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India/Pakistan - Background Notes S-0863-0001-12-00001 Expanded Number S-0863-0001 -12-00001 Title Items-in-Peace-keeping operations - India/Pakistan - background notes Date Created 2=1411971 Record Type Archival Item Container S-0863-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: India/Pakistan Print Name of Person Submit Image SgaueoSignature of PersonesnSbi Submit I IHB/bb 23 April 1971 THZ PAKISTAN CRISIS A. Background of' the conflict While there are deeper causes of conflict covering political, economic and cultural areas between the two parts of Pakistan, the present crisis directly emanates from the postponement of the constituent assembly which was due to meet on 2 March 1971 to frame a constitution and to arrange for the transfer of power to the newly elected National Assembly. In the elections held in December 1970 two parties had emerged as the most important political entities in the two wings of the country: in East Pakistan it was the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujib-Ur-Rahaman; in West Pakistan it was the Pakistan People's Party led by Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, a former Foreign Minister. As a result of the disagreement between the two major parties on certain basic issues concerning the constitution to be drafted and because of a threat --.by Mr. Bhutto to boycott the assembly, if it were called, President Yahya Khan decided to postpone the convening of the constituent assembly in order to give more time to the parties to reach an agreement. The Awami League, however, did not agree with the proposed postponement and began a movement to take control of the civilian administration in East Pakistan. In order to avert further deterioration, President Yabya Khan fixed a firm date - 25 March 1971 - for the convening of the assembly and went to Dacca to hold talks with the political leaders in East Pakistan. He was joined later by Mr. Bhutto. The talks between President Yabhya Khan and the political leaders continued for about a week. In spite of some Press reports of progress being made in those talks, no agreement was reached as it appeared that the West Pakistan leaders were not prepared to accept Shiekh Mujib-Ur-Rahamant s demand with regard to East Pakistan having full control over revenue raising items, foreign trade and foreign aid. The Pakistan army also feared that the ascendancy of Sheikh Mjuib-Ur-Eahaman to power might considerably reduce the size, strength and impoktance of the army. Daring the night of 25/26 March, President Yabya Khan, after stating that the Awami League was not interested in a peaceful transfer of power but in breaking East Pakistan away from the rest of the country, called in the army to maintain law and order in the province, banned all political activities and issued new martial law regulations. As a result off -_)strict Press censorship, very little authoritative news came out of East Pakistan, although'it became well known that the army had taken -2 - very stern measures. The reports of the killing of civilians and unarmed people aroused 'world concern for the affairs of East Pakistan. B. International repercussions The East Pakistan strife seems to have affected India very seriously. This was but natural because of the close cultural and linguistic relations between East Pakistan and West Bengal.' Very soon after the action of the Pakistan army, Mrs.* Ghandi, Prime Minister of India, made a statement extending the sympathy and moral support of her people to the East Pakistanis .(This was followed by a resolution in the Indian Parliament. In a note verbale to the Secretary-General on 30 March, the Permanent Representative of India also stated that while his Government had acted 'with great restraint it could not but take notice of the reaction of the people of India to the reports of massive killings of unarmed people in East Pakistan. There were also popular appeals-forfunds and other assistance and some armed volunteers were said to have crossed the border. On 7TApril, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan in a note verbale to the Secretary-General described India's attitude towards the East Pakistani matters as interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan in violation of Article 2, paragraph T, of the Charter. Pakistan also objected to India's using the expression "the question of the situation in East Pakistan". Pakistan also charged India 'with continuing a virulent propaganda campaign against it and also with deploying six Divisions of the Indian army in proximity to the borders of East Pakistan,, besides encouraging the despatch of armed Indian volunteers into East Pakistan. India denied Pakistan's charges of interference and stated that its only concern was that, if international opinion did not give sympathy and support to the people of East Pakistan, tension in the sub-continent was bound to increase, There was also concern in other parts of the world. On 4iApril President Podgorny, President of the Soviet Union,, sent a message to President Yahya Khan expressing concern about the bloodshed and the measures taken by the Pakistan army and also expressing hope of a peaceful settlement of the consitutuionaJ. crisis with the elected-representatives of East Pakistan. President Yahya Khan, in reply, sought the help of President Podgorny to press India not to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan and not to use the situation there to the detriment of Pakistan 's unity and integrity. The People's Republic of China took the view that the events in Pakistan were the concern of the Government of Pakistan and that the unity of the people of East and West-Pakistan was a basic guarantee for Pakistan to attain prosperity and strength. After condemning India's reported interference, the Prime Minister of- -3 - the People's Republic of China stated "should Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese Government and people will, as always,, firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their just struggle"t . C. Possible international action Soon after the strife in East Pakistan, there were some Press reports that the Security Council might be convened to consider the situation. If there were any efforts to that effect, they did not materialize so far. The Security Council could be seized of the situation in East Pakistan either under Article 35 by a State or under Article 99 by the Secretary-General. None of these initiatives were taken so far. The most likely comparable case would be the case of the situation in Northern Ireland which, however, the Security Council after listening to the initial statements, did not put on its agenda. It appears that some delegations thought that in the present case the Security Council could consider, in conformity with Article 29 of the Charter., the desirability of establishing a committee on an ad hoc basis,, to assist the Council. It is learnt that the major Powers are impressing upon Pakistan the need to find a political solution of the crisis. According to Press reports from the Government of Pakistan the situation in East Pakistan at present appears to be quiet and the Pakistan army appears to be in control of the province. From other sourwces there are reports of continuing fighting in some border areas. Pakistan's charges against India of armed attack across the border have recently increased considerably. These charges have been denied by India. Tension has also increased as a result of the establishment of the "Government of Bangla-Desh"' on 17 April which, according to Pakistan, was done with th6 connivance of India and with its assistance. Indiats reported refusal to Pakistan's request to evict-one of its diplomatic officials - the Deputy High Commissioner who had seized Pakistan' s Consulate in Calcutta, and Pakistan's refusal of India Ia request for permissirm to airlift its diplomatic personnel from Dacca, has also l~ed to further tension. The situation on the border of East Pakistan and West Bengal being so tense, the danger of an armed conflict, with possibilities of foreign intervention, cannot be ruled out. It will require great restraint on all sides to ensure that the situation does not deteriorate into an international c1-onflagration.__ Meanwhile, the need for international aid, both in West Bengal and East Pakistan, might become acute in the coming days. Although the Governmentof Pakistan had initially discouraged offers of aid, after restoration of normalcy acceptance of such offers could not be excluded..
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