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Clayton Act Against Monopolization by Tying, 287 Dealership, 256 Cambridge University Press 052179031X - Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution Keith N. Hylton Index More information Index A.A.Poultry Farms, Inc.v.Rose Acre Clayton Act against Farms, Inc., 216–18 monopolization by tying, 287 abusive business, 167, 171 dealership, 256, 260, 264 conduct-focused test of, 187, 188, exclusivity, 262–4 188n13, 193 inference doctrine development intent to monopolize for, 187, 188, for, 132–40, 145 193, 194 inferred versus not, 141 refusal to deal by, 187, 247 Interstate circuit and, 133–8 Section 2 violation for, 188, 190 noncompete, 33–4, 100, 103, 257, access. See also essential facility 264 local association, 180 resale price, 269 problems of open, 208–11 termination of (vertical restraints), up-front fee for, 212 270–1, 272–3, 275–6 acquittals, false, 130–1, 189, 214, 220, unilateral contract theory for, 351, 375 138–40, 158 administrative concerns unilateral contract theory rejection courts errors and, 130–1 for, 140–3, 158 economic reasonableness v., vertical restraint, 270–8 xiii–xv, 92, 106–7, 116, 171 vertical restraints and exclusivity, per-se rule and, 122 262–4 Administrative Procedure Act, 48 airline industry, as example of adverse selection, 5–6, 24 parallel pricing, 73 Aghion, Phillipe, 199n30, 200–1 Akerlof, George, 24–5 agreement(s), 28, 75, 132–3, 222 Albrecht v.The Herald Co., 123n17, to boycott, 166, 168, 169–70, 184 262, 262n21, 262n23, 273, cheating on collusive, 145, 153–4 277 379 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 052179031X - Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution Keith N. Hylton Index More information 380 Index Alcoa.See United States v.Aluminum Associated Press v.United States, Co.of America (Alcoa) 177–81, 182, 184, 208–10 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.v. association Indian Head, Inc., 361–3, 366 dissemination of information and, allocation 146–9 horizontal, 126 as extragovernmental agency, 170, territorial, 118, 119 171, 179–80 Ambook Enterprises v.Time, 141n26 new competition practice of, 146 American Column & Lumber Co.v. price fixing in, 106, 118–19, 121 United States, 145–9, 149–52, price-setting cooperative, 120 154 product standard setting by American Tobacco Growers, Inc.v. private, 361–2 Neal, 208, 210, 211 protection of access for local, 180 American Tobacco v.United States, restraint of trade and bylaws of, 77, 139–40, 158, 195 177–8 anticompetitive theory veto in, 178, 180, 181 tying, after Chicago School and, Atlantic Richfield Co.(ARCO) v. 281–3, 288 USA Petroleum Co., 218, tying and difficulty with, 307–10 262n23 tying, Chicago School and, 279–81 atomism, 40, 190 vertical mergers and, 335 perfect competition and, 4, 8 Antitrust Division. See Justice attempt, at monopolization Department Clayton Act and, 287 antitrust law. See also Clayton Act; dangerous probability requirement Sherman Act of, 244–5, 246, 248–51, 263 Antitrust Paradox (Bork), xii definition of, 244 Appalachian Coals v.United States, evidence, objective, in, 245, 250 107–9, 111 evidence of unfair tactics in, 247, apprehension 249 enforcement and probability of, exclusion of competitors with, 247 50, 51 right/refusal to deal in, 246–8, Areeda, Philip, 220–1, 230, 248n15 246n7, 263–4 Arizona v.Maricopa County Medical specific intent of, 245, 246, 247–51 Society, 122–5, 122n17, 126n23 the Swift formula and modern Arrow-Hart & Hegman Electric Co.v. doctrine of, 244–8 FTC, 318n24 violation of, 244 ASCAP, 120–2 attorneys’ fees, and deterrence, 58 Aspen Skiing Co.v.Aspen Highlands author, opinion of, xi Skiing Corp., 203–6, 207, 210, Automatic Radio Mfg.Co, v.Ford 228, 231n2 Motor Co., 295n42 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 052179031X - Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution Keith N. Hylton Index More information Index 381 Bain, Joe, 16 Associate Press and, 177–81 bargaining, 159–60, 342–3 competition effected by, 170–1, barriers, 23. See also entry 174–5 artificial (privately created), 15–16 conspiracy’s proof/rule of reason natural barrier to, 16 for, 166, 167, 168, 169–70 Barry Wright Corp.v.ITT Grinnell direct-selling wholesalers, retailers Corp., xv, 199n32, 214–15, 219, and, 167 224 efficiency defenses for, 176 basing point pricing, 81 eliminating of firms by, 174–6 cases, 155–9 exclusionary plan and, 173–4, 177, competition and, 162–5 180 cross-hauling and, 162 exclusions, rule of reason and, definition of, 154–5 181–2 delivered pricing system and, free option arrangement, members 158–9, 161–2 and, 167–8 economics, 160–5 Klor’s paradox, boycott doctrine and kinked demand curve, 163 and, 174–7 freight absorption and, 162 no effect on competition and, most favored customer clause and, 172–4 159–60 in noncompetitive political arena, per-se rule not, 158–9, 164 359, 360, 363–4, 365, 366, 369 Bauer & Cie v.O’Donnell, 261 per-se rule and, 166, 169–70, 171, Becker, Gary, 44 173, 177, 179–82, 184, 185 Bendix Corp., 348–9, 350 post-BMI/Sylvania and, 172, 181–5 benefit, potential competition, 345 post-Socony, 170–7 Berkey Photo v.Eastman Kodak Co., pre-Socony, 166–70 203 price-fixing, 169, 171 Bertrand, Joseph, 76–7, 76n15, 83–5, proof versus conspiracy to, 171 150 public harm and, 173–6, 184 Blair, Roger, xvi restriction of distributors freedom blanket license arrangement, 120–1 prohibited in, 168–9 block booking, 292 rule of reason and, 166–70, 173–4, BMI. See Broadcast Music Inc.v. 182, 183, 184–5 Columbia Broadcasting System brand loyalty, 73 Bobbs-Merrill Co.v.Strauss , 261, brand name, 25–6 261n19 Brandeis, Justice, 148, 152 Bolton, Patrick, 199n30, 200–1 Breyer, Judge, 215 boycotts, 29, 155, 157, 166, 168, 169–70 Breyer, Justice, xv agreement to, 166, 168, 169–70, bribes, 8, 358, 367, 369 184, 264 bright line rule, 215, 220–1, 320 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 052179031X - Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution Keith N. Hylton Index More information 382 Index Broadcast Music Inc.(BMI) v. buyers Columbia Broadcasting System, lying by, 72 120–2, 124–5, 128–9, 166, 172, 182, 184, 289 California Motor Transport Co.v. Brooke Group Ltd.v.Brown & Trucking Unlimited, 356–7, 363, Williamson Tobacco Corp., 214, 368–71 219 California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn Brown Shoe Co.v.United States, 311, v.Midcal Aluminum, 372, 374 318–20, 321, 322, 323, 325, 327, California v.American Stores Co., 338–41 55n24 Brunswick Corp.v.Pueblo Bowl-O- California.v.ARC , 63n40 Mat,63 cartels, 18n13, 99n17. See also Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc.v. boycotts; collusion Buffalo Evening News, Inc., basic theory of, 68–71 217n64 collusion and, 69–73 Bureau of Competition, 48, 50n10 conscious parallelism for, 73–89 Bureau of Consumer Protection, 48 conspiracy doctrine, conscious Bureau of Economics, 50n10 parallelism and, 75, 87, 89 Burger, Justice, 119 cooperative elements of, 122 business. See also corporation enforcement, 70–1, 87–8, 136, 146, anticipation by, 76 337 capacity constrained, 115 inferring conspiracy for, 87–9 failure of competitor, 320, 327, 339 influence government for internal capital market for, 312, regulated price by, 367 312n7 informal exchange relationships in, lack of resources of, 320 71 larger relationship to smaller, 204, instability of, 68–9, 76n14, 159, 160, 320 216 material reserves for, 327–8 interdependence theory and, 76–7, protection of small, 40–2, 192–3, 81–2, 86, 87 320–1, 323, 339 intraenterprise conspiracy and, 74, right/refusal to deal in, 246–8, 78–80 246n7, 263–4, 270 lying by buyers of, 72 risk taking compensation for, market share of, 72 231–2, 269–70, 293, 295 monitoring of, 71–3, 86, 87–8, 136 self-dealing in, 337 output versus price agreements size, 188, 190, 193, 204 with, 72 vertically integrated, 203 price-fixing, 17–18, 62, 68–9, 80n27, Business Electronics v.Sharp 87, 107–8, 253, 256, 338 Electronics, 275–7 sales, 107–8 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 052179031X - Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution Keith N. Hylton Index More information Index 383 stable, 71n3, 73 rule of reason and, 305, 317 casebook, drawback of, xi Section 7, competition CBS, 120–1, 128 substantially reduced and, 56–7, Cellophane.See United States v.E.I. 318, 319–20, 322, 323, 325, 330, du Pont De Nemours & Co. 335, 338, 339, 347, 350 (Cellophane) Sherman Act and, 47, 54 Cement Institute.See Federal Trade stock transfers and, 318, 335, Commission v.Cement Institute 335n9, 336 Cement Manufacturers Protective tying and, 285–6, 290, 293, 294 Assn. v.United States, 167–9, vertical mergers and, 335–6 171–2, 178, 181 Cline v.Frink Dairy Co,31 Central Shade Roller Co.v.Cushman, Clorox.See Federal Trade 101n20 Commission v.Proctor & chain-store paradox, 225–6, 226n76 Gamble Co.(Clorox) , 344–8 Chamberlain, Edward, 22, 75n12, 76 Coase, Ronald, 8, 242–3, 333, 341–2 Chicago Board of Trade v.United Coke, Edward, 36 States, 104–7, 108, 109, 109n37, collusion, 68–9, 222 111–12, 116, 117, 119, 126–8, avoidance of per-se rule in, 117 129, 153, 172, 174, 183, 184, brand loyalty and, 73 267n41, 365n24 cartels and, 69–73 Chicago School, 280–1, 308 cheating on agreement of, 145, City of Columbia v.Omni Outdoor 153–4 Advertising, 367, 369, 377 circumstantial evidence for, 73, 133 Clayton Act, 30, 39–40 concentration and, 156, 312 amendments to, 318, 335, 338 enforcement of, 70–1, 87–8 against attempt of monopolization, evidence and, 135 287, 304, 307 explicit versus tacit, 145 commodities affected by, 290, lying by buyers in, 72 290n29, 293, 294 monitoring of, 72–3, 153 consumer protection with, 320, one-shot versus repeat-player, 349–50 70–1, 96 exclusive dealing and, 303, 304 retail price maintenance, 253 fine/punishment of, 47, 48–9, 52 stable versus instability of, 69–70, horizontal mergers and, 318, 320 71n3, 135 injunctions under, 55, 55n24, 56 tacit, 73–4, 75, 76–7, 85, 86–8, injury requirement of, 218 88n39, 140, 145, 149, 153, 219 private actions, treble damages and trigger strategy, 77 and, 58, 60 tying facilitating of, 283 protection of small businesses vertical mergers facilitation of, with, 320 337–8, 337n12, 340 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 052179031X - Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution Keith N.
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