Martha Monzón Flores

24 Pacification of the chichimeca Region Martha Monzón Flores They do not exist. They died because they did not fit into a world whose rational- ity was beyond their comprehension, and because they could not “stop being” indigenous, nomads and barbarians, according to the classification granted to them by their conquerors (Valdés 1995:17). To the Spanish conquerors, northern New Spain represented a difficult prob- lem in terms of domination and control. Spaniards began moving north after the conquest of the Basin of Mexico in 1521, with the aim of exploring and expanding the area of domination. Not until 1541, however, when a fierce attack occurred against the Cazcanes in the Mixtón War, did confrontations intensify, foretelling the war and bloodshed to come. Numerous battles were fought from that time until 1590–1592 to solidify the territory already in Spanish possession and to exert control over the region’s rich resources and resident population. Between 1590 and 1592, a peace agreement was signed by the indigenous and Spanish parties, and the town of San Luis de la Paz was founded in commemoration of the event. From the time of the arrival of the missionaries, whose work was not always successful, to the present, many historical accounts have been written about these 393 Martha Monzón Flores incidents. The legal status of los indígenas—the indigenous people—before the in- troduction of the so-called New Laws by the Spanish Crown is a common topic of discussion at conferences and scientific meetings. Despite continual confrontations between both parties and assaults and rob- beries in the villages, Spanish wagons and influence continued to follow the trajec- tory of the “silver route,” with subsequent loss of human life and economy. This situation is illustrated in the Map of the Villas of San Miguel and San Felipe, prepared in 1580 at the request of King Felipe II (Nieto 1995). Its painter masterfully captured the region, its inhabitants, and the social situation, as well as the geogra- phy, flora, and fauna, much of which is still recognizable today. He also presented scenes that portray the tensions in the area. Various indigenous people are shown, some individually, others strategically grouped, with their bows and arrows pointed toward the roadways, natural passes, and plains. The map also depicts friars and Spanish assassins, cattle and horses killed by arrows, the shadowy images of Spanish soldiers guarding the road, and an Indian executed by hanging. Spanish actions were dictated by current events, sometimes planned, other times unforeseen, and were not always appropriate. The Spaniards eventually pre- vailed in spite of this, largely as a result of the military pressure they were able to exert on the Indians. The latter lacked the means to obtain additional assistance, which undermined their resistance. In contrast, Spanish soldiers received continual support from the Crown. In 1561 Don Alonso de Zorita brought before King Felipe II of Spain a document in which he outlined a plan of action that could be implemented to pacify the area of conflict. Don Alonso, who held the title of lawyer (licenciado), had arrived in New Spain in 1556 following a long career as a public official, first with the High Court of Granada and later with the High Courts of Santo Domingo and Guate- mala. Upon his arrival he was appointed judge of the High Court of New Spain in Mexico City and became representative to Viceroy Don Luis de Velasco (Ahrndt 2001:18; see also Vigil 1987; Zorita 1963).1 The Crown had previously sent the viceroy its so-called New Laws, which, among other provisions, ordered a reduction in the amount of tribute or taxes, made the encomiendas (grants of Indian land and labor) nonhereditary, and prohib- ited exploitation of the Indians. These new statutes were at odds with the private interests of New Spain, especially those individuals who amassed their wealth by exploiting the Indians, such as the head encomenderos (grantees) of Martín Courts. This led to a period of transition and instability between the High Court and the viceroy (Ahrndt 2001:19). To create a more even balance among members of the High Court and to gen- erate support for approval of the laws mentioned earlier, the viceroy requested the allocation of additional judges, a petition accepted by the Crown. For this reason, Judge Zorita was sent to New Spain. From the first, he openly supported the deci- sions of the viceroyalty, and the two men later developed a strong personal friend- ship (Ahrndt 2001). 394 Pacification of the Chichimeca Region Judge Zorita also relied on assistance from the Franciscan missionaries, with whom he shared many philosophical beliefs. Those beliefs, developed during his academic years in Salamanca, gave his character a strong humanistic aspect. This is clear in his earliest writings as a lawyer working on behalf of the poor of Granada— in particular, his offer of a dignified treaty to the indigenous people that generally coincided with the statutes set by the New Laws (Ahrndt 2001). Zorita’s ideas and actions were attacked by other members of the Royal High Court, especially the royal commissioner, Gerónimo de Valderrama. He was criti- cized as much for his unconditional support of the viceroy as for his openness regarding protection of the Indians. The situation became so tense that the judge, who was experiencing health problems, requested a return to Spain. The viceroy persuaded Zorita to remain in his position, but when the former died in 1564, Zorita was left without official protection (Ahrndt 2001:21). In 1561, five years before leaving New Spain, Zorita prepared a document in which he addressed the pacification of the Chichimeca area. The concrete actions outlined in his proposal were intended to achieve quick resolution of the armed conflict that characterized Indian-Spanish relations at the time. His proposal in- cluded these provisions: • Establish new Spanish towns in the north. • Appoint a governor and a captain in each town to maintain order. • Nominate a legal body to include mayors, managers, and justice and council officials. • Obey the High Court of Mexico. • Set aside areas for churches, monasteries, hospitals, town halls, prisons, plazas, and public spaces. • Provide financial support from the Royal Revenue Office for salaries of Span- ish officials and the civilian population. • Distribute fields and ranch land. • Bestow grants from Crown lands or mines on Spanish soldiers who protect the friars. • Settle the Indians peacefully in towns. • Keep Indian and Spanish towns separate. • Protect Indian towns from outside intruders. • Assign the Franciscan Order responsibility for converting and educating the natives. • Prohibit the establishment of an archdiocese for twenty years, and bar other religious orders from the region. • Recognize peaceful Indians as citizens of the Royal Crown of Castille, and en- sure that they are not subject to the encomienda system, sold, pressed into debt or servitude, or alienated by title or any other manner. Exempt the Indians from tribute for ten years, after which time their tax should be moderate and should take into account the amount they have earned from their land. 395 Martha Monzón Flores • Protect the rule, rents, and duties of Indian lords, caciques (leaders), and prin- cipals; prohibit wrongs against them, and give them preference in the division of lands. • Include friendly and cooperative Indians in the division of lands. • Exempt the Indians from tithes. • Implement a duty in place of the tithe, a portion of which is intended for the church. • Provide support to the church in the form of ornaments, wine, candles, and oil. Zorita’s proposal established the offices of governor and captain, provided salaries for Spanish officials and civilians, and limited the number of friars who could work in each community. It also identified the benefits that would result from each of these points, both for the Crown and to secure the peace (Vigil 1987:220; Zorita 1963, 1971). Regrettably, Zorita’s ideas were never implemented. Further, they contributed to the military strength of opposition groups, which confederated themselves into a grand alliance. The result was a fierce battle in 1561 on the Span- ish mining frontier, initiated by the Spanish. Other battles followed, jeopardizing the economic activities of the region even before the attacks of the Chichimecas became relentless (Powell 1984:86; see also Powell 1952).2 Viceroy Don Gastón de Peralta, Marquis of Falces, in command from 1566 to 1567, tested various strategies for peace, but without positive results. Eventually, he organized a large-scale war to establish command over the territory, with the aim of breaking the indigenous groups’ military might (Powell 1984:86). Viceroy Martín Enríquez, whose command during 1568–1580 succeeded that of Peralta, continued this policy. Clashes continued, each more damaging to the opposition and the civilian population. To avoid being victims of war, people migrated to areas that offered greater security (Powell 1984:87). In time, it became evident that the decision to confront the resistance through war had led only to increased Spanish uncertainty and a lack of capacity to capital- ize on victories, spurred by an increase in Chichimeca attacks. This led to a notable decrease in the production of silver. Given that silver production sustained the economy of the entire region, the negative effects of its decline were felt quickly (Powell 1984:87). Captain Pedro de Ahumada was charged with establishing peace during this period. In a wise military move, he became more familiar with the territory and the Chichimecas’ travel routes and held a number of meetings with opposition leaders, offering them gifts in return for promises of peace. His actual intent, however, was to invade the areas controlled by the indigenous resistance (Powell 1984:94).

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