The African Standby Force Put to the Test

CSS Analysis in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 84 • November 2010

THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE PUT TO THE TEST

Demand for international peace operations remains high while the willingness of the international community to intervene is declining and defence budgets continue to shrink. The notion of greater regionalisation in security thus continues to enjoy growing appeal. In Africa, after years of preparation, the African Security Force is about to become a reality. However, considerable difficulties remain, and peacekeeping in Africa will continue to require external support for the foreseeable future.

macy, of the regional organisation may be further undermined by regional hegem- ons who have the power to shape the organisation’s agenda to their advantage. This applies to regional powers such as South Africa and Nigeria. Although these two states provide their respective regions with the resources, capacity and political clout needed for regional conflict management, the dependency of, respectively, ECOWAS and the Southern African Devel- opment Community (SADC) on a regional hegemon is also the source of political tension.

A weighty argument against the regionali-

Reuters / Thomas Mukoya sation of peace operations is that the continent’s regional and sub-regional organi- Kenyan troops participate in an international exercise of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade, December 2009. sations face severe resource and capacity constraints that may not allow them to Africa continues to be the site of many of pacific settlement of local disputes and al- execute operations effectively. Critics of the world’s deadliest conflicts. In the past low for the possibility of regional enforce- greater regionalisation point out that the 25 years, there have been an estimated ment action under the authority of the Se- willingness to intervene must be matched 3,800,000 to 6,899,000 conflict-related curity Council. However, the division of the by the capacity to do so. The problem is casualties. Today there are more UN peace- world into bipolar blocs during the Cold further aggravated by the fact that, often, keeping troops in Africa than on any other War era prevented an effective regionali- regional organisations are called upon continent. UN deployments have increased sation of peace operations. It was only af- only if the conflict situation is too intricate tenfold over the last decade. Africa cur- ter the end of the bipolar stand-off that or risky to be dealt with by the UN. This rently hosts eight UN peace operations the political landscape finally allowed for contributes to the weakening of regional and over 80 per cent of all deployed UN greater regional responsibility, while the organisations by involving them only peacekeepers. Bringing peace and secu- rising number of conflicts simultaneously when the chances of success are poor. In rity to the continent thus remains a para- created growing demand for such burden- a similar vein, the 2008 joint AU-UN Panel mount challenge. A crucial task in meeting sharing arrangements. Report commission under the leadership that challenge is building up the conti- of Romano Prodi noted that ‘there is a nent’s own peace capabilities. Nonetheless, the concept of security re- growing anomalous and undesirable trend gionalisation is not uncontested. Sceptics in which organisations lacking the neces- The regionalisation of peace operations argue that the impartiality of regional or- sary capabilities have been left to bear the is not a new idea. Articles 52 and 53 of ganisations is adversely affected by their brunt in terms of providing the interna- Chapter VIII of the UN Charter encourage ties with the respective conflict parties. tional community’s initial response, while regional arrangements to engage in the The impartiality, and thus also the legiti- others more capable have not engaged.’

The case for more regional The ASF is by far the most robust compo- tempts failed because states felt threat- responsibility nent of the APSA. With its Military Staff ened by the inevitable surrender of some Yet, despite these problems and short- Committee, the ASF was conceived to con- aspects of their sovereignty and control comings, the case for more regional duct, observe, and monitor peacekeeping over national capabilities. Through its responsibility is strong. The idea of re- missions and support operations. Its tasks unique reliance on regional frameworks, gionalising responsibility for peace and include operations across the entire spec- the ASF represents a major improvement security should be seen as part of an trum of missions, ranging from peacekeep- in this respect. Its decentralised charac- emancipative effort that gives greater ing to peace enforcement, as summarised ter ties states and RECs into a common ownership to regional actors. Especially in in the six mission scenarios (cf. box). The framework co-ordinated by the AU and the last decade, Africans have developed ASF will be able to draw on both military gives them greater ownership in building the political will to take greater respon- and civilian contingents. a continental security architecture. This in- sibility for their continent’s troubles. The creases the stakes of all actors involved in argument that regionalisation leads to The ASF does not entail the establish- the process and creates constructive peer- more local ownership carries additional ment of a standing multinational force, group pressure among them. weight in view of the rising international but is built around a standby arrangement business involvement of powers such as where states earmark and train specific Operationalising the ASF: Progress China, Brazil, or the US on the continent. units for joint operations and then keep and problems This has led to fear of a new “scramble for these units ready for rapid deployment While the initiative was initially slow to Africa”. Many Africans would therefore at appropriate notice. The ASF comprises take off, considerable progress has by prefer that intervening troops come from stand-by brigades in each of the five re- now been achieved towards the goal of their own region. gions (south, east, north, west, and cen- making the ASF fully operational by the tral Africa): ��the Southern African Develop- end of 2010. The ASF Doctrine, a training The regionalisation of security must also ment Community Brigade (SADCBRIG), policy, an ASF Logistics Concept, a Com- be seen in the context of the international the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EAS- mand and Control Plan and the Standard community’s decreasing willingness to in- BRIG), the North African Standby Brigade Operating Procedures have been finalised tervene. Slumping public support for mili- (NASBRIG), the Economic Community of and approved in March 2008. These docu- tary operations abroad and tight defence West African States Brigade (ECOBRIG), ments provide the tools for operationalis- budgets in the West mean that in the fu- and the Economic Community of Central ing the ASF. ture African nations will increasingly have African States Brigade (ECCASBRIG). Each to conduct their own peacekeeping opera- of these brigades is to have around 5,000 However, some problems with the operations. It is therefore imperative to build up members, for an overall strength of 25,000 tionalisation of the ASF remain as a result greater regional capabilities for managing to 30,000 personnel in the ASF. The five of regional differences, questions about peace and security on the continent. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) the mandating procedure and the political serve as regional pillars of the ASF. process. The readiness of the five brigades Regionalisation, however, is complemen- varies considerably and the persistence of tary to international efforts under the Many attempts at establishing some sort conflicts in several regions makes progress auspices of the UN and by no means as a of Pan-African military force preceded difficult. While EASBRIG, EASBRIG, and simple substitution for them. This requires the creation of the ASF. Most of these at- SADCBRIG are making good progress, both good coordination and a clear delimitation of responsibilities between the UN and Mission Scenarios for the African Standby Force the regional organisations involved. Expe- rience has been gained in this regard in Scenario 1: past operations, for instance in Liberia. Regional military advice to a political mission (e.g., Cote d’Ivoire).

Scenario 2: The ASF in the African Security AU regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN Mission (e.g., OAU/AU liaison mission Architecture in the border area between Ethiopia and Eritrea (OLMEE) or the Verification Monitoring The ASF constitutes one of the most im- Team (VMT) in Sudan). portant and ambitious elements of the African Peace and Security Architecture Scenario 3: (APSA). Upon the creation of the African Stand-alone observer mission (e.g., AU missions in Burundi (AMIB) or the AU Mission in the Comoros (AMIC)). Union (AU), the African Peace and Security Protocol was adopted at the 2002 summit Scenario 4: in Durban. As part of the continent’s new Stand-alone peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and preventive peace and security architecture, it estab- deployment of troops for peace enforcement (e.g., AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB)). lished the AU Peace and Security Council Scenario 5: as its centrepiece, the Continental Early Peacekeeping mission in accordance with a complex, multidimensional peacekeeping Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, mission. the Peace Fund and the African Standby Force. A major impetus for the creation of Scenario 6: the ASF was the international communi- (Military) intervention of the AU in grave emergencies, e.g. for prevention of genocide, when the international community fails to intervene. ty’s failure during the Rwandan genocide of 1994. African Union (Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force)

the northern and central brigades (NAS- cal body composed of member states that has become an important means to try to BRIG, ECCASBRIG) are still lagging behind. pursue their respective national interests. protect the growing number of US inter- Its decisions regarding the deployment ests on the continent. Moreover, a sound burden-sharing ar- of an ASF Mission will therefore depend, rangement between the AU and the re- among other things, on the interests and Finally, successful co-operation with the gional organisations will have to be found political dynamics of members of the PSC UN will be crucial for the future of regional with regard to the use of ASF capabilities and the strength and diplomatic skills of peacekeeping in Africa. UN DPKO has es- and of the regional brigades. The provi- the Chairperson of the PSC in any given tablished a liaison team to the AU’s Peace sion of both adequate personnel and crisis situation. The PSC’s ability to forge a Support Operations Division in order to sufficient financial resources, as well as consensus will be critical to the speediness offer expertise and tailored support to the the improvement of logistical capabili- and legitimacy of its decisions and, there- operationalisation of the ASF. While there ties to conduct ASF missions are also vi- fore, also of the deployments themselves. is broad agreement that available peace- tal challenges. The evaluation of “Exercise keeping capacities for the UN and in Africa Carana”, which was held by the AU at the Crucial external support need to be mutually reinforcing, achieving end of October 2010, is expected to yield There is widespread international sup- this is easier said than done. The mixed ex- further insight into the current strengths port for the operationalisation of the ASF. perience of the most recent mission, UNA- and weaknesses of the ASF. By far the largest donor of AU peace and MID in Sudan, underscores the complexity security initiatives is the EU. As part of of achieving an approach that is satisfac- There also remain some unresolved ques- the joint Africa-EU tory to both par- tions about the mandating procedure. Strategy adopted in «Successful co-operation with the ties. On the one Although it is not established as a legal 2007, the partner- UN will be crucial for the future of hand, the AU was requirement for the AU, at the policy level ship on Peace and regional peacekeeping in Africa.» instrumental in the Policy for the Establishment of the ASF Security supports persuading the provides that ‘the AU will seek UN Security the functioning of the APSA and also spe- Sudanese government to accept the es- Council authorisation for its enforcement cifically the operationalisation of the ASF. tablishment of the mission and, albeit actions.’ So far, the AU has sought the sup- The EU has financed many aspects of the with difficulties, to facilitate its deploy- port of the UNSC for all its missions, not emerging force through its EUR 250 mil- ment. But at the same time, UNAMID has only in cases of enforcement action. This lion African Peace Facility (APF). It has also illustrated the difficulties associated with gives AU missions a greater sense of in- been active in the field of training, where conducting hybrid peace operations. ternational legitimacy. The practice has the EU has taken over the French capac- also been established to enable the AU to ity building programme Renforcement des There are good reasons why the estab- access the financial resources of the Afri- capacités africaines de maintien de la paix lishment of the ASF is a desirable devel- can Peace Facility, which are provided by (RECAMP) and established “AMANI Africa”, opment that has been supported by a the European Union and are conditional a training programme that aims to devel- range of international actors. Given the upon UNSC authorisation. However, since op a long-term management capacity for overstretch of international crisis man- decisions of the UN Security Council can the ASF by evaluating and enhancing the agement capabilities at a time of tight fi- take a long time to be implemented, some decision-making competencies of senior nancial resources, the build-up of regional have argued in favour of AU mandates military, civilian and police officials of the institutions and capabilities for peace op- taking precedence where urgent action is ASF. erations in Africa is an important task. It is required. also to be welcomed from the perspective Similarly, the US has been placing more of giving greater responsibility and owner- A particular case arises with respect to and more emphasis on regional capacity- ship to regional actors. The decisive factor mission scenario 6. For this type of sce- building for peace operations. This com- for the success of the ASF will, however, nario, the legal authority derives from the mitment to African conflict manage- not only be the availability of sufficient re- Constitutive Act of the AU, which, in its ment capabilities results from a growing sources and adequate institutional struc- famous Article 4(h), codifies the “respon- awareness that persisting conflicts in tures but also the common political will sibility to protect” and thus provides for a Africa are a direct threat to a range of US needed to make effective use of this new right of intervention that goes beyond the interests. The continuation of conflict in capability. provisions of the UN Charter. Should the Western Africa poses significant risks to AU request an UNSC authorisation when major US investment in the region’s oil acting under the terms of Article 4(h), it production and refinery infrastructure is therefore somewhat doubtful from a and thus to reliable oil supply. Central Author: legal point of view if the UNSC could give and Eastern Africa, on the other hand, are Aleksandra Dier authorisation for the AU on a matter in re- a particular concern in the fight against [email protected] spect of which the UN does not itself have terrorism. State failure and continuing Responsible editor: authority under the UN Charter. instability in the region provide fertile Daniel Trachsler ground for groups such as Al Qaeda and [email protected] But the vital factor will be the political other Islamist organisations to flourish. Other CSS Analyses / Mailinglist: process. There is a need to ensure political Since the US is reluctant to deploy its www.sta.ethz.ch consensus among nations before an op- own troops to these trouble zones, lend- eration can be approved and deployed. The ing support for the strengthening of Af- German and French versions: AU’s Peace and Security Council is a politi- rican conflict management capabilities www.ssn.ethz.ch