A European Peace Order and the German Question: Legal and Political Aspects

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

A European Peace Order and the German Question: Legal and Political Aspects Michigan Journal of International Law Volume 11 Issue 3 1990 A European Peace Order and the German Question: Legal and Political Aspects Jost Delbrueck Institute of International Law at the University of Kiel Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil Part of the European Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons Recommended Citation Jost Delbrueck, A European Peace Order and the German Question: Legal and Political Aspects, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 897 (1990). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol11/iss3/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A EUROPEAN PEACE ORDER AND THE GERMAN QUESTION: LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS Jost Delbrueck* I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF A EUROPEAN PEACE ORDER IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE The post-World War II political setting in Europe was marked by the stable posture of two tightly structured opposing bloc-systems. In military terms, the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization, and in the economic sphere, the Eastern European Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation and the Western European Eco- nomic Communities, represented the stark distinctions of the Cold War. This stable posture has definitely come to an end. Due to the rapid decline of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, there is a growing concern in various political quarters about an emerging polit- ical instability in Eastern and Central Europe brought about by the Eastern European States' reassertion of their political independence. The primary source of concern over a possible instability in Central Europe - and elsewhere - is, however, the issue of an imminent (re-) unification of Germany. This concern has a special sense of urgency about it because the re-emergence of a unified Germany, now taken for granted, might come about so rapidly as to not allow for a careful restructuring of the European state system. Such restructuring is nec- essary in order to avoid the risks of general political instability, and the risk of a renewed threat to the security of the European nations in particular, on the part of a unified Germany. As the emphasis on a renewed German threat already indicates, the problem of a European Peace Order which safeguards the security of all European states and accommodates German interests in gaining or simultaneously re-es- tablishing a unified national state, is not a new one. In order to get a clear and sober assessment of the needs which a lasting European Peace Order must meet in the light of historical experience, including a solution to the notorious "German Question," a short review of the * Dr. iur.habil., LL.M (Indiana), Professor of Constitutional and International Law, Direc- tor of the Institute of International Law at the University of Kiel, Federal Republic of Germany, currently Visiting Professor at Indiana University School of Law; the following article is the slightly revised and edited version of a paper presented by the author as a fellow of the Institute for Advanced Study at Indiana University on Febraury 14, 1990. Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw [Vol. 11:897 problem of a European Peace Order may be helpful as a prelude to the following discussion of the possible course of events, and the adequate strategies to influence that course. 1. The European State System as a Peace Order after the Breakdown of the Holy Roman Empire In 1815, the Congress of Vienna was faced with the restructuring of the European State System. The Holy Roman Empire had dis- integrated following Napoleon's failed attempts to build a European Order under French hegemony at the turn of the 19th Century. The result was a balance of power system which came to be known as the Concert of Europe which was, in a sense, the non-institutionalized forerunner of the League of Nations system.' The Concert of Europe system basically rested on the guarantees and responsibilities of the then existing Great Powers (France, Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia), and successfully secured a stable order in Central Europe for over half a century. It did not, however, provide for a unified Ger- many as part of the system, despite strong national ambitions on the part of the rising German bourgeois class. The German Confedera- tion (der Deutsche Bund) created by the Vienna Congress fell far short of creating a united German nation-state. Revolutionary attempts by the liberal bourgeoisie and more radical groups in 1848-49 to set up a united Germany under a constitutional monarchy which, once estab- lished, would have had to be a part of the Vienna Congress system, did not succeed either. Although an impressive Constitution was drawn up by an elected National Assembly (the so-called FrankfurterPauls- kirchen Verfassung) the system could never be enforced after the polit- ical and military breakdown of the revolution. The eventual unification of Germany, excluding Austria, by Bismarck in 1870-71 came too late to accommodate the diverse interests of the European states within the framework of the Concert of Europe, and the newly created "German Reich" - formed after Bismarck stepped down - proved to be ill adapted to the ailing Concert system. Later developments are well known: Europe plunged into the abyss of the First World War - with Germany playing a major role - which proved so fatal to the European Order and the political sta- tus of the European powers. 1. See Delbrueck, I, in G. DAHM, J. DELBRUECK, R. WOLFRUM, I VOELKERRECHT 13 (2d ed. 1989) (citing I. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEM AND PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1956)). Spring 1990] European Peace Order And The German Question 899 2. The Inter- War Period The question of a European Peace Order was again the subject of an international forum comparable to the Vienna Congress during the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. This conference, however, never intended to create a new order for Europe which would include Ger- many as an integral part of a respective political system. Rather, the Versailles Conference took two different directions. First, inspired by the ideas of the peace movement emerging at the end of the 19th Cen- tury and leading to, among others, the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the diplomats at Versailles established the League of Nations. The League was designed as a universal institution for the maintenance of international peace. This step represented the first at- tempt by the international community of states to internationalize re- sponsibility for the maintenance of peace among states under the auspices of an international organization. 2 Second, the Versailles Con- ference provided for a separate legal regime over Gemany - the ac- tual peace treaty arrangements. The defects of these two different decisions (i.e., setting up the League system and, separately, the peace settlement for Germany), formally forged together in one treaty instrument,3 were manifold and proved to be disastrous in the end. Although, in theory, the League at that time probably best resembled the Confederation of the Republi- can States envisaged by Immanuel Kant in his tract Perpetual Peace,4 in practice, only a small number of its members proved to be "Repub- lican States" in the Kantian sense. Furthermore, the League was neither universal in membership nor in political perception. In fact, it was, for the most part, Eurocentric. Yet, the League excluded from its ranks and agenda the geographical center of Europe - Germany - which was not to become a member of the League during the first years of its existence. 5 A temporary trend toward redressing some of 2. For a more detailed analysis of these developments see id. at 13; see also Delbrueck, Peace Through Emerging InternationalLaw, in THE QUEST FOR PEACE: TRANSCENDING COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AND WAR AMONG SOCIETIES, CULTURES AND STATES 127 (R. Vaeyrynen ed. 1987). 3. See Treaty of Peace with Germany (Versailles Peace Treaty), 66th Cong., 1st Sess., SEN. DOC. No. 85 (1919). For the official German source, see 1919 REICHSGESETZBLAT-r (OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE GERMAN REICH) 688 (texts in the authentic English and French languages as well as in the official German translation). 4. See I. KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 59 (L.W. Beck ed. 1959). 5. The lack of universality was due, first, to the fact that the United States - though one of the major initiators of the League - did not become a member because the U.S. Senate refused to agree to the ratification of the Versailles Peace Treaty, and secondly, the newly established Soviet Union - the first Socialist state to come about - was not yet recognized internationally. It was, therefore, not admitted to League membership. Thus, three large powers were not part of the League system at the outset. Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 11:897 these defects, evidenced by admitting Germany (1926) and the Soviet Union (1934), as well as tying the United States to the League System through the Pact for the General Renunciation of War (Briand/Kel- logg Pact) of 1928,6 did not persist. In the mid-1930s, the League rapidly declined in political relevance and did not even function as an effective control mechanism over an ever more menacing former en- emy state - Hitler's National-Socialist Germany. 7 The institutional approach taken by the Versailles Conference to solve the problem of how to safeguard international peace under the responsibility of the international community of states was a sound one.
Recommended publications
  • The Franco-Prussian War: Its Impact on France and Germany, 1870-1914
    The Franco-Prussian War: Its Impact on France and Germany, 1870-1914 Emily Murray Professor Goldberg History Honors Thesis April 11, 2016 1 Historian Niall Ferguson introduced his seminal work on the twentieth century by posing the question “Megalomaniacs may order men to invade Russia, but why do the men obey?”1 He then sought to answer this question over the course of the text. Unfortunately, his analysis focused on too late a period. In reality, the cultural and political conditions that fostered unparalleled levels of bloodshed in the twentieth century began before 1900. The 1870 Franco- Prussian War and the years that surrounded it were the more pertinent catalyst. This event initiated the environment and experiences that catapulted Europe into the previously unimaginable events of the twentieth century. Individuals obey orders, despite the dictates of reason or personal well-being, because personal experiences unite them into a group of unconscious or emotionally motivated actors. The Franco-Prussian War is an example of how places, events, and sentiments can create a unique sense of collective identity that drives seemingly irrational behavior. It happened in both France and Germany. These identities would become the cultural and political foundations that changed the world in the tumultuous twentieth century. The political and cultural development of Europe is complex and highly interconnected, making helpful insights into specific events difficult. It is hard to distinguish where one era of history begins or ends. It is a challenge to separate the inherently complicated systems of national and ethnic identities defined by blood, borders, and collective experience.
    [Show full text]
  • France and the German Question, 1945–1955
    CreswellFrance and and the Trachtenberg German Question France and the German Question, 1945–1955 ✣ What role did France play in the Cold War, and how is French policy in that conºict to be understood? For many years the prevailing as- sumption among scholars was that French policy was not very important. France, as the historian John Young points out, was “usually mentioned in Cold War histories only as an aside.” When the country was discussed at all, he notes, it was “often treated as a weak and vacillating power, obsessed with outdated ideas of a German ‘menace.’”1 And indeed scholars often explicitly argued (to quote one typical passage) that during the early Cold War period “the major obsession of French policy was defense against the German threat.” “French awareness of the Russian threat,” on the other hand, was sup- posedly “belated and reluctant.”2 The French government, it was said, was not eager in the immediate postwar period to see a Western bloc come into being to balance Soviet power in Europe; the hope instead was that France could serve as a kind of bridge between East and West.3 The basic French aim, according to this interpretation, was to keep Germany down by preserving the wartime alliance intact. Germany itself would no longer be a centralized state; the territory on the left bank of the Rhine would not even be part of Germany; the Ruhr basin, Germany’s industrial heartland, would be subject to allied control. Those goals, it was commonly assumed, were taken seriously, not just by General Charles de Gaulle, who headed the French provisional government until Jan- uary 1946, but by Georges Bidault, who served as foreign minister almost without in- terruption from 1944 through mid-1948 and was the most important ªgure in French foreign policy in the immediate post–de Gaulle period.
    [Show full text]
  • English Reactions to the Franco-Prussian War Andrew Mcginnis
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Virtual Commons - Bridgewater State University Bridgewater State University Virtual Commons - Bridgewater State University Honors Program Theses and Projects Undergraduate Honors Program 12-17-2015 A Snapshot in Time: English Reactions to the Franco-Prussian War Andrew McGinnis Follow this and additional works at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/honors_proj Part of the European History Commons Recommended Citation McGinnis, Andrew. (2015). A Snapshot in Time: English Reactions to the Franco-Prussian War. In BSU Honors Program Theses and Projects. Item 125. Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/honors_proj/125 Copyright © 2015 Andrew McGinnis This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts. A Snapshot in Time: English Reactions to the Franco-Prussian War Andrew McGinnis Submitted in Partial Completion of the Requirements for Commonwealth Honors in History Bridgewater State University December 17, 2015 Dr. Leonid Heretz, Thesis Director Dr. Thomas Nester, Committee Member Dr. Sarah Wiggins, Committee Member A Snapshot in Time: English Reactions to the Franco-Prussian War Andrew McGinnis 13 December 2015 2 The decade culminating in 1871 was filled with turmoil and forceful politics that united Germany under Prussian control. The major event that completed this process was the Franco- Prussian War of 1870-1871. This war led to a change in the status quo. It both weakened France’s power and strengthened the legitimacy of a unified Germany under Prussia. In the 19th Century, Great Britain was the dominant country in European power politics.
    [Show full text]
  • How to Research International Treaties and Agreements
    Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review Volume 20 Number 4 Article 2 12-1-1998 How to Research International Treaties and Agreements Edward Grosek Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Edward Grosek, How to Research International Treaties and Agreements, 20 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 641 (1998). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol20/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. How to Research International Treaties and Agreements EDWARD GROSEK* I. Preface ...................................................................................................... 643 II. Table .......................................................................................................... 644 III. General Compilations of Treaties and of Other Sources of Treaty Texts and the Indices to Them ............................................................... 661 A G eneral International Treaty Collections ......................................... 661 B. International Law ................................................................................ 665 IV . The Im portance
    [Show full text]
  • German’ Communities from Eastern Europe at the End of the Second World War
    EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION EUI Working Paper HEC No. 2004/1 The Expulsion of the ‘German’ Communities from Eastern Europe at the End of the Second World War Edited by STEFFEN PRAUSER and ARFON REES BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI) All rights reserved. No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form without permission of the author(s). © 2004 Steffen Prauser and Arfon Rees and individual authors Published in Italy December 2004 European University Institute Badia Fiesolana I – 50016 San Domenico (FI) Italy www.iue.it Contents Introduction: Steffen Prauser and Arfon Rees 1 Chapter 1: Piotr Pykel: The Expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia 11 Chapter 2: Tomasz Kamusella: The Expulsion of the Population Categorized as ‘Germans' from the Post-1945 Poland 21 Chapter 3: Balázs Apor: The Expulsion of the German Speaking Population from Hungary 33 Chapter 4: Stanislav Sretenovic and Steffen Prauser: The “Expulsion” of the German Speaking Minority from Yugoslavia 47 Chapter 5: Markus Wien: The Germans in Romania – the Ambiguous Fate of a Minority 59 Chapter 6: Tillmann Tegeler: The Expulsion of the German Speakers from the Baltic Countries 71 Chapter 7: Luigi Cajani: School History Textbooks and Forced Population Displacements in Europe after the Second World War 81 Bibliography 91 EUI WP HEC 2004/1 Notes on the Contributors BALÁZS APOR, STEFFEN PRAUSER, PIOTR PYKEL, STANISLAV SRETENOVIC and MARKUS WIEN are researchers in the Department of History and Civilization, European University Institute, Florence. TILLMANN TEGELER is a postgraduate at Osteuropa-Institut Munich, Germany. Dr TOMASZ KAMUSELLA, is a lecturer in modern European history at Opole University, Opole, Poland.
    [Show full text]
  • Der Deutsche Bund: 1815-1866' and Hewitson, 'Nationalism in Germany, 1848-1866: Revolutionary Nation'
    Habsburg Austensen on Gruner, 'Der Deutsche Bund: 1815-1866' and Hewitson, 'Nationalism in Germany, 1848-1866: Revolutionary Nation' Review published on Tuesday, October 9, 2012 Wolf D. Gruner. Der Deutsche Bund: 1815-1866. Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2010. 128 pp. EUR 8.95 (paper), ISBN 978-3-406-58795-5.Mark Hewitson. Nationalism in Germany, 1848-1866: Revolutionary Nation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. xiii + 462 pp. $90.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-4039-1329-6; $34.95 (paper), ISBN 978-1-4039-1330-2. Reviewed by Roy A. Austensen (Valparaiso University) Published on HABSBURG (October, 2012) Commissioned by Jonathan Kwan A European Germany or a German Europe? As we approach the bicentennial of the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), historians are still very much concerned with the political settlements regarding central Europe that resulted in the creation of the German Confederation (the Deutsche Bund), a loose confederation of thirty-five states and four free cities that included the German territories of two great powers, Austria and Prussia. Under the presidency of Austria, the Bund provided a modest degree of unity for the German states while maintaining the sovereignty of its members. From its very beginning, the Bund was a disappointment to those who argued for the creation of some sort of united Germany; and dissatisfaction with the Bund only grew over the years, given its cumbersome political machinery, its inability to produce needed reforms, and its frequent functioning as a vehicle for the repressive policies of Austria and Prussia. The two volumes under consideration here examine the nature of the “Germanquestion” during the era of the Deutsche Bund, but from very different perspectives.
    [Show full text]
  • Reunification: East Germanys Integration Into the European Communities
    The European Dimension of German Reunification: East Germany's Integration into the European Communities Thomas Gtegerich--- Introdumon In 1989-1990, the German question, which had (again) been open since 19451, found a definite answer in the form of a reunification2 of the Fed- eral Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the whole of Berlin. The answer was European in nature, and it partly * Dr. jur., LL.M. (University of Virginia 1985), Research Fellow at the Institute. Abbreviations: All E.R. All England Law Reports; BGBI. Bundesgesetzblatt; BL Basic Law; BR-Drs. Drucksachen des Bundesrates; BT-Drs. Drucksachen des Bundestages; BullBReg. Bulletin der Bundesregierung; BullEC Bulletin of the Euro- pean Communities; BVerfGE Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts; CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; C.M.L.Rev. Common Market Law Review; CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; DA Deutschland Archiv; DtZ Deutsch-Deutsche Rechts-Zeitschrift; EA Europa-Archiv; EC European Communities; ECJ Court of justice of the European Communities; ECR European Court Reports; ECSC European Coal and Steel Community; EEC European Economic Community; EPIL Inst. R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public Interna- tional Law, Instalment; ERP European Recovery Program; EuGRZ EuropHische Grundrechte Zeitschrift; EuR Europarecht; EuZW Europiische Zeitschrift fdr Wirtschaftsrecht; FAZ Frankfurter Allgerneine Zeitung; FS Festschrift; JZ juristen Zeitung; n. note(s); NJW Neue juristische Wochenschrift; Oj Official journal of the European Communities; RIW Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft; SEA Single European Act; VVDStRL Ver6ffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staats- rechtslehrer. 1 Cf. D. B I u rn e n w i t z, What is Germany? (1989).
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact: Proposing a Treaty for the Renunciation of Nuclear Wars As an Instrument of National Policy
    Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2014 Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact: Proposing a Treaty for the Renunciation of Nuclear Wars as an Instrument of National Policy David A. Koplow Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1891 https://ssrn.com/abstract=2510612 42 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 123 (2014-2015) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the International Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons A NUCLEAR KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT: PROPOSING A TREATY FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY David A. Koplowt Si vis pacem, para bellum ("If you want peace, prepare for war") - Roman adage Si vis pacem, parapacem ("If you want peace, prepare for peace") - Inscription on the ceremonial pen used to sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact CONTENTS IN TR O D U C T IO N ............................................................................... 124 I. PARSING THE TEXT OF THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT..... 127 II. THE ANTECEDENTS AND SEQUELAE OF KELLOGG- B R IAN D .................................................................................... 132 A. Three Types ofAnti- War Treaties...................................... 135 B. The Evolution of the Kellogg-BriandPact ......................... 138 C. The Post-World War If Legacy.......................................... 140 D. PrincipalAttributes of Kellogg-Briand ............................. 145 1. Kellogg-Briandis Legally Binding............................... 145 2. Kellogg-Briandis, in Effect, a "No First Use" Com m itment .................................................................. 146 3. Kellogg-BriandDoes Not Address Disarmament, and Contains no Implementation Mechanisms or Diplomatic Infrastructure............................................
    [Show full text]
  • The New German Question by Timothy Garton Ash | T
    The New German Question by Timothy Garton Ash | T... http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/aug/15... Font Size: A A A The New German Question AUGUST 15, 2013 Timothy Garton Ash There is a new German question. It is this: Can Europe’s most powerful country lead the way in building both a sustainable, internationally competitive eurozone and a strong, internationally credible European Union? Germany’s difficulties in responding convincingly to this challenge are partly the result of earlier German questions and the solutions found to them. Yesterday’s answers have sown the seeds of today’s question. Before I explore those historical connections, however, let us reflect on everything that this new German question is not. Twenty-three years after unification, the enlarged Federal Republic of Germany is about as solid a bourgeois liberal democracy as you can find on earth. It has not only absorbed the huge costs of unification but also, since 2003, made impressive economic reforms, Angela Merkel; drawing by James Ferguson lowering labor costs by consensus and hence restoring its global competitiveness. This land is civilized, free, prosperous, law-abiding, moderate, and cautious. Its many virtues might be summarized as “the banality of the good.” Asked by the tabloid BILD-Zeitung what feelings Germany awakes in her, Angela Merkel once famously replied, “I think of well-sealed windows! No other country can make such well-sealed and nice windows [dichte und schöne Fenster].” 1 Yet the place is not altogether so banal. Opening the well-sealed windows of my hotel room in Berlin, I look across Unter den Linden to the illuminated, translucent dome of the Reichstag building, at the heart of what is now, after London, Europe’s most exciting city.
    [Show full text]
  • The Relation of the Schleswig-Holstein Question to the Unification of Germany: 1865-1866
    Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 1936 The Relation of the Schleswig-Holstein Question to the Unification of Germany: 1865-1866 Katherine Marie Brennan Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Brennan, Katherine Marie, "The Relation of the Schleswig-Holstein Question to the Unification of Germany: 1865-1866" (1936). Master's Theses. 68. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/68 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1936 Katherine Marie Brennan TH3 RELATION OF THE SCHLESV!IG-HOLSTEUi Q.UESTION TO THE UNIFICATION OF GERMJu~ 1865-1866 by KATHERINE MA...11IE BRE:t:TI\fAJJ" A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILI..:ME1TT OF THE REQ.UIREUE1TTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN LOYOLA UNIVERSITY JUNE, 1936 TABLE OF CONTENTS Historical Background 1 Chapter I Convention of Gastein 15 Chapter II Prussian Attempts at Alliance 37 Chapter III Leading to War 53 Chapter IV V/ar Comes 79 Chapter V War and Peace 101 Appendices 110 Bibliography 124 VITA AVETORIS Katherine Marie Brennan was born in February 18, 1913, in Philadelphia, Pa. Her primary and secondary education, howe­ ever, she received in the Middle West; and in September, 1930 entered Mundelein College, Chicago, Illinois.
    [Show full text]
  • Selling the Economic Miracle Economic Reconstruction and Politics in West Germany, 1949-1957 Monograph Mark E
    MONOGRAPHS IN GERMAN HISTORY VOLUME 18 MONOGRAPHS Selling the Economic Miracle Economic the Selling IN GERMAN HISTORY Selling The Economic Miracle VOLUME 18 Economic Reconstruction and Politics in West Germany, 1949-1957 Mark E. Spicka The origins and nature of the “economic miracle” in Germany in the 1950s continue to attract great interest from historians, economists, and political scientists. Examining election campaign propaganda and various public relations campaigns during this period, the author explores ways that conservative political and economic groups sought to construct and Selling the sell a political meaning of the Social Market Economy and the Economic Miracle, which contributed to conservative electoral success, constructed a Economic new understanding of economics by West German society, and provided legitimacy for the new Federal Republic Germany. In particular, the Miracle author focuses on the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union’s (CDU/CSU) approach to electoral politics, which represented the creation of a more “Americanized” political culture reflected in the Economic Reconstruction borrowing of many techniques in electioneering from the United States, and Politics in West such as public opinion polling and advertising techniques. Germany, 1949-1957 Mark E. Spicka is Associate Professor of History at Shippensburg University in Pennsylvania. He received his Ph.D. from the Ohio State University in 2000 and was a Fulbright Scholar in Germany in 1996/1997. He has published a number of articles that have appeared in German Politics and Society, German Studies Review, and The Historian. Spicka E. Mark Cover Image: “Erhard keeps his promises: Prosperity for all through the social market economy” 1957 Bundestag election poster by Die Waage, Plakatsammlung, BA Koblenz.
    [Show full text]
  • Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter
    xv Anticipatory Collective Self... Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties Have Said George K. Walker DEBATE CONTINUES on whether anticipatory self,defense is A permitted in the era of the UN Charter.! Two recent commentators say that States need not await the first blow but may react in self,defense,2 provided principles of necessity and proportionality are observed. They differ, however, on when States may claim anticipatory self,defense.3 This is not surprising, since others seem to change views.4 Still others take no clear position.5 Most anticipatory self,defense claims since World War II have been asserted by States responding unilaterally to another country's actions. Claims of this nature are more likely to be raised in the future.6 The UN Charter, Article 51, declares in part that "Nothing in the ... Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self,defence if an armed attack occurs against a [UN] Member ... until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." This article proposes to analyze the alternative to individual self,defense, i.e, collective security pursuant to treaty. After examining nineteenth century international agreements and those of the first half of this century, the scope of collective self,defense in Charter, era treaties What the Treaties Have Said will be analyzed. The inquiry for these agreements is whether a right of anticipatory collective self,defense is stated in them, paralleling States' right to claim individual anticipatory self,defense. If there is a right of anticipatory collective self,defense, what is the scope of that right, and what are the limitations on it? If the Peace of Westphalia (1648)7 began the nation,state system, the Congress of Vienna (1815)8 started the modem movement toward collective security.9 It is from this benchmark that Part I examines treaty systems through World War I.
    [Show full text]