that instead of the

Americans failing, they did not stand a chance against the propaganda machine of the communists. This argument seems to place PSYOP in a vacuum only fighting other PSYOP efforts, however this is flawed in the fact that there are combat arms commanders interacting

18 Michael Barger, “Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam” (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 2007) 88- 96. 19 Mervyn Edwin Roberts III, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2018), 12. 9 with local populations and tactical operations happening that can change the message and outlook of a PSYOP plan. Throughout the book, Roberts constantly uses the statistics of flyers dropped and missions “completed” as a way to demonstrate their effectiveness. However, just like using body count as a way to measure progress, this is a faulty method of measurement. He states that up until the Tet Offensive (where his book concludes), American PSYOP was making a strong head way against the enemy. How can this be, when the Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam (PROVN) study, conducted in 1966 to find a way forward to win the war, indicated the American military was soon reaching a point of no return, a point where failure was inevitable, in Vietnam? Although this thesis examines many of the same sources, it reaches different conclusions. This thesis rejects Roberts’ argument that the level of effort indicates the effectiveness of PSYOP. Moreover, the thesis expands the scope of Roberts’ study beyond the Tet Offensive.

Along with research into secondary literature on the arguments in Vietnam War historiography, this work evaluates several primary sources from a number of collections.

However, the primary source research for this was limited to using only digitized archival collections due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This thesis draws heavily from the digitized documents found on the Texas Tech Virtual Vietnam Archive, which provides multiple finding aids to help sort through sources. This work also utilizes the Defense Technical

Information Center’s data base of historical manuals and studies, along with the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College’s collection of theses from former students. As a result of the limited nature of access to sources due to the pandemic, this thesis’s arguments will necessarily be tentative and suggestive. The sources used are partial and selective, limiting the ability of this work to draw definite conclusions. 10

In order to explore the major themes indicated in the historiography above, this thesis is organized into three chapters and a conclusion that explores the implementation and failures of

PSYOP in the Vietnam War. The first chapter evaluates the doctrine, training, and overall understanding by staff officers of PSYOP. Examining Field Manuals and Standard Operating

Procedures, the first chapter investigates what the operators were taught and using as guides towards their jobs. After investigating the doctrine on hand for PSYOP personnel and staff officers, this chapter then assesses the actual training that officers went through and the amount of PSYOP personnel on hand. This analysis concludes that there was limited training on PSYOP for divisional commanders, and those on the staff charged with handling and directing the

PSYOP assets had to learn on the job (a characteristic of all army jobs). Lastly, this chapter will consider how much divisional commanders and their staff officers actually understood the job of

PSYOP while under pressure to produce presentable statistics.

The second chapter of this thesis serves as a case study on the use of PSYOP during

Operation Junction City. Operation Junction City was a major offensive into strongly held NVA territory just north of the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon in 1966. This case study of

Operation Junction City helps examine the use of PSYOP assets during the command of General

Westmoreland. Using this case study supports the thesis by explaining the views of combat commanders on how PSYOP was used and how to evaluate it. The operation reveals that commanders measured effectiveness by effort, lacking true knowledge on the appropriate measurement of PSYOP.

Chapter three presents another case study focusing on Operation Apache Snow, which occurred from 10 May 1969 to 7 June 1969. This chapter further supports the thesis by showcasing the underutilization of PSYOP assets during Operation Apache Snow. This major 11 operation yielded few deserters or informants and showcases a total lack of appreciation for

PSYOP through a lack of documentation. Further, this case study also allows for a better critique of the efforts by General Abrams to change the trajectory of the war. Engaging in the broader historiographical debate over Abrams’ command, this chapter concludes that there was more of a consistency in the command’s operational concept than significant changes to wage a “better war.”

Through the analysis of doctrine, after action reports and wartime studies and surveys, this thesis concludes that PSYOP was a neglected and mismanaged asset in the fight for pacification of South Vietnam. This mismanagement and neglect manifested itself among solders and junior officers. For example, in a recent talk given at this author’s Basic Officer Leader

Course at Fort Lee, Virginia, a former platoon leader during the American Vietnam War explained that PSYOP to him was, “One bullet to the head, and two to the heart of the VC.” It expands the analysis of the Hearts and Minds Revisionists that the U.S. Army failed to properly integrate PSYOP into its counterinsurgency efforts and focused too much on large scale combat operations. It complicates the scholarship assessing the Army’s flawed metrics for success by demonstrating that the Army attributed PSYOP outcomes to PSYOP output.20 In doing so, this work challenges the conclusions of the most recent and comprehensive study of PSYOP to date.21

20 See Daddis, No Sure Victory. 21 Roberts III, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2018). 12

CHAPTER 1. BY THE NUMBERS: THE INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE OF PSYOP

An analysis of psychological operation (PSYOP) capabilities and operations in Vietnam first requires a basic understanding of the related doctrine, organization, and training. Doctrine for soldiers in the United States Army was (and continues to be) the bible(s) by which they planned and executed operations. Officers and enlisted soldiers alike memorized doctrine on patrolling and attacking the enemy. However, many combat arms officers had little to no training on how to integrate PSYOP assets into their operations prior to taking over command or filling a staff position that oversaw specialized PSYOP units. As a result, the U.S. Army failed as an institution to integrate essential training for these staff officers and failed develop and distribute adequate doctrine to enable their synchronization of PSYOP doctrine and personnel into their combat operations. Army operations in Vietnam suffered from these failures, inhibiting their ability to pacify the countryside and wage a successful counterinsurgency effort.

The dissection and scrutiny of doctrine is commonplace among works about the Vietnam

War.22 John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam discusses how rigid the doctrine of the United States Army was, and how dependent the Army was on staying within the traditions of the ground maneuver warfare doctrine it created.23 While the examination of doctrine is common, many authors, such as Nagl, do not scrutinize the doctrine and training of PSYOP operators or asses unit commanders’ knowledge of

22 There are broader arguments here of Clausewitzian Revisionists vs Hearts and Minds Revisionists. Clausewitzian Revisionists argue that had the war been expanded and been fought conventionally, the U.S. would have won. Hearts and Minds Revisionism put more trust into pacification and minimal conventional war functions. See Gary Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War. 23 John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002). See also: Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam and Daddis, No Sure Victory. 13

PSYOP.24 This chapter is organized into five sections; each section discusses a significant shortcoming that undermined the effectiveness of PSYOPs in the Vietnam War. The first section details the complicated web of command that PSYOP operators worked within, showcasing issues of who to report to and how to gain support. The second section examines the doctrine and training of PSYOP operators and of combat arms officers, indicating that there was a dearth of knowledge from the combat arms commanders on this important force multiplier. This section’s evaluation of PSYOP’s doctrine and training reinforces the arguments made by Daddis, that the doctrine was ignored and did not evolve with the understanding of the war. Section three scrutinizes that reliance on statistical data, showing that effort does not mean effectiveness.

Section four discusses the equipment and manpower shortages that undermined PSYOP units, underscoring how the demand for output exceeded the capabilities of the operators who were already stretched thin. Lastly, section five explores the racism that was abundant in officer and enlisted corps in Vietnam, and how that impacted the goals of PSYOP in support of pacification.

The conclusion of this chapter links for the first time PSYOP to the broader arguments of others such as Daddis and Krepinevich, that doctrine had failed the Army and that commanders mistook effort for effectiveness.25

Organization and Chain of Command: Who’s In Charge?

PSYOP doctrine and knowledge had a minimal role in the United States Army’s planning and focus of combat operations during the Vietnam War. Throughout all of United States’ history, as soon as wars ended institutional knowledge on PSYOP was lost. Operators and

24 Specialized studies on PSYOP by Kodosky and Roberts do not examine fully the shortcomings of developing the essential doctrine and training in PSYOP capabilities that would be essential to its successful integration into operations in Vietnam. Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style, and Roberts, The Psychological War for Vietnam. 25 See Daddis, No Sure Victory and Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam. 14 leaders left the military to continue on their civilian lives, taking their experience and expertise with them. The Cold War standoff created an emphasis on combat arms jobs, and without direct conflict the military did not see the need to continue a propaganda arm. Then, from the onset of each war, PSYOP had to be re-learned and adjusted to fit the war. Following the end of World

War Two, President Harry S. Truman and the U.S Army aimed to be prepared in the new Cold

War for all aspects of a conflict and worked to establish a multi-level bureaucratic approach to

PSYOP.26 From this concept emerged a convoluted group of organizations and agencies that muddled the ideas and concepts of PSYOP.

Throughout the duration of the Vietnam War, different State and Defense agencies/units performed PSYOP roles on varying levels that contradicted and complicated the PSYOP objectives. The State Department’s Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) intended to help the government of South Vietnam’s officials convince their citizens that it provided the best chance to maintain security and prosperity. However, JUSPAO also took on the role of giving press briefings to the U.S. media, contributing to skepticism by linking foreign propaganda to domestic public affairs. This raised fears that the U.S. media and people were being manipulated by the same propaganda campaigns that targeted the South Vietnamese.27

JUSPAO was an outgrowth of the United States Information Agency (USIA), which at times was also directly involved in Vietnam. Not only was there a State Department agency and various other intelligence facets involved in PSYOP in Vietnam, but also the military (and, in particular, the U.S. Army) had its own PSYOP units in Vietnam. This web of agencies and directives

26 Mervyn Edwin Roberts III, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2018) 25-32. 27 Kodosky Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond. (Lanham; Lexington Books 2007) 8-10. 15 complicated the mission of PSYOP, each organization pulling resources from the other – impacting the tactical ability of army PSYOP in support of major missions.

In order to understand army PSYOP, one has to understand its command structure and how that affected the outcomes of its use. The 4th PSYOP Group, in 1967, consolidated all of the army’s PSYOP capabilities into a single command in Vietnam.28 Prior to the creation of the 4th

PSYOP group, individual battalions and companies were attached to combat units, but with no direct line of contact with the other PSYOP agencies, each developing their own operating procedures and acting individually under a loose guidance from JUSPAO until the creating of the

4th PSYOP group. When the 4th PSYOP group was created, it was put under the umbrella of

JUSPAO to attempt to coordinate PSYOP efforts.29 After the 4th PSYOP group was stood up, it was comprised of four PSYOP’s battalions; the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th. Each battalion was stationed in different corps zones throughout Vietnam, and the headquarters of the 4th PSYOP Group was located with MAC-V Command in Saigon. Each battalion was authorized 174 soldiers to conduct operations. However, the battalions were continually undermanned, a common issue for

U.S. forces throughout the war. 30 Unlike most maneuver army units, which had a direct chain of command that they fell under and received orders from, PSYOP units were tailored to the goals of conventional unit commanders from the corps commander and down. 31 The PSYOP units

28 Military Psychological Operations, 07 January 1960, Box 13, Folder 03, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 - Insurgency Warfare, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2171303001, Accessed 19 Aug 2020. 29 Michael Barger. “Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam” (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 2007) 88- 96. 30 Military Psychological Operations, 07 January 1960, Box 13, Folder 03, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 - Insurgency Warfare, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2171303001, Accessed 19 Aug 2020. 31 R.P. Morris. “Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level” (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 1969). 16 attached to the corps commander comprised the PSYOP Battalion HQ, from there teams became attached to other combat unit commanders depending on operations in the corps.

Many different teams in a PSYOP battalion supported military operations in varying ways. These teams had particular specialties in supporting the unit operations, such as; printing teams, radio propaganda teams, intelligence teams, research teams, operating teams, etc. Teams could be configured differently, and staffed particularly, based upon the needs of the corps commander and his subordinate conventional units. This wide array of jobs and uses makes it hard to determine, through the doctrine and reports, the flow of command and how officers were to effectively measure their impact on the war. 32 With this “cellular” command structure of

PSYOP units in place from the introduction of PSYOP units to the war effort, it was reported that this way of operating created a lack of personnel or operations functions and coordination with the corps area combat arms units.33

While the structure of the teams and fluidity of operational planning clotted the effectiveness of PSYOP units, there was also a confusing web of command and advisory roles in the whole of Vietnam that was increasingly more disarrayed at the corps level. The large web of who commands who, and who advises who created large gaps in understanding and coordination between units and departments. According to a JUSPAO manual, army PSYOP command assessed needs and requirements in order to tell JUSPAO coordinators where to allocate resources. Alongside army PSYOP and JUSPAO there was also the Civil Operations and

32 R.P. Morris. “Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level” (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 1969). 33 Michael Barger. “Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam” (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 2007) 108- 111. 17

Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) which coordinated all pacification programs.34

With all the agencies and directorates involved, the task of using PSYOP effectively and

efficiently to support the military mission was clouded by too many hands in the pot. The wide

array of commands from State and Defense Department agencies and the support relationship of

PSYOP inhibited the ability for PSYOP to be understood and used effectively.

The 6th PSYOP Battalion (the HQ Unit of the 4th PSYOP Group also the units for that

corps area) fell under control of the MAC-V Psychological Operations Directorate (POD) office.

The objective of the POD according to the JUSPAO general briefing book was that:

The MACV Psychological Operations Directorate directs tactical psychological

warfare in support of military operations against the enemy including support to

the Chieu Hoi program. It provides staff supervision support to psychological

operations conducted by U.S. and Free World Military forces in addition to

advisory assistance to the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Approximately 1,300 Army,

Navy, Air Force and Marine military personnel are committed to Psychological

Operations duty in Vietnam.35

The POD Director reported to the operations officer (J3) of MAC-V. While at this higher level of planning, the job of who the PSYOP personnel reported to was clear cut, it was not like that for units at corps level and below. PSYOP battalions and teams reported to different staff officers

34 Book, Joint United States Public Affairs Office - JUSPAO Vietnam General Briefing Book, June 1968, Box 02, Folder 14, Fred Walker Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=20580214003, Accessed 19 Aug 2020. 35 Book, Joint United States Public Affairs Office - JUSPAO Vietnam General Briefing Book, June 1968, Box 02, Folder 14, Fred Walker Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=20580214003, Accessed 19 Aug 2020. 18 depending on the unit. Some units mirrored the POD and reported to the conventional unit’s operations officer (S3) while other teams reported to the security and intelligence officer (S2) or the civil affairs/public affairs officer (S5).36 This confused and inconsistent command structure caused many failures in the productivity of army PSYOP in Vietnam and made their job more difficult. PSYOP teams had to work in the overcrowded PSYOP field and work with civilian counterparts while producing manageable data and support for their attached conventional army units.

Doctrine and the Army’s Professional Education System: Read this Doctrine take this

Class, it Might Help

Rules and regulations guide a wide variety of jobs and topics in the United States Army.

For example, Field Manual (FM) 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations,37 explained, for commanders and staff of brigades, the objectives and resources at their disposal. It also outlined the major goals of a counterguerrilla war and generally how to conduct counterguerrilla operations from their level of planning.38 Not only did the conventional commanders and soldiers of the army have manuals and schools, the PSYOP operators and team leaders also had their own

FMs and specialized training to follow. Focusing on the jobs that each type of PSYOP team were to do, the regulations for the PSYOP operators were complicated and fluid. Along with that,

PSYOP operators were under command of combat brigade, divisional and corps commanders

36 R.P. Morris. “Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level” (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 1969). 37 The doctrine at the time referred to “counterguerrilla warfare”, this is synonymous with the current term “counterinsurgency." In this thesis I will use the term “counterinsurgency” to describe the war effort. 38 FM 31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations, 25 July 1969, Box 05, Folder 18, United States Armed Forces Manuals Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1370518001, Accessed 20 Aug 2020. 19

who had little to no training on the concepts of PSYOP or what they could actively be used for.39

An examination of the doctrine taught to combat commanders and to PSYOP personnel

demonstrates the essential conclusion that the doctrine was not adequate to guiding or preparing

either group to conduct effective PSYOP operations in a counterguerrilla war.

Much of the literature on doctrine during the Vietnam War points to the rigidity of United

States military ideals. This literature argues that General William Westmoreland failed to

accurately judge the situation in Vietnam and created such a climate in MAC-V that commanders

were obsessed with the “body count”. While it is true that General Westmoreland emphasized

bringing the fight to the enemy (see chapter 2), the issue is field commanders waged a

conventional war that they were trained and equipped for, instead of fighting the war of

counterinsurgency that confronted them in Vietnam. The training and doctrine of the United

States Army had not caught up to where the war was and the type of war it was fighting.

Integrating PSYOP into their operations, an obvious tool to “win the hearts and minds” of the

people, was neglected when officers trained to take command.40

An example of the lack of doctrine given to conventional commanders on the use and function of PSYOP can be found in FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations. In FM 31-16 only one and half pages provided information on PSYOP concepts and the units/teams that could be used. The FM quickly described some of the goals and needs of PSYOP; the FM discusses the logistical requirements of the PSYOP units, the need to tailor PSYOP programs to the mission, and that there must be staff oversight of the PSYOP units. It also mentioned that there were

39 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-13. 40 See Daddis, Westmoreland’s War and Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. 20 staffing shortcomings within the PSYOP teams, and that the conventional unit might have to pull from its current roster of officers to help facilitate. 41

The use of PSYOP, in as simple a mission as dropping flyers from helicopters, was not a priority to many conventional unit commanders. The lack of knowledge and teaching of PSYOP in the schoolhouses of the army led to a misuse or failure to actually use PSYOP by conventional unit commanders. In a study conducted in 1966, 17 of 25 battalion commanders did not see a need for PSYOP personnel in their staff.42 This lack of appreciation and emphasis on PSYOP capabilities and usage from commanders may have been due to the lack of training on PSYOP before taking command and on the lack of doctrinal guidance available to conventional army commanders.

In addition to the failure of the army professional education system to train its combat commanders in the use of PSYOP assets, the army’s training of its dedicated PSYOP personnel also suffered from a lack of resources and inconsistent requirements for graduation. FM 33-5:

Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures along with FM 33-1: Psychological

Operations were the main doctrinal guides to PSYOP operators and unit staff officers. These manuals described the mission and operations that PSYOP conducted, and the role of PSYOP at the different levels of command.43 The FMs outlined the jobs of different PSYOP teams and how they could be used in support of combat operations. However, these manuals suffered from the

41 FM 31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations, 25 July 1969, Box 05, Folder 18, United States Armed Forces Manuals Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1370518001, Accessed 23 Aug 2020. 42 Report, U.S. Army-Vietnam - Evaluation Of U.S. Army Combat Operations In Vietnam (ARCOV) - Volume 5: Annex D: Command, Control, And Communications, 25 April 1966, Box 05, Folder 06, Glenn Helm Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1070506001, Accessed 07 May 2020. 43 There are three levels off command: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical with definitions being found in JP3-0: Fundamentals of Joint Operations 21 same liabilities of the combat units, they failed to adapt their doctrine and operations to counter the insurgency that confronted the army in Vietnam.

While these FMs explored and described the various roles and capabilities of PSYOP assets, they were a limited guide to PSYOP. FM 33-1 provided only four pages of information on how PSYOP can be used to support tactical operations, two of them were illustrations of how to organize personnel into smaller teams when attached to a conventional unit’s command and staff.

This section gave a brief explanation for staff officers on how to incorporate PSYOP into their tactical planning.44 While strategic and operational command planning of PSYOP was important to the war, commanders at the tactical command level that planned offensives moving through

Vietnam were given little information on how to plan and integrate the use of their PSYOP assets. These FMs lacked substance for commanders and staff to accurately use, and PSYOP operators had to fight for attention and resources in an overstretched army that prioritized its combat forces of infantry and armor. An analysis of these FMs reveals why commanders underutilized their PSYOP assets, the manuals for the use of them focused much more on strategic ideas than on tactical use. In a study conducted in 1969 of PSYOP officers:

Thirty percent of the team leaders stated there were insufficient DA [Department of the

Army] guidelines published on the employment of PSYOP teams, techniques, or

doctrine. More information was needed on the employment of PSYOP teams in

combined operations with MEDCAP [Medical Civic Action Program], armed

propaganda, and cultural drama teams.45

44 Psychological Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine, June 1968, Box 04, Folder 10, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 11 - Monographs, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2390410002, Accessed 21 Aug 2020. 45ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-18. 22

This statistic shows that the officers using the FMs viewed them as inadequate to accomplish

their jobs. If the PSYOP officers who had gone through specific training on PSYOP still found

the FMs insufficient, then it is not surprising that conventional officers did not grasp the

concepts. This suggests one reason why so many battalion commanders thought so little for the

need for PSYOP assets.

The doctrine on PSYOP and its capabilities was lacking, as the FMs showed little more

than concepts and did nothing more than outline the role of PSYOP. Moreover, the training that

maneuver unit staff officers received on PSYOP was dreadfully small. As described above, and

in FM 33-1 and FM 33-5, PSYOP units were attached to conventional maneuver units. In these

units the PSYOP operators fell under different staff sections according to the unit that they were

attached to, and in most divisions the PSYOP units were attached the civil affairs section even

though the FM stated that they should be attached to the operations section.46 However, not every officer in the staff that was in charge of PSYOP directly received training on PSYOP or the training for the conventional staff officers was inadequate.

In a study conducted in 1969, most PSYOP officers felt that there was a sufficient number of qualified PSYOP officers working as team leaders. However, this study also concluded that:

Although the general PSYOP qualifications were considered adequate, there was insufficient development of area-oriented and language-qualified personnel to meet technical requirements. The number of PSYOP school trained officers assigned to tactical units was inadequate according to 70 percent of the respondents. There were less than 40 percent of PSYOP-qualified or school trained officers assigned to the tactical units.47

46 R.P. Morris. “Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level” (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 1969). 47 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-16. 23

This dearth of knowledge on PSYOP was a critical failure for conventional units and led to the

misuse and misunderstanding of PSYOP capabilities. The lack of qualified staff had an impact in

different ways; one being that the staff sections of the maneuver units lacked contact/expert

knowledge on PSYOP, another being that there was lack of tactical PSYOP officers to bring

attention to how PSYOP may have impacted the battlefield, and a third that most lacked training

in culture and language that would be essential for appealing to the “hearts and minds” of the

Vietnamese.

The impact of the lack of knowledge on PSYOP among conventional staff officers was

critical to the way PSYOP was handled in Vietnam, because these staff officers were who drove

the development on the tactical use of PSYOP in support of combat operations.48 With inadequate training of staff officers and unit commanders, PSYOP was not used to its fullest potential. Many PSYOP officers, acting as Team Leaders, indicated in the 1969 study that:

A problem confronting most PSYOP commanders and staff officers was what they

considered to be a lack of understanding on the part of tactical unit commanders

concerning the role, capability, and employment of PSYOP in stability operations. The

majority of PSYOP field personnel indicated that some tactical commanders were more

interested in high body counts during combat operations than in integrating PSYOP as

part of the tactical operation. One PSYOP unit commander reported that his PSYOP

teams in support of a division were only 70-percent effective because team assets were

used for purposes other than PSYOP.49

48 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-16. 49 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-16. 24

The “lack of understanding” was a major contributor to the failure of PSYOP in Vietnam. With this inadequate training for conventional unit staff officers in PSYOP, many of the officers assigned to PSYOP duties did their jobs reluctantly. Low morale and high turnover characterized many junior PSYOP leadership positions. These officers looked for ways to transfer from this duty position, and PSYOP team leaders reported that they would have three to four staff officers rotate through the position during the length of their one-year deployment.50

Not only was there a concern with the insufficient training of staff officers in PSYOP reported by PSYOP team leaders, but there was also a lack of training for the enlisted PSYOP personnel and discrepancies in the training of PSYOP officers. Thirty percent of the PSYOP team leaders called for more training of the enlisted personnel to efficiently conduct operations.51

Most of the enlisted personnel had not received specific PSYOP training or had much prior knowledge of PSYOP duties. While those glaring issues stood in the way of productive PSYOP uses, there was also an issue with the training of PSYOP officers. The PSYOP program was too theoretical, lacking substance and focusing too much on abstract concepts.52 This emphasis on theory, while understandably important, distracted from learning how to effectively produce material. Along with this, thirty percent of the PSYOP officers, according the 1969 survey,

50 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-17. 51 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-15. 52 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-13. 25 indicated that there was not enough instructions and standards in the FMs that helped in combining PSYOP with conventional unit operations.

The training for PSYOP officers did expand over the course of the war to include a more in-depth study of the subject. In the 1962 course, officers were only required to complete roughly

3 weeks of training.53 However, by 1968 the course was expanded to a 16-week format, with about eight hours of classes each day.54 Missing from both sets of course descriptions was any follow on schools on the language or culture of the people of Vietnam. This failure to train on the culture of the people that they were being tasked with influencing caused major issues.

Reports from many PSYOP personnel, both State Department civilian and army PSYOP operators, indicated a need for the basic understanding of the language.55

Effort over Effectiveness: Misapplied Metrics of Success for PSYOP

Many scholars of the Vietnam War have criticized the Army’s obsession on reporting numbers and statistics during the war. Scholars such as Andrew Krepinevich and Gregory

Daddis have decried the reliance on statistical fulfillment that leaders such as Secretary of

Defense Robert S McNamara deemed as the only way to measure the war’s progress.56 In most

53 United States Army Special Warfare School, Program of Instruction for 33-G-F7: Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare Staff Officer, March 1962, Box 18, Folder 03, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 - Insurgency Warfare, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2171803005, Accessed 22 Aug 2020. 54 Listing of subjects in PSYOP Staff Officer Program of Instruction - U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Psychological Operations Department, Fort Bragg, 17 September 1968, Box 01, Folder 01, Peter Swartz Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=13530101002, Accessed 22 Aug 2020. 55 Report, APA/PSYOP - End-of-Tour Report. Vietnam Center and Archive. 20580224001 09 July 1968 Box 02, Folder 24. Fred Walker Collection. The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 16 Apr. 2019. 56 See Daddis No Sure Victory and Krepinevich’s The Army and Vietnam. 26 historical monographs, they discuss body counts and weapons captured, and how that did not equal to winning the hearts and minds of the populations- and they are correct. However, the obsession with statistical measurement was also applied to the tool that may have been the most effective to “win the hearts and minds”: PSYOP.

FM 33-5 contains a small subsection on the “Evaluation of PSYOP Effectiveness” that stated:

PSYOP are continuously evaluated for errors, weaknesses, or changes which require

adjustment or improvement. PSYOP effectiveness is difficult to measure, especially

among hostile audiences. The quantity of propaganda output is a measure of PSYOP

effort rather than PSYOP effectiveness.57

The last sentence of this quote exemplifies the reason that PSYOP effectiveness is so hard to measure, it is not quantitative, and this led to a misuse of PSYOP by maneuver commanders. The

FM then went on to explain that there are direct and indirect indicators of effectiveness. None of the described indicators in either category lend themselves to the numerical needs of reporting required by staff officers to their commanders. This inability of PSYOP to be quantified may have led many commanders to ignore and mishandle their PSYOP assets. An interaction from one of the PSYOP team leaders with a unit commander was described in the 1969 reports:

The body count and kill attitude was manifested in the remark of a unit commander who

boasted that his Chieu Hoi program consisted of two 105mm howitzers - one of which

was marked Chieu and the other Hoi.58

57 Emphasis mine. FM 33-5 Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, 20 October 1966, Box 05, Folder 20, United States Armed Forces Manuals Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1370520001, Accessed 23 Aug 2020. 58 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-16. 27

This exchange was a perfect example of the misunderstanding of the concepts by conventional

unit officers. The exaggerated importance on kill ratio pushed by maneuver commanders created

a toxic atmosphere of neglect for the pacification process. The quote from above shows how this

inflated need to cause destruction to the enemy negatively impacted PSYOP, and thusly the

pacification efforts.

While the FMs described that the measurement of effectiveness of PSYOP is problematic

at best, many officers still endeavored to find a way to create a way to view the indicators

statistically. A Command and General Staff College (CGSC) thesis written by Lieutenant

Colonel R. P. Morris, an Army officer who had worked with PSYOP as a commander in

Vietnam, surveyed seven Army divisions then operating in Vietnam and his classmates at the

Command and General Staff College. Through his extensive research and data collection,

Lieutenant Colonel Morris found that the most common indicator of PSYOP effectiveness used

by division staff officers in Vietnam was the amount of ralliers through the Chieu Hoi program.

The Chieu Hoi program, or “open arms”, was a program that promised fair treatment and good

care of a North Vietnamese Army or National Liberation Front soldier who defected to U.S. or

ARVN forces. These ralliers attributed their defection to the leaflets that were dropped by

PSYOP teams, which led many conventional unit staff officers to measure the effectiveness of

PSYOP based on how many leaflets were dropped.59 However, this statistic was not reliable for

the same reason the measurement of bodies and kills was not: human error of double counting

59 R.P. Morris. “Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level” (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 1969). 28 and inflating numbers.60 The reporting of the numbers conflicts with the admonition in the FM, the effort of a PSYOP campaign does not mean that it is effective in its actions.

The following two chapters provide case studies that examine this issue in greater depth.

The imperative to quantify progress led to staff officers reporting numbers of leaflets dropped and number of ralliers/prisoners taken, and those are typically the only mentions of PSYOP in any combat unit’s after actions reports. A 1971 MAC-V study provides a substantial amount of research into which forms of propaganda led to ralliers making their decision.61 However, this report again focuses on mass numbers and percentages, and was written as the war was winding to the end and the American presence in Vietnam was declining. While the study did indicate that there was some correlation between some propaganda that the ralliers consumed and their decision to leave, General Westmoreland in his memoir states that despite the presence of some

PSYOP material and units, there was never any mass defections. It is important to note that

PSYOP is only mentioned for a paragraph in his memoir, illustrating the lack of prevalence in his overall strategy.62

Curiously and significantly, each of these studies omitted a seemingly essential factor: the reaction of the target civilian population to the PSYOP campaign/programs. In FM 33-1 there was a clear goal of PSYOP during “Stability Operations”, the first bullet point was to, “Gain the support of the populace for the host government.” 63While this section on stability operations

60 R.P. Morris. “Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level” (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 1969). 61 Volume 1 Final Technical Report Psychological Operations Studies -- Vietnam, 25 May 1971, Box 15, Folder 01, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 - Insurgency Warfare, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2171501001, Accessed 22 Aug 2020. 62 William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1976), 282. 63 Psychological Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine, June 1968, Box 04, Folder 10, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 11 - Monographs, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech 29 was only about two pages of actual information, it seems that most conventional unit officers/staff did not heed it. In both the 1971 study from MAC-V and the CGSC thesis from

Morris there was little examination of the civilian population. Both of these studies focused on the information gained from ralliers that came from enemy combatants. While this statistical information added knowledge to ascertain the most efficient form of PSYOP towards enemy combatants, it did not provide support in ways to influence the civilian population of South

Vietnam.

While the obsession with effort equating effectiveness was prevalent in most combat commands, there were some positive examples of using PSYOP during the war that focused on

PSYOP more than pure combat operations. For example, in Operation Roundup in fall 1970, unit-specific leaflets and loudspeaker calls resulted in more that 1,400 ralliers from the VC

“owned” Mekong Delta. Those locally-targeted leaflet and loudspeaker calls had been created in conjunction with an armed sweep of the delta by ARVN forces backed by U.S. personnel. In preparing the leaflets to appeal to the specific conditions that confronted individual enemy units, the PSYOP operators used messages directly targeting VC units in the area. Then again, the same tactics were used in another sweep of the delta in winter 1970 which produced over 600 ralliers. This suggests how PSYOP leaflets can be of most impact when tailored to the specific location and enemy, and that quickly reacting to intelligence gathered about the enemy enhance

PSYOP operations in support of the combat operations.64

University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2390410002, Accessed 21 Aug 2020. 64 Colburn Lovett, “Effective Combat PSYOP in the Delta” in “The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application,” eds. Ronald De McLaurin et al., vol. I (Washington: American Institutes for Research, 1976): 413-416. 30

Barger’s CGSC thesis states a similar concept. Using the operations of the 173rd Airborne

Brigade being conducted in 1969-1970 as an example, he explains that the 173rd’s commander fully integrated PSYOP into his tactical operations with success. They distributed Chieu Hoi appeals following battlefield victories, encouraging enemy soldiers to defect instead of suffering the fate of their comrades who were killed in the recent engagement.65 PSYOP units supporting the 173rd carefully crafted their Chieu Hoi appeals to cite details such as specific combat losses, current weather conditions, and intelligence reports that enemy troops were suffering from a lack of food. This example demonstrates how effectively PSYOP can be when fully integrated with the unit’s intelligence and operations staffs during the planning and execution of the missions.

This also serves as an example that conducting large scale, search-and-destroy missions, like

Operation Apache Snow was not useful in advancing the pacification efforts purported to be central to Abrams’ operational concept. Barger also cites a study published in 1971 that concluded that Chieu Hoi appeals directly targeting enemy units recently attacked had the greatest chance of yielding ralliers.66 As these examples demonstrate, PSYOP, when fully incorporated into intelligence and operational planning and specifically targeted, can produce impactful results on the battlefield.

Personnel and Equipment Shortages: Make it Work, It’s All We Have

A costly obstacle to accomplishing the mission given to PSYOP units was the lack of equipment and personnel. An all too common occurrence in the conventional units of Vietnam, equipment shortages and manning shortages made completing a mission extremely difficult. In the PSYOP unit’s structure there were printing presses, loudspeakers, and movie projectors just

65 Barger. “Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam”, 74- 75 66 Barger. “Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam”, 78- 80. 31 to name some of the unique needs of PSYOP. These needs were hard to support and lacked priority in the supply planning of conventional unit commanders and their staff, who were already working with a burdened supply system. The issues of supply and manning compounded the problems for PSYOP.

There were two issues facing the PSYOP teams in respect to equipment. One was that there was a heavy demand with little equipment, and the other was that there were few repair parts when a piece of equipment broke down. Annex E of the 1969 “Employment of U.S.

Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam” report, includes a vast list of issues pertaining to the lack of equipment. In this report, team leaders expressed that the printing demands of the conventional units far exceeded the capabilities of the light mobile printing presses issued to the

PSYOP printing teams.67 While the demand on the PSYOP units were increased, the supply of machines did not allow units to meet the demand. Not only were printing presses vastly overused, they were also misused from their original intent. PSYOP devoted over thirty percent of its printing capabilities towards supporting civilian agencies’ national goals, which means that the presses were less able to accomplish their primary mission of supporting tactical level

PSYOP.68 This drain on their own resources meant that army PSYOP units were not able to focus on creating leaflets for the tactical use of the local area of operations and instead mass printed leaflets with only national goals in mind.

Another shortage was of trained PSYOP operators in teams. As of 1 December 1969, the

4th PSYOP Group had been authorized to have 876 military personnel, 176 for the Group headquarters and 175 for each battalion. However, in the 1969 report there were 843 military personnel in country and most of them lacked the language or technical skills required of the job.

67 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”, III-3. 68 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”, III-3. 32

It was also not uncommon for officers to rotate out of country months before their year of duty was done so that they could return to the United States for some sort of schooling or change of job.69 The continual rotation of operators, especially officers, was detrimental to the stability of the teams as the knowledge that they had gained was lost. The rotation of personnel meant that knowledge of the area that the operators were supposed to become experts in left and had to be relearned by the next leader. Reports from JUSPAO officials also stated the need for better trained operators, better/more equipment, and for longer tours to establish and retain knowledge of the assigned areas.70

Racial Prejudice: Being Racist Doesn’t Help

The prevalent racism and the actions of United States military and civilian personnel in

Vietnam was negatively impactful on the operations and goals of PSYOP. The view that U.S. military personnel held of the Vietnamese people was that they were a people of lower intelligence and barbaric lifestyle. This racist attitude grew as the war progressed, moving from a view of the Vietnamese people needing to be taught to the U.S. personnel treating them hatefully and disrespecting them as living peoples. These racially motivated views harbored by United

States “experts” were extremely detrimental to the American effort in Vietnam. These beliefs were held by both conventional military commanders and soldiers as well as PSYOP planners and operators.71

A common thread of thought among U.S. officers was that the Vietnamese people were passive and submissive according to Colonel Bambery, former G5 of the 1st Cavalry Division:

69 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”, II-10. 70Report, APA/PSYOP - End-of-Tour Report. Vietnam Center and Archive. 20580224001 09 July 1968 Box 02, Folder 24. Fred Walker Collection. The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 16 Apr. 2019 71 Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond, 10. 33

… there is an inherent "desire to please" that characterizes people within the oriental

races, and this desire to say what the questioner would like to hear is a factor that must be

taken into account when making subjective evaluations of PSYOP feedback information

obtained through interrogations.72

This quote demonstrates the problems that racism played when evaluating PSYOP effectiveness in Vietnam. Many American officials believed that the Vietnamese were incapable of being successful or productive in fighting the insurgency without the help of the U.S. The way that officials saw the people as simplistic directly undermined the war effort in securing the peoples allegiance to the government and trust towards the U.S. military forces.73

The racist views of many of the service members in country contradicted the message that the PSYOP personnel were trying to create. Tactical PSYOP officers remarked that the actions of U.S. soldiers could have a colossal impact on the mission being conducted:

There was a lack of understanding of the manner in which individual actions adversely

affected the PSYOP effort and harmed the US image. Over 60 percent of the PSYOP

team leaders replied that the actions of some US troops were frequently detrimental to

US/Vietnamese relationships. Actions and incidents frequently cited which created

adverse impact on the Vietnamese society were vehicle accidents, general misconduct of

troops, and patronizing or disrespectful actions toward the Vietnamese people.74

72 R.P. Morris. “Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level” (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 1969). 73 Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style, 6-10. 74 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”, II-17. 34

This misconduct by U.S. personnel is found in sources like Howard Jones’s My Lai: Vietnam,

1968, and the Descent into Darkness and Robert Kodosky’s Psychological Operations American

Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Officer, Vietnam and Beyond.75 Along with the popular media, the racial attitudes of U.S. personnel are eternalized in military history and teaching with the My Lai Massacre becoming a focus of many commanders after the Vietnam

War.

Conclusion

The PSYOP effort in Vietnam was mismanaged, misrepresented, and misunderstood by those in command. The limited overall understanding of how to use and direct PSYOP that did emerge was lost in the conventional focus of troop movements and officer rotations. The organization in Vietnam was convoluted with agencies and directorates that muddled who actually had control of what aspects of the United States involvement in South Vietnam. The multiple agencies in charge of PSYOP ranged from military to civilian. They created a web of networks that muddled the command of PSYOP. United States Army PSYOP was not fully integrated under a unified group until 1967, two years after ground combat troops were introduced into South Vietnam. Even after consolidation into the 4th PSYOP group, there was still a disconnect between the maneuver unit commanders and the PSYOP teams.

Not only was the structure of PSYOP command a hinderance for the implementation of

PSYOP missions and goals, the doctrine and training about PSYOP was also deficient. The doctrine on PSYOP discussed complicated theories about PSYOP, but these types of vague theoretical concepts were not helpful or impactful when conventional army officers read them.

75 Howard Jones, My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Decent into Darkness, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style. 35

Failing to understand the concepts and goals of PSYOP, conventional unit commanders and staff

officers misused their PSYOP capabilities. Staff officers, with little to no training, were put in

charge of PSYOP activities for their unit. This lack of doctrinal clarity and integration in

professional training courses led to these staff officers looking for ways to leave their post for a

new job in order to advance their own career.

Not only was there a lack of training and comprehensive doctrine, PSYOP also had to

respond to the conflict’s obsession with demonstrating it was “winning” the counterinsurgency

by citing statistical data. When the job of PSYOP was to influence the population and enemy

into cooperation, it was hard to generate meaningful statistics to measure the effectiveness of

influence. However, this did not stop conventional unit commanders from demanding statistical

indicators of success and for staff officers to provide them. As a result, the metrics of success for

PSYOP operations became statistics on often misleading items such as the number of leaflets

dropped, or the number of enemy defectors processed. The metrics, or effort, of the PSYOP and

combat commanders does not equal an effective PSYOP campaign. These conclusions on

PSYOPs in this chapter provide an additional component to support the broader arguments of

Gregory Daddis’ No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the

Vietnam War. While Daddis clearly demonstrates that statistical measurements of body counts

and weapons captured served as a flawed measurement for combat forces, this chapter reveals

that combat support units, such as PSYOP teams, suffered from the same liabilities.76

Lacking vital equipment to do the job and being hindered by the racialized sensibilities held by many American service members, PSYOP team leaders and operators found it difficult to be effective at the tactical level. PSYOP units were tasked with producing paper media that far

76 See Daddis, No Sure Victory. 36 outpaced their ability to produce. Not only that, at times they lacked the ability to repair vital equipment needed to conduct the wide variety of missions applicable to their job. Operators were also hindered by the actions of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam. The racist attitudes and abusive actions taken by military personnel toward the Vietnamese civilian population critically damaged the rapport of the government and of the U.S. military.

These factors all combine to explain the failure of PSYOP in Vietnam, and thusly the failure of the war effort in all. With the obvious lack of emphasis on PSYOP, the “other war” could never be truly won. This chapter expands the known shortcomings of the maneuver units to effectively employ the force multiplier of PSYOP. Other works focus on PSYOP as it acted, almost in a vacuum, this chapter shows that PSYOP had a complicated relationship with maneuver warfare.77 The proceeding chapters will provide case studies of two major, conventional, army operations that PSYOP units supported. The examination of these operations provides clear examples of how PSYOP was used and seen by unit commanders, and how it failed to do more than produce paper to be scattered into the jungle.

77 Roberts III, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968. 37

CHAPTER 2. A TOOTHLESS COMB: PSYOP IN OPERATION JUNCTION CITY

1967 was the “year of the offensive” in Vietnam according to General William

Westmoreland, Commander of Military Assistance Command- Vietnam (MAC-V). General

Westmoreland, obsessed with the idea of finding and fixing the enemy, was looking for a way to establish a path of victory in the war.78 While the concept of “taking it to the enemy” became prevalent, Westmoreland looked to his II Field Force Commander, Lieutenant General Jonathan

Seaman, to plan an operation to clear out the VC stronghold in War Zone C. War Zone C was vastly important for General Westmoreland; the close proximity of War Zone C to the capital city of South Vietnam, Saigon, made it necessary to establish a stronger United States military presence. Born from the need for both a battlefield victory and greater security of the capital,

Seaman planned Operation Junction City. Upwards of 35,000 United States Army soldiers, and tons of equipment and ammunition was brought to bear in the 80x50 kilometer area of operation for Operation Junction City.79 The main goals of the operation were to deny the enemy logistical support, deplete their numbers, and prevent them from any access to the local civilian population in the area. While initially seeming to be a victory for MAC-V, the operation failed to deny the enemy a base of operations they would use several months later to launch attacks against Saigon during the Tet Offensive. The commanders of the operation failed to use an asset whose main mission is to influence and coerce combatives and civilians alike, PSYOP.

78 General Westmoreland’s war of attrition, a war fought with the enemy seen as the center of gravity, is in contrast with the war for Hearts and Minds- a war where the center of gravity is the civilian population. This war of attrition being fought by Westmoreland took away the focus PSYOP could have had on influencing the civilian population to trust the GVN. Attrition instead forced PSYOP to focus on the enemy combatants. For more on Hearts and Minds revisionism see Gary Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War. 79 Bernard William Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City: A Turning Point. (Washington: Dept. of the Army, 1974), 83-90. 38

Using the case study of Operation Junction City to explore the implementation of PSYOP

allows for an analysis of the place PSYOP held in the planning and conduct of large operations

during the Vietnam War. The operation is an ideal example of the infamous concept of “search and destroy.” This concept has come under considerable scrutiny from scholars of the Vietnam

War, and analyzing one of the largest search and destroy operations of the war illuminates how

PSYOP units fit into the order of movement and attack.80 Assessing the use of PSYOP in

Operation Junction City, this chapter is organized into three sections: the first examines the movement and actions of conventional forces, the second section reviews the use of PSYOP units during the operation, and the third section provides a critique of the use of PSYOP in the operation.

This chapter demonstrates how unit commanders considered PSYOP during this period of the war, using Operation Junction City as a case study for the implementation of PSYOP. It will also show how PSYOP was understood (or not) as a tool for combat commanders. This work uses Operation Junction City and the implementation of PSYOP to argue that commanders did not have a full understanding of PSYOP units, their capabilities, and to a greater degree, the overall objective of the war. While this chapter acknowledges that commanders did have PSYOP units attached to them, it argues that they used them incompletely as reactionary support and misleadingly calculated the success of using PSYOP in the same failed way they calculated

“winning” during a large operation by using flawed metrics to gauge success. In this case, maneuver staff officers simply asserted that the number of flyers dropped indicated the effectiveness of PSYOP support of the mission.81

80 For an overview of competing critiques of Westmoreland’s operational concept, see, for example, Gary Hess, Gregory Daddis’ Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam and John Nagl. 81 This critique is built of a broader one developed by Gregory Daddis in his work, No Sure Victory, that US forces developed flawed measurements of effectiveness and progress in Vietnam. 39

In examining PSYOP during Operation Junction City, this chapter complicates the

scholarship on Operation Junction City. For example, it contradicts the assertion of Lieutenant

General Bernard William Rogers in Cedar Fall-Junction City: A Turning Point, where he argues

that the operation was an astounding success.82 There are two issues with this assertion: there is

no lasting effect on the population in the area of Operation Junction City and Rogers, who was

the assistant divisional commander for the 1st Infantry Division during Operation Junction City,

was hardly an impartial analyst. This chapter will also challenge the work of Mervyn Roberts’s

The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968, by demonstrating the ineptness of maneuver

commanders in use of their PSYOP assets.83 Moreover, this chapter will build upon the findings of Gregory Daddis and Andrew Krepinevich that the obsession for statistics hurt the pacification efforts in Vietnam, by demonstrating that PSYOP fell prey to this obsession as well.84 Finally,

this chapter supports the primary argument of this thesis by demonstrating that PSYOP was

under-utilized by maneuver commanders.

The Horseshoe, a Jungle, and Walking Operation Junction City was born out of what General Westmoreland saw in the report

from a study commissioned by the Army Chief of Staff, the Program for the Pacification and

Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN).85 Directed by Creighton Abrams and published in March of 1966, General Westmoreland did not receive the PROVN study favorably.

It effectively said that the course taken by MAC-V was leading to an unfavorable outcome (i.e., losing the war) for the United States in Vietnam. However, General Westmoreland inferred from

82 Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City: A Turning Point. 83 Mervyn Edwin Roberts III, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2018). 84 See, for example, Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam and Daddis, No Sure Victory and Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam. 85 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 181. 40

PROVN that he was doing most of what the study recommended and that the United States and

South Vietnamese forces needed to take the offensive in South Vietnam. The assessment from

PROVN was that there needed to be more offensive operations in the sense of maneuver warfare, but that the focus needed to be on securing the civilian population. General Westmoreland’s narrow interpretation of PROVN resulted in the increased emphasis on conventional warfare, resulting in operations such as Junction City. To draw the elusive Viet Cong and North

Vietnamese infiltrators into battle, General Westmoreland and his staff developed plans for massive search and destroy operations.86 Operation Junction City was one of these major offensives planned in order to “bring the fight to the enemy.”

Operation Junction City was a three-phase plan, commanded by II Field Force

Commander, Lieutenant General Jonathan Seaman, meant to trap and destroy the elusive headquarters of the NVA, known as the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN). The operation lasted from 22 February to 14 May 1967.87 The major ground forces deployed for

Operation Junction City included the 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry

Division,173rd Airborne Brigade, 3rd Brigade- 4th Infantry Division, 196th Infantry Brigade, 11th

Armored Cavalry Regiment, and four different Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units.88 In total, this operation committed about 35,000 soldiers and was the biggest combat operation of the war up to that point.

The first phase of Operation Junction City started on 22 February and concluded on 17

March 1967. The plan for phase one was simple: set up positions of units in a horseshoe shape

86 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 186-191. 87 Rogers Cedar Falls, Junction City, 83-84. 88 Rogers Cedar Falls, Junction City, 97-100. 41 blocking off escape routes for the North Vietnamese/ Viet Cong towards Cambodia. To conduct these blocking maneuvers the 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division flew in by helicopter to the northwestern blocking positions. The 173rd Airborne Brigade conducted an airborne assault to move into position, taking the northeastern part of the horseshoe, and the 3rd Brigade of the 1st

Infantry Division moved by road north from their staging area to connect with the 173rd Airborne

Brigade to create the eastern leg of the horseshoe.89 The horseshoes’ western leg contained 2

ARVN elements, the 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, and the 196th Infantry Brigade.

The 2nd Brigade of the 25th Infantry and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment pushed from up the south in a large sweep to engage and destroy the enemy. In total,18 battalions and 13 artillery firebases created the horseshoe for Operation Junction City. 90

For the most part, the first half of the first phase of Operation Junction City encountered the typical harassing engagements by the Viet Cong. Much of these types of engagements were quick and never lasted much longer than 30 minutes. The large sweeps of War Zone C conducted by the units involved during this first phase produced little in the way of actionable intelligence or enemy contact. The combat units found small food storages, weapons caches, and offices during this phase. Along with sporadic harassing small-arms fire, United States troops repeatedly encountered roads that were mined, which slowed their progress.91 While the norm of the first phase was low-level engagements, a unit from the 1st Infantry Division was caught in the first

89 Junction City: On the Offensive in War Zone C, No Date, Box 08, Folder 07, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 02 - Military Operations, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2130807059, Accessed 06 May 2020. 90 Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City, 100-101. 91 Operational Report Lessons Learned - 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, October 1967, Box 11, Folder 10, Americal Division Veterans Association Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1387ORLL11101967, Accessed 06 May 2020. 42 phase’s largest engagement. On 28 February, a company from the 1st Infantry Division encountered a large force of North Vietnamese troops (NVA). This battle was the first battle of

Prek Klok, in which a company from the 1st Infantry Division suddenly came under heavy fire from enemy forces, which progressed into a deliberate attack from the North Vietnamese that did not fully end until 4.5 hours after the initial start. A sweep of the area, conducted well after dark, identified 165 bodies.92 There were 25 American KIA and 28 wounded.93 The second battle of

Prek Klok took place ten days later at an artillery support base in the same area. The base took mortar fire, which the United States soldiers returned. The Viet Cong soldiers eventually launched a ground attack, which the Americans repulsed.94 There were 197 Viet Cong dead and five wounded, along with three U.S. soldiers dead and 38 wounded.95 While these battles were the highlight, they were the exception in phase one. During the first phase, PSYOP units produced quick reaction leaflets to these engagements, targeting the enemy units who they had just repulsed. The first phase ended at midnight on 18 March, and the second phase began.

Phase two of Operation Junction City was to take place in the eastern part of the horseshoe and move west towards the middle of the original horseshoe. The reason for this movement was to provide security for engineering units to build roads and bases, along with attempting to further cut off the movement of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. The U.S. forces built these roads to help the flow of civilians in the area and to help in future operations if

92 Danger Forward: The Magazine of the Big Red One, Vietnam, No Date, Charles Winer Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2842Serial610921, Accessed 06 May 2020. 93 Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City, 116. 94 Danger Forward: The Magazine of the Big Red One, Vietnam, No Date, Charles Winer Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2842Serial610921, Accessed 06 May 2020 95 Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City, 121. 43 needed.96 The after-action comments from the 1st Infantry Division operations officer summarizes the plan for the second phase;

The plan for the second phase in War Zone C was quite simple: place two brigades of

infantry, reinforced with armored and mechanized forces, across the flow of VC traffic.

The 2d Brigade and 173d Airborne Brigade, under operational control of the 1st Division,

were chosen for the task. They executed search and destroy operations in the general area

indicated on the JUNCTION CITY II map, attached. The 1st Brigade secured QUAN

LOI, Route 246 to the bridge site, and Route 245 to MINH THANH. The 1st Brigade of

the 9th Division, also under 1st Division control, secured Route 13 from LAI KHE to

QUAN LOI. During this phase of the operation the 1st Infantry Division controlled five

brigades and an armored cavalry regiment in addition to supporting artillery, engineer,

aviation, signal, and logistical units.97

Phase two of the operation lasted from 18 March till 15 April 1967 and included three major engagements. This summary shows that the operations were huge and encompassed a large number of soldiers and resources. The number of maneuver units committed to the operation contrasts a limited number of undermanned PSYOP team attached to support an operation of this magnitude.

96 Combat Comments - 1st Infantry Division - Narrative, No Date, Box 02, Folder 03, Black Knights 3/5 Cavalry Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=26240203005, Accessed 06 May 2020. 97 Combat Comments - 1st Infantry Division - Narrative, No Date, Box 02, Folder 03, Black Knights 3/5 Cavalry Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=26240203005, Accessed 06 May 2020. 44

The first major engagement of phase two was the battle of Ap Bau Bang II, which

occurred on 20 March 1967.98 Ap Bau Bang II was very similar to the second battle of Prek

Klock, in which a large enemy force of a mixed VC and NVA attacked an artillery support base.

Starting with heavy mortar and large machine gun fire, the North Vietnamese launched a ground

attack that the overwhelming U.S. firepower repulsed. The outcome of Ap Bau Bang II was that

the U.S. forces sustained 3 killed and 63 wounded while the Viet Cong suffered around 231

killed and 5 wounded (taken as POWs).99 The battle of Soui Tre was another major engagement

of phase two. The attack at Soui Tre happened at the same time as Ap Bau Bang II and was just

as similar. The U.S. soldiers barely held off the massed attacks on the base until reinforcements

arrived and forced the enemy to retreat. The mixed forces of NVA and VC suffered an estimated

647 killed and 7 prisoners, where the U.S. troops suffered 31 killed and 109 wounded.100 The

third major engagement that took place was the battle of Ap Gu on 26 March 1967. During this

battle, a reconnaissance platoon was attacked and then reinforced by a larger unit. After the U.S.

troops had gained reinforcements, the enemy forces launched a large assault that met coordinated

U.S. artillery and gunfire.101 The mixed NVA and VC forces suffered approximately 609 killed and 5 captured while the U.S. forces suffered 17 killed and 102 wounded.102 These three battles were the major markers of the second phase. The PSYOP mission and actions during the second

98 Combat Comments - 1st Infantry Division - Narrative, No Date, Box 02, Folder 03, Black Knights 3/5 Cavalry Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=26240203005, Accessed 06 May 2020. 99 Combat Comments - 1st Infantry Division - Narrative, No Date, Box 02, Folder 03, Black Knights 3/5 Cavalry Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=26240203005, Accessed 06 May 2020. 100 Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City, 135-140. 101 Danger Forward: The Magazine of the Big Red One, Vietnam, No Date, Charles Winer Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2842Serial610921, Accessed 06 May 2020 102 Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City, 147. 45 phase mirrored those of the first. It was used primarily after major engagements to convince what was left of enemy units to surrender by dropping leaflets on their positions and broadcasting over loudspeakers on helicopters.

The third phase of Operation Junction City was the close-out of the operation. This phase had one brigade, approximately 1,800 soldiers, operating in an area that had previously encompassed 35,000 soldiers during the first two phases.103 While considerably smaller, this remaining unit continued to conduct search and destroy operations to try and pin down enemy forces. At the end of this huge operation, the U.S. forces failed to find and destroy the COSVN headquarters.104 While this standard operational overview dominates the limited scholarship on

Operation Junction City, these battles and movements overshadow a considerably impactful, yet misused, tool for army commanders in Vietnam; PSYOP.

Paper in the Sky

Conventional troop movements and finding, fixing and killing the enemy were at the forefront of the minds of the commanders of the units discussed above during Operation Junction

City. However, there was an aspect of the operation that only gets brief mention in most of their after action reports and lessons learned reports following the end of the operation, which was the use of PSYOP units and capabilities on the enemy and civilian population in War Zone C. While

PSYOP receives minimal attention, it was nonetheless used during this operation. However, its use was limited in scope and impact. This was not surprising, as the commanders were more

103 Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City, 149. 104 Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, 09 November 1967, Box 02, Folder 03, Black Knights 3/5 Cavalry Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=26240203001, Accessed 07 May 2020. 46 focused on ground combat operations, and the command of PSYOP was uncoordinated within the Corps.

The only PSYOP asset committed in direct support of Operation Junction City was the company attached to II Field Force Command, the 246th PSYOP Company.105 This company was part of the tactical unit PSYOP battalion, the 6th PSYOP Battalion. Each Field Force had one attached PSYOP company that supported operations in that Field Force’s area of operation.106

The way that these PSYOP assets were used during Operation Junction City was to create and distribute quick reaction leaflets following the surrender of an enemy combatant.107 These captured soldiers were be interviewed by the PSYOP teams and asked to give statements urging their former comrades to surrender. These types of leaflets were then created by the PSYOP unit and then dropped from aircraft into the jungle where it was thought that the enemy force were.

While this type of quick reaction leaflet making was the most impactful as shown in Chapter

One, the times that it was used where small and only used for a short time period before the combat arms units moved on.

During the entirety of Operation Junction City PSYOP units dropped 9,768,000 leaflets.

Discussing what types of leaflets were dropped, General Frederick Weyand (25th Infantry

Division Commander) commented:

105 Operational Report Lessons Learned - 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, October 1967, Box 11, Folder 10, Americal Division Veterans Association Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1387ORLL11101967, Accessed 07 May 2020. 106 Book, Joint United States Public Affairs Office - JUSPAO Vietnam General Briefing Book, June 1968, Box 02, Folder 14, Fred Walker Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=20580214003, Accessed 07 May 2020. 107 Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City, 151. 47

The major engagements of 20, 21, and 31 March were followed up with a wide variety of

“quick-reaction” leaflets. They showed photographs of VC dead and contained surrender

appeals of the survivors. A specially designed memorandum addressed to the CG of the

9th VC Div was reproduced and distributed as a leaflet to further exploit our success of 20

March.108

Along with these leaflet drops into the jungle, the 246th PSYOP company also conducted 102 hours of aerial loudspeaker appeals for surrender from helicopters.109 The main goal of the unit commanders in using PSYOP was to quickly produce enemy surrenders in order to gain further intelligence. They assumed that it was en masse as well, meaning that combat arms commanders did not understand that PSYOP is a subtle attack on an enemy’s nerve and that effort did not mean that it was effective.110 Maneuver commanders believed that their defeat of the forces they had already encountered destroyed the will to fight of the remaining enemy forces. In total there were only 139 Chieu Hoi (Open Arms, a program that offered protection and safety for any NVA or NLF member who turned in themselves and their weapons) ralliers/defectors, an abysmal number compared to the leaflets dropped and loudspeaker missions ran.111 The U.S. commanders attributed this small amount of ralliers to the “harden nature” of this particular band of combatants. This is why the commanders emphasized the use of quick reaction leaflets; they did

108 Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City, 151. 109 Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City 151. 110Whiskeyman, Andrew D. "Leaflets and Loudspeakers: The Role of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Large-Scale Combat Operations." Perceptions are reality: historical case studies of information operations in large-scale combat operations7 (2018): 91-107. U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center. Accessed May 10, 2020. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi- books/perceptions-are-reality-lsco-volume-7.pdf 111 Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City, 151. 48 not think the typical propaganda (i.e. the mass produced Chieu Hoi leaflets that played on the desire of fighters to go home to their families) would work on these enemy forces.112

The reporting on PSYOP activity during the operation is very limited, and reports from

U.S. units simply outline how many leaflets were dropped by their respective PSYOP attachments. For example, this excerpt from a report from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment;

The psychological warfare effort of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, during the

period February thru April 1967, was supported by the 10th Mobile Field Team from the

246th Psychological Operations Company in the quarter, dropping 7,351,000 leaflets and

broadcasting a total of eighty-nine hours. In addition, it produced forty-eight tapes for

broadcast and distributed 62,000 leaflets. Activities during the quarter can be classified as

coverage of the base camp area and support of combat operations (Operations Junction

CITY I and II, and MANHATTAN).113

This is one example of many summaries in after action reports. Many commanders saw the use of PSYOP as a small tool compared to their fixation on ammunition used and enemy killed - indicating their reliance on enemy attrition over protecting the local population. This lack of emphasis was one of the reasons that Operation Junction City did not complete its total goal of pacifying War Zone C.

112 Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City, 151. 113 Operational Report Lessons Learned - 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, October 1967, Box 11, Folder 10, Americal Division Veterans Association Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1387ORLL11101967, Accessed 07 May 2020. 49

Analysis

When assessing Operation Junction City and how PSYOP was used during the operation, there are a few major shortcomings to dissect. First, the overwhelming emphasis on reporting statistics that were inaccurate measures of combatting an insurgency is a known shortcoming of

U.S. operations in Vietnam, but this fixating on citing irrelevant statistics to assert progress was even more significant for asserting the effectiveness of PSYOP. A second prevalent issue in the operation was the lack of understanding on what PSYOP is and how to use PSYOP by the commanders of the conventional army units. Third, the conventional units did not stay in the area to affect enduring security improvements, therefore the long-term capabilities of PSYOP were not used to effectively neutralize enemy support. The fourth issue is the comparative lack of manpower for PSYOP units.

The emphasis on citing misleading statistics to indicate effectiveness has been at the heart of the debates about the Vietnam War.114 During Operation Junction City, commanders reported how many fliers were dropped and how many hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts were made.

This depiction of effort meaning effectiveness heightened the misunderstanding of what PSYOP is meant to do, and inaccurately depicted the success of PSYOP during the operation. Many unit reports provided the number of fliers dropped and explained that this amount meant that the use of PSYOP was effective.115 The writers of these reports clearly thought that if they showed that there had been a considerable use of use of PSYOP assets, that meant that it was effective. This suggests that staff officers were severely undertrained in basic knowledge of PSYOP. However,

114 See, for example, Daddis, No Sure Victory. 115 Operational Report Lessons Learned - 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, October 1967, Box 11, Folder 10, Americal Division Veterans Association Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1387ORLL11101967, Accessed 07 May 2020. 50 with the sheer number of leaflets dropped, there were still only 139 ralliers.116 Emphasizing the number of leaflets dropped shows that the commanders of the units did not fully understand how to effectively use the PSYOP capabilities at their disposal as they only used them after decisive engagements and only targeted enemy forces, while ignoring the civilian population. Influencing the civilian population of the area to support U.S. and South Vietnamese forces might weaken the support for the NVA and VC forces in the area, denying them their valuable bas of support.

.While it can be seen as operationally important to not to alert enemy forces of approaching U.S. military forces, it is illogical to think that the NVA and VC did not already predict the movement of U.S. troops into the area. Heightened reconnaissance missions in the area already tipped off the enemy that a larger operation was likely imminent. Blasting the enemy forces with information about a “huge” U.S. force might have produced more (and earlier) ralliers that had been a priority for the operations. Moreover, according to FM 33-1, the main goals of tactical

PSYOP was to get enemy forces to surrender before even fighting.117

The conventional commanders of the units involved in Operation Junction City emphasized the use of their soldiers and artillery in combating the enemy. Reports from the operation detail how many enemy were killed, how many artillery rounds were used, and how much ammunition was expended.118 These commanders focused on how best to use their conventional resources and troops before contemplating how to effectively impact the enemy using their PSYOP attachments. Many of these commanders opted to use their attached PSYOP teams to make “quick-reaction” leaflets to be dropped in the general vicinity of where the enemy

116Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City, 151. 117 Psychological Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine, June 1968, Box 04, Folder 10, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 11 - Monographs, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2390410002, Accessed 21 Aug 2020. 118Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 191. 51

could be.119 These quick-reaction leaflets were normally created after a major engagement was concluded. This meant that these leaflets targeted an enemy that had already fled from the battlefield.120 However, they were impactful in creating the number of ralliers that were recorded during Operation Junction City. According to an early study of PSYOP, there was a general lack of understanding and appreciation for using PSYOP,

Some commanders showed a distinct lack of appreciation for the role and capability of

psychological operations, while a few held the propaganda tool in too high of esteem and

often were disappointed when their efforts did not produce immediate results. On the

other hand, many were more interested in high body counts than in what the

psychological could do for them in defeating the enemy. 121

This lack of care contributed to the misuse of PSYOP, and commanders did not use it as an offensive weapon.

This distinct disinterest in PSYOP is very prevalent in a study that interviewed battalion level combat arms officers,

Seventeen of 21 battalion commanders responding indicated there was no requirement for

psychological warfare personnel at battalion level and four commanders felt that

psychological warfare personnel should be included in a battalion section.122

119Rogers, Cedar Falls, Junction City, 151 120Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 190-191. 121 Chandler, War of Ideas, 88. 122 Report, U.S. Army-Vietnam - Evaluation Of U.S. Army Combat Operations In Vietnam (ARCOV) - Volume 5: Annex D: Command, Control, And Communications, 25 April 1966, Box 05, Folder 06, Glenn Helm Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1070506001, Accessed 07 May 2020. 52

This disregard for PSYOP is problematic, as this shows that most commanders did not see it as a

useful tool at their disposal. This study, conducted a year before Operation Junction City, showed the

prevailing thoughts of commanders in the field. This explains the lack of emphasis to actively use

PSYOP and PSYOP capabilities during the operation. The handbook issued to commanders in 1967

included one memorandum in it, in which the use of PSYOP was one sub point in the annex

encouraging them to “capitalize on psywar opportunities.” Relegating the use of PSYOP to a small

point in the annex further demonstrates the lack of emphasis on PSYOP.123 Compounding this

problem was the lack of training commanders received about what PSYOP was and what it could do

before taking command in Vietnam. The year-long command training course for officers only required about an hour on the use of PSYOP, and instead focused a vast majority of the time on conventional troop movements and warfare.124 This doctrinal and teaching focus led to an Army

officer corps inadept at handling the tools at their disposal. During Operation Junction City, the use

of their PSYOP capabilities was an afterthought and only heavily used after the major engagements

like the battles of Ap Bang II and Ap Gu. While these commanders eventually used their PSYOP

assets, they used it to target only the enemy and failed to proactively use the assets or target the

civilian with their PSYOP programs.

The third shortcoming in the use of PSYOP in Operation Junction City is that, just like the

maneuver units, once the operation was over the units pulled out, which defies the fundamentals of

holding terrain and protecting the population when waging a counterinsurgency. This concept has

also been discussed heavily in accordance with the troop movements of conventional army units.

This factor of not staying in one area for long greatly affected the capabilities of PSYOP units

123 Handbook for US Forces in Vietnam, April 1967, Box 04, Folder 03, United States Armed Forces Manuals Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1370403001, Accessed 07 May 2020. 124 Handbook for US Forces in Vietnam, April 1967, Box 04, Folder 03, United States Armed Forces Manuals Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=1370403001, Accessed 07 May 2020. 53

and teams. The main focus of PSYOP units were to target the local population and local enemy

forces.125 Staying in one local area would allow PSYOP teams to have been able continue to produce propaganda material that more accurately reflected the locality, as studies concluded that large operations take time to manifest any real, actionable data.126 As seen, the commanders

during Operation Junction City used PSYOP abilities only after battles and did not directly

engage the local population of War Zone C in much beyond the leaflet drops. Not only did the

commanders of the conventional units fail to use PSYOP offensively, but they also failed to

target the civilian population of the area, which was the main goal of a “hearts and minds” war-

but not of Westmoreland’s. The same 1969 study from chapter one shows that voices of PSYOP

operators fell on the deaf ears of commanders, who much preferred conventional operations or

had little understanding of PSYOP.127

The last issue that PSYOP faced during Operation Junction City was the lack of

manpower and equipment. There was only one PSYOP company tasked with supporting

Operation Junction City. The 246th PSYOP Company was attached the headquarters of II Field

Force from the 6th PSYOP Battalion. This unit was tasked to support II Field Force actions throughout the war.128 During Operation Junction City, the 246th PSYOP Company was stretched

very thin between the large number of conventional units used in the operation.129 Field Teams,

125 PSYOP Standard Operating Procedures; Annex F to Advisory Team 52 SOP, No Date, Box 01, Folder 10, Gary Gillette Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=3590110001, Accessed 07 May 2020. 126 Volume 1 Final Technical Report Psychological Operations Studies -- Vietnam, 25 May 1971, Box 15, Folder 01, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 - Insurgency Warfare, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2171501001, Accessed 22 Sep 2020. 127 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-16. 128 Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, AD- 367-095 - Office of the Adjutant General, 29 September 1967, Defense Technical Research Library. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/387095.pdf 129Roberts, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 253. 54 consisting of two soldiers, were typically attached to battalion headquarters. This means that with 22 infantry battalions involved in combat during Operation Junction City, only 44 PSYOP personal were on the ground. To compare further, there were typically anywhere between 920 to

1,000 soldiers in an infantry company (according to doctrine, however most companies were undermanned), compared to only two PSYOP soldiers. The difference in numbers is astounding.

The pace and size of combat pushed by General Westmoreland and the Field Force commanders outpaced the capabilities of PSYOP personnel to support them. Along with the personnel shortages, the 246th PSYOP Company suffered from a shortage of equipment, such as printing machines and loudspeakers. Continually needing to request more maintenance support, many

PSYOP units were not always able to operate at full capacity.130 The size of resources needed for

Operation Junction City was expansive, and little thought was given to committing the resources essential to support PSYOP missions. Logistical support was designated for those combat maneuver units before others. This allocation of resources meant that the logistical units were more focused on resupply/fixing the maneuverer units and deprioritized the needs of PSYOP units.

Conclusion

Operation Junction City ultimately failed to destroy the COSVN headquarters or produce enduring security and pacification gains in the area of War Zone C.131 The operation’s concentration on fighting a conventional war of destroying enemy troops failed to adequately use one of the most important tools at hand: PSYOP teams and units. Not utilizing these resources effectively meant that, while the body count of the enemy combatants was high, there was no

130 Roberts, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 252. 131 Gregory A. Daddis, Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 106-107. 55 long-lasting impact on the security and stability in War Zone C and the enemy was denied that area for only a short amount of time. Operation Junction City accurately shows that there were glaring issues within the commanders of U.S. Army forces within the MAC-V command. The maneuver commanders focused so much on quantifying “success” that they failed to understand the impact of the operation and leaflets dropped. They failed to identify PSYOP as a useful tool, unable to see the need for its assets to be attached to any command lower than division.

Not only was PSYOP misunderstood by combat arms commanders of the maneuver units, but they also had to withdraw with the maneuver unit when it left the area. This meant that the PSYOP units did not gain more knowledge of the civilian population to act on, and the

PSYOP units lacked adequate equipment and manpower. The commanders involved in

Operation Junction City, one of the largest operations of the Vietnam War, failed to use their

PSYOP assets in an appropriate manner, thusly contributing to the failure of the overall objective to deny the enemy access to the population and support. These factors combined meant that the operation failed to do much more than scratch the surface of the NVA and VC stronghold in the

War Zone.

This chapter’s case study expands upon the shortcomings emphasized by Daddis that the demand to quantify the actions of the war did not qualify the actions. While operations like

Operation Junction City created a vast amount of statistical data that could be easily presented, there was no long term effect on War Zone C. Further, this case study reveals that the biggest inhibitor to PSYOP affectability was not the competency of the enemy PSYOP as Roberts contends, but rather that the maneuver commanders did not involve PSYOP into the operation with force. In contrast, as discussed in Chapter One, the 173rd integrated their PSYOP assets into their planning and missions to great success. The integration of PSYOP into tactical planning for 56 the 173rd produced higher rallier numbers. While General Rogers assessed the operation as a success and asserted that it was a turning point, subsequent scholarship supported by this case study shows that Operation Junction City produced few enduring gains. 57

CHAPTER 3. DIFFERENT COMMANDER, IDENTICAL OPERATIONS, SAME OUTCOMES: A CASE STUDY OF OPERATION APACHE SNOW

After replacing General Westmoreland following the instability created by the 1968 Tet

Offensive, General Creighton Abrams took command of MAC-V. General Abrams started implementing his own strategy known as the “one war” strategy or the “better war” philosophy, which he had devised while directing the PROVN study group.132 Inherently complicated by the preceding years of combat and strife, the strategy that General Abrams commenced planning and attempted to execute ultimately failed to change the course or outcomes of the war. To accomplish President Richard Nixon’s domestic political imperatives of reducing the number of

U.S. troops drafted, deployed to Vietnam, and suffering casualties, Abrams sped up the pace of

“Vietnamization” (turning over control of major fighting to the ARVN). Although the PROVN study he directed in 1966 proposed a fundamentally different operational concept to focus on protecting the population, Abrams’ actual operations differed little from Westmoreland’s.

General Abrams, like General Westmoreland, continued to search for the enemy, to seize the initiative, and to attack the enemy on a large scale in order to prevent the NVA or VC from launching another Tet-like offensive.133 As part of this operational concept, General Abrams ordered commanders to complete a series of sweeps through the A Shau Valley, near the Laotian border. Launched on 10 May 1969 and lasting till 7 June 1969, Operation Apache Snow is not recognizably different in planning or execution than that of the Operation Junction City.

132 Much has been written on this subject alone. Lewis Sorley’s A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam outlines a more positive outlook on the Abrams concepts and plans for the war. Gregory Daddis’ Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam, and Andrew Krepinevich The Army and Vietnam, have strong critiques of the “better war” under General Abrams. 133 Gregory Daddis, Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2017), 1-10. 58

Operation Apache Snow gained national attention, and popular culture infamy, due to the

lengthy and bloody assault on Hill 937. This hill, later named Hamburger Hill, was the site of

intense fighting and was the setting for the movie Hamburger Hill.134 This operation had the same outcome of many other large operations; it was a tactical success in temporarily dislodging the enemy but U.S. and ARVN forces failed to hold the objective, as U.S. troops eventually left the valley and it was once again used by the NVA/VC.135 While using Operation Apache Snow

as a case study, this chapter will examine how combat commanders utilized, or failed to utilize,

their PSYOP capabilities in coordination with conventional unit operations.

This chapter is organized into three sections. The first section examines the movement

and action of the conventional units, outlining major engagements with the enemy while also

inserting where the PSYOP units were used in conjunction with those engagements. The second

section studies the particular use of PSYOP during the operation; where the units were, how

commanders used the units, and when they were used. The third section provides an overall

analysis of actions, data, and use of PSYOP in conjunction with Operation Apache Snow.

In examining After Action Reports, Operations Orders, and combat narratives from

Operation Apache Snow, this chapter suggests that under command of General Abrams MAC-V

never achieved a turnaround in pacification or an improvement in the usage of PSYOP assets. As

argued in the preceding chapters, PSYOP is a tool to be used when pacifying both enemy

combatants and civilians, and under General Abrams’ command there was an apathetic use of

PSYOP capabilities during major American operations. This chapter contributes to the scholarly

debate on the end of the war by reinforcing Daddis’ argument of continuity in the transition from

General Westmoreland to General Abrams. It supports his overall arguments that General

134 Hamburger Hill, James Carabatsos. (RKO Pictures: 1987), DVD. 135 Daddis, Withdrawal, 64-65. 59

Abrams and the U.S. mission was not able to reverse the failing of the American mission in

South Vietnam. Daddis argues that Lewis Sorely’s “better war” thesis overextends reality, and

this chapter highlights that the small strategic changes that were implemented did not alter the

broader operational concepts held by combat commanders.136 Through this chapter’s study of

Operation Apache Snow, it will become obvious that no matter how grandiose of plans General

Abrams still conducted essentially the same PSYOP war as General Westmoreland. The operational goals of Operation Apache Snow were, in truth, no different than those of operations under General Westmoreland.

In addition to engaging in the broader scholarship on the war, this chapter also challenges and complicates the more specialized series of studies on PSYOP during the war. First, by going past the 1968 Tet offensive and exploring the use of PSYOP assets during the command of

General Abrams, this chapters extends its analysis beyond the more limited timeframe of

Roberts’s The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968.137 In examining an operation that takes place past the end of Robert’s study, this chapter suggests that PSYOP failed to gain traction within the planning conscience of the combat arms commanders. Roberts ends his study at 1968, at the numerical peak of rallier defections from the VC and NVA. This chapter goes beyond that, revealing through an analysis of Operation Apache Snow that PSYOP assets remained largely sidelined despite their doctrinal importance in efforts to win “hearts and minds.”

136 Daddis, Withdrawal, 8-13. Also, Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam. 137 Roberts III, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968. 60

The Valley

When General Abrams assumed command of MAC-V, many military and civilian leaders thought that his concepts and strategies were different, and thusly better, than that of his predecessor. However, General Abrams’ position proved to be both impossible and perilous politically. Faced with an ever growing opposition at home, and pressure to produce “winning” results, General Abrams sought to maintain the forward progress in Vietnam since the NVA and

VC troops had been pushed out of the major cities after the Tet offensive.138 In order to maintain this “battlefield dominance,” General Abrams had commanders conduct sweeps of the A Shau

Valley prior to Operation Apache Snow. He did this earlier in 1968 -1969 during Operations

Somerset Plain and Massachusetts Striker. These operations aimed to deny the NVA/VC logistical resupply routes and to create a defensive line along the Laotian border to protect the pacification operations.

Operation Apache Snow was a large, joint and combined operation that included troops from the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and ARVN. The units of the operation were comprised of the 3rd Brigade - 101st Airborne (Army), the 9th Marines - 3rd Marine Division (Marine Corps), the 1st ARVN Regiment, and the 3rd ARVN Regiment.139 In total around 2,000 troops participated in Operation Apache Snow. The A Shau Valley was situated in the I Corps field command area, just West of the battle-scared city of Hue, near the Laotian border.140 The major

terrain feature, Hill 937 (the above mentioned “Hamburger Hill”) dominated the landscape and

was the major objective of two regiments of the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

138 Daddis, Withdrawal, 64-65. 139 ARMY 1969 XXIV Corps Apache Snow, 16 September 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010547, Accessed 24 Sep 2020. 140 Daddis, Withdrawal, 64-65. 61

Intelligence assets reported the movement of NVA troops into the valley, and General Abrams

and his commanders hoped to head off another feared attack on Hue.

On 10 May 1969, American and ARVN troops launched Operation Apache Snow into the

A Shau Valley. A brigade of the 101st Airborne Division and an ARVN Regiment moved into

the northern part of the A Shau Valley, while the 9th Marines and another ARVN Regiment

moved in from the south to block the NVA troops from fleeing from the valley and to destroy

enemy camps when they were located. 141

For the first ten days of the assault, most units – aside from those assaulting Hill 937 – experienced little resistance. Other than sporadic small arms and machine gun fires, little happened anywhere that was not Hill 937. The 2/501 Infantry and the 1/506 Infantry engaged at

Hill 937 faced a “dug in” and determined enemy.142 For ten days these two units, later reinforced

with the 3/187 Infantry, assaulted the hill. This frontal assault on the hill was disastrously

planned and executed, which was the reason for the high casualty count for Operation Apache

Snow. It took eight days to close on the southern base of Hill 937, and the probing attacks from

U.S. forces had alerted the heavily fortified NVA to the next plan.

The attack on Hill 937 had started on 18 May when American troops assaulted the Hill

and were continually repulsed by the NVA defenders. It was not until 20 May, ten days after the

start of the operation and two days of direct assaults up the hill, that American troops cleared Hill

141 ARMY 1969 3-101ST INF Apache Snow, 25 June 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010449, Accessed 24 Sep 2020. 142 ARMY 1969 XXIV Corps Apache Snow, 16 September 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010547, Accessed 24 Sep 2020. 62

937.143 The battle for Hill 937 was the largest contact of the operation between the NVA/VC and

American/ARVN troops. The battle resulted in more than half of the casualties US forces

sustained in the operation with 56 killed in action and 420 wounded.144 The ratio of losses for the

NVA/VC are similar, as it is estimated that 630 were killed in just the fight for the hill. 145

While the intense fighting occurred for the operation on Hill 937, the units not involved

taking it continued the original plan of Operation Apache Snow and established firebases and

conducted large sweeps of the jungle that surrounded the newly erected bases. An NVA attack

conducted on 13 May targeted firebase Airborne. During this attack a sizable enemy force

infiltrated the base, which extracted a heavy toll on the American defenders. The soldiers at

firebase Airborne were able to repulse the attack by the early morning. Americans suffered 22

killed and 61 wounded, while also losing five howitzers to damages. The attacking NVA

suffered an estimated 40 killed with an unknown amount wounded.146 After the attackers were

repulsed, the base was reinforced and search and destroy operations were conducted to seek out

the enemy.147

The attack on firebase Airborne is the largest NVA encounter of Operation Apache

Snow, aside from the battle for Hill 937. U.S. and ARVN forces spent the rest of the operation

searching through the jungle, finding only the occasional stockpiles of food and ammunition.

143 Narrative of Operation Apache Snow by 101st Airborne Division - Support Document from Project CHECO Report #2, ca. 1969, Box 0008, Folder 1462, Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=F031100081462, Accessed 24 Sep 2020. 144Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 173. 145Daddis, Withdrawal, 66. 146 Narrative of Operation Apache Snow by 101st Airborne Division - Support Document from Project CHECO Report #2, ca. 1969, Box 0008, Folder 1462, Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=F031100081462, Accessed 05 Oct 2020. 147Army 1969 1-506 Inf Bn Operation Apache Snow, 18 June 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010432, Accessed 05 Oct 2020. 63

Some units found caches and field hospitals on their patrols surrounding the firebases that had

been established in the valley. The 9th Marines also set up road cuts and blocks along the road

that ran through the valley in order to restrict NVA movement.148 Operation Apache Snow slowly ended, with units one-by-one pulled out of the valley. The remaining units, the 3rd

Airborne Brigade and 3rd ARVN Regiment, terminated the operation on 7 June 1969.149 At the

conclusion of Operation Apache Snow there were a total of 90 U.S. killed in action and 582 U.S.

wounded. The ARVN also suffered 31 killed in action and 137 wounded.150 The NVA casualty

count was never fully agreed upon by commanders with some after action reports stating over

1000 NVA killed.151 Other reports suggested around 650 to 700 NVA troops were killed during

Operation Apache Snow.152 While the movements and encounters of conventional maneuver units are well documented, and take the forefront of the story normally told of Operation Apache

Snow and the infamous Hamburger Hill, PSYOP units also supported the operation. They conducted leaflet drops and loudspeaker fly overs as they had done during Operation Junction

City. Underused and underreported, PSYOP officials did not have the chance to create a lasting impact on the area of operations for Operation Apache Snow.

148 ARMY 1969 XXIV Corps Apache Snow, 16 September 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010547, Accessed 24 Sep 2020. 149 ARMY 1969 XXIV Corps Apache Snow, 16 September 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010547, Accessed 05 Oct 2020. 150 ARMY 1969 XXIV Corps Apache Snow, 16 September 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010547, Accessed 05 Oct 2020. 151 ARMY 1969 XXIV Corps Apache Snow, 16 September 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010547, Accessed 05 Oct 2020. 152 Rendezvous With Destiny, Summer 1969 - 101st Airborne Division - Publication, 1969, Box 06, Folder 16, Barry Wain Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=28810616035, Accessed 05 Oct 2020. 64

Loudspeaker in the Air

The operational and after action reports showed a vast array of reporting on the

movements of conventional units. From ammunition expended and arms captured to body

counts, the reports detail what the conventional forces were doing. However, PSYOPs is only

mentioned briefly in any of the reports on Operation Apache Snow. A small section from one of

the reports states that a PSYOP team attached to the 3rd Marine Division supported the operation through the dropping of 2,042,000 leaflets and through aerial broadcasting for around 2 hours and 55 minutes. Along with this support to the 3rd Marine Division, the teams attached to the

101st Airborne disseminated 5,310,000 leaflets and produced 47 hours and 40 minutes of aerial broadcasts. The leaflets dropped in support of Operation Apache Snow were non-specific Chieu

Hoi program leaflets, pushing the generic national theme of laying down arms without directly targeting any specific units or fighters. They encouraged VC/NVA soldiers to turn themselves in with assurances of being treated kindly by the American and ARVN military. These leaflets did not target the specific NVA regiments like had been done in Operation Junction City. This lack of targeting made the appeals to surrender less personal and was something that many of these

NVA soldiers had already come across on their movement down into the valley. Combined, the two divisions dropped a total of 7,352,000 leaflets and conducted 50 hours and 35 minutes of aerial broadcasting during Operation Apache Snow. 153 In comparison to the number of leaflets

dropped and appeals broadcasted, reports state that there were 1,387.9 tons of bombs dropped by

air support, and 221.5 tons of napalm dropped.154 These numbers do not include the amount of

153 ARMY 1969 XXIV Corps Apache Snow, 16 September 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010547, Accessed 24 Sep 2020. 154 ARMY 1969 XXIV Corps Apache Snow, 16 September 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010547, Accessed 03 Dec 2020. 65

ammunition used in about 5,584 artillery missions completed during Operation Apache Snow.155

The examples of tons of bombs or artillery missions completed serves as a perfect example of combat arms using easily quantifiable data to demonstrate effectiveness, something that the

PSYOP effort also fell prey to.

In total, the operational impact of the PSYOP campaign in support of Operation Apache

Snow was abysmal at best. There were only two Chieu Hoi ralliers from the enemy, and the operation only produced six enemy prisoners. These leaflets and broadcasts encouraged the surrender of NVA forces and called for them to give up fighting in exchange for being fed, and assuring them that they were treated well by the American and ARVN military. The leaflets and loudspeakers did influence 15 civilians to attempt to aid the American forces in the valley.156

These small sections of a few reports are the only available information on the PSYOP support

of Operation Apache Snow, complicating and frustrating the ability to compare how PSYOP

units were used during Operation Apache Snow to Operation Junction City. Unlike records from

Operation Junction City, none of the reports from Operation Apache Snow discuss the creation

of quick reaction leaflets or broadcasts towards the enemy. These quick reaction leaflets and

broadcasts had the best impact on NVA/VC fighters throughout the war. The reports from

Operation Apache Snow do not identify the PSYOP unit in support.157 The absence of details regarding the supporting unit, mission, and outcome of PSYOPs assets in support of the

155 ARMY 1969 3-101ST INF Apache Snow, 25 June 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010449, Accessed 03 Dec 2020. 156 ARMY 1969 XXIV Corps Apache Snow, 16 September 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010547, Accessed 24 Sep 2020. 157 Since the operation took place in I Corps, it was most likely members from the 7th PSYOPs Battalion participated in the operation 66 operation beyond simple statistics of resources expended suggests that there was little use, thought, or understanding of the capabilities of PSYOP.

Going to need more numbers and more than numbers

On examining PSYOP during Operation Apache Snow, the first issue revealed is the dearth of documentation of PSYOP during the operation. In the first chapter, this work discussed how conventional unit commanders often lacked understanding or specific attention when it came to the use and deployment of PSYOP teams and assets. The same 1969 report mentioned in chapter one of this work states something similar from PSYOPs personnel that had been interviewed:

A problem confronting most PSYOP commanders and staff officers was what they

considered to be a lack of understanding on the part of tactical unit commanders

concerning the role, capability, and employment of PSYOP in stability operations. The

majority of PSYOP field personnel indicated that some tactical commanders were more

interested in high body counts during combat operations than in integrating PSYOP as

part of the tactical operation.158

This emphasis on conventional troop actions and misleading metrics of success is clearly displayed in the reporting of Operation Apache Snow. These sources suggest that there was a disconnect between the maneuver operations ordered by General Abrams, and his purported strategic priorities of “Vietnamization” and the “one war” effort focused on pacification of the rural population. In fact, combat arms commanders became less focused on pacification and stability as their ARVN counterparts took over the war. Reports from many battalion commanders indicate that there was no PSYOP support at all, after action reports from the

158 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-16. 67 commanders of the 1-506th did not even have more than “N/A” in the comments for the PSYOP sections of the report.159 In comparison to Operation Junction City, Operation Apache Snow was similar in enemy structure, civilian presence, and mission. In both operations there was more hardened NVA troops than VC guerillas and a lack of civilian interaction. Both missions focused on finding and destroying the enemy as far away from large cities as possible. The difference lies that, at least in Operation Junction City the commanders directed their PSYOP assets to “target” their enemy by name and called on the enemy to surrender due to the loss of comrades they suffered in combat. For Operation Apache Snow there is no such report of this. This suggests that there was a slightly better integration of PSYOP assets during Operation Junction City and that commanders there had a better understanding of the capabilities of PSYOP.

Not only is there a dearth of reporting for PSYOP during Operation Apache Snow, there is also no mention of which PSYOP unit was used in support of the operation. The reports, if they do mention PSYOP at all, say something like this from the report from 3rd Brigade, 101st

Airborne:

During Operation Apache Snow, psychological operations was confined to Aerial Broadcasting from UH-1H helicopters, and mass leaflet drops in support of 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).160

This reporting suggests how little understanding, or caring, there was about the use of PSYOP in support of Operation Apache Snow. While aerial broadcast and leaflet drops were not atypical of

PSYOP support of major tactical operations, in comparison to the howitzer-launched leaflets during Operation Junction City there seems to be less creativity and less effort to use PSYOP

159 Army 1969 1-506 Inf Bn Operation Apache Snow, 18 June 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010432, Accessed 05 Oct 2020. 160 ARMY 1969 3-101ST INF Apache Snow, 25 June 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010449, Accessed 06 Oct 2020. 68

assets to encourage the enemy to surrender peacefully. Limited to a small scope of blanket

leaflets that did not target the specific NVA regiments that were known to be operating in the

area, PSYOP assets were less effectively employed in Operation Apache Snow than they had been at Operation Junction City. For PSYOP units, the “better war” under Abrams actually seemed like a less integrated war.

While the limited statistical data on enemy defectors suggests one reason why the

PSYOP used during the operation was not effective, even more telling is that the absence of

documentation for planning the use of PSYOP during Operation Apache Snow suggests that

maneuver commanders possessed little awareness of, or interest in, the capabilities of PSYOP

assets. Another significant aspect of Operation Apache Snow is the fixation in all of the after action reports on statistics, like body count, artillery used, and number of bombs dropped. This focus on using quantifiable metrics of effort to suggest success is a common theme, as discussed in chapter one. In the after-action report from the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division only one

page of the 31-page report discusses the use of PSYOPs in support of the mission. On this page

they explain that there were no defectors and only a handful of prisoners of war taken.161 While

this thesis contends that the lack of defectors can be attributed to an apathetic use of PSYOP, it is

also plausible that the ability for enemy egress from contact and the hardened attitudes of NVA

regulars contributed to the low statistic of defectors. As contended in the previous chapter,

PSYOP does not occur in a vacuum and can succumb to multiple influences outside of the

control of PSYOP operators. The rest of the reports provide either a narrative of Operation

Apache Snow or tables detailing the amount of ammunition used, types of artillery fire, and

161 ARMY 1969 3-101ST INF Apache Snow, 25 June 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010449, Accessed 22 Nov 2020. 69

enemy killed. In the actual narrative report written by the 101st Airborne Division, there is no example of the use of PSYOP in 30 pages of narrative (mostly on the battle for Hill

937).162While the report is written by a non-PSYOP expert, this still indicates the inattention that

PSYOP received from young staff officers.

With the comparative absence of the planned use of PSYOP assets, it is not surprising

that there is little to no reporting of it in after action reports. However, this makes it even harder

to conclude definitively if the PSYOP that was used during Operation Apache Snow was actually

measurable or effective. As discussed in Chapter One, field manuals and CGSC studies indicated

that assessing the effectiveness of PSYOPs required debriefings of ralliers to ascertain what type

of PSYOP (i.e. leaflet or broadcast) influenced them to give up fighting.163 In the reports from the after action reports of few prisoners and ralliers taken during the operations, there are some false positives that staff officers used to support their lackluster attempts at using the PSYOP assets available to them. Meaning, that when this low number of ralliers gave interviews, they were used to show that the effort of the commanders to use PSYOP meant that it was effective.164

The leaflets of Operation Apache Snow were not targeted like those seen in Operation Junction

City, which targeted specific NVA units and used the interviews of defectors to make direct please to the comrades to lay down their arms. These targeted leaflets were the most useful in

162 Narrative of Operation Apache Snow by 101st Airborne Division - Support Document from Project CHECO Report #2, ca. 1969, Box 0008, Folder 1462, Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=F031100081462, Accessed 22 Nov 2020. 163 Psychological Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine, June 1968, Box 04, Folder 10, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 11 - Monographs, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2390410002, Accessed 21 Aug 2020. R.P. Morris. Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command And General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 1969). 164 ARMY 1969 XXIV Corps Apache Snow, 16 September 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010547, Accessed 24 Sep 2020. 70

Vietnam. As discussed in Chapter One, in Operation Roundup in fall 1970, personalized leaflets

and loudspeaker calls resulted in more that 1,400 ralliers. Again, the same tactics were used in

another sweep of the delta in winter 1970 which produced over 600 ralliers.

In the same time frame as Operations Apache Snow, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was

conducting operations that integrated PSYOP into tactical operations with great success.165 These

examples demonstrate how effective PSYOP can be when fully integrated with a unit’s

intelligence and operations staffs during the planning and execution of the missions. This also

serves as an example that conducting large scale, search-and-destroy missions, like Operation

Apache Snow was not useful in advancing the pacification efforts purported to be central to

Abrams’ operational concept. Attempting to declare an easily quantifiable victory in the war, the

planners of Operation Apache Snow veered away from the goal of pacification and drained

resources. PSYOP, when fully incorporated into intelligence and operational planning and

specifically targeted, can produce impactful results on the battlefield.

Another concept to consider when analyzing the use of PSYOP assets during Operation

Apache Snow is remembering that, while doctrine in FM 33-5 attached PSYOPs unit to the

Operations branch (S3), studies revealed that in practice many units attached them instead to the

Civil Affairs branch (S5).166 Significantly, most of the operation orders and after action reports

are written by those working the operations staff, who may not have had any direct

communication with the PSYOP units. Also, the civil affairs staff were often not a major

165 Barger. “Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam”, 74-75 166 Psychological Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine, June 1968, Box 04, Folder 10, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 11 - Monographs, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2390410002, Accessed 21 Aug 2020. R.P. Morris. Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level (Fort Leavenworth, Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, 1969). 71 consideration in the minds of operations personnel as they planned combat missions. Not only is this lack of communication suggested in the reports that can be found about Operation Apache

Snow, but this also suggests why PSYOPs leaders were not thoroughly integrated into the planning and why their assets were insufficiently utilized in the operation.

The civil affairs branch is normally integrated into operational planning when there is thought to be high civilian activity. According to the operational narrative found in the reports, there was little contact with civilians during Operation Apache Snow.167 While this might raise the question of how Operation Apache Snow can be used as a case study for this work, it is important to note that the standard missions of PSYOP were to influence enemy combatants to lay down their arms along with convincing civilians to support the South Vietnamese government. Therefore, this is another example of maneuver commanders failing to fully realize the support that PSYOP could offer. Most of the narrative (and thusly the reports themselves) are spent examining the attack on Hill 937, leaving little consideration for much outside of the compelling story of attacking the Hill.168 Young staff officers, aspiring to leave their staff positions and return to leading troops, undoubtfully saw it more impactful and beneficial to show the conventional side of Operation Apache Snow. Through all of the reports, there is no mention of the civil affairs branch, which suggests why there is a dearth of documentation regarding

PSYOP assets that fell under their control. This suggests a lack of training on PSYOP capabilities for combat arms officers, and a lack of emphasis placed on PSYOP from corps and

167 ARMY 1969 XXIV Corps Apache Snow, 16 September 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010547, Accessed 24 Sep 2020. 168 ARMY 1969 XXIV Corps Apache Snow, 16 September 1969, Box 00, Folder 01, Bud Harton Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=168300010547, Accessed 24 Sep 2020. 72

divisional commanders. With commanders showing no interest in the use, reporting, or quality of

PSYOP, it undoubtfully influenced the minds of their young subordinate staff officers.

A third issue for PSYOP in Operation Apache Snow was insufficient staffing. Chapter

One examined shortages in filling authorized PYSOP positions with trained personnel. This

seems to have been just as much of an issue for Operation Apache Snow as it was for the overall

Vietnam War. In Chapter Two, the operation reports for Operation Junction City showed the

exact PSYOP company that was attached to the command for the operation.169 In the operation

order and after-action reports for Operation Apache Snow, there is no such entry. As explained

in Chapter One, in 1967 all PSYOP units were brought under the 4th PSYOP group in order to

establish a better link between units. Due to the location of Operation Apache Snow it would

have been the 7th PSYOP Battalion that provided PSYOPs units.170 The 7th PSYOP Battalion, according to a report pulled in March of 1969, was authorized 175 personnel. However, according to the same report, they only had 160 assigned.171 Of this 160 assigned, it is not

possible that all of them were assigned to support Operation Apache Snow. According to

doctrine, the PSYOP field teams were attached to maneuver units based upon the anticipated

need of the mission. However, each corps had assigned PSYOP officers who advised when the

use of field teams were appropriate. The complication of the PSYOP effort can be seen as a

hinderance to effective communication of anticipated needs, as field teams only had so much

capability to print or only had so much support. The teams that came from the 7th PSYOP

Battalion could have been no more than a loudspeaker team and an advisory team, each team

169 In Operation Junction City, the reports and book by General Roger name the company exactly. Operation Junction City happens just before the creation of the 4th PSYOPs group umbrella. 170 History and Mission, 4th Psychological Operations Group, No Date, Box 01, Folder 03, John Cheney Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=10020103010, Accessed 22 Nov 2020. 171 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-10. 73

being small in number.172 Some were undoubtedly tasked out to other operations or on some other job rotation. As stated in Chapter One, U.S. Army personnel (especially officers) regularly left or changed units in the middle of their deployment rotations. Already chronically understaffed, PSYOPs units would have struggled to support Operation Apache Snow.

Analyzing the use and effectiveness of PSYOPs for Operation Apache Snow is challenging for multiple reasons. The doctrinal metrics from the FMs and the “best practices” indicators of PYSOP effectiveness from Morris’ CGSC report do not appear in the plans or operations of the combat units who participated in the operation. Moreover, there are no available reports on Operation Apache Snow from PSYOP units or commanders who supported the operation. Operation Apache Snow lends itself to be analyzed in a different sense, suggesting that one of the reasons for the lack of evidence of PSYOP usage was because it was not seen as a useful tool by combat arms commanders. Planners were much more focused on the conventional units’ battles, and once the attack on Hill 937 became so drastic, it took the attention of the conventional unit staffers and commanders. This is not atypical of many reports; however, this means that pitched battles were still more the focus of combat arms units than pacification. With the examples on the 173rd and the Mekong Delta operations from Chapter One, it can be

suggested that the inclusion of PSYOP into planning may have impacted the outcomes.

Conclusion

PSYOP usage in support of Operation Apache Snow is hard to assess as much more than

“failed”. As seen through this chapter, conventional infantry commanders failed to effectively

use PSYOP throughout the mission. Due to the nature of the command under General Abrams,

172 Handbook, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam - PSYOP Guide, 20580213001. Vietnam Center and Archive. 27 April 1968, Box 02, Folder 13, Fred Walker Collection, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=20580213001, Accessed 15 Feb 2021. 74

and the complicated process of getting PSYOP assets attached, it is not surprising that the

PSYOP messages transmitted in support of Operation Apache Snow did not directly targeted

specific enemy units as had happened during Operation Junction City. While planning Apache

Snow, there is no evidence of conventional maneuver commanders preparing for the use of their

PSYOP assets. There are no reports of interacting with field teams from the 7th PSYOP

Battalion, and there are no reports of any PSYOP staff officers being involved in the planning or the operation as it unfolded. The fixation on the conventional use of combat arms became the center of attention for the planners of Operation Apache Snow. In most of the after action reports written by operations staff officers, there is little said on the use of PSYOP during the mission.

This lack of emphasis on even reporting any PSYOP activity for Operation Apache Snow supports the broader arguments suggested in the first chapter. First: that staff officers were not interested in reporting more than numbers that produced positive statistics. Secondly, the priority for the limited manpower and resources was given to conventional army units and that PSYOP support was relegated to last thoughts.

While a total of 7,352,000 total leaflets were dropped and 50 hours and 35 minutes of aerial broadcasting commenced, there was little to show for it in the way of ralliers.173 Since

there were little ralliers, the measurements of effectiveness that LTC Morris proposed in his

CGSC thesis are not helpful here. The main focus of the mission, to forcefully drive the NVA

out of the A Shau Valley, was a conventional success but a failure in unnecessary loss of life.

When neglecting to use PSYOP assets fully, commanders failed to make a lasting impact on the

morale of the enemy and failed to swing locals to rally in support of the GVN.

173 Ralliers in the sense of Operation Apache Snow would have been lower than typical for an operation this size due to the fact that these were not Viet Cong, but NVA regular forces. However, the reports show that the local population did not cooperate excitedly with the American and ARVN forces. 75

Overall, Operation Apache Snow proved to be a massive political failure. The story of

Hill 937, popularized as Hamburger Hill in news stories all over the United States, took over the

narrative. General Abrams’ goal of bringing the fight to the enemy was hardly a revolutionary

concept.174 The carnage of Hamburger Hill brought with it political fallout, and has been the

subject of many popular culture references and movies. In the end, the pacification and PSYOP

policies of “the better war” were, in fact, and little different than the concepts used under General

Westmoreland. This chapter’s assertions support the broader points made in Daddis’ book

Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam175. Through the example of

Operation Apache Snow, this chapter illustrates that commanders under Abrams possessed no greater appreciation for the capabilities of PSYOP teams despite Abrams’ purported emphasis on pacification and waging a more effective counterinsurgency. Despite the supposed refocus of the war to wage a counterinsurgency that prioritized protecting the civilian population under General

Abrams, large scale search-and-destroy missions continued to take up the majority of the time and resources of American military units in South Vietnam. The focus of this chapter challenges

Roberts in his study of PSYOP through 1968. While he argues that the PSYOP effort was on the incline during 1968 and that the PSYOP targeting the North Vietnamese was making an impact, this chapter shows something different. It shows an ever growing apathy to use the PSYOP assets at hand from combat arms commanders and the strong will of the NVA soldier to continue to fight.

175 See Daddis, Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam. 76

CONCLUSION

On 21 December 1971, the 7th PSYOP Battalion, the last remaining U.S. Army PSYOP headquarters left in South Vietnam, was deactivated.176 The PSYOP war that had been taken

over by American forces with the creation of the JUSPAO and integration of the 4th PSYOP was transferred into the hands of their South Vietnamese counterparts. Slowly, the American effort in

South Vietnam ended. The withdrawal of the last combat troops in 1973 signaled the end of direct U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam. The government of South Vietnam collapsed under a vicious assault from the NVA in late April 1975, ending the long civil war.177 The

American war effort failed; it never established any cohesive pacification programs due to the lack of a unified command and a South Vietnamese government riddled with instability, illegitimacy, and corruption. Not only did the conventional efforts of the U.S. military fail, but so did the PSYOP effort.

The PSYOP effort in Vietnam started off in a disorganized manner, and never became untangled from the web of agencies and directives. U.S. Army PSYOP efforts suffered greatly from a lack of focus and coordination under this web of JUSPAO, CORDS, CIA, and MAC-V directives. Resources were pulled every which way, and mission directives changed with the creation of new agencies or the release of new studies. When finally organized into one group in

1967, PSYOP units still maintained their cellular structure.178 This structure left PSYOP units

without a standardized format and without clear and consistent lines of command and

176 Barger, “Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam”,79- 80. 177 Daddis, Withdrawal, 196-199. 178 Military Psychological Operations, 07 January 1960, Box 13, Folder 03, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 - Insurgency Warfare, Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2171303001, Accessed 19 Aug 2020. 77

communications that integrated PSYOP units with the combat units they supported. This maze of

unit structure and management made the process of requesting PSYOP support complicated.

With army PSYOP printing assets being used for both tactical operations and strategic national

directives, the messages confused the locals in an area of operations, and the mismanagement

was detrimental to the overall attempts of pacification.

While PSYOP suffered from the muddled network of commands and agencies, PSYOP

agonized under a dearth of doctrine, an apathetic understanding by combat arms commanders,

and a deficient number of operators and equipment. The vague doctrine and limited training

given to PSYOP operators lacked practical application. They reported that the training focused

too much on nuanced psychological theory, and not enough on the concrete and practical

implementation of PSYOP in the complex environment in South Vietnam.179 While the PSYOP

operators found that the training and doctrine was wanting, they also discovered that most

combat arms commanders possessed little knowledge of the capabilities and proper integration of

PSYOP assets into their operations. The combat arms commanders received little training on the

subject, which led to evaluations of the effectiveness of PSYOP missions being simply and

inappropriately equated to the effort put into the mission. Some combat arms commanders

disregarded PSYOP as a whole, ignoring the PSYOP effort in favor of pure combat

operations.180 This simplistic and misguided view on PSYOP was one of the biggest detriments of the PSYOP effort. While suffering from doctrinal and training shortcomings, PSYOP efforts also struggled with an increased workload for printing with a comparative lack of resources and

179 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-16. 180 ACTIV, “Employment of U.S. Psychological Operations Units in Vietnam,”11-16. 78

operators. The demand for printed material, driven by the ability to produce quantifiable

measurable effort, far outpaced the ability of PSYOP printers.181

The case studies in Chapters Two and Three demonstrated how a combination of the factors above inhibited the effectiveness of PSYOP support of combat operations. In chapter two, the examination of Operation Junction City showed the example of effort being ascribed to effectiveness of the PSYOP mission. Not only was this issue of effort vs. effectiveness put on display, but the chapter also highlighted the strain of the mission pace for Operation Junction

City. The tempo of the operation, coupled with the strains on equipment and operators, made the effective application of PSYOP difficult. While Operation Junction City did produce Chieu Hoi ralliers, the PSYOP mission was deemed a success simply due to its scale of effort quantified as the number of leaflets circulated and the hours of messages broadcast.

The case study in chapter three, Operation Apache Snow, showed glaring issues in the lack of planned use of PSYOP and the inability of PSYOP units to produce reaction leaflets after engagements. The dearth of reporting on the PSYOP efforts in the after action reports from combat arms operation officers indicates an apathetic approach to the use of PSYOP. With the results of the PSYOP effort being minimal ralliers, the PSYOP work can be deemed a failure when compared to examples where the PSYOP assets were directly involved in the planning.182

Operation Apache Snow perfectly highlights several shortcomings in the poor integration of

PSYOP into combat operations, showing that an apathy for the use of PSYOP was prevalent in the combat arms commanders as the war dwindled on. This episode challenges scholarship that emphasizes that the U.S. waged a more effective war following the Tet Offensive. As this case

181 Barger, “Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam”,24- 26. 182 Barger, “Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam”, 78-80. 79

study demonstrates, the elevation of Creighton Abrams to command of MAC-V did not produce

a “better war” for PSYOP.183

Exploring PSYOP in this manner complicates several stands of the current historiography of the Vietnam War, and in particular the limited scholarship on the U.S. PSYOP effort. In situating this work into the scholarship on the American effort in South Vietnam, this work falls under the Revisionist “Hearts-and-Minds” critique of the war effort.184 The “Hearts-and-Minds”

revisionist critique of the war argues that the center of the war was the VC and the civilian

population. Focusing more on pacification efforts of a small-scale war, “Hearts-and-Minds”

revisionist argue that the failure of the war is due to the erroneous focus of combat commanders

on search and destroy operations. This work expands upon the prominent critiques of “search

and destroy” operations by scholars such as Krepinevich and Nagl, arguing that effectively

implementing PSYOP into pacification and combat operations might have had an impact on the

counterinsurgency effort.185 By arguing that PSYOP was misunderstood and misused, this work suggests that the outcome of the American effort might have been different if PSYOP had been better integrated into the plans of tactical level combat commanders.

In exploring the operations laid out in the previous chapters, this work comes in conflict with the “better war” argument from Lewis Sorley.186 The examinations of Operation Apache

Snow indicates that there was not a radical change in how the war was being conducted by

General Abrams. Consequently, the case studies illustrate that there was a growth in apathy for

using PSYOP assets in support of operations. Arguing that effort did not equate effectiveness,

183 Sorley, A Better War. 184 See, for example, Krepinevich: The Army and Vietnam, Cable, Conflict of Myth and Unholy Grail, and Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. 185 Krepinevich: The Army and Vietnam and Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. 186 Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam. 80

this work aligns itself with the likes of Gregory Daddis’ No Sure Victory.187 As Daddis explains in his work, the obsession with statistical data on the war effort led to a fascination by combat commanders on reporting quantifiable statistics. These statistics, such as body counts or weapons captured, were often inflated and used to assert that progress was being made in the war. The same problem can be seen in this study’s examination of the PSYOP effort. Combat commanders reported the number of fliers dropped or hours of loudspeaker calls being conducted, using these as a means to show that they were making an effort so therefore it was effective. As explained throughout this thesis, this a flawed system that failed to accurately portray the situation on the ground in South Vietnam.

In addition to engaging in broader arguments about the overall war effort, this work engages in the detailed but limited scholarship on the PSYOP effort in Vietnam. The three major works on PSYOP that this thesis complicates are Barger’s CGSC thesis “Psychological

Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam,” Kodosky’s

Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office,

Vietnam and Beyond, and Roberts’s most recent study The Psychological War for Vietnam,

1960-1968.188 These studies all include important contributions to the scholarship on PSYOP in

Vietnam, but each differs from this work in the time period they consider, the sources they

evaluate, and the conclusion they reach. Both Kodosky’s and Barger’s scholarship are closely

aligned with this thesis, but differ in scope and argumentation. This thesis comes to a different

conclusion on the effectiveness of JUSPOA guidance than Barger, arguing that the creation of

JUSPAO did not help the PSYOP effort. Moreover, this study’s case studies of major operations

187 Daddis, No Sure Victory. 188 Barger, “Psychological Operations Supporting Counterinsurgency: 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam”, Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond, and Roberts III, The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960-1968. 81 complicates the assertions made by Kodosky that PSYOP is not a tactical level tool, arguing instead that the application of tactical level PSYOP had the ability to be the most effective. This use of case studies of major combat opertions also extends beyond Barger’s scope of analysis, showing how PSYOP was mismanaged when supporting major operations.

While complicating the conclusions of both Barger and Kodosky, this work directly challenges many of the conclusions of Roberts’ monograph. Roberts’ argument is that from the onset of U.S. intervention, American PSYOP had been used effectively and was making significant progress in defeating the enemy. He contends that instead of the Americans failing, they did not stand a chance against the propaganda machine of the communists. This argument seems to place PSYOP in a vacuum only fighting other PSYOP efforts. However, as shown in the previous chapters, this overlooks the fact that there were combat arms commanders interacting with local populations and tactical operations happening that can change the message and efficacy of a PSYOP plan. Throughout his book, Roberts constantly uses the statistics of flyers dropped and missions “completed” to assert that effort equaled effectiveness. Conversely, this work shows that this form of measurement is extremely flawed. Roberts also indicates at the end of his book that the PSYOP effort had by 1968 looked promising and that the American pacification efforts were succeeding, something that this work counters by exploring the apathy that combat arms commanders had for using PSYOP assets during a major operation. Overall, this work reaches different conclusions despite using many of the same sources that Roberts consulted in his study. Furthermore, this thesis expands beyond the conclusion of Roberts’ study following 1968 Tet offensive, exploring the years of “Vietnamization” and apathy of PSYOP efforts. 82

Overall, this work argues that the PSYOP effort in Vietnam failed, due in part, to the combat arms commanders’ lack of understanding and apathetic implementation of PSYOP support to their operation. This, coupled with doctrinal and training shortcomings and insufficient operators and equipment, hindered the potential success of PSYOP in Vietnam.

While this work reaches its tentative conclusions, it is also important to point out the limitations of the thesis. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic closed archives and prohibited university-sponsored research travel for the duration of the preparation of this thesis. This work necessarily relied on the vast but partial holding of digital archives in order to complete its argument. With access to archival sources strictly limited and the academic calendar tightly compressed, the arguments of this thesis are necessarily suggestive rather than conclusive.

There is still much more research to be done on this topic. There needs to be a more comprehensive examination of the policy creation of PSYOP doctrine, something that this thesis was not able to undertake because of the limited time and restrictions brought on by the COVID-

19 pandemic. Furthermore, future research may go into greater depth on the tactical uses of

PSYOP. Additional case studies of large-scale operations or research into PSYOP support of pacification efforts may reveal PSYOP in a different light by illuminating specific instances of success or failure. There is also a need to further explore the PSYOP capabilities of the North

Vietnamese by examining sources in Vietnamese. Roberts does an admirable job of examining the PSYOP efforts of the NVA and VC, but his overall conclusions fall short. PSYOP efforts were hindered by the national and institutional cultures, the inadequate training of training of

U.S. Army combat arms commanders, and an unquenchable need to quantify all aspects of the war in Vietnam. The study of the failure of PSYOP efforts is indicative of the overall failure of

U.S. involvement in South Vietnam, yet further research is needed to reach a full diagnosis of the 83 reasons for that failure. Further research can bring to light a greater understanding of the shortcomings of this complicated and vital, yet underappreciated component of the American counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. 84

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Barry Wain Collection

Black Knights 3/5 Cavalry Collection

Bud Harton Collection

Charles Winer Collection 85

Douglas Pike Collection

Fred Walker Collection

Gary Gillette Collection

Glenn Helm Collection

Harry Wagner Collection

John Cheney Collection

Peter Swartz Collection

Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive Collection

United States Armed Forces Manuals Collection

William Foulke Collection

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