Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

1390_A1-A7 11/4/08 4:36 PM Page 1 330-383/B428-S/40005 Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970 Middle East Region 1. National Security Study Memorandum 21 Washington, January 21, 1969. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff SUBJECT Middle East Policy The President has directed the preparation of two papers on Arab-Israel problems for consideration by the NSC. One paper should consider alternative US policy approaches aimed at securing a Middle East settlement, including (1) direct Arab-Israeli negotiations (2) U.S.- Soviet negotiations and (3) Four Power negotiations.2 The paper should also consider the possibility that no early settlement will be reached, and US interests and policies in such a situation. The second paper should consider alternative views of basic US interests in the area and should include consideration of the issues listed in the attachment. The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East perform this study. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu- tional Files (H-Files), Box H–126, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 2. Secret. 2 The first study required by this NSSM is scheduled for publication in Foreign Re- lations, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972. 1 1390_A1-A7 11/4/08 4:36 PM Page 2 330-383/B428-S/40005 2 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV The first paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by January 25, 1969. The second paper should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by February 24, 1969. Attachment 1. What is the role of the Middle East today in U.S. global strat- egy? What are the real U.S. interests there and how important are they? 2. What is the nature of the Soviet threat to the Middle East? How likely is Soviet dominance or predominance? What forces will tend to limit Soviet influence? 3. What is the precise nature of the Soviet threat to NATO via the Middle East? 4. What is the present state of the U.S. position in the Middle East? Is it eroding drastically? Or is there a level of common interests shared with some nations in the area which will prevent it from deteriorating beyond a certain point? Is an early Arab-Israel settlement essential to preserving the U.S. position? 5. In the light of answers to these questions, what is the most appropriate U.S. posture toward the Middle East? What level and kinds of involvement are appropriate in view of our interests and U.S. and Soviet capabilities? 2. Paper Prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia1 NSCIG/NEA 69–1B (Revised) Washington, January 30, 1969. BASIC US INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST This paper examines some of the basic interests and assumptions that underlie US policy formulation in the Middle East. Alternative 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu- tional Files (H-Files), Box H–020, NSC Meetings, Briefing by Joint Staff: SOIP, 2/4/69. Secret. This paper was prepared in response to NSSM 2, Document 1. A January 24 ver- sion of this paper is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–020, NSC Meetings, Middle East, 2/1/69. Saun- ders’s comments on the paper, sent in a January 23 memorandum to the chairman of the IG, are ibid., NSC Files, Box 1233, Saunders Files, Basic Policy, Middle East, 1/20/69– 12/31/69. 1390_A1-A7 11/4/08 4:36 PM Page 3 330-383/B428-S/40005 Middle East Region 3 views on the following questions are addressed: (1) How important are our interests in that area? (2) How grave is the Soviet threat to these interests? (3) To what extent does the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East threaten NATO? (4) What is the present US position in the area? (5) How important is an early Arab-Israel settlement to the preservation of our interests? (6) What posture should the United States adopt vis-à-vis the conflicting states and groupings of states in the area? 1. What are our interests and how important are they? In the Northern Tier of the Middle East region, the independence and integrity of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, and perhaps of Iran are generally recognized as vital US interests. While there is also general agreement that the area south of the Northern Tier, comprising the Eastern Arab world and Israel, is important, the degree of its importance is debatable. At one end of the spectrum is the view that the area as a whole is vital on the grounds that it represents, in toto, a conglomerate of Western interests whose loss would tip the global strategic balance in favor of the Soviets. This view leans heavily on the importance of Arab oil to the Free World and the need to prevent its becoming a pawn subject to the whims of regimes under Soviet influence or control. Supporters of this view argue that the Arabs control the only geography and resources of vital importance to us in the area and would have us cast our lot firmly with the Arabs. At the other extreme, it is argued that the foregoing view is based on outmoded strategic concepts (e.g., we no longer rely on forward air bases) and on an oversimplified picture of the Arab world as a homo- geneous entity. While not denying the importance of Arab oil to the Free World, supporters of this position argue that the oil flow will not be interrupted for political reasons because the Arabs have nowhere to market their oil except Western Europe. As a corollary, it is also argued that the US commitment to Israel makes that nation’s security a vital US interest—an argument frequently bolstered by the contention that a strong Israel offers the best hope for holding the line against further Soviet penetration of the Middle East. Neither of these theses, it seems to us, correctly defines the degree and ways in which the Arab-Israel area of the Middle East is important to the United States. It is difficult to prove that this area is vital to our security, in the sense that our own survival would be threatened by the ex- tinction of any state in the area. With the possible exception of Israel, which is a special case, developments in or affecting a given country at a given time do not vitally affect the United States. On the other hand, the collective or substantial loss of the area to the Free World by incorporation into the Soviet orbit would present a serious long-term threat to the American position in the world. 1390_A1-A7 11/4/08 4:36 PM Page 4 330-383/B428-S/40005 4 Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV Although we have no treaty commitment to the preservation of Israel’s security, there is a long-standing national consensus that we have a basic interest in Israel’s survival. That fact, and Arab opposi- tion to Israel’s existence, complicate the analysis. Leaving aside sub- sidiary though significant considerations related to investment, trade and communications, we are perforce deeply involved in the Middle East for two fundamental purposes: (1) because we wish to assure the survival of Israel, and (2) because, in terms of our global strategic interests, we do not wish the land mass, population and resources of the eastern Arab world to fall under Soviet domination. We seek the achievement of both purposes. But, given the underlying forces of conflict in the area, pursuit of either purpose tends to militate against achievement of the other. While neither purpose is “vital” in the strict sense that failure to achieve it would require us to go to war to safe- guard our national security, both are of sufficient importance that we cannot disengage from the area without sustaining a serious blow to our Great Power position. Under any definition of our interests in the Arab-Israel situation, the avoidance of military confrontation between the Soviets and our- selves is the Number One priority. Next in order of priority are the pre- vention of the introduction by a Middle East power of strategic mis- siles or nuclear weapons into the area, the avoidance of a situation in which the use of US military forces in the Arab-Israel conflict would be necessary and the avoidance of another war itself between Israel and the Arabs. Beyond that, we see a continuing American interest in Israel’s ability to defend itself against any combination of Arab states and in Western access to Arab oil as well as to transit and communications through the area. 2. How grave is the Soviet threat? The Soviet Union continues its ef- forts to reduce Western, and particularly American, positions and influence in the Middle East, and to expand its own. It has established strong—but not “dominant”—positions in the UAR, Syria, and Iraq. It has replaced the bulk of the military equipment lost in the war by these states.2 It has increased the number of its military advisors substan- tially. It has sought to exploit opportunities to expand Soviet influence in the Yemen and the new state of South Yemen. The Soviets have bartered military equipment to Iran and have offered military assist- ance to Jordan and Lebanon.

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