Antonija Petri čuši ć
Assessing the Second Generation Conditionality: Minority Rights as the Component of EU Conditionality Policy for the Western Balkans
Dissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades einer Doktorin der Rechtswissenschaften an der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz
Erstbegutachter: Univ.-Prof. Dr.iur. Joseph Marko Zweitbegutachter: Univ.-Prof. Dr.phil. Florian Bieber
Zagreb/Graz, März 2013
ii Ehrenwörtliche Erklärung
Ich erkläre ehrenwörltlich, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation selbständig verfasst, andere als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel nicht benutzt und mich auch sonst keiner unerlaubten Hilfsmittel bedient habe. Ich versichere ferner, dass ich diese Dissertation bisher weder im In- noch im Ausland in irgendeiner Form als wissenschaftliche Arbeit vorgelegt habe.
Graz, im März 2013
Dipl.iur. Antonija Petri čuši ć, MA
iii Acknowledgement Note
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my thesis supervisors, Professor Dr. Joseph Marko and Professor Dr. Florian Bieber, for their academic guidance which has been unwavering throughout a substantive part of my academic career and also for their trust in my academic capacities. I am also grateful for the opportunity they gave me to participate in several of their numerous research projects dealing with South Eastern Europe and minority rights. Such participation allowed me to learn from and collaborate with outstanding colleagues and progress professionally. Particularly, I am grateful to Professor Marko for allowing me to take part in his initiated European-scale project “MIRICO - Human and Minority Rights in the Life Cycle of Ethnic Conflicts”. In this project, I was part of a team that comprised the most prominent European experts dealing with minority rights. While working on this project, I developed ideas and hypotheses that became part of my thesis research. I am also grateful to Professor Bieber for his willingness to act as my second supervisor. His academic excellence has served as a motivating force since our initial meeting, which was well over a decade ago. I am eternally indebted to Professor Dr. Wolfgang Benedek, who was not only an inspiring professor in Sarajevo and Graz, but is the one who I hold responsible for directing me and my academic pursuits into the field of human rights. The truly international environment of the Karl-Franzens University provided me with an inspiring academic setting and numerous research facilities and events during my stay in Graz. South Eastern Europe is most certainly a core research interest for a number of social science institutes and departments at the University of Graz. Often, I felt much closer to the Balkans in Graz than in Zagreb. Being part of the Karl-Franzens University and particularly as a member of Professor Marko’s team, was an honour and without doubt contributed greatly to my professional development. Furthermore, I want to express my gratitude to professors at the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb: Professor Dr. Josip Kregar, Professor Dr. Duško Sekuli ć and Professor Dr. Slaven Ravli ć for being supportive academic tutors since the time I commenced my employment at the Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb in May 2009. I owe a great debt of gratitude to Professor Kregar who suggested exploring the concept of political culture that became an essential theoretical concept around which my thesis developed. My sincere gratitude goes to Professor Sekuli ć, who encouraged me to structure my thinking in a way that allowed me to conduct research as a sociologist. Some of my friends and colleagues from my current working place deserve to be mentioned here to: Aleksandra Čar, Andrea Grgi ć and Marko Juri ć, whose talent, wit and great sense of humour allowed me to academically prosper. There are also many students who I got in touch with in the course of the last three years and who confirmed to me that teaching is the most fulfilling part of the academic career. Several of these students have demonstrated to me intense inquisitiveness, ambition and a genuine commitment to the project in which we were jointly involved, and as such, have assured me that the next generation of lawyers is certainly going to be exceptional. With this in mind, I thank Nina, Andreja, Matea, Ivan, Marko and Vedran for their time and energy. I am also indebted to several of my colleagues and friends at the University of Graz who supported me throughout my professional engagement at this institution, from February 2006 to August 2008. I am overwhelmed to have Dr. Emma Lantschner as both a friend and a colleague. I have observed her dedication to her work and the perfection in all her professional efforts that she has been undertaking since I got to know her in Bolzano/Bozen in early 2003. She remains a dear and true friend. My working hours in Graz were enriched through the company of Dr. Edith Marko, Dr. Michaela Salamun, Mag. Marianne Pasterk, and a number of collaborators who were interns in the Kompetenzzentrum Südosteuropa. The free
iv time that I had in Graz was enriched by Dr. Merima Čajlakovi ć, Dr. Gudrun Waniek, Dr. Dijana Jureša, Mag. Elma Osmanovi ć and Mag.Emina Hasovi ć who all helped me on a number of occasions to find a way through conundrums of Austrian administration and enriched my everyday life in Graz. I would also like to extend my appreciation to several colleagues I was lucky to have been introduced to during my employment at the European Academy of Bolzano/Bozen in 2003 and 2004. These colleagues are Eva Maria Moar, Sergiu Constantin, Markko Kallonen, Professor Dr. Francesco Palermo, Professor Dr. Jens Woelk, Dr. Roberta Medda-Windischer, Dr. Gabriel von Toggenburg, Dr. Guenther Rautz, Carolin Zvilling, Paulina Borowska and Elisabeth Alber. Their scientific excellence together with their warmth and kindness shaped me in the beginning of my career both as a person and as an academic. This dissertation was financially supported by grant from the Steiermärkische Sparkasse. This generous support as well as the prize of the Styrian Governor allowed me to undertake research for this thesis, to grasp knowledge, to question and to explain, in other words, to achieve the most exciting activities an academic and scientist can perform. I extend my deepest gratitude to my mother. Without her love, help, encouragement and support I would not have had the chance to achieve such professional and personal growth. Lastly, I dedicate this work to my son Marco. My life with him is ever challenging and most fulfilling.
v
“Because democracy depends not only on elections, but also strong and accountable institutions, and the respect for the rights of minorities. ”
Barack Obama ∗
∗ Quote from the speech “Moment of Opportunity: American Diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa” delivered on 19 May 2011.
vi Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION 1
1.1. Research Questions 2
1.2. Basic Research Hypothesis 6
1.3. Research Concepts 7
1.4. Methodology 9
2. DEMOCRATIZATION THAT ACKNOWLEDGES SOCIO-CULTURAL VALUES 11
2.1. Theoretical Models of Democratic Consolidation 12 2.1.1. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s Five Arenas of Democratic Consolidation 15 2.1.2. Claus Offe’s Triple Transition Theory 18 2.1.3. Wolfgang Merkel’s Four Dimensions of Democratic Consolidation 20
2.2. Preprequisites of Attitudinal Consolidation in Plural Societies 28 2.2.1. Values and Attitudes Supportive to Democracy 29 2.2.2. Convergence of Socio-Cultural Values in Plural Societies 40
3. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 46
3.1. Political Culture in the Western Balkans 46
3.2. Two Decades of the Western Balkans Democratic Transformation 55
4. POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY AS THE EXTERNAL DEMOCRACY PROMOTION MECHANISM 70
4.1. Europeanisation Conceptualized as External Socialization 71
4.2. Limits of the EU Conditionality on Democratization 78
4.3. Democratic Consolidaiton of the Western Balkans through Stabilisation and Integration 88
5. ASSESSING THE SECOND GENERATION CONDITIONALITY: FROM POST- CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION TO EU INTEGRATION 102
5.1. Introduction of the First Generation Minority Conditionality for the Central and Eastern European Countries 103
vii 5.2. Second Generation Conditionality and Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity in the Western Balkans 111 5.2.1. Normative and Institutional Solutions Assuring ‘Respect for and Protection of Minorities’ 114 5.2.1. Refuge Return 136 5.2.2. Prosecution of War Crimes 143 5.2.3. Reconcilation 164
5.3. Attitudinal Consolidtion through the Second Generation Conditionality 187
6. CONCLUSIONS 195
BIBLIOGRAPHY 199
viii 1. Introduction
This dissertation is about democratization of the post-conflict region through the application of the second generation conditionality, i.e. pre-accession conditionality that requires broadest integration of national minorities in the Western Balkans countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) currently aspiring to attain membership in the European Union (EU or the Union). The first generation minority conditionality required ‘respect for and protection of persons belonging to minorities’ and was applied towards the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. In comparison to the first generation minority conditionality, which primarily required normative and institutional mechanisms for accommodation of national minorities, the second generation conditionality contains novel elements related to refugee return, prosecution of war crimes and post-conflict inter-ethnic reconciliation. Not negating the importance of socio-economic development in the democratic transformation period, nor of historical causes specific to a given country or a region, this dissertation is confined to the analysis of the importance of socio-cultural factors (e.g. citizens’ values and attitudes) in the process of democratization. I will therefore argue that the EU decided to expand its political criteria related to respect for and protection of minorities aiming at promotion of inter-personal trust in post-conflict societies of the Western Balkans. This consequently contributes to establishement of civic values and addresses lack of inter-ethnic cooperation and insufficient civic engagement in the region. I will elaborate below that democracy is most likely to emerge and flourish under specific social and cultural conditions and that ordinary people play a significant role in the democratization process, primarily by adopting values that push for and are conducive to democracy. By applying the second generation conditionality the EU is attempting to stabilise the region by igniting a democratic political culture in which civic values prevail and, in this way, is consequently contributing to the quality of democracy in the region. The dissertation has several interrelated objectives: (1) to describe the relevance of the political culture in postcommunist and post-conflict democratic transitions; (2) to position the EU as the external socialization agent since, trough the Stabilization and Association process (SAp), the tailor- made pre-accession policy for the Western Balkans, the EU transfers socio-cultural values such as respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities etc.; (3) to prove that pre-accession political conditionality should not subscribe merely to state building efforts that aim at reform of legislation and institution building but also to aleration of dominant socio-
1 cultural values and norms what results in a consolidated democratic political culture. These pre-accession reforms are dependent upon actors that are advocating for liberal-democratic values and therefore should be oriented to the society in general, not merely the poltical and administrative elites; (4) to illustrate EU conditionality on democratization plays seminal role since the democratic consolidation is far from being completed in spite of two decades of the Western Balkans post-conflict and postcommunist transition; and (t) to provide conclusions if a tailor-made diversity conditionality for the Western Balkans is able to produce sociocultural changes that will increase the level of interpersonal trust among the populations of the countries that are still torn along inter-ethnic cleavages and in this way contribute to the attitudinal consolidation of democracvy in the region.
1.1. Research Questions
Umberto Eco recently declared that “...it is culture, not war that cements our [European] identity. The French, the Italians, the Germans, the Spanish and the English have spent centuries killing each other. Today, we've been at peace for 70 years and no one realises how amazing that is any more. Indeed, the very idea of a war between Spain and France, or Italy and Germany, provokes hilarity. The United States needed a civil war to unite properly. I hope that culture and the [European] market will do the same for us.” 1 My research takes this claim on. Culture, being a set of values, norms and behaviours shared in a society, is an indicator of values around which society is integrated. That is because values are the building blocks of norms and institutions, which are basic rules of social conduct. The concept of attitudinal consolidation in this dissertation serves as a point of departure for better understanding of the political transformation of the regimes of the Western Balkans countries in the course of the EU accession. In the pre-accession period the EU expects not only norm convergence but also acceptance of values it has been founded on from the (potential) candidate countries. That is because a common agreement upon shared values is a condition for a sustainable society, including the supra national political entity such as the Union is. I argue that if the EU’s accession process is to sufficiently support democratic transformation of the Western Balkans post-conflict societies it need to produce socio-cultural changes in population. I will point out in which way the EU accession process serves as a socializing agent in altering the political culture in the Western Balkan, simultaneously altering dominant social norms and socio-cultural values.
1 Umberto Eco, “It’s culture, not war, that cements European identity”, The Guardian , 26.01.2012, available at
2 The EUenlargement process started to give attention to national minorities after the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, which specifically highlighted the ‘respect for and protection of minorities’ as an accession criterion. This was unprecedented in the history of the EU because minority protection criteria lacked any legislative ground in the EU. Nevertheless, the European Commission’s decision to include minority protections as pre-accession criteria has resulted in an improvement of minority rights in those countries that were targeted by this political conditionality. Such conditionality produced new pieces of legislation, political strategies and even effective implementation of laws in the new Member States. Implicitly, and partially as a result of the introduction of the minority conditionality criterion, the Union became concerned with persons belonging to minorities in its internal policies: the Treaty of Lisbon that entered into force on 1 December 2009, i.e . after the new CEE Member States joined the Union introduced the rights of persons belonging to minorities into EU primary law by recognising them as one of the founding values on which the Union is founded, and acknowledging this value as common to the Member States. This Treaty furthermore requests that the EU institutions and Member States should not discriminate against persons belonging to national, linguistic, ethnic and religious minorities. In other words, the condition that was introduced as an external (conditionality) requirement became an internal policy protecting persons belonging to the stated minorities against discrimination and social exclusion. The criterion of ‘respect for and protection of minorities’ has a dual intention: it helps to preserve the distinctive culture of minorities by assuring cultural autonomy and their integration into society, and influences societal values striving for greater tolerance of inter- ethnic heterogeneity. Consequently, such a complex task requires not only the restructuring of legal provisions and institutions that assure ‘respect for and protection of persons belonging to minorities’, but also a change of existing socio-cultural norms and values in societies recently involved in inter-ethnic conflicts. Minority protection remains a criterion to be fulfilled in the prospective Western Balkans EU enlargement. Gabriel Toggenburg was the first to note that the EU has developed its conditionality policy vis-à-vis the Western Balkans, resulting in a revised conditionality policy. 2 The foundations of such conditionality were laid at the April 1997 Council Meeting
2 See Gabriel N. Toggenburg, “A Remaining Share or a New Part? The Union’s Role vis-à-vis Minorities After the Enlargement Decade”, 5 European University Institute (EUI) Working Paper (2006), pp. 1-32, available at
3 of the EU Member States foreign Ministers 3 and in the Luxembourg June 1999 Council Meeting of the EU Member States foreign Ministers. 4 Based on those EU high level political decisions, the countries of the region were required (1) to provide evidence of credible commitments to democratic reform and progress in compliance with the generally recognised standards of human and minority rights, including commitments on facilitating refugee return; (2) show a credible commitment to engage in economic reform; (3) demonstrate a willingness to develop regional economic and political relations and commitment to neighbourly relations; (4) comply with the obligations under the Peace Agreements and with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); and (5) respect other conditionalities defined by the Council. One might conclude, as I have, that the second generation minority conditionality extends the minority criterion into the necessity to cope with war crimes, providing assurance of refugee return and repossession of property as well as appraises the reconciliation attempts in the Western Balkans post-conflict societies. Expanded political conditionality contained in the Stabilization and Association process (SAp) usually is treated in academic research as a novel element of conditionality, often not related at all to minority rights conditionality. 5 I consider that exactly this introduction of broader and tougher pre-accession criteria demonstrates that the minority conditionality has become more significantelement of pre- accession political conditionality since the SAp (explicitly) aims at rectifying wrongdoings which resulted from the conflicts, and (implicitly) hopes to produce change of values and attitudes towards ethnic national minorities and promotion of tolerance and coexistence. This conditionality contributes to the re-emergence of interpersonal trust and cooperation among the ethnic groups in countries that recently experienced violent wars and severe inter-ethnic conflicts. Namely, the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) resulted in three major armed conflicts: in Croatia (1991-1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1998-1999). In addition to those three large scale violations
Petrovi ć, “Stick And Carrot: All You Wanted To Know About The Policy of Conditionality But Didn’t Dare To Ask”, 4 Western Balkans Security Observer (2007), pp. 54-61. 3 General Affairs Council meeting, 7738/97 (PRES 129), 29.04.1997, available at
4 of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian laws, there were two small-scale conflicts in Slovenia (June-July 1991) and in Macedonia (January-August 2001). The inadequately solved issue of minority protections and the unwillingness of newly independent states to effectively recognize groups’ claims for greater autonomy led to the emergence of a series of ethnic conflicts in 1990s. In spite of a massive expulsion of population that took place in the aftermath of wars in many of these countries, which resulted in a significant refugee flaw, all countries of the Western Balkans continue to be multi-ethnic societies. This set a clear need for the establishment of political systems that will accommodate minorities and achieve long lasting stability of the region. By examining a course of the Western Balkans accession and scrutinizing the conditionality component that requires ‘protection of and promotion of minority rights’, this dissertation will therefore try to answer following research questions: Can socio-cultural values be modelled by external actors in order to converge into an ideal model required by the international organization? Can the EU political conditionality be conceptualized as the ‘norm entrepreneur’ that is able to result in redefinition and change of dominant socio-cultural values in the countreis that are exposed to it? Furthermore, I will hererby attempt to establish what the successes and limitations of minority conditionality policy in the previous EU phases of enlargement were? Have the minority rights standards, as agreed upon in the course of the latest two phases of enlargement, become in any sense incorporated into acquis communautaire ? What were the reasons behind expanding the diversity criteria for the Western Balkans countries, which nowadays requires not only stability of institutions guaranteeing protection of national minorities, but also visible track-record in implementing minority rights, active involvement of the governmental institutions into process of post-conflict reconciliation as well as prosecution of war crimes? How successful has this tailor-made conditionality policy actually been in practice until now? Should a (relative) success of the core minority rights policy (i.e. subscription to contemporary standards of minority protection) in the region be solely attributable to the process of its Europeanization? Or were there and are there still some other factors at work? Are the other policies of the second generation conditionality (namely, the refugee return, prosecution of war crimes and reconciliation) equally succesfuly transposed in the pre-accesssion period? This dissertation will, in general, research how successfully diversity acquis have been transposed so far and put in practice in the Western Balkans and establish has the level of inter-personal trust has increased between the citizens as the consequence of the second generation conditionality?
5 1.2. Basic Research Hypothesis
The following hypotheses are considered: H1: Succesful democratic consolidation of the post-conflict region requires simultaneous constitutional, institutional, attitudinal and behavioral transforations. Since the countries of the Western Balkans have been undergoing incomplete democratic transformation for the past two decades, the EU accession process, as the most viable external democratization incentive, has foreseen tailor-made conditionality that shall induce both normative and institutional reforms, as well as attitudinal and behavioral societal changes. H2: For the democratic reforms to be successful in a post-conflict environment with impaired inter-ethnic relations, simultaneously to transformation of legislation, institutions, and economc system, it is particularly necessary to ignate a value-change process among a wider population. H3: The EU political conditionality serves as socialization towards preferred behaviours that shall preferably result in the internalization of new values and norms. Therefore, transformation of socio-cultural values in the (potential) candidate countries of the Western Balkans takes place in the pre-accession period as a result of the tailor-made second generation conditionality that requires acknowledgement of ethnic heterogeneity through normative and institutional mechanisms, integration of national minorities in political and societal processes, creation of conditions conductive for the return of refugees, investigation and prosecution of war-crimes, and re-emergence of inter-ethnic cooperation and reconciliation. H4: The second generation conditionality enhances attitudinal consolidation since policies that are pursued as a result of it contribute to the re-emergence of interpersonal and institutional trust, which in turn encourages development of other pertinent social-cultural variables, like tolerance, political participation, associational membership and social capital. Those socio-cultural values, in turn, subsequently consolidate the Western Balkans democracies. EU political conditionality is in this dissertation therefore understood as an external democratization tool that generates changes in values, norms and institutions in the (potential) candidate countries. By examining outcomes of the second generation conditionality, this dissertation will attempt to prove that the EU is contributing to change of a particulalr socio- cultural value, i.e. trust, whose prevalence is important for democratic consolidation of the post-authoritarian and post-conflict region. This dissertation argues that the second generation conditionality shall result in following outsomes: (1) it shall serve as a political socialisation
6 agent, inducing the socio-cultural values that are required in the democratic society; (2) it shall rectify the wrongdoings of the inter-ethnic conflicts and consequences of wars (by encouraging investigation and prosecution of war crimes, return of refugees and reposition of pre-war properties and through wide-encompassing post-conflict societal reconcilation); (3) it shall help the political and societal integration of all ethnic groups and asure equality of all citizens what, in turn, serves as a conflict prevention guarantee; and finally (4) by achieving those two previous objectives it shall contribute to attitudinal consolidation of democracy in the post-conflict Western Balkans countries.
1.3. Research Concepts
What follows is a short explanation of concepts used in the above enumerated hypothesis: Diversity acquis is made up of values which the Union is founded upon, as well as all other legal norms that ensure respect for persons belonging to minorities, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of membership to a national minority and demands respect of cultural, religious and linguistic diversity in the EU. The diversity acquis , apart from encompassing those legal foundations prescribed in the EU law, with respect to (potential) candidate countries is as well made of a necessity to abide to standards of minority protection set by the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Framework Convention) and the Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. First generation conditionality is a pre-accession conditionality applied vis-à-vis the former candidate countries in CEE. In a nutshell, the conditionality is enumerated in few criteria that were made obligatory for any country aspiring to the membership, given that it respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and human dignity. Political criteria require that a country aspiring to the EU membership achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Economic criteria require that a country has a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. A legislative criterion requires that the country is able to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. Finally, administrative criterion requires administrative capacity for implementing previously enumerated obligations. Second-generation conditionality is a tailor-made pre-accession conditionality for the Western Balkans countries, which takes into account recent violent conflicts and societal, political, as well as economic consequences which came as a result. Consequently, the
7 second-generation conditionality requires from (potential) candidate countries, in fulfilling a part of political criterion that requires ‘respect for and protection of minorities’ to actively foster rights of national minorities through normative-institutional setting, as well as to bring about return of displaced population, to help rebuild and repair their housing, create economic and political climate prone to return of displaced population, engage in broader reconciliation framework, thus accomplishing primarily prosecution of war crimes and inter-ethnic reconciliation within a society. Reconciliation is a social process which involves all members of (usually post-conflict and/or transitional) society and aims towards a normalisation of relations between citizens. In such societal process, numerous activities are undertaken, either by public figures, state institutions, or civil society organizations, which are conductive to re-emergence of interpersonal trust among citizens. At the same time, the reconciliation process makes the citizens “sufficiently committed to the norms and values that motivate their ruling institutions, sufficiently confident that those who operate those institutions do so also on the basis of those norms and values, and sufficiently secure about their fellow citizens’ commitment to abide by these basic norms and values”. 6 Transitional justice is a complex processes in divided societies that primarily imply investigation and prosecution of war crimes, either before judicial bodies of the country where those had been committed or before the international tribunal whose jurisdiction has been recognised. It furthermore implies the establishment of truth commissions, lustration processes, voicing of public apologies, compensation for victims, etc. The overall aim of this process is to distribute justice to the victims, and by establishing facts over the crimes and perpetrators to help deconstructing myths and stereotypes and to foster trust among different communities. National minority refers to a group of persons in a state who reside on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof, maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with that state, display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics, are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of that state or of a region of that state and are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including their culture, traditions, religion or language.
6 Pablo de Greiff, “The Role of Apologies in National Reconciliation Processes: On Making Trustworthy Institutions Trusted ,” in Mark Gibney, Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Jean-Marc Coicaud and Niklaus Steiner (eds.), The Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 120-136, at 126.
8 Rights of national minorities are following rights prescribed by the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention: the rights to freedom of assembly, association, expression, thought, conscience, and religion (Articles 7, 8, and 9); the right to access mainstream media and creation and use of minority media (Article 9); the right to use a minority language in private and in public and display information in the minority language (Articles 10 and 11); the right to use the minority language before administrative authorities and to display bilingual topographical indications in the minority language in areas inhabited by national minorities ‘traditionally’ or ‘in substantial numbers’ (Articles 10 and 11); the right to foster knowledge of the culture, history, language, and religion of both majority and minorities (Article 12); the right to set up and manage their own educational establishments and learn their own language (Articles 13 and 14); the right to effective participation in cultural, social and economic life, and in public affairs (Article 15); the right not to alter the proportions of the population in areas inhabited by minorities (Article 16); the right to maintain contacts across frontiers (Article 17).The protection of national minorities has become an integral part of the international protection of human rights. For the purpose of this research, the scope of minority rights as prescribed by the Framework Convention is taken as expletory for describing the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. The Framework Convention is the first legally binding multilateral minority instrument, of which all countries of the Western Balkans are participating parties. Moreover, the Framework Convention, along with the Charter on Regional and Minority Languages, is being used as a subsidiary legal standard in meeting the political criterion requiring ‘respect for and protection of minorities’.
1.4. Methodology
This dissertation primarily utilized qualitative research methods, such as textual analysis, archival work, and interviews. It presents a secondary data analysis, since the items presented in this dissertation were not specifically designed for the research questions addressed in this work but has been already published as previous research work (scholarly books, articles etc.), international organisations’ reports, web available information, previously published empirical and statistical data etc. Several theoretical concepts applied in this dissertation serve as a point of departure for better understanding of the simultaneity of transformation the post-conflict Western Balkans societies require. The social constructivists-culturalist approach towards the impact of Europeanization applied hereby shall demonstrate that the Europeanization process imply adjustment of domestic policies of acceding countries with a view to conforming to principles
9 and values of the Community law. I will argue that in the pre-accession period the EU expects not only norm convergence and institutional reshuffle but also acceptance of its founding values from the (potential) candidate countries. This dissertation therefore conceptualizes Europeanization as a means of political socialisation, understanding it as a process in which an individual’s attitudes and values are being shaped. Such a process should subsequently assure post-conflict consolidation of democracy, and stabilise the inter-ethnic relations in the Western Balkan countries. By evoking a constructivist-culturalist theoretical approach, this dissertation will demonstrate that cultural learning can be driven by external circumstances, i.e. by the EU accession process which promotes certain values that need to be embraced and (at least formally) transposed into domestic legislations and practices of democratic institutions of the future Member States. This dissertation will therefore attempt to establish if the EU political conditionality that relates to management of ethnic diversity in the post- conflict society induces change of socio-cultural values and societal norms necessary for a development of civic attitudes. As indicated at the very outset of this work, I hope to shed light on the following questions through my research: (1) does the EU accession process serves as a socializing agent in altering the political culture in the Western Balkan countries; (2) does the applied tailor-made political conditionality designed for the Western Balkans contributes to the re- emergence of interpersonal trust and cooperation among the ethnic groups; and consequently (3) does the EU, by insisting upon realisation of national minority rights, pursuit of transitional justice and reconciliation, implicitly fosters emergence of civic culture, which, in the long run, helps democratic consolidation and serves as a guarantee of conflict prevention? In order to demonstrate applicability of the theoretical conceptualization of Europeanization as a means of political socialisation, the documents and policies of EU institutions, domestic legal texts and political decisions will be analysed what shall allow me to arrive at a complete understanding of the pre-accession diversity conditionality as a value change mechanism. In addition, in order to prove above enumerated research hypotheses, empirical data from a recently conducted survey dealing with attitudes, views and values will be consulted to highlight the hypothesis of deficiency of civic culture in the Western Balkans.
10 2. Democratization that Acknowledges Socio-Cultural Values
The last three decades of the twentieth century were marked by the transition from authoritarian regimes to new democracies worldwide: the end of the dictatorships in Spain and Portugal, the overturn of the military regimes in Latin America, the transition to democracy in Africa, the abolition of apartheid in South Africa and the collapse of the former communist Europe. 7 The transition to the new form of political regime neither contains a guarantee that a country will remain democratic nor it will consolidate its democracy succesfuly. This Chapter will therefore try to establish when exactly is a new democracy consolidated? Is it sufficient to have ‘democratic’ constitution and laws that are passed in a legitimately elected legislative body? What kind of economic regulation is favourable for democratic consolidation, or can democracy flourish equally well in the command as in the liberal market economic system? Can democracy be achieved in multinational state? Finally, does consolidated democracy require active citizen participation and vibrant civil society? Out of many different explanations of democratization processes, the following Chapter will, at the outset, present several theoretical democratisation models that take into account sociocultural variables, i.e. political culture and social values as importants factors of in the democratic consolidation process. Those are multilevel models of democratic consolidation that require simultaneous or subsequent appearance of certain elements that add to the profound transformation of a political system, specific social and cultural conditions being one of them. 8 Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart for example considered effective democracy much broader than the emergence of electoral democracies. 9 They argued that
7 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century ( Norman: University of OklahomaPress, 1991). For a critique of Huntington's democratization paradigm see Renske Doorenspleet, “Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization”, 52 (3) World Politics (2000), pp. 384-406. See also Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, 1968); Wolfgang Merkel, “The consolidation of post-autocratic democracies”, 5 (3) Democratization (1998), pp. 33-67; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions”, 9 Governance (1996), pp. 247-64; Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Juan J. Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes”, in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Volume 3 (1974), pp. 175- 411. See also Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy. Participatory politics for a new age (Barkeley: University of California Press, 1984). See also Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues” Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell and Samuel Valenzuela (eds.), Issues in Democratic Consolidation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 294-341. 8 Roland Inglehart, “Globalization and Postmodern Values”, 28 (1) The Washington Quarterly (2000), pp. 215- 228, at 228. 9 The term ‘effective democracy’ has been empirically tested in the writings of Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel who consider effective democracy much broader than the emergence of electoral democracies. See e.g. Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart, “The Role of Ordinary People in Democratization”, 19 (1) Journal of Democracy (2008), pp. 126-140. See a recent debate over the effective democracy index critique: Carl Henrik
11 ordinary people play a significant role in the democratization process, primarily by adopting values that push for and are conducive to democracy. Consequently, their democratic mass orientations translate into effective democratic institutions. Introduction of democratic institutions do not automatically produce sociocultural changes, such as interpersonal trust, that are stabilitzing democratic system. In this opening Chapter, I will subsequently argue that trust shall be treated as a prevailing sociocultural factor that contributes to stability and consolidation of democracies acknowledging “there is no institutional quick fix for the problem of creating trust and social capital”. 10 . Finally, in this Chapter I will demonstrate which conditions need to be met in order to induce attitudinal changes condictive to democracy.
2.1. Theoretical Models of Democratic Consolidation
Democratization 11 is the process in which a previously non-democratic state becomes democratic. Alhough, according to to Robert Dahl, no country in the world is fully democratized, for a country to be relatively democratized regime it needs to meet quite a few characteristics. 12 In his concept of ‘polyarchy’ Dahl enumerated following elements of an ideal type of a relatively democratized regime: elected officials; free and fair elections; inclusive suffrage; the right to run for office; freedom of expression; alternative information; and associational autonomy. 13 Conseqenetly, according to Dahl, consolidation happens when
Knutsen, “Measuring Effective Democracy”, 31 (2) International Political Science Review (2010), pp. 109-128. See also, the response arguing in favour of reliability and validity of the index: Amy C. Alexander, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, “Measuring effective democracy: A defense”, 33 (1) International Political Science Review (2012), pp. 41-62. 10 Ronald Inglehart, “Trust, well-being and democracy”, in M. E. Warren (ed.), Democracy & Trust (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), at 88. 11 Seminal writings on the process of democratic consolidation are works of Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). Among other early works on democratic consolidation see Philippe C. Schmitter, The Consolidation of Democracy and the Representation of Social Groups”, 35 American Behavioural Scientist (1992), pp. 422-449; Samuel J. Valenzuela, “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions”, in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela, Issues in Democratic Consolidation (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 57-104; Ben Ross Schneider, “Democratic Consolidations: Some Broad Comparisons and Sweeping Arguments”, 30 Latin American Research Review (1995), pp. 215-234. See also Wolfgang Merkel, “Die Konsolidierung postautoritärer und posttotalitärer Demokratien: Ein Beitrag zur theorieorientierten Transformationsforschung”, in Hans Süssmuth (ed.), Transformationsprozesse in den Staaten Ostmitteleuropas (Baden-Baden: Nomos,1998), pp. 39-61; Rudolf Rizman, “Demokrati čna tranzicija in konsolidacija v primerjalni perspektivi” 43 (5/6) Teorija in praksa (2006), pp. 674-689. However, there are scientists who are critical towards this concept. Guillermo O’Donnell, for example, argued that ‘democracy’ and ‘consolidation’ are terms too polysomic to make a good pair, in Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions About Consolidation”, 7 (2) Journal of Democracy (1996), pp. 34-51. Andreas Schedler, on the other hand, pointed towards numerous different definitions of democratic consolidation. See Andreas Schedler, “What Is Democratic Consolidation?” 9 (2) Journal of Democracy (1998), pp. 91–107. 12 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). 13 Ibid .
12 both a system of contestation and the right to participataton are developed. 14 Hans-Jürgen Puhle correspondingly believes that a democratic minimum presupposes “the right of citizenship with a high degree of inclusion, free and fair, competitive and effective elections, freedom of association and information, effective government by elected officials which can be held accountable, the recognition of human and civil rights, and the guarantee of rule of law and civil liberties”. 15 Wolfgang Merkel held that minimal democratic criteria presuppose universal adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source of information. 16 Merkel moreover introduced a concept of an ‘embedded democracy’ than requires synchronized convergence of five partial regimes: “a democratic electoral regime, political rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that the effective power to govern lives in the hands of democratically elected representatives”. 17 Similarly, Leslie Holmes enumerated seven salient features required for a large-scale, workable and sustainable democracy to emerge: “(1) competitive election of ruling elites, and political pluralism more generally: the latter includes a plurality of non-exclusive political parties, and elections that are held regularly, reasonably frequently, and that are genuinely competitive and secret; (2) a division of powers between the two or three main arms of the formal ruling part of the political system (i.e. the legislative, executive and possibly judicial arms), and a system of checks and balances; (3) a pluralistic approach to socialisation, especially in the areas of education and the mass media; moreover, these two areas must be free to question and criticise the regime and system; (4) full acceptance by both the state and society of diverse belief systems, notably religious, within the limits of the law; (5) respect for minority rights; (6) the rule of law; and (7) a dominant political culture that both accepts and expects the first six points, and that encourages (and legitimises) political participation”. 18 Consolidation therefore does not happen simultaneously with a regime transformation. Puhle argued that “ [c]onsolidation is not just a new phase after the end of the transition and institutionalization [but ] a different process the beginnings of which overlap with the second phase of the transition (after the founding elections) and which in most cases continues after
14 Ibid ., at 6-7. 15 Hans-Jürgen Puhle, “Democratic Consolidation and ‘Defective Democracies’” 47 Estudio/Working Paper (2005), available at
13 the end of the transition until a characteristic threshold is reached after which the new democracy can be considered to be consolidated.” 19 Puhle summarized the different phases of regime transformation, developed in a whole new industry of the social sciences which he labeled “the industry of transitology, or transformatology”. 20 According to Puhle transitology pays attention to four stages of regime transformation: “(1) the ‘opening’, demise or liberalization of authoritarian or communist regimes, (2) the institutional transition, in the narrower sense, from a non-democratic to a democratic regime (if it went well), (3) the problems of the consolidation of democracy, if it came to that, or in its absence the respective alternatives, and (4) the processes and trajectories of the broader and more complex socio- economic and cultural transformations involved, particularly the transformation of a centrally planned state economy into a market economy as it occurred in the ex-communist countries, with all the problems of adequate, proper and timely coordination and ‘sequencing’”. 21 All above enumerated elements of democratic transformation imply that if a democratic regime is to become long-term stable, workable and sustainable it requires profound consolidation. Out of numerous interpretations of the democratic consolidation,several theoretical democratisation models that conceptualize democratization as a sequence process and that take into account sociocultural variables as indispensable prerequisite of democracy will be presented below. These theoretical approaches of democratic consolidation take account of accommodation of plural identities, what is important because all countries analyzed later in this dissertation are multiethnic societies. 22 The first theoriteical concept introduced is Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s model of the five arenas that presupposes institutional, attitudinal and behavioral consolidation.The second is Claus Offe’s simultaneity transition theory. Finally, Wolfgang Merkel’s model of four dimensions of democratic consolidation will be presented. The last model will subsequrntly be applied in this dissertation since it presupose bluntly the consoldiation of
19 Hans-Jürgen Puhle, op.cit. (2005),at 4. 20 Ibid. , at 2. 21 Ibid. , at 2-3. 22 See e.g. Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition: the East European and East German Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); V. P. Gagnon, “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia”, 19 (3) International Security (1994-1995), pp. 130-166; Vesna Peši ć, “Nationalism of an Impossible State: A Framework for Understanding the Unsuccessful Transition to Legitimacy in Serbia” in Dragica Vujadinović and Vladimir Goati, Between Authoritarianism and Democracy: Serbia at the Political Crossroads (Beograd: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Centar za demokratsku tranziciju, 2009), pp. 71-86; Jóhanna Kristín Birnir, Ethnicity and Electoral Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002); Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholz, “Legacies and Leverage: EU Political Conditionality and Democracy Promotion in Historical Perspective”, 62(3) Europe-Asia Studies (2010), pp. 443-460.
14 civic culture, i.e. emergence of democratic values, as indispensable prerequisite of the democratic consolidation.
2.1.1. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s Five Arenas of Democratic Consolidation
The early literature on the consolidation of democracy, authored by Juan Stepen and Alfred Linz, argued that after “a democratic transition is completed, there are still many tasks that need to be accomplished, conditions that must be established, and attitudes and habits that must be cultivated before democracy can be regarded as consolidated”. 23 Fort hem, consolidated democracy implies “a political regime in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, ‘the only game in town’”. 24 Those two prominent theoreticians of democratic consolidation held that consolidation happens only when “democracy becomes internalised behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally” 25 Stepen and Linz explained that “ behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or by seceding from the state. Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more-or- less isolated from prodemocratic forces. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process”. 26 Stepen and Linz argued that, given that a condition of a functioning state is secured, in order for a democracy to be consolidated, five other interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions must emerge. Thise conditions, once met, result in five arenas of democratic consolidation. This is how Stepen and Linz explained
23 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies”, 7 (2) Journal of Democracy (1996), pp. 14-33, at 15. 24 Ibid. , at 16. 25 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), at 15. This model inspired Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle who developled identical threefold consolidation model. See e.g. Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1995). See also Richard Gunther and P- Nikiforos Diamandouros, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, “O’Donnell's ‘Illusions’: A Rejoinder”, 7 (4) Journal of Democ racy (1996), pp. 151-159. 26 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, op.cit. (1996), at 16.
15 the necessity of simultaneous occurance of pro-democratic conditions: “First, the conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society. Second, there must be a relatively autonomous political society that is made of institutions of a democratic political society - political parties, legislatures, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, and interparty alliances . Third, throughout the territory of the state all major political actors, especially the government and the state apparatus, must be effectively subjected to a rule of law that protects individual freedoms and associational life. Fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government. Fifth, there must be an institutionalized economic society. 27 Stepen and Linz therefore conceptualized democracy not as a regime, but as an interacting system of five arenas: civil society, political society, rule of law, state bureaucracy and economic society.They considered that a modern consolidated democracy comprises of“five major interrelated arenas, each of which, to function properly, must have its own primary organizing principle”. 28 Moreover, “ [n]o single arena in such a system can function properly without some support from another arena, or often from all of the remaining arenas. For example, civil society in a democracy needs the support of a rule of law that guarantees to people their right of association, and needs the support of a state apparatus that will effectively impose legal sanctions on those who would illegally attempt to deny others that right. Furthermore, each arena in the democratic system has an impact on other arenas. For example, political society manages the governmental bureaucracy and produces the overall regulatory framework that guides and contains economic society. In a consolidated democracy, therefore, there are constant mediations among the five principal arenas, each of which is influenced by the others”. 29 Already the early literature on Central and Eastern European democratic consolidation expressed concerns the simultaneity of transformations might induce authoritarian temptations and increase of nationalistic sentiments. Linz and Stepan for example recognized “the dangers posed by ethnic conflict in multinational states” 30 as an obstacle to democratic consolidation. They offered a “strong hypothesis about how not to consolidate democracy in multinational settings”. 31 If the newly democratic state denies citizenship to people residing on its terittorry the more unlikely it is that this state will consolidate democracy. In other words, guarantee of inclusive and equal citizenship for all citizens increases the chances of democratic
27 Ibid. , at 17. 28 Ibid. , at 22. 29 Ibid. , at 22-23. 30 Ibid. , at 23. 31 Ibid.
16 consolidation in multinational states. In addition, Linz and Stepan reminded that “[s]uch multinational states also have an even greater need than other polities to explore a variety of nonmajoritarian, nonplebiscitarian formulas. For example, if there are strong geographic concentrations of different groups within the state, federalism might be an option worth exploring. The state and the society might also allow a variety of publicly supported communal institutions - such as media and schools in different languages, symbolic recognition of cultural diversity, a variety of legally accepted marriage codes, legal and political tolerance for parties representing different communities, and a whole array of political procedures and devices that Arend Lijphart has described as ‘consociational democracy’. Typically, proportional representation, rather than large single-member districts with first-past-the-post elections, can facilitate representation of geographically dispersed minorities”. 32 Linz and Stepan also foresaw the electoral procedure in a nondemocratic, multinational federal system. They suggested that “the crafting of democratic federalism should probably begin with elections at the federal level, so as to generate a legitimate framework for later deliberations on how to decentralize the polity democratically. If the first competitive elections are regional, the elections will tend to favor regional nationalists, and ethnocracies rather than democracies may well emerge”. 33 Multipleand complementary political identities are according to Linz and Stepan “the key factors that makes democracy in multinational states possible”. 34 Those two authors believe since political identities are not fixed and permanent, they can be nurtured by different inclusive policies. Jacques Thomassen and Hermann Schmitt similarly claimed “[h]eterogeneity in terms of race, language or religion are supposed to put the stability of a political system at risk” [...] “not heterogeneity as such threatens the stability of a political system, but the extent to which they are cross- cutting rather than mutually reinforcing”. 35 Accordingly, Lipset argued that “the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations. To the degree that a significant proportion of the population is pulled among conflicting forces, its members have an interest in reducing the intensity of political conflict”. 36
32 Ibid. , at 26. 33 Ibid. , at 26-27. 34 Ibid. , at 28. 35 Jacques Thomassen and Hermann Schmitt, “Democracy and Legitimacy in the EU”, 45 (1) Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning (2004), pp. 377-410. 36 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (London: William Heinemann, 1960), at 89.
17 2.1.2. Claus Offe’s Triple Transition Theory
Claus Offe introduced a paradigm of a triple transition for the the Central and East European states, implying that in those former socialist countries the simultaneous transformations of state identities, political regimes, and economic systems takes place. 37 He described the simultaneous transformation towards democracy in following order: “[r]esources must be produced and distributed, rights defined and put into effect, respect for identities must become accustomed to, and dependably provided, within the territorial integrity of the post-communist society”. 38 Quite some authors challenged a prospect of simultaneity of economic and political transformations arguing that success in one reform area might hinder the progress in another. 39 Already Stepen and Linz noticed a challenge of simultaneity of different transformations, and they argued that “in countries with imploded command economies, democratic polities can and must be installed and legitimized by a variety of other appeals before the possible benefits of a market economy fully materialize.”40 Offe is not exception to this line of argumentation. In his words, “ [t]he very simultaneity of the three transformations generates decision-loads of unprecedented magnitude. Unlike the situation in the Western democracies, there is no time for slow maturation, experience, and learning along the evolutionary scale of nation building, constitution making, and the politics of allocation and redistribution. And there are no model cases that might be imitated or, for that matter, no victorious power that would impose its will from the outside, as was the case with the new East and West European postwar regimes. As a consequence, the decisions made on all three of these levels may easily turn out to be incompatible so as to obstruct each other rather than forming a coherent whole”. 41 The Offe’s dilemma of simultaneity poses challenge to socio- cultural factors, as they also necessary undergo transformation induced by economic and political reforms. He talked about those factors by distinguishing between three hierarchical
37 Claus Offe, “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe”, 71 (3) Social Research (2004), pp. 501-528. Compare also Jon Elster, “The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform”, in Douglas Greenberg, Stanley N. Katz, Melanie Beth Oliviero, and Steven C. Wheatley (eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Richter, Emanuel, “Upheavals in the East and Turmoil in Political Theory: Comments on Offe’s ‘Capitalism by Democratic Design?’” 58 (4) Social Research (1991), pp. 893-902.; Jasen Castillo, “The dilemma of simultaneity”, 160 (1) World Affairs (1997), pp. 34-42. 38 Claus Offe, Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1994), at 20. 39 See e.g. Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New York: Times Books, 1990). Przeworski, Adam (1991) Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 40 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, op.cit. (1996), at 29. 41 Claus Offe, op.cit. (2004), at 508.
18 levels of decision making. Offe argued that “ [a]t the most fundamental level a ‘decision’ mustbe made as to who ‘we’ are; that is, a decision on identity, citizenship,and the territorial as well as social and cultural boundaries ofthe nation-state. At the second level, rules, procedures, and rightsmust be established that together make up the constitution or theinstitutional framework of the ‘regime’. It is only at the highestlevel that those processes and decisions go on that are sometimesmistaken for the essence of politics, namely, decisions on whogets what, when, and how - in terms of both political power andeconomic resources”. 42 Offe moreover underlined that the transformations in Central and East European brought about simultaneity of the territorial issues and the issue of democracy. Whereas territorial issues required “the determination of the borders for a state and a population, and the consolidation of these borders within the framework of a European order of states; the issue of democracy [resulted in ] the dissolution of the monopoly claims of a party and its replacement by a constitutionally tamed exercise of authority and party competition in the context of guarantees of basic human and citizen rights […] the issue of the economic and property order, and the orderly political management of pressing production and distribution problems”. 43 By distinguishing betweenthree levels; of nationhood, constitution making, and the normal politics of allocation, Claus Off also paid high tribute to accommodation of plural identities in new democracies. Recognizing that Central and East European countries not only faced the challenges of simultaneity of democracy introduction along with the market transformation, Offe noted they also had to undergo nation-state building processes. Most of the post-communist countries were undertaking processes the Western European countries were mastering over a centuries-long sequence. 44 He moreover warned that the Central and East European scene is “dominated by territorial disputes, migrations, minority or nationality conflicts, and corresponding secessionist longings”. 45 Although criticizers of the transitionalists’ concerns over challenges of diversity management in the transitional period asserted that “the breakdown literature has failed”46 in this prediction, the temporarily failed
42 Ibid. , at 505. 43 Ibid. , at 508. 44 Ibid. , at 505. 45 Ibid. 46 See e.g. Béla Greskovits, Political Economy of Protest and Patience: East European and Latin American Transformations Compared (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), at 4-11. See also Valerie Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience”, 55 World Politics (2003), pp. 167-192; Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Conclusions”, 33 (6-7) Comparative Political Studies (2000), pp. 703-734; Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, 13 (1) Journal of Democracy (2002), pp. 5-21.
19 democratic practice in Slovakia during Vladimír Me čiar’s governments, exclusion of certain natonal minorities from the citizenship (such was the case with Russian speaking population in the Baltic countries, or exclusion of Roma minority from effective public participation across the whole Central and East Europe) to me demonstrate those transitologists’ warnings need to be taken into account seriously. For sure occurance of semi-authoritarian goverenemnts in the serveral early Western Balkans democracies and dominant and prevailing ethno-nationalist discourse from 1990s that is still rooted across the Balkans confirm vividly the accuracy of such an argument.
2.1.3. Wolfgang Merkel’s Four Dimensions of Democratic Consolidation
Wolfgang Merkel suggested the sequence theory of democratic consolidation through four levels. According to him, the democratization process starts with constitutional consolidation , which “refers to the key political, constitutionally established institutions, such as the head of state, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, and the electoral system. Collectively, they form the macrolevel, the level of structures ”. 47 The first democratization level, constitutional consolidation, being structural and macro-level component, as a rule is the first one to finish, and “it affects the second, third, and fourth levels through components of norms and penalties that facilitate or constrict action and thereby shape structures”. 48 Merkel claimed that “[p]olitical institutions are the missing link between the macro level of the system and the micro level of political action” 49 and Adam Przeworski explained the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system as the transfer of political power from one small group of individuals to a set of institutionalized rules. 50 Przeworski’s definition of democratization bluntly emphasizes importance of the institutional colndolidation. He argued that “democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town; when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost.” 51 Actually, the democratisation literature is often assuming the institutionalist approach,
47 Wolfgang Merkel, “PlausibleTheory, Unexpected Results: The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe”, in 2 Internationale Politikund Gesellschaft/ International Politics and Society, Newsletterder Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2008), pp. 11-29. at 15. 48 Ibid. 49 Wolfgang Merkel, “Institutions and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe”, 86 Estudio/ Working Paper (1996), available at
20 explaining the process of democratisation by the transformative potential of political elites, researching their strategic actions and consequent performances of institutions in a concrete country. 52 One of the approaches to democratization that treats the institutional consolidation as essential distinguishes between three determinants of a young democracy’s fate: (1) establishment of institutions that place effective constraints on executive authorities, (2) economic performance that encompass fair redistribution of economic power; and finally, they argue that (3) the degree and kind of support a young democracy receives from the international community also contributes to its consolidation. 53 However, the external push towards democratization comes very often in substantive extent only “after domestic actors - such as reformist factions of the old regime, regime opposition, and protest movements - had already triggered the transition to democracy”. 54 Huntington similarly claimed that “emergence of social, economic and external conditions favourable to democracy is never enough to produce democracy”. 55 Huntington bluntly stated that “[t]he democratic regime is installed not by trends but by people. Democracies are created not by causes but by causers”. 56 He goes on, by explaining that those causers often did not desire democratic outcomes, but that democracy turned out to be the least unacceptable outcome. The role of political leader(s) is prevalent for the establishment of democracy, but only if the socio- economic conditions exist at the same time. 57 It has been recognized in the academic literature that “hardships caused by the social and economic transformation and cultural traditions [...]might lead to political attitudes that endanger the process of democratization and the further development of European social culture”. 58 Former democratic experience, especially in Eastern Europe, played a significant role in embarking the path of democratisation. Those
52 The institutional theory in political science, in short, explains the mechanisms that transmit identified and aggregated individual preferences to the level of collective choices. For a comprehensive overview of institutional theory see e.g. Jon Pierre, B. Guy Peters and Gerry Stoker (eds.), Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism (London: Cssells, 1999); Jon Elster et al. , Institutional Design in Post- communist Societies: Building the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998). For explanation of the interrelationship between democratisation theories and institutionalist theories see Ole Nørgaard, “Democracy, Democratization and Institutional Theory“, available at
21 countries managed easily to set up representative institutions. This, however, has not taken place in the Soviet satellites in Central Asia, who inherited authoritarian experience. 59
Figure 1: Wolfgang Merkel's multilevel model of democratic consolidation . Source: Wolfgang Merkel, “Plausible Theory, Unexpected Results: The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe”, 2 Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft/International Politics and Society, Newsletter der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2008), pp. 11-29, at 13.
The second level of democratic consolidation, according to Merkel, is a stage of representative consolidation , and “concerns the territorial and functional representation of interests. In other words, it is primarily about parties and interest groups, or the mesolevel of collective actors ”. Guillermo O’ Donnell claimed that a democracy is consolidated when “power is alternated between rivals, support for the system is continued during times of economic hardship, rebels are defeated and punished, the regime remains stable in the face of restructuring of the party system, and there exists no significant political anti-system”. 60 Numerous are authors who position political parties centrally in the democratic consolidation processes. 61 Huntington similarly argued that democratic consolidation occurs if “the party or
59 Anthony Jones, for example, argued that “Eastern Europe had a whole generation of people who grew up in democracies. While they were able to return to what they had, the rest of the Soviet Union had difficulties, having no previous experience with democracy. Each state went back to what they had: authoritarianism”. Cited in Caitria O'Neill, “Revolution and Democracy”, Harvard Political Review (2012), available at
22 group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election.” 62 The second level is followed by the level of behavioral consolidation , “where the ‘informal’ actors operate - the potentially political ones, such as the armed forces, major land owners, capital, business, and radical movements and groups. They make up a second mesolevel , that of informal political actors”. 63 Merkel hereby recalled that success with constitutional and representative consolidation is “crucial in deciding whether the informal political actors with potential veto power will pursue their interests inside, outside, or against democratic norms and institutions”. 64 Finally, “if the first three levels have been consolidated, they become seminal for the emergence of the civil society that stabilizes a democracy”. 65 As a result, the fourth, micro level , represents the democratic consolidation of the political culture and concludes with the emergence of a citizenship culture. Merkel considered the culture of citizenship as “the sociocultural substructure of democracy”. 66 However, the process of the political culture consolidation takes the longest to achieve. For example, political culture consolidation in the countries that became democracies in the second wave of democratization (Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, and Japan after 1945) took decades and, moreover, “can be sealed only by a generational change”. 67 Along with the authoritarian tradition, the lack of democratic political culture in the post-communist countries has been discouraging the consolidation of democracy. Philippe Schmitter correspondingly underlined importance of political culture and social values in the process of democratic consolidation. He argued that a democracy is consolidated when “social relations become social values i.e. patterns of interaction can become so regular in their occurrence, so endowed with meaning, so capable of motivating behaviour that they become autonomous in their internal function and resistant
Press, 1999). Leonardo Morlino and José R. Montero, “Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe”, in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1995), pp. 231-260. Gianfranco Pasquino, “Executive-Legislative Relations in Southern Europe”, in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1995), pp. 261- 283. John Huber and Ronald Inglehart, Expert Interpretations of Party Space andParty Location in 42 Societies, 1 Party Politics 1 (1995), pp.73-112.Franklin, Mark, et al. Electoral Change: Responses to Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 62 Samuel Huntington, op.cit. (1991), at 267. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid.
23 to externally induced change.” 68 Václav Havel acknowledged that democratic consolidation might require a generational change, arguing “while the formal establishment of democracy typically took only a matter of days, weeks or, at most, months, real democracy did not emerge easily. It is, indeed, an ongoing process, one that has not been completed even now. New generations, without the burdensome experience of life under totalitarianism, are only now emerging into adulthood. These new generations are only gradually moving into positions in the decision making process in their countries”. 69 In another writing of his, Merkel put forward a shorter consolidation format, considering that “the process of democratic consolidation is best described as a sequence of three interlocking phases. It starts with structural consolidation (constitution, political institutions), influences the level of representative consolidation (intermediate organization of interests: parties, interest groups), in order to then bring about long term attitudinal consolidation (specific and diffuse support of citizens)”. 70 With respect to attitudional consolidation, Wolfgang Merkel and Hans-Joachim Lauth consider the existence of a civil society to be a requirement for democracy to emerge since its activities promote democratic values and civic culture by executing four functions: (1) it serves as a protection against arbitrary use of state power, it contributes to a balancing between state authority and society, (3) it serves as a political socialisation agent, educating about the democracy, (4) it serves as a means of public criticism of the state activities. 71 Though there are authors who argue that democratic values should not be considered to be indispensable prerequisite of democracy, 72 numerous theoretical approaches and empirical studies confirmed the importance of values for democratic consolidation. For
68 Philippe C.Schmitter, “The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups”, 35 American Behavioural Scientist (1992), pp. 422-449. 69 Václav Havel, “Preface”, in Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demeš (eds.), Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2011), at 6. Compare also Ralf Dahrendorf, op.cit. (1990). 70 Wolfgang Merkel, “Institutions and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe”, 86 Estudio/Working Paper (1996), available at
24 example, the structuralist approach to democratisation 73 does acknowledge the importance of sociocultural factors, argueing that once the new democratic institutions are in place, they will produce appropriate democratic values. 74 Samuel Huntington’s typology of factors that led to a decline of autocratic regimes, 75 and general factors that create conditions favourable for democratisation might be placed into the structuralist theoretical branch. Huntington furthermore admitted that “in any particular country, democratization was the result of a combination of some general causes and plus other factors unique to that country”. 76 Those general factors, according to him, which helped the transformation from authoritarian to democratic regimes in 1970s and 1980s were following: “most important, higher level of economic well-being, which lead to more widespread literacy, education and urbanization, a larger middle class and the development of values and attitudes that were supportive of democracy changes in both the popular and the leadership in the Catholic Church leading the Church to oppose authoritarian regimes; the changed policies supporting democratic development in the European Community, the United States, and, in the mid 1980s, the Soviet Union; and the snowballing effect that the emergence of democratic regimes in lead countries such as Spain, Argentina, the Philippines, and Poland had in strengthening movements toward democracy in other countries”. 77 Former democratic experience, especially in Eastern Europe, played a significant role in embarking the path of democratisation. Those countries managed to set up representative institutions. This, however, has not taken place in the Soviet satellites in Central Asia, who inherited authoritarian experience. 78 In numerous writings of Hans- Jürgen Puhle,Wolfgang Merkel and their associates it is argued that a consolidated or, in their
73 Structuralist approaches to regime change might be in, simplest words, explained by argument that “holds that regimes change because they are not constructed properly. If the parts of government – their structures and processes – do not “fit” or “align” properly, then the government cannot last. The regime will change to another form that, potentially at least, is properly constructed”. See Mark Irving Lichbach, “Regime Change: A Test of Structuralist and Functionalist Explanations”, 14 Comparative Political Studies (1981), pp. 49-73. 74 For a structuralist approach in democratisation theory see e.g. Herbert Kitschelt, “Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations?”, 86 (4) The American Political Science Review (1992), pp. 1028- 1034. See also Juan J. Linz, “Toward Consolidated Democracies”, 7 (2) Journal of Democracy (1996), pp.14-33; Arendt Lijphart, Patternsof Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Arendt Lijphart and Carlos H. Weisman (eds.), Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 75 Huntington enumerated a number of factors that contributed to a breakdown or weakening of the authoritarian regimes, some of them being “the prevalence of democratic norms globally and in many individual countries; the resulting general absence of ideology-based legitimacy for authoritarian regimes other than one-party systems; ... Marxist-Leninist ideology; and unwise and ineffective economic policies; ... the development of divisions within the ruling coalitions in the authoritarian regimes ... and the snowball effects of the downfalls of some authoritarian regimes”. See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century ( Norman: University of OklahomaPress, 1991), at 106. 76 Ibid. , at 107. 77 Ibid. , at 106. 78 Caitria O’Neill, “Revolution and Democracy”, Harvard Political Review (2012), available at
25 words, ‘embedded’ democracy, is not necessary the only outcome of a regime transformation process. 79 Merkel for example stated that “even a ‘maximally’ consolidated democratic system is not completely impervious to potential tendencies toward deconsolidation”. 80 The transformation can result in the three other possibilities: reversion into an autocratic regime, an unconsolidated or not yet consolidated democracy still in transition, or a defective democracy which has one or several defect partial regimes.81 Puhle explained that defective democracy “should no longer be considered as autocratic regimes for the simple reason that they have established an electoral regime which essentially functions along democratic lines (free and fair elections). This implies that the outcomes of the elections are respected as a rule. In contrast to the functioning electoral regime which is the core of democracy, the other criteria and partial regimes will often be found violated or reduced in a way that the violations and reductions constitute characteristic ‘defects’ in certain areas which break up the functional logic of the system of liberal democracy and the balance between the different factors and partial regimes of ‘embeddedness’ designed in order to protect and promote liberty, equity and control”. 82 There are four ideal types of the defective democracy. Exclusive democracy is at stake when regime of the inclusive and universal suffrage is defected in a way that “some of the criteria of the electoral regime (but not its democratic core and substance) have been violated”. 83 For example when on the ground of ethnicity, religion or gender certain segments of population are excluded from the electoral participation. Illiberal democracy comes about in case the political liberties are infringed. Tutelary democracy is the type of defective democracy is “characterized by the existence of reserved domains of undemocratic forces functioning as extrademocratic power centers and veto players, like the military or some traditional oligarchic factions and groups”. 84 Delegative democracy occurs in the absence of the checks and balances mechanism, or when the principle of horizontal accountability is reduced or abolished. The fourth type, illiberal democracy (or democradura), comes aboutwhen the violations of the criteria of liberal democracy take place, either with
79 Wolfgang Merkel, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Aurel Croissant, Claudia Eicher, Peter Thiery, Defekte Demokratien, Band 1: Theorie (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 2003); Wolfgang Merkel, Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Aurel Croissant, Peter Thiery, Defekte Demokratien. Band 2: Regionalanalysen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2006); Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtransformation (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2007); Wolfgang Merkel and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Von der Diktatur zur Demokratie. Transformationen, Erfolgsbedingungen, Entwicklungspfade (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999); Wolfgang Merkel, “Die Konsolidierung postautoritarer und posttotalitarer Demokratien: Ein Beitrag zur theorieorientierten Transformationsforschung”, in Hans Süssmuth (ed.) Transformationsprozesse in den Staaten Ostmitteleuropas (Baden-Baden, 1998) pp. 39-61. 80 Wolfgang Merkel, “Against Any Theory: Rapid Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe”, 3 (1) Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva (2007), pp.7-24, at 11. 81 Hans-Jürgen Puhle, op.cit. (2005), at 3. 82 Ibid. , at 11. 83 Ibid. , at 12. 84 Ibid.
26 regard the rule of law or the guarantees of human and civil rights. 85 Democracies that have not secured equal access to rights to parts of their population that differ in ethnical, religious, cultural traits can be ascribed as the exclusionary Illiberal type of defective democracy. Among the most important factors that contribute to the emergence and the relative persistence of defective democracies Puhle enumerated the following: the particular trajectory of modernization, the level of socio-economic development, the current business cycle and its political impacts, the strength and autonomy of civil society, its elites, cleavages, capacities for mobilization, the accumulated ‘social capital’ and the degree of interpersonal trust, the impact of an overall cultural transformation, international influence and the regional context. 86 Puhle mentioned that “the constellations of stateness, of national integration and the potential for conflict solution, the mechanisms of territorial government providing a higher or lesser degree of regional or sectoral autonomy, etc.” 87 also belong to the factors that are conducive to the establishment of a defective democracy.
85 Ibid. . 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid.See also Vladimir Tismaneanu, “Discomforts of Victory: Democracy, Liberal Values and Nationalism in Post-Communist Europe”, 25 (2) West European Politics (2002), pp. 81-100.
27 2.2. Preprequisites of Attitudinal Consolidation in Plural Societies
Although deeply rooted, political values are not resistant to change, since, after all, they are socially induced and constructed. 88 Values 89 can explain the political actions of individual actors, which in turn help or endanger democratic consolidation. The following parahraphs will first attempt to establish which values must prevail in the society in order to support cooperation and civic engagement and then will explore which conditions need to be met in order to induce attitudinal change condictive to democracy. Dieter Fuchs suggested support for democracy happens at three hierarchical levels: (1) of basic values, (2) structure and (3) political culture. 90 According to his theory, “support for basic democratic values constitutes the topmost level, political culture. Citizens must perceive democracy as the best option among different political systems and reject autocratic systems. The second level, citizens’ attitudes towards the political structure of democracy, refers to the selective implementation of the democratic culture and delineates the democratic institutional system set forth in national constitutions. Citizens rejecting a particular democratic institutional system may still hold democratic values. [...] Attitudes towards the political process form the third and lowest level of Fuch’s model. This refers to concrete actions taken by actors within an institutional system in order to achieve their goals. Once again, a critical position does not necessarily contradict democratic values”. 91 Explaining individuals’ preferences and actions, Ivan Krastev uses the term ‘perceptions’ instead of attitudes and values, in explaining their prevalence in the democratic process. He argued that “[i]n democratic politics, perceptions are
88 See e.g. Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 89 According to Milton Rokeach values are the “cognitive representations and transformations of needs” and they, exactly, are the basis upon which an individual’s judgments are made. Milton Rokeach, The Nature of Human Values (New York: Macmillan, 1973). Another of Rokeach’s definitions of values is explained as “enduring belief[s] that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end-states of existence”. Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968). Robin Williams argued that values are “core conceptions of the desirable within every individual and society. They serve as standards or criteria to guide not only action but also judgment, choice, attitude, evaluation, argument, exhortation, rationalization, and […] attribution of causality”. Robin M. Williams “Change and Stability in Value Systems: A Sociological Perspective”, in Milton Rokeach (ed.), Understanding Human Values: Individual and Societal (New York: The Free Press, 1979), at 3. See also Robin M. Williams, "The Concept of Values" in David L. Sills (ed.), The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 283-287. See also Pat Duffy Hutcheon, “Value Theory: Toward Conceptual Clarification”, 23 The British Journal of Sociology (1972), pp. 172-187. 90 Dieter Fuchs, “Welche Demokratie wollen die Deutschen? Einstellungen zur Demokratie im vereinigten Deutschland”, in Oscar W. Gabriel (ed.), Politische Orientierungen und Verhaltensweisen im vereinigten Deutschland (Opladen 1997), pp. 81-113, at 83. 91 Jurgen Gerhards, Cultural Overstretch: Differences between Old and New Member States of the EU and Turkey (New York: Routledge, 2007), at 110. Comparea also Frederick D. Weil, “Political Culture, Political Structure, and Democracy”, in Frederick D. Weil, Jeffrey Huffman and Mary Gauntier, Political Culture and Structure. Research on Democracy and Society (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1994), pp. 65-115; Ronald F. Inglehart, “Political Culture and Democracy”, in Howard Wiarda (ed.), New Directions in Comparative Politics (New York: Westview Press, 2002), pp. 141-164.
28 in a sense all that matters. People’s perceptions determine how they vote, how much money they save, whether they want to immigrate or not, and whether they feel more inclined to cooperation than conflict”. 92 The following paragraphs will therefore demonstrate causal relationship between sociocultural factors and the development of democratic consolidation.
2.2.1. Values and Attitudes Supportive to Democracy
Political culture 93 litarture has established that the evolution and persistence of democracy requires the emergence and maintenance of certain supportive habits and attitudes among the general public.The values and attitudes which emerge with, and work to sustain, participatory democratic institutions relate to the manner in which people within a polity view their relationships with others vis-à-vis their own interests.American political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba back in 1960s attempted to identify which attitudes of population prevail in a political system that turns stable and prosperous. Accordingly, they argue “[i]f we are to come closer to understandings the problems of the diffusion of democratic culture, we have to be able to specify the content of what has to be diffused, to develop appropriate measures for it, to discover its quantitative incidence and demographic distribution in countries with a wide range of experience with democracy. With such knowledge we can speculate intelligently about ‘how much of what’ must be present in a country before democratic institutions take root in congruent attitudes and expectations.” 94 Almond and Verba detected the relationship between political culture and political structure 95
92 Ivan Krastev, “The Balkans: Democracy Without Choices” 13 Journal of Democracy (2002), pp. 39-53, at40. 93 The concept of political culture was originally proposed by Gabriel Almond and developed by him and Sidney Verba. In their words, it “refers to the specifically political orientations - attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system. We speak of a political culture just as we can speak of an economic culture or a religious culture. It is a set of orientations toward a special set of social objects and processes”. See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), at 12. See also Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little Brown, 1980). Roland Ingehart explained why this study made a profound influence on political science since“[p]revious works that attempted to deal with the impact of culture on politics relied on impressionistic evidence. Cultural influences on the distinctive political behaviour of a given people were interpreted in terms of vague but presumably indelible characteristics such as ‘national character’. By providing a well-developed theory of political culture based on cross-national empirical data, Almond and Verba moved from the realm of literary impressions to that of testable propositions.” Roland Ingehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture”, 82 (4) The American Political Science Review (1988), pp. 1203-1230, at 1204. For early research on the concept see Gabriel Almond, “Comparative Political Systems”, 18 Journal of Politics (1956), 391-409. See also Seymour M. Lipset, “The Centrality of Political Culture”, in Larry Diamond (ed.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 150-173. 94 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, op. cit. (1963), at 8. 95 From abundant scholarly literature describing the relationship between political culture and political structure see e.g. Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe: centre formation, system building and political structuring between the nation-state and the EU (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). On interdependence of social structure and political structure see David Lockwood, Some Remarks on ‘The Social System’, 7 (2) British Journal of Sociology (1956), pp. 134-146; Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure (New York: Free Press ,
29 as one of the most significant researchable aspects of the problem of both political stability and change. 96 They identified the ‘civic culture’ as a factor that underlies democratic political systems, establishing the causal connection between political culture and democratic stability. 97 Civic culture is combination of different ideal types 98 of political culture that emerged in the West (parochial, subject and participant) as a result of a gradual political development based on history and civic culture characteristics, developing as a fusion of new patterns of attitudes, merged with the old ones. 99 They argued that a civic political culture consists of a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, perceptions and the like, that support participation in a democratic political system, since later allows ordinary citizens to participate in political decisions. 100 Almond and Verba have established that the distinctive property of the civic culture is not its participant orientation but its mixed quality: the participant role is fused with and balanced by the subject role (which embodies acceptance of political authority and allegiance to it) and the parochial role (which binds the individual to traditional, non-political groups, such as family and church and absorbs some of the energy and effect that might otherwise be focused on politics). 101 Similarly, Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky argued that democracy requires both “the participatory norms that come with [...] the cultures of individualism and egalitarianism” and the culture of “hierarchy to include the norm that the parts should sacrifice to the whole”.102 To sum up, Alond and Verba were among the first 103 political scientist who recognized that civic values have the capacity to facilitate the development of democracy and support a
1969); Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, Comparative politics: rationality, culture, and structure (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 96 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, op.cit .(1963), at 33. 97 Ibid ., at 366. 98 Ideal type is a typological term introduced into sociology by Max Weber that signifies hypothetical concept(s) constructed in social sciences in order to analyse, explain and stress certain elements common to most cases of the phenomena that are being researched. He explains it as an “abstract model that, when used as a standard of comparison, enables us to see aspects of the real world in a clearer, more systematic way. See Allan G. Johnson, The Blackwell dictionary of sociology: a user's guide to sociological language (Wiley-Blackwell, 2000), at 150. 99 The civic culture is “neither traditional nor modern but partaking of both; a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it.” Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, op.cit. ( 1963), at 368. 100 Almond and Verba, op.cit. (1963), at 178 101 Larry Jay Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), at 171. 102 Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), at 171. 103 Some earlier prominent social scientists noted existence of some cultural factors that made some countries more democratic and just, for their citizens. For example, French social theorist Alexis de Tocqueville in his analysis of American societycoined in 1835 a phrase “habits of the heart”, describing the customs and values of Americans that “maintain the democratic republic”. De Tocqueville defines “habits of the heart” as the notions, opinions and ideas that “shape mental habits” and the “sum of moral and intellectual dispositions” of people in society. Consequently, he concluded “if men are to remain civilised or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio as the equality of conditions is increased.” See Alexis de
30 development of the democratic consolidation, what was conseently embraced and confirmed in numerous academic research. 104 Robert Dahl argued that it is “rather widely recognized that differences in the political culture of various countries help to account for differences in the nature of their political systems”. 105 Lucian W. Pye correspondingly underlined a value of political culture in political integration. He claimed that “political cultures provide people with a sense of national identity and a feeling of belonging to particular political systems”. 106 According to him, this “basic relationship between national identity and personal identity provides a fundamental link between the socialization process and the integration of the political process”. 107 In addition to this, he recognized that common political culture helps integration of the various structures involved in the political process (those who govern, and those that are being governed). Finally, Pye’s third aspect of integration “concerns the manner in which various subcommunities, ethnic or regional groups, or subcultures are related to each other”. 108 Political cultures, Pye claims, “differ according to the extent to which they permit such minorities to preserve their separate identities while meeting the expected standards of integration”. 109
Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1945). A pioneering behavioural political science paradigm was introduced in early 1950s by Harold Laswell, who put forward a concept of the democratic personality, associating individual’s personality with her or his political belief. According to Laswell, in democratic community “human dignity is realised in theory and fact. It is characterized by wide rather than narrow participation in shaping and sharing of values.” His concept of the democratic personality was subsequently explored and further elaborated by social scientists. See Harold D. Lasswell, Political Writings (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951), at 475-476.; Harold D. Lasswell, “Democratic Character”, in Harold D. Lasswell, Political Writings (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 465-525. See also Fred I. Greenstein, “Harold D. Lasswell’s Concept of Democratic Character”, 30 (3) The Journal of Politics (1968), pp. 696-709. The roots of political culture as a sociological and theoretical concept can furthermore be traced into attempts of social scientists to explain why some nations had turned to authoritarianism in the wake of World War II while others supported democratic institutions. For example, Theodor Adorno and his associates, dissecting the psyche of German society concluded that exactly authoritarian structure of the family had led Germans to support authoritarian politics and social prejudice.Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (Studies in Prejudice) , (W. W. Norton & Company, 1993). 104 Undertaking numerous research efforts on value orientations world-wide, Ronald Inglehart for example surveyed the role of civic culture in the development of democracy, measuring it with three variables: interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and percentage of people who support revolutionary change. His survey results indicated that, since cultural values are stable and enduring, substantial and consistent cross-cultural variations prevail, and that in those nations that are characterized by high levels of life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, tolerance, etc., maintenance of democratic institutions is more likely than those whose publics lacked such attitudes. Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 105 Robert A. Dahl, op.cit (1971), at. 166. 106 Lucian W. Pye “Political Culture”, International Encyclopedia of the Social Science s (1968), available at < http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3045000958.html>. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid.
31 Out of numberous typologies of political culture, 110 this dissertation findsdichotomous division of political culture into democratic and authoritarianas the most convincing to explain the necessity of this socio-cultural variable in the democratization proces.Such a discotomy has often been applied in literature on post-communist studies.111 James Alexander explained the difference between ideal types of democratic and authoritarian political culture. A democratic political culture, according to him, “manifests popular feelings for political efficacy, interpersonal trust and tolerance. People are tolerant of political change and willing to question authority in thought or action, or acknowledge the rights of people who do. Society is based on recognition of individual rights if the rights of others are not impinged. Individually motivated participation in public life is accepted and even encouraged. Yet, individuals decide whether to participate”. 112 On the other hand, “[a]uthoritarian political culture is a culture of popular passivity, lack of interpersonal trust and intolerance of difference. Whereas individuals in democratic political culture desire significant independence from political authority, strong authoritarian relationships are valued in an authoritarian political culture. The wielding on authority is a basic and pervasive feature of
110 Archie Brown identified four categories of political culture: unified, dominant (which coexists with various political subcultures), dichotomous and fragmented. Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds.), Political culture and political change in communist states (London: Macmillan Press, 1979). Lucian W. Pye divided political culture into democratic, totalitarian and one that is specific to transitional systems. Lucian W. Pye “Political Culture”, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968), available at
32 social relationship. Intolerance of political change - often change that endorses individual rights because it threatens to lead to less ‘ordered’ society - is emblematic. Authoritarian personalities are more comfortable with ceding to the state, or an individual leader, the right to decide on their general future rather than to take personal responsibility for those decisions. Obedience to authority is unquestioned both by decision makers and political subjects. In general, subjects do not participate independently in political processes, they are lead”. 113 Alexander, nevertheless, does acknowledge that some “democratic characteristics are present in societies classified as authoritarian and authoritarian characteristics are found in democratic societies”. 114 Although Almond and Verba made clear that their research concept of civic culture did not carry the explanatory power for creation of the civic culture in the newly-created nations, 115 this concept is often invoked in explaining the transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes, particularly in order to demonstrate difference in the patterns of political attitudes and the degree of political participation of citizens in countries with different political regimes. 116 Not surprisingly, the political culture concept was reinvigorated, experiencing “significant renaissance” 117 during the transformation period of former socialist countries into democracies. There are numerous writings which point toward a conclusion that the (democratic) future of newly emerging democracies depend on the degree to which their citizens have embraced civic principles and hold values that are receptive for the stabilisation of democracy. 118 In addition, abundant democratic transition literature distingusihes trust as
113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. , at 14-15. 115 Almond and Verba, op.cit. (1963), at 368. 116 Dieter Fuchs, Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Carolin Schöbel, “Perspektiven der politischen Kultur im vereinigten Deutschland.Eine empirische Studie”, 32 (91) Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament (1991), pp. 35-46; Dieter Fuchs, Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Carolin Schöbel, “Demokratische Bürgerkultur in der ehemaligen DDR?”, 51 WZB-Mitteilungen (1991), pp. 25-27; Dieter Fuchs, Edeltraud Roller und Bernhard Weßels (eds,), Bürger und Demokratie in Ost und West. Studien zur politischen Kultur und zum politischen Prozeß Festschrift für Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag 2002); Jurgen Gerhards, Cultural Overstretch: Differences between Old and New Member States of the EU and Turkey (New York: Routledge, 2007). 117 Jurgen Gerhards, Cultural Overstretch: Differences between Old and New Member States of the EU and Turkey (New York: Routledge, 2007), at 14; See also e.g. Einar Berntzen, and Per Selle, “Plaidoyer for the Restoration of the Concept of Political Culture or Bringing Political Culture Back In”, 31 (1-2) International Journal of Comparative Sociology (1990), pp. 32-48; Roger Eatwell (ed.), European Political Culture: Conflict or Convergence (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); Detlef Pollack, Political culture in post-communist Europe: attitudes in new democracies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). 118 Peter Gerlich, Fritz Plasser and Peter A. Ulram (eds.), Regimewechsel. Demokratisirung und politische Kultur in Ost-Mitteleuropa (Wien/Köln/Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 1992); Fritz Plasser and Andreas Pribersky (eds.), Political Culture in East Central Europe (Aldershot: Avebury Publishers, 1996); Fritz Plasser, Peter A.Ulram and Harald Waldrauch, Politischer Kulturwandel in Ost-Mitteleuropa: Theorie und Empirie demokratischer Konsolidierung (Opladen: Leske+Budrich-Verlag, 1997); Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda, “Democratization in Central and East European Countries”, 73 International Affairs (1997), pp. 59-82; Attila Ágh, Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998); Attila Ágh, The
33 an enduring socio-cultural condition conducive to the viability of democracy. 119 Trust will therefore be treated in this dissertation as a central socio-cultural variable esential for the democratic consolidation. Eric Uslaner, for example, argued that “trust in other people is based upon a fundamental ethnical assumption: that other people share your fundamental values. They do not necessarily agree with you politically or religiously. But at some fundamental level, people accept the agreement that they have common bonds that make cooperation vital. And these common bonds rest upon assumption about human nature.” 120 He, moreover, argued that “we must do more than simply cooperate with others we know are trustworthy. We must have positive views of strangers, of people who are different from ourselves and presume that they are trustworthy”. 121 Challenging a non-cooperative game-theory, which argues that it makes no sense to support solutions for the common good if you do not trust most other agents to do the same, Elinor Ostrom’s work has established trust as the most fundamental variable of a societal research. 122 Already Almond and Verba demonstrated that in those countries where a greater proportion of interpersonal trust exists, democracy has historically worked well. That is according to them, because interpersonal trust resulting in relationships formation, leads to a sense of cooperation which in turn creates stable democracy. 123 William Mishler and Richard Rose applied the cultural theories of democracy in explaining post-communist
Politics of Central Europe (London: Sage, 1998); Rose Richard, Mishler William and Haerpfer Christian, Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Postcommunist Societies (Johns Hopkins Press, 1998); Dieter Fuchs, Edeltraud Roller und Bernhard Weßels (eds,), Bürger und Demokratie in Ost und West. Studien zur politischen Kultur und zum politischen Prozeß Festschrift für Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag 2002); Wolfgang Franzen, Hans Peter Haarland and Hans-Joachim Niessen, Osteuropa auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union. Transformationsbarometer Osteuropa 2002 (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2002); Geoffrey Pridham, “EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-Communist States: Formality and Reality”, 40 (5) Journal of Common Market Studies (2002), pp. 953-973; Detlef Pollack, Jorg Jacobs, Olaf Muller and Gert Pickel (eds.), Political culture in post-communist Europe: attitudes in new democracies (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003); Wolfgang Franzen, Hans Peter Haarland and Hans-Joachim Niessen, Osteuropa zwischen Euphorie, Enttäuschung und Realität: Daten zur Systemtransformation 1990-2003 (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. 2005); Richard Rose, Understanding Post-Communist Transformation: A Bottom up Approach (London:New Yourk, Routledge, 2009). 119 Roland Inglehart, “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy”, 22 International Political Science Review (2001), pp. 201-214. See also Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), at 1211. Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing values and political styles among Western publics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 120 Eric M. Uslaner, The Moral Foundation of Trust (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 2. 121 Ibid. 122 Elinor Ostrom, “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action”, 92 (1) The American Political Science Review (1998), pp. 1–22. See also Elinor Ostrom and James Walker (eds.), Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons for Experimental Research (Russell Sage Foundation, 2005). See also Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Modern Traditions in Civic Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Claus Offe, “How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?”, in Mark E. Warren (ed.) Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 42-88 and Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness (New York: Russell Sage, 2002). 123 Roland Ingehart, op.cit. (1988), at 1205.See also Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Roland Inglehart, “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy”, 22 International Political Science Review (2001), pp. 201-214.
34 transformation by treating trust as a necessary condition for democratic regimes to emerge, and arguing that both interpersonal and institutional trust contribute to citizen involvement in political life. 124 Mishler and Rose examined the structure and determinants of public trust in nine post-Communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. They argued that “[c]itizens in Central and Eastern Europe have good reason to distrust political and social institutions. Most have lived their entire lives under authoritarian regimes, some more totalitarian than others but all inclined to subjugate individual interests to those of the Communist Party”. 125 Massive alienation and distrust of the regime and a lingering cynicism toward both political and civil institutions are, according to them, the legacy of Communism. They however acknowledged that “the ultimate failure and collapse of Communism also may serve, perversely, to encourage public trust in the institutions of the new regimes [but] in the longer term, however, trust must be earned; it must be performance based”. 126 In short, Mishler and Rose agreed that the extent of public trust is important for democratic consolidation, but that the legacy of distrust is not as significant as scepticism. They argued that “as long as the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe protect the individual liberties that citizens so highly value, skepticism is unlikely to degenerate into distrust”. 127 Since it generates norms of reciprocity Mishler and Rose considered trust essential for the establishment of civil society, “the institutions of which create within citizens a sense of community and connect them to government”. 128 The concept of social capital,129 quite analogous to interpersonal trust, 130 was
124 William Mishler and Richard Rose, “What are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies” 34 (1) Comparative Political Studies (2001), pp. 30-62. See also William Mishler and Richard Rose, “What are the Consequences of Political Trust: A Test of Cultural and Institutional Theories in Russia”, 20 (10) Comparative Political Studies (2005), pp. 1-29. William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Learning and Re-Learning Regime Support: The Dynamics of Post-Communist Regimes”, 41 European Journal of Political Research (2002) pp. 5-35. 125 William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post Communist Societies”, 59 (2) The Journal of Politics (1997), pp. 418-451, at 419- 420. 126 Ibid . 127 Ibid. , at 457. 128 Ibid. , at 419. See also Martin Krygier, „Virtuous Circles: Antipodean Reflections on Power, Institutions and Civil Society“, 1 East European Politics and Societies (1997), pp. 66-72. 129 Other seminal sociological works in which the concept of social capital has been researched in Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House and Vintage Books, 1961); Pierre Bourdieu, “Ökonomisches Kapital, kulturelles Kapital, soziales Kapital” in Reinhard Kreckel (ed.), Soziale Ungleichheiten (Soziale Welt, Sonderheft 2) (Goettingen: Otto Schartz & Co, 1983), pp. 183-98; James S. Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”, 94 The American Journal of Sociology (1988), pp. 95-120. 130 Florencia Torch and Eduardo Valenzuela for example distinguish two ideal-typical forms of social capital: one being ‘reciprocity’ and the other one ‘trust’. A distinctive element is the meaning of the social relations that embed them. Accordingly, reciprocity is “the type of social capital embedded in personal relations, triply defined in the factual, social and temporal dimensions by co-presence, reciprocity and memory, respectively. Trust is the type of social capital embedded in relations with strangers, defined by the condition of impersonality or anonymity”. See Florencia Torch and Eduardo Valenzuela, “Trust and Reciprocity: A Theoretical Distinction of the Sources of Social Capital”, 14 European Journal of Social Theory (2011), pp. 181-198, at 181.
35 particularly well established and demonstrated in research and discussions by Ronald Inglehart and Robert Putnam. 131 Putnam’s theory of social capital proved that rich and dense associational networks facilitate the underlying conditions of interpersonal trust, tolerance and cooperation, providing the social foundations for a vibrant democracy. 132 He argues that a kind of trust that he labels as a ‘thin trust’ , built by generalized mutual reciprocity, is the core of social capital, because it nurtures newly formed networks and chances of new associations beyond daily friendship, which arise out of a ‘thick trust’ , which is derived from personal experiences. Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle, for example, considers “generalized trust as the heart of social capital, since it is an integral and probably irreplaceable part of any democratic political culture, as it clearly indicates an inclusive and tolerant approach to the population at large.” 133 Trust and civic engagement are intransigently connected. The existence of interpersonal trust has implications in the political sphere, allowing citizens to join forces in interest groups and political parties, since trust enables them to come together in citizens’ initiatives more easily. Lucian Pye notes, “[p]olitics rests upon collective actions which in turn depend upon a basic spirit of trust and a capacity for cooperation. At the same time politics involves conflict and competition. Cultures must therefore strike an acceptable balance between cooperation and competition, and the capacity of political cultures to manage this problem usually depends on how the basic socialization process handles the problems of mutual trust and distrust in personality development”. 134 William Mishler and Richard Rose similarly underlined the importance of trust for democratic governments and their representative relationship with citizens. They argued that “[i]n modern democracies, where
131 Putnam holds that trust and associational membership are sources of social trust: “social trust and civic engagement are strongly correlated; the greater the density of associational membership in a society, the more trusting its citizens”. Robert D. Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital”, 6 (1) The Journal of Democracy (1995), pp. 65-78, at 73. 132 Putnam discussed the concept of social trust in his book ‘ Making Democracy Work’ , operationalizing it in his research, and concluding that civic community and social capital are the essential conditions of successful democracies. See Robert D. Putnam , Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (NY: Simon and Schuster. 2000), at 19. Putnam’s study of civic culture traditions in modern Italy established that Italian (as a rule Northern) regions have considerably more citizen associations and group activities and consequently tend to have a more stable democracy.Namely, civic engagement reflects both citizens’ interest in public issues and their devotion to public causes. Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton University Press, 1999), at 87. 133 Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle, “How Political Institutions Create and Destroy Social Capital: An Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust”, Paper presented at Collegium Budapest, Project on Honesty and Trust: Theory and Experience in the Light of Post-Socialist Experience (2002), available at
36 citizens exercise control over government through representative institutions, it is trust which gives representatives the leeway to postpone short term constituency concerns while pursuing longer term national interests”. 135 Putnam argued that “democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society”. 136 Civil society is able to serve as a mobilizing agent of political change in the transitional period or as a watchdog in a time of consolidation since “[c]ivil society organizations seek from the state concessions, benefits, policy changes, relief, redress, and accountability”. 137 Juan Stepen and Alfred Linz defined civil society as an “arena of the polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, and to advance their interests”. 138 They warned that civil society can be perceived as contesting with political socity in the moment of democratic transition. For that reason, according to them, “[d]emocratic leaders of political society quite often argue that civil society, having played its historic role, should be demobilized so as to allow for the development of normal democratic politics. [However a] robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state, can help start transitions, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, and help consolidate and deepen democracy”. 139 Thomas Carrothers also emphasized the role of civil society in conversion of democratic forms into democratic substance. 140 Manal A. Jamal considered that “civil society can contribute to democracy in four central ways: (a) it counters state power, (b) it facilitates political participation by helping in the aggregation and representation of interests, (c) it serves as a political arena that could play an important role in the development of some of the necessary attributes for democratic development, and (d) more broadly, it plays an important role in furthering struggles for citizenship rights”. 141
135 William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies”, 59 (2) The Journal of Politics (1997), pp. 418-451, at 419. 136 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1994), at 182. 137 Larry Diamond, “Towards democratic consolidation”, in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), The global resurgence of democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 227-240, at 229. 138 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, op.cit. (1996), at 17. 139 Ibid. , at 18. 140 Thomas Carrothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, 13 (1) Journal of Democracy (2002), pp. 5-21, at 7. 141 Manal A. Jamal, “Democracy Promotion, Civil Society Building, and the Primacy of Politics”, 45 (1) Comparative Political Studies (2012), pp. 3-31, at 12. More on the importance of civil society in the democratization process see Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development”, 22 (1) Third World Quarterly (2001), pp. 7-20; and Larry Diamond, “Rethinking civil society: toward democratic consolidation”, 5 (3 ) Journal of Democracy (1994), pp. 4-18.
37 In her analysis of social capital Elinor Ostrom underlined it is hard to construct isocial capital through external interventions. In such cases, she argues “turning over the task of creating social capital to make physical and human capital more effective to a public bureaucracy may not generate the intended results unless officials are strongly motivated to facilitate the growth and empowerment of others. The social capital created may instead be the organization of limited networks of individuals or cliques that engage in mutual reciprocity at the expense of the larger group they are supposed to be serving”. 142 Similalrly Hans-Georg Heinrich and Doris Vogl rightly warned that “mechanical application of Western models and priorities will not produce the desired outcome [since, unlikely post-Communist civil societies] “the Western civil society operates in the framework of a law-governed state with a free press, judicial review and parliamentary commissioners”. 143 Apart from contributing to creation of citizens’ associations, interpersonal trust and social capital influences a complexity of attitudes and behaviours towards public officials and institutions. Since interpersonal trust requires interaction, the interaction happens through social institutions, in due course becoming a shared set of values, virtues, and expectations within society as a whole. According to Christopher Beem, interaction is directly linked to enabling people in building communities, committing to each other, and the knitting of social fabric. 144 A long-term commitment to of the public to democratic institutions is furthermore required in order to sustain democracy. 145 Inglehart rightly point towards Almond and Verba’s conclusion “that interpersonal formation of secondary associations, which in turn is essential to effective political participation in any large democracy. A sense of trust is also required for the functioning of the democratic rules of the game: one must view the opposition as a loyal opposition, who will not imprison or execute you if you surrender political power but can be relied upon to govern within the laws and to surrender political power reciprocally if your side wins the next election”. 146 In other words, citizens, who are confident in existing political
142 Elinor Ostrom, “Social capital: a fad or a fundamental concept?”, in Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (eds.), Social capital: A Multifaceted Perspective (Washington DC: World Bank, 2000), pp. 172-214, at 181. 143 Hans-Georg Heinrich and Doris Vogl, “Civil Society in Kazakhstan. A report from an empirical survey”, available at
38 institutions, are more likely to be trusting in their fellow citizens, since “individuals who feel existing political institutions are adequate in representing their interests are also more likely to feel trusting towards others. Because individuals feel that existing political institutions can protect their interests, they are more likely to feel secure when trusting others”. 147 Claus Offe offered a definition of institutional trust , arguing that “‘ trusting institutions ’ means something entirely different from ‘trusting my neighbo r’: it means knowing and recognizing as valid the values and the form of life incorporated in an institution and deriving from this recognition the assumption that this idea makes sufficient sense to a sufficient number of people to motivate their ongoing active support for the institution and the compliance with its rules. Successful institutions generate a negative feedback loop: they make sense to actors so that actors will support them and comply with what the institutionally defined order prescribes”. 148 Offe claimed that social capital is one of “bottleneck variable upon which the viability of institutions is thought to be contingent”. 149 A lack of social capital produces mistrust in government and political systems which in turn allows a political community to be stable or unstable. 150 Trusting institutions implies that the citizen acknowledges and accepts their constitutive rules, values, and norms and regards them as binding. The level of trust in institutions in a given society indicates a degree of trust in political institutions such as parliament, government, administration, judiciary, political parties, the police, the army and local government, as well as institutions such as church, media, civil society, education institutions, etc. However, a blind trust by citizens in their government cultivates political apathy and undermines government’s responsibility, which in the long term undermines democracy. 151 Namely, democracy presupposes “an active and vigilant citizenry with a healthy scepticism of government and a willingness, should the need arise, to suspend trust and assert control over government”. 152
147 Amaney Jamal, “When Is Social Trust a Desirable Outcome? Examining Levels of Trust in the Arab World”, 40 (11) Comparative Political Studies (2007), pp. 1328-1349, at 1337. Compare also Russell Hardin, “Trustworthiness”, 107 Ethics (1996), pp. 26-42. 148 Claus Offe, “How Can We Trust our Fellow Citizens”, in Mark Warren (ed.), Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 42-87, at 70-71. 149 Claus Offe, “How Can We Trust our Fellow Citizens” in Mark Warren (ed.) Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.42-87, at 42. 150 See e.g. Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman, “Soviet Political Culture and Covert Participation in Policy Implementation”, 78 (3) American Political Science Review (1984), pp. 603-621; Donatella della Porta, “Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political Corruption” in Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 202-229. 151 Ibid. Compare also William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1968), at 46-48. Compare Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 27. 152 William Mishler and Richard Rose, op.cit. , at 419.
39 However, erosion of this kind of trust has been omnipresent. Under the notion of “democratic paradox” Robert Dahl described the absurdity present in many of the oldest and most stable democratic countries: while their citizens possess little confidence in some key democratic institutions, most citizens still continue to believe in the desirability of democracy. 153 Dissatisfaction and growing loss of faith in the functioning of institutions of democratic government has been documented since the 1970s. 154 For Newton and Norris this “erosion of confidence in the major institutions of society, especially those of representative democracy, is a far more serious threat to democracy than a loss of trust in other citizens or politicians”. 155 They explain that “loss of confidence in institutions may well be a better indicator of public disaffection with the modern world because they are the basic pillars of society” 156 therefore they regard “confidence in institutions as the central indicator of the underlying feeling of the general public about its polity”. 157 Ivan Krastev rightly points towards a democracy paradox of today: “Democratic institutions are more transparent and, at the same time, less trusted than ever. Trust in politicians has hit rock bottom.” 158
2.2.2. Convergence of Socio-Cultural Values in Plural Societies
Ethnicity is understood as a form of cultural identity, albeit one that operates at a deep and emotional level. An ‘ethnic’ culture encompasses values, traditions and practices but, crucially, also gives a people a common identity and sense of distinctiveness, usually by focusing upon their origins and descent”. 159 Ethnicity is thus a cultural phenomenon with certain biological and social traits, and it becomes politically significant once people start to insist on the significance of their distinctiveness and identity and on the rights that derive
153 Robert A. Dahl, “A Democratic Paradox?”, 115 (1) Political Science Quarterly (2000), pp. 35-40. 154 See e.g. Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1975), at 158-59; John Dunn, “Trust and political agency”, in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988); Joseph S. Nye, “Introduction: The decline of confidence in government”, in Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King, eds., Why AmericansMistrust Government ( Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1997). 155 Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris, “Confidence in Public Institutions: Faith, Culture or Performance?” in Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam (eds), Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 156 Ibid. 157 Ibid. 158 Ivan Krastev, “The Future of Democracy”,109 IMWpost (2012), available at
40 from this group character. 160 Charles Foster stated that identity is among most fundamental elements of political culture, since exactly identity “combines a definition of the individual and his role within society with both complementary community as well as geographical and ideological loyalties. It is this identity which legitimizes the activities of leadership and allows it to mobilize support and commitment, especially important in crisis periods”. 161 A society cannot be maintained in the case where there are strong value conflicts present. Sharing of fundamental values in a society makes possible the emergence and fostering of interpersonal trust . In ethnically divided societies, alike in societies that are structured upon social cleavages, it is to be expected that a level of cooperation and trust will be lower, or at least will vary in comparison to ethnically homogenous societies. The very existence of interpersonal trust in such societies fosters tolerance and acceptance of the plurality of ideas, interests and attitudes. 162 However, empirical studies that linked the ethno- cultural heterogeneity and social and political attitudes and behaviours related to the concept of political culture have emerged only recently. 163 The pioneer in this field was Robert Putnam, who researched the impact of the racial composition of US neighbourhoods on social capital and discovered that residents in mixed census tracts exhibited considerably lower levels of involvement in public life. 164 Putnam concluded that “[d]iversity, at least in the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us” 165 since his research confirmed decrease of solidarity with both other ethnic groups, and with members of the in-group in diverse neighbourhoods. In other words, the ethnic-cultural diversity has a negative impact on inter- personal trust since it challenges social solidarity and inhibits social capital. 166 Eric Uslaner
160 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), at 3. 161 Charles R. Foster, “Political Culture and Regional Ethnic Minorities”, 44 (2) The Journal of Politics (1982), pp. 560-568, at 561. See e.g. Mitja Žagar, “New European identities: Central Europe, the EU eastern enlargement and identity formation”, in Jody Patricia Jensen (ed.), Europe bound: faultlines and frontlines of security in the Balkans (Szombathely: Savaria University Press, 2003), pp. 301-325. 162 Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle, op.cit. (2002), at 3. See also Robert T. Golembiewski and Mark L. McConkie, “The centrality of interpersonal trust in group processes” in C. L. Cooper (ed.), Theories of group processes (London: Wiley, 1975), pp.131-185; Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Hamish Hamilton1995); Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1979). 163 Obviously, ethnic diversity has not been established as the only downgrading variable to social capital. Class, educational attainment, poverty, crime, etc. are all empirically proven as factors that lower levels of social cohesion. On effects of ethnic diversity on economic policies and outcomes see e.g. Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara, “Participation in heterogeneous communities”, 115 (3) Quarterly Journal of Economics (2000), pp. 847–904. See also Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara, “Who trusts others”, 85 (2) Journal of Public Economics (2002), pp. 207–234. Eve Parts, “Indicators of social capital in the EU”, available at
41 similalrly formulated that the best inducer of trust is equality since “it leads to more optimism and creates a shared sense of togetherness, which are both essential for the creation of trust”. 167 A classic modernization argument explains that nations are completely modern constructions borne of nationalism and that were able to emerge merely with the development of modern societies due to industrialisation. According to them, nationalism is a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent. 168 Consequently, according to Crawford Young “[c]ultural pluralism is a quintessentially modern phenomenon.” 169 Andreas Wimmer argued moreover “that nationalist and ethnic politics are not just a by-product of modern state formation or of industrialisation; rather, modernity itself rests on a basis of ethnic and nationalist principles ”. 170 Quite contrarily, Walker Connor argued that ethnic conflicts have a root in primordial conflicts of identities, perceiving ethnicity as a matter of deeply rooted identity and culture and representing a perennial issue of political life. 171 The political salience of ethnicity has been confirmed in numerous works dealing with the impact of cultural (and ethnic) diversity on political processes. Verba argued back in the 1960s that “the sense of identity with the nation [...] legitimizes the activities of national elites and makes it possible for them to mobilize the commitment and support of their followers”. 172 Charles Foster explained that political significance of ethnic identity “arises only when such
Damage Social Capital? A Comparative Study of Neighbourhood Diversity and Social Capital in the US and Britain”, 43 (2) Canadian Journal of Political Science-Revue Canadienne De Science Politique (2010), pp. 289- 318. 167 Tim Reeskens, “Ethnic Cultural Diversity, Migrant Integration Policies and Social Cohesion in Europe Investigating the Conditional Effect of Ethnic Cultural Diversity on Generalized Trust”, available at
42 differences emerge in the public sphere” 173 and exactly in this moment “ethnic identity gains such wide or intense support that it rivals that of the dominant social order and thus challenges the legitimacy of the central leadership, the stage of potential political conflict has been reached”. 174 Milton Esman enumerated five conditions that explain the politicization of ethnic solidarities: (1) group identity based on objective social distinctions and the feelings of solidarity they generate; (2) grievances based upon perceived political, economic or cultural deprivation or discrimination; (3) rising expectations of amelioration; (4) declining authority and effectiveness of the political center; and (5) effective political organization. 175 Charles Foster argued that exactly such above enlisted subjective attitudes and perceptions are “clearly related to, though not necessarily contained within, political culture”. 176 Since ethnic heterogeneity constitutes a threat to homogenisation of political culture, Foster considered that the capability of multiple identities is necessary to reconcile regional and ethnic diversity with the centripetal pressures of highly centralized authority in a world of large modern nation-states. 177 As a consequence of deep ethnic, cultural, religious, racial or political divisions, political subcultures emerge and stabilise, imbedding and cementing the divide of what additionally undermines efficacy of policy making and governance. 178 Marcus Ethridge and Howard Handelman put forward examples of divided societies such as these in which conflictual political culture prevails due to ethnic, religious or racial divisions. Among those, they mention Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Lebanon or South Africa, which are all examples of countries where deep ethnic and/or religious cleavages persist. However, they do note there are some multi-ethnic and multi-confessional democracies (such as the United States, Switzerland and Canada), thus demonstrating that heterogonous societies might develop consensual political culture. 179 Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholz demonstrated that historical legacies condition the likelihood of a successful democratisation processes. 180 Claus Offe considered
173 Charles Foster, op. cit. , at 564. 174 Ibid. 175 Milton J. Esman, “Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict in Industrialized Societies”, in Milton J. Esman (ed.), Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (London: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 371-390, at 338. 176 Charles Foster, op. cit. , at 564. 177 Ibid. , at 565. 178 Marcus E. Ethridge and Howard Handelman, Politics in a Changing World (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth, 2004), at 68-69. 179 Ibid. , at 68.In his seminal book, that constitutes a foundation of the consociational democracy, Arend Lijphart questioned how is possible that “the Netherlands presents a paradox. On the one hand, it is characterized by an extraordinary degree of social cleavage; on the other hand, Holland is also one of the most notable examples of a successful democracy”. See Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in The Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), at 1-2. 180 Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholz, op.cit. (2010).
43 that the way forward in democratic consolidation of the new CEE countries is a combination of simultaneous strengthening of new democratic politics and economies, along with the development of a new conception of nationhood capable of absorbing ethnic conflicts. 181 Ethan Kapstein and Nathan Converse established that the problem of consolidating young democracies is particula rly acute in deeply divided societies where structural conditions [ …] may motivate politicians to centralize political and economic power rather than to distribute it more widely. 182 Andreas Wimmer argued the unsuccessful regime change is, inter alia , conditioned by improper inter-ethnic relations. He argued that in those cases “[w]here states were too weak to overcome indirect rule and communal self-government, to penetrate a society or override other bonds of loyalty and solidarity, and where a network of civil society organisation had not yet developed, ethnicity was quickly politicised and politics turned into a matter of ethnic justice [i.e., bitter competition among ethnic groups]. The timing of the two processes - state modernization and the rise of civil society - and the values reached on each scale therefore explain whether the ethnicised or the fully nationalized versions of state formation prevail”. 183 Linz and Stepan similarly warned that the chances of democratic consolidation are quite slim when political elites at the same time need to foster economic and political transformation of the former communist federation and initiate nation-building policies. 184 Vladimir Vuj čić established the correlation between civic political culture and consolidation of plural and multi-ethnic democracies. He argues that civic democratic political culture, specifically, has a significant role in managing interethnic relations in a democratic state. Vuj čić holds that fostering of democratic political culture should moreover improve complex and sensitive inter-ethnic relations in a country. He also considers that interethnic relations cannot be handled solely by legal, economic and institutional means. Criticizing both classic and communitarian liberalism (claiming the first neglects various identities (religious, racial, ethnic, national etc.), whereas the later overlooks the excluding force of various identities), Vuj čić argues that establishment of a trans-national democratic citizenry, free from all ascriptive criteria and identities might help span shortcomings of classic and communitarian liberalism. Being aware this outcome is quite unlikely in ethnically diverse societies, he supports deployment of patriotism, which, according to him “can play a
181 Claus Offe, op.cit. (1997). 182 Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, The Fate of Young Democracies (Cambridge University Press, 2008), at xiv. Compare also Zoltan D. Barany and Robert G. Moser (eds.), Ethnic Politics After Communism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 183 Andreas Wimmer, op.cit (2002), at 79. 184 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, op.cit. (1996), at 28.
44 prominent role in bridging the political and cultural atomizations and conflicts in society. It can undertake this role only if constituted in the civic and not the crude (fixed) ethnic sense - though the national defines the limits and the meaning of this constitution - provided it evolves into the loyalty to one’s homeland and going hand in hand with the development of democracy and human rights”. 185
185 Vladimir Vuj čić, “Politi čka kultura i me đunacionalni odnosi u demokraciji”, 35 (2) Politi čka misao (1998), pp. 25- 49, at 49.
45 3. Democratic Consolidation in the Western Balkans It has been already asserted above that democratization theories consider that ethnic diversity is a factor hindering democratic consolidation and that democratic failures of post- communist states are (at least partially) explained by the continuing prevalence of ethno- nationalism and socio-cultural legacies in political and social life. Speaking about the challenge of the democratic consolidation in in multinational states, Linz and Stepen noticed that “there is often more than one ‘awakened nation’ present in the state.” 186 Exactly this absence of congruence between the polis and the demos in the Western Balkans countries set hurdles to the democratization of the region in the past two decades. This Chapter will therefore provide answers on a question how underdevelopment of political culture hinders democratization of the Western Balkans? The democratic consolidation turns out to be challenging in deeply divided and ethnically diverse societies in which recent wars and interethnic conflicts produced long-term consequences, which destabilized the consolidation of democracy well beyond the nation-building processes. The Chapter will present several research findings of the political scientists and sociologists that acknowledged ethnic heterogeneity of the region as a challenge of successful regime transformation. The Chapter will subsequently research how much relevance does ethnic heterogeneity constitute to the consolidation of democracy in the region? The empirical results on values and attitudes of (national) populations will be consulted in order to establish what role political culture plays in the democratic consolidation? This Chapter will try to establish if the introduction and development of democracy over the last two decades in the Western Balkan countries influenced peoples’ constructive and participatory attitudes towards politics? It will furthermore research if the Western Balkans citizens are sufficiently involved in cooperative public activities and what is their support for the political system and institutions? Answering those questions, I will try to demonstrate a tailor-made external socialization into civic values is needed if the Western Balkans democratic consolidation is to occur.
3.1. Political Culture in the Western Balkans
The former authoritarian regime under the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), which lasted for more than four decades, had not only constrained civil and political rights and lacked legitimacy, but moreover, this political system did not allow for the development of civic virtues upon which democracy is founded. Moreover, in ethnically
186 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, op.cit. (1996), at 23.
46 diverse federation whose territorial units experienced divergent historical ties to former state structures, the convergence of political culture has never existed. Examining empirical differentiation among Yugoslav political cultures (specific for encompassing five nations and number of other ethnic minority groups that were called ‘nationalities’), Gary Bertch and George Zaninovich established that “political culture as defined in terms of ethnicity or nationality can be useful in delineating salient lines of cultural differences and potential conflict”. 187 They managed to delineate, empirically, the boundaries of and specifying the distance amongst political cultures within a single territorial state. Bertch and Zaninovich explained ‘cultural distance’ as a phenomenon within the Yugoslav political setting through different variables: the varied historical experiences, the level of economic development, the political strategies of each of these groups, and eventually the policy goals of regional Yuoslav leaderships (especially towards decentralization). Those researchers furthermore distinguished between three ideal types of the past Yugoslav political culture. Northwest political culture was characterised by low parochial-traditional and socialist-patriotic values, high competitive-decentralist attitudes and was dominated by Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (and party members) on low parochial-traditional expression, and by party members on high competitive decentralism. Southeast political culture was characterised by high parochial- traditional and socialist-patriotic, low competitive-decentralist values. This ideal type was dominated by Macedonians, joined by Serbs and Croats (and party members) on high socialist-patriotic expression values, and by Serbs on moderately low competitive decentralism values. Heartland political culture was characterized by relative similarity of Serb-Croat (and party members) expression on all three factors; unified swing toward low parochial-traditionalism and high socialist-patriotism, and a similarly moderate expression on the competitive-decentralist factor. 188 Bertch and Zaninovich noted that membership in the League of Communists has the effect of diluting these differences. Therefore they asserted the fourth ideal type of Yuggoslav political culture: the political culture of the League of Communists . It “reflects aspects of these three regional political-culturalf orms. Specifically, it is strong on modernizing attitudes, emphasizes a socialist-patriotic perspective, and scores high on the competitive-decentralist factor”. 189 Moreover, they explained the stance towards modernization of each of the political cultures: “The northwest political culture would be characterized as more modernizing in perspective, reflecting a low profile on Yugoslav
187 Gary K. Bertch and George M. Zaninovich, “A Factor Analytical Method of Identifying Different Political Cultures.The Multinational Case Yugoslav Case”, 6(2) Comparative Politics (1974), pp. 219.-244, at 219. 188 Ibid. , at 241. 189 Ibid.
47 socialist patriotism, and more supportive of decentralized institutions. The southeast political culture would tend to reflect the opposite attributes - namely, traditionalism in basic orientation, stressing the virtues of patriotism and socialism, and favouring the role of centralized authority in the system. The heartland political culture reflects a combination of the general characteristics of the preceding two. This culture is modernizing in perspective, tends to stress the importance of a socialist-patriotic disposition, and takes a moderate position on the issue of centralized versus decentralized authority”. 190 From 1943 to 1992 the SFRY was an ethno-federal state consisting of six socialist republics: BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. Territorially, the biggest federal unit, Serbia, under its governance also had two autonomous provinces: Vojvodina and, Kosovo and Metohija. The SFRY was a home to 26 ethnic groups, among whom some were established as the constituent ‘nations’ (narodi), those being South Slavic ethnic groups (i.e. Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Serbs and Slovenes), and ‘nationalities’ ( narodnosti ) (those being non-South Slavic ethnic groups such as Albanians, Austrians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Germans, Hungarians, Italians, Jews, Roma, Romanians, Rutherian, Slovaks and Turks). Nationalities enjoyed certain rights that guaranteed preservation of their cultural specificities and, from today’s human rights prospective, could be perceived as national minorities. Such a rich ethnic mixture was managed through a post- Second Wold War inter-ethnic ideology called ‘brotherhood and unity’ which obviously proved superficial and non-efficiently pursued by ethnically and regionally segmented socialist party elite since the dissolution of Yugoslavia resulted in bitter, inter-ethnic conflicts fought between the peoples of the former SFRY. 191 Dejan Joivi ć rightly asserted “the conflicts of the 1990s were not about states denying the existence of minorities, but rather over groups not being satisfied being classified as minorities, rather than nations.” 192 Namely,
190 Ibid. 191 From abundant scholarly account of the collapse of SFRY see e.g. Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia (Boulder, CO.: Westview Pres, 1992); Robert F. Miller, “Yugoslavia: The End of the Experiment”, in Janina Frentzel-Zagorska (ed.), From a One-Party State to Democracy: Transition in Eastern Europe (Amsterdam-Atlanta, Ga: Rodopi, 1993), pp. 197-219; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (Boulder, CO.: Westview Pres, 1995); John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Sabrina P. Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia: scholarly debates about the Yugoslav breakup and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 192 Florian Bieber, “The role of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in selected countries of South-Eastern Europe after two monitoring cycles”, at
48 reinforcement of the fear of becoming a minority was used as a mobilization agent by the nationalists in the early 1990s across Yugoslavia and manipulated by political elites. 193 Serbian political elites of that time insisted in preserving Yugoslavia, as a guarantee of the Serb unity in one land. Whereas other titular nations (‘narodi’) were at large opposing preservation of centralist, unitary Yugoslavia, co-titular nations in republics (e.g. Serbs in Croatia, Albanians and Turks in Macedonia) were rejecting an idea of becoming a minority in a state they used to be recognized a status of a co-nation. Therefore, no matter the extent of the offered minority rights guarantees in nevly emerging nation-states was, they would not suffice for (minority) political leaders of the early 1990s. 194 Separatist claims of the Serb political leadership both in Croatia, and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina, resulted at first in nationalist homogenisation of other ethnic groups, and later in violent conflicts, despite the different normative and institutional frameworks that were set up in the meantime which should have facilitated early resolution of ethnic conflicts. 195 On the pretext of preservation of the SFRY integrity Croatia was attacked, by a then, Yugoslav National Army (YNA), which was controlled by Miloševi ć196 and dominated by Serb personnel, whereas at the same time the Serb population living in certain parts of Croatia, being backed be the YNA’s weapons, requested secession from Croatia. 197 In spite of the external aggression on the Croatian sovereign territory that confirms an inter-state nature of the war, the Croatian Homeland War, which lasted from 1991 to 1995, was mainly fought along ethnic lines, which attributes to it a
Balkanologie (2001), pp. 21-36; Antonija Petri čuši ć, “Nation-Building in Croatia and the Treatment of Minorities: Rights and Wrongs”, L'Europe en Formation (2008), pp. 135-145; Gale Stokes, “Nezavisnot i sudbina manjina, 1991-1992”, in Charles Ingarao and Thomas A. Emmert (eds.), Suo čavanje s jugoslavenskim kontroverzama (Sarajevo: Bibiloteka Memorija, 2010), pp. 86-115. 193 Florian Bieber, “Minority Rights in Practice in South Eastern Europe”, Balkan Yearbook of Human Rights: 2004 Minority Rights (Balkan Human Rights Network, 2005), pp. 49-73. Dejan Jovi ć, “Fear of becoming minority as a motivator of conflict in the former Yugoslavia”, 5 (1-2) Balkanologie (2001), pp. 21-36. Compare also Matjaž Klemen čič and Mitja Žagar, The former Yugoslavia's diverse peoples: A reference sourcebook, (Ethnic diversity within nations) (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004). 194 Dejan Jovi ć, op.cit. (2001). 195 Ted R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), at 294. See also Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 229-284; Ted R. Gurr, “Minorities, Nationalists and Ethnopolitical Conflict”, in Chester A. Crocker and Fen O. Hampson (eds.), Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 53-77, at 54. 196 The ICTY traial confirmed that Miloševi ć held the position of the de facto commander-in-chief in the operations of the Yugoslav People's Army in Croatia and BiH. See alsoJosip Glaurdic, “Inside the Serbian War Machine. The Miloševi ć Telephone Intercepts”, 1991-1992, 23 (1) East European Politics and Societies (2009), pp. 86-104. 197 On the escalation of agression and internal conflict see Branka Magaš and Ivo Žani ć, The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995 (London: Frank Cass, 2001). On the nature of the conflict in Croatia see Ivo Josipovi ć (ed.), Responsibility for War Crimes: Croatian Perspective - Selected Issues (Zagreb: Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, 2005). On the emergence of the self-proclaimed Serb contolled territory within the independent Croatia throughout 1991-1995 see Nikica Bari ć, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990-1995 (Zagreb: Golden Marketing -Tehni čka knjiga, 2005) and Edith Marko-Stöckl, “The Making of Ethnic Insecurity: A Case Study of the Krajina Serbs”, 1 (2) Human Security Pespectives (2004), pp. 24-33.
49 nature of an inter-ethnic conflict. The nature of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that initiated in April 1992 and lasted till November 1995, was particularly complex and subject to conflicting interpretations. 198 For example, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) determined the war’s nature to be international, by recognizing “there is much evidence of direct or indirect participation by the official army of the FRY, along with the Bosnian Serb armed forces, in military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. 199 Sumantra Bose considered that the 1992-95 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be regarded as a civil war, though he argued that the war’s vital dimension is territorially external to Bosnia. 200 Mary Kaldor classified this chain of violent conflicts within BiH as the new war, neither purely civil nor inter-state in its nature, but containing elements of both. 201 In the period 1998-1999, an armed conflict occurred in the Serbian province of Kosovo. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces fought against Albanian separatist forces. However, NATO intervened on the side of the Albanians, justifying its intervention as a humanitarian intervention. 202 The conflict between Macedonians and Albanians that took place well through to 2001 is partially a consequence of Kosovo war spill over effect, since the rebellious Albanian insurgents were backed by the Kosovar army. This conflict, however, is partially a result of improper diversity management of the countries’ numerous ethnic communities, with the Albanian one being numerically significant. 203 In words of Sabrina Ramet and Davorka Mati ć, “ [w]ith the fall of communism and the breakup of Yugoslavia, the successor states have faced a historic challenge to create separate, modern democracies from the ashes of the former authoritarian state”. 204 Strive to achieve national independence of nevly emerging states resulted in with prevalence of ethnic-nationalism, inter-ethnic conflicts and severe deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in the first decade of the democratic transition accross the Western Balkans. The
198 Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), at 190-191. 199 ICJ ruling of 26 February 2007 in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), available at
50 period of the 1990s resulted therefore in acceptance of “anti-civilized, retrograde values of extreme nationalism” rejecting “civilized values that already existed”. 205 The widespread presence of authoritarianism in the countries that emerged out of former Yugoslavia Sergej Flere and Aleksandar Molnar claim it is a result of prevailing ethnocentric values, violent ethnic antagonisms as well as because of the retraditionalisation of the post-Yugoslav sphere. 206 In a social climate burdened with violent wars and inter-ethnic conflicts, the new self- proclaimed democratic nation-states had not been able to accomplish successful transition to functional and sustainable liberal democracy. Substantive absence of democratic political culture was often recognized as a relevant variable for explaining societal transofmation that acted excluding and discriminatory towards national minorities in research dealing with democratic consolidation. 207 Dragica Vujadinovi ć explained the failure of regime transformation in the countries emerging of SFRY as a result of prevalent nationalist discourse. According to her, within dissolution of SFRY “nationalism was given free rein to permeate value orientations and political culture”. 208 She furthermore suggests that “the civilized values we had been exposed to failed to take root in social and political life and to change essentially the existing authoritarian political culture. This failure was due to: (1) the appropriation of these values by the regime, and their presentation as socialist values, and (2) the development of nationalism, which by the time of the crisis and state break-up had already imposed its de-personalizing, collectivist values (compatible with the dominant authoritarian political culture) on a substantial portion of the population. The constitutional framework of nationalist socialism established the basis for the future radical ethnification of politics and politicization of
205 Dragica Vujadinovi ć, “Civil Society, Political Culture, Everyday Life - Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia”, in Dragica Vujadinovi ć et al. (eds.), Between Authoritarianism and Democracy: Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia, Volume II: Civil Society and Political Culture (Beograd: Cedet, 2005), pp. 30-53, at 38. Compare also Bora Kuzmanovi ć and Miloš Beši ć, Svjetovi vrijednosti (Podgorica: CID, 2000); Mirjana Vasovi ć, “Value systems and democratic transformation”, in Radmila Nakarada, Slobodan Samardzic, Lidija R. Basta Fleiner (eds.), The Labyrinth of the Crisis, Prerequisites for the Democratic Transformation of the FR Yugoslavia (Fribourg: Institut du Federalisme /Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2001), pp. 369-394. 206 Sergej Flere and Aleksandar Molnar, “Avtoritarizem, etnocentrizem in retradicionalizacija”, 9 (13) Družboslovne razprave (1992), pp. 5-14. Compare also Sergej Flere and Miran Lavri č, “Operationalizing the civil religion concept at a cross-cultural level”, 46 (4) Journal for the scientific study of religion (2007), pp. 595- 604. 207 See e.g. Sabrina P. Ramet, “The Denial Syndrome and Its Consequences: Serbian Political Culture since 2000”, 40 (1) Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2007), pp. 41-58; Sabrina P. Ramet, “Democratic Values and Ethnic Polarization in the Western Balkans”, 58 (1) Südosteuropa (2010), pp. 2-14; Sonja Schüler (ed.), Politische Kultur in (Südost-)Europa : Charakteristika, Vermittlung, Wandel (München : Verlag Otto Sagner, 2012); Rudolf M. Rizman, Uncertain Path: Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Slovenia (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 2006); Rudolf M. Rizman, “Demokrati čna tranzicija in konsolidacija v primerjalni perspektivi” 43 (5/6) Teorija in praksa (2006), pp. 674-689; Rudolf M. Rizman, “The relevance of nationalism for democratic citizenship”, 7 (1) Javnost (2000), pp. 5-13. 208
51 ethnicity, the ultimate consequence of which was the break-up of SFRY”. 209 Similalrly, Mitja Žagar reminded us that an inappropriate management of nationalism, ideology that was publicly condemned and suppressed for the official discourse in the multi-ethnic federation, actually helped its outburst at the beginning of the 1990s. Žagar recalled that the way in which the communist regime in the former Yugoslav federation fought nationalism was apparently not successful and for this exact reason, nationalism therefore played a key role in the collapse of the federation. Following the introduction of political pluralism, political elites, or at least some of their segments, in all the federal units used nationalism and nationalist ideology as the most effective way to mobilize voters. Emerging political parties had fortified their membership and electoral base on the nationalistic pretext, while, at the same time, democratic infrastructure and culture had not yet been developed. Žagar considered that the introduction of the formal political pluralism encouraged the setting off of democratic political culture and infrastructure in some environments, but soon, due to the impact and enforcement of nationalism and populism, what was followed with wars and conflicts, this initial development of democratic political culture never got a chance to expand. 210 The fall of the two (semi)autocratic governments of Serbia and Croatia in 2000 allowed for the change of the social climate and establishment of pro-democratic governments. 211 (Semi)autocratic governments, that were in power throughout 1990s, managed to lose popular support, while at the same time the oppositions united, treating the forthcoming “elections as a referendum on the principal status quo” in those two countries. 212 The authoritarian political culture of the 1990s, was abruptly transformed through a voter- attraction campaign, undertook “[t]hrough independent media, and supported by civil society activities aimed at voter information and mobilization” [...] “resulting in an above-average turnout”, 213 and the downfall of the regimes that led the wars of the 1990’s. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik noted that “opposition leaders inherited from the communist era a political culture that lacked any understanding of - or much experience with - collaboration in
209 Dragica Vujadinovi ć, “Civil Society, Political Culture, Everyday Life - Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia”, available at
52 pursuit of political power or any sense of important role of democratic oppositions in tracking and responding to public opinion when mobilizing political support or shaping ideas”. 214 Recent inter-ethnic conflicts and wars, perceived as social trauma, have certainly contributed to the deterioration of interpersonal trust, even in the cities, villages and neighbourhoods that used to be traditionally inter-ethnic. Dahl’s explanation of conflict suggested that political disagreements are becoming severe when “an increase in threats of actual violence, suppression of opponents, civil war, secession, disloyalty, or a marked increase in demoralization, apathy, indifference, or alienation” start to occur. 215 In the post conflict Western Balkans societies, histories of exclusion and nationalist violence have resulted in such deep divisions that agreement on the atrocities of the past is still impossible. Harry Eckstein, for example, stated that such “traumatic social discontinuity should have logically expectable consequences, no less than other change. The one consequence of social trauma absolutely precluded by culturalist assumptions is rapid reorientation. Social upheaval may overcome cultural inertia, but if so, actors should be plunged into a collective infancy in which cognitions that make experience intelligible and normative dispositions (affect, evaluative schemes) must be learned again, and learned cumulatively. No culturalist may expect, for instance, a democratic political culture to form, in a few short years, in a society like Germany after World War II, or “national” orientations to form rapidly in postcolonial tribal societies. Instead, changes in political cultures that occur in response to social discontinuity should initially exhibit considerable formlessness”. 216 Eckstein however argued that “‘cultural entropy’ can never be complete” since “social units, like the family, survive the greatest upheavals”. 217 Upheavals in the Balkans, as a form of a ‘social discontinuity’, certainly resulted in the deterioration of interpersonal trust in the countries of the region but also caused a rescheduling of values. Namely, when the former political and social system collapsed, people had a feeling that a society was disintegrating. With a rise of nationalist political parties that gained power, societal strongholds were found in one’s own ethnic group, nation, religion,
214 Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 5. Ivan Vejvoda, “Democratic Despotism: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia” in Geoffrey Pridham and Tom Gallagher (eds.) Experimenting with democracy: regime change in the Balkans (London/New York: Routledge, 2000). Christopher K. Lamont and Dejan Jovi ć, “Introduction: Croatia after Tudman: Encounters with the Consequences of Conflict and Authoritarianism”, 62 (10) Europe-Asia Studies (2010), pp. 1609-1620. Compare also Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 215 Robert A. Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in The United States. Conflict and Consent (Chicago: Rand McNally&Co., 1967), at 279. 216 Harry Eckstein, “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change”, 82 (3) The American Political Science Review (1988), pp. 789-804, at 796. 217 Ibid.
53 common cultural traits or history. Authoritarianism values became dominant, and they inevitably result in the exclusion of the others (national minorities), retraditionalisation, greater religiosity, 218 and the rise of nationalist sentiments that remain widespread till today. 219 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, for example, found the prevailing existence of Balkan particularism 220 to be responsible for the inadequate level of social capital in the Western Balkans region. 221 She explained particularism as “a mentality prevailing in collectivistic societies in which the standards for the way a person should be treated depend on the group to which the person belongs”. 222 She opposed particularism to universalism, with the latter being “the practice of individualistic societies, where equal treatment applies to everyone regardless of the group to which he or she belongs. In a universal society, rules of the game tend to be the same everywhere; in particularistic societies, they tend to be extremely specific for that society only”. 223 Mungiu-Pippidi understood Europeanization process as “a specific modernization process, consisting to a large extent in the adoption of new formal rules (institutional imports) and their implementation”. 224 She therefore advocated that “[i]f Southeast Europe is to be Europeanized, a set of explicit policies should be designed to address particularism, which, by its nature, is deeply opposed to true modernization and has enough flexibility to pervert slow and inconsistent attempts at institutional change”. 225 Mungiu-Pippidi warned that “[p]articularistic societies seem to have a frighteningly strong digestive capacity, for which the thousands of pages of acquis communautaire may prove no real challenge. The risk is then that the societies will only see formal and superficial changes, leaving their deep structure untouched”. 226
218 Duško Sekuli ć and Željka Šporer,”Religioznost kao prediktor vrijednosnih orijentacija”, 27 (1–2) Revija za sociologiju (2006), pp. 1–19; Sergej Flere and Andrej Kirbiš, “New age is not inimical to religion and traditionalism: Rebuttal”, 48 (1) Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (2009) , pp. 179-184; Sergej Flere and Rudi Klanjšek, “Cross-cultural insight into the association between religiousness and authoritarianism”, 31 (2) Archiv fur Religionspsych ologie (2009), pp. 177-190. 219 Compare Mikloš Biro, Vladimir Mihi ć, Petar Milin and Svetlana Logar, “Da li su društveno-politi čke promene u Srbiji promenile nivo autoritarnosti i etnocentrizma gra đana?”, 35 (1-2) Psihologija (2002), pp. 37- 47. 220 Mungiu-Pippidi borrowed the term ‘particularism’ form the Argentine political scientist Guillermo O'Donnell who put forward the concept of ‘particularism’ in analysis of the Third Wave democratization failures since a number of democratized Latin American countries have rid themselves of authoritarian regimes. See e.g. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions About Consolidation”, 7 (2) Journal of Democracy (1996), pp. 34-51. See also Guillermo O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies”, in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (eds.), The Self-restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), pp. 29-52. 221 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Deconstructing Balkan Particularism: The Ambiguous Social Capital of Southeastern Europe”, 5 (1) Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2006), pp. 49-68. 222 Ibid., at 50. 223 Ibid. 224 Ibid. 225 Ibid., at 67. 226 Ibid.
54 3.2. Two Decades of the Western Balkans Democratic Transformation
In the paragraphs below the results of the inter-generational survey “A Tale of Two Generations - From Yugoslavia to the EU” are presented with the aim to shed a light on insufficient consolidation of civic culture. 227 Though the study offers insight into views and attitudes of 1971 and 1991 generations, merely grouply presented attitudes per country are presented in this dissertation The method was based on questionnaires, complemented by face-to-face interviews with approximately 250-300 respondents from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, using a standard set of core questions that have been translated into the languages of the respective country. All samples are probability-based and nationally representative of the resident population were aged 20 and 40 at the moment of the interview. The coverage area was the entire country. The first question the study data reveal is if the Western Balakns countries are home to democratic citizens? Namely, a good democratic citizen possesses certain democratic competences that allow him or her to shape a civic community. A pioneering behavioural political science paradigm was introduced in early 1950s by Harold Laswell, who put forward a concept of a ‘democratic personality’, associating an individual’s personality with his or her political belief. 228 Almond and Verba also offered a description of a ‘self-confident citizen’ defining him as “the man able to take some part in the running of his political system. He has influence over the decisions that are made in it. 229 Those concepts were subsequently explored and further elaborated by social scientists. 230 Consequently, the democratic citizen would be “someone who cares about how well the political institutions work in his or her society. Such a citizen wants to make these institutions the best can be.” 231 S/he furthermore is the “one who knows how to engage in public talk with others” 232 , in other words, exercises trust towards others. It has been verified that those who participate more in a civic community and engage
227 The European Fund for the Balkans, “The Tale of Two Generations”, available at
55 into voluntary associational activities also tend to participate more intensely in political activities. 233 According to Natalia Latki, activities “such as voting, discussing politics or membership in various groups and parties” should be labelled as ‘civic’ “as they are oriented towards “shared benefits rather than self-interest”. 234 Finally, tolerance, understood as “the disposition to be patient with the opinions and practice of others”, 235 belongs to a circle of civic virtues that are fostered in a society with prevalent democratic political culture. Empirical research has proven that political activism increases tolerance: “that persons who say they vote are slightly more generally tolerant than non-voters; [...] the more people discuss politics, the more likely they are to be generally tolerant and the less they are likely to be generally intolerant; persons who have attended a political rally, are more likely to be tolerant to both right and left; persons who report having given money (for political purposes) are much more likely to be tolerant”. 236 Unconditional support for democracy, respect for human rights, tolerance and acceptance of otherness are values, i.e. specific socio-cultural values that need to prevail in order to label the Western Balkans political culture as sufficiently democratic. However, those democratic values need to be complemented by other collective forms of behaviour: political participation and voter turnout, party and union memberships or volunteering in civil society organisations, and finally through informal forms of social interaction that indicate higher levels of interpersonal trust exist among citizens. The empirical data presented below will demonstrate that introduction and development of democracy over the last two decades in the Western Balkan countries have influenced peoples’ constructive and participatory attitudes towards politics only to a certain degree. Assuiming that readiness to engage in political action is a clear indicator of participative political culture, participant political culture is specific for a population that possesses a strong sense of influence, competence and confidence in understanding of the domestic political system. Survey results indicate however that populations in all of the Western Balkan countries at large did not participate in any action related to problems in local community or society in general which points towards the
233 Compare Theda Skocpol, “How Americans Became Civic” in Theda Skocpol and Morris Fiorina (eds.), Civic Engagement in American Democracy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1999), pp. 27-80. 234 Natalia Letki, “Explaining Political Participation in East-Central Europe: Social Capital, Democracy and the Communist Past”, 57 (4) Political Research Quarterly (2004), pp. 665-679. 235 Lawrence J. R. Herson and C. Richard Hofstetter, “Tolerance, Consensus, and the Democratic Creed: A Contextual Exploration”, 37 (4) The Journal of Politics (1975), pp. 1007-1032, at 1013. Their research, for example, proved that tolerance increased with the level of education and income, to a certain respect with gender too, with females being more tolerant toward political opponents, as well as with organization membership and liberal ideological attitude. 236 Ibid ., at 1027. Compare also Francis Fukuyama, Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995).
56 conclusion that political culture in the region is rather underdeveloped, i.e. that citizens are passive towards political institutions and role differentiation in political life.
Figure 2: Participation in action related to problems in local community or society in general. Source: The European Fund for the Balkans, Survey “The Tale of Two Generations”, 2011.
Figure 3: Citizen’s activity undertaken in a community or society in general. Source: The European Fund for the Balkans, Survey “The Tale of Two Generations”, 2011.
When taking part in an action or initiative in the previous year respondents mostly attempted to solve problems in their country or community by signing petitions or attending public rallies. Other actions people took part in were attending a public rally or demonstrations, or attending public debates. Just a small number of respondents (from 5-20%) find that their membership in civic associations can help solving societal problems. Such a small number of persons across the region who are attempting to influence the policy outcomes through interest groups indicates the low level of interpersonal trust which is
57 necessary for cooperative public activities that eventually result in societal changes. The studies of political participation in the former socialist countries demonstrate that political culture in former socialist and authoritarian countries is parochial and subjective. 237 Participation in post-communist societies namely takes place either outside the nominally participatory institutions, or within those institutions but in non-prescribed ways since those countries are vested with a legacy of social and political distrust which results in informal networks. Interpersonal distrust inherited from the former political regime is directed towards the state institutions. A striking 40% of respondents in Croatia, with similar rate in Serbia and BiH entity Republika Srpska, declared their lack of interest in communal life. To me, this is a worrying indicator of the absence of civic values and prevailing individualism. In average, 20% of respondents in all surveyed countries think the time constraints keep them away from participation in issues of communal interest. A significant percentage, ranging from 14-25%, is made up of those people that opted for civic apathy because they do not believe they are able to influence the process and contribute to societal change. Even one quarter of respondents in Albania and one fifth of them in BiH entity Federation of BiH consider that there is no need to act and seek reforms, which is surprising when the quality of life in those countries is taken into account. The same is thought by the percentage of respondents in Serbia and Republika Srpska, and approximately 13% of those surveyed in Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo. A similar percentage of respondents in the region do not even know what they might to in order to address problems in local community or society in general.
237 Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman, “Soviet Political Culture and Covert Participation in Policy Implementation”, 78 (3) American Political Science Review (1984), pp. 603-621, at 610. See also Richard Rose, Understanding Post-Communist Transformation: A Bottom up Approach (London/New York: Routledge, 2009).
58
Figure 4: Reason for not participating in civic actions. Source: The European Fund for the Balkans, Survey “The Tale of Two Generations”, 2011.
Inglehart suggested a strong inter-relationship between democratic institutions and economic affluence, arguing that “economic development is conducive to democracy […] because it encourages supportive cultural orientations”. 238 Namely, in a society where economic needs are not met by a majority of persons, values that reflect economic and safety needs prevail. People in such societies are more likely to value economic growth rather than environmental protection; they will support more authoritarian styles of leadership, exhibit strong feelings of national pride, be strongly in favour of maintaining a large, strong army and will be more willing to sacrifice civil liberties for the sake of law and order. On the other hand, persons who have experienced sustained high material affluence start to give high priority to values such as individual improvement, personal freedom, citizen input in government decisions, the ideals of a society based on humanism, and maintaining a clean and healthy environment. Needless to say therefore, people in the Western Balkans societies characterized with lower economic development perceive unemployment, health, and poor economic growth as their priorities. Indeed, this study indicated that a majority of those
238 Ronald Inglehart, “Trust, Well-Being and Democracy,” in Mark E. Warren (ed.), Democracy and Trust (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 88-120 , at 97. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). See also Robert D. Putnam, “Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital”, 6 (1) The Journal of Democracy (1995), pp. 65-78. However, there are numerous critiques on Putnam’s interpretations of the consequences of modernization processes to political participation and activism. See e.g. Dietlind Stolle and Marc Hooghe, “Inaccurate, Exceptional, One-Sided or Irrelevant? The Debate about the Alleged Decline of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in Western Societies”, 35 (1) British Journal of Political Science (2005), pp. 149-167. See also Marc Hooghe, “Why Should We Be Bowling Alone? Results from a Belgian Survey on Civic Participation”, 14 (1) Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations (2003), pp. 41-59
59 surveyed think that the gap between the poor and the rich is too big and that government should take steps to decrease it. Since peoples’ priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment, the values central to people in the Western Balkans inspire them to get involved in activities that shall influence societal change which could improve their everyday life. The hypothesis that was disclosed in previous generational surveys on post-materialist values was that younger generations value priorities differently from older generations’, because they have been brought up under much more secure formative conditions. 239 However, this assumption cannot be reconfirmed in the present study, indicating the economic stagnation of virtually all countries in the region. The present survey indicates materialist values that are still the most dominant ones when people decide to undertake public action. In contrast to this finding, people in wealthier Western countries are generally more concerned with post- materialist values, those emphasizing self-expression and quality of life (e.g. environmental protection and lifestyle issues). Research of human development has found that only in post- industrial societies, which have experienced sustained economic growth, is the emphasis of human autonomy growing. On the contrary, low income societies, such as former socialist countries, show relatively little impact from the trend of autonomy of choices. “The value systems of those societies continue to impose strong constraints on human self-expression. The diversity of basic cultural values helps to explain the huge differences that exist in how institutions perform in societies around the world. The degree to which given publics give high priority to self-expression largely shapes the extent to which society provide democratic rights, the degree to which women are represented in positions of power, and the extent to which elites govern responsively and according to the rule of law.” 240 Respondents who have undertaken action or initiative for changes in their country in the year preceding the surveying date were predominantly motivated by unemployment. Low living standards and poverty are ranked as succeeding motivators of civic activism. Health related problems and education follow in the list of motivators for political action. Corruption is another relatively important motivator for finding solutions in society. Such results clearly indicate that people in the Western Balkans are concerned with materialist values, such as employment, costs of life, free education, and health care, i.e. those that allow for survival and physical safety and were secured free of charge in the former political regime.
239 Ronald Inglehart, “Globalization and Postmodern Values”, 23 (1) Washington Quarterly (2000), pp. 215-228. 240 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 3-4.
60
Figure 5: Motivation for undertaking civic action. Source: The European Fund for the Balkans, Survey “The Tale of Two Generations”, 2011.
In general, a minority of the people believe that citizens can influence changes in the society; whereas half of the respondents in Kosovo believe this, merely 15-18% of people in Serbia, Croatia and the Republic of Srpska have a positive attitude towards the civic change. In general, younger generations believe somewhat more than older ones that through their own actions citizens can bring changes in society, with 40% of younger respondents in Albania and 36% of them in Macedonia. However, absolute optimism regarding ownership over own political destiny is not present in any of the surveyed countries.
Figure 6: Attitudes on citizens’ ability to influence changes in the society. Source: The European Fund for the Balkans, Survey “The Tale of Two Generations”, 2011.
61 With the exception of Kosovo and Macedonia, in which the absolute majority of people think that voting in the elections is the most efficient way for the citizens to express their political beliefs, people are quite divided in their opinions on this issue. Though in Albania, Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia, voting in elections is still the most frequent answer, in Bosnia and Herzegovina a relative majority of respondents (35% from Republika Srpska and 31% of them from Federation BiH) considers that through street demonstrations citizens might most efficiently find solutions to their problems. To me this is a clear indicator of a lack of trust in institutions. A strikingly low percentage of respondents (ranging from 8% to 22% across the region) consider citizens’ associations as an efficient way to articulate needs and in this way try to influence political process. Again, this is an obvious indicator of the absence of interpersonal trust among citizens and correspondingly, low social capital in the region. In order for a political community to persist over time, cohesion amongst the members of society is needed. Social cohesion has been moreover degraded with recent inter-ethnic deterioration of contacts and cooperation across the region. 241 Countries with low levels of interpersonal trust are less likely to build the kind of vibrant civil society that spurs strong government performance, and the result will be low citizen confidence in government and public institutions. 242
Figure 7: Attitudes on the most efficient way for the citizens to find solutions to their problems. Source: The European Fund for the Balkans, Survey “The Tale of Two Generations”, 2011.
241 Robert F. Miller, “The dilemmas of civil society in Yugoslavia: The burden of nationalism”, in Robert F. Miller (ed.), The Developments of Civil Society in Communist Systems (Sydney: Ilen & Unwin, 1993), pp. 84- 109. 242 Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris, op.cit.
62 William Mishler and Richard Rose, for example, underlined the importance of trust for democratic governments and their representative relationship with citizens. They argued that “[i]n modern democracies, where citizens exercise control over government through representative institutions, it is trust which gives representatives the leeway to postpone short term constituency concerns while pursuing longer term national interests.”. 243 Levels of social trust are influenced by citizen evaluations of their governments and the rise of trust in institutions is likely inevitable if democratic institutions do not function in accordance to their mandate: delivering services while non-discriminating and fostering equally of all citizens, but also as a result of economic development. However, although “[d]issatisfaction with the performance of regimes characterized by widespread corruption, abuse of power and intolerance of dissent, can be regarded as a healthy reaction”, 244 the public disapproval of government’s actions is exceptional and merely sporadic, usually not mobilising a significant percentage of the population. May that be because poor government performance, rampant political corruption 245 and decreasing living standards is what the Western Balkan citizens have been facing since their countries’ independence and consider those dysfunctions as systematic?
243 William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post Communist Societies Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies”, 59 (2) The Journal of Politics (1997), pp. 418-451, at 419. 244 Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 27. 245 Donatella della Porta, for example, claims that such institutional performance and a corruption prone social setting contributes to widespread social distrust. See Donatella della Porta, “Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political Corruption” in Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 202-229.
63
Figure 8: Trust in institutions. Source: The European Fund for the Balkans, Survey “The Tale of Two Generations”, 2011.
Ivan Krastev considered in 2002 that a crisis of democracy is at stake in South-Eastern Europe, “rather than a problem of not-yet-completed democratization”. 246 He provided evidence for such a claim by providing empirical data that revealed a dramatically low level of trust in democratic institutions; generalized that antiparty sentiment is growing, there is little confidence in politicians, and voter turnout is falling. 247 Citizens support for the political system in which they live is important, since political system stability is conditioned with political culture in congruence with its political structure. In other words, only those political institutions that are supported and trusted by citizens will function properly. The level of trust in institutions in a given society indicates a degree of trust in political institutions such as parliament, government, administration, judiciary, political parties, the police, the army and local governments. Nations that enjoy a high level of social trust also tend to enjoy a relatively high level of confidence in political and bureaucratic institutions. The research results reveal that confidence in political and bureaucratic institutions is quite low across the Western Balkans region (with the exception of Kosovo, where trust in institutions is disproportionally higher than in other countries of the region. This, for sure, can this be explained by recently acquired statehood and related civic pride). In almost all countries of the region, religious institutions are trusted the most (support for them range from 31% to
246 Ivan Krastev, “The Balkans: Democracy Without Choices”, 13 (3) Journal of Democracy (2002), pp. 39-53, at 41. 247 Ibid.
64 60%). The army and the police are the subsequent most trusted institutions. Similar findings were made in other recent surveys, which established likewise, that people in the region trust ‘the uniforms’ the most: church, army and police. 248 The trust in the parliament is strikingly low in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, whereas one fifth and one quarter of respondents from Albania and Macedonia respectively trust in this chief political institution.
Figure 9: Expression of intention to cast the ballot in the forthcoming elections. Source: The European Fund for the Balkans, Survey “The Tale of Two Generations”, 2011.
Similarly to growing lack of trust in institutions, voter turnout continues to stagnate and decline across the globe being triggered by political apathy, arousing from disillusionment and disaffection with the formal political process. This, in turn, causes a crisis of legitimacy of representative democracy and endangers participatory society. Back in the early 1970s, Verba and Nie stated that “where few take part in decisions there is little democracy”. 249 Similarly, William Mishler and Richard Rose warned that democracy presupposes “an active and vigilant citizenry with a healthy scepticism of government and a willingness, should the need arise, to suspend trust and assert control over government”. 250 A
248 Duško Sekuli ć and Željka Šporer, “Are We Losing Trust in Institutions”, in Josip Kregar, Duško Sekuli ć i Željka Šporer, Korupcija i povjerenje (Zagreb, Centar za demokraciju i pravo Miko Tripalo i Pravni fakultet, 2011), pp. 77-126. 249 Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), at 1. 250 William Mishler and Richard Rose, op.cit. , at 419.
65 blind trust by citizens in their government cultivates political apathy and undermines a government’s responsibility, which in long term undermines democracy. 251 Research on voter turnout in post-communist countries established several conditions that influence said voter turnout. 252 Firstly, institutional ones relate to the type of electoral system and party system characteristics. Research has, for example, showed that turnout is substantially higher under proportional representation, under a larger district magnitude, and under more proportional systems in general.253 Secondly, socioeconomic factors might be detrimental for low voter turnout in some regions, i.e. economic conditions discourage people to vote if they reside in areas that experience economic hardship, high unemployment rates, etc. This phenomenon is known in academic literature as “the withdrawal hypothesis”, 254 explaining individual’s withdrawal from political participation by economic adversities that are causing him/her to place personal economic concerns over voting option. 255 Thirdly, Tatiana Kostadinova includes also a third, “dynamic component” which explains temporal changes generated by the transitional process. 256 Public distrust in institutions results in voter apathy. Political apathy is however, not strikingly high in the Western Balkans since a majority of people in all surveyed countries are planning to vote in the next elections. However, political apathy seems to be more present among youth, especially in Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia. The reasons that make people abstain is their conviction that elections do not bring change, or that there is no party they would vote for. Surprisingly, a minority of respondents claim they do not vote because they are not interested in politics, since their other responses reveal that at large they do not try to influence in any other way political processes in their countries.
251 Ibid. Compare also William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1968), at 46-48. Compare Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), at 27. 252 André Blais, “What Affects Voter Turnout?”, 9 Annual Review of Political Science (2006), pp. 111-125. See also Alexander C. Pacek, Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker, “Disenchanted or Discerning: Voter Turnout in Post-Communist Countries”, 71 The Journal of Politics (2009), pp 473-491; Stephen White and Ian MacAllister, “Turnout and Representation Bias in Post-communist Europe”, 55 (3) Political Studies (2007), pp. 586-606; Filip Kostelka, “The Turnout Decline in the Post-Communist Members States of the EU: a Multicausal Explanation”, Paper prepared for presentation at the Third ECPR Graduate Conference (2010), available at
66 Citizens’ lack of trust in political parties across the region caused the emergence of a great deal of political parties and independent lists that (mis)use populism for getting into the political arena. Often small parties or independent lists tend to need coalition partners allowing for a formation of governments (or in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, causing the political deadlock that lasted for fourteen months). The fragmentation of the political party scene is even more notable at the local level where in order to form functioning local governments, such independent lists serve as clientelistic coalitional partners which eventually results in their illegitimacy before voters. In general, among the people who will not vote in the next elections, the minority are those who are not interested in politics, while more frequently, the reasons are that people do not believe that elections will bring change or that there is no party they would vote for.
Figure 10: Reasons for not voting in the forthcoming elections. Source: The European Fund for the Balkans, Survey “The Tale of Two Generations”, 2011.
Voter turnout has been decreasing in every country of the region in the past two decades. The latest parliamentary elections in Serbia mobilised 57.77% of voters (in comparison to 61.35% registered at the previous 2008 elections) whereas the second round of the presidential elections took 46.26% of the voters to polling stations. 257 The presidential elections held in December 2002 in Serbia failed three times due to a very low turnout (turnout in the second round was less than 50% of eligible voters, what was required by the electoral legislation of that time). The legislation needed to be changed in order to assure
257 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter turnout data for Serbia, available at
67 functioning of this democratic institution. At the Croatian presidential elections held in 2010 only 50.13% of people bothered to vote in the parliamentary elections. In 2011 we saw the lowest turnout: 54.17%. 258 In previous parliamentary elections the turnout was notably higher (59.58%), whereas presidential elections tend to attract less voters (around 50% in the last consecutive terms) since the president has fairly limited competences. It is possible to explain the volatility of voter turnout in post-communist countries by three hypothesis: a ‘depressing disenchantment’ hypothesis predicts that voters are less likely to vote in elections when political and economic conditions are worse; a ‘motivating disenchantment’ hypothesis predicts that voters are more likely to vote in elections when conditions are worse; and a ‘stakes based hypothesis’ predicts that voters are more likely to vote in more important elections. 259 The ‘depressing disenchantment’ hypothesis is likely confirmed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country that is, except Kosovo, in the worst off economic situation. There, the voter turnout is persistently low, around 55%. 260 The last, ‘stakes’ based hypothesis was confirmed in numerous elections in the Western Balkans. For example, at the first democratic parliamentary elections in Croatia held in 1992 75.61% of voters showed up, whereas at the presidential elections 74.90% showed up. 261 Furthermore, the change of government in 2000, when semi-autocratic governmental style dominant throughout the 1990s was removed in 2000, attracted more people to the polls: 76.55% at the parliamentary and 60.88% at the presidential elections. 262 Similarly, the early democratic election in Albania brought 98.92% and 91.50% of voters to the voting station in 1991 and 1992 respectively. In the latest parliamentary elections, merely 50.77% of Albanian voters voted. 263 A similar trend can be established for the 2002 Macedonian parliamentary elections when 74.60% voters turned out at polling stations. This was actually the first election conflict held following the inter-ethnic conflict that resulted in the Ohrid Framework Peace Agreement which ended the crisis from 2001. Consequently, the 2002 elections were crucial for the country's stability and this probably caused rise in the voter turnout since presidential elections held in May 2004 mobilised merely 55% of voters.
258 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter turnout data for Croatia, available at
68 By applying the last hypothesis, one might expect that in those countries which secured independence recently (e.g. Montenegro in 2006 and Kosovo in 2008), the voter turnout to be a bit higher that in the neighbouring countries because of a national(ist) revival. Whereas 72.05% and 66.19% of Montenegrin citizens turned up at the parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2009 respectively 264 and in Kosovo only 45.62% of voters cast their ballot in the 2010 parliamentary elections. 265 The data for Kosovo is likely not representing the real picture, since its population voting is split: Serb population from the North part of the country votes in the Serbian elections and boycotts the Kosovar ones. 266 Civic community is being confirmed by the existence of interest in political process and by active participation of citizens in public affairs. What the survey presented above discloses is an alienated political culture with a low degree of confidence in political institutions and a lack of trust in the individual political competences of the respondents across the surveyed region. The fact that people in the Western Balkan countries are to a great extent politically detached, do not believe they can influence political change, and are predominantly motivated by materialist values when undertaking civic engagement points towards a subject political culture. Predominant lack of trust in political institutions among the Western Balkan citizens, followed by absence of interest for social and political actions and quite significant political apathy and lack of hope they themselves are able to influence the political process, all result in the relatively low voting turnout, often allowing nationalist political options to gain or remain in power. With still prevailing informal networks that are friendship and keen based, social capital understood as “a culture of trust and tolerance in which extensive networks of voluntary associations emerge” 267 is still not common in the Western Balkans. Empirical results presented above imply that the Western Balkan democracy is not consolidating simply as a result of adopting the right laws and introducing new institutions. In order for democracy to become the ‘habit of the heart’ of the Western Balkan people, interpersonal trust and social capital need to be much more vigorously developed and specifically, social and cultural conditions need to be established and passed from one generation to another.
264 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter turnout data for Montenegro, available at
69 4. Political Conditionality as theExternal Democracy Promotion Mechanism
The democratization literature stressess the role of external actors, arguing they often have a pervasive impact on post-authoritarian transformations. 268 Robert Dahl’s argument that “the destiny of a country is never wholly in the hands of its own people” 269 applies to democratic transformation too. This Chapter will therefore suggest that the EU pre-accession conditionality in the field of democracy can be understood as an external democracy promotion mechanism and as a process of political socialization and collective learning. Implying that the external democratization incentive pursued by the EU is able to produce change to domestic political and social processes within and amongst the Western Balkan countries, the Chapter will subsequently detail the development of a special, tailor-made pre- accession policy for the region i.e. the Stabilisation ands Association process (SAp). Briefly, through this two-dimensional policy, i.e. firstly, stabilisation and secondly, association, assistance is given to countries in the region to foster stable democracies and functional market economies. The policy vigorously promotes regional cooperation in many areas including political cooperation. It also includes several novel components aimed at rectifying the wrongdoings of the interethnic conflicts and wars fought the in 1990s. Namely, apart from requesting respect for human and minority rights, the second generation conditionality requires the countries of the region to support the return of refugees and displaced persons and commit to transitional justice, either through cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or trough investigation and prosecution of war crimes at the national level. Meeting these pre-accession political criteria policies not only results in a smoother path to EU membership, but also has profound societal implications for the
268 See e.g. David A. Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions”, 24 (1) World Politics (1971), pp. 19-38; Laurence Whitehead, “International Aspects of Democratization”, 3 Comparative Perspectives (1986), pp. 3-46; Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction” in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 1-38; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”, 45 (4) International Studies Quarterly (2001), pp. 487-515; Jan Beyers, “Conceptual and methodological challenges in the study of European socialization”, 17 (6) Journal of European Public Policy (2010), pp. 909-920. On the impact of the EU membership perspective as stabilizing factor for CEE democriacies see e.g. Frank Schimmelfennig, “International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment”, 6 (1) European Journal of International Relations (2000), pp. 109-139; Frank Schimmelfennig, “Transnational Socialization. Community-Building in an Integrated Europe”, in Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie (eds.), Transnational EU (London: Routledge 2005), pp. 61-82; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Milada A. Vachudová, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 269 Robert A. Dahl, op.cit (1971), at 189.
70 countries of the region, since it results in the consolidation of democratic political culture and the stabilisation of democracies of the region.
4.1. Europeanisation Conceptualized as External Socialization
There are diverse theoretical approaches and analyses of European integration and its outcomes on domestic politics. 270 The Europeanization is, by the proponents of the rationalist 271 theories of integration, understood as a process that has ‘transformative impact’ on the interests and identities of individuals, arguing nevertheless that “this transformation will remain largely invisible in approaches that neglect processes of identity formation and/or assume interests to be given exogenously”. 272 Authors applying this theoretical perspective often explain Europeanisation outcomes through the changes that the EU institutions produce in political systems of the Member States and the effects that come about in the national politics as a result of adopting the EU normative and strategic requirements. The rationalist approach deploys external incentives and externally driven rule adoption as means that actors rationally presumed to be beneficial for maximizing political costs and benefits of rule adoption. Börzel and Risse explained an interpretation of this theory, by arguing that it follows the ‘logic of consequentialism’. 273 For rationalists, “the misfit between European and domestic processes, policies, and institutions provides societal and/or political actors with new opportunities and constraints to pursue their interests. Whether such changes in the political opportunity structure lead to a domestic redistribution of power depends on the capacity of actors to exploit these opportunities and avoid the constraints”. 274 Rational choice theories are invoked to study issues ranging from formal EU institutions to the Europeanization of domestic politics and public opinion toward the EU. 275 For example, James Caporaso and Joseph Jupille considered EU institutions as “social soil within which
270 For an overview on theories on EU enlargement see e.g. Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), The politics of EU enlargement: theoretical approaches (Routledge, Abingdon, UK; New York, USA, 2005). 271 Rational choice theory, a broad approach used by social scientists to explain human behaviour, argues, in short, that people do their best under prevailing circumstances. Duncan Snidal defines rational choice as “a methodological approach that explains both individual and collective (social) outcomes in terms of individual goal-seeking under constraints.” See Duncan Snidal, “Rational choice and international relations”, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations (New York: Sage2002), pp. 73-94, at 74. 272 Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen and Antje Wiener, “The social construction of Europe”, 6 (4) Journal of European Public Policy (1999), pp. 528-544, at 529. 273 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe”, in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 57-82, at 58. 274 Ibid. 275 Mark A. Pollack, “Rational Choice and EU Politics”, in Knud Erik Jørgensen, Mark A. Pollack and Ben Rosamond (eds.), The Handbook of EU Politics (New York: Sage Publications, 2007), pp. 31-56, at 38.
71 actors’ preferences might be transformed”. 276 The pre-accession compliance with EU acquis assumes “actors to be rational utility-maximizers calculating the material as well as political costs and benefits of adopting and implementing new rules. In this view, sizable and credible external EU incentives are necessary in order to overcome opposition to EU rules by national governments or other domestic veto-players incurring costs from rule adoption”. 277 Since the 1990s a new social scientific alternative for the study of European integration has been steadily emerging: social constructivism. 278 Constructivists, unlike promoters of rationalist theories, “focus on the role of norms in social life, demonstrating that norms matter in a constitutive, interest-shaping way not captured by rationalist arguments”. 279 In short, this theory argues that social actors are continually changing historical contexts constructing reality. According to proponents of this theoretical approach, “social constructivism is situated between rationalism, represented by such approaches as neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, and reflectivism, which includes postmodernism and poststructuralism”. 280 The structuralist approach, in contrast, explains Europeanization as “an emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance - on the domestic structures of the Member States”. 281 Although the structuralist approach towards European integration’s impact on Member States takes as well into consideration of political culture transformation, its primary interest lays in change of formal structures - such as national legal systems, and/or national and regional administrations. Secondly, structuralists are into exploring “the ability of the EU to shape informal structures, such as business- government relations, public discourses, nation-state identities, and collective understanding
276 James Caporaso and Joseph Jupille, “Institutionalism and the EU: Beyond International Relations and Comparative Politics”, 2 Annual Review of Political Science (1999), pp. 429-44. 277 Frank Schimmelfennig and Florian Traunerin, “Introduction: Post-accession compliance in the EU's new member states”, 13 (2) European Integration Online Papers (2009), pp. 1-8, at 3. Similar arguments are employed in a number of writings on impact of EU conditionality in the CEE countries. See e.g. See also Dimitris Papadimitriou, Negotiating the New Europe: the EU and Eastern Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, 11 (4) Journal of European Public Policy (2004), pp. 661-679; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2005); Heather Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006). 278 On the assumptions of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, who coined the term ‘social construct’, this theoretical approach emphasizes the importance of political socialization and the social construction of reality. Not surprisingly, therefore, the constructivist perspective is sometimes labelled as a sociological one. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Harmandsworth: Penguin Books, 1966). 279 Jeffrey Checkel, “Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change”, 55 (3) International Organization (2001), pp. 553-588, at 554. 280 Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen and Antje Wiener (eds.), The social construction of Europe (London: SAGE Publications, 1999). In this volume see works of Ernst B. Haas, “Does Constructivism Subsume Neo-Functionalism”, pp. 22-31; Steve Smith, “Social Constructivism and European Studies”, pp. 189-198. 281 Maria Green Cowles, Thomas Risse-Kappen and James Caporazo , Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), at 1.
72 of citizenship norms”. 282 The structuralist constructivist approach examines the EU as a multileveled and polycentric emerging political field, finding basic theoretical justifications in Pierre Bourdieu’s structural constructivist theory of politics. 283 The structural constructivist approach to European integration answers what mechanisms political agents (those e.g. being Members of the European Parliament or Brussels bureaucrats) reproduce and transform the European political order. They take into account that European integration “has produced new power centres, hierarchies, and political resources [...] who, constrained and empowered by structures that are material and symbolic, struggle to accumulate political resources and increase their own power”. 284 In explaining the European integration process, social constructivism underlines the symbolic aspects of European integration, that is, discourses, norms and, more generally, the power of words and symbols to construct two distinct political ontologies or legitimate political orders relative to Europe: a Europe of nation-states and a Europe of transnational processes. 285 Social constructivists explore polity formation through rules and norms, the transformation of identities, the role of ideas, and the uses of language. Social constructivism focuses on what practitioners call social ontologies, which include such diverse phenomena as inter-subjective meanings, cultures of national security, and symbolic politics. By emphasizing social interaction, they are able to examine in a new way the structure of the international system, and the dialectics between states and international order. The constructivists approach emphasizes a “logic of appropriateness” and processes of persuasion. 286 This perspective advocates that “[r]ules are followed because they are seen as
282 Ibid. 283 Pierre Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of Our Time (Cambridge: Polity, 1998) and Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” 4 Sociological Theory (1989), pp. 14-25; Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 397- 465. Bourdieu argued that political action consists predominantly of symbolic action: speeches, writings, and other symbolic interventions. His sociology of domination uses a concept of symbolic violence that imposes a certain cultural code. Through cultural codes symbolic violence is unconsciously reproduced by the dominated. Bourdieu analysed politics as a social activity, naming it as the political field. According to him, “[t]he political field constitutes a space that is structured such that the value of each element of it is formed through the network of relationships this element entertains with the other elements in the field.” See Niilo Kauppi, “Elements for a Structural Constructivist Theory of Politics and of European Integration”, available at < http://aei.pitt.edu/9048/1/Kauppi104.pdf>, at 8. 284 Niilo Kauppi, “Elements for a Structural Constructivist Theory of Politics and of European Integration”, available at
73 natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation”. 287 In other words, European policies, norms, and the collective understandings attached to them exert adaptational pressures on domestic-level processes, because they do not resonate well with domestic norms and collective understandings. In a social-constructivist manner Radaelli explained Europeanization as “processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”. 288 In Heather Grabbe’s words, “[t]his definition stresses the importance of change in the logic of political behaviour, which is a useful way of distinguishing Europeanisation effects from the many other processes of change at work in the postcommunist political context”. 289 She therefore distinguished between two kinds of transfers the Europeanisation mechanisms is producing: “ hard transfer , that is, how the EU transferred rules, procedures and policy paradigms [and] soft transfer - of styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms”. 290 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse argued that Europeanization results in the adaptational domestic processes. They suggested that there are two mediating factors which influence the internalization of new norms and the development of new identities: the first are the “change agents” or “norm entrepreneurs” that are able to “mobilize in the domestic context and persuade others to redefine their interests and
followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation”. See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, 52 (4) International Organization (1998), pp. 943-969, at 948-954. See also James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The logic of appropriateness”, 4 ARENA Working Papers (2009), pp. 1- 28, available at
74 identities”. 291 The second factor is political culture and other informal institutions “which are conducive to consensus-building and cost-sharing”. 292 In conclusion social constructivist theories perceive socialization as externally induced norm compliance that requires acceptance of preferred behaviours, eventually resulting in the internalization of new values and norms. 293 After the fall of communism in Europe the EU, as well as several other international organizations (e.g. the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) initiated a large-scale project of international socialization of the post-communist European countries which resulted in Western-inspired “rule-conforming political change”. 294 According to Frank Schimmelfennig, international socialization has three major components. The first is a tangible perspective of the membership in the international organization , since “only the high material and political rewards of membership in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have triggered sustained domestic change in those CEE countries that initially violated the liberal-democratic community norms”. 295 It is a ‘strategy of reinforcement by reward’, since if a country does not conform, the reward is withheld but there are no coercive enforcement. The second is inter-governmental nature of international reinforcement where “the outcome depends on the political cost-benefit calculations of governments”. 296 Schimmelfennig explains such socialization strategy emerged “because societies are too weak vis-à-vis the states, and electorates are too volatile, to serve as effective agents of socialization”. 297 The third component of successful international socialization
291 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe”, in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 57-82, at 60. 292 Ibid . 293 Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 294 Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, International Socialization in Europe. European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change (Bakingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), at 54. See also Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Judith Kelley, “International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and International Socialization by International Institutions”, 58 (3) International Organization (2004), pp. 425-57. See also Alexandra Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe’”, 59 (4) International Organization (2005), pp. 973-1012; Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in the New Europe”, 11 ARENA Working Paper (2001), available at
75 requires party constellations around liberal, pro-Western values in the countries aspiring to the membership. Namely, “[i]n countries in which all major parties are pro-Western and reform-minded (liberal party constellation), international socialization has been smooth and has produced stable, consolidated democracies”. 298 After fifteen years of international socialization of the new European (predominantly democratic) countries, Schimmelfennig concluded that “the results have been highly divergent. Whereas one group of countries, mainly the central European and Baltic countries, quickly and smoothly adopted fundamental liberal norms of state organization and conduct, other CEEC countries - most notably Belarus and Serbia - have long defied ‘Westernization’. Still others have displayed inconsistent patterns characterized by stop-and-go processes or fluctuation between progress and reversals”. 299 Although for the external socialization to be successful, the informal rules, procedures, shared beliefs and norms preferred by socializing agentsneed to be embraced by a wider population, the international socialization is often conceptualized merely as an elite oriented socialization. Geoffrey Pridham for example explained this phenomenon as “the transnationail tensification of party with personal links has had its political socialisation effects - grandly called ‘Europeanisation’ - where mentalities from elites in established democracies rubbed off on new party leaders and officials-many often young and with no previous political experience”. 300 Heather Grabbe, in the course of the former enlargement waves, warned that “[a]ccession conditions and negotiations privilege a relatively small group of central government officials over other political actors. The lack of involvement of parliamentarians and wider society in the accession process could, in turn, exacerbate the EU’s own democratic deficit after enlargement”. 301 As a response of such exclusion, the citizens’ reaction shows to be discontent over political structure, decrease of support to the existing political options and
298 Ibid. 299 Ibid. See also Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, “The Impact of EU Political Conditionality”, in Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), pp. 29-50; Frank Schimmelfennig, “The EU: Promoting Liberal Democracy through Membership Conditionality”, in Trine Flockhart (ed.), Socializing Democratic Norms. The Role of International Organizations for the Construction of Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2005), pp. 106-126. 300 Geoffrey Pridham, “Complying with the EU's Democratic Conditionality: Transnational Party Linkages and Regime Change in Slovakia, 1993-1998”, 51 (7) Europe-Asia Studies (1999), pp. 1221-1244, at 1225.Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds.), Political culture and political change in communist states (London: Macmillan Press, 1979). 301 Heather Grabbe, “How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity”, 8 (6) Journal of European Public Policy (2001), pp. 1013-1031. See also Urlich Sedelmeier, “Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States”, 6 (1) Living reviews in European governance (2011), pp. 5-52.
76 the decline in trust in institutions, and eventually in decrease of popular support for the EU membership. 302 An elite-initiated democratization process (as such, the process of EU accession can be understood) differs significantly from the successful functioning of democratic norms, rules and institutions and acceptance of their jurisdictions in the hearts of the citizens. Therefore is necessary to conceptualize of Europeanization as “a processes of socialization and learning resulting in the internalization of new norms and the development of new identities”. 303 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse condition the positive outcomes in the socialising process by the presence of at least one of two mediating factors: in order to allow for it, there must be change agents or norm entrepreneurs at the domestic level, and there must be a political culture and other informal institutions conducive to consensus-building and cost sharing. This, what they called ‘sociological logic of domestic change’, puts emphasis on “arguing, learning, and socialization as the mechanisms by which new norms and identities emanating from Europeanization processes are internalized by domestic actors and lead to new definitions of interests and of collective identities”. 304 The task of change agents or norm initiators is first to mobilize and “to pressure policy-makers to initiate change by increasing the costs of certain strategic options”, 305 but also to use “moral arguments and strategic constructions in order to persuade actors to redefine their interests and identities engaging them in processes of social learning. Persuasion and arguing are the mechanisms by which these norm entrepreneurs try to induce change”. 306 Political culture and other informal institutions, according to Börzel and Risse, “facilitate domestic change in response to Europeanization. Informal institutions entail collective understandings of appropriate behavior that strongly influence the ways in which domestic actors respond to Europeanization pressures. First, a consensus-oriented or cooperative decision-making culture helps to overcome multiple veto points by rendering
302 Vedran Džihi ć, Dieter Segert and Angela Wieser, “The Crisis of Representative Democracy in the Post- Yugoslav Region. Discrepancies of Elite Policies and Citizens’ Expectations”, 36 (1) Journal Southeastern Europe (2011), pp. 87-110. 303 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe”, in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 57-82, at 60. 304 Ibid. 305 Ibid. 306 Ibid. Börzel and Risse distinguished between two types of norm- and idea-promoting agents: (i) epistemiccommunities “are networks of actors with an authoritative claim to knowledge and a normative agenda. They legitimate new norms and ideas by providing scientific knowledge about cause-and-effect relationships. Epistemic communities are the more influential in inducing change, the higher the uncertainty about cause-and- effect relationships in the particular issue-area among policy-makers, the higher the consensus among the scientists involved, and the more scientific advice is institutionalized in the policy-making process”, whereas (ii) advocacy or principled issue networks are bound together by shared beliefs and values rather than by consensual knowledge. They appeal to collectively shared norms and identities in order to persuade other actors to reconsider their goals and preferences”.
77 their use inappropriate for actors. […] Second, a consensus-oriented political culture allows for a sharing of adaptational costs which facilitates the accommodation of pressure for adaptation. Rather than shifting adaptational costs upon a social or political minority, the “winners” of domestic change compensate the ‘losers’”. 307 In conclusion, the EU uses its enlargement policy as political socialization mechanism, requiring that specific social norms and value need to be embraced and (at least formally) transposed into domestic legislations and practices of democratic institutions of the future Member States. 308
4.2. Limits of the EU Conditionality on Democratization
The entire European unification project represents a model of post-conflict integration. It came into being in the aftermath of the Second World War, with an objective of establishment of long-lasting peace and reconciliation among formerly warring nations. The European Coal and Steel Community put in place in 1952, an initial seed of the today’s EU, was built around both economic and political goals. Europe on the whole managed to put aside the harsh atrocities of the Second World War, and its common economic and political project played a main role in properly addressing and putting aside monsters of nationalism and inter-ethnic hatred. In an almost sixty year long history, the EU went through a continuous widening and deepening, adjusting its institutional mechanisms to the increased needs of the Union and its Member States. 309 The international organization that originally comprised of six countries, after five successive enlargements, has grown into 27 Member States. Both through its enlargement policy and the neighbourhood policy, the EU has established itself as an actor capable of influencing the rules that govern political entities beyond its jurisdiction. Namely, the EU attached conditions to aid, trade, and political
307 Ibid. 308 See e.g. Heather Grabbe, The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Cornell University Press, 2005); Paul Blokker, “Multiple democracies: political cultures and democratic variety in post-enlargement Europe”, 14 (2) Contemporary Politics (2008), pp. 161-178; Frank Schimmelfennig, “EU enlargement and international socialization” in Fergus Carr and Andrew Massey (eds.), Public policy and the new European agendas (Edwarde Elgar Publishin, 2006), pp. 81-98. 309 Founding treaties of the EU represent a set of binding agreements between EU Member States, setting out EU objectives, rules for EU institutions, how decisions are made and the relationship between the EU and its Member States. See the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (1951), the Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) (1957), as amended by the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty on EU (1992), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Treaty of Nice (2000), the Lisbon Treaty (2007), available at
78 relations from 1988 onwards. 310 This ability to ‘reproduce itself’ outside of its own borders has been documented in various policies that are being ‘exported’ or ‘promoted’. 311 From its inception, the European Economic Community stipulated that it was open to all European democratic states and “advocated the universality of its democratic, pluralist, and liberal values and principles”. 312 The first materialization of a tangible political conditionality, 313 in this still ‘preliminary phase’,314 might be traced back to 1961, when the European Parliamentary Assembly unanimously adopted the report drawn up on behalf of the Political Committee on the political and institutional aspects of the accession to or association with the European Economic Community. This, so called Birkelbach Report, pronounced that only those states guaranteeing truly democratic practices and respect for human rights and fundamental liberties would be admitted into the European Community. 315 In late 1973 the European Community introduced the concept of European identity into its common foreign relations. 316 In that moment, principles of democracy, the rule of law, representative democracy, social justice and respect for human rights were established as fundamental elements of European identity and recognized as values and principles which this organization is also promoting outside its borders.317 The EU, perceived as the union of shared values and ideas, aims at attracting countries that are sharing not only a common European past, but also respect the principles and values that are in the core of the Union. The Union is moreover “founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to
310 Karen Elizabeth Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?”, 3 European Foreign Affairs Review (1997), pp. 253-274. 311 Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The EU as a Global Actor (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), at 249. 312 Othon Anastasakis, op.cit. (2008), at 367. 313 Conditionality can be defined as the “use of fulfilment of stipulated political conditions as a prerequisite for obtaining economic aid, debt relief, most-favoured nation treatment, subsidized credit, or membership in coveted regional or global organizations”.Philip Schmitter, “International Context and Consolidation”, in Laurence Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford University Press, 2001). 314 Geoffrey Pridham, “Unfinished business? Eastern enlargement and democratic conditionality”, 36 FRIDE Working Paper (2007), available at
79 minorities” 318 . These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. 319 Consequently, the acceptance of very same principles and values is requested for the membership in the EU. 320 The state aspiring to the EU membership must furthermore be committed to promoting those values within their jurisdiction. 321 The first articulated pre-accession political conditionality was applied during the pre- accession of the post-dictatorial Southern European states: Greece, Spain and Portugal. They were requested to support pluralist democracy, liberal constitution and free elections. This initial political conditionality had its justification in the Single European Act, which, in its preamble, made reference to “the principles of democracy and compliance with the law and with human rights” to which the Member States are attached.” 322 When the neutral EFTA countries were joining in 1995, the Commission did not require democratic and market economy conditions, for the simple fact that those countries were functional market economies and had democratic political systems in place. The Commission, however, required in the fourth enlargement wave the entire acquis communautaire to be accepted, including the common foreign and security policy, in advance to the accession. Therferore, already in earlier waves of enlargement, the Union “has expanded its regulatory framework into candidate countries and has undoubtedly contributed to the democratic consolidation of new member states”.323 However, then “it was enough for the applicant State to demonstrate to the Communities that ‘its Constitution guarantees’ the existence of pluralistic democracy
318 Article 49 of the Treaty on EU. Consolidated versions of the Treaty on EU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Official Journal C 83, 30.3.2010, available at
80 and protection of human rights in order to meet this requirement”. 324 The EU continued with much vigour to apply political conditionality vis-à-vis the post-communist CEE and Baltic countries, producing ‘transformative power’ that strengthened democracy in those new Member States. The EU accession of Spain, Portugal, and Greece was assessed as having contributed to the consolidation of democracy in those countries since a membership prospective in, of that time, the European Community, helped in creating the critical domestic masses in the push toward democracy in those three countries. Similarly, EU membership proved essential for inspiring democratic changes and allowed for rapid and to a great extent effective institutional system transformation that reflects and puts into action EU rules, values and principles in former socialist CEE countries throughout the 1990s and in the first decade of the 2000s. In both cases, the establishment of democratic institutions was a requisite for securing the economic benefits of membership in this particular European international organization. The EU-conducted process of international socialization was, at the most, comprehensively and systematically applied with respect to the accession of the CEE countries to the EU, which was “not only the biggest but also the most complex and elaborate enlargement round in the history of the EU.” 325 Formal democratic conditions for those countries were imposed for the first time in 1993 by the European Council in Copenhagen 326 in order to overcome opposition from several Member States to Eastward enlargement. 327 Heather Grabbe found the pre-accession conditions “self-evident, a set of ‘motherhood and apple pie’ criteria to which no self-respecting European could object [and ] essential to reassure EU states that the Central and Eastern European countries will-if they become members-look like familiar, west European countries, not bringing instability, authoritarianism, or economic collapse into the Union”. 328 According to Stephan Renner and Florian Trauner pre-accession conditionality “constitutes a rigid form of external governance
324 Dimitry Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2008), at 34. 325 Frank Schimmelfennig and Florian Traunerin, op.cit. (2009), at 1. 326 European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993 - Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 180/1/93 REV 1, available at
81 since it consists precisely of aligning the candidate countries with the EU acquis ”. 329 Schimmelfennig and Traunerin argued that such complex conditionality “resulted from the fact that the EU’s acquis itself had become more complex and demanding than in earlier times. Above all, however, it reflects the situation that the CEE candidates for membership still had to grapple with their double and in some cases triple transformation from (1) autocracy to democracy, (2) planned economy to market economy, and (3) multinational to independent statehood, when they embarked upon the path to EU membership.” 330 They in addition asserted that in this enlargement wave the EU considered special attention to political conditions, additional requirements beyond the acquis (such as protection of national minorities or administrative reform), and detailed and continued monitoring imperative.” 331 Rory Domm claimed that the EU conditionality can be depicted as an “ ad hoc acquis democratique ”. 332 In a bit different manner, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier distinguished between two main forms of conditionality applied in CEE countries: democratic conditionality and acquis conditionality. Whereas the former concerns the general EU rules of liberal democracy, the later concerns the specific rules of the EU acquis communautiare .333 Those authors argued that the first set of conditionality starts to apply even before the formal relationship of the EU and a prospective member initiates, whereas the acquis related democracy conditionality “sets in once the candidate countries start to prepare for full membership” 334 becoming “the major external incentive for rule adoption”. 335 Similar to this vein, Ian Manners distinguished between aquis politique that comprises of commonly accepted political standards, norms, and practices and technical acquis communautaire , which requires transposition of EU legislative corpus. 336 The accession criteria required a candidate country to have: (1) stable institutions that are able to enforce legislation and who primarily assures that democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities is assured; (2) a functioning market economy that will be able to cope with the pressure of competition and the market forces set by the EU; and (3) the ability to assume the obligations of membership, that is being assessed
329 Stephan Renner and Florian Trauner, “Creeping EU Membership in South-east Europe: The Dynamics of EU Rule Transfer to the Western Balkans”, 31(4) Journal of European Integration (2009), pp. 449-465, at 451. 330 Frank Schimmelfennig and Florian Traunerin, op.cit. (2009), at 1. 331 Ibid. 332 Rory Domm, “Europeanization without Democratization: A Critique of the International Community Peacebuilding Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovin”, 7 (1) Black Sea Studies (2007), pp. 159-176, at 3. 333 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), at 211. 334 Ibid. , at 212. 335 Ibid. 336 Ian Manners, “Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?”, 40 ( 2) Journal of Common Market Studies (2002) , pp. 235-258.
82 by transposition of EU norms into domestic legal system, by building up a professional and functioning public administration that is able to implement both national and supra-national legislation. It is considered that the political criteria are met if the country is a parliamentary democracy with a solid and stable constitutional and legislative framework, largely in line with European principles and standards. It is welcomed if there is a general consensus on the goal of EU membership among different political options in the country. The effectiveness and stability of democratic institutions should be sufficiently achieved. Parliamentary institutions and procedures should function properly, meaning that the parliament exercises effective oversight and control over the government and scrutinizes its legislative development efficiently. The country should be strongly committed to regional cooperation; play a constructive regional role and participate actively in regional initiatives. Bilateral relations with neighbours should be good. The legislative pre-accession criterion requires the candidate country to incorporate all of the EU's laws and standards into its national legislation before they join the EU, i.e. to make EU law part of its own legislation and implement it from the moment of the accession. The Community acquis is a body of common binding norms and obligations agreed at the level of the EU that is to be respected by the Member States. The acquis is formally constituted of (1) the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; (2) the legislation adopted in application of the treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice; (3) the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; (4) measures relating to the common foreign and security policy; (5) measures relating to justice and home affairs; (6) international agreements concluded by the Community and those concluded by the Member States between themselves in the field of the Union’s activities. 337 The Copenhagen accession conditions were subsequently strengthened and expanded by the Madrid European Council in 1995, where it was stated that a candidate country must also be able to put the EU rules and procedures into effect. 338 In other words, the candidate country is requested to put up the administrative conditions for accession into the EU, by adapting, reforming and upgrading its administrative structures. The conditionality emphasizes the importance of EU legislation implementation, just as much as through
337 Both academic and popular literature often recalled that the constantly evolving acquis communautaire contained more than 80,000 pages of EU treaties, directives, regulations, resolutions and judicial decisions already in respect of the fifth enlargement wave that enlarged the EU in May 2004. See Alina Kaczorowska, EU Law (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2010), at 68. See also Christine Delcourt, “The Acquis Communautaire : Has the Concept Had Its Day?“, 38 Common Market Law Review (2001), pp. 829-870. 338 The 1995 Madrid European Council referred to the need “to create the conditions for the gradual, harmonious integration of [the applicant] countries, particularly through the development of the market economy, the adjustment of their administrative structures and the creation of a stable economic and monetary environment.” See Madrid European Council 15 and 16 December 1995 - Presidency Conclusions, available at
83 ‘harmonisation’, i.e. its transposition into national legislation, as it ensures that the EU legislation becomes implemented and enforced effectively through the appropriate administrative and judicial structures of an applicant country. In addition to political and administrative criteria, the Union’s capacity to absorb new members was attached the pre- accession conditionality. Dimitry Kochenov reminded that “adoption of Regulation 622/98 made the Copenhagen political criteria de facto legally enforceable, since the pre-accession financial assistance awarded to the candidate countries was made directly dependant on their progress towards meeting the criteria”. 339 The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 made for the first time an explicit link between fulfillment of democracy conditionality and the start of negotiations. 340 In turn, conditionality induced Europeanization developed in the pre-accession criteria was subsequently enforced through the regular annual reports that oversee implementation of conditionality, through the accession negotiations processes. Pointing towards the ‘asymmetry of interdependence’ in the pre-accession period, Grabbe reminded that the CEE countries “had little to offer the EU, given their tiny economic size. They also had little to bargain with because of the strong desire of their political elites to join - even if public opinion was subject to greater fluctuation. This asymmetry of interdependence allowed the EU to set the rules of the game in the accession conditionality”. 341 Grabbe however underlined that the EU had envisadged hardly any coercive sanctions against undemocratic practices of CEE countries in the course of the accession; they were merely threatened with the exclusion from various parts of the accession process or with withdrawal with financial assistance. Consequently, “ [t]he value of these sanctions relied entirely on how desirable inclusion in the process was to a country’s political elite; hence the EU had leverage only where a regime had at least partly bought into the aims of integration. 342 Similarly, Schimmelfennig and Traunerin explained that “EU membership was highly attractive, even
339 Dimitry Kochenov, op.cit. (2008), at 34-35. See also Council Regulation (EC) No 622/98 of 16 March 1998 on assistance to the applicant States in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of Accession Partnerships. OJ L 85, 20.3.1998, p. 1-2, available at
84 indispensable, for the CEE countries but much less so for the old Member States. This constellation gave the EU the necessary bargaining power to dictate the terms of accession for the candidates and to enforce its conditionality. In addition, selective invitations to accession negotiations in 1997 and 1999 lent the EU’s accession conditionality high credibility. They demonstrated that, whereas the EU was serious about Eastern enlargement, non-compliant applicants would not be considered. To the extent that EU rules were clear and determinate, and the EU signaled that adopting them was necessary to complete the accession negotiations, the EU was able to overcome potential domestic opposition and ensure pervasive rule adoption in the candidate countries.” 343 Explaining the complexity of political conditionality applied upon candidate countries of the latest two enlargement waves, Schimmelfennig and Traunerin argued “this process has never before been accompanied by such extensive programming, conditionality, and monitoring as in Eastern enlargement.” 344 Othon Anastasakis argued that it was the post- communist environment of CEE countries which “led the EU to place political criteria at the core of its conditionality, firmly specifying them once again in Copenhagen and laying explicitly the non-negotiable side of political conditionality: pluralist and multi-party democracy, respect for human and minority rights, rule of law, independence of civil society, freedom of expression, separation of powers, and civilian control over the military, among others. The scope of political conditionality has since increased to include further criteria such as the fight against corruption, social and cultural rights, and good neighbourly relations among states”. 345 Besides, CEE enlargement process required to some extent also a socio- cultural value adjustment, because the EU considered that the prevalence of authoritarian socio-cultural values in those countries would not be compatible with democratic values that are prevalent in the Member States. Anastasakis explained that “political conditionality is linked with political transformation and reform that claims to be EU-compatible and seeks convergence with the norms and practices of the EU, and in the long run leads to democratic consolidation and a better-quality democracy”. 346 He furthermore noted a dual character of political conditionality. For him, EU political conditionality “is a strategy with both a substantive and an operational dimension”. 347 The substantive dimension of political conditionality refers to the establishment of political criteria being made in advance, which requires acceptance of the
343 Frank Schimmelfennig and Florian Traunerin, op.cit. (2009), at 1. 344 Ibid. 345 Othon Anastasakis, op.cit. (2008), at 367. 346 Ibid. 347 Ibid.
85 values, standards, demands and obligations. It requires adoption and implementation of pre- accession political criteria in advance to the accession. The operational dimension concerns the way the pre-accession political conditionality is operated through deadlines, thresholds, and the practice of pressure from abroad. According to Anastasakis, both dimensions affect the outcome of political transformation. 348 The CEE enlargement of the EU was nevertheless perceived as threatening the EU institutional system’s capacity more than any of the preceding enlargements, since it has led to a diminishing of the economic and social cohesion and the growth of the socio-economic disparities, as the new member States were as a rule, economically underdeveloped. Bruno De Witte, inter alia, suggested the accession implies that “[e]ach new member state also brings new practices of political and administrative culture, which again complicates (at least in a first period of adaptation) the informal patterns of EU decision-making.” 349 Though Eurocrats are sometimes accused of not being able to explain why further EU enlargement is beneficial to common people, the enlargement of CEE countries was not only beneficial to acceding countries but it paid off for the Union and its Member States. That is because “[e]nlargement serves the EU’s strategic interests in stability, security and conflict prevention. It has helped to increase prosperity and growth opportunities, to improve links with vital transport and energy routes, and to increase the EU's weight in the world.” 350 The effects of the fifth enlargement of the EU are positively assessed by the Commission. It namely claims that the latest enlargement has “helped to consolidate democracy and the rule of law in Europe [and ] has enhanced economic opportunities and increased the weight of the EU in tackling global challenges such as climate change, competitiveness and the regulation and supervision of financial markets.” 351 Besides, the Commission considers “enlargement is one of the most effective foreign policy instruments of the EU.” 352 Heather Grabbe though warned that “both EU and CEE policy-makers tended to exaggerate the extent of EU influence for political purposes. Both the main sources for evidence of Europeanisation (i.e. actors in EU institutions
348 Ibid. Explaining the transformative power of the EU in South-Eastern Europe Othon Anastasakis opted “to use the term ‘political conditionality’ instead of ‘democratic conditionality’ in order to emphasize the notion of political transformation, and less so that of ‘democratization’”. 349 Bruno De Witte, “Anticipating the Institutional Consequences of Expanded Membership of the EU”, 23 (3) International Political Science Review (2002), pp. 235-248, at 236. 350 Commission of the European Communities, Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key- documents/reports_nov_2008/strategy_paper_incl_country_conclu_en.pdf, 12. 351 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010, COM(2009) 533, Brussels, 14.10.2009, available at
86 and candidate country governments) had a vested interest in claiming that the EU was the principal driver of most reforms. CEE officials tended to talk up the EU’s role to emphasise the scale of preparations and how ready they were, and to blame the EU for unpopular reforms. On the EU side, both officials and politicians liked to promote enlargement as a commitment device in post-communist transition, claiming that the Union was the principal driver of beneficial political and economic reforms in CEE”. 353 The EU’s enlargement process was seriously hampered in 2005, after the voters in France and the Netherlands turned down the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. 354 Subsequently, the official enlargement policy re-enumerated criterion of ‘absorption capacity’ with more elaboration. 355 After it became obvious that the draft Constitution for Europe would never became ratified in certain Member States, ‘period of reflection’ on the future of Europe was proclaimed, intending to start a process of debate with European citizens on the future of the EU 356 In 2007 a compromise was agreed on, convening an inter-governmental conference (IGC) to prepare a reform treaty for the EU. 357 The Treaty of Lisbon was eventually signed on 13 December 2007. 358 Provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon dealing with enlargement prescribe that Union’s institutional framework should allow a smooth adaptation of the Union’s institutions once a new Member State joins the EU. Finally, the Lisbon Treaty strengthens the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments in the accession
353 Heather Grabbe, op.cit. (2006), at 48. 354 The Constitutional Treaty was adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the Brussels European Council on 17 and 18 June 2004 and signed in Rome on 29 October 2004. The Constitutional Treaty rejection at the referenda held in two old Member Ststes caused a grave setback for the process of European integration and signalled a clear enlargement fatigue. On this see e.g. Boyka Stefanova, “The ‘No’ Vote in the French and Dutch Referenda on the EU Constitution: A Spillover of Consequences for the Wider Europe”, 39 (2) PS: Political Science and Politics (2006), pp. 251-255; Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, “The End of Europe?”, 84 (6) Foreign Affairs (2005), pp. 55-67; Richard Whitman, “No and after: Options for Europe”, 81 (4) International Affairs (2005), pp. 673-687. 355 The November 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper of the European Commission defined it as the “capacity to act and decide according to a fair balance within institutions; respect budgetary limits and implement common policies that function well and achieve their objectives”. Communication from the Commission - 2005 enlargement strategy paper, COM(2005) 561 final, 9.11.2005, available at
87 procedure since both must be notified of each membership application. This right had been set in the Treaty on EU and subsequently reaffirmed in the text of the Lisbon Treaty, which stated that “ [t]he European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.” In spite of the enlargement fatigue, the EU has received a number of new applications for membership: by Croatia in 2003, Macedonia in 2005, Montenegro in December 2008, Albania in April 2009, Iceland in July 2009 and Serbia in December 2009. These applications demonstrate the attractivity of the EU membership persists and reinforcesthe EU role in promoting stability, security and prosperity outside of its current borders.
4.3. Democratic Consolidaiton of the Western Balkans through Stabilisation and Integration
Sonja Grimm and Wolfgang Merkel established that embedding democratization in post-war and post-conflict societies entails a comprehensive agenda of political, social, and economic methods of peace-building. 359 Indeed, conflict prevention and peace building can be successful only if they start in parallel in three key sectors: the creation of a secure environment, the promotion of sustainable democratic systems, and the promotion of economic and social well-being. Progress in all three sectors is necessary for sustainable peace and democracy. However, criticizers of conventuional conditionality assert that democratic consolidation in the post-conflict multiethnic states requires different approaches of that promoted through argued that the ‘traditional’ or CEE conditionality. Gülnur Aybet and Florian Bieber emphasized that ‘conventional conditionality’ is not applicable to post- conflict societies. 360 According to them, existence of local norms at the domestic level and “a
359 Sonja Grimm and Wolfgang Merkel, “War and Democratization: Legality, Legitimacy and Effectiveness”, 15 (3) Democratization (2008), pp. 457-471. See also Wolfgang Merkel and Sonja Grimm (eds.), War and Democratization. Legality, Legitimacy and Effectiveness (London/New York: Routledge, 2009). 360 Gülnur Aybet and Florian Bieber “From Dayton to Brussels: The Impact of EU and NATO Conditionality on State Building in Bosnia & Hercegovina”, in Florian Bieber (ed.), EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), pp.137-163, at 137.
88 rational, unified elite, with a common vision for the country” 361 are prerequisites that make possible “the ‘engagement’ of local or domestic norms with international one” 362 what subsequently results in external socialization. Similalry is argued by Tina Freyburg and Solveig Richter who considered that the external democracy promotion applied in the EU’s political conditionality is not able to trigger democratic change in countries burdened with legacies of ethnic conflict. According to them, democratic change is then only possible in the course of a profound identity change. 363 Besides, Vojko Volk argued that “the standard EU carrot and stick policy in the Balkans is becoming rather ridiculous […] because there is no certainty that fulfilling criteria brings any results, and secondly because carrot and stick policies don’t work in multi-ethnic states like Bosnia and Herzegovina. The carrot for one ethnic group may be the stick for the other, and vice versa.” 364 The EU, due to its geographic proximity, as well as the attractiveness of EU membership of the Western Balkan countries, nevertheless has stepped into the post-conflict stage and designed a whole new accession policy for the region. The EU approach towards the Western Balkans, once elaborated, simultaneously encompassed two dimensions: primarily one of stabilisation, and consequently of association. Othon Anastasakis’ definition of the South East European style of Europeanization “attacks old habits, transforms political cultures, and sets new rules of the game”. 365 Acknowledging pro-European consensus in of all the Western Balkan countries, Anastasakis warned, however, that Europeanization might polarize the Western Balkan states and societies since “it threatens the status quo, attacks old habits, transforms political cultures, and sets new rules of the game”. 366 According to him, Europeanization in this particular region should be perceived “as an increasingly demanding, externally driven, and coercive process of domestic and regional change brought about by the EU. Europeanization is internalized differently by the various states or national actors in the Balkans, and its degree of success relies on their ability and willingness to change”. 367 Anastasakis in addition argued that without the EU pressure exerted through political
361 Ibid. , at 142. 362 Ibid. , at 159. 363 Tina Freyburg and Solveig Richter, “National identity matters. The limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkans”, 17 (2) Journal of European Public Policy (2010), pp. 263-281. 364 Vojko Volk, “Volk on Heather Grabbe’s "Getting the EU's Enlargement back on Track”, available at
89 conditionality, many of the domestic changes would have not taken place, or would have taken a longer time to happen. 368 The Union’s assitance in long-term state and democracy-building in the Balkans, contributing to its stabilisation as well as the democratic consolidation, initiated the early framework policies for the Western Balkans in mid-1990s. However, in June 1999, realizing that the previously introduced tailor-made policies for the Balkans, Regional Approach 369 and the Stability Pact,370 could serve merely as interim steps towards membership and further stabilisation of the region, the EU initiated the EU Stabilization and Association process (SAp) for countries of South-Eastern Europe. 371 The EU stared the SAp for five countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro), arriving in the course of following ten years to seven (the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro dissolved into independent Serbia and Montenegro in 2006, whereas in 2008 Kosovo declared independence from Serbia). Being a wide pre-accession policy, the SAp has three elaborated aims: (1) to stabilise the countries and encouraging their swift transition to a market economy, (2) to promote regional cooperation and (3) to result in eventual membership of the EU. Based on incentives and meeting of conditions, the countries of the region are being rewarded for the reform progress through financial and human resources. 372 The stabilisation dimension assumed political and economic conditions. Those conditions, inter-alia , require state building, good governance, administrative and judicial
368 Ibid . 369 The primary objectives of the regional approach, laid down in 1996, were to support the implementation of the Dayton/Paris and Erdut peace agreements, and to create an area of political stability and economic prosperity by: (i) establishing and maintaining democracy and the rule of law; (ii) ensuring respect for minorities and human rights; and (iii) reviving economic activity. Therefore, the first tailor-made policy approach for the region intended to both improve political stability and allow for economic development and re-emergence of regional cooperation. See Conclusions of the General Affairs Council meeting of 26 February 1996, Press: 33 Nr: 4720/96, available at
90 reform, rule of law including the fight against corruption and organized crime, reconciliation, socioeconomic developments, and civil society development.373 Reform processes that shall arise from those conditions should have an impact on societies and post-conflict societal reconstruction. With respect to its integration dimension, the SAp relies on a realistic conditionality compliance expectation in advance to signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA). This palpable ‘carrot’ element in the SAP represents a contractual relationship between the EU and each Western Balkan country, offering a membership and entailing mutual rights and obligations. So far, all of the Western Balkan countries, apart from BiH 374 and Kosovo, concluded SAAs. 375 Once they signed the SAA, the countries were allowed into a free trade area with the EU and the associated disciplines (competition and state aid rules, intellectual property, etc.) and benefits (e.g. rights of establishment). As a result of this market liberalisation, the rise of the economic standard in the (potential) candidate countries is expected. Consequently, economic growth should also result in the shift in orientations towards democratic values. Obviously, apart from backing the economies of the region by integrating them into the EU, the SAp has a political component too. By evoking political conditionality, it expects that the (potential) candidate countries subscribe to the EU legislation, but also to embrace the common European values that entail respect for democracy, the rule of law, human and minority rights, solidarity, constituting the very foundations of the Union. In addition to these fundamental values, peaceful resolution of conflicts and regional co-operation are principles of the highest importance, to which the EU requires commitment in this pre-accession period. Several of the countries of the region went further on in the pre-accession procedure. Croatia is, for the time being, the only acceding country with a prospective membership as of
373 See e.g. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Western Balkans: Enhancing the European perspective, COM(2008) 127 final, 5.3.2008, available at
91 1 July 2013 since it closed all negotiating chapters and signed the Accession Agreement. Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are the official candidate countries for membership. Montenegro is the only remaining country of the region that is involved in formal negotiations for the membership. Macedonia, although being the first country of the region to whom the official candidate status was granted back in late 2005, has not been given a recent starting date for negotiations due to Greece’s objection on the country’s official name. Although Albania applied for membership on 28 April 2009, it is still waiting for the Commission’s decision to grant the candidate status. Kosovo, whose statehood is still not recognized by several EU Member States, has nevertheless been offered the European perspective since the EU’s commitment to Kosovo was reinforced through numerous documents and policies. 376 Although it lacks the full international recognition, and obviously belongs to “intermediate spaces between the inside and outside of the Union”, i.e. “near abroad”, 377 Kosovo is participating in the SAp and the Commission issued a feasibility study for a SAA between the EU and Kosovo in October 2012. 378 Given that the international monitoring of this country ended in September of 2012, it is reasonable to expect that the EU opens up a more intensive relationship with the Kosovo authorities. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi described above demonstrated mixture and complexity of accession statuses as the ‘twilight zone of accession’. 379 Though divergence of accession statuses stipulates that the Union indeed acknowledges individual achievements (in democratic consolidation, economic and societal reforms etc.) of the (potential) candidate countries, by the inconsistency in the accession process (e.g. enduring candidate status of Macedonia without the negotiations commencement, delayed candidacy status for Albania)
376 Communication from the Commission, “A European Future for Kosovo”, COM(2005) 156 final, 20.4.2005, available at
92 the Union itself contributes to unpredictability in the region. 380 However, more than a decade after the SAp was established, the progress in EU integration of the Western Balkans is still overshadowed by a fragile stabilisation of several countries in the region. Othon Anastasakis’s description of the Western Balkans as a region that “suffers from normative contradictions, and [where] the notions of security, justice, human rights, and minority protection have different, often conflicting meanings for the different ethnic groups or states” 381 describes well the situation that pose challenges to the successful implementation of the political conditionality. Anastasakis furthermore draws attention to the fact that “[a]s a rule, most parties feel themselves to be victims of the injustices of the other ethnic group or of external actors; the allegations differ completely, depending on which side is making a claim. The notion of international justice and cooperation with ICTY, for example, has a different meaning for Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks (Muslims), or Kosovo Albanians. Most Serbs feel that the international community is laying the blame squarely and unjustly on them for the wars and the crimes of the 1990s. Kosovo Albanians feel that they have the right to independent statehood as a result of the atrocities committed against their people during the Miloševi ć period. Bosniak (Muslims) feel that they have been the weaker and the most severely hit ethnic group during the wars in Bosnia. Finally, Croats argue that they had every right to defend their territory from Serb aggression during the wars of Croatian secession and should not be punished for that”. 382 Anastasakis aditionally noted that “[w]ithin such a contradictory climate, it is difficult to establish a common sense of objective historical truth, regional justice, a satisfactory solution to the return of refugees or a common understanding of good neighbourly relations”. 383 Máire Braniff noted that, as a result of the simultaniety of conflict transformation, state weakness and state building, the Western Balkans region is subjected “to extensive political conditionality and socialization, which has traditionally been outside the scope of any EU policies”. 384 Indeed, the Copenhagen political criteria are also to be followed by the Western Balkan (potential) candidate countries. 385 The speed with which each Western Balkans country advances depends solely “on its individual merits and success in establishing
380 Ibid. 381 Othon Anastasakis, op.cit. (2008), at 370. 382 Ibid. , at 370-371. 383 Ibid. , at 371. 384 Máire Braniff, Integrating the Balkans: Conflict Resolution and the Impact of EU Expansion (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011), at 385 See e.g. Frank Schimmelfenning, “EU Political Conditionality After the 2004 Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness”, 15 (6) Journal of European Public Policy (2008), pp. 918-937; Diane Éthier, “Promotion de la démocratie dans les Balkans: L'efficacité inégale de la conditionnalité et des incitatifs”, 39 (4) Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique (2006), pp. 803-825.
93 a track record of achievements in addressing reform priorities”. 386 The European Commission highlighted the importance of meeting the conditionality criteria in the region, hoping that its enlargement policy will “demonstrate its power of transformation in the region where states are weak and societies divided”. 387 Through the activities of the European Commission and its delegations in the (potential) candidate countries the EU is interfering in the domestic politics of the Western Balkan countries. The conditionality interference takes place principally by putting pressure on national political and administrative elites to comply with the criteria and to lesser extent through various projects implemented with the help of civil society organizations in the countries of the region. This implies that the EU integration practice pursued throughout the CEE relies predominantly on the cooperation of governing elites of the EU and applicant countries. 388 For example, Vedran Đihi ć and Angela Wieser found that the EU conditionality on democratization in the Western Balkans is inherently formal and elite driven. According to them, “ [t]his inherently top-down process, at least in the Western Balkans, provides limited incentives to citizens to participate in the reforms”. 389 They furthermore argue that “the conditions offer few tangible ‘carrots’ and rewards for citizens. Before the country actually joins the EU, citizens feel little tangible progress toward the long- term objectives of increased living standards, prosperity, decreased corruption or freedom of movement. The legislative and administrative reforms provide little ‘short-term’ improvement for citizens, due to the fact that formal change only slowly translates into institutional reality and even when it does, the benefits for citizens are often not immediate”. 390 Allan Tatham’s remark on the conditionality compliance in the Western Balkans as implying both the eligibility and the capacity to accede is accurately depicting the new austerity of the pre-accession political conditionality. 391 Othon Anastasakis asserted quite a harsh criticism towards a political conditionality policy for the Western Balkans and warned that “the EU is using normative claims, as they are practiced and understood by Western states, in its effort not just to convince the people in the region of the rightfulness of the
386 Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Western Balkans: Enhancing the European perspective”, SEC(2008) 288, COM(2008) 127 final, available at
94 criteria, but also as a means to interfere more legitimately in the internal affairs of local governments, as the administrator, the arbiter, and the bearer of moral values”. 392 He reminded that “political conditionality [often ] generates reaction, polarization and a sense of injustice in most Western Balkan countries, especially when it touches upon nationally sensitive matters and unresolved post-conflict issues”. 393 According to him, “[t]he Western Balkan region reveals special trends in the EU’s handling of the strategy of political conditionality, and some creeping contradictions and dangers are beginning to reveal the changing nature and the limits of conditionality. More specifically, the EU (a) is adding further, yet necessary, political conditions and criteria to weaker or more reluctant partners and emphasizes the ‘journey’ rather than the outcome of accession, affecting the credibility of the strategy; (b) is blending together normative, functional and realpolitik claims in the choice of its conditions, affecting the clarity of its intentions; (c) is pursuing, in some cases, a rigorous assessment of compliance and, in other cases, a more adaptable and pragmatic assessment, affecting the consistency of the process”. 394 Dimitry Kochenov, who analsed entire CEE enlargement process with respect to democracy promotion in aceeding states, argued that “[c]onditionality can only become a true principle of enlargement, when the whole accession process is mostly moved away from the sphere of politics into the realm of the law”. 395 The practice of mere political decisions on the side of Memebr States when awarding progress in accession-negotations, instead of a firm legal compliance, confirms that the very same democratization ambuiquity applied in the CEE enlargement is beingpursued throughout the Western Balkans accession. Namely, identical criticism of thone that was voiced over the European Commission’s pre-accessment of democracy in CEE countries, (that, inter alia, ascerted that tresholds for meeting the Copenhagen criterion of democracy were too low and subsequently too easily acknowledged country as a functioning democracy; absence of stabdards that the candidate country would need to comply with; superficial analysis of the democratization efforts in the progress reports; lack of clarity about the benchmarks; unequvivocal scrutinizing of application of conditionality in diffrerent countries) 396 can be applied in the assessment of the pre- accessment of democracy in the Western Balkans countries. Not surprisingly, the EU applies the equal assessment methodology introducd in the CEE enlargement for the countries of the
392 Othon Anastasakis, op.cit. (2008), at 371. 393 Ibid. , at 365-366. 394 Ibid. , at 366. 395 Dimitry Kochenov, op.cit. (2008), at 312. 396 Ibid. , at 300-3011.
95 Western Balkans. Same as in the previous enlargement vawes, 397 the European Council ultimately decides on the application of pre-accession conditionality. 398 Accomplishment of democratic, economic and institutional reforms and compliance with conditionality is an essential element for receiving financial assistance in the pre-accession period. If a (potential) candidate country fails to respect the accession criteria, or when progress toward fulfilment of the accession criteria is insufficient, the Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may take appropriate steps with regard to any assistance granted. Conseqently, the non-compliance with the political conditionality might result in hindering of the pre-accession process, either through suspension of financial assistance or by blocking progress in the accession proccess. In Heather Grabbe’s words, “[u]se of the gate-keeping sanction becomes more controversial as countriesget closer to membership [what was, for example, manifested when] the EU stopped a candidate from starting accession negotiation sbecause of non-fulfilment of the political criteria in 2005, when Croatia was told that it could not begin negotiations as planned on17 March because it had not fully complied with the InternationalCriminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia”. 399 Therefore, a satisfactory track record in implementing pre-accession political conditionality is an essential element for each country’s progress towards EU membership. (Potential) candidate’s advancement in the accession process (e.g. the signing of the SAA, lifting up the visa regime with the EU Member States, granting the candidate status, opening of the negotiations, closing the negotiation, ratifying the Accession Treaty) is being granted upon demonstration of the (potential) candidate country’s readiness to meet the pre-accesssion criteria. The EU Member States have mandated the European Commission to report on progress in enlargement policy. The assessment of democracy in the pre-accession period is being scrutinized by the European Commission. Through a set of EU enlargement related documents, the Commisssion reports on the progress achieved over the previous year by each (potenital) candidate country. In the Progress Reports the Commission’s monitoring and assessment of what (potential) candidate country has undertaken to meet accession criteria over the previous year is assessed. Apart from serving as an overview on achieved reforms in
397 Seethe Council Regulation (EC) No 622/98 of 16 March 1998 on assistance to the applicant States in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of Accession Partnerships, OJ C 48, 13. 2. 1998, p. 18. 398 Article 21 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre- Accession Assistance (IPA), OJ L 210 , 31.07.2006, p.. 82-93. 399 Heather Grabbe, op.cit. (2005), at 88.
96 the (potential) candidate countries, the annual Enlargement Strategy 400 paper outlines the Commission’s approach to on-going enlargement challenges and provides the basis for a debate on further enlargement among the Member States in the European Council. The European Council decides then unanimously about subsequent steps and further accession on the basis of each of the countries’ own merits. Apart from monitoring the accession progress through the annual progress reports and the Enlargement Strategy, application of conditionality is scrutinized in the EU sccession negotiations. That is the process by which a candidate country accedes to the EU by demonstrating its willingness and ability to adopt its legislation. The parties in the negotiations process are the candidate country on one side and the EU Member States on the other, the former being represented by a country’s administrative elite, and the latter being represented by the European Commission. One of the pre-accession conditions, whose meeting shall lead to the accession, is the adoption of the acquis communautaire . However, a candidate country does not negotiate on the acquis communautaire itself, but rather on the conditions and ways for its own legislation to be harmonised with it and on the means for its implementation. Therefore, the negotiation process actually entails the process of subscribing to the values and to the legal, economic and social system of the EU. For the purpose of the accession negotiations, the EU legislation is divided into 35 subject-related chapters. 401 By including fundamental rights in the negotiating chapters, they started being treated as the acquis rather than solely the political criteria concerning implementation of human rights and the protection of minorities. The minority pre-accession criterion is enlisted and negotiated in the Chapter 23, dealing with ‘Judiciary and Fundamental Rights’. The accession negotiations with the (potential) candidates of the Western Balkans have become stringent in comparison to the former ones. The new negotiations’ approach puts a stronger focus on the rule of law, fight against corruption, but requiring the government’s active commitment to implementation of diversity conditionality. Such harsh negotiations conditionality is demonstrated through benchmarks that needed to be met in order to open and close some of the negotiating chapters. The negotiating procedure starts with a screening exercise that has two phases: the explanatory screening and the bi-lateral screening. In the former, the Commission services explain the acquis to the administration of the candidate countries. In the latter, the administration of each country separately outlines to the
400 See e.g. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013, COM(2012) 600, 10.10.2012, available at
97 Commission services the situation in the country on the particular chapter. The screening exercise is completed with the drafting of a screening report that the Commission submits to the Council. This report summarises the legislative harmonisation and administrative adjustment of the country in the particular chapter and possibly proposes opening benchmarks.vIn further discussion of the screening report and of the opening benchmarks by the Council, the presidency sends a letter to the candidate country summarising the result of this discussion. In case the Council establishes opening benchmarks, the candidate country needs to meet them. The Commission follows this work and submits a report to the Council once it reaches the conclusion that the opening benchmarks are met. Upon agreement of the Council on the Commission’s report on the opening benchmarks, the candidate country is invited to submit its negotiating position. Taking this negotiating position into account, the Commission then submits to the Council a drafted common position that possibly includes closing benchmarks. On this basis, the Council adopts the EU common position and the chapter is opened for negotiations at the Intergovernmental Conference held between the Member States and the candidate country. After negotiations on individual chapters have been concluded, the conclusion of the negotiations is to be transferred into a legal text, the Accession Treaty. As soon as an Accession Treaty has been concluded, the candidate country is regarded as an acceding country and has the right to participate in the work of the European Council and the European Parliament and other EU institutions as an active observer. However, for the treaty to become valid, the European Parliament needs to give its consent and the European Council must reach a unanimous decision on the acceptance of the new candidate country. In addition, the candidate country and all Member States must validate the Accession Treaty, usually in ratification procedures in their national parliaments. Based on the stringent on-going negotiating framework that was for the first time applied with respect to Croatia, it is reasonable to expect in future negotiating approaches will entail even more demanding framework. What for sure has been recognized by the EU institutions is that “[t]he experience acquired from the negotiations with Croatia [is going to] be used to the benefit of future negotiations, notably in relation to the negotiating chapters on judiciary and fundamental rights and to justice, freedom and security”. 402 Already in the case of the sixth enlargement wave, that encompassed Romania and Bulgaria, stricter suspension clauses in the Accession Treaties signed in April 2005 were
402 General Affairs Council meeting, Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process, Brussels, 05.12.201, available at
98 foreseen for those two countries. Those specific safeguards were introduced in order to allow the Commission to recommend to the Council postponing the date of accession by one year if there is clear evidence that there is a serious risk that Bulgaria or Romania will be manifestly unprepared to meet the requirements of membership, which, inter alia , contain the improvement of minority protection in both of the countries concerned. Similarly, the Commission is allowed to closely monitor all commitments undertaken by Croatia in the period after the accession negotiations were finished, focusing in particular on competition policy, judiciary and fundamental rights and freedoms, security and justice. 403 In the case of Croatia, France and the Netherlands advocated the imposition of such a mechanism, in spite of objections to it on the side of the Commission and the vast majority of EU member States. Those that oppose post-negotiations monitoring argued that “[s]imilar monitoring of Bulgaria and Romania has produced few results”. 404 It is furthermore likely that the same practice will be applied in future Western Balkans accessions, contributing to the compliance with conditionality. The EU membership, however, no longer exempts a new Member State from being monitored. The pre-accession scrutinizing expanded the momentum of the accession with regard to Bulgaria and Romania. The Co-operation and Verification Mechanisms was set up for two countries that joined the Union in January 2007. A novel post-accession monitoring mechanism came into being due to “a sense that these two new member states from the Balkans were less prepared for the integration tasks ahead compared with previous enlargements. This mood of doubt and caution concerning these two countries was not new for it had followed their evolving record on conditionality matters during the accession process, that is over European political standards, economic reforms and ‘the ability to assume the obligations of membership”. 405 The Co-operation and Verification Mechanism consists of half-annual monitoring reporting in which the progress assessed vis-à-vis the benchmarks set at the time of accession on judicial reform, the fight against corruption and organised crime (the later one tackling exclusively Bulgaria). The Commission issued its first reports in June 2007 and subsequently interim reports have been issued every six months. The ‘carrot’ rationality behind such treatment of (only particular) Member States is explained by a
403 See Article 36 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Croatia and the adjustments to the Treaty on EU, the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ L 112, 24.04.2012., p. 21, available at
99 determination that the progress in meeting the benchmarks and demonstrated ability to deal with corruption in the two scrutinised countries will allow their citizens to reap the full benefits of EU membership and enhance their confidence in the rule of law. The ‘stick’ component of the mechanism is contained in the option of a suspension of certain EU funds until the authorities are able to demonstrate that sound financial management structures are in place and operating effectively. To me, the fact that the two latest admitted Member States were granted the EU membership, despite obviously not meeting political conditionality, again speaks in favour of an argument that a decision on accession progress is prevalently a political decision on the side of the Commission and the Member States, not exclusively a matter of rule, norms and value compliance. Condemning strong scepticism towards CVM exerted from Brussels, the study on the impact of the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism on Romania demonstrated that it played a role in reforming the Romanian judicial system and additionally encouraged fight against corruption in that country. 406 Such a conclusion open up the possibility to apply the mechanism more vigorously in the forthcoming accessions, expanding eventually its competences also to the area of diversity management; minority rights, refugee return, investigation and prosecution of war crimes and overall societal reconciliation. In spite of the proposlas coming from a certain number of Members of the European Parliament that Croatia should be also imposed the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism too, the first Western Balkans country will be monitored only until its accession. 407 In spite of proximate Croatian accession to the EU, which for sure serves as a motivation for subsequent and much needed reform processes in the region, the insecurity of prospective membership diminishes the attractiveness of EU membership among the Westrn Balkans citizens. Besides, the considerable length of the Western Balkans EU accession process as well as its predmonant positioning towards cooperation with political and administrative elites both contribute to the failing attractiveness of the project among the Western Balkans citizens. Rightful political systems are those which are considered to be legitimate not only by elites, but by the population in general. Therefore, the adherence to European values will be successfully achieved only if both the political elites and the populations of the (potential) candidate countries hold those values legitimate. However, a
406 Romanian Centre for European Policies and Romanian Academic Society, “Worth Having It.The Effectiveness of the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism on Romania”, 16 Policy Memo (2010), available at
100 trend of emergence and consolidation of radical nationalistic political parties and agendas in the EU Member States makes the leverage of condemning nationalistic discourse and necessity to promote inter-ethnic tolerance less legitimate to apply towards the potential candidate countries.
101 5. Assessing the Second Generation Conditionality: From Post- Conflict Reconstruction to the EU Integration
What distinguishes the CEE new democracies from the Western Balkans ones is a lack of inter-ethnic violence and the delusive stability these countries continued to enjoy following the regime transformation. This stability cannot however, be explained by ethnic heterogeneity of the consolidated CEE democracies, since each and every one of these countries has ethnically diverse populations. Unlike CEE countries, diverse and multiethnic Western Balkans societies did not only undergo regime transformation in the past two decades but they also witnessed severe worsening of inter-ethnic relations due to wars and inter-ethnic conflicts. Those damaged inter-ethnic relations hinder development of interpersonal trust and endow citizens with different (and differing) expectations towards institutional performances. 408 In transitional post-conflict societies of this kind, the re-emergence of interpersonal trust plays a seminal role in overreaching inter-ethnic cleavages. Whereas Heather Grabbe distinguishes the dual purpose of the conditionality vis-à-vis the new Member States: (1) to minimize the risk of new entrants becoming politically unstable and economically burdensome to the existing Union, and (2) to ensure that the countries joining were ready to meet the entirety of EU rules, with only minimal and temporary exceptions,409 I hereby argue that the EU in the meantime came out with the third (partially explicit) rationale of the Western Balkans conditionality. By insisting on rectification of inter-ethnic conflicts and war wrongdoings, it pacifies consequently inter-ethnic relations, consolidates democracy of the Western Balkans countries and stabilises the region. Therefore, the EU has developed the second generation conditionality to be applied as the external socialisation agent. Without a solid normative ground in the acquis , what makes it resemble CEE minority rights conditionality, diversity conditionality was expanded to several policies that contribute to post-conflict ethnic diversity management. The later attribute formulates it as a tailor-made pre-accession strategy. The development of diversity conditionality for the Western Balkan countries is therefore a clear evidence that the EU went on with the ‘normative overstretch’ applied in the CEE enlargement. The second generation conditionality goes far beyond the formal criteria established by the acquis since the already normatively overstretched minority rights conditionality has been has extended to several other policy fields, e.g. refugee return,
408 Tom R. Tyler, “Public trust and confidence in legal authorities: What do majority and minority group members want from the law and legal institutions?”, 19(2) Behavioral Sciences & the Law (2001), pp. 215-235. 409 Heather Grabbe, “EU Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire ”, 23 (3) International Political Science Review (2002), 249-268, at 251. See also Heather Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006).
102 prosecution of war crimes, and reconciliation. In none of those novel criteria the EU has no direct competence, and the legitimacy of condtionality relies merely on a common set of values the EU has been founded on. In order to assess the level of the compliance with the second generation conditionality, this Chapter will first seek to identify the Western Balkans national minorities; will delve into the (symbolic) text of constitutions - whether they acknowledge the fact of a country’s ethnic diversity and whether there is legislation in place that guarantees minority protection. Subsequently, the Chapter will assess the outcomes of refugee return that constitutes a base for ethnic reconciliation, since its accomplishment increases the re-emergence of interpersonal trust in war-torn return areas. The Chapter will then briefly assess the requirement of transitional justice pursuance and its achievements to date, arguing again, that the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and punishment of wrongdoers through lawful judicial procedures promotes both interpersonal and institutional trust. The Chapter will move on to deal with the pre-accession condition that requires post- conflict societal and interstate reconciliation. Post-conflict reconciliation contributes to the re- emergence of trust between citizens and their trust in institutions. An increase in trust within and amongst post-conflict societies reflects an emergence of democratic political culture that stabilises and consolidates democracy. Finally, the Chapter provides an assessment of diversity management in the Western Balkans, vis-à-vis application of the second generation diversity conditionality.
5.1. Introduction of the First Generation Minority Conditionality for the Central and Eastern European Countries
The European continent is home to a plethora of ethnic communities; hardly one of them is situated in a single nation state. Besides, as a result of movement of people into and within this European international undertaking, the EU population is becoming increasingly diverse. However, the European ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious diversity have not since recently been acknowledged in the European Union’s legal corpus. 410 Gabriel Toggenburg rightly asserted that “ [t]he EU has become a visible player in the field of minority protection with the expansion of the enlargement perspective at the beginning of the 1990s. This, however, does not mean that the Union has not addressed the topic before. Already in the 1980s the European Parliament was addressing minority related issues in
410 On the history of EU minority policy see Bruno De Witte and Enikö Horvath, “The Many Faces of Minority Policy in the EU”, in KristinHenrard and Robert Dunbar (eds.), Synergies in Minority Protection: European and International Law Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 365-384. See also DimitryKochenov, “EU's Minority Protection”, in Will Kymlicka and Jane Boulden (eds.), International Approaches to Governing Ethnic Diversity (forthcoming in Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
103 specific resolutions.” 411 Explaining the evolvement of EU’s policies vis-à-vis minorities, Toggenburg distinguished between four phases of minority protection at the EU-level. 412 The first ‘ idealistic phase ’ was dominated by soft law resolutions of the European Parliament. Consequently, “minority protection was in this first phase articulated only in non-legally binding documents and never reached the level of legal norms and obligations. Finally this first phase of European involvement in minority issues finds its motivation not in external pressure but rather in a value-oriented role of the European Parliament.” 413 The second one, ‘the enlargement phase’ was dominated by conditionality administered by the European Commission. The third, ‘ internalization phase’ , entails four dimensions. The first, ‘political dimension’ , elaborated in new postulations by the European Parliament after the experience of Eastern enlargement and ‘ legislative dimension ’, representing the law making period that started after the Treaty of Amsterdam, equipping the EU with a broad legislative competence “to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” by “all sorts of appropriate action”. 414 The normative involvement of the EU in the area of minority protection started in this phase, and continued with the introduction of protection of persons belonging to national minorities in the EU primary law in 2009. The ‘ constitutional dimension’ is reflected through legislative references to the protection of persons belonging to national minorities introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. 415 Finally, the ‘ governance dimension ’ includes instruments that enforce the implementation of the Union's minority protection through, e.g., the “system of extended Impact Assessments, the application of the so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in areas like employment, social inclusion and integration, and the provision of new financial stimuli”. 416 In 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon, 417 which amended the EU’s two core treaties, the Treaty on EU and the Treaty establishing the European Community, introduced the term ‘minorities’ into EU primary law, “the first explicit reference to minorities in the history of
411 Gabriel N. Toggenburg, “The EU’s evolving policies vis-à-vis minorities: a play in four parts and an open end” (2008), at
104 the EU” 418 took place. By acknowledging that “respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” 419 is a value on which the Union is founded, minority rights finally got a normative justification at the level of the EU. 420 However, the Treaty of Lisbon neither defined the term ‘minority’ nor recognised specific rights of persons belonging to minorities. The wording of the Lisbon Treaty, by using the term ‘persons belonging to’ minorities, indicate that “the EU is concerned about the individual right to equality of all persons, taking account of their individual situation” 421 and not by collective or group rights. On the contrary, there are positions that argue that the Treaty of Lisbon does not provide the EU with new legislative competences that would allow formation of an overarching EU minority protection policy. Such a standpoint, voiced from the Fundamentals Rights Agency, considered that minority protection “remains a transversal task that the EU can or must pursue in a variety of policy contexts”. 422 Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon requires that the EU combats social exclusion horizontally. 423 The Treaty of Lisbon has furthermore endowed the Union with an obligation to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation not only in the context of its anti-discrimination policy, but whenever “defining and implementing [any] of its policies and activities”. 424 This as well created legislative basis to treat the equality enforcement as “a transversal duty of the EU”. 425 EU influence on diversity management in the CEE countries was exerted through the Copenhagen criteria. 426 The EU conditioned its financial assistance with requirement of
418 Fundamental Rights Agency, Respect for and protection of persons belonging to minorities 2008-2010 (Vienna: Fundamental Rights Agency, 2010), also available at
105 respect for human and minority rights, whereas compliance with ( inter alia minority rights) conditionality, on the other hand, resulted in a membership perspective. 427 Explaining why the West suddenly became “a champion of minorities in post-communist Europe”, 428 Kymlicka offered two reasons for introducing minority conditionality for post-communist countries which were required to demonstrate the ability of management of their ethnic diversity. The first reason was a humanitarian concern. It has twofold motivation; “to stop the suffering of minorities facing persecution, mob violence, and ethnic cleansing” [whereas a] “more self- interested reason was the belief that escalating ethnic violence would generate large-scale refugee movements into Western Europe”, [along the concern that] “ethnic civil wars often create pockets of lawlessness which become havens for the smuggling of arms and drugs, or for other forms of criminality and extremism”. 429 The second reason for introduction of minority conditionality was put forward as “a test of their overall political maturity, and hence of their readiness to rejoin Europe”. 430 In this way, the respect for and protection of minorities was perceived as a fundamental measure of a country’s ‘moral progress’ and an indicator of democratic consolidation. 431 In the end, Kymlicka stated that “for a complex mixture of humanitarian, self-interested, and ideological reasons, minority rights have become ‘internationalized’ in Europe. Acceptance of the international monitoring and enforcement of these norms has become a test of a country's readiness for Europe. Meeting international norms of minority rights is seen as proof that a country has left behind its ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’ and ‘tribal nationalisms’, and is able to join a ‘modern’ liberal and cosmopolitan Europe”. 432 Minority condiitonality at that time belonged to so called ‘soft EU law’, i.e. the one that has normative content but is not formally binding. 433 Bruno de Witte was therefore right
Challenges”, in Filling the Frame: Five Years Monitoring the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2004), pp. 43-51. 427 General Affairs Council, 29.04.1997., Press: 129 Nr: 7738/97, available at
106 when he irronicaly noted that minority rights were an “export article and not one for domestic consumption”.434 Namely, several ‘old’ EU Member States neither in that time nor today recognized the existence of national minorities within their national jurisdictions and had failed to ratify and implement international legally-binding standards for minority protection incorporated in the Framework Convention 435 and the Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. 436 At the same time candidate countries of that time were expected to incorporate and implement international legal standards of minority protection as a part of the pre- accession conditionality. De Witte therefore argued that by imposing minority conditionality, the EU has carved out an area of influence that it did not have over its Member States. 437 Similalrly, Gwendolyn Sasse recognized that the political conditionality applied ‘normative overstretch’ with respect to minority conditionality since it posed requirements (and values) that are neither univocally shered by the member States nor the Union had a normative foundation on protection of national minorities in its legislation and therefore lacked clear standards for measuring compliance of this conditionality component. 438 In spite of this, the European Commission treats minority protection in the accession process as a part of the acquis communautaire . Gergana Noutcheva argued for example that fact that minority conditionality lacks a normative justification in the EU legal corpus, in turn, affects the degree of compliance. She in addition asserted that compliance with those particular conditions infringes occasionally upon the state sovereignty. As a result, the perceived lack of legitimacy on the side of the Union, “opens up political space for domestic actors to contest the positions taken by the EU on normative grounds”. 439 Dimitry Kochenov noted similarly that the absence of “any viable internal minority protection standard did not prevent the EU from treating minority protection as one of the key elements of the pre-accession process leading to the Eastern enlargement, reinforcing the
107 internal-external competence divide and reducing the effectiveness of minority protection in the EU”. 440 Acknowledging “a deep contrast between the internal and external application of the minority norm by the EU”, Guido Schwellnus claimed that minority protection “has acquired an immensely important role in the Union’s external relations after the end of the Cold War” 441 (indeed, it was included in the guidelines for the recognition of new states after the break-up of Yugoslavia, and later was made of the pre-accession conditionality), but “[o]n the other hand, minority rights played hardly a role in the internal development of the acquis communautaire ”. 442 Quite conversingly, Gabriel Toggenburg explained the impact of the Eastern enlargement to expansion of EU minority policy as “the primordial catalyst moving the protection of minorities onto the EU’s agenda”. 443 The introduction of the term ‘minorities’ in the Treaty of Lisbon 444 into EU primary law, 445 was “the first explicit reference to minorities in the history of the EU”. 446 This signifies that the Union is not concerned with ‘persons belonging to minorities’ any longer merely in the context of the enlargement and in the pre-accession period but across the range of its internal policies. Ioannis Grigoriadis moreover argued that Europeanization has triggered “considerable progress” in minority
440 DimitryKochenov, “The Summary of Contradictions: Outline of the EU’s Numerous Approaches to Minority Protection”, 31 (1) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review (2008), pp. 1-51. 441 Guido Schwellnus, op.cit. (2001), at 1. 442 Ibid. 443 Gabriel N. Toggenburg, “A Remaining Share or a New Part? The Union’s Role vis-a-vis Minorities After the Enlargement Decade”, 5 European University Institute (EUI) Working Paper (2006), pp. 1-32, available at
108 rights protection even in minority rights reluctant Member States such as Greece is, and also in a long-term candidate country i.e. Turkey, but he nevertheless believes “it has not fulfilled its full potential”. 447 The pre-accession minority conditionality has contributed to the improvement of human rights protection and democratization in previous enlargement waves although it has not produced uniformed reform policy outcomes and significant reform divergence across policy areas. 448 Assessment of minority policies proved not to be an easy task and often was even perceived as an unjust process. First of all, the Union was accused of promoting and insisting on double standards, since some of its own Member states did not recognise existence of national minorities on their territories and lacked any minority rights policies. In addition, the Union was blamed of superficial monitoring of candidate states; giving more attention to certain ethnic groups, and not approaching the policy from the broad spectrum that would assess state of affairs of all national minorities in the candidate countries. Some argued that at the time of the CEE accession the Union was more concerned with regional stability rather than for enhancement of minority protection and embracing standards in practice. 449 Neverthless, an abundant amount of literature on this issue confirms a positive impact of EU democratic conditionality on the political systems of the countries of CEE and the extent to which the process of EU integration has encouraged and strengthened democratic consolidation. 450 Assessing the effectiveness of EU conditionality with regard to minority
447 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “On the Europeanization of Minority Rights Protection: Comparing the Cases of Greece and Turkey”, 13 (1) Mediterranean Politics (2008), pp. 23-41, at 23-24. See alsoIoannis N. Grigoriadis, Turkish Political Culture and the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 448 Tim Haughton, “When Does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality and the Accession Process in Central and Eastern Europe”, 5 Political Studies Review (2007), pp. 233-246. 449 See e.g. See also Magdalena Opalski and Piotr Dutkiewicz, Ethnic minority rights in Central Eastern Europe (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Foundation, 1996); Peter Cumper and Steven Charles Wheatley (eds.), Minority rights in the 'new' Europe (The Hague/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999); Gaetano Pentassuglia, “The EU and the Protection of Minorities: The Case of Eastern Europe”, 12 (1) European Journal for International Law (2001), pp. 3-38; Peter Vermeersch, “EU Enlargement and Minority Rights Policies in Central Europe: Explaining Policy Shifts in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland”, 1 Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2003), pp. 1-32; Eva G. Heidbreder and Laura Carasco, “Assessing the Assessment. A review on the Application Criterion Minority protection by the European Commission”, 4 EIPA working paper (2003), available at
109 protection in previous enlargement waves, Schwellnus asserted that (1) certain changes in national policies and legislation indeed occurred (however, leaving an open-end to assessment of their implementation), (2) although EU conditionality had an uneven effect on transposition of minority related legislation (whereas the non-discrimination legislation has been successfully transposed in advance to the accession, “ambiguous principles and varying specific demands [in the field of minority rights] have promoted more diverse outcomes”), eventually resulting in (3) lack of coherent minority rights standards, in spite of decade-long systematic monitoring of minority protection. Nevertheless, he argued that a true “conditionality in the domain of minority rights remains limited to the EU”. 451 Guido Schwellnus, Lilla Balázs and Liudmila Mikalayeva concluded that the minority conditionality resulted in positive domestic change, in which pro-minority oriented governments and veto players in conjunction with small minorities always lead to positive change irrespective of external incentives, and one including external incentives as a necessary component, which consistently produces a positive outcome in less favourable domestic conditions, i.e. with large minorities and in presence of nationalist veto players. 452 Dimitry Kochenov asserted that with respect CEE minority conditionality “the Commission simultaneously promoted two contradicting approaches in external relations: de facto assimilation, which is prohibited by article 5(2) of the Framework Convention, and cultural autonomy, which brings to life a complicated web of partly overlapping, partly contradicting standards”. 453 That is due to the fact that minority rights and human rights protection concerns did not play an important role in pre-accession in some of the Baltic states, such as in the cases of Latvia and Estonia where the very conditionality framework proved generally fragile and totally dysfunctional outside
Europe (Cornell University Press, 2005); Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Theorising EU enlargement: research focus, hypotheses, and the state of research”, 9 (4) Journal of European Public Policy (2002), pp. 500–28; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds.) The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 451 Guido Schwellnus, “Looking Back at Ten Years of EU Minority Conditionality vis-à-vis Central and Eastern European Candidate States”, 4 European Yearbook of Minority Issues (2004/05), 321–340, at 339. 452 Guido Schwellnus, Lilla Balázs and Liudmila Mikalayeva, “It ain’t over when it’s over: The adoption and sustainability of minority protection rules in new EU member states”, 13 (2) European Integration online Papers Special Issue (2009), available at
110 the areas directly covered by the acquis .454 Consequently, in spite of formally being subject to the same scrutiny and standards from the European level, the attitudes and policies in each new Member State regarding protection of national minorities and recognising a scope of their rights have been and remain different. Often the ex-communist legacy and different political culture played an important factor in the pace of domestic reform. In the case of the CEE countries, particularly in the Baltic states, the legacies of its Soviet past had infected the status of considerable minority communities. 455 As a result, minority policies still differ significantly among the CEE countries in spite of the fact that all of them have been required to embrace and transpose the same acquis and standards of minority protection. In general, it can be said, that those countries who are kin-states to large minority populations in other (often neighbouring) countries are more prone to development of a minority protection mechanism, both in their own territories as well as abroad. Hungary is one of those examples. Its developed pro-minority internal and external policy is therefore a result of historically grounded dispersion of Hungarian ethnic populations. 456
5.2. Second Generation Conditionality and Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity in the Western Balkans
It has been underlined already above that the EU and its Member States realised back in the late 1990s that the war-torn Western Balkans region required a more comprehensive
454 Jean-Bernard Adrey, “Minority Language Rights Before and After the 2004 EU Enlargement: The Copenhagen Criteria in the Baltic States”, 26 (5) Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development (2005), 453-468. See also Nida M. Gelazis, “The Effects of EU Conditionality on Citizenship Policies and Protection of National Minorities in the Baltic States”, 68 European University Institute Working Papers ( 2000), at
111 and tailor-made political conditionality than the one applied for post-authoritarian transformation of CEE. Gabriel Toggenburg explained the graduated approach of the second generation conditionality through different levels, such that “[t]he first level of conditionality does not expressis verbis refer to minority protection. The second level of this graduated approach requires the country’s credible commitment to democratic reforms and progress in compliance with the generally recognised standards of human and minority rights. At the third level of the graduated approach conditionality is explicitly described as an evolutionary process. The start of negotiations is only possible if the country at stake fulfils 10 general conditions. These included the credible offer to and a visible implementation of real opportunities for displaced persons (including so called ‘internal migrants’) and refugees to return to their places of origin, and absence of harassment initiated or tolerated by public authorities; the absence of generally discriminatory treatment and harassment of minorities by public authorities and the absence of discriminatory treatment and harassment of independentmedia. The permission to begin negotiations requires a lower level of compliance than the conclusion of the agreements. At each stage, including after the conclusion of agreements, the situation should be monitored and, in accordance with the relevant articles of the agreement, its application could be suspended in case of serious non-compliance.” 457 It is therefore reasonable to accept Toggenburg’s assessment that “the momentum of minority protection has not faded away after the ‘big-bang enlargement’ of May 2004 but has rather been fine-tuned and further developed in the context of South-Eastern Europe.” 458 This new, tailor-made diversity conditionality, that is an integral part of a broader political conditionality, requires first of all an embracement of the EU fundamental values, i.e. respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities; since they constitute the very foundations of the EU. Furthermore, the conditionality encompasses requirement of ‘respect for and protection of national minorities’, which needs to be demonstrated in legislative guarantees and corresponding institutions for their implementation. The countries of the region are furthermore encouraged to establish modern democratic institutions through which accommodation of diversity, tolerance and principles of equality are being fostered. Consequently, and in relation to the previous element of diversity conditionality, the Union
457 Gabriel N. Toggenburg, “A Remaining Share or a New Part? The Union’s Role vis-a-vis Minorities After the Enlargement Decade”, 5 European University Institute (EUI) Working Paper (2006), pp. 1-32, available at
112 request that (potential) candidate country respect international law as well as inviolability of international borders. In relation to this element of conditionality, the principles of peaceful conflict resolution and regional co-operation are fundamental. By continuously encouraging further return of refugees and internally displaced persons through the SAp, considering it crucial for ethnic reconciliation and treating it as index of democratic maturity, the EU introduced refugee return as one of its novel pre-accession conditions. The EU has in addition continuously pursuing transitional justice policies by urging the countries of the Western Balkans to co-operate fully and unequivocally with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and o intensify domestic efforts in prosecution of war crimes. Finally, the EU has been steadily encouraging regional cooperation and reconciliation between the peoples of the Western Balkans. By insisting in meeting the above enumerated novel tailor- made diversity criteria, the EU encourages the Western Balkan countries to further consolidate peace and to promote stability, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human and minority rights within their jurisdictions. In this way, the European perspective acts as a catalyst for addressing societal cleavages and problems that have roots in the region’s recent violent conflicts. The second generation conditionality shall therefore be understood as a means of socialization and collective learning introduced with an intention not merely to induce the cooperation of governing elites but also to result in the rise of interpersonal trust and contribute in creation of civic identities among the citizens of the Western Balkans countries. All diversity conditionality requirements are interlinked and realization of each enhances re- emergence of trust among people and towards institutions. The trust encourages development of other pertinent social-cultural variables, like tolerance, political participation, associational membership and social capital. The sense of trust considered important for democratic consolidation of the region, rich in both post-authoritarian and post-conflict countries, is a thin or civic trust , not the thick form of trust embedded in personal relationships. The civic trust emerges among citizens who do not necessarily share ethnic, religious, cultural traits, but who are members of the same political community. In turn, the rise of interpersonal trust between citizens belonging to different ethnic groups decreases the risk of renewed conflict and instability and adds to attitudinal consolidation of democracy. Diversity conditionality thus serves as “a key engine for transforming societies in the region, including interethnic relations”.459
459 Florian Bieber, op.cit. (2005), at 72.
113 What follows below is a descrption of insufficent EU interventions in the period of the SFRY dissolution and context in which peace treaties were brought into being, providing for accommodation of ethnic diversity, power-shring institutional solutions and territorial autonomy. I will subsequently present a segment of pre-accession conditionality that, in my opinion, is relevant for a profound societal transformation in the Western Balkans, legitimizing the EU as the political socialization agent and its Stabilization and Association process as external democracy promotion actor. The introduction of this novel tailor-made condtionality is particularly important as partially cooperative ethno-nationalist political elites do not considerably sustain democratic consolidation of the region. Namely, the ethno- nationalist elites “generate power within the national political setting by widely relying on the discoursive strength of ethno nationalism, clientelistic structures and so called ‘reserved domains’” 460 often “represent serious obstacles for sustainable democratic development and EU-related reforms since they fundamentally oppose the democratic progress and political reforms needed for EU integration”. 461 It has been already recognized in the academic literature this round of EU enlargement should “pay close attention to the role played, or potentially played, by ordinary citizens in the Western Balkans in shaping the impact of EU policies [whereas ] the influence of non-elites on the outcomes of EU conditionality is [still ] often overlooked by both policy makers and scholars looking at the process so far”. 462
5.2.1. Normative and Institutional Solutions Assuring ‘Respect for and Protection of Minorities’
Mikhail Molchanov argues that post-communist nationalism “has nothing to do with primordial ethnic animosities” but rather is “a phenomenon of political culture and a result of conscious choices made by political elites”. 463 In the late period of the SFRY, political elites chose to play on ethnic tensions for their own advantage instead of negotiating rational solutions. Ethno-nationalist political elites, by resorting to nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric, utilised authoritarian and conflictual political cultures for mobilisation of public support throughout 1990s. Howard Handelman recalled that “although Bosnian Serbs and Muslims had enjoyed rather amicable relationships for many years, after the breakup of Yugoslavia extremist leaders such as then-Serb-president Slobodan Miloševi ć promoted
460 Vedran Đihi ć and Angela Wieser, op.cit. (2012), at 33-34. 461 Ibid. 462 Paula M. Pickering, “The Constraints on European Institutions’ Conditionality in the Western Balkans”, in Florian Bieber (ed.), EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), pp.165-170, at 168. 463 Mikhail A. Molchanov, Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations (Texas, Texas T&A University Press, 2002), at 10.
114 ethnic hatred and mass murder in order to build their own political power base”. 464 However, ethno-nationalist leaders’ glorification of the group and demonization of its enemies, “encouraged their constituents to tie their personal fates to the fate of the larger group”. 465 In Serbia, as indicated above, ethno-mobilization started with Slobodan Miloševi ć’s rise to power, i.e. after he gained control over the League of Communists of Serbia in 1986. The expression of the Serbian nationalism gave rise to other nations’ nationalisms. One explanation of the international community’s ignorance towards the escalating wars and inter-ethnic conflict in early 1990s asserted that “[i]n the early stages of the war in Yugoslavia (1990-91), the international community seemed intent on preserving the territorial integrity of the country and was hesitant to become entangled in a turbulent region that had ignited World War I. The Brioni Accords, created with the help of negotiators from the European Community, established a cease-fire on 8 July 1991; however, violence soon broke out again. Unrest spread quickly, and although Western nations desired stability, they were generally unwilling to intervene militarily to establish and maintain order in the region”. 466 Ettore Greco argued that even the later “EU diplomatic action in South-Eastern Europe has tended to focus on conflict containment rather than on working proactively on the search for more stable solutions”.467 Greco furthermore held that such an approach “result in a prolonged waiting game based on the principles that secessionist drives should always be resisted, as they represent a major factor of instability. Because of the the EU’s internal divisions, this approach often represents the minimum common denominator among the member states”. 468 The European Community however, did made an attempt at peace-building in the very early stages of the conflicts, by convening the Yugoslav Peace Conference in September in
464 Howard Handelman, “The politics of cultural pluralism and ethnic conflict”, in Howard Handelman, Challenge of Third World Development (Pearson Education, 2009), pp. 94-132, at 119. See also Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (Boulder, CO.: Westview Pres, 1995) and Florian Bieber, Nationalismus in Serbien vom Tode Titos zum Ende der Ära Miloševi ć (Munster: Lit Verlag, 2005). 465 Gavan Duffy and Nicole Lindstrom, “Conflicting Identities: Solidary Incentives in the Serbo-Croatian War” 39 (1) Journal of Peace Research (2002), pp. 69-90, at 87. 466 Christopher Rudolph, “Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals”, 55 (3) International Organization (2001), pp. 655-691, at 661. See also James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav war (New York: Columbia University Press 1997); Herwig Roggemann, Krieg und Frieden auf dem Balkan (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1993). 467 Ettore Greco, “South-Eastern Europe”, in Roland Dannreuther (ed .), EU Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy (London: Routledge, 2004), pp., 62-78, at 76. 468 Ibid. Similar argument can be found in Bruce W. Jentleson “A Responsibility to Protect. The Defining Challenge for Global Community”, 28 (4) Harvard International Review (2007), pp. 19-20. See also Matjaž Klemen čić, “Me đunarodna zajednica i SRJ/zara ćene strane”, in Charles Ingarao and Thomas A. Emmert (eds.), Suo čavanje s jugoslavenskim kontroverzama (Sarajevo: Bibiloteka Memorija, 2010), pp. 152-196; Josip Glaurdic, The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2011) and Branislav Radelji ć, Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia: The Role of Non-State Actors and European Diplomacy (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012).
115 The Hague. It was seemingly “the last chance to save the common Yugoslav state frame and find a solution to the divisions inflaming the country”. 469 The Badinter Commission, set up in 1991 under the auspices of the Peace Conference, concluded that certain greater ethnic groups, that were not in favour of being ascribed a minority status in newly proclaimed states (those being Kosovo Albanians, the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia) were entitled to all the rights afforded to national minorities and ethnic groups as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms accorded to individuals under international law, but the right to secession was denied. 470 Indeed, strong links between minority rights violations, inter-ethnic inequalities, or loss of autonomy and the outbreak of major conflicts has been documented in academic literature. 471 In a former Yugoslav context, this was not a predominant case, because “the conflicts of the 1990s were not about states denying the existence of minorities, but rather over groups not being satisfied being classified as minorities, rather than nations.” 472 Namely, reinforcement of the fear of becoming a minority was manipulated by political elites and used as a mobilization agent by the nationalists in the early 1990s across Yugoslavia. 473 Co-titular nations in former SFRY republics (e.g. Serbs in Croatia, Albanians in Macedonia) were rejecting an idea of becoming a minority in a state they used to be recognized a status of a co-nation. Therefore, no matter the extent of the offered minority rights guarantees was, they would not suffice for (minority) political leaders
469 Sonja Biserko, “The Dissolution of Yugoslavia: Roots of the Conflict”, available at
116 of the early 1990s. 474 Separatist claims of Serbs both in Croatia and later in BiH resulted in nationalist homogenisation of other ethnic groups, leading first in the breakup of the former state, and later in violent conflicts, despite the different normative and institutional frameworks that were set up in the meantime which should have facilitated early resolution of ethnic conflicts. 475 Several peace plans were put forward in the early 1990s with the aim to interrupt the escalated violence and cease the hostilities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 476 Nevertheless, external interventions designed to resolve violent conflicts are less likely to succeed than systemic transformations that replace former authoritarianism with constitutional governance. Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke explained that “peace agreements typically aim to establish or extend a ceasefire by linking the ceasefire to new political and legal structures, through what is essentially a constitutional framework or ‘power map’ for the state. This involves setting out the organs of government and key legal institutions, in what might be termed a ‘constitutional moment’ aimed at addressing the state’s internal and external legitimacy”. 477 According to them, peace agreements’ “overhaul is designed to respond to root causes of violence which lie in challenges to the state’s legitimacy, based on its failure to provide equally for all groups”. 478 Already in the early stages, those peace plans were proposing various forms of power-sharing mechanisms and territorial delimitation, e.g. the devolution of central government to local ethnic communities contained in the Carrington- Cutileiro Plan from September 1991; territorial restructuring of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a confederation of 10 autonomous provinces, each ethnic group controlling three provinces and Sarajevo being shared by all, as proposed in the Vance-Owen Plan of January 1993; organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a union of three republics with a central government that retains residual competences, as put forward by the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan
474 Dejan Jovi ć, op.cit. (2001). 475 Ted R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), at 294. See also Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 229-284; Ted R. Gurr, “Minorities, Nationalists and Ethnopolitical Conflict”, in Chester A. Crocker and Fen O. Hampson (eds.), Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 53-77, at 54. 476 Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements, 1989–1996”, 34 (3) Journal of PeaceResearch (1997), pp.339-358. See also Andreas Wimmer, Richard J. Goldstone, Donald L. Horowitz, Ulrike Joras, Conrad Schetter (eds.), Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a New Realism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004). 477 Christine Bell and Catherine O'Rourke, “The people’s peace? Peace agreements, civil society, and participatory democracy”, 28 International Political Science Review (2007), pp. 293-384, at 293. See also Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (eds.), From war to democracy: Dilemmas of peacebuilding (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 182-210. 478 Ibid , at 295.
117 of July 1993. 479 The quantity and complexity of proposed internationally brokered solutions indicate that the conflict resolution was a troublesome issue. As a result of this, complex power-sharing regimes provided the most effective answer to thorny conflict situations in severely divided Western Balkan societies. 480 In seeking to bridge the apparent consociational-integrationist divide, Stefan Wolff defines complex power- sharing as “a practice of conflict settlement that has a form of self-governance at its heart but whose overall institutional design includes a range of further mechanisms for the accommodation of ethnic diversity in divided societies’ which move beyond the ‘core prescriptions of each theory.”. 481 Whereas, integrative power-sharing solutions may not be viable in deeply divided societies emerging from violent conflict, consociational solutions run the risk of further embedding primarily ethnic cleavages, though in the short term there may be no other option. 482 The General Framework Agreement for Peace that brought the ceasefire in warring Bosnia and Herzegovina, so called the Dayton Agreement, was initialled on 21 November 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, USA and signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris. 483 It preserved territorial integrity of a new state, but it also institutionalised its partition into two entities according to the ethnic distribution of population that came out as a consequence of the forced expulsions of a population, ethnic cleansing and sometimes genocide. Although, after the entities’ constitutional amendments that took place in 2002, the entities no longer formally constitute territorial autonomies, (one of the power-sharing elements thus being reduced), the Agreement unquestionably consolidated the ethnic division of the country. When such a territorial solution comes accompanied with other strict power-sharing elements (grand coalition, minority vetoes, proportional representation), in societies where power sharing arrangements “did not evolve over time on the basis of older institutional traditions or came
479 For an overview on the international community’s intervention in the early staes of the conflicts aee Ugo Caruso, “Interplay between Council of Europe, OSCE, EU and NATO”, at
118 into being ‘coincidentally’, but were rather conceived to manage ethnic relations, it often and easily happen that inter-ethnic cooperation does not evolve” 484 there are few or no incentives for cross-ethnic cooperation. BiH has a bicameral legislature where the three so-called “constituent peoples”, Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, are represented in parity in the second chamber, the House of Peoples. The same goes for the collective State Presidency consisting of one Bosniak, one Serb, and one Croat member. According to the Electoral Law, the Serb member must have been previously elected from the territory of Republika Srpska, while the Bosniak and Croat members must have been elected from the territory of FBiH. Finally, the government(s) composed of a prime minister, ministers and their deputies are composed according to an ethnic key. 485 Obviously, the Dayton power sharing solutions privilege group representation to institutional efficiency. Complex territorial division and a dysfunctional system of public administration along with a system of group representation and ethnic quotas makes the decision-making process complicated and costly. In August 2001 the Ohrid Framework Agreement restored peace in Macedonia by addressing the multi-ethnic character of the country in the Constitution, assuring equitable representation of minorities in the public sector and providing for the future decentralisation process. Its accompanying annexes included a timetable for the legal enactment of reforms. Constitutional changes that took place already at the end of the same year, introduced several aspects of power sharing, but did not established Macedonia as a fully-flagged power-sharing system, since it has not foreseen segmental autonomy for the communities. Nevertheless, such an inadequacy has been repaired by the enhanced local self-government reform, which took place soon after the Ohrid was signed resulting in a de facto territorial autonomy. 486 The Ohrid Agreement did not encompass a requirement for grand coalition. However, a tradition of grand coalitions has been in place since the beginning of the country’s independence in 1992. Ohrid, as well, set a framework for the educational reform that allowed for official use of minority languages in education, recognising right to university education in Albanian language, and prescribed co-official status of minority languages in municipalities inhabited
484 Florian Bieber, “Power Sharing after Yugoslavia: Functionality and Dysfunctionality of Power-sharing Institutions in Post-war Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo”, in Sid Noel, From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies (McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP, 2005), pp. 85-103. 485 Claire Gordon, op.cit. , at 18. More detailed on ethnic instituonalisation in BiH in Joseph Marko, “Post- conflict Reconstruction through State- and Nation-building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 4 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers (2005), avai čable at
119 by at least 20% of the minority population. The Agreement has foreseen a special parliamentary procedure; the so called ‘Badinter majority’, to be used for adopting a number of the Constitutional amendments and minority related legislation. 487 In short, the conflict resolution strategy applied in Macedonia was based on both decentralisation (i.e. assuring tacit territorial autonomy for the Albanian minority) and assurance of minority participation in the state institutions. The development of the peace plan for Kosovo took extremely long and still has not resulted in a solution acceptable for the both conflicting sides. na The Rambouillet Peace Plan of 1999, rejected by the Serbian government, would have granted Kosovo a substantial autonomy within Yugoslavia, albeit for an interim period of three years, and allowed for a binding referendum on the province’s final status after three years. Democratic self- government measures proposed by Rambouillet included all matters of daily importance to people in Kosovo; education, health care, and economic development, along with political institutions: a president, an assembly, own courts, strong local government, and an assurance of minority protection. Despite the guarantees given to the FRY’s territorial integrity and sovereignty (the so called ‘non-negotiable principles’ of Rambouillet), Belgrade authorities of that time refused to sign the document, continuing to expel hundreds and thousands of Kosovo Albanians. Later accepted by Miloševi ć, the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin agenda eliminated Rambouillet’s implicit call for a referendum on independence after three years, whereas any determination of Kosovo’s final status would now have to be approved by the UN Security Council in accordance with the will of the people of Kosovo. 488 Indeed, all of these elements were part of the 1244 UNSC Resolution adopted on 10 June 1999. Although the UNSC Resolution allowed for deployment of the NATO troops in Kosovo under the UN peacekeeping mission, it gave domestic credibility to Miloševi ć who was able to present the Resolution as his success, placing the whole Kosovo issue back into the UN system and guaranteeing the territorial sovereignty and integrity of the FR Yugoslavia. The international community, being aware that the Kosovo status requires viable and long-term solution, endowed the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari with a task to submit to the UN Security Council a framework under which co-exsistence between the two biggest ethnic communities in Kosovo would be feasible. Ahtisaari proposed in April 2007 a
487 Zoran Ilievski, “Country Specific Report on Actors and Processes of Ethno-Mobilization, Violent Conflicts and Consequences: Macedonia”, available at
120 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (hereinafter: the Ahtisaari Plan). 489 The Ahtisaari Plan defined “the provisions necessary for a future Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable” 490 offering numerous compromise-based solutions. It included “detailed measures to ensure the promotion and protection of the rights of communities and their members, the effective decentralization of government, and the preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage”. 491 The Ahtisaari Plan furthermore provided for “the representation of Kosovo’s non-Albanians in key public institutions to safeguard their rights and to encourage their active participation in public life”. 492 It foresaw high level of decentralization and established new municipalities with a Kosovo Serb majority, providing for possibility of establishment of additional municipalities for non-majority communities. The Ahtisaari Plan prescribed that municipalities wide-ranging local municipal powers and are responsible for issues that are in principle relevant for preservation of cultural autonomy. The Settlement foresaw as well “a future international civilian and military presence in Kosovo, to supervise implementation of the Settlement and assist the competent Kosovo authorities in ensuring peace and stability throughout Kosovo”. 493 It was foreseen that the Settlement’s provisions “take precedence over all other legal provisions in Kosovo”. 494 The Ahtisaari Plan furthermore contained reference to Kosovo’s future status, acknowledging to Kosovo “the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements and to seek membership in international organizations”.495 In line with this recommendation, the Kosovo Assembly declared the independence of Kosovo on 17 February 2008. In the declaration of independence, it committed itself to maintain implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan and accepted international supervision of independence, which was eventually lifted in early October 2012. 496 Although none of the above briefly analysed countries fulfil all elements of the power- sharing mechanism, BiH, Kosovo and Macedonian political systems obviously resulted in broad institutionalization of ethnicity. 497 As explained in academic literature,
489 Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's future status, “The Comprehensive proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement”, available at
121 “[i]nstitutionalized ethnicity is conceptually broader and allows for the inclusion of cases where power-sharing takes place only to some degree. Furthermore, it places the emphasis on institutional representation of ethnicity, where governments exercise only limited powers - be it due to weak states or strong international intervention - and little of it is shared, but mostly divided.” 498 Research has therefore drawn “a critical distinction between provisions to make the peace hold and provisions for power-sharing and post-conflict reconstruction. It is suggested that contradictions may emerge between the original compromises which were required to silence the guns and the necessary conditions to move the peace forward to the design and implementation of viable state-building and democratization policies, which two processes need to be treated as related though separate and not necessarily simultaneous.” 499 In addition, in order for the realization of human and minority rights in a post-conflict settlement to happen, peace treaties should incorporate human and minority rights guarantees, embodied in constitutional amendments and other legislation, along with security guarantees. Peace treaties should at least entail broader democracy promotion strategies, i.e. framework for the institutional post-conflict solutions. 500 Segmental (territorial) autonomy or separation along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines was neither prescribed in the peace treaties nor an intended consequence of the peace agreement brokered in the Balkans. However, to some extent all three above elaborated peace treaties contributed to population fragmentation through territorial entities (due to incompletion of the return process, unfavourable economic opportunities in the areas of return, discriminatory treatment of returnees or their security concerns). Such options, no matter how pragmatic they might seem reasonable in the aftermath of ethnic conflicts, in long term “entrench old hatreds and wounds. Such has been the case in Kosovo, where after seven years of international rule, society is deeply segregated and the threat of another ethnic conflict remains very real.” 501 Although peace treaties resulted in territorial separation along ethnic lines, the smaller extent of ethnicity institutionalization in the Ohrid peace plan allows for functioning of the Macedonian state. BiH, on the other hand, almost seventeen years after
498 Ibid. , at 3. 499 Claire Gordon, op.cit. , at 4. 500 Compare e.g. Diane Ethier, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and Incentives”, 10 (1) Democratization (2003), pp. 99-120; Peter J. Burnell, “From evaluating democracy assistance to appraising democracy promotion”, 56 (2) Political Studies (2008), pp. 414-434. Both argued that the external democratization incentives need to be road encompassing and based on in-advance research of the country that is receiving aid. 501 Clive Baldwin, Chris Chapman and Zoë Gray, “Minority Rights: The Key to Conflict Prevention”, at
122 the conflict has ended, pays the price of the (over-)creative ambiguity included in the peace- plan’s institutional setting. The Dayton peace accord, being called “a masterful diplomatic creation precisely because of its imperfection” 502 has managed to vaguely glue together “two antagonistic entities as constituent parts of the country; proclaiming democracy while entrenching ethnically based institutional structures and political parties; reaffirming individual rights while legitimizing ethnic majoritarianism.” 503 Critics of the peacemakers argue in addition that they, by a rule, focus only on those ethnic groups that were involved in a conflict, ignoring others (i.e. smaller minorities that were not directly involved in the ethnic conflict).504 This certainly has been a case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, where smaller minorities were not consulted and involved in the peace processes. The international community perhaps naively believed that post-conflict social reconstruction would happen in the course of the following months. Local expert, Zoran Peji ć, observed years ago that “’nation building’, democratic elections, and the rule of law were expected to occur, by some miracle, within moths in the country where the blood on the ground is still very fresh, where half of the population does not reside where it did in 1991, where distrust is still running high, and many possible new political thinking is overwhelmed by territorial ethnic entrenchment.” 505 From what has been eleaborated above, it is obvious that already in the peace threaties constitutional democratic consolidation was envisadged, since they obviously contain constitutional and institutional guarantee for accommodation of ethnic diversity. According to Wolfgang Merkel’s multilayered sequence of democratization, the democratization process necessarily starts with a constitutional consolidation. Constitutions namely attempt to manage conflicts of interest between societal groups and individuals by means of fair rules and neutral institutions. 506 Constitution builders aim to ensure that the outcomes of constitution-building processes are legitimate, broadly accepted and nationally owned. 507 The primary task of constitutionalism in all post-communist countries was to mark a transition from the old
502 Zoran Paji ć, “The Role of Institutions in Peace Building” in Žarko Papi ć et al., International Support Policies to SEE Countries – Lessons (Not) Learned in Bosnia–Herzegovina (Open Society Fund/Soros Foundation, Sarajevo, 2001), at 50. 503 Ibid. 504 Clive Baldwin, Chris Chapman and Zoë Gray, op.cit. , at 2. 505 Zoran Paji ć, op.cit. , at 50. 506 Winluck Wahiu, “Introduction”, in Markus Böckenförde, Nora Hedling and Winluck Wahiu, A Practical Guide to Constitution Building (Stocholm: International IDEA, 2011), pp. 1-42, at 5. 507 On constitutional engineering in general see Giovanni Sartori, Comparative constitutional engineering: An inquiry into structures, incentives, and outcomes (New York: New York University Press, 1994). On constitution building in post-coomunist Eastern Europe see Jon Elster, ClaussOffe and Ulrich Preuss , Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 63- 108. Generally on designs for constitutional institutions and processes see Edward McWhinney, Constitution- making: Principles, Process, Practice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp. 67-125.
123 authoritarian regime to the new democratic one, emphasizing the prevalent importance of division of powers, political pluralism, the rule of law and the bill of human rights. With no doubt for Wolfgang Merkel, “democratic constitutions are created, even during the transition to democracy, by political actors who pursue their own particular interests and who have different normative ideas about the optimal structure of a democratic society”. 508 Accountable and efficient public institutions, that pursue transparent government activities, represent a minimum condition required for the exercise of democracy. Dimitar Bechev recognized the inefficiency of state institutions as the chief impediment for the reform processes in the region. He argued that “state weakness has done more harm to the EU prospects of Balkan countries than ethnic divisions or lingering status issues”. 509 David Mendeloff, contradictorily, recognized the weakness of state institutions as a variable that is gladly deployed by ethnic entrepreneurs. He argued that in conditions of state weakness “political entrepreneurs are most likely to appeal to group security or status concerns through ethnic scapegoating and hate-mongering”. 510 Namely, such a structural deficient, allows ethnic entrepreneurs “to use historical lies and distortions as a basis for these political appeals”. 511 Not surprisingly, such ethno-national manipulations were possible since the population raised in the autocratic political regime often lacked a fundamental base of democratic political culture. 512 The constitution building is a process that may be highly contentious, particularly when recent experiences of severe inter-ethnic conflict and corresponding prolonged, embedded social divisions are taken into account. Claus Offe, speaking about democratic transition traps with regard to inclusive nation-building, argued that, in the early stages of democratic transition political “actors are in a position to see which constitutional design and which ethnic boundaries of a state will best serve their interest in policy outcomes, or their passions for ethnic identities and resentments. The situation is replete with opportunities, rightly perceived to be unique in their scope, to improve one’s ‘original endowment’, or to take revenge”. 513 Correspondingly, “principles of justice, freedom, and peace” 514 can simply be disregarded for certain segements of population. Sujit Chaudhry similarly warned that failure to properly “respond to the challenges raised by the equation of ethnocultural identity
508 Wolfgang Merkel, “Institutions and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe”, 86 Estudio/Working Paper (1996), available at
124 and political interest” 515 in ethnically diverse and divided societies might lead to the extreme consequences: discrimination and exclusion, forced assimilation, civil war, ethnic cleansing and even genocide. He explained, therefore, that specifically “constitutional design in divided societies bears a particularly heavy burden”. 516 Apart from serving a regulatory role, i.e. the one pertaining to institutional and decision making set-up, “in a divided society, a constitution must go further and constitute the very demos which governs itselfunder and through the constitutional regime”. 517 Robert Hayden rightly asked what happens, however, “when there is no demos , no single political community that accepts a state (a territory with a government) as its own, because the population divides itself into different ethnic groups, no one of which comprises a majority of the population, and most of the members of each seeing their worst danger as subordination to the others?”. 518 In ethnically divided societies, Chaudhry furthermore argued, that “the constitution is often the principal vehicle for the forging of a common political identity, which is, in turn, necessary to make that constitutional regime work. To some extent, the constitution can foster the development of a common political identity by creating the institutional spaces for shared decision making among members of different ethnoculrural groups. Concrete experiences of shared decision making within a framework of the rule oflaw, and without recourse to force or fraud, can serve as the germ of a nascent sense of political community. For the same reason, against the backdrop of division and a lack of trust, the process of debating and negotiating a constitution can also help to create the political community on whose existence the constitutional order which results from that process depends”. 519 Fred Riggs similarly considered that viable systems of constitutional government, i.e. those in which “power is exercised responsibly and effectively, offer the only hope that ethnonational violence can be replaced by the nonviolent politics of ethnic competition”. 520
515 Sujit Chaudhry, “Bridging Comparatie Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies”, in Sujit Chaudhry (ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accomodation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 3-40, at 5. See also Arendt Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies”, 15 (2) Journal of Democracy (2004), pp. 96-109. 516 Ibid. 517 Ibid. 518 Robert M. Hayden, “’Democracy’ without a Demos?The Bosnian Constitutional Experiment and the Intentional Construction of Nonfunctioning States”, 19 East European Politics & Societies (2005), pp. 226-259, at 227. 519 Sujit Chaudhry, op.cit. ( 2008), at 5. 520 Fred W. Riggs “Ethnonational Rebellions and Viable Constitutionalism”, 16 International Political Science Review (1995), pp. 375-404.
125 Institutional design in ethnically diverse and divided societies represents a particular challenge to constitution builders. 521 Arend Lijphart distinguished between two kinds of political communities in his work Democracy in Plural Societies . He claimed that culturally, religiously and ethnically homogeneous political communities are not overwhelmed by political divisions, whereas culturally and ethnically diverse societies are. 522 Lijphart furthermore considered that constitutional design in deeply divided societies should by no means be majoritarian, since “majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy. What such societies need is a democratic regime that emphasizes consensus instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of being satisfied with a bare majority”. 523 But obviously, normative changes in the texts of constitutions of new nation-states emerging out of Socialist Yugoslavia did not take ethnic diversity into account and in this way added to ethnomobilisation. 524 First of all, ascribing minority status to those ethnic groups in newly formed nation-states that used to enjoy the status of the nation, inevitably increased tensions, and more than once escalated into ethnic conflicts. That was, according to Will Kymlicka, because those were “conflict involving large, territorially concentrated groups who have manifested the capacity and the aspiration to govern themselves and to administer their own public institutions in their own language, and who typically have possessed some form of self- government and official language status in the past. They have mobilized for territorial autonomy, official language status, minority language universities, and consociational power- sharing mechanisms”. 525 At the same time, the newly achieved nation-states at large did not acknowledge those minority groups’ claims in their constitutions. For example, Macedonia, which used to be defined in the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as “the national state of the Macedonian nation and state of the Albanian and Turk nationalities”, was proclaimed in the early 1990s into a ‘national state of the Macedonian people’. This change, that established Macedonians as the only titular nation, along with abolition of some provisions from communist times which allowed for the official use of minority languages and the lack of guarantees of political representation of
521 Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), at 13-47. Compare also NenadDimitrijevi ć, “Nationalized States of Eastern Europe: Is There a Constitutional Alternative?”, 54 Studies in East European Thought (2002), pp. 245-269. 522 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale Univiversity Press, 1977), at 71-74. 523 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), at 33. 524 MitjaŽagar, “Constitutions in Multi-Ethnic Reality”, 29-3 Razprave in gradivo (1994/1995), pp. 143-164. 525 Will Kymlicka, “National Minorities in Post-Communist Europe: The Role of International Norms and European Integration”, in Zoltan D. Barany and Robert G. Moser, Ethnic Politics After Communism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 191-217, at 205.
126 minorities, and the introduction of the Macedonian language and its Cyrillic alphabet as the official ones, caused dissatisfaction particularly on the side of the Albanian minority. The fact that the Macedonian constitution of 1991 was in its nature a civic constitution that should have been ethnicity blind, played no role for Macedonian Albanians. Being dissatisfied with such a constitutional arrangement, the ethnic Albanian leaders demanded a state-forming “constitutive” status for the Albanian community with veto powers, and recognition of the Albanian language as an official language. The Croatian constitution of 1991, as well, defined the country as a nation state of the Croatian nation (and the state of the members of autochthonous national minorities), aggravating dissatisfaction on the side of the former second titular nation in Croatia, the Serbs, which used to constitute 12.5% of the population in 1991. Despite numerous other constitutional provisions dealing with the rights of minorities, the Constitution did not suit Croatian Serbs as it ‘degraded’ them to the status of a national minority from previously being one of the republic’s constituent nations. This Constitutional change has widely been used as an argument by the Serb political leaders for ethnically mobilizing the Serbs in Krajina to start the violent uprising. They simply disregarded the fact that under the previous Constitution and political regime the Serbs, like the Croats, had not been given the possibility to organize associations and parties along ethnic lines. In addition, they intentionally ignored the fact that, in accordance with the earlier Constitution of the SR Croatia from 1974, the Serbs had not been allowed territorial autonomy or secession arguing exactly for such forms of (internal and external) autonomy. The Badinter commission requested the development of a minority rights regime in Croatia, which was eventually presented in the 1992 Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities. Eventually, the new Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities 526 was passed in late 2002, guaranteeing a broad spectrum of minority rights, but not re-introducing any form of territorial autonomy for the Serbs. The expulsion of the Serb population in the aftermath of the state-led liberating operations in 1995 justified for the government officials the exclusion of territorial-autonomy clause, because the Serbs did not any longer constitute a significant portion of population. The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia passed in November 2006 defines Serbia as a nation-state of Serbian people and all citizens who live in it. In the Preamble, Kosovo is defined as “an integral part of the territory of Serbia, that it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia and that from such status of the Province of
526 Ustavni zakon o pravima nacionalnih manjina, Narodne novine 155/2002.
127 Kosovo and Metohija follow constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign political relations.” The Constitution furthermore prescribes protection of the rights of national minorities “for the purpose of exercising full equality and preserving their identity” (Article 14). The Law on Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities passed by the Yugoslav Federal Parliament in February 2002 continues to be applied after the dissolution of the State Union. Previously it was supposed to be applied in both republics of the State Union, but Montenegro resisted in implementing it at its territory. The 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro in the preamble provided that Montenegro is a nation-state founded “on the basis of historical rights of the Montenegrin people to their own country, acquired in the centuries-old struggles for freedom”. 527 Later, before the country declared independence, the consent of national minority communities was necessary to win a referendum majority. Not surprisingly, this political bargaining resulted in a special piece of minority legislation, and even in a different concept of state. Instead of the nation-state, Montenegro opted for a civic concept. The Montenegrin Parliament adopted the Law on National Minority Rights and Freedoms in May 2006. 528 The law includes a number of provisions that should allow ethnic minorities to assert their rights, influence policy in accordance with their interests, and obtain permanent representation in national and municipal assemblies. However, in spite of the initial euphoria of Montenegrin national minorities, who perceived the Law as a means for accomplishment of their better integration in the society, shortly after the referendum for the country’s independence, the Montenegrin Constitutional Court declared two key articles of the Minority Law unconstitutional that allowed for double voting right in parliamentary election for national minority members. 529 As a result, the new Montenegrin Constitution, 530 adopted in October 2007, specifically states that the issue of minority permanent representation in parliament will be resolved through the application of affirmative action, allowing for the possibility of these key articles or their modified version to be reinstated. In addition to this provision, the Constitution guarantees the set of rights and liberties to persons belonging to minority nations and other minority national communities and prohibits forceful assimilation.
527 Ustav Crne Gore, Službeni list RCG 48/1992. 528 Zakon o manjinskim pravima i slobodama, Službeni listRCG, 31/2006, 38/2007. 529 Odluka Ustavnog suda Republike Crne Gore U.br. 53/06 od 11. jula 2006. godine, sa izdvojenim mišljenjem, Službeni list RCG 51/2006. 530 Ustav Crne Gore, Službeni listRCG 1/2007.
128 The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is set forth in Annex 4 to the Dayton Agreement and has never been published in the BiH official gazette. 531 The Constitutional preamble has a reference to “Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina” who determined the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Constitution furthermore prescribed that exclusively, citizens of the BiH declaring Bosniak, Croat and Serb ethnic belonging, i.e. those belonging to three constituent people, are entitled to occupy position in the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the second chamber of Parliament) and the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the collective Head of State). 532 National minorities in BiH, as well as all the citizens of this country who are not willing to declare ethnic belonging, as a result of such Constitutionally established provisions, are ineligible to stand for election for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and cannot be nominated to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a political system which de iure and de facto discriminates on the basis of ethnicity resulted in the complaint to the ECtHR of two BiH citizens. 533 They argued that by lacking affiliation with a constituent people, despite possessing experience comparable to that of the highest elected officials in BiH, they are deprived of equal political participation. The Grand Chamber judgment of the ECtHR established a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights taken together with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections), and violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 (general prohibition of discrimination) to the Convention. 534 However, the necessary measures on the side of BiH aimed at eliminating discrimination against applicants since the execution of this judgment requires amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to its electoral legislation which, in a complex power-sharing arrangement cemented by inter-ethnic and inter-party cleavages seems impossible to find what qualifies BiH as a weak state. 535
531 The General Framework Agreement: Annex 4, Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at
129 After Kosovo declared its independence in February 2008, its parliamentary assembly officially adopted a new Constitution in June 2008 declaring Kosovo as an “an independent, sovereign, democratic, unique and indivisible state”. 536 Article 1 proclaims that “[t]he Republic of Kosovo shall have no territorial claims against, and shall seek no union with, any State or part of any State.” Drawing upon recommendations of the U.N. Special Envoy to Kosovo by Marti Ahtisaari, the Constitution also includes an entire chapter spelling out the rights of and provisions for Kosovo’s minority groups, including parliamentary seat allotment. Twenty of the assembly’s 120 seats shall be reserved for minorities, each of whom are guaranteed a respective minimum number of seats as follows: the Roma community, one seat; the Ashkali community, one seat; the Egyptian community, one seat; and one additional seat will be awarded to either the Roma, the Ashkali or the Egyptian community with the highest overall votes; the Bosnian community, three seats; the Turkish community, two seats; and the Gorani community, one seat. The new constitution envisions handing power of the UNMIK over to the ethnic Albanian government, with assistance in key areas from the EU. References to state-forming quality of the majority ethnic group in numerous constitutions presented above disclose that the Western Balkan states predominantly opted for ethno-nationalist and exclusionary constitutional foundations, revealing bigoted preference for the ethnic majority. 537 Such constitutional solutions, at the outset of the nation-state formation period, additionally contributed to societal divisions among ethnic lines. Nenad Dimitrijevi ć consideres that as long as constitutionally acknowledged “ethnically perceived statehood stands, policy-framed privileges for minorities will remain at mercy of majoritarian preferences, which are too often and too easily in countries of the region legitimised by claiming the primacy of majority rule”. 538 Constitutions, instead, in ethnically diverse societies should be symbolic documents where minority rights are brought into balance with
104 (685) Current History (2005), pp. 365-374; Florian Bieber, “After Dayton, Dayton? The Evolution of an Unpopular Peace?”, 5 (1) Ethnopolitics (2006), pp. 15-31; Dimitar Bechev, “Whither Bosnia? Dilemmas of State-Building in the Western Balkans”, 6(4) Turkish Policy Quarerly (2008), pp. 87-95. More on numerous suggestions how to implement the ECtHR judgement in Dino Abazovi ć et al. (eds.), Mjestoiuloga 'Ostalih' u UstavuBosneiHercegovineibudu ćimustavnimrješenjimazaBosnuiHercegovinu (Sarajevo: Institut za društvena istraživanja Fakulteta politi čkih nauka u Sarajevu, 2010); Daniel Bochsler, “Electoral Rules and the Representation of Ethnic Minorities in Post-Communist Democracies”, 11 European Yearbook of Minority Issues (2010), pp. 153-180; Daniel Bochsler, “Non-discriminatory Rules and Ethnic Representation: The Election of the Bosnian State Presidency, 11 (1) Ethnopolitics (2011), pp. 66-84; EdinHodži ć and Nenad Stojanovi ć, Novi-stari ustavn iinženjering? Izazovi i implikacije presude Evropskog suda za ljudska prava u predmetu Sejdi ć i Finciprotiv BiH (Sarajevo: Analitika-Centar za društvena istraživanja, 2011). 536 Kushtetuta e Republikës së Kosovës (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo), Gazeta Zyrtare e Republikëssë Kosovës 3/2008. 537 Nenad Dimitrijevi ć, “Ethno-Nationalized States of Eastern Europe: Is There a Constitutional Alternative?”, 54 Studies in East European Thought (2002), pp. 245-269. 538 Ibid.
130 majority rule. 539 Constitutions should, in addition, provide the ultimate expression of a country's dominant political values and should indicate if not prevailing, then at least desired political culture. Finally, in the states that were home to several ethnic groups, they should serve as symbolic fora for recognition of multi-ethnic character of the state. Ironically, the EU’s insistence on re-invigoration of the Western Balkans multiculturalism was perceived by Jacques Rupnik as one of the paradoxes of the EU accession policy. By recalling that the EU “this argument was voiced loud and clear in the 1990s by Western intellectuals, politicians and the media, creating legitimacy and public support for a European engagement, and even for military intervention against ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo”, Rupnik reminded that the EU “resists ethnic partition in Kosovo, Bosnia or FYROM in the name of a civic concept of the new nation-state in the making and of a multicultural society” whereas “in all corners of old and new Europe, we see a return of identity politics and the rise of national-populist forces on issues related to immigration and integration”. 540 Numerous are authors who draw attention to the fact that externally imposed democratization occasionally used undemocratic means in the Western Balkans. Joseph Marko recalled that the international community “preaches democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights” but exercised the transitional powers it received through the peace treaty provisions that established international civilian administration “too often in an ‘imperial’ way and [...] did not meet the lowest standards of rule of law”. 541 Marko therefore warned that “all the emphasis on European values and standards is in strong danger of losing credibility”. 542 Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin similarly sarcastically compared the unlimited authority of BiH’s High Representative “to overrule the democratic institutions of a sovereign member state of the United Nations” to Inidan Raj. 543 Othon Anastasakis as well considered that “the instrument of EU conditionality is not always, strictly speaking, democratic, based as
539 Sujit Choudhry, “Bridging Comparatie Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies”, in Sujit Choudhry (ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 540 Jacques Rupnik “The Balkans as a European question”, in Jacques Rupnik (ed.),”The Western Balkans and the EU: ‘the hour of Europe’”, 126 Chaillot Papers (2011), available at
131 it is on an unequal and asymmetric relationship of imposition, pressure, control and, partly, threats. Moreover, local compliance with some of the criteria is not always the result of democratic dialogue within the countries, their parliaments and/or societies, especially when it has to happen at very high speed. From a substantive point of view, EU political conditionality can run counter to democratization, at least in the short term when some of the prescriptions prioritize law and order instead of elections and/or civil society development. This happens, especially, in post-conflict cases where the rule of law is weak and the goal of law and order takes precedence over other democratic bottom-up goals and criteria”. 544 In spite of validity of such a criticism, the external pressure and particularly EU diversity conditionality have been serving as the main factor driving predominantly legislative and institutional alignments in the Western Balkan (potential) candidate countries and norm compliance vis-à-vis protection of minority rights. Namely, in the eve of the international recognition of the newly emerging Western Balkan states, the international community requested subscription to international and European standards of minority protection and putting up minority measures and policies and their accommodation for recognition and membership in return. The European Community conditioned an international recognition of the newly proclaimed sovereign countries in the early 1990s was by acknowledgement of minority rights. The European Community’s “conditional recognition represented a genuine attempt to address some of the presumed sources of violent conflict in the region”. 545 It, for example, resulted in the December 1991 Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia which represented fulfilment of a condition for European Community’s recognition of Croatia. 546 Guarantees of minority rights were codified in peace treaties as well, since they constitute a necessary precondition for related post-conflict course of activities and processes such as reconstruction, and return of refugees and displaced persons. When the conflicts were pacified and the countries of the region applied for membership in the Council of Europe, their acceptance to this organization was again conditioned by the improvement of minority rights regimes and transposition of Europeanminority rights standards into their constitutions and their national legislation. As a result of this, minority legislation across the Western Balkans region is chiefly in line with the Framework Convention and the Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, since almost all countries, apart from Albania which has not ratified
544 Othon Anastasakis, op.cit. (2008), at 366. 545 Richard Caplan, “Conditional Recognition as an Instrument of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: The European Community and Yugoslavia”, 8 (2) Nations and Nationalism (2002), pp. 157-177. 546 Ustavni zakon o ljudskim pravima i slobodama i o pravima etni čkih i nacionalnih zajednica ili manjina u Republic iHrvatskoj , Narodne Novine 65/1991, 70/1991, 27/1992, 34/1992, 68/1995, 105/2000.
132 the Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, subscribed to the standards of those minority rights instruments. In addition, each country has prescribed a special piece of legislation assuring the minority rights regime along the constitutional guarantees: the Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities 547 and Charter of Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties 548 was adopted in FRY of that time in 2002, and later “inherited” by Serbia. The Croatian Constitutional Law on the Rights of Minorities was passed in late 2002. 549 In Bosnia- Herzegovina, the Law on the Protection of Rights of Members of National Minorities was passed in 2003 550 and followed by two entity minority laws. 551 In advance to secession from the State Union with Serbia, Montenegro adopted the Law on Minority Rights and Freedoms 552 in advance to its referendum of independence in 2006. The Law on Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Communities and their Members in Kosovo 553 was passed in 2008. In the same year, the Law on the Advancement and Protection of Members of Communities which are smaller than 20% of the Population of Macedonia 554 saw the light of the day. In detecting who the addressees of this pre-accession diversity conditionality are, I turn to two classifications on national minority in the Western Balkans. Explaining the dichotomy between ‘state-forming minorities’ and ‘minorities’, Joseph Marko argued that those minority communities in the Western Balkans countries that consider themselves to be a state-forming nations are reluctantly to be treated as a minority. They insist on “’institutional equality’, i.e. the right to decide equally on all political decisions not only concerning their own group, but the entire state and society as such.” 555 Marko distinguishes therefore between constituent peoples (as it is case in Bosnia and Herzegovina) or co-nations (like, e.g. Albanians in Macedonia, Serbs in Kosovo, Serbs at the beginning of 1990s in Croatia) and
547 Zakon o zaštiti prava i sloboda nacionalnih manjina, Službeni list SRJ 11/2002 and Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije 72/2009. 548 Povelja o ljudskim i manjinskim pravima i gra đanskim slobodama, Službeni list Srbije i Crne Gore 6/2003. 549 Ustavni zakon o pravima nacionalnih manjina, Narodne novine 115/2002, 80/2010.See also Antonija Petri čuši ć, “Croatian Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities”, 2 European Yearbook of Minority Issues (2004), pp. 607-629. 550 Zakona o zaštiti prava nacionalnih manjina, Službeni glasnik BiH 12/2003.Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o zaštiti prava pripadnika nacionalnih manjina – Službeni glasnik BiH 76/2005. 551 Zakona o zaštiti prava pripadnika nacionalnih manjina, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske 2/2004.Zakon o zaštiti prava pripadnika nacionalnih manjina u Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine, Službene novine FBiH, 56/2008. 552 Zakona o manjinskim pravima i slobodama, Službeni list 31/2006, 51/2006, 38/2007. 553 Ligji 03/L-047 për Mbrojtjendhe Promovimin e të Drejtavetë.KomunitetevedheAnëtarëvetë Tyre në Republikën, Gazeta Zyrtare e Republikëssë Kosovës 9/2008. 554 Закон за употреба на јазик што го зборуваат најмалку 20% од граѓаните во Република Македонија и во единиците на локалната самоуправа , Службен весник на Република Македонија 101/2008. 555 Emma Lantschner and Joseph Marko “Conclusions: European Integration and its Effects on Minority Protection in South Eastern Europe” in Emma Lantschner, Joseph Marko and Antonija Petri čuši ć (eds.), European Integration and its Effects on Minority Protection in South Eastern Europe (Nomos, Baden Baden, 2008), 361.
133 minorities (in a traditional sense). Those minorities strict sensu , according to Florian Bieber, could be classified into six categories. The first group is made of “marginal minorities, those that are small in size and often under threat of assimilation (e.g. Roma in Bosnia and Herzegovina and groups such as Vlachs in Macedonia, Czechs in Croatia or Bulgarians in Serbia). To the second group belong those (Roma, Ashkalia and Egyptians) characterized by poverty and exclusion from economic and social life of the majority. The third category encompasses larger minorities which are able to sustain their own culture and enjoy kin-state support and have not been part of the conflicts of the 1990s. This primarily includes the Hungarian minority in Serbia. A fourth group of minorities has been directly affected by the conflicts of the 1990s and thus minority-majority relations are often particularly tense. Such communities include Serbs in Croatia and Albanians in Southern Serbia. A fifth community incorporates the minorities which emerged as a result of intra-Yugoslav migrations, such as most Bosniaks/Muslims in Croatia or Macedonians in Serbia.” The last category comprises of de facto minorities who are “state majorities which find themselves in a situation where they live as minority in particular parts of the country”. 556 It is furthermore important to establishe what exactly is the European Commission interested in scrutinizing when assessing the diversity conditionality? In its Screening report on Croatia, the Commission stated that “minority rights … include the right to non- discrimination of a person belonging to a national minority; the freedom of association, to assembly, of expression; the freedom of religion; the right to use one’s language; and the effective participation in public affairs”. 557 The Western Balkans minority legislation at large guarantees equality, freedom to express minority national identity, freedom to use minority language and script, and cultural autonomy. Co-official status of minority languages has been assured in several countries at the national level (e.g. Albanian in Macedonian, Serbian in Kosovo), and often the co-official use of minority languages (particularly at regional and local levels) is guaranteed. In addition, education in minority languages as well, is to a great extent foreseen, and minorities can publish in their languages and often also broadcast TV and radio programmes. Assurance of political representation makes minority groups more likely to accept integration into society. Legislative provisions in place in Croatia, Montenegro and Kosovo assure political representation of minorities in Parliament and in the Government,
556 Florian Bieber, “The role of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in selected countries of South-Eastern Europe after two monitoring cycles“, at
134 allowing for consociational arrangements to emerge.39 A trend that assures that minority positions are heard even at the lower levels of governance is assured through the work of national minority councils, i.e. consultative inter-ethnic bodies that should be assigned with a capacity to co-define minority related (local and regional) policies. Such consultative bodies, though with differing mandates and competences, are established already in Croatia, BiH, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegroand Serbia. Nevertheless, all cultural autonomy related rights (as prescribed in both domestic legislation and in international instruments) alone seem unacceptable to minority political elites until a minority makes a substantive percentage of population. Kymlicka for example claimed that “[t]he fact that these national minorities are not satisfied with these provisions is sometimes taken as evidence of the illiberalism of their political culture, or the radicalism of their leadership. But it’s worth noting that no sizeable politically mobilized national minority in the West would be satisfied either. No one can seriously suppose that national minorities in Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, Bern, South Tyrol, Aland Islands or Puerto Rico would be satisfied simply with minority elementary schools but not mother-tongue universities, or bilingual street signs but not official language status, or local administration but not regional autonomy”. 558 vTherefore, territorial autonomy solutions came as a result of unwillingness of numerically large minority groups in the Western Balkans to subscribe merely to protection of their cultural traits. Although territorial autonomy has not been acknowledged in the text of the Ohrid Agreement, a process of decentralization took place in the aftermath of the peace treaty, allowing for de facto autonomy of those Macedonian municipalities in which Albanian population makes majority of population. 559 The same can be said for Kosovo, where
558 Will Kymlicka, “National Minorities in Post-Communist Europe: The Role of International Norms and European Integration”, in Zoltan Barany and Robert Moser (eds.) Ethnic Politics After Communism (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2005), 191-217, at 205. Compare also Will Kymlicka, “Nation-building and minority rights: comparing West and East”, 2 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2000), pp. 173-182. Joseph Marko similarly argued that different categories, often based on numerical strengths, of the Western Balkans minorities have various claims. See Emma Lantschner and Joseph Marko “Conclusions: European Integration and its Effects on Minority Protection in South Eastern Europe” in Emma Lantschner, Joseph Marko and Antonija Petri čuši ć (eds.), European Integration and its Effects on Minority Protection in South Eastern Europe (Baden Baden: Nomos, 2008), at 361-362. See also Jenny Engström, “Multi-ethnicity or Bi-nationalism? The Framework Agreement and the Future of the Macedonian State”, 1 Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (2002), available at
135 territorial organization foresses a high degree of local self-governance autonomy for municipalities. 560
5.2.1. Refuge Return
It is estimated that the violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia resulted in approximately 140,000 casualties, whereas the whereabouts of 14,000 still missing people are unaccounted into his number. 561 In addition, the brutality of these conflicts resulted in the displacement of more than three million persons, 562 causing the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War and coining the term “ethnic cleansing”. 563 A significant number of displaced persons either resettled from previously mixed areas into locations populated by people of their ethnicity or moved into a kin-state. A substantive number of them were resettled to third countries, i.e. countries outside the region, through programs organized by various international organizations. More than fifteen years since the end of the conflicts, it is estimated that there were still “about 438,000 refugees and other displaced persons whose legitimate claims have not yet been met, and for whom durable solutions have not been found”. 564 Therefore, refugee return in the Western Balkans can, at best, be considered as a partial success only. As Florian Bieber noted some years ago, “ [t]he post conflict regions have become more homogeneous since 1991 and restored diversity in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina has peaked already a few years ago and shows no sign of becoming sustainable. It is thus unlikely to stem the tide of ethnic homogenization and territorialisation.” 565 Insisting on the right to return, the international community has attempted to restore the pre-war ethnic picture and to rectify the ethnic cleansing effects. Besides this, the actual
560 Articles 123 and 124 of the Constitution of Kosovo, Kushtetuta e Republikës së Kosovës, Gazeta Zyrtare e Republikëssë Kosovës 3/2008. See also Law Nr. 03/L-040 on Local Self-Government, Ligjit Nr. 03/L-040 për vetëqeverisje locale, Gazeta Zyrtare e Republikëssë Kosovës 9/2008. 561 Parliamentary Assembly CoE (PACE), Political Affairs Committee, “Reconciliation and political dialogue between the countries of the former Yugoslavia”, Doc. 12461, 07.01.2011, available at
136 return of refugees to their pre-war housing and assurance of financial resources for reconstruction of looted and destroyed housings contributions is a base for subsequent reconciliation. 566 The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights has also linked the implementation of human rights of refugees and displaced persons in the region to the process of inter-ethnic reconciliation in the region and the development of national systems for the protection of human and minority rights. 567 Aside from that, progress in refugee return is also an indicator of progress in democratic consolidation. Nevertheless, in spite of refugee return becoming a component of the EU diversity tailor-made conditionality, there are still outstanding opened refugee displacement issues in the Western Balkans. In order to bring the refugee return process to an end, refugees and displaced persons have several options at their disposal, each requiring clear political will on the part of the states concerned and their financial support. The primary state duty and responsibility is to allow for voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes or places of habitual residence in safety and dignity. However, refugees and displaced persons might opt for not returning. In that case, states can either financially back their voluntary resettlement or support local integration of refugees into the communities in which they are presently located. In order for those processes to be satisfactory, returnees’ “decisions should be based on updated, reliable data on the number and situation of forcibly displaced persons and returnees”. 568 Apart from establishing favourable return conditions and providing the respective necessary means, the authorities of the Western Balkan countries also need “to ensure the full participation of minority members in all relevant action-planning and decision-making”. 569 When Serb refugees left their homes in Croatia during the war, the authorities took the right to repossess their housings and made them available to refugees, settlers and displaced people, primarily of Croat ethnicity. The peak of the refugee return in Croatia happened between 1997 and 2000, when the security situation was still troublesome. 570 Namely, in 1998 the Return Program was introduced and only after this policy decision of the Croatian
566 Empirical research on the correlation between refugee return and reconciliation in the areas of refugee return in Croatia was systematically done by Dragutin Babić. See e.g. Dragutin Babi ć, “Povratak i mogu ćnost suživota ratnih stradalnika u zapadnom dijelu Brodsko-posavske županije”, 4(1) Zlatna dolin , (1998), pp. 271-285; Dragutin Babi ć, “Sukobi i suradnja povratnika i useljenika u poslijeratnom razdoblju: Brodsko-posavska županija”, 15(4) Migracijske teme (1999), pp. 483-500; Dragutin Babi ć, “Oprost i pomirenje kao pretpostavka suživota: proces koji je po čeo ili utopijski izazov? (Slu čaj Brodsko-posavske županije)”, 33 (3-4) Revija za sociologiju (2002), pp. 197-211; Dragutin Babi ć, “Suživot Hrvata i Srba u prijeratnom, ratnom i poslijeratnom razdoblju implicitna kritika interpretacije rata u Hrvatskoj kao etnickog sukoba”, 20(2-3) Migracijske i etni čke teme (2004), pp. 187-208. 567 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, op.cit. (2012). 568 Ibid. 569 Ibid. 570 Milan Mesi ć and Dragan Bagi ć, Minority Return to Croatia: Study of an Open Process (Zagreb: UNHCR, 2012), at 27.
137 government “significant, but still very low numbers of Serbian refugees began to return”. 571 Returnees who returned in this first return wave often originated from predominantly rural areas that were confronted with the problem of land mines and other explosive remnants of war, faced discrimination in access to markets for agricultural produce, as well as very poor road access, electricity and water supplies. 572 Milan Mesi ć and DraganBagi ć argued that “occupancy and tenancy rights certainly do not belong to the field of international refugee law, but they may be considered humanitarian law for reasons of obvious discrimination against Serb refugees at the time of their abolishment”. 573 The introduction of the legal framework on property repossession for refugees and, even more so, its implementation had been a slow and very costly process. It appears that progress in this field has been very likely terminated. Mesi ć and Bagi ć, for example, stated that “the restitution of ownership of homes, land and other real estate to their legal owners (minority refugees) was for the most part accomplished by 2005”. 574 Apart from this, refugee return was hindered by discriminatory legal framework and by inexistent or inadequate political will of both central and local policy makers. 575 Serbs who returned in this first return wave often faced long, complex and discriminatory bureaucratic procedures. For example, whilst ethnic Croats who were refugees to Croatia from neighbouring countries, who had not previously been residents in Croatia, were able to obtain citizenship quickly, returning Serbs encountered difficulties in proving their right of residence and citizenship. In economically deprived areas of return, Serbs face major difficulties regarding access to employment. Since employment opportunities in such areas are scarce, Serbs are particularly discriminated against in access to employment in the public sector. 576 Moreover, a large number of ethnic Serb-owned homes were either destroyed in the war or occupied by ethnic Croats. In 2006, the Commission reported that “the situation concerning reconstruction of housing has continued to improve” 577 since the Croatian government by that date had reconstructed “over 140,000 out of the 200,000 destroyed houses
571 Viktor Koska, “Return and Reintegration of Minority Refugees: The Complexity of the Serbian Returnees Experiences in the Town of Glina”, 45(5) Politi čkamisao (2008), pp. 191-217, at 192. 572 Richard Allen, Angela Li Rosi and Maria Skeie, Should I stay or should I go? A review of UNHCR’s response to the protracted refugee situation in Serbia and Croatia (Geneve: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010), at 22. See also DraganBagi ć and Milan Mesi ć, Društveno-ekonomski uvjeti održivosti povratka - primjer srpskih povratnika u Hrvatsku”, 15 (1) Revija za socijalnu politiku (2008), pp. 23-38. 573 Milan Mesi ć and DraganBagi ć, op.cit. (2012), at 26. 574 Ibid. , at 30. 575 Brad K. Blitz, “Refugee Returns in Croatia: Contradictions and Reform”, 23 (3) Politics (2003), pp. 181-191. See also Viktor Koska, op.cit. (2008), at 192. See also Human Rights Watch, “Broken Promises: Impediments to Refugee Return to Croatia”, 15 (6) Human Rights Watch Report (2003),
138 and apartments”. 578 In that year, the Commission furthermore informed that “a relatively small number of the 20,000 or so houses that had been occupied remain to be repossessed and handed over to their rightful owners”. 579 Finally, a category of former residents who had occupancy rights to socially owned apartments ( stanarsko pravo ) was for a long time prevented in the return attempts. This category flat occupancy that existed in socialist system, allowed them to enjoy a life-long tenancy even to pass the tenancy right on to their children. The abolishment of tenure and tenancy rights has rendered a majority of refugees with limited and low-incomes more vulnerable to sub-standard living conditions, evictions and homelessness. 580 The issue of convalidation, i.e. the validation of working years concerning pension rights of those residing in the occupied parts of Croatia during the first part of the 1990s, was as well treated as one of the key concerns returnees were facing and which required a pro-active stance of the Croatian government in the pre-accession period. In 2008, the Commission positively assessed “that the Government has taken various decisions reopening the possibility for these pension rights to be accessed”.581 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the issue of the refugee return was foreseen already in the text of the peace agreement of December 1995, which ended the war in that country. The Dayton Agreement encompassed in the Annex 7 “Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons”. 582 The Constitution of BiH, which was as well made as a part of the Dayton Agreement, also contains a provision regarding the rights of refugees and displaced persons. 583 The Dayton Agreement recognized that “[t]he early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. 584 It foresaw furthermore that “[a]ll refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. They have the right, in accordance with Annex 7 to the General Framework Agreement, to have restored [...] property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any such property that cannot be restored to them. Any commitments or statements relating to such property
578 Ibid. 579 Ibid. 580 Anna-Maria Radi ć, “Socijalna prava: prognanici, povratnici i izbjeglice”, 11 (1) Revija za socijalnu politiku (2004), pp. 129-136. See also Veljko Mikelic, Torsten Schoen and Marjolein Benschop, Housing and Property Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia (Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2005). 581 EC, Croatia 2008 Progress Report, COM(2008) 674, at 15. See also EC, Croatia 2009 Progress Report, COM(2009) 533, at 17. 582 The General Framework Agreement: Annex 7, Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons,
139 made under duress are null and void”. 585 Such legally provided right of return endowed BiH authorities with a task to create the “political, economic, and social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, without preference for any particular group”. 586 This was quite a challenge for a country which was economically worn out in a four year long war and burdened with more than one million refugees. 587 Similar to a praxis of the Croatian authorities in the aftermath of the conflict termination in the mid-1990s, BiH local authorities declared fled property as abandoned and allowed occupancy of this property by incoming refugees and displaced persons. In addition to this, refugees often found shelter in vacant property even without the authorization of the local authorities. Once the conflict was over, returnees wishing to return faced difficulties in reclaiming their right to housing since refugees had occupied the majority of this property. This created a complex and costly situation that required the finding of alternative accommodation for new occupants of the fled property. Similar to the Croatian early returnee peak, the number of returnees in BiH has been continuously falling since 2002. 588 Nevertheless, the number of those expressing at least a declaratory intention to return is quite high. Around 120,000 people registered as refugees and displaced persons expressed the intention to regain their former places of residence. Back in 2007 589 The Office of the High Representative, together with a number of international agencies present in the country, e.g. the OSCE and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “closely reviewed the revocation of the discriminatory war legislation and actively supported the adoption and implementation of adequate housing laws, which encouraged refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their pre-war homes”. 590 The comparative research has established that the measures foreseen in the conflict aftermath that should allow for refugee return are often inadequate, which a relatively low number of the actual returnees in Croatia and BIH confirm. Patricia Weiss Fagan established three reasons which prevent a successful refugee return: “a widely shared but flawed assumption that the need to create a future for returnees is satisfied by restoring them to their
585 Ibid . 586 Ibid. , article II.1. 587 See e.g. Sophie Albert, “The Return of Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Peace-building with People”, 4 International Peacekeeping (1997), pp. 1-23. 588 Dragan Živi ć, “Prognano stanovništvo iz hrvatskog Podunavlja i problemi njegovog povratka” (1991.-2001.), 65 (1) Hrvatski geografski glasnik (2003), pp. 63-81. 589 EC, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007 Progress Report, at 19. 590 Veljko Mikelic, Torsten Schoen and Marjolein Benschop, op.cit .(2005), at 1.
140 prior lives; a lack of long-term engagement by implementing authorities; and a focus on rural reintegration when many refugees and IDPs are returning to urban areas”. 591 Almost 850,000 people, mostly Albanians, fled from the Kosovo conflict that took place in late 1998 and the first half of 1999. They were largely temporarily accommodated in Macedonia and Albania. The return of Kosovo refugees was prompt and successful due to the international community’s prompt involvement. The NATO humanitarian intervention lasted from 24 March to 11 June 1999, allegedly under the slogan “Serbs out, peacekeepers in, refugees back”. 592 It, nevertheless, caused the Serb population from Kosovo to flee as well. Out of the total number of over 200,000 displaced Serb refugees back in 1999, it was estimated in 2007 that merely 16,000 have returned to their original housings. 593 However, some returns are fictive, since there are no reliable statistics on how many of those returnees have indeed remained in Kosovo. Apart from primary security concerns, bleak employment prospects discourage the return of Serbs and other minority communities in Kosovo. Serb refugees from Kosovo up to the present day have not reassumed a majority of their property, particularly in the bigger cities. The international community has played an active role in finding durable solutions for refugees and displaced persons in the region and each of its countries. The OSCE and the UNHCR worked particularly on realisation of the rights of refugees to return to their pre-war homes and reclaim their property throughout the region. They seriously monitored the progress of refugee return, explaining it as an issue belonging to international obligations the states of the region had voluntarily subscribed to, including the commitment to implement the obligations effectively and efficiently. Apart from the two aforementioned international agents, the EU, as well, has been closely engaged in promoting just, comprehensive and durable solutions for the problems of refugees and IDPs in the Western Balkans. 594 Obviously, refugee return is a policy with a scope which is broader than a simple domestic one. Therefore, the proper addressing of refugee return has required significant international funding, and even more a high degree of political commitment of the states concerned.
591 Patricia Weiss Fagan, “Refugees and IDPs after Conflict. Why They Do Not Go Home”, 268 United States Institute of Peace Report (2011), available at
141 An additional encouragement for the regional dimension in refugee return therefore came with the internationally driven process which recognized the primacy of the individual’s right to choose where to live, rather than emphasizing return over other solutions. The international community put forward in late 2004 a proposal of a regional political process, hoping it would add impetus in removing the obstacles to return: eventually creating the conditions for those displaced to make a free choice on whether to return or to locally integrate in the country of refuge. As a result, a trilateral Declaration was eventually signed by the ministers responsible for refugee matters of Croatia, BiH and Serbia and Montenegro on 31 January 2005 in Sarajevo. The governments committed to the resolution of all practical, political and legal issues affecting refugees, through the meeting of concrete benchmarks, by the end of 2006 to assure the non-discriminatory access to rights such as property, pensions, health care, employment and the facilitation of local integration for those wishing to remain in their countries of refuge; to develop national plans (Road Maps) specifying tasks and benchmarks at national level as well as a Regional Matrix listing tasks to be tackled jointly; and the appointment of an intergovernmental Task Force that will meet at least four times a year to oversee the drafting and mutual agreement of the Road Maps and the Regional Matrix as well as the implementation of the process. Each of the country concerned was given a list of tasks considered important for the successful implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration. In spite of quite regular Task Force meetings and the development of national Road Maps (which eventually resulted in the Joint Matrix), the significant measurable progress in refugee return has not been achieved. However, four countries of the region (when Serbia and Montenegro disintegrated in 2006 each country became a part of the Sarajevo Process) have made progress on a number of outstanding issues such as data exchange, civil documentation, public information, pensions and trust fund mechanisms. 595 The European Commission itself acknowledged that progress on regional cooperation and implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration was “slower than expected” 596 or that “no decisive progress on implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration [...] has been achieved”. 597 According to the Commission, the lack of political consensus between the signatories kept the Process blocked for a long time. 598 The UNHCR initiative came at a time when the momentum behind this process had started to decline in 2008. It reinvigorated this process, leading to the ministerial meeting in Belgrade in March 2010, at which the foreign ministers of all four countries made a new
595 EC, Croatia 2011 Progress Report, SEC(2011) 1200, 12.10.2011, at 14. 596 EC, Croatia 2006 Progress Report, SEC(2006) 1385, 08.11.2006, at 13 597 EC, Croatia 2007 Progress Report, SEC(2007) 1431, 06.11.2007, at 15. 598 Ibid.
142 commitment to the search for solutions, agreeing to work together to clarify refugee statistics. 599 In spite of this renewed commitment, a number of difficult issues remained opened, e.g. occupancy and tenancy rights. In November 2011 the Foreign Affairs Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia signed a Joint Declaration, including a Framework Programme to help resolving the protracted displacement situation in the Western Balkans. A five-year plan agreed there envisages the closing down of all refugee centres and providing housing for all displaced people. On 24 April 2012 the conference on housing solutions for refugees and displaced persons was organised in Sarajevo with the aim to underline the international community’s firm support to close the refugee chapter across the region. Financial resources collected are supposed to be implemented over a five-year period, predominantly ensuring adequate housing to all remaining refugees accommodated in collective centres.
5.2.2. Prosecution of War Crimes
Crimes committeed in the recently waged wars across the region “included widespread and serious crimes against civilians, prisoners of war, and civilian property. Killing, torture, rape, forcible displacement, and indiscriminate and deliberate attacks on civilian targets were commonplace”. 600 Such a protracted situation in war crimes’ prosecution and sentencing for sure doeas not contribute to re-establishment of interpersonal trust and impedes emergence of democratic political culture. Bringing perpetrators of the war crimes to the justice is just one element of transitional justice, which can be described as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”. 601 Transitional justice therefore contains both judicial and non-judicial instruments. As a judicial mechanism, transitional justice aims at bringing to justice through lawful court procedures that might be international or domestic. Being understood as a non-judicial mechanism, transitional justice can be described as “legal responses to a former regime’s repressive acts following a change in political systems”. 602 A fundamental nature of those two mechanisms
599 Richard Allen, Angela Li Rosi and Maria Skeie, op.cit .(2010), at 1. 600 Human Rights Watch, “Still Waiting - Bringing Justice for War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, and Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Cantonal and District Courts” (2008), available at
143 differs. Whereas the one of judicial is retributive, intended for prosecuting those who have committed war crimes through fair proceedings, 603 the nature of non-judicial mechanism is restorative and preventive, 604 “aiming to provide redress to victims and to eliminate impunity and ensure that all people in the region come to terms with the past, and live in peace and security in cohesive, pluralist democratic societies”. 605 Post-war justice justice initiatives are meant to promote both interpersonal and institutional trust through lawful judicial procedures. That is because, as Pablo de Greiff argued, “law both presupposes and catalyzes trust among individuals and trust between them and their institutions. It can help generate trust between citizens by stabilizing expectations and thus diminishing the risks of trusting others. Similarly, law helps generate trust in institutions (including the institutions of law themselves) by accumulating a record of reliably solving conflicts, among other ways. But the accomplishment of these goals naturally presupposes the effectiveness of the law, and in a world of less than generalized spontaneous compliance, this means that law, although rational, must also be coercive. This coercive character at the limit entails criminal punishment.” 606 In conclusion, post-war justice should allow for a genuine inter-ethnic reconciliation and durable peace in the region. This is “a long-term and complex process whose success depends upon a supportive, mature political climate that should be characterised by will and determination on the part of political leaders”. 607 The paragraphs below will demonstrate in which was the actor preference towards post-war justice had been influenced by the EU accession prospects. The international criminal law experienced revival at the end of twentieth century since four supranational judicial bodies were put into place: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY or Tribunal), the International Criminal Tribunal
603 For theoretical conceptualization see James P. Sterba, “Retributive Justice”, 5 (3) Political Theory (1977), pp. 349-362. For application of the theoretical concept in the region see e.g. Janine N. Clark, “The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an Empirical Study in Bosnia and Hercegovina”, 7 (3) Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009), pp. 463-387. 604 John Braithwaite, “Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts”, 25 Crime and Justice (1999), pp. 1-127 605 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, op.cit. (2012), at 10. 606 Pablo de Greiff, “The Role of Apologies in National Reconciliation Processes: On Making Trustworthy Institutions Trusted ,” in Mark Gibney, Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Jean-Marc Coicaud and Niklaus Steiner (eds.), The Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 120-136, at 134. Monika Nalepa defined transitional justice to include more conflict-induced areas. According to her, it consists of “all procedures adopted to deal with members and collaborators of an ancien re´gime following a country’s transition from war to peace or from autocracy to democracy. Transitional justice procedures can include, for example, trying former perpetrators, granting amnesty, issuing apologies, and effecting victim compensation schemes. They also frequently involve a variety of ‘‘truth revelation’’ programs under which so-called truth commissions open the former authoritarian police’s secret files and vet public officials to reveal any links those officials may have had to the former autocrats”. Monika Nalepa, “Tolerating Mistakes: How Do Popular Perceptions of Procedural Fairness Affect Demand for Transitional Justice?”, 56 (3) Journal of Conflict Resolution (2012), pp. 490-515, at 491. 607 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, op.cit. (2012), at 43.
144 for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court. Although those bodies obtain legitimacy through their international constituents and founding documents that were made within the UN, their mandates are political and nature limited in power. 608 The ICTY was established back in 1993 by the by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII for the purpose of prosecuting serious violations of international humanitarian law. 609 This Tribunal was established in response to mass atrocities then taking place in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovinawith a fourfold mandate: (1) to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law; (2) to render justice to the victims; (3) to deter further crimes; and (4) to contribute to the restoration of peace by holding accountable persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. It has authority to prosecute and try four clusters of offences: (1) grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; (2) violations of the laws or customs of war; (3) genocide and (4) crimes against humanity.610 The ICTY is meant to work “on the prosecution and trial of the civilian, military and paramilitary leaders suspected of being responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, rather than on minor actors”. 611 Its main objectives, in the words of Ivo Josipovi ć, are “to establish justice, render justice to victims and determine the historical truth”. 612 In meeting this goal, the ICTY investigations and court trials have played a key role in laying out the facts and truth of recently waged wars. By collecting evidence in advance to indictments, the Tribunal undertook comprehensive investigations into the roles of military and civilian officials of that time, at the same time, reconstructing the historical traits. Although this component of the ICTY’s achievements is highly contested, both by rightist politicians and the general population in the region, and even by scholars, 613 the documentation collected by the Tribunal’s prosecutors will for sure serve as a scholarly
608 Christopher Rudolph, “Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals”, 55 (3) International Organization (2001), pp. 655-691. 609 U.N.S.C. Res. 827 (1993). 610 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia , available at
145 research resource. 614 Finally, the ICTY legacy will be measured “by the extent to which local courts in the former Yugoslavia have the ability to competently and fairly adjudicate war crimes cases”. 615 As part of its completion strategy 616 the ICTY began in 2005 “transferring middle and lower-level defendants indicted by it to the national jurisdictions of the countries of the former Yugoslavia for trial”. 617 The Tribunal has therefore endeavoured to transfer collected information and attained expertise to courts in the region. Judicial institutions in the region might benefit from the work of the ICTY’s information and expertise in a manifold ways: either by using adjudicated facts established by the ICTY; relying on ICTY jurisprudence for issues of substantive law; following guidance from ICTY procedural decisions; or by using the ICTY evidence. 618 Since 2010 the ICTY has been announcing the completion strategy since the UN Security Council required the ICTY to expeditiously complete all its remaining work no later than 31 December 2014. 619 Consequently, the establishment of an ad hoc mechanism was initiated to carry on part of ICTY’s core judicial functions will stop after its closure.The goal of this mechanism is to carry out a number of residual functions. Eight potential residual functions were identified in the UN Secretary-General’s Report of 21 May 2009: “(a) trial of fugitives; (b) trial of contempt cases; (c) protection of witnesses; (d) review of judgements; (e) referrals of cases to national jurisdictions; (f) supervision of enforcement of sentences; (g) assistance to national jurisdictions; and (h) maintenance of the archives. Capacity-building activities in the affected countries were also mentioned by the Tribunals as an important
614 For the Tribunal’s impact and impact assessment see Bert Swart, Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter (eds.), The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). See also Janine N. Clark, “Judging the ICTY: Has It Achieved Its Objectives?”, 9 (1) Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2009), pp.123-142; Ksenija Turkovi ć, “The Value of the ICTY as a Historiographical Tool”, in Thomas Kruessmann (ed.), ICTY: Towards a Fair Trial? (Wien/Graz: Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2008), pp. 29-46. 615 Human Rights Watch, “Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro”, 16 (7) Rights Watch Report (2004), available at
146 element of their legacy”. 620 The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals was established on 22 December 2010 both for the ICTR and the ICTY. 621 The ICTY International Residual Mechanism is due to start functioning on 1 July 2013 prior to the actual closure of the ICTY. Since all high-level fugitives have been extradicted in the meantime, the ICTY residual mechanism will allow for the completion of their trials. Payam Akhavan argued that work of the ICTY has “significantly contributedto peace building in postwar societies, as well as to introducing criminal accountability into the culture of international relations”. 622 He furthermore argued the ICTY helped “to marginalize nationalist political leaders and other forces allied to ethnic war and genocide, to discourage vengeance by victim groups, and to transform criminal justice into an important element of the contemporary international agenda. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the work of the ICTY has dramatically changed the civic landscape and permitted the ascendancy of more moderate political forces backing multiethnic coexistence and nonviolent democratic process. In Yugoslavia, the ICTY helped to delegitimize Miloševi ć’s leadership, as revealed by his attacks on the Tribunal prior to his overthrow, as well as the later calls for his prosecution by the Serb and Montenegrin public. In Kosovo, the ICTY indictment did not stem the deportation and abuse of ethnic Albanians during the NATO campaign, but it has at least marginally discouraged anti-Serb vengeance by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In Croatia, cooperation with the ICTY has facilitated steps toward international integration, discrediting extremist elements and encouraging liberal political forces to consider the initiation of complementary war crimes prosecutions before national courts”.623 The EU accession process in the Western Balkans played a role in a task of the successful implementation of the ICTY mission. Since a success of post-war justice “depends upon a supportive, mature political climate that should be characterised by will and determination on the part of political leaders”, 624 and as a result of (particularly initial) lack of such political will, countries in the region have often been urged to ICTY cooperation in the
620 Report of the Secretary-General on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the options for possible locations for the archives of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the seat of the residual mechanism(s) for the Tribunals, UN Doc. S/2009/258, 21.05.2009, available at
147 context of EU accession. 625 Indeed, the 2000 change of government in Croatia and Serbia led to pro-active cooperation with the ICTY. 626 Formerly, Croatia had extradited to the ICTY only Bosnian Croats who fought on the territory of BiH not Croatian military commanders despite the existing Constitutional Law on Cooperation of the Republic of Croatia with the ICTY passed already in 1996. 627 Soon after assuming the office, the new government turned over to ICTY the war crime suspect the previous government had avoided extraditing for two years. In April 2000 the Croatian Parliament passed the ‘Declaration of Cooperation with the International Criminal Court in the Hague’. 628 As a consequence, the government allowed the ICTY staff to investigate inside Croatia and to share documentation. Domestic pressures, asserted by the opposition of that time and war veteran associations, made cooperation with the ICTY increasingly costly. 629 Whereas the new President Stjepan Mesi ć applied the jurisdiction of a chief army commander to and retired seven generals who openly objected the government’s cooperation with the ICTY, the coalitional government of that time was not able to sustain pressure over this sensitive issue. When in July of 2001 the government voted on extradition of any Croatian indicted by the ICTY, this caused four dissenting ministers to resign. Nontheless, the new government consolidated institutional framework for the cooperation with the Tribunal. 630 In 2001 former several formerly higly ranked military officers, Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak and Mladen Marka č, were indicted by the ICTY for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war, committed during the military operation ‘Storm’, undertaken in the summer of 1995 by the Croatian armed forces in the region that was at that time occupied by the Serb renegades. Being triggered by the contradicting ICTY interpretation of recent past, the Croatian Parliament adopted in 2000 the ‘Declaration on the
625 John Hagan, Justice in the Balkans: Prosecuting War Crimes in the Hague Tribunal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Brad K. Blitz (ed.), War And Change in the Balkans: Nationalism, Conflict And Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Victor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Christopher Lamont, International Criminal Justice and the Politics of Compliance (Lndon: Ashgate, 2010). 626 Dejan Jovi ć, “Croatia after Tudjman: the ICTY and issues of transitional justice”, 116 Chaillot Paper (2009), pp. 13-27. 627 Ustavni zakon o suradnji Republike Hrvatske s Me đunarodnim kaznenim sudom, Narodne novine 32/96.Uredba o Uredu za suradnju s Me đunarodnim sudom pravde i Me đunarodnim kaznenim sudom, Narodne novine 61/1996. 628 Deklaracija o suradnji s Me đunarodnim kaznenim sudom u den Haagu, Narodne novine 41/2000. 629 In 2005, upon arrest of general Ante Gotovina in Spain, a rally of an estimated 40,000 Croatian veterans and citizens was organised in the city of Split, serioulsly thretening the government's tenure. See Victor Peskin and Mieczysław P. Boduszynski, “International justice and domestic politics: post-Tudjman Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia”, 55 (7) Europe-Asia Studies (2003), pp. 1117-1142. 630 Uredba o Savjetu za suradnju s Me đunarodnim sudom i me đunarodnim kaznenim sudovima i Uredu za suradnju s Me đunarodnim sudom i Me đunarodnim kaznenim sudom, Narodne novine 70/2001.
148 Homeland War’ 631 on and in June 2006 the ‘Declaration on Operation Storm’. 632 The main message contained in the Declaration on the Homeland War is that the war waged between 1991 and 1995 was “a just and legitimate defence [aiming] to defend its internationally- recognised borders against Greater Serbia’s aggression”. The waged war, the Parliament ruled, “was one of liberation not one of conquest”.633 The Declaration on Operation Storm 634 portrayed this military operation was confirmed as just battle in accordance with international law; as deciding battle since it brought Croatia peace and freedom, and permanently changed the relations of military power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 635 The change of government in late 2003, in spite of wide-range suspicions, has not brought deterioration of the relationship of Croatia with the ICTY. On the contrary, the rightist governments first led by the Prime Minister Ivo Sanadar and since 2009 by Jadranka Kosor fulfilled all ICTY request and created political climate conductive for development of solid minority policy and the climate of reconciliation. 636 However, even after all war-crime suspects from Croatia were transferred to the ICTY and the negotiations initiated, the cooperation with the ICTY again popped out as problematic. The ICTY chief prosecutor Serge Brammertz, namely requested delivery of missing military documents concerning Operation Storm and in his reports to the UN Security Council accused Croatian authorities for non cooperation. This caused a continued blockage by the Great Britain and the Netherlands of Chapter 23 and postponed the completion of the negotiations. Once the ICTY chief prosecutor reported to the UN Security Council stated that Croatia responded in a timely and adequate manner to the Office of the Prosecutor’s requests for assistance, the accession negotiations were brought to an end. In 2008 Progress Report Croatia was requested “to ensure a full and proper investigation into the whereabouts of the missing files”. 637 The ICTY Trial Chamber order
631 Deklaracija Hrvatskog državnog sabora o Domovinskom ratu, Narodne novine 102/2000. 632 Deklaracija o Oluji, Narodne novine 76/2006. 633 Drago Hedl, “Croatia: Rewriting History”, Institute for War & Peace Reporting , 09.11.2005, available at
149 Croatia in September 2008 to provide a detailed report specifying the efforts undertaken to obtain the requested documents. In 2009, the Progress report cited the address the ICTY Chief Prosecutor to the U.N. Security Council from June that year, stating “that progress in Croatia’s investigation into the fate of the missing documents had been limited and that the large majority of the military documents sought had not been submitted to the Tribunal”. 638 The Commssion therefore warned in 2009 Progress report that “Croatia needs to ensure all necessary steps are taken to settle this issue”. 639 At that time, Croatia was already well ahead in the accession negotiations process, and the absence of requested cooperation with the ICTY had affected the closure of the Chapter 23 since the submission of the requested military documents had been set as the main benchmark for the closue of this negotiating chapter. 640 However, the acquittal of the Croatian generals Ante Gotovina and Mladen Marka č, after the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY reversed earlier convictions 641 for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war seriously undermined the leverage of the second generation conditionality delaing with the prosecution of the war crimes. The
Political change relevant for a democratic consolidation happened in the neighbouring Yugoslavia when reformers took power in in October 2000, following massive protests across Serbia over vote manipulations in the presidential elections. Diane Orentlicher described Miloševi ć’s Serbia as “unremittingly hostile to the ICTY, and Serbian citizens were served a steady diet of anti-Hague vitriol”. 642 Relationship with the ICTY started to change, since broad-based reformist coalition government led by late Prime Minister Zoran Đin đić endorsed extradition of war crime indictees, justifying that with a requirement to respect the international obligations. In order to strengthen this line of argumentation, in April 2002, the federal parliament enacted the Law on Cooperation of Serbia and Montenegro with the ICTY 643 which established “a national council for cooperation with responsibility for coordinating the government’s responses to ICTY requests”. 644 In addition, the new and all
638 EC, Croatia 2009 Progress Report, COM(2009) 533, at 17. 639 Ibid. 640 See e.g. Berislav Jelini ć, “Farce over the artillery logs: Caprice over two remaining documents”, Nacional , available at
150 subsequent governments were for the most part facilitating ICTY’s requests for access to documents and archives. Miloševi ć’s immediate successor, the new President Vojislav Koštunica, “carried forward an anti-Hague stance and has found broad support in a populace among whom nationalists remain a potent political force”. 645 Although Đin đić ensured substantial progress in cooperation, primarily by ordering the extradition of Miloševi ć, there was a strong opposition among the political elite for this to happen. 646 The Serbian government even needed to overrule Serbian Constitutional Court’s decision which suspends a federal government decree enabling Miloševi ć’s extradition. 647 When Miloševi ć was finally transferred to the ICTY on 29 June 2001, the President Koštunica condemned Miloševi ć’s extradition, deeming it unconstitutional. Miloševi ć, who died while in detention during the first instance trial in March 2006, was indicted for number of war crimes against humanity, violations of the laws or customs of war and grave breaches of the Geneva conventions of 1949 committed in Croatia, BiH and Kosovo including genocide, deportation, murder, persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds etc. Although its death prevented the Tribunal in bringing the verdict, already the evidence presented in the Miloševi ć trial “had a galvanizing impact on Serbian opinion”. 648 This particularly stands for a video where soldiers of a paramilitary unit from Serbia known as the Scorpions carried a mass execution of Bosniak prisoners of war near Srebrenica in 1995 that “ripped away the veil of secrecy and denial of Serbian military operations in Bosnia during the 1992-95 war”. 649 Bechev reminded that the EU “has consistently criticised the broad coalition government of Vojislav Koštunica for failing to surrender high-level military figures indicted for war crimes during the Kosovo war”. 650 Although the Serbian subsequent President Boris Tadi ć, “has pledged to improve cooperation with The Hague and move Serbia closer to EU membership [...] his narrow constitutional powers give him few levers”. 651 The arrest of war- crime suspects at large had been a pre-condition for Serbia’s advancement in the EU accession. Political leaders often invoked different institutional, political or legal obstacles justifying in this way insufficient cooperation. In 2002, the new Law on Cooperation of
645 Ibid. , at 12. 646 Time World, “Zoran Djindjic: Architect of Extradition”, Time Magazine , 02.07.2001, available at
151 Serbia and Montenegro with the ICTY was passed. 652 It continued to bind Montegro after its seccession form the State Union with Serbia in 2006. Boris Tadi ć, for example, argued that the insufficient reform of Serbia’s police and security services prevented Serbia’s attorities to arrest three remaining war-crime suspects chased by the ICTY, Radovan Karadži ć, Ratko Mladi ć and Goran Hadži ć.653 Surrendering of those three to the ICTY was first the precondition for signing the SAA and then for granting candidate status to Serbia. 654 Despite such officially voiced excuses for the lack of cooperation, Diane Orentlicher noted that “substantial proportion of the Serbian electorate comprises hard-line nationalists who are strongly opposed to war crimes prosecutions of Serbian leaders and citizens”. 655 Consequently, “[w]ith no political party commanding an absolute majority of the Serbian population during the post-Miloševi ć period, each elected government has worried about antagonizing a significant sector of the public. Thus, even during periods when Prime Minister Koštunica has been comparatively cooperative with the ICTY, he has framed his cooperation in terms that resonate with Serbian nationalists”. 656 Brian Grodsky similarly argued that such situation, in which the domestic political elites are beeing “sandwiched between international pressure for justice and constituent non-elite pressure against it,” 657 necessarily results in a ‘compromise justice’. Compromises that political elite need to undertake in order to maintain in power weaken justice mechanisms and make post-conflict reconciliation less likely. The cooperation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the ICTY has been considerably less difficult that the one of Serbia and Croatia. This is due to the fact that the international community, including its military component, has been present in the country since the Dayton Peace Agreement. Its resources were often deployed in chasing the war crime suspects. As a consequence, the ICTY has prosecuted and brought to trails many of the leading figures responsible for the crimes committed during the 1992-95 war in BiH, in this
652 Zakon o saradnji sa me đjunarodnim krivi čnim sudom, Službeni glasnik 72/2009. 653 Douglas Hamilton, “Serbian president says premier blocks coalition deal”, Reuters , 04.05.2007, cited in Diane F. Orentlicher, op.cit. (2008), at 40. See also Dejan Anastasijevi ć, “Serbian Voters Spurn Nationalists“, Time World , 12.05.2008, available at
152 way sending “a powerful message that leaders who are responsible for the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide must face justice for their crimes”. 658 The international community holds that development of an effective war crimes trial capability constitutes “an essential part of the establishment of the rule of law and fundamental to the reconciliation process, creating necessary conditions to secure a lasting peace in BiH”. 659 Given the scale of human rights and humanitarian law violations that took place in the course of the 1992-95 war in BiH, numerous are cases involving defendants indicted before the ICTY that were referred to the BiH judicial institutions for adjudication of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war. 660 To meet this end, the ICTY and the OHR assited in a development of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the BiH Prosecutors Office. The OSCE Mission to BiH assisted in justice sector reforms in BiH, one of its focal areas being strengthening the capacity of the judicial system to handle war crime trials. At the BiH state level as well as in its entities legislation that guarantees cooperation with the tribunal has been put in place. 661 Lara Nettelfield established the ICTY role has contributed to BiH post-conflict societal re-building in threefold way: primarily by helping to set up national judicial institutions capable of carrying on the work of the tribunal; by fostering new assumptions about justice and accountability among Bosnian population, and by fostering a formation of civil-society organizations active in this filed. 662 However, Janine Clark’s filed research in Bosnia and Herzegovina drew attention to the fact there is little empirical evidence that the ICTY has contributed to the restoration and maintenance of peace or reconciliation in the country. 663 Merely two former Macedonian officials were inicted by the ICTY: the former Interior Minister Ljube Boškovski and the security officer Johan Tar čulovski. They were prosecuted for war crime that took place in the last days of the inter-ethnic conflict in Macedonia.
658 Human Rights Watch, op.cit. (2008), at 1. 659 OHR-ICTY Working Group on Development of BiH Capacity for War-crimes Trial Successfully Completed, OHR/P.I.S./731e, 21.02.2003, available at
153 Namely, ten civilians were killed in a police operation on 12 August 2001 in the Albanian village of Ljuboten. 664 The trial commenced in April 2007 and in July 2008 the Tribunal found Tar čulovski guilty of “ordering, planning and instigating murder, wanton destruction and cruel treatment, all violations of the laws or customs of war”. 665 Boškoski was found not guilty of all charges. 666 The Appeals Chamber upheld the factual findings of the Trial Chamber in the Tar čulovski case in May 2010, as well as the original sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment. 667 While the two indictees were detained at the Tribunal, Macedonian government offered bail guarantees for their temporary release. 668 Such a practice of assuring financial backing for war crime indictees has been widely applied by the governeemnts of the region (who, often, finance the defense costs of indictees). However, the Macodnonain authorities assumed quite a particular stance with regard to post-war justice. First, they requested that all investigations for war crimes committed in the course of the 2001 inter- ethnic conflict in Macedonia should be deffered to the ICTY. Indeed, as a result of the approaching completion, the Tribunal transferred four cases it had investigated to Macedonian jurisdication already back in 2002. 669 Instead of pursuing prosecution in those cases before domestic courts, the general amnesty was agreed as a matter of inter-ethnic political agreement. The Macodonian parliament passed on 19 July 2011 a decision to apply the 2002 Amnesty Law 670 to all cases the ICTY returned to Macedonia for prosecution. In this way, this country disregarded the role the post-war justice usually plays in post-conflict inter-ethnic reconciliation. The CoE High Commissioner warned that such a decision, if applied, “will lead to the termination of proceedings related to four war-crime cases, which would be a serious blow to the ongoing efforts towards achieving justice in the region”. 671
664 Marija Lazarova, “ICTY Indicts Former Macedonian Interior Minister, Security Chief”, Southeast European Times , 16.03.2005, available at
154 The Serbian and Croatian authorities had been criticized in several Progress Reports for a failure to locate, arrest and transfer war crime suspects that were fugitives. 672 Such a failure to meet obligation to fully co-operate with the ICTY, in turn, wasused as a pretext of postponing the signing and then the ratification of the EU Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) with both Croatia and Serbia. 673 In the case of Croatia’s negotiations, the Chapter on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights was vetoed by some of the Member States. 674 Croatia's cooperation with the ICTY had continually been cited by the European Commission in the progress reports as something that required further improvement. Moreover, the start of the Croatian accession negotiations was conditioned by its demonstration of continuous and full cooperation with the ICTY. Just one day before negotiations were supposed to initiate in March 2005 the EU postponed the commencement for the reason that the Croatian efforts to capture the war crime suspect at large were neither timely nor sufficient. The ICTY-related conditionality and its blunt application resulted in huge frustration on the side of Croats. Dejan Jovi ć explained the social distancing towards the EU that happened as a consequence of this part of political conditionality with explanation that the EU, or “Europe replaced Yugoslavia as a fundamental Other”. 675 In 2006, the Commission acknowledged that Serbian the legislative framework had “significantly improved through the revision of criminal laws” 676 and that that domestic war crimes trials, particulalrly the Ov čara case and the Scorpions case had been done efficiently. 677 However, the Commission warned there were “no senior military or police officers among the accused in any of the cases”. 678 In addition, the Progress Report stated such positve developments had been “undermined by a major lack of political will to establish accountability in this area”. In addition, the Commission warned that “open denigration by some [Serbian] politicians” had increassed pressure on the war crimes judiciary. 679 However, in 2008, the Commssion noted that Serbia had made significant progress on improving cooperation with the ICTY sinceseveral war crime inictees were captured that year, among them, Radovan Karadži ć, the war time political leader of the Bosnian Srbs. The two last fugitives, Ratko Mladi ć and Goran Hadži ć, were burdening Serbia’s progress in the EU
672 EC, Serbia 2006 Progress Report, SEC(2006) 1389, at 16. 673 EC, Serbia 2007 Progress Report, SEC(2007) 1435, at 4-5. 674 EurActiv, “Croatia sees breakthrough in EU talks”, EurActiv , 21.06.2010, available at
155 accession until their capture in 2011. Namely, the Commission had been continuously treating full cooperation with the ICTY as Serbia’s international obligation and the key priority of the European Partnership. 680 In order to meet this condition, Serbia was expected to freeze the assets of ICTY fugitives, to undertake special investigative measures against support networks for war crime fugitives, and eventually tp capture the fugitives. In conclusion, since effective war-crime prosecutions policy contributes to the reconstitution of both interpersonal trust among the citizens and the trust of citizens in their institutions, cooperation with the ICTY is a pre-accession condition of a fundamental importance. Apart from requesting cooperation with the ICTY, the EU insists in prosecuting war crimes in domestic courts of (potential) candidate countries what will be elaborated more in detail below. Already at the time of the ICTY establishment, the UN Secretary General clearly stated that it was “not the intention of the Security Council to preclude or prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts with respect to such acts”. 681 Instead, the Secretary General advocated back in 1993 that “national courts should be encouraged to exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with their relevant national laws and procedures”. 682 That is because the Tribunal has, due to limited time-framework it operated as well as its mission to trial perpetrators of the most serious war crimes, managed to adjudicate only a relatively small number of cases. All remaining war-crime cases need to be tried by domestic courts in the region. By assisting in meeting this goal, the international community has assisted in the empowering of national prosecution and judicial institutions. 683 In addition, the protection of witnesses in war crimes trails has been identified as “a cornerstone for justice and reconciliation in the Balkans”. 684 The adequate protection of witnesses in the region is crucial since “the testimonies of witnesses have been indispensible to both the work of the ICTY and that of the national courts. They have made an essential contribution to justice and reconciliation in the region, since their testimonies not only form the basis of court judgments but also reveal to those who live in the region and beyond the truth about the crimes committed. Although there have been many improvements in recent times, many witnesses decide not to testify because of threats, intimidation and fears for their safety. Without the
680 EC, Serbia 2008 Progress Report, SEC(2008) 2698 final, at 21. See also EC, Serbia 2009 Progress Report, SEC(2009) 1339, at 20. 681 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) (S/25704), section II, article 8D, para. 64. cited in Human Rights Watch, op.cit. (2004), at 2-4. 682 Human Rights Watch, op.cit. (2004), at 2-4. 683 Ibid. 684 PACE, Political Affairs Committee, op.cit. (2011), at 15.
156 protection and support that witnesses need to be able to testify, prosecutions cannot be completed and therefore justice and reconciliation cannot be achieved”. 685 Both the ICTY trials and proceedings before domestic courts, according to Ivo Josipovi ć, are “important legal, political and moral catalyst” particularly relevant for the Western Balkans countries “on their way towards accession to the European Union”. 686 Similarly to a good track record of BiH in extradicting ICTY indictees, the arrest of persons suspected for committing war crimes turned to be the most successful in this country since the international military corps, which was justified by the Dayton Agreement, supported the arrest the indictees. 687 Bringing the alleged perpetrators to the courts in Croatia and Serbia turned much more problematic. However, the first domestic criminal proceedings for war-related crimes in some of the countries of the region took place “during or just after the wars, as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in 1993 and 1996 respectively”. 688 The Human Rights Watch, who observed war crimes trials in Croatia, reported that at that eatly time of war crimes prosecution those trial were characterized by “(1) a hugely disproportionate number of cases being brought against the ethnic Serb minority, some on far weaker charges than cases against ethnic Croats; (2) the use of group indictments that fail to specify an individual defendant's role in the commission of the alleged crime; (3) use of in absentia trials; and (4) convictions of ethnic Serbs where the evidence did not support the charges”. 689 Therefore, “systematic attempts to deal with the past before national courts [in the region] only started after the establishment of specialised war crimes chambers in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2005), Croatia (2003) and Serbia (2003)”. 690 In Croatia, specialised chambers with the mission to adjudicate on war-related criminal cases were established within the county courts in Zagreb, Osijek, Rijeka and Split. As a result, “[t]he first transfer to a specialised chamber took place in 2006 based on the Chief State Prosecutor’s concerns over impartiality and witness intimidation in the local jurisdiction”. 691 Previously to introducing specialised war crimes courts, “proceedings for war-related crimes had been conducted before 21 county courts, in the environment and the community where the crime had been
685 Human Rights Watch, op.cit. (2004), at 2-4. 686 Ivo Josipovi ć, op.cit. (2006), at 145. 687 Linda Karadaku, “Region faces long road in prosecuting war crimes”, 26.04.2012, Southeast European Times , available at
157 committed”. 692 This was problematic, particulalty with respect to witness protection since “a number of courts lacked the expertise and infrastructure for witness protection and support. For example, they did not have separate entrances for the public, the accused and the witnesses”. 693 The European Commission as well treated “security guarantees for witnesses and informants as well as investigative materials [as a matter] of paramount importance”. 694 The 2006 Progress report noted that “the issue of witness protection is being tackled seriously by the State Prosecutor, [but] is not being addressed sufficiently in the wider judicial system. Witnesses, particularly those called to testify against members of the Croatian army, still face intimidation, and there is a reluctance to turn to the police among potential witnesses, especially minorities. To ensure integrity of the judicial process, protection for witnesses should be extended beyond the trial period, to informants, or other sources of information in the pre-trial or investigative phase”. 695 In the meantime, four specialised court chambers in Croatia “have been equipped to protect witnesses and use videoconferences”, 696 while in 2009 the new Law on Criminal Procedure was passed “providing for the reopening of cases concerning war-related crimes, which were tried in absentia”. 697 After initial difficulties in transposing ICTY charges into Croatian domestic law in the case against Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac, 698 the Croatian national judicial system proved competent in coping with the task of war crimes prosecution. Namely, another highly positioned military commander and his subordinates were prosecuted for committing war crimes against Serb civilians in Eastern Croatin region of Slavonia in 1991and found guilty in 2009. However, when the Serbian procecutor in late 2011 issued indictments against several Croatian high profile politicians, who held command responsibility in early 1990s when several war crimes were committed over the Serbs in Slavonia, the Croatian Parliament passed in October 2011 the Law on the Annulment of Certain Legal Acts of Judicial Bodies of the Former Yugoslav National Army, the Former SFRY and the Republic of Serbia. 699 The law “proclaimed null and void all legal acts relating to the 1991-1995 war in which Croatian nationals are suspected, indicted or
692 Ibid. 693 Ibid. 694 EC, Croatia 2006 Progress Report, COM(2006) 649 final, at 15. 695 Ibid. 696 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, op.cit. (2012), at 16. 697 Ibid. See also Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Narodne novine 152/2008. 698 EC, Croatia 2006 Progress Report, COM(2006) 649 final, at 15. 699 Zakon o ništetnosti odre đenih pravnih akata pravosudnih tijela bivše JNA, bivše SFRJ i Republike Srbije, Narodne novine 124/2011.
158 sentenced for war crimes”. 700 The passing of the above law was assessed as “a serious setback” 701 in Croatia’s commitment to prosecute war crimes. Bogdan Ivaniševi ć informed that “between 1996 and 2003 the competence to try war crimes cases in Serbia belonged to ordinary criminal law jurisdictions in all district courts in the country [and consequently] only seven war crimes trials took place during that period”. 702 The Law on Organization and Competence of State Bodies in the Proceedings Against War Crimes Perpetrators established in 2003the War Crimes Chamber of the District Court in Belgrade and the Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor of the Republic of Serbia. 703 Those two institutions’ jurisdiction is to prosecute and process the war crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991. Prior to establishment of those specialised bodies, “FRY courts had prosecuted only a handful of war crime cases stemming from the 1990s conflicts and these typically involved ordinary soldiers or lower-ranking officers. Those convicted of war crimes generally were punished with low sentences”. 704 The OSCE Misison to Serbia therefore put forward “a comprehensive Strategy designed to provide assistance and expertise to build up the national capacity to conduct sensitive and complex war crime trials”. 705 As a consequence of increased co-operation of the Serbian institutions with the Tribunal and the increased capacities of the national judicial and presecutor’s institutions, several cases weretransferred from the ICTY's competence to the Office of the Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor (the 1992 Zvornik case and the Vukovar Gang of Three case; Vladimir Kovacevic aka Rambo case accused of shelling the city of Dubrovnik in 1991). 706 The War Crimes Chamber’s record in dealing with war-related criminal proceedings to date is assessed as “mixed” 707 or as resulting in “slow progress”. 708 The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights has enumerated a number of problems the Serbian judicial institutions were still facing in 2012 that hider conduct of domestic war crime trials. He argued that “the WarCrimes Prosecutor and his deputies are operating in an atmosphere of
700 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, op.cit. (2012), at 16. 701 Ibid. See also Zlata Đur đevi ć, “Tuma čenje Zakona o ništetnosti odre đenih pravnih akata pravosudnih tijela bivše JNA, bivše SFRJ i Republike Srbije”, 1 (1) Zagreba čka pravna revija (2012), pp. 109-121. 702 Bogdan Ivaniševi ć, “Against the Current: War Crimes Prosecutions in Serbia”, International Centre for Transitional Justice (2007), available at
159 threats and intimidation from some members of the public [and] limited political support and even obstruction by some political parties”. 709 Moreover, the witness protection system in Serbia is inadequate 710 due to a lack of co-ordination and co-operation between the Witness Protection Unit, the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office and the War Crimes Chamber; the judicial institutions report insufficient human and financial resources as well as the lack of adequate equipment”. 711 The judicial system of Bosnia and Herzegovina “has shown its ability to try complex war crime cases transferred from the ICTY in a fair and efficient manner”. 712 The ICTY Chief Prosecutor informed in 2010 that “authorities continue to respond adequately to requests for assistance” 713 and in 2011 that “the day-to-day cooperation with the [Procesutor’s Office] proceeded well. However, the Prosecutor stated [in 2011] that there are troubling signs that the National War Crimes Strategy is struggling and urgent action is required to turn the situation around”. 714 However, what stand behind such positive evaluations is a continous and committed work of the international community, who initiated establishment of domestic judicial institutions such as the special War Crimes Chamber at the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH in 2005. The War Crimes Chamber emerged as a result of a strong push by the ICTY, and its effective functioning remains a crucial part of the ICTY’s completion strategy. In order to assure capacity building and expertise transfer, several former ICTY staff members have joined the BiH War Crimes Chamber. The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an example of a hybrid or mixed court, which might be “introduced as a mechanism for combining international intervention and support for the national judicial system”. 715 Those courts are “considered to incorporate the benefits of both international and national courts [allowing for] international expertise and [contributing] to capacity building of national legal systems. In addition, their situation in the local setting allows for greater ownership and potential impact on the population”. 716 While the Court of
709 Ibid. 710 Bogdan Ivaniševi ć, op.cit. (2007), at 22. 711 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, op.cit. (2012), at 16. 712 Ibid. ,at 15. 713 Prosecutor Brammertz’s Address before the Security Council, Press Release, OK/OTP/1354e, 18.06.2010, available at < http://www.icty.org/sid/10423 >. 714 Completion Strategy: Prosecutor Brammertz’s address before the Security Council, Press Release, FS/OTP/1466e, 07.12.2011, available at
160 Bosnia and Herzegovina, more specifically the War Crimes Chamber within it, is responsible for adjudication of high-profile cases, the cantonal and district courts of BiH are supposed to examin the vast majority of war crime cases. In the course of 2005-2010, “the domestic criminal justice system of BiH has completed over 200 cases”. 717 The weakness of the judicial institutional system in BiH, both of the cantonal and district courts and prosecutors’ offices, has been contnously constitutinga challenge for trying war crime cases in the country. 718 The ICTY Chief Prosecutor, for example, encouraged in 2010 “courts dealing with war crimes cases at all levels of the judicial system to further improve their working relationships”. 719 The 2010 OSCE report on war crimes processing in BiH found however that “certain courts and prosecutor’s offices in both of the entities (Banja Luka, Biha ć, Mostar, Novi Travnik, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Trebinje, and Zenica) and Br čko District demonstrated ample capacity, willingness, and professionalism to fairly and efficiently process war crimes cases, free of any indication of ethnic bias [at the same time acknowledging that] problems remain with some courts and prosecutor’s offices”. 720 In order to address “systemic problems hampering effective and efficient processing of war crimes cases” 721 the Council of Ministers of BiH adopted in December 2008 the National Strategy or War Crimes Processing. 722 This Strategy “refers to an estimated 10,000 suspects, of whom about 1,300 are under active investigation. It set seven years as the time needed to prosecute the most complex and highest priority cases, and 15 years the time required for other cases. The Strategy provides for the establishment of a unique, centralised database containing information on all incomplete cases”. 723 The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights expressed “serious concerns about the lack of progress in the implementation of the National War Crimes Processing Strategy [...] mainly due to insufficient co-ordination between the various justice sector institutions at the state level, in the entities and the Br čko District, and the lack of funds for the strategy’s implementation”. 724
717 OSCE BiH, “Delivering justice in BiH: an overview of war crimes processing from 2005 to 2010”, (2011), available at
161 Despite the judicial institutions in place, predominantly the Kosovo Judicial Council and the Ministry of Justice established back in 2005, and the international community’s involvement into prosecution of war crimes in domestic courts, “the Kosovo judicial system remains weak at all levels”. 725 Many war crime cases in Kosovo remain unresolved and the “impunity persists for war crimes committed by both sides of the 1999 armed conflict. Few of the Serb military, police and paramilitary forces responsible for war crimes against Kosovo Albanians have been brought to justice. However, even fewer members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), responsible for war crimes against Kosovo Serbs, Roma and members of other minority communities have been prosecuted and convicted”. 726 First the UNMIK, since 2000, andlater the EULEX permitted international prosecutors, judges and lawyers to prosecute, adjudicate war crimes or serve alongside local professionals in individual war crimes cases before the local courts. 727 Amnesty International 2008 report discredited the UNMIK’s international justice system in Kosovo, demonstrating that UNMIK had failed to establish an effective and impartial justice system, with concrete reference to the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. 728 As from December 2008 war crime investigations have been carried out by the War Crimes Investigation Unit of EULEX, comprised of international investigators. EULEX judges have competence over war-related criminal trials. In 2009 and 2010, respectively, ten and four such judgments were delivered. 729 The Amnesty International recnety advocated that that EULEX should “as a matter of urgency, prioritizes the investigation and prosecution of crimes under international law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity”. 730 War-crime investigations and proceedings in Montenegro are handled by a special State Prosecutor, who, inter alia , has a mandate for war crimes prosecution as well asspecialised departments in the Podgorica and Bijelo Polje Superior Courts. As a rule,the only persons indictedso far were the immediate perpetrators, not the commanders of crimes. 731 This for sure, was the case in the prosecution of murder of twenty civilians in BiH,
725 Ibid. , at 16. 726 Amnesty International, “Kosovo: Time for EULEX to prioritize war crimes”, (2012), available at
162 in which a Montenegrin citizen Nebojša Ranisavljević was sentenced by the Bijelo Polje Superior Court to fifteen years of imprisonment. 732 Until 2008, this was the only war crimes trial held in Montenegro. In that year the prosecution commenced in the high profile war crimes case in which at least 79 Bosniak and Bosnian Serb refugees were deported from Montenegro to Republika Srpska in 1992. Majority of those men were exectuted after being handed over to the Republika Srpska authorities. 733 Although a number of survivors and relatives of victims received compensation from the Montenegrin authorities, 734 nine former Montenegrin police officers suspected for this crime have not been sentenced. However, in March 2012 Montenegrin Supreme Court overturned the judgement that released the suspects and ordered the re-trial. 735 Four other war crime trials have been pending: “(1) the trial for war crimes against POWs and civilians in the Morinj camp in 1991; (2) the trial for war crimes against the civilian population – refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the so-called Deportation of Refugees case, in May 1992; (3) the trial for war crimes against the civilian population in the Bukovica region in 1992 and 1993; and (4) the trial for war crimes against the civilian population at Kalu đerski laz in 1999”. 736 In January 2011, the Pijelo Polje Superior Court held there was not enough evidence which would prove that the seven indictees, former military and police officers, indeed tortured Muslims from the village of Bukovica, killed six of them and forced about 200 Muslims to flee the village.The Court then held there was not enough evidence which would prove the indictement whatwas subsequently confirmed by the appellate court. 737 In conclusion, and with respect to conditionality compliance in this segement of the second generation conditiolaity of all above analysed countries, it is obvious that the EU pre- accession conditionality significantly induced cooperation of the Western Balkans states with the ICTY and assured their commitment to the war-crime prosecutin in the domestic trials. In Marlene Spoerri’s words, “policies of conditionality might help achieve accountability by enabling arrest and extradictions to take place [but ] they might also inadvertently protract the
732 Documenta, Humanitarian Law Center, and Research and Documentation Center, Transitional justice in Post- Yugoslav countries (2006), available at
163 normative shifts required to see truth and reconciliation achieved”. 738 What, therefore, is still missing across the Balkans is “the moral incentive for cooperation” 739 since “the wast majority of public support for ICTY cooperation [conseqently, also to domestic prosecution of the war crimes ] stems not from a moral concern that justice be done, but from a utilitarian fixation with European integration and material prosperity”. 740 That shows that this external incentive has not proven sufficient to result in producing sufficient socio-cultural changes among the Western Balkans population and did not reduce prevailing ethno-nationalist discourse.Indeed, Spoerri is right when she argues that “ [c]oming to terms with the wrongs committed in the name of one’s people is tremendously difficult. Doing so requires not only the will to honestly assess one’s nation’s role in enabling such wrongs, but also the humility to admit the wrongdoing and the courage to make amends”. 741 She is therefore right when argues that application of conditionality with respect of this instrument of transitional justice should assume “an honest appraisal of the potential pitfalls of its application and how they might be overcome”. 742
5.2.3. Reconcilation
Post-conflict reconciliation presupposes a set of conditions that need to emerge in advance and parallel to it. 743 A single conceptualization of reconciliation does not exist. Reconciliation understood as coexistence implies “finding a way to live alongside former enemies - not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately”. 744 Another conceptualization of reconciliation treats it as a change of attitudes where reconciliation is
738 Marlene Spoerri, “Justice Imposed: How Policies of Conditionality Effect Transitional Justice in the Former Yugoslavia”, in Florian Bieber (ed.), EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), pp.53-77, 739 Ibid. , at 66. 740 Ibid. , at 67. 741 Ibid. , at 72. 742 Ibid. , at 73. 743 Andrew Schaap, Political Reconciliation (New York: Routledge, 2005); Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir (eds.), The politics of reconciliation in multicultural societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Elazar Barkan, Alexander Karn (eds.), Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Dorothy C. Shea, The South African Thruth Commission: the politics of reconciliation (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000); Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). 744 David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes and Luc Huyse (eds.), Reconciliation after Violent Conflict. A Handbook (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance/IDEA, 2003), at 12.
164 conceived as “a project of departure from violence”. 745 However, Pablo de Greiff’s definition of reconciliation serves the best the operationalization of the present research. He conceptualized reconciliation as a minimal “condition under which citizens can trust one another as citizens again (or anew). That means that they are sufficiently committed to the norms and values that motivate their ruling institutions, sufficiently confident that those who operate those institutions do so also on the basis of those norms and values, and sufficiently secure about their fellow citizens’ commitment to abide by these basic norms and values”. 746 Similarly, Ervin Staub claimed that reconciliation “means coming to accept each other and develop mutual trust”. 747 Obviously, this approach might easily be subscribed to EU second generation conditionality, which promotes reconciliation as a tool of political socialization. Understood as such, reconciliation expected in the course of EU accession to take place is not merely inter-personal, but at civic and political levels. Namely, wider institutional aim of transitional justice processes is to restore the rule of law in the society, and consequently contribute to democratization of judicial institutions. Since the reconciliatory activities contribute to rise of interpersonal trust as well as make political institutions trustworthy and trusted, reconciliatory practices contribute to the rise of democratic political culture. Numerous are activities that promote post-conflict reconciliation within a country that was experienced violent conflict: the acknowledgment of a wrongdoing, the recognition of past suffering and of the psychological and material legacies it has left in contemporary society, the acceptance of one’s responsibility, the expression of sorrow and regret for it either in a form of symbolic measures such as apologies or through formal education, and monetary compensation to victims. However, in the aftermath of violent conflicts that resulted in systematic human rights abuses, “the recovery of trust in institutions requires not only that the basic underlying norms be legitimate, but also, that the institutions be effective in realizing those norms”. 748 Reconciliation process therefore entails as well strengthening of both state and societal institutions. For its more than six decades lasting contribution to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights the EU was awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace
745 John Borneman, “Reconciliation after Ethnic Cleansing: Listening, Retribution, Affiliation”, 14 Public Culture (2002), pp. 281-304, at 282. 746 Pablo de Greiff, op.cit. ( 2008), at 126. 747 Ervin Staub, “Genocide and Mass Killing: Origins, Prevention, Healing and Reconciliation”, 21 Political Psychology (2000) , pp. 367-382, at 376. 748 Pablo de Greiff, op.cit. ( 2008), at 132.
165 Prize. 749 In that occasion the President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz pronounced that “ [t]he EU’s principles and values of reconciliation can serve as an inspiration to other regions in the world. From the Balkans to the Caucasus, the EU serves as a beacon for democracy and reconciliation.” 750 Indeed, the EU serves as a model for reconciliation, but does not exert the conditionality with regard to it. A comparative anaylisis of the Progress Reports reveals that the issue of reconciliation rises in the pre-accession agenda the more advanced candidate country has gone in the course of the EU accession. Therefore,the Croatian EU accession has so far served as the most evident conditioning example with respect to post-conflict reconciliation. 751 Already being well into the accession negotiations, Croatia has been warned in several progress reports that national minorities are “generally perceived in the media as separate entities and not as an integral part of society” 752 and once prevailing negative stereotyping of minorities in the press over time started to decline in Croatia. 753 The Croatian authorities were subsequently encouraged in 2006 to undertake “[i]nitiatives promoting greater integration, reconciliation and tolerance as well as joint activities” that would assure re-rapprochement between different ethnic communities. 754 In 2007 they were urged “to encourage a spirit of tolerance towards the Serb and Roma minorities in particular and take appropriate measures to protect persons belonging to these minorities who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence”. 755 In 2008, the Commssion noted that “[i]nitiatives promoting greater integration, reconciliation and tolerance as well as joint activities within the current system should be further encouraged” in Croatia. 756 In 2009, the Commssion acknowledged that “[h]igh-level public expressions of commitment to the rights of minorities, reaffirming their place in Croatian
749 The Norwegian Nobel Committee, “The Nobel Peace Prize 2012”, Press Release, 12.10.2012, available at
166 society, have continued”. 757 However, in that year’s progress assessment, Croatia was yet again warnded that it “needs to encourage a spirit of tolerance towards the Serb minority and take appropriate measures to protect those who may still be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence”. 758 Both motoring reports on Croatia’s accession preparations underlined as well the need “to continue to foster a spirit of tolerance towards minorities, in particular Croatian Serbs, and to take appropriate measures to protect those who may still be subjected to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence”. 759 None of the Progress Reports on Macedonia and Bosnia and Herezovina contain a clear reference to reconciliatory requests in the course of the EU accession. Considering the severity of inter-ethnic conflicts and pertaining societal and political cleavages that emerged as results of them, this is quite surprising. For example, following processes are identified as the ones that dominate the societal and political life of BiH: “fear of endangerment coming from other ethnic groups; prevalence of the ethnic principle; bad/non-existent interethnic relations; ethnically segregated curricula in schools and universities; lack of culture of compromise; deficiency of peace building and reconciliation ; lack of civic culture; big, costly and ineffective administration; ethnic-driven manipulation of the people by political stakeholders; and disagreement on the involvement o the international community. 760 Such a setting in present-day BiH, according to Janine N. Clark can merely be interpreted as a negative peace, i.e. an absence of conflict, whereas reconciliation is yet to emerge in this country. 761 Such descriptions can easily be applied to any other post-conflict society in the region where true reconciliatory attempts are yet to be systematically introduced and implemented. The academic research has demonstrated that exactly ethno-nationalist and traditionalist values are the most serious impediments for a successful reconciliation. 762 Despite of a sufficient conditinonig with respect to the reconciliation criterion, the European Parliament recently encouraged the Macedonian authorities that “further and even stronger efforts are needed in order to achieve full reconciliation between
757 EC, Croatia 2009 Progress Report, COM(2009) 533, at 16. 758 Ibid. ,at 16. 759 EC, Monitoring report on Croatia’s accession preparations, 24.04.2012, at 6.See also Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia’s state of preparedness for EU membership, COM(2012) 601, 10.10.2012,at 4. 760 Paul Pasch (ed.), Bosnia and Herzegovina 2025: Scenarios on Future (Sarajevo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012), at 62-63. 761 Janine N. Clark, “From negative to positive peace: The case of Bosnia and Hercegovina”, 8 (4) Journal of Human Rights (2009), pp. 360-384. 762 See e.g. research of Nebojša Petrovi ć, Psihološke osnove pomirenja izme đu Srba, Hrvata i Bošnjaka (Beograd: Institut za psihologiju Filozofskog fakulteta, 2005). See also Sr đanPuhalo (ed.), SpremnostzapomirenjeuBosniiHercegovini (Sarajevo: FriedrichEbertStiftung, 2010). See also Nicolass Moll, “Francusko-njema čko pomirenje i Balkan: motivacija, a ne model”, 14 Status. Magazin za politi čku kulturu i društvena pitanja (2010), pp. 264-289.
167 the parties and lay down the basis for the consolidation of non-partisan and interethnic democratic institutions”. 763 In the paragraphs below I will describe what has been done in the region with respect to post-conflict reconciliation so far, partially as a consequence of the EU pre-accession conditinality. The first aspect of pre-accession diversity conditionality that fosters the post-conflict reconciliation is reflected in a request of cooperation between the Western Balkans states. Such conditionality contributes to good neighbourliness, particularly needed in the post- conflict region. The process of the European integration of the Western Balkans entails a significant regional dimension that is demonstrated in the pre-accession conditions that require regional cooperation, both economic and political, and maintenance of the good neighbourly relations in the region. Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations are treated as factors that “contribute to prosperity, stability, reconciliation and a climate conducive to addressing open bilateral issues and the legacy of the past”. 764 There was an initial hesitance of the countries of the region to engage into regional cooperation. Croatia, for example, feared that this component of the conditionality might assume the ‘convoy’ instead of ‘regatta’ principle of individual accession. 765 However, as the immediacy of the conflicts was further in time, the regional trading ties started to re-emerge, resulting in economic development. In the case of the Western Balkans, initial co-operational activities in the areas of trade, energy, and transport encouraged further opening of the economies and led to proliferation of the development of regional ties. Nowadays, the Western Balkans countries participate in a number of regional cooperation initiatives: the Regional Cooperation Council, the South-East European Cooperation Process, the Central European Initiative, the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, the Danube Cooperation Process, etc. However, finding the amount of regional cooperation still deficient, Vladimir Gliorov asserted that the lack of regional cooperation can be remedied by the speed up of the process of EU integration. He admitted that the on-going SAp may produce the same results, though that
763 European Parliament, Motion for a resolution to wind up the debate on statements by the Council and the Commission pursuant to Rule 110(2) of the Rules of Procedure on the 2011 progress report on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2011/2887(RSP), 29.2.2012, available at
168 process is riskier and requires more time, whereas faster EU integration of the Western Balkans would result in more significant economic growth. 766 Why is the promotion of regional cooperation important for the European Union? The European Commission has identified three core-motivations for achieving this: for political, economic and security reasons. 767 For obvious reasons, those three dimensions are closely interlinked: “regional stability and security are needed for economic development, which in turn favours stability and security in the region”. 768 The political dimension of regional cooperation is (1) needed as a crucial ingredient of stability; (2) a catalyst for reconciliation, good-neighbourliness and good political relations; and (3) about helping overcome nationalism and intolerance and promoting mutual understanding and political dialogue in the region. 769 Regional political cooperation is crucial for re-emergence of mutual trust among citizens of the Western Balkans countries. In other words, demonstrated political will at the highest level and commitment of political leaders to neighbourhood re-rapprochement implicitly influences the emergence of democratic political culture. As a result of the gradual emergence of inter-regional ties, the EU has even more recently encouraged the Western Balkan countries “to address bilateral issues, falling outside areas of EU competence and/or contractual obligations towards the EU, in a constructive spirit, as early as possible, taking into account overall EU interests and values”. 770 In spite of this conditionality component, there are only few regional initiatives undertaken at the regional level to facilitate regional political stabilisation, in particular to address post-conflict majority-minority relations and opened up space for restoration of good neighbourly relations. 771 Several are worth being mentioned here. The first one, for sure was an Agreement on Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed in August 1996 opened a space for improvement of the bilateral relations between two countries. The Agreement, inter alia , deals extensively with
766 Vladimir Gligorov, “Southeast Europe: Regional Cooperation with Multiple Equilibria”, 58 The wiiw Balkan Observatory Working Papers (2004), available at
169 the issue of the refugee return, whereas the parties agreed to assure conditions for free and safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons in the places of their former residences or other places of their choice. The parties agreed to assure a restitution of property or a just compensation to the returnees. Obviously all provisions of the Agreement have not been yet met, but it for sure contributed to the re-emergence of good neighbourly relations between previously waring countreis. The countries of the region, either at the level of state institutions or through the co- operation of civil society organizations, have undertaken numerous subsequent efforts to reconstruct and re-establish political co-operation. Those steps were acknowledged by the CoE Parliamentary Assembly as satisfactory examples “of people and leaders from the region working together for change” 772 and as indicating “a greater willingness to overcome the legacy of the past”. 773 Those regional initiatives that contribute to re-establishment of political dialogue are after named after the town in which the political commitment to certain issue has been agreed between political leaders. The Igman Initiative, which was named after BiH Mountain Igman, is an an umbrella association gathering some 140 civil society organisations from BiH, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro that has been active since 2000 in so called ‘the Dayton Triangle’. 774 It made the move to gather presidents of the three Dayton Areement signatoriesin order to amplify its message condemning the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995 and urging“the harshest punishment for its perpetrators, instigators and the authors of that criminal idea”. 775 This idea can be considered historical, because that was “the second time since the signature of the Dayton Accords, the three heads of state have come together for a summit meeting [and] the first time ever that they have met at the invitation of a group of non-governmental organizations”. 776 Aiming to contribute to creating the climate of trust and good neighbourly relations and the overall stabilisation of circumstances in the region the three presidents signedat the Initiative’s meeting held in Belgrade on 27 June 2005 the Igman Declaration .777 In this joint statement, they expressed conviction there is no alternative to the full renewal of good neighbourly relations, European standards on protecting the rights and
772 PACE, Political Affairs Committee, op.cit. (2011), at 15. 773 Ibid ., at 7. 774 More information on the Igman Initiative available at
170 freedoms of national minorities, regional co-operation based on full equality and the principle of fulfilling common interests and membership in the EU as the ultimate goal all three countries are aspiring to. Igman Declaration, inter alia , dealt with the issues of national minorities and the return of all refugees. Regional co-operation is, as well, an important factor for the effective prosecution and punishment of war-crimes and contributes to the fight against impunity in the region. The decade following the termination of the conflicts was protracted in an inadequate cooperation in war crimes prosecutions between the states in the region. Human Rights Watch Report issued in late 2004 detected that “[l]ack of cooperation impacts not only on the investigation of crimes, but also on the conduct of the trials themselves, including the attendance of witnesses living in another state, and the ability of judges to travel to another state to take testimony”. 778 As the political commitment for the prosecution of war crimes intensified among the countries of the reion, it became apparent that co-operation among the national prosecutor’s offices and the courts is a necessity. Namely, a number of “prosecutions in the national courts have been hampered as over 100 indictees have emigrated beyond the states of the former Yugoslavia in an attempt to evade justice”. 779 In late 2004, judges and public prosecutors of the three countries of the region (BiH, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro) acompanied by the OSCE and ICTY experts gathered in the Serbian city of Pali ć with the aim to stimulate co-operation in the judicial matters. The ‘Pali ć Process ’ has initiated an inter- state dialogue and judicial cooperation in war crime proceedings. In June 2005 ministers of Justice from the three countreis met at the Croatian island Brijuni, but “it turned out to be impossible to reach consensus on a document, due fundamentally to the lack of agreement on key issues such as the extradition of nationals, acceptance of foreign verdicts, exchange of evidence, victim/witness support and cross border witness location”. 780 The the initial hesitance to allow for extradictions has been rectified and the improvemed co-operation between national prosecutors and judicial bodies has been established in recent years. Bilateral agreements on mutual execution of sentences in criminal matters and enforcement of foreign court rulings were signed in February 2010 between the Ministers of Justice of BiH, Croatia and Serbia. The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights recently voiced concern over on-going practice of BiH and Serbia that obstruct extraditions of their own nationals. 781
778 Human Rights Watch, op.cit. (2004), at 3. 779 Ibid ., at 14. 780 Jorge Fuentes, “Pali ć Process”, 137 The Courier: Newsletter of the OSCE Office in Zagreb (2008), available at
171 Under the aegis of the international community, ministers responsible for refugees and internally displaced persons of BiH, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro sealed the Sarajevo Declaration in 2005. 782 The ministers agreed to find a solution to the problem of internally displaced persons and refugees by the end of 2006; to facilitating the return or local integration of refugees, depending on the latter’s decision, without any discrimination; to granting refugees the same rights and and the same responsibilities as all other citizens; to providing assistance and support to refugees in cooperation with UNHCR, the EU and OSCE; and to ensuring access to all rights and entitlements, including the right to accommodation, in a fair and transparent manner. 783 In spite of the fact that the goal was obviously overambitious, the process has been sustained over the years, resulting in improvement of national refugee return policies. In March 2010 the Slovenian and Croatian prime ministers hosted a high profile conference on the Western Balkans the in Slovenian mountain resort of Brdo pri Kranju. 784 The conference gathered representatives of almost all countries of the region: Albania, BiH, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Serbia opted boycotting it since Kosovo was invited to take place in this high level meeting,. The ‘ Brdo Process ’ that was launced in this occasion is ment to serve as informal cooperation that strengthens relations between the countries of the region as they seek membership in Euro-Atlantic organisations. The participating countries agreed that they would “provide each other with mutual support and an exchange of experience gained during the integration processes” and that they would “promote good neighbourly relations, through [their] continuous work on projects of common interest and invest best efforts in addressing open bilateral issues in a European spirit”. 785 Co-operation modality applied within the Brdo Process has take “Višegrad Group” as a model to look upon,“since this type of co-operation implies that none of the countries assumes a leading or predominant role in the region”. 786 The presidents of Turkey and Serbia and a member of the BiH Presidency signed in April 2010 in Istanbul a declaration advocating peace in South Eeastern Europe and proclaiming the integration into the EU as a chif foreign goal. In the Istanbul Declaration three chiefs of states pledged to overcome their historic differences and build a common
782 Declaration of Regional Ministerial Conference on Refugee Returns, 31.01.2005, available at
172 future based on tolerance and understanding and agreed that regional policy should be based on ensuring security and permanent political dialogue. 787 The regional cooperation in the Western Balkans has intensified as well in the economic terms, but cross-border cooperation in other areas has not yet assumed the pre- conflict scope. 788 Trend of “proliferation of Euroregions, associations of municipalities, NGOs and businesses across borders” steadily emerges. 789 Civil society organizations have initiated several projects that could have a long-term impact on the normalization of inter- ethnic relations in the region. For example, the Mayors of Tuzla, Osijek and Novi Sad, together with the directors of three local NGOs (Centre for Regionalism from Novi Sad, the Forum of Citizens of Tuzla, and the Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights from Osijek) signed an Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance on 21 January 2002 creating Tuzla- Osijek-Novi Sad Triangle. In the Agreement they undertook the obligation to promote the interethnic relations in their respective regions through cooperation in the fields of economy, culture, information, sports etc. Inspired by this initiative, the Agreement for Interethnic Tolerance and Cooperation was signed by representatives of 38 Local Governments and 37 NGOs from seven countries of the region on 6 July 2004 in Belgrade. It aims to establish a social framework for the activities of local self-government bodies, local public institutions, non-governmental organizations and citizens of multicultural towns of South-Eastern Europe. The signatory parties undertook to promote ethnic and religious tolerance and human rights protection, as well as to preserve cultural diversity, protect rights and freedoms of national and ethnic minorities, and cherish civil values and good traditions. A coalition of civil society organisations from BiH, Croatia and Serbia brought into being a Regional Commission for Establishing the Facts about the War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia (REKOM) with a goal to document war crimes in order to honour and acknowledge all the victims. To me it seems that so far achieved results have not yet produced required societal change. The post-conflict cooperation takes place either on the highest political level or at the level of civil society that per se has a more tolerant and open attitudes. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that thefull reconciliation between countries on the region “depends on the successful resolution of a number of outstanding issues which still jeopardise efforts for stabilisation in the region,
787 Istanbul Triletaral Summit Declaration, Istanbul, 24.04.2010, available at
173 notably missing persons, prosecution of war crimes, refugees and internally displaced persons and border disputes”. 790 In addition to conditionality woth respect reginal cooperation, the pre-accession diversity conditionality that fosters the post-conflict reconciliation encourages the establishment of truth commissions as well introduction of unbiased teaching of recent history in the educational systems of the Western Balkans countries. Those processes namely should play an important role in deconstructing historical narratives which led to wars and ethnic conflicts. Needless to say, there is no uniform interpretative truth about the recent violent conflicts, neither among the countries of the region, nor among the ethnic groups inhabiting them. 791 Truth finding about recent wrongdoings shall not be ascribed merely to judicial processes, since “[w]hen the court of law is used for history lessons, then the risk of show trials cannot be far off”. 792 Exactly for this reason generations to come should be taught carefully about the recent past, in order to break the vicious circle of “inter-generational vengeance”. 793 Kora Andrieu warned that any attempt to impose a single version of history could also be counterproductive, and risk provoking a backlash of competing narratives that celebrate or negate the past, rather than condemning it. 794 Straight after the termination of conflict, the history teaching might be considered problematic, and can be suspended for certain period of time. This was, for example, the case in Eastern Slavonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, after more than ten years after the conflict termination, the sate authorities are showing intention “to devise acceptable approaches to teaching this controversial subject.” 795 When eventually time has come to prepare a recent history textbook, the ethnic sentiment will pay an important role in reception of textbooks. History textbooks, being important means for national identity formation, are regularly under strict scrutiny of the state educational institutions that use “history for their own ends and impose both their
790 CoE Parliamentary Assembly, Political Affairs Committee, “Reconciliation and political dialogue between the countries of the former Yugoslavia”, Doc. 12461, 07.01.2011, available at
174 version of historical facts and their definition of the good and bad figures of history.” 796 In post-conflict societies, they will be labelled as historical falsification if they attempt to deconstruct the official truth, whereas textbook that do present the ‘official truth’ merely pursue ethno-mobilization in education that should be avoided under any circumstances. 797 The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights noted in his recent report on post-war justice in the region that public apologies are “[u]nfortunately [...] are not mentioned in school text books, nor is there a plan aiming to include them in educational material at all levels. 798 Pablo de Greiff argued that truth-telling as well fosters civic trust, particularly among the “citizens who are fearful that the past might repeat itself, whose confidence was shattered by experiences of violence and abuse”. 799 Elizabeth Kiss acknowledged “dual perspective of the truth commission experience: of reluctant realpolitik and of visionary moral ambition”. 800 She metaphorically claimed that wounds heal “fester when they are not exposed to the open, so unacknowledged injustice can poison societies and produce the cycles of distrust, hatred, and violence we have witnessed in many parts of the world”. 801 For victims, “[t]elling the truth about their wounds can heal”, whereas, according to her, “perhaps listening to such stories can help heal societies”. 802 David Mendeloff enumerated eight reasons put forward by truth-telling advocates why exposing and publicly accounting for wartime misdeeds is an essential component of the peace building process. According to them, truth-telling “(1) encourages social healing and reconciliation, (2) promotes justice, (3) allows for the establishment of an official historical record, (4) serves a public education function, (5) aids institutional reform, (6) helps promote democracy, and (7) pre-empts as well as (8) deters future atrocities”. 803 Mendeloff concluded that “truth-telling may help shape perceptions of group security over the long term in certain types of war-torn societies, namely those that are deeply divided along cultural lines. In deeply divided war-torn societies in which groups are forced to live together, truth-telling may help dampen security fears that could spark conflict in the event of state weakness”. 804
796 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1283 (1996) on history and the learning of history in Europe, at
175 Truth commissions are obviously non-judicial bodies established to investigate human rights abuses. 805 However, once established their “use of non-punitive transitional justice approaches must be done in way that truly complements ongoing [war crimes] trials and not as a way to deny justice to victims”. 806 There were several attempts to establish a truth commissions in the region. In Bosnia and Herzegovina several of those initiatives were either bottom-up projectes or supported by international donors. 807 In Serbia, the only attempt to put up the truth commission was state-initiated. The President Vojislav Koštunica inaugurated on 22 February 2002 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Serbia and Montenegro with a mission to investigate war crimes committed in former Yuglosavia. 808 Brian Grodsky claimed that establishment of this particular truth commissions was an act of ‘compromise justice’. The Serbian truth commisison, according to him, was set up “to show compliance with international demands for justice and to reduce external pressure for the (domestically unpopular) transfer of individuals to the ICTY”. 809 In the end, none of those truth reconciliation initiatives inititated in the region have turned out successfully. Moreover, such initiatives have not even emerged at the level of publicly proclaimed idea in Croatia, Macedonia or in Kosovo. Serbian one, for example, was dismissed several months after its establishment “because of a lack of agreement on essential aspects of the mandate, a lack of political will, funding and civil society support”.810
805 For an extensive overview of twenty one truth commission’ expereinces see Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (London: Routledge, 2002). 806 Human Rights Watch, op.cit. (2008), at 70. 807 Neil J. Kritz and Jakob Finci, “A Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Idea Whose Time Has Come”, 3 International Law Forum (2001), pp. 50-58. See also Sanela Basic, “Bosnian Society on the Path to Justice, Truth and Reconciliation”, in Martina Fischer (ed.), Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ten Years after Dayton (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2006), pp. 357-386; Valery Perry, “A Survey of Reconciliation Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Gap Between People and Politics”, in Joanna R. Quinn (ed.), Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2009), pp. 207-231. See also Mirna Buljugi ć, “No Progress for Sarajevo Truth Commission”, 20.02.2007, BIRN Justice report , available at
176 Invoking the term ‘unofficial truth projects’ Louis Bickford claimed they emerge not as the state-run projects, but initiatives of “human rights NGOs, victim groups, universities, and other societal organizations” being “geared towards revealing the truth about crimes committed in the past as a component of a broader strategy of accountability and justice” and “self-consciously or coincidentally resemble official truth commissions”. 811 One of such, even more regional, initiative emerged in the course of the last four years. The Regional Commission for Establishing the facts About War Crimes and other Gross Violations Of Human Rights Committed on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (REKOM) is an effort undertaken by civil society organizations in the Western Balkans to establish a “precise, official and objective record of war crimes and other serious breaches of human rights, to recognize victims and their suffering, as well as to stop such crimes being repeated”. 812 The founders of the REKOM initiative did acknowledged that the trials held before the ICTY and national courts have contributed “significantly to punishing war crimes perpetrators [but] do not fully satisfy victims’ needs for justice and are insufficient for the creation of the conditions necessary to achieve a lasting peace in the region”. 813 The founders hope that such regional initiative is “the most efficient way to achieve a comprehensive historical record of the crimes committed in the period 1991 ‐2001 and the role that national elites, institutions, and individuals played in those traumatic events”. 814 Since the initiative is in its early phase, it is still early to offer its assessment. However, having a regional dimension and being financially secured by foreign donations it has potential to contribute to restoration of confidence between individuals, peoples, and states in the region and consequently to strengthen the Western Balkans democracy. One should, however, be aware of limited impact of the truth telling initiatives. David Mendeloff, for example, drew attention to the fact that that “truth-telling advocates claim far more about the power of truth-telling than logic or evidence dictates”, 815 although he agreed that in post-conflict societies truth telling predominantly serves as prevention of the resumption of violent conflict. 816 Numerous are furthermore examples where existence of truth commission is not considered by the victims as sufficient mechanism for providing
811 Louis Bickford, “Unofficial Truth Projects”, 29 (4) Human Rights Quarterly (2007), pp. 994-1035, at 994- 995. 812 Žarko Puhovski, “Editorial”, 3 RECOM Iniative Voice (2102), available at
177 retributive justice. 817 The academic research has established that truth commissions alone have a negative impact on human rights and democracy, but contribute positively when combined with trials and amnesties. 818 Therefore, ‘justice balance’ approach to transitional justice, which combines several transitional justice mechanisms at once, such as reparations, apologies, and especially giving victims an opportunity to describe what had happened to them, could have much more significant a restorative effect. 819 In such a balanced approach to post-war justice, judicialcomponent provides accountability whereas truth telling mechanisms provide long-term stability, both conseqently improving and consolidation democracy. The third aspect of pre-accession diversity conditionality that fosters the post-conflict reconciliation encourages paying tributes and assuring compensations to war victims. Vladimir Jankelevitch stated that forgiving gross crimes against humanity would equal committing another crime of equal scale. 820 Similarly, Richard von Weizsäcker underlined that reconciliation is futile without remembrance. According to him, “[r]emembering means recalling an occurrence honestly and undistortedly so that it becomes a part of our very beings. This places high demands on our truthfulness”. 821 He continues this argument stating that remembrance “is the source of faith in redemption. This experience creates hope, creates faith in redemption, in reunification of the divided, in reconciliation. Whoever forgets this experience loses his faith”. 822 With respect to victims’ remembrance in the aftermath of the World War II, Karl Jaspers told that “[e]veryone tends to interpret great losses and trials as a sacrifice. But the possible interpretations of this sacrifice are so abysmally different that, at first, they divide people”. 823 Brandon Hamber, Liz Šev čenko and Ereshnee Naidu researched how memorialisation supports social reconstruction and evaluatead the youth education programmes in three
817 For example, James Gibson’s research on South African truth commission revealed that that Blacks did not find that the TRC adequately provided retributive justice. See James L. Gibson, ‘”Truth, Justice and Reconciliation: Judging the Fairness of Amnesty in South Africa”, 46 (3) American Journal of Political Science (2002), pp. 540-556; James L. Gibson, “Does Truth Lead to Reconciliation? Testing the Causal Assumptions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process”, 48 (2) American Journal of PoliticalScience (2004), pp. 201-217; James L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004); James L. Gibson, “The Truth about Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa”, 26 (4) International Political Science Review (2005), pp. 341-361. 818 Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne and Andrew G. Reiter, “The Justice Balance: When Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy”, 32 (4) Human Rights Quarterly (2010), pp. 980-1007. 819 More on the concept of ‘justice balance’ approach to transitional justice see in Pablo de Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of Reparations (New York: Oxford, 2006). 820 Vladimir Jankelevitch, L’Imprescriptible (Paris: Seuil, 1986), at 21. 821 Richard von Weizsäcker, Speech in the Bundestag on 8 May 1985 during the Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the End of War in Europe and of National-Socialist Tyranny, available at
178 countries in order to be able to suggest strategies for conceptualising and evaluating the impact of memorialisation. 824 Their research has confirmed those places have had various positive impacts on the young people who visited them, what opens up space for treating memorial sites as agents of youth political socialization. However, as long as memorials throughout the region predominantly pay tribute exclusively to victims of the majority groups and in the absence of a single memorial that would acknowledge victims the armed forces of majority is responsible for 825 it is difficult to stipulate when such an possibility of civic educational options is going to emerge in the countries of the region. Politicians make highly symbolic moves when they pay tribute to the sites of victim remembrance of the other ethnic groups. The heads of state of almost all of the countries of the region attended a commemoration in Srebrenica in July 2010. This annual commemoration marks the anniversary of the 1995 mass executions of over 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys from Srebrenica.826 This act was recognized as genocide in the ICJ ruling in the case Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia as well as in the ICTY Radislav Krsti ć Case. 827 With exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “reportedly due to strong opposition by politicians from Republika Srpska”, 828 all the remaining Western Balkans states adopted relevant resolutions on Srebrenica. The European Parliament’s Resolution of 15 January 2009 on Srebrenica served as an inspiration for such symbolic political gesture. 829 The Resolution namely called on “the Council and the Commission to commemorate appropriately the anniversary of the Srebrenica-Poto čari act of genocide by supporting Parliament's recognition of 11 July as the day of commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide all over the EU, and to call on all the countries of the western Balkans to do the same”. 830 It furthermore supported “the valuable and difficult work of the ICTY [and stressed that] bringing to justice those responsible for the massacres in and around Srebrenica is an important step towards peace and
824 Brandon Hamber, Liz Šev čenko and Ereshnee Naidu, “Utopian Dreams or Practical Possibilities? The Challenges of Evaluating the Impact of Memorialisation in Societies in Transition”, 4 (3) International Journal of Transitional Justice (2010), pp. 397-420. 825 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, op.cit. (2012), at 29. 826 Helge Brunborg, Torkild Hovde Lyngstad and Henrik Urdal, “Accounting for Genocide: How Many Were Killed in Srebrenica?”, 19 (3) European Journal of Population/Revue Européenne de Démographie (2003), pp. 229-248. See also Isabelle Delpla, “Faits, responsabilités, intelligibilité: comparer les enquêtes et les rapports sur Srebrenica”, 65 Cultures & Conflits (2007), pp. 119-136. 827 ICTY Appeal Chamber Judgement in the Case (IT-98-33) the Prosecutor v. Radislav Krsti ć. See also Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 828 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, op.cit. (2012), at 30. 829 European Parliament, Resolution of on Srebrenica, P6_TA(2009)0028, 15.01.2009, available at
179 stability in the region”. 831 The Resolution as well underlined “the importance of reconciliation as part of the European integration process”. 832 Numerous are war victims from the region who have been waiting too long to see justice for the crimes committed over them, their beloved ones or their property done. 833 In a post-conflict environment, with numerous peculuary and non-peculiary demages, victims of war and their families need to be given a possibility to file compensation claims against the state through lawful court proceedings. There are still quite some unresolved claims for compensation for war-related damages and lootings of properties. The returnees were faced with substantial claims for unsolicited investments made in their absence before repossessing their property. The Government has still not issued a foreseen decree on this issue based on extra-judicial settlements. There remains a backlog in payment of compensation to owners for delays in repossessing their property. 834 This is due to the fact that a reparation mechanism for victims of war-related crimes has not yet been put up in all countries. At the state level in BiH, an effective mechanism that would ensure reparation for all victims of war-related crimes and their families is still lacking. At the entity level, particularly the Federation of BiH, the existing system “does not effectively address the needs of the victims of war-related crimes”. 835 It exsists in Republika Srpska where the authorities developed a general compensation scheme for war damages in the 2005 War Damages Act of the Republika Srpska. 836 However, “[t]he relevant legislation at the level of the entities and cantons aimed at providing reparation to the victims of the war is significantly more favourable to war veterans than to civilian victims”. 837 The victim copnesation scheme is put in place in Croatia through the 2003 Law on the Responsibility for Damage Caused by Acts of Terrorism and Public Demonstrations 838 and the Law on the Responsibility of the Republic of Croatia for Damage Caused by Members of Croatian Armed and Police Forces during the Homeland War.839 In Serbia such a mecahnism is still lacking but “administrative compensation for a
831 Ibid. , Para. 3. 832 Ibid. , Para. 4. 833 See e.g. Vesna Nikoli ć-Ristanovi Ć and Sanja Ćopi ć, “Položaj žrtve u Srbiji: klasi čni krivi čni postupak i mogu ćnosti restorativne pravde”, 9 (1) Temida (2006), pp. 67-75. 834 Croatia 2006 Progress Report, COM(2006) 649 final, at 18. 835 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, op.cit. (2012), at 27-28. 836 Zakon o ostvarivanju prava nanaknadu materijalne i nematerijalne štete nastale u period ratnih dejstava od 20. maja1992. Godine do 19.juna 1996. godine, Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske 103/2005, 1/09, 49/2009, 118/2009. 837 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, op.cit. (2012), at 27-28. 838 Zakono o dgovornosti za štetu nastalu uslijed teroristi čkih akata i javnih demonstracija, Narodne novine 117/2003. 839 Zakon o odgovornosti RH za štetu uzrokovanu od pripadnika hrvatskih oružanih i redarstvenih snaga tijekom Domovinskog rata, Narodne novine 117/2003. See also Tino Bego and Tanja Vukov, “Razli čiti oblici naknada štete sudskim putem zbog usmr ćenja bliske osobe u Hrvatskoj”, available at
180 limited group of war victims, excluding victims whose injuries or loss of life resulted from actions of Serbian state agencies” 840 is foreseen. An absence of a “formal reparation scheme” prompted many war victims from Croatia to initiate ordinary civil proceedings in which they requested compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. Some have obtained compensation 841 while majority of those private lawsuits against the state failed. 842 Finally, the last aspect of pre-accession diversity conditionality that fosters the post- conflict reconciliation concerns Public Apologies. Kora Andrieu argued that official apologies for past wrongs are an essential component of liberal society and “help building or rebuilding civic trust in the aftermath of mass atrocity” 843 serving as an intersubjective process of socialisation. According to Andrieu, apologies as part of the reconstruction process of post- conflict societies result in increased social trust. The advantage of public apologies lays in the fact they do not require “an agreement on substantial moral values, but only on the rules by which facts will be established. [...] But this is not to say that apologies cannot embed any value or affirm any norms. They are actually unthinkable without the values that they reaffirm despite their transgression”. 844 She therefore claims that apologies have “a rule-setting function, which is essential in the aftermath of mass atrocities”. 845 She found apologies essential for the rebinding of social ties, since “in reaffirming the lost normative foundations of a society, they redefine the community’s rules of membership”. 846 Emphasizing a central role of trust re-building in the reconciliation process, Pablo de Greiff held that “the affirmation of norms that is required for reconstituting civic trust in the aftermath of violence calls for concrete actions that go beyond apologies”. 847 In order to succesfuly close the reconciliation cyrcle, he advocated for an effective prosecutions policy since it “can contribute to the reconstitution of the trust of citizens in their institutions” 848 and post-transitional institutional reform since it re-legitimize the State and prevents the recurrence of violence. In addition to those processes, society should be open to truth telling and willing to compensate victims financially. He argued that reparations “constitute for
181 victims a manifestation of the seriousness of the State and of their fellow citizens in their efforts to re-establish relations of equality and respect”. 849 Concluding, he stated that “[i]n the absence of measures such as these, we have no obvious reason to think that citizens will be willing to deposit their trust in the institutions of the State, independently of how profusely past violators may apologize. Indeed, in the absence of measures of this sort, the verbal reaffirmation of the underlying basic norms is bound to sound hollow. In their absence, then, apologies will not be able to bring about reconciliation, if this is a condition that involves civic trust”. 850 Post-conflict societal reconstruction has been subsequently backed through several public apologies for the past atrocities that have happened after 2000. It is widely believed that public apology, often executed by a prominent (political) figure fosters re-emergence of trust and cooperation between groups confronting one another over past injustices. The Montenegrin President Milo Đukanovic offered a public apology "[o]n my own behalf and on behalf of all the citizens of Montenegro [...] to all citizens of Croatia, particularly in Konavli and Dubrovnik for all the pain and material damage inflicted by any member of the Montenegrin people during the Belgrade-led campaign against Croatia in 1991”. 851 Đukanovi ć voiced the apology while meeting the Croatian President Stipe Mesi ć at the coastal resort of Cavtat in 2000. Subsequent step in the normalisation of the neighbourly relations was taken in September 2003 during the first visit to Belgrade by a Croatian president since the Croatian declaration of independence in 1991. In that occasion the presidents of Croatia and Serbia- Montenegro Stjepan Mesi ć and Svetozar Marovi ć, exchanged apologies for the violence perpetrated during the conflicts of the 1990s. Svetozar Marovi ć, apologized “for all the evils any citizen of Serbia and Montenegro has committed against any citizen of Croatia” and Mesi ć responded: “On my behalf I also apologize to all those who have suffered pain or damage at any time from citizens of Croatia who misused or acted against the law”. 852 In the occasion of his first official visit to Sarajevo Svetozar Marovi ć apologized as well to BIH: “I
849 Ibid. 850 Pablo de Greiff, “Repairing the Past: Compensation for Victims of Human Rights Violations”, in Pablo de Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of Reparations (New York: Oxford, 2006), pp. 1-18, at 15. 851 Nick Thorpe, “Djukanovic 'sorry' for Dubrovnik bombing”, BBC News , 25.06.2000, available at
182 want to use this opportunity to apologize for every evil or misfortune which anyone in Bosnia-Herzegovina suffered from anyone from Serbia and Montenegro”. 853 The Serb President Boris Tadi ć attended first time a commemoration to victims of the Srebrenica massacre in 2005 and then again in 2010. The wording of the Tadi ć message in 2005 did not include apology for the crimes committed by the Serbian forces against the Bosniaks of Srebrenica, being rather general. However, prior to leaving for Srebrenica, where he did not held a speech, in his op-ed in The Wall Street Journal Tadi ć said: “On 11 June, the day when we remember victims of Srebrenica, we express condolences also to all the other innocent victims. By respecting the victims of the others and by understanding the suffering of the others, we find strength for reconciliation, which is a prerequisite for future and good neighbourly relations in the Balkans”. 854 Before leaving Belgrade for Srebrenica the first time, Tadi ć had said that wanted to pay his respects to the victims, stressing that “Serbia's future depends” on the extent to which that country distances itself from war crimes committed on its behalf in the 1990s. Several nationalist politicians warned him publicly not to apologize for it. Whereas in the occasion of his first attendance of commemoration Tadi ć did not openly apologized, his attendance of commemoration in 2010 bore much more political significance. 855 Namely, earlier that year, on 1 April 2010, the Serbian parliament adopted the ‘Declaration of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia Condemning the Crime in Srebrenica’. 856 In the occasion of his second visit to Srebernica, Tadi ć expressed “his condolences and remorse for the crimes that occurred” 857 and noted that “the regional reconciliation process can be completed only if all nations agree to take responsibility for the crimes that certain individuals committed on their behalf”. 858 The first attempts of the Serbian parliament to bring about a declaration on Srebrenica dated back in 2005, but the leading political parties were unable to reach a consensus on the text of the document. Soon after the 2008 change in government, which deposed conservative
853 New York Times, Calling for Forgiveness, Serbia Leader Apologizes to Bosnia for War, New York Times , 14.11.2003, available at
183 Vojislav Kostunica and the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, Serbia “seemed to have taken its war time responsibilities seriously, first arresting the fugitive Karadzic and subsequently opening up the question of a war crimes declaration”. 859 Whereas the Declaration received appraisal from the international actors, in BiH, predominantly among the Bosniaks, it was seen as not admitting enough responsibility for the crimes committed. Similarly, in Serbia some media and the nationalist political elites condemned it as unnecessary. Assessing the Declaration’s effects quite critically, Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik argued that “[c]onsidering Serbia’s previous record with ICTY cooperation and reluctance to open the war crimes debate at home, it is easy to be cynical and suggest that the only reason such a declaration was ever delivered was in order to demonstrate to the EU that Serbia is committed to the opening up of the war crimes question, after the contentious signing of the SAA to which The Netherlands objected (on the basis of Serbia’s noncompliance with the ICTY). The declaration itself does not mean an awful lot. It does not tie Serbia in with any obligations towards the ICTY or the victims, nor does it reveal any new information or positioning, nor does it open up the debate on war crimes. It also came with a caveat that the declaration on Serbian victims of war crimes was to follow shortly after. What it does mean is that a significant group of those in power have finally made an explicit statement on this issue”. 860 Being interviewed by the Croatian national television the Serbian President Boris Tadi ć offered apology on 24 June 2007 “[t]o all the citizens of Croatia and to all members of the Croatian people who were made miserable by the members of my people, I offer an apology and take responsibility for that”. 861 Croatian and Serb politician, apart from rigid rightist ones, in general welcomed the statement. In November 2010, for the first time, the presidents of Serbia and Croatia visited the memorial for the Croatian victims in Vukovar together, where they pronounced their apologies. 862 This was a historic visit which caused different reactions in Croatia and Serbia, as in the case of the Serbian President’s visits to Srebrenica in 2005 and 2010. In his address to BiH Parliament in April 2010, the Croatian President Ivo Josipovi ć, who at that time was shortly in the office, apologised because “the Republic of Croatia has
859 Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, op.cit. (2010), at 1. 860 Ibid. (2010), at 2-3. 861 Natasa Radic and Igor Jovanovic, “From Serbia's president, an unprecedented gesture”, SETimes.com , 27.06.2007, available at
184 contributed to that with its policies in the 1990s”863 stating that “the then Croatian policy has contributed to the suffering of people and divisions which still burden us today”. 864 Josipovi ć used this occasion as well to urge BiH and regional leaders to put the past behind and work towards a shared, prosperous future in the European Union. Josipovi ć expressed his determination that “[a]new time has come, a time which calls for a new policy […] all of us - Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs and Europeans alike - must find strength to overcome suspicions and fears”, adding that “chauvinist and extremist policies” must never again be allowed to triumph. 865 After the speech in the BiH Parlament, Josipovi ć visited willages of Ahmi ći and Križancevo Selo. Wheraes in the first more than one hundred Bosniak civilians, women, children and elderly, were killed by Bosnian Croat forces, in the second willage Bosniak troops killed Bosnian Croat civilians in December 1993. In paying tribute to the victims of both sides, Josipovi ć was accompanied by a Bosniak and Croatian political leaders from BiH as well as by the leaders of Bosnia's Catholic Church and Islamic Community. Josipovi ć applogy in Sarajevo as well as the visit to Ahmi ći was condemned by the leadership of the ruling Croatian Democratic Union. 866 It is unavoidable to note that public in the Western Balkans countries often does not support the reconciliatory attempts of political leaders and civil society. Žarko Puhovski described the prevalent societal atmosphere in the region as holding “heroism to be the fundamental feature of humanity, and war the privileged context for the manifestation of heroism”. 867 In the post-war period such values and attitudes “work [...] as the moral legitimation for lying about victims (‘ours’ and ‘theirs’), or at least as the basis for avoiding the truth to the greatest extent possible in order to preserve the image of a state in which ‘we’ are entirely in the right, and ‘they’ in the wrong”. As a result of such prevailing social climate,
863 Balkan Insight, “Josipovic Delivers Unprecedented Apology to Bosnia”, Balkan Insight , 14.04.2010, available at
185 continued resistance to ICTY surrenders in the region “comes from the popularity of the indicted war criminals themselves”. 868 In connection to such prevailing value orientations, it is worrisome that “commendable apologies [of the prominent political leaders from the region] have not been accompanied by any measures such as a public campaign which would raise public awareness and sensitise the population at large”. 869 The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights assessed the achievement of public apologies as weak and insufficient. He claimed they “rather failed to attain acceptance by the victims and wide-ranging awareness of the population in whose name state officials make declarations”. 870 The Commissioner furthermore expressed his concern that “[r]eactions from politicians and the public following apologies are indicative of the need to act in a systematic manner in order to make the public aware of the importance of such acts for peace and social cohesion in the region”. 871 In the 2006 Croatian Progress Report the European Commission acknowledged that “[s]ymbolic gestures and positive statements on reconciliation from senior State officials, mutual visits between leaders from both Croatia and Serbia [...] have contributed towards an improved [inter-ethnic] atmosphere. 872 Despite seemingly vigorous highest political support for the issue of reconciliation, for the time being not the state institutions, but non- governmental organisations play the most significant role in promoting reconciliation in the region. Such absence of wider society involvement into the reconciliation process and the prevalence of “‘bottom-bottom’ efforts [are unable] to pierce and influence the majority of the population and the wide political leaderships. 873 Reconciliation is impossible before citizens of all countries in the region and of all ethnicities start publicly accepting responsibility for failing to prevent the war crimes committed in their name. One way to assure opening towards reconciliation is to recognize commonly shared protracted human rights problems. Iosif Kovras argued, for example, noted that the issue of missing persons that is common to previously conflicting sides has a potential to become a driving force for reconciliation and might open up a window of opportunity to grassroots actors. 874 Similarly, the above elaborated regional inter-governmental commitment to refugee return came into being. Once
868 Diane F. Orentlicher, op.cit. (2008), at 40. 869 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, op.cit. (2012), at 29-30. 870 Ibid. 871 Ibid. 872 EC, Croatia 2006 Progress Report, COM(2006) 649 final, at 13. 873 See Olivera Simi ć and Kathleen Daly ‘“One pair of shoes, one life’: steps towards accountability for genocide in Srebrenica”, 5 International Journal of Transitional Justice (2011), pp. 477-491. 874 Iosif Kovras, “De-linkage processes and grassroots movements in transitional justice”, 47 (1) Cooperation and Conflict (2012), pp. 88-105 .See also Janine N. Clark, “Missing Persons, Reconciliation and the View from Below: A Case-Study of Bosnia-Hercegovina”, 10 (4) Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2010), pp.425-442.
186 the regional commitment to refugee return was achieved, the refugee return ceased to constitute a political problem, what was, subsequently, positively assessed in the EU pre- accession monitoring.
5.3. Attitudinal Consolidtion through the Second Generation Conditionality
It has been demonstrated below that the EU political conditionality started impacting diversity management in the time of the CEE enlargement period and that conditionality has been further developed and stretched for the prospective Western Balkans (potential) candidate countries. The accommodation of national minorities, their inclusion into decision making processes, preservation of their cultural specificities have remained as a part of pre- accession political conditionality developed in 1993. As a result of this unprecedented conditionality, a significant legislative corpus had been put into place to accommodate the ethnic heterogeneity of CEE countries. However, although pre-accession minority conditionality did result in salience of externally induced norms in the domestic legislation and institutions, the first generation minority conditionality was not sufficient to address societal and political exclusion and discrimination of all national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. The conditionality, sometimes inconsistently applied, for example has not resulted in significant inclusion of the Roma minority, whose living conditions and human right violations are still present in CEE, neither has it helped to integrate the Russian speaking minority in the Baltic States. On the other hand, originally externally applied minority conditionality has affected (previously non-existent) internal EU minority policy. The Treaty of the EU, which came into being after the last enlargement wave took place, explicitly enlisted the rights of persons belonging to minorities among the Union’s founding values to which it is explicitly committed. In addition, the Union has in the meantime set up the legal framework to fight discrimination, racism and xenophobia, resulting in consolidating internal protection of national minorities. Diversity conditionality proves particularly important in the Western Balkans where, as a consequence of several extremely violent conflicts and wars fought in the course of the 1990s a legacy of inter-ethnic divisions, sometimes territorial partitions and redrawing of the ethnic pictures still exist. Therefore,the Union addressed recent violent upheavals in the region and deterioration of inter-ethnic relations by insisting the countries of the Western Balkans, apart from assuring ‘respect for and protection of minorities’,need to assure sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, ethnic reconciliation and
187 promotion of tolerance, and full and unequivocal prosecution of war crimes. In addition to those criteria, constructive regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations are recognised as qualifying indicators of the region’s readiness to integrate into the EU. It has been already recognized in the academic literature this round of EU enlargement should “pay close attention to the role played, or potentially played, by ordinary citizens in the Western Balkans in shaping the impact of EU policies [but ] the influence of non-elites on the outcomes of EU conditionality is often overlooked by both policy makers and scholars looking at the process so far”. 875 Changes in the Western Balkans socies that are emerging as a result of externally driven EU conditionality shall result in emergence of democratic political culture and consequently enhace ‘attitudinal conditionality’. 876 Obviously, attitudinal conditionality cannot be achieved unless an unconditional mass support for democratic values, institutions as well as high proportion of inter-personal trust emerge in the country. The aseseemnt of conditionality compliance in the former enlargement vawes points towards the conclusion that the EU conditionality requires primarily legislative and administrative reforms and therefore enhances primarily formal changes in the functioning of domestic institutions and political system, whereas has limited influence over substantive societal transformation. Similalrly, in the Western Balkans accession the EU insists that its commitment and assistance must be matched by a genuine commitment from the governments of the Western Balkan countries and taking concrete steps to make the necessary reforms, to establish adequate administrative capacity and to co-operate amongst themselves. However, requirement of merely normative and institutional consolidation has been modified in the course of the Western Balkans accession since implementation of the second generation conditionality presupposes activities and initiatives that promote social cohesion, ethnic and religious tolerance, multiculturalism, return of refugees and internally displaced persons, procesutin of war crimes and combating of regressive nationalism. The Western Balkans accession process, entailing the important prospect of the EU membership, helped initially consolidation of peace and gave strong encouragement to political reforms in the period following 2000, while simultaneously reinforcing stability and democratic development in
875 Paula M. Pickering, “The Constraints on European Institutions’ Conditionality in the Western Balkans”, in Florian Bieber (ed.), EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), pp.165-170, at 168. 876 Ali Resul Usul, Democracy in Turkey: The Impact of EU Political Conditionality (London/New York: Routledge, 2010), at 19. Idea that change of political culture in the future Memebr States is or should be part of the pre-accession conditionality is also asserted in the work of Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda, “Democratization in Central and East European Countries”, 73 International Affairs (1997), pp. 59-82, at 60; as well as in Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), at 65. See also Doh Chull Shin and Jason Wells, “Is Democracy the Only Game in Town?”, 16 (2) Journal of Democracy (2005), pp. 88-101; and Gerard Alexander, The Sources of Democratic Consolidation (Cornell University Press, 2002).
188 this part of Europe. Yet, the Western Balkans countries have not yet achieved full constitutional consolidation since building of fully functioning states, capable of providing for the needs of their citizens, remains a major challenge for the whole region. Besides, in order for consolidation of democratic political culture to happen as a consequence of the second generation conditionality implementation, the Commission should more vigorously treat conditionality vis-à-vis promotion of European values a cross-cutting issue, both in the monitoring process and throughout the negotiations. Stefan Wolff suggested that, for minority protection to become a central interest for the Western Balkans countries, diversity conditionality should “be attached to specific programmes that are most important to governments in its partner countries in the region and that also emphasise the regional dimension of minority protection”. 877 Actually, the EU has been already well ago criticized for not giving minority protection the sufficient priority in the EU progress reports, and for being inconsistent in its criticism across the different countries and across the different minority groups. 878 Similar to the CEE pre-accession monitoring, the Roma minority have been given particular attention in assessing reform progresses of all countries of the region. Apart from Roma, progress reports treat with particular diligence realization of minority rights of the so called ‘state-forming’ nations, whereas it neglects realization of minority rights vis-à-vis smaller minorities. The analysis above demonstrated, however, certain segments of the second generation conditionality have served predominantly as important catalysts of change in normative and institutional reforms for accommodation of ethnic diversity. This is primarily the case with respect to diversity conditionality that requires enactment and implementation of certain legislative guarantees of minority protection (e.g. representation in public administration and in political life, empowerment of newly established minority rights institutions, such as national minority councils, inclusion of national minorities in media and educational processes, etc.). At this level, diversity conditionality achieved respectable norm compliance since all countries of the region enacted comprehensive minority rights legislation that is incorporating all standards of minority protection developed by the Council of Europe. Apart from requiring norm compliance, the pre-accession diversity conditionality is furthermore continuously and devotedly concentrated on refugee return, as a rule by acknowledging the improvements both in the number of formal returnees as well as the revision of policies towards refugees. However, the actual number of
877 Stefan Wolff, Ana-Maria Anghelea and Ivana Djuric, Minority Rights in the Western Balkans , (Brussels: European Parliament, 2008), at ii. 878 Snježana Bokuli ć and Galina Kostadinova, Pushing for change?: South East Europe's minorities in the EU Progress Reports (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2008).
189 refugee returns has not been substantively increased in spite of the articulated conditionality applied in this field. This opens up a space for a conclusion that earlier introduction of refugee-return related conditionality would have achieved much more result. An effective prosecution of war-crimes and establishment of truth in judicial proceedings shall not only increase the level of inter-ethnic trust, thus contributing to the socio-cultural change, but should also help in the reconstitution of the trust of citizens in judicial institutions. The pre-accession diversity conditionality that insists in full and proper cooperation with the ICTY has been principally evoked mostly with respect Croatia and Serbia, resulting however merely in changes of political elites’s behavior towards prosecution of war crimes, and establishment of domestic institutions that help in reaching this goal. The Western Balkans elite behaviour towards the cooperation with the ICTY have been transformed and changed by the EU membership perspective. The EU used its tool of membership prospect (and the promotion to various stages in the approximation process, such as candidacy status, start of or progress in the accession negotiations etc.) in order to achieve rule compliance of political actors to give up shortcomings in cooperating with the ICTY and do more to find indictees in hiding. On the other hand, this element of the pre-accession conditionality has not sufficiently influnced socio-cultural changes among the Western Balkans population as a popular support for the prosecution of war crimes committed by the members of the own nation is worringly low across the region. However, the pursuit of the EU’s conditionality in the context of post-conflict reconciliation is worryingly limited so far taken that societal and inter-ethnic reconciliation are processes that contribute and lead to a profound transformation of post-conflict societies. Reconciliation with either individual or group (former) enemies is a process of re- establishment of interpersonal trust which eventually results in an array of productive relationships. The EU does not provide any concrete parameter on how and in which time frame the post-conflict reconciliation measures shall be underetaken and endorsed in the accession process. In spite of commonly imposed reconciliation goal through the SAp, each Western Balkans country needs to develop its own specific policy and modality of reconciliation and of fostering coexistence and tolerance. The EU could serve as a much more powerful catalyst in inducing this societal change, exceptionally needed in the post-conflict region, by requesting initiatives that promote reconciliation and inter-ethnic tolerance throughout the entire pre-accession period, and not only insisting in those societal processes closely to the accession, as was the case with Croatia. In my opinion, the conditinalty with regard to reconciliation although introduced at the outset of the SAp, was far too late applied
190 in the Western Balkans accession. Only if the conditionality on reconciliation is straightforwardly communicated in progress reports and documents of the EU institutions it is likely that pro-reconcilatory activities conductive to re-emergence of interpersonal trust among citizens by public figures, state institutions, or civil society organizations would occur. Tim Haughton for example considered that the EU’s ‘transformative power’ is at its peak exactly in moments when a decision to open accession negotiations is made. 879 However, I consider that the negotiations exactly are able to produce the most palpable reform results with respect to implementation of the second generation conditionality; because in this period the Commission is able to apply the most stringent and the most effective leverage mechanism. This argument might be consolidated by the fact that membership preparation does not any longer end with the signature of the Accession Treaty. Namely, in the course of negotiations, the candidate country commits to a number of obligations to be implemented by the date of accession, at the latest, unless specific transitional provisions of its EU accession agreements have been agreed. The Croatian Accession Treaty provides that the Commission shall issue six-monthly assessments up to accession on the implementation of these commitments undertaken by Croatia in these areas. The monitoring report provides an overall assessment of the level of preparedness for membership and highlights the areas where further efforts are necessary in order for Croatia to be ready for membership. 880 However, in the area of fundamental rights, i.e. with regard to the implementation of diversity conditionality, impartial handling of war crimes cases is the only issue left to the post-negotiation monitoring mechanism that Croatia is set to meet before or by the date of accession. There are however three safeguard clauses in the Accession Treaty of the EU with Croatia: a general economic safeguard clause, a specific internal market safeguard clause and a specific justice and home affairs safeguard clause. Those safeguard clauses are designed to deal with difficulties that might be encountered as Croatia adjusts to its responsibilities and rights as an EU Member State. They allow the Union to remedy difficulties encountered as a result of accession, lasting in principle for three years. 881 However, absence of the second generation conditionality requirements in the safeguard clauses speaks in favour of the conclusion that the leverage of the diversity conditionality applies in full only throughout period prior-to
879 Tim Haughton, “When Does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality and the Accession Process in Central and Eastern Europe”, 5 Political Studies Review (2007), pp. 233-246. 880 Monitoring report on Croatia’s accession preparations - Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 24 April 2012, available at
191 signing the Accession Treaty: i.e. in advance to the granting of candidate status, before the commencement of and during the accession negotiations. Since, once the country join the EU, the diversity conditionality no longer applies, it is not sufficient that the pre-accession learning process influences merely political and administrative elites, but it is necessary to induce wider societal changes. For that reason, the EU can achieve sustainability of policies that are being transformed through the second generation conditionality by continuously targeting additional agents of political socialization that are active at domestic level. Educational process, media and civil society all contribute to the development of civic identiy and, in my opinion, would need to be more significantly involved in the pre-accession financing. That is because the creation of civic identities could turn to be constructive in overcoming ethno-national exclusiveness. In addition, systematic development of civic identities would in a long run help in pacification of the region, and, very likely, contribute to establishment of more tolerant societies. For example, civic education raises informed, critical and responsible citizens, thus contributing to consolidation of democratic political culture. Therefore, the EU should encourage governments of the (potential) candidate countries to develop and implement educational programmes of civic education. In addition to this, I believe that by developing social capital, policy outcomes in the region might be improved substantially. The EU financial and technical support for development of civil society, educational entities as well as media ventures should be much more vigorous and encompassing in the pre-accession period, since, as demonstrated above, those political socialization agets are able to contribute to the rise of trust, an important socio- cultural variable that eventually contributes to the rise of democratic political culture and attitudinal consolidation. To conclude, in spite of the comprehensive tailor-made diversity conditionality, developed to address many of urgent societal shortcomings throughout the region, the progress achieved to this point in meeting the second generation of minority conditionality to me seems at best - limited. First of all, there is still outstanding refugee displacement which, unresolved even until now, clearly indicates that the wide-ranging rectification of ethnic cleansing and population displacements will not happen. Namely, the armed conflicts endowed the region with extreme polarisation of societies along ethnic lines. Moreover, wrongdoings of those conflicts have not been properly addressed: the process of transitional justice has not been completed, due to a reluctance to cope with the war crimes by the states and due to non-elimination of impunity for war-related crimes; it is estimated that claims for reparation of approximately 438,000 refugees and other displaced persons have not yet been
192 met and are without long-term solutions; many victims of the wars have still not received adequate reparation for the harm they have suffered, there are still some 13,500 missing persons whose fates have not yet been clarified; and the serious commencement of inter- ethnic reconciliation is yet to happen. Although, “constructive steps already taken by governments in the region [who ] demonstrated the courage to offer formal apologies and exchange essential information in order to establish the truth, overcome the violent legacy of the past, and build sustainable democratic societies”. 882 Such initiatives deserve wide support, and Europe has a special, supportive role to play in this. One should keep in mind, though, that only as long as the Western Balkans countries continue to have a viable prospect of membership, will the EU continue to be the main motivator for domestic reforms. The assurance of the EU membership perspective is an imperative for success of all, including political, reforms, as for the reform “dynamic to work, membership had to be a realistic goal: it had to look probable that the institution would expand and that the candidates would be able to fulfil the requirements. Hence the external influence of the EU depended on a certain tension between confidence that membership would be secured and fear of rejection owing to inadequate reforms”. 883 It is therefore on the side of the Union to provide much vigourus and articulated conditionality on reform policies that are attached to the second generation conditionality.The support for such conditionality need to be mirrored through financial assistance the EU is providing for the (potential) candidate countries’ institutions, but also the civil society, media and educational institutions. Besides, the annual progress reports should give emphasiz on the achievements in the goals of the cecond generation conditionality in a more articulated way. This is particularly necessary with regard to reconciliation, because the wide-encompasing societal healing reform processes that shall result in self-reflection over the atrocities caused by each national group, requires more determined external guidance if it wants to result with gradual deconstruction of the prevailing ethno-nationalism. It should not be forgotten that the on-going insecruty of the memebership perspective not olnly empoweres non-cooperative behavior of the ethno-nationalist elites, but also results in rising Euro-scepticism across the region. Vedran Đihi ć and Angela Wieser for example noted that “ [t]he high level of Euro-scepticism in Croatia and decreasing popular support for the EU in Serbia […] reveal the trapped position of citizens, frustrated with the government in the Croatian case and discouraged by the lack of substantial refom as well as the pace of EU
882 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, op.cit. (2012), at 44. 883 Heather Grabbe, op.cit. (2002), pp. 53.
193 integration process in Serbia. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the elites do not behave pragmatically and, as a result, public disillusionment with the EU will further increase”. 884 Finally, diversity conditionality outcomes are intrinsically linked with socio-economic growth in the region. Not only that the membership of the Union requires the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, but economic reforms and growth help consolidation of democracy. Namely, a successful democratic consolidation requires that economic, social and political systems are to be transformed simultaneously. Academic research has confirmed that in a society where economic needs are not met, socio-cultural values that reflect economic and safety needs prevail among population. Conseqently, strengthening of economy and improvement of socio-economic conditions also allow for a value shift opening up space for more interpersonal trust and cooperation among citizens. Years ago, Joseph Marko warned that “a dramatic improvement of the economic conditions is needed [in order] to ease the ethnic tensions”. 885 The global economic crisis significantly hit the region that had already experienced deterioration of economic growth and impoverishment as result of war related destruction of property. Significant improvement of economic conditions is therefore a prerequisite for the post-conflict Western Balkans societies to transform. The international community has played a predominant role in the transition from conflict to peace in the region by rebuilding of predominantly the institutional and to a less extent also the socio-economic framework.886 The economic crisis in the EU has implications on the support for future EU enlargements into the region. The EU can always recall the absorption capacity mechanism to postpone further accessions. This, of course, is threatening to the reform capacity of the regional political elites. Renner and Trauner draw attention to the Union’s fundamental commitment deficit, arguing that “without a clear time frame regarding a future EU membership for the countries in the Western Balkans, the prospect of membership remains only an abstract possibility without palpable political implications”. 887
884 Vedran Đihi ć and Angela Wieser, op.cit. (2012), at 49. 885 Joseph Marko, “Post-conflict Reconstruction through State- and Nation-building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 4 European Diversity and Autonomy Papers (2005), available at
194 6. Conclusions
In this dissertation I demonstrated that democratic consolidation needs to be conceptualized as a multidimensional process which requires many reform steps simultaneously occurring at different levels. It requires simultaneity of normative and institutional changes, existence of civil society, active citizens’ popular participation and economic transformation. Democratic consolidation, however, turns out to be particularly challenging in deeply divided and ethnically diverse societies. The countries of the Western Balkans, being burdened with the legacies of recent wars and interethnic conflicts, therefore find themselves subjected to a very demanding process of democratization. Namely, mere novel normative solutions, even when brought into practice by accomplishments of democratic institutions cannot alone make democracy functional. That is because laws or constitutions are not self-executing but politicians and institutions are required to inhale life in norms by putting them into practice. Besides, for a democracy to grow, citizens must be(come) engaged and interested in their political system and participate in it, either on the side of the political institutions, or by contesting their work through their engagement in the civil society. In this dissertation I particularly underlined the variable of societal transformation in the process of democratic consolidation, considering it the most important factor for the post- conflict transformation of the Western Balkans. I argued that deficit of civic values, deteriorated inter-personal contacts and decreased cooperation across ethnic lines characterize the Western Balkans societies.By introducing additional pre-accession conditionality in the field of democracy through the Stabilisation and Association process, the EU has induced the external socialization that, inter alia , presupposes acceptance of the preferred social norms and values by the wider Western Balkans population. I recognized the ‘second generation conditionality’ as a means of a socialization and collective learning introduced with an intention to result in the rise of interpersonal trust and eventual creation of civic identities. Moreover, by imposing those additional criteria the EU addressed specific legacy of prevailing ethno-nationalistic policies that occurred in the aftermath of SFRY dissolution, being aware that waged wars and ethnic-conflict inheritance continually threatens to overwhelm democratic consolidation and the stability of the region. In additon, such external socialization supports development of fair and just societies and contributes to the social cohesion of all ethnic (and societal) groups in the Western Balkans countries. It also
195 contributes to the rise of stability and, eventually, decreases chances for perpetuation of inter- ethnic conflicts. All of the Western Balkan countries have demonstrated firm willingness to embark the family of European states that share not merely a common market, but also common values, laws and institutions and the strive to continuous democratic consolidation. The membership perspective entitles the EU with powerful leverage to influence precisely societal, institutional, legislative, economic and political changes, i.e. reforms that often seem unpopular and come at high costs for domestic political elites in the Western Balkan countries. Namely, in the post-conflict societies affected by strong nationalistic political discourse, those necessary reforms are particularly demanding. The reform tool of EU enlargement into the Western Balkans takes two courses: the implementation of pre-accession political criteria and harmonization of the (potential) candidate country’s legislation to the EU acquis . Potential membership is primary and at the outset conditioned by acceptance and implementation of the Copenhagen and the Stabilization and Association tailor-made criteria, resulting in the expected and desired political and societal reforms. Positive progress in meeting those pre-accession criteria results in candidate status and the opening of the accession negotiations. In this stage of the pre-accession relations, particularly in the membership negotiations phase, the EU expects the transfer of its normative foundations and the values upon which it is founded, including respect of the rights of persons belonging to minorities, to take place in candidate countries. The novel elements of the political conditions for the Western Balkans are elaborated as the ‘second generation conditionality’ with a common objective: to increase level of trust in the deeply divided and ethnically diverse societies in the region. Recognition and acknowledgement of ethnic diversity in the text of constitutions, as well as in the normative-institutional solutions; creation and maintenance of conditions that are conductive to refugee return and repossession of property; all reconciliatory activities initiated both from the side of state institutions and civil society organizations; post-war establishment of truth, either in judicial proceedings or in educational process, are factors that contribute to rise of trust in the post-conflict Western Balkans. Trust, in turn, allows for a re-approach and an increase in interdependence of communities torn apart by recent wars and inter-ethnic conflicts. However, the above analysed implementation of the second generation conditionality demonstrates that the Western Balkans countries have not yet progressed sufficiently in the consolidation of democratization in spite of the introduction of above elaborated tailor-made political conditionality. The stage of constitutional consolidation has not been successfully
196 passed yet, since consolidation of institutions and reforms of public administration have not yet been fully achieved throughout the region. Namely, state-building processes in BiH and in Kosovo have not yet been fully completed. Besides, weakness of the state structures across the region is often underlined as a major impediment for successful implementation of necessary reforms. Nor have all countries of the region achieved representative consolidation since the territorial and functional representation of interests of all ethnic groups has not been assured yet. In addition, democratic progress in several countries of the region “is trapped between fear of ethnic rivals” 888 that do not behave supportively towards consolidation of democracy. That means not all countries have achieved behavioral consolidation which requires that formal and informal political actors from both majority and minority communities effectively cooperate, through the institutions and various power-sharing mechanisms. Finally, the emergence of democratic consolidation of the political culture is still questionable in all of the Western Balkans countries analysed above since inter-ethnic cleavages do not fade away but seem to be deeply cemented. Democratic consolidation is particularly problematic in several countries with deeply rooted power sharing mechanisms that reinforce the inter-ethnic divide and institutionalise ethnicity. For that reason, attitudinal consolidation seems for the time being implausible in Kosovo, Macedonia and BiH, and is still widely undeveloped in other countries of the region where inter-ethnic cooperation among greatest part of population is dominantly scarce. In spite of inadequate inducement of the democratic consolidation progress through the SAp, the prospect of EU membership still remains (and probably will remain in the future, regardless of the present institutional and financial crisis the EU is faced with) the main foreign policy goal of all countries in the region. As such, it still constitutes a strongest incentive and excellent catalyst for domestic reforms. However, in my opinion, in spite of the existence of an attractive goal ( i.e. the EU membership) the profound post-conflict transformation of the Western Balkans societies is not going to be achieved easily and soon, to a great extent due to absence of civic culture and pro-democratic values among the citizens. Although the SAp obviously contains an elaborated political culture democratisation component, to this point it has not succeeded significantly in attitudinal consolidation and establishment of civic virtues. I believe this is due to the fact that the SAp to a great extent relies on the inter-elite cooperation. For example, the goals of the second generation conditionality (assurance of minority rights, reconciliation, providing conditions for refugee return, prosecution of war crimes) are for the time being merely supported by the political
888 Vedran Đihi ć and Angela Wieser, op.cit. (2012), at 48.
197 elites, who have demonstrated their (often merely declaratory) commitment to them in numerous occasions. However, those second generation conditionality’s objectives are much less supported by the general population. For a profound transformation of the Western Balkan societies, that are both post-conflict and transitional, it is therefore not sufficient to address effects of Europeanization merely to political and administrative elites, but means of broader societal impact need to be envisaged. In addition, a non-transparent and non-inclusive pre-accession processes that, again, is limited to interaction between the political and administrative elites of the EU and (potential) candidate countries, assists insufficiently in creation of socio-cultural changes among general population. External socialization, which indeed needs to be promoted through the second generation conditionality, needs to affect citizens more elaborately. I believe the second generation conditionality shall target braoder number of adressees than nowadays, having particularly in mind necessity to include ecucational institutions and media as so far unexploited agents of the political socialization. The EU must moreover go on with pursuing its financial assistance to the region. Namely, only a gradual change of values accompanied by economic growth and subsequent modernization of the Western Balkans countries can result in substantive establishment of civic virtues. In spite of harsh criticism for further EU enlargement currently coming from numerous political parties and interest groups across the EU, the EU cannot leave aside the countries of the Western Balkans region. There are two obvious reasons for this. Firstly, just as used to be the case with CEE Member States, accession of this part of Europe will finally result in a geographically rounded integration. Secondly, if the EU wants stability in its continent it should diminish any chance for eruption of violent inter-ethnic conflict such as the region of the Western Balkans witnessed throughout 1990s. The enlargement allows that the peace and the stability, the EU has been exposed to for a long time, to be extended to this particular post-conflict region. The second generation conditionality should therefore be more convincingly applied and with respect to broader spectar of addresses in order to induce socio-cultural changes that will result in co-existence and cooperation of numerous ethnic groups inhabiting the countries of the region. Finally, now the policies emerging from the second generation conditionality are being placed within the wider context of democratization and social reconstruction, it is legitimate to expect that the EU will insist more vigorously in their implementation also in the countries of its neighbourhood and through its development aid policies.
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