Cross-National Public Opinion on Climate Change: the Effects of Afºuence and Vulnerability • So Young Kim and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias*

Cross-National Public Opinion on Climate Change So Young Kim and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias Cross-National Public Opinion on Climate Change: The Effects of Afºuence and Vulnerability • So Young Kim and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias*

Climate change has emerged as one of the most important issues of the twenty- ªrst century. The World Bank focused its 2010 annual World Development Report on the challenges of climate change. Countries, individually and collec- tively, have instituted comprehensive policies to curb greenhouse gases, including Germany’s 2008 Climate Initiative, the UK’s 2010 Climate Change Plan, and the European Union’s 2013 Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change. The urgent need to address and adapt to climate change requires both new public policies and changes in individual behavior. As a complex global and scientiªc issue, climate change presents unprecedented political, economic, and moral challenges. Two aspects of climate change in particular—the high economic costs of reducing carbon emissions and the long-term horizon of global warming—are barriers to signiªcant policy changes. Despite the growing recognition of the need for international climate policy, the 2009 Copenhagen Con- vention of the Parties failed to agree on a successor to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Understanding public attitudes toward climate change and the costs and beneªts of government action to address it is essential for designing effective climate policies and for changing individual behavior. Public concern about climate change has increased signiªcantly over the past two decades. Recent polls show that large majorities in all countries surveyed are now moderately or highly concerned about climate change.1 Yet public support for climate policies and for changing personal behavior has been slower to develop. Furthermore, signiªcant cross-national variation in attitudes toward climate policies persists, and on certain issues cross-country differences have increased over time.2 These trends are surprising given the greater global dissemination of the scientiªc evidence of anthropogenic climate change.3

* We are very grateful to Dennis Chong of the University of Southern California and three anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments on this paper. 1. World Public Opinion 2007, 2009, 2011. 2. Wolinsky-Nahmias and Kim 2009. 3. IPCC 2007, World Bank 2012.

79 80 • Cross-National Public Opinion on Climate Change

In this article we examine recent trends in international attitudes toward climate change by exploring public support for government action and for changing personal behavior. Our approach to these issues differs from previous studies in two important ways. First, we examine public attitudes using multiple cross-national surveys conducted by the BBC World Service, Pew Global Atti- tudes Project, the World Bank, and other organizations. This examination facili- tates analysis of variation among and between developed and developing societies. Using repeated surveys of the same countries and several measures of speciªc issues allows us to construct reliable indicators of public opinion toward climate change. Second, instead of looking exclusively at measures of general concern, we study responses to more detailed questions that reºect the intensity of public concern on this issue, the degree of support for speciªc policies, and the willingness to change individual behavior. Although surveys show considerable international concern about climate change, we found signiªcant cross-national variation in intensity of concern, support for domestic and international policies, and propensity to change individual behavior. To explain such variation, we tested the impact of two key national factors—economic afºuence and vulnerability to climate change. Eco- nomic afºuence, represented by GDP per capita, indicates a country’s material and technological capacity to address climate change and the economic security of its citizens. Climate vulnerability reºects the susceptibility of a country to a variety of risks and hazards associated with climate change such as drought, ºooding, and soil erosion. Our analysis shows that a national population’s attitudes toward climate change are not straightforwardly related to its afºuence and climate vulnerability. Citizens in developed nations tend to be less concerned about climate change and less supportive of certain climate policies than those in developing nations. These ªndings support earlier critiques of the post-materialism hypoth- esis, which suggests that developed countries will place greater priority on environmental issues. We also found that while a country’s susceptibility to climate change does not explain cross-national variation in levels of concern, it does correlate with people’s willingness to pay for climate policies. These results help explain the dynamics and intensity of international attitudes toward climate change. Although the inºuence of public opinion on climate policy is a separate research issue, our analysis offers insight about politically feasible climate policies that can garner public support. In this article we review the literature on cross-national variation in public opinion on climate change. We then present the survey data and our ªndings and discuss the implications of our analysis.4

4. We focus on cross-national variation and include individual-level variations within countries only in one multi-level regression analysis. So Young Kim and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias • 81

Aggregate Correlates of Climate Change Opinion International surveys have greatly expanded their coverage of questions related to climate change in the past ten years, following alarming scientiªc reports and growing international attention. More recently, high-impact storms (such as Hurricane Sandy, which ºooded much of New York City in October 2012) and growing evidence of the serious economic, social, and political implications of climate change have attracted broader media attention and public discussion.5 Reports and studies of international public opinion on climate change have shown cross-national differences in national attitudes but have remained largely descriptive in nature.6 Leiserowitz (2007) discussed several international surveys focusing on public awareness and risk perceptions of global warming and climate policy preferences and priorities. Brechin (2010) reviewed ªve international surveys looking at public concern about and knowledge of global climate change and public support for climate policies. These overviews cover a broad range of issues and generally show high levels of international public concern. Yet, few studies seek to explain cross-national variation in climate opinions. In his analysis of a survey encompassing forty-six countries, Sandvik found that public concern about global warming correlates negatively with national wealth. Tjerstrom and Tientenberg also found a negative correlation between per capita GDP and strong national climate policy. Kvaloy, Finseraas, and List- haug conducted a multi-level regression analysis of concern for global warming from the most recent wave of the World Values Survey (2005ϳ09) and found a negative coefªcient for GDP per capita, similar to Sandvik’s result.7 Economic development is perhaps the most widely studied explanation of cross-national variation in environmental attitudes. Following Maslow’s theory that humans have a hierarchy of needs, Ronald Inglehart’s post-materialism thesis suggested that people (and countries) with higher income levels would endorse environmental issues more than those with lower income levels because afºu- ent people are more likely to be interested in quality of life issues.8 Empirical research yielded mixed, but largely unsupportive, results. Some studies found a signiªcant correlation between national wealth and environmental attitudes.9 Other studies, however, found little if any evidence of such correlation.10 In sev-

5. Nisbet and Myers (2007) showed the proportion of the respondents who had heard of the “greenhouse effect” has soared from 39 percent in 1986 to more than 80 percent beginning in early 2000s. 6. Kull 2007; Leiserowitz 2007; Brechin 2010. Earlier cross-national studies including Brechin (2003) and Lorenzoni and Pidgeon (2006) focused on advanced countries. Dunlap (1998) cov- ered six countries including four developing nations. 7. Kvaloy et al. 2012; Sandvik 2008; Tjerstrom and Tientenberg 2008. 8. Inglehart 1981,1990; Maslow 1954. 9. Diekmann and Franzen 1999; Kemmelmeier et al. 2002. 10. Brechin and Kempton 1994; Brechin 1999; Dunlap et al. 1993; Dunlap and Mertig 1995; Dunlap and York 2008; Givens and Jorgenson 2011; Kidd and Lee 1997; Mostafa 2011. Givens 82 • Cross-National Public Opinion on Climate Change eral cross-national studies of environmental awareness and concern, Dunlap and his colleagues raised serious doubts about the post-materialism argument. Dunlap, Gallup, and Gallup (1993) found no signiªcant differences in the levels of environmental concern between rich and poor countries in their Health of the Planet (HOP) survey of twenty-four countries. More recently, Dunlap and York (2008) discovered widespread environmental awareness across wealthy and poor countries, which suggests rising global environmentalism. They pro- posed that environmental protection may actually be a materialistic concern for the poor, as environmental degradation directly threatens their welfare and living conditions. In this study, we broaden the discussion of the relationship between economic development and environmental concerns by examining, across multiple international surveys, the impact of wealth on (1) intensity of concern about climate change, (2) commitment and support for costly measures, and (3) views about international policies on climate change. Climate change has also been studied in the literature on risk perception and communication.11 Studies of risk communication draw on individual-level variations in perception and knowledge of climate change. Indeed at the aggregate level, we might expect cross-national differences in public perceptions of the risks associated with climate change, especially with the growing number of extreme weather events including tsunamis, unprecedented heat and cold spells, and hurricanes. People who live in countries that are vulnerable to climate change risks and hazards may be more likely to demand government action and change their personal behavior. In their analysis of the Montreal and Helsinki Protocols, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta found that ecological vulnerability and economic capacity explain much of the variation in countries’ positions on international environmental regulations.12 This pattern may also hold in the case of climate. Although the en- tire planet will be affected by climate change, the extent, nature, and timing of the impacts will vary according to geographic location and other factors. Indeed, some highly vulnerable countries are already experiencing serious droughts, heavy rainfalls, and rising sea levels.13 In this study, we examine whether the public in countries highly vulnerable to climate change is more concerned with the economic and social ramiªcations of climate change and therefore more likely to support costly climate measures.14 In sum, we explore the reasons for cross-national differences in public

and Jorgenson (2011) and Mostafa (2011) found negative correlation between economic development and environmental concern but positive correlation between rate of economic growth and environmental concern at the aggregate level. 11. O’Connor et al. 1999. 12. Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994. 13. Scientists are careful about linking speciªc weather events to climate change, though some sim- ulation analysis supports such connections; see Min et al. (2011). 14. Zahran et al. (2008) ªnd US counties with greater climate change vulnerability tend to partici- pate in the Cities for Climate Protection Campaign (ICLEI) more. So Young Kim and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias • 83

opinion on climate change by focusing on two aggregate conditions: a country’s level of wealth and its degree of vulnerability to climate change. After introduc- ing the data, we describe the cross-national variation of public views on climate change. We then examine whether greater economic wealth and higher climate vulnerability help explain variation in levels of concern about climate change, support for climate policies and behavioral changes, and favorability of views on international climate policy.

Study Design To analyze international public opinion on climate change, we constructed a comprehensive cross-national dataset that integrates twelve major international surveys. We included two types of data from the last ªve years. We drew on large-scale multi-issue surveys such as the 2007 Pew Global Attitude Project (PGAP) (sample of 45,239 from thirty-seven countries) and the 2005 World Values Survey (sample of 67,208 from forty-seven countries). We also analyze polls that focus on climate change, including the 2008 HSBC’s Climate Change Conªdence Monitor (sample of 12,000 from twelve countries), the 2006 BBC World Service Poll on Climate Change (sample of 22,182 from twenty-ªve countries), and the 2007 BBC World Service Poll (sample of 19,579 from nine- teen countries).15 Our analysis examines three key aspects of international attitudes toward climate change: strength of concern, commitment and support for speciªc measures, and views on international climate policy. In addition to examining general trends in public opinion, we analyzed the impact of two key aggregate variables—economic development and climate vulnerability—on international public opinion. As our measure of economic development, we used GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity) from the IMF.16 For climate vulnerability, we used the sub-index on climate change developed by the South Paciªc Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC).17 We used three speciªc indicators to capture intensity and sincerity of climate attitudes. First, although most studies examine only direction of opinion,18 we differentiated between “strong” and “weak” expressions of concern in order to analyze the intensity of opinion on climate change. We sought to understand

15. See Appendix for complete survey information and sample size. 16. IMF 2011. 17. This database on environmental vulnerability was compiled for 235 countries. The sub-index for climate change is a composite indicator of seven natural hazard indicators, four resistance indicators, and three damage indicators (SOPAC 2004,10). 18. The distinction between the direction and strength of opinion was noted in many studies. Schuman and Presser (1981) distinguished between centrality, intensity, and committed action, where intensity indicators ask how strongly respondents feel about a given issue (e.g. “very strong” or “fairly strong”). Dunlap (1995) categorized four aspects (direction, degree, salience, and intensity), with the degree of opinion measuring whether an individual is strongly or mildly in favor of an item. We use “intensity” of opinion following Schuman and Presser, simi- larly to Dunlap’s “degree” of opinion. 84 • Cross-National Public Opinion on Climate Change the strength of underlying attitudes, given that weak-to-moderate expressions of concern over climate change appear to have become commonplace and so- cially desirable.19 As we demonstrate, although many countries exhibited similar levels of general concern, they diverged signiªcantly once we took intensity of opinions into account. Such differences in attitude strength (both for and against action) can reºect the intensity of division in a country, which can affect the likelihood of achieving political solutions.20 In addition to focusing on “strong” response categories, we examined commitment and sincerity by analyzing questions on willingness to bear costs associated with policy changes and to alter one’s behavior. Our three indicators combined—intensity of attitudes, willingness to pay, and willingness to change lifestyle—provide insight into the strength and sincerity of attitudes toward climate change. Finally, we examined views about international climate policy. We begin by presenting the cross-national distribution of views on these issues, and then examine the effects of a country’s material afºuence and vulnerability to climate change on public attitudes.

Cross-National Variation in Climate Change Opinion

Concern about Climate Change Given the growing evidence of large-scale climate change impacts and increased media attention to the issue, it is not surprising that international surveys consistently show high levels of public concern. The 1992 HOP survey showed that an already high average rate of 78 percent of respondents across twenty-four countries agreed that climate change was a serious problem. The widespread concern of the early 1990s has become almost universal concern in recent surveys, with 86–89 percent rates of concern, across 82 countries included in three surveys.21 Despite these high rates of concern, we ªnd cross-national variation in the intensity of public attitudes toward climate change, as seen in Figure 1. This ªgure shows the mean rates of “strong” concern about global warming in thirty- seven countries from the 2007 PGAP survey. These rates range from 32 percent in Egypt to 88 percent in Brazil. Notably, high levels of public concern in advanced countries (marked by light bars) did not consistently supersede high levels of concern in developing countries. Thus, the highest rates of “strong” concern were in the two developing countries of Brazil and Bangladesh.22 Moreover,

19. Harrison and Sundstrom 2007. 20. International variation in “strong” responses may also reºect cultural differences across societies with different levels of tolerance or generosity. We thank an anonymous reviewer for point- ing this out. 21. World Bank 2009; Pew Research Center 2007; and GlobeScan 2006. See survey information in Appendix. 22. This is consistent with other surveys; see Brechin (2010) and Leiserowitz (2007). So Young Kim and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias • 85

Figure 1 “Strong” Concern with Global Warming (mean rates of respondents by country) Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007. Dark bars: developing countries, light bars: developed countries. 86 • Cross-National Public Opinion on Climate Change in major developed countries (including the US, Canada, and Britain), the level of strong concern was far below the international average. This ªnding parallels results from several other surveys documenting that people in developing countries consider climate change to be a very serious issue at rates similar to or signiªcantly higher than those in developed countries.23 Continued cross-national variation in public attitudes toward climate change is interesting given the growing publicity surrounding climate change. High levels of concern in developing countries raise questions about Inglehart’s post-materialism thesis that people (and countries) with higher income levels, having satisªed their basic material needs, will endorse environmental issues more than those with lower income levels. The higher rates of strong concern in developing countries that we ªnd are more consistent with the global environmentalism view, as discussed by Dunlap and York (2008). The higher rate of strong concern in developing countries may also reºect changing perceptions of climate change as a problem that extends beyond environmental concerns and now includes far-reaching consequences such as natural disasters, water, energy, and the economy. While public concern is very high, concern by itself rarely leads to policy change. Signiªcant progress requires public support of climate policies, especially because of their potential economic costs and possible reduction of living standards in developed countries.

Commitment and Support for Climate Policy Opponents of climate policy in the US have often used the high projected costs of addressing climate change to justify further scientiªc study and delayed government action. Indeed, only about one third of Americans support government policy that would involve signiªcant costs.24 Recent international surveys have also examined public willingness to pay for climate change action. Given the growing (if possibly superªcial) public recognition of climate change as a serious problem, responses to willingness-to-pay questions provide a more reliable indicator of sincere support for climate policies. Several multinational surveys found signiªcant variation in the public willingness to pay for climate policies. The 2009 World Bank survey showed support for paying 1 percent of GDP to address climate change, ranging from 11 percent of those surveyed (Russia) to 68 percent (China).25 In the US, 48 percent of the public was willing to pay 1 percent of GDP, just above the interna-

23. World Bank 2009; Pew Research Center 2007; and GlobeScan 2006. Eurobarometer surveys also show some variation between more and less afºuent European countries, though the variation in afºuence is relatively small (Eurobarometer 2007, 2008). 24. Borick 2010, 38. 25. The international average was 45.6 percent (all countries except for Russia scored between 32 percent and 68 percent). So Young Kim and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias • 87 tional mean of 45.6 percent. On average, people in developed countries showed slightly more willingness to pay 1 percent of GDP to address climate change. In- ternational variation was also signiªcant in response to the 2008 HSBC question on whether respondents already had changed their lifestyle in response to climate change. The United States scored the lowest rate of agreement (24 percent) and China the highest (56 percent). Publics in developing countries were more likely, on average, to say they had changed their behavior. In the 2009 World Bank survey, large majorities (around 60 percent in both developed and developing countries) felt their government pays too little attention to climate change and should give it a higher priority. Even larger majorities (averaging around 80 percent in developed and 90 percent in developing nations) agreed that their country has “a responsibility to deal with climate change,” with the public in China scoring 98 percent, second only to Bangla- desh (99 percent). Thus, large majorities of citizens around the world hold their own governments accountable and believe their country has a responsibility to address climate change.26

Views on International Climate Policies Ever since the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997, international efforts have continued to foster participation and implementation of the CO2 reductions prescribed by the Protocol. More recently, efforts have focused on designing a follow-on to the Kyoto Protocol. Several international surveys asked questions about the efforts to design climate policy. These questions fall into three main categories: conformity with other countries’ behavior and policy, speciªc target reduction goals, and the responsibility of developed vs. developing countries for emissions cuts and ªnancial contributions. Most questions in recent surveys fall into the third category. The obligations and rights of developed and developing countries have long been at the center of international debate over climate policy. In the Kyoto Protocol, the international community recognized the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, requiring developed countries to reduce their emissions while allowing developing countries to increase theirs. The principle recognizes that developed countries have been emitting the largest portion of GHGs while developing nations are more vulnerable to climate change, partly due to the costs of adaptation policies. Yet, the debate over the extent and legiti- macy of these unequal responsibilities still continues. Figure 2 presents ªve survey questions about international climate policy issues. The ªrst three questions examine attitudes on international conformity. Higher percentages of respondents in developing countries, on average, expected that if their country took steps, other countries would follow, and supported contributing to international efforts to help developing countries. Nota-

26. World Bank, 2009. 88 • Cross-National Public Opinion on Climate Change

Figure 2 Public Views on International Climate Policy See Appendix for surveys’ documentation. bly, very high majorities in both developing and developed countries believed, on the eve of the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, that if other countries agreed in Copenhagen to limit GHG emissions their country also should do so. These high proportions reºect the extraordinary expectations of people around the world before Copenhagen for a serious international effort to combat climate change. Not surprisingly, citizens of developing nations showed more support for So Young Kim and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias • 89

proposals to assist poor countries or exempt them from emissions reductions. Yet, more than three quarters of respondents in developed countries, on average, supported helping poor countries. Citizens of advanced countries were more supportive of limiting developing countries’ emissions independently or in ex- change for ªnancial and technical assistance. While cross-national variance is signiªcant, overall we found high public support for international efforts to curb GHGs.

Explaining Cross-National Variations in Climate Change Opinion International opinion surveys show high levels of public concern about climate change, but also signiªcant cross-national variation in the intensity of concern and support for speciªc policies. In this section, we explore more systematically the extent to which a country’s level of afºuence and degree of climate vulnerability affect the intensity and sincerity of public attitudes toward climate change. In our analysis, we present Spearman’s rank order (␳) coefªcients because we are interested in how each nation’s level of economic development and vulnerability to climate change ranks with its attitudes about climate change.27 In addition to our cross-national regression analysis, we use a multi-level regression for a simultaneous examination of individual and aggregate (country) level variations of concern about climate change.

Concern with Climate Change In an effort to examine possible effects of economic development and environmental vulnerability on public concern, we ªrst examine (Table 1) questions about the priority given to climate change relative to other concerns (e.g., the economy, international terrorism, or other environmental problems). We then analyze questions about the seriousness of climate change that do not explicitly compare it to other issues. To examine the intensity of attitudes, on each question we identify the percentage of respondents who feel strongly about the issue by indicating, for example, that they feel climate change is a “very serious” problem or that they worry “a great deal” about global warming. The last two col- umns display the Spearman rank coefªcients of each question response rates with GDP per capita and the climate change vulnerability index. Overall, the intensity of public concern about climate change correlates more with level of economic development than with climate vulnerability. The belief that global warming is a “very serious issue” shows a signiªcant negative correlation with GDP per capita (2009 WB Q1). The same survey also asked

27. In addition, most of the survey data we use are organized in ranks. Unlike Pearson’s r coefªcient that measures the correlation two raw-numbered variables, Spearman’s rank (␳) captures the correlation between the orders of two ranked variables. In the current cross-national survey data, higher ␳ coefªcients indicate that countries ranking higher on one variable tend to rank higher on a second variable. Table 1 Public Concern with Climate Change

Spearman Rank Correlations with

GDP per Capita CC Vulnerability

Comparative Questions 2006GS/ N ϭ 30 (21) Q18 How serious a problem do you consider each of the following issues to be? Ϫ0.134 Ϫ0.062 Climate change or global warming due to the greenhouse effect [Very serious] 2005WVS/ N ϭ 47 (36) Qb Please tell me how serious you consider each of the following to be for the Ϫ0.151 Ϫ0.040 world as a whole? Global warming or greenhouse effect. [Very serious] 1992HOP/ N ϭ 24 (13) Qb Comparative rankings of global environmental problems: air pollution, water Ϫ0.216 Ϫ0.231 pollution, contamination of soil, loss of species, loss of rainforest, global warming, loss of ozone Stand-Alone Questions 2009WB/ N ϭ 15 (13) Q1 Climate change also known as global warming is very serious. Ϫ0.529*** Ϫ0.143 Q7 Climate change will start to substantially harm people: now or in 10 years. Ϫ0.621** Ϫ0.133 2007PGAP/ N ϭ 37 (25) Q98 Global warming is very serious. Ϫ0.099 Ϫ0.077 2006BBC/ N ϭ 19 (12) Q1 How concerned are you that the way the world produces and uses energy is Ϫ0.420* Ϫ0.011 causing environmental problems including climate change? [Very concerned]

***signiªcant at 99%, **signiªcant at 95%, *signiªcant at 90%. GDP per capita from IMF World Economic Outlook (2011). CC vulnerability from SOPAC Environmental Vulnerability Index (2004). N: total number of countries; (x): number of developing countries in parentheses. So Young Kim and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias • 91

respondents when they believed climate change would begin to harm people. People in developing countries were signiªcantly more likely to say that climate change was causing damage currently or would within the next ten years. One exception to stronger concern with climate change in developing countries is the 2006 BBC question, which asked whether respondents are concerned that current methods of producing and consuming energy contribute to climate change. When the subject of energy use was introduced, respondents in developed countries expressed greater concern, on average, than those in developing countries. These results probably reºect the greater dependence on energy and an overall greater linkage between climate change and energy use in advanced countries. Surprisingly, there is no signiªcant impact of a nation’s vulnerability to climate change on any of the measures of public concern in Table 1. These unex- pected results held when we used an alternative measure of vulnerability (the Global Climate Risk Index of the German Watch Group).28 We discuss these ªndings below. In Table 2, we extend the analysis to include a comparison between aggregate and individual level concern. We employ a multi-level regression to simul- taneously examine individual and aggregate variations in concern about climate change. Since international survey data are constructed from individual responses aggregated into national response rates, we gain additional insights from examining variation at both levels. The multi-level analysis also helps test whether aggregate-level ªndings from our correlation analysis of cross-national variations holds when individual-level variations are explicitly taken into account. We draw on Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug (2012), one of the few studies using multi-level analysis on climate change opinion as a benchmark.29 The ªrst column in Table 2 presents the regression outcomes replicated from Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug (2012, Table II). They found that individuals with post-materialist attitudes are more likely to express concerns about climate change. In contrast, aggregate afºuence measured by the log of GDP per capita is insigniªcant (and negatively signed). They also ªnd that exposure to climate-related disasters has a signiªcant negative effect on concern with climate change. This result coincides with our ªnding that vulnerability has no signiªcant effect on most questions about public concern with climate change (see Table 1). Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug explained this counterintuitive ªnding by suggesting that disaster-prone countries tend to also have other acute problems that may lead people to be less concerned with global warming. Our two multi-level regression models yield stronger results than Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug’s ªndings. In the ªrst model, we allowed the effect of individual-level post-materialism to vary by country. In the second model, we ran a mixed logit model where the dependent variable was a binary response, with

28. German Watch Group, 2012. 29. We use the same World Values Survey dataset as Kvaloy et al. (2012). 92 • Cross-National Public Opinion on Climate Change

Table 2 Multi-Level Analysis of Public Concern with Global Warming

Kvaloy et al. Postmaterialism “Strongly (2012)2) Variation3) Agree”4)

Individual-Level Postmaterialism1) Ϫ0.029*** Ϫ0.030*** 0.103***

Aggregate-level Log (GDP per capita) Ϫ0.019 Ϫ0.044 Ϫ0.019 Log (Exposed to climate disasters) Ϫ1.163*** Ϫ1.304** Ϫ3.198**

***signiªcant at 99%, **signiªcant at 95%, *signiªcant at 90%. Source: World Values Survey Wave IV (2005), CRED International Disaster Database (2012). Total number of respondents ϭ 39,210 (number of countries ϭ 41). 1Other individual-level variables not shown here include age, sex, education, political ideology, re- ligiosity, and the views of fate. 2Random-intercept model (Table II of Kvaloy et al. 2012). 3Random-slope model. 4Mixed logit model with a random slope.

“strongly agree” responses coded as “1.” The result of this multi-level analysis shows an interesting difference in the effect of post-materialism at the individual versus the aggregate levels. Within nations, individuals with more postmaterialist attitudes tend to be signiªcantly more concerned with climate change. At the aggregate level, however, rates of people strongly concerned with global warming are not higher in afºuent countries. Overall, the coefªcient estimates in both our models of “strong” responses are much higher than Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug’s regression. These ªndings are consistent with our earlier results, indicating that even when individual variations within countries are taken into account, respondents in more afºuent countries are not more strongly concerned about climate change than those in developing countries.

Commitment and Support for Climate Policy Public willingness to pay for climate policies is a critical issue, as even modest estimates suggest that effective climate policies will be very costly. Table 3 shows the effects of GDP per capita and climate vulnerability on both willingness to pay for climate policy and support for government action. Notably, HSBC surveys taken in 2007 and 2008 indicate that the public in developing countries is more strongly willing to change its behavior than the public in developed countries. Also as shown in the responses to Q15D of the 2009 World Bank survey, respondents in developing countries, on average, are Table 3 Commitment and Support for Climate Policy

Spearman Rank Correlations with

GDP per Capita CC Vulnerability

Commitment to Climate Actions 2009WB/ N ϭ 15 (13) Q14 Taking steps against climate change would increase costs to the average person Ϫ0.384 Ϫ0.525** for energy and other products by [1% GDP per capita] per month. Would you be willing to pay this cost? How about an increase of [0.5% GDP per capita] per month? Ϫ0.348 Ϫ0.143 2006CCGA/ N ϭ 13 (8) Q1 Global warming is a serious and pressing problem. We should begin taking Ϫ0.557** Ϫ0.336 steps now even if this involves signiªcant costs. 2008HSBC/ N ϭ 12 (6) Q2 I am personally making a signiªcant effort to help reduce climate change Ϫ0.797*** Ϫ0.188 through how I live my life today. 2007HSBC/ N ϭ 12 (6) Q2 I am personally making a signiªcant effort to help reduce climate change Ϫ0.837*** Ϫ0.416 through how I live my life today. Support for Climate Policies 2009WB/ N ϭ 15 (13) Q15B Limiting the rate of constructing coal-ªred power plants, even if this increases Ϫ0.388 Ϫ0.470* the cost of energy. [Favor strongly] Table 3 (Continued)

Spearman Rank Correlations with

GDP per Capita CC Vulnerability

Q15C Gradually increasing the requirements for fuel efªciency in automobiles, even if Ϫ0.027 Ϫ0.573** this raises the cost of cars and bus fares. [Favor strongly] Q15D Gradually reducing government subsidies that favor private transportation, Ϫ0.624** Ϫ0.201 even if this raises its cost. [Favor strongly] 2007BBC/ N ϭ 21 (14) Q1 Increasing the cost of the types of energy that most cause climate change, such Ϫ0.133 Ϫ0.610** as coal and oil/petrol, to encourage individuals and industry to use less. [Deªnitely necessary] Q4 What if this energy tax was introduced at the same time as your other taxes were Ϫ0.069 Ϫ0.392* reduced by the same amount, keeping your total taxes at the current level even with the energy tax? [Strongly agree] 2006BBC/ N ϭ 19 (12) Q2A Increasing energy taxes to encourage conservation. [Strongly favor] Ϫ0.598*** Ϫ0.085

*** signiªcant at 99%, **signiªcant at 95%, *signiªcant at 90%. N: total number of countries; (x): number of developing countries in parentheses. So Young Kim and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias • 95 also more strongly supportive of reducing government subsidies that favor private transportation. In contrast, Q2A of the 2006 BBC poll shows that proposals to increase energy taxes and to mandate fuel efªciency requirements for automakers receive signiªcantly higher rates of strong support in wealthier countries. Our analysis ªnds that climate vulnerability is signiªcantly correlated with a commitment to proactive climate policies. For example, the 2009 World Bank survey shows that the public in countries with higher climate vulnerability is signiªcantly more willing to bear the cost of 1 percent of GDP to address climate change. The same survey also indicates people in more vulnerable countries are more likely to strongly favor regulatory measures on coal-based power generation and automobile fuel efªciency. Environmental vulnerability to climate change correlates more highly with support for government climate policy (see lower panel of Table 3) than with individual willingness to change behavior. This may reºect that the problem of climate change requires national and international solutions and is beyond the capacity of any individual to make a signiªcant impact. It may, however, simply reºect people’s preferences to see government action rather than to change their own habits. A more difªcult question by the 2009 World Bank survey asked respondents whether “the problem of climate change should be given priority even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.” The correlations between willingness to address climate change and GDP per capita and climate vulnerability are shown in Figure 3. As evident in the upper-panel, even when economic costs are mentioned in the question, people in developing countries are more likely to “strongly” support giving priority to addressing climate change despite economic costs. In contrast, the lower-panel shows a weaker correlation between climate change vulnerability and strong agreement to address climate change.

Views on International Climate Policies Global climate change presents serious challenges for international cooperation. Not only do nations bear different levels of responsibility for GHG emissions, countries also vary in their projected carbon emissions and in their capacity to adapt to climate change. How does a country’s level of economic development and environmental vulnerability affect public perceptions of responsibility and international cooperation? Recent surveys show the public in developing countries holds higher expectations of and trust in international collaboration than the public in developed countries. On the eve of the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the Parties, the World Bank survey asked whether, once one’s own country addresses climate change, one would expect other countries to follow. As shown in the result for Q10 of the 2009 World Bank survey of Table 4, more respondents in devel- Figure 3 Afºuence, Climate Change Vulnerability, and “Strong” Opinions Source: 2009 World Bank Survey, IMF World Economic Outlook, SOPAC Environmental Vulnerability Index. Table 4 Views on International Climate Policy

Spearman Rank Correlations with

GDP per Capita CC Vulnerability

2009WB/ N ϭ 15 (13) Q9 Our country does have a responsibility to take steps to deal with climate Ϫ0.521 Ϫ0.279** change. Q10 If our country takes steps to deal with the problem of climate change, other Ϫ0.764 Ϫ0.072*** countries would then be more willing to act. Q11 [Country] and other countries will be meeting in December in Copenhagen. If Ϫ0.344 Ϫ0.301 the other countries come to an agreement, [country] should be willing to commit to limiting its emissions. Q16 [Country] should contribute to international efforts to help poor countries Ϫ0.657*** Ϫ0.093 deal with these climate-induced changes? 2009WPOJ (N ϭ 22) Approve of how each country is dealing with the issue of climate change? Q2A China Ϫ0.707*** Ϫ0.130 Q2B US Ϫ0.300 Ϫ0.106 Table 4 (Continued)

Spearman Rank Correlations with

GDP per Capita CC Vulnerability

2007BBC/ N ϭ 21 (14) Q4A (1) Because total emissions from less wealthy countries are substantial and Ϫ0.526** Ϫ0.259 growing, these countries SHOULD limit their emissions. Q4B (2) Because countries that are less wealthy produce relatively low emissions Ϫ0.267 Ϫ0.426* per person, they SHOULD NOT be expected to limit their emissions. Q5 Wealthy countries agree to provide less-wealthy countries with ªnancial assis- 0.378* Ϫ0.012 tance and technology, while less-wealthy countries agree to limit their emissions along with wealthy countries.

*** signiªcant at 99%, **signiªcant at 95%, *signiªcant at 90%. N: total number of countries; (x): number of developing countries in parentheses. So Young Kim and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias • 99 oping countries answered positively than in developed countries. Q9 of the same survey also indicates that publics in developing countries more readily ac- cept their country’s responsibility to address climate change. In addition, the proposal to aid poor countries suffering from climate change received sig- niªcantly higher support in less wealthy countries (Q16). These results are consistent with the higher level of strong concern about climate change in developing countries. Interestingly, public views of the two largest GHG emitters—China and the US—vary considerably among both developed and developing countries. Approval levels for China’s climate policy fall below 20 percent in all developed countries surveyed in the 2009 World Public Opinion Poll, but are higher, on average, in developing countries (yet with high variation, ranging from 21 percent in Turkey to 93 percent in Pakistan). In contrast, approval rates for the US vary more across all countries and are not signiªcantly correlated with development levels. Two questions in the BBC 2007 survey examined people’s perceptions of the obligations and rights of developed and developing countries regarding carbon emissions. Our analysis shows that a country’s GDP per capita has a signiªcant impact on public perceptions on this issue. When asked whether developing countries should limit GHG emissions along with wealthy countries (Q4A), higher proportions of respondents in developed countries agreed; the question was preceded by the statement: “Because total emissions from less wealthy countries are substantial and growing.” Responses to a second question revealed that publics in developed countries were more supportive of developed countries providing ªnancial and technological assistance to developing countries that agree to reduce emissions. The analysis demonstrates a country’s climate vulnerability has limited impact on public views about international climate policy. Respondents in more vulnerable countries were more likely to agree that less wealthy countries should not be expected “to limit their emissions of climate change gases.” How- ever, none of the other questions yielded signiªcant results.

Discussion Addressing climate change requires signiªcant action at the international, state, local, and individual levels. The effectiveness of international policy depends on the willingness of national governments to adopt domestic mitigation and adaptation policies, which in turn depends at least partially on public support. Drawing on several large-scale multinational surveys, this study explores cross- national variation in public opinion on climate change, focusing on the effects of economic development and environmental vulnerability to climate change. Although surveys were conducted in different sets of countries and used slightly different wording, several key ªndings emerged across the surveys. While awareness and concern about climate change are high worldwide, 100 • Cross-National Public Opinion on Climate Change there exists substantial cross-national variation in public opinion on important aspects of climate change. We found wide variation in global attitudes especially when considering three indicators of intensity and sincerity of attitudes— strength of concern, willingness to pay for climate policies, and willingness to take personal action. Such cross-national differences can add to the difªculty of designing and implementing global climate policies. Our analysis lends support to the argument of global environmentalism and demonstrates that contrary to the prediction of the post-materialism hy- pothesis, levels of “strong” public concern about climate change are generally higher in developing countries. Furthermore, there is little evidence that support for action, whether through government policies or individual behavior, is higher in developed countries. In the post-materialism argument, environmental problems are primarily viewed as quality of life issues (or a luxury good) that can be better addressed as individual or national wealth increases. Yet, material afºuence may have a mixed effect due to the opportunity cost of adjusting to climate change; because climate change mitigation and adaptation require divert- ing resources from existing or future use, the economic costs of such diversions are likely to be higher in wealthier nations. Climate change vulnerability does not have a signiªcant impact on the intensity of public concern about climate change or on the strength of public support for international policies. Although mixed, the evidence regarding personal commitment and support for government policies generally demonstrates that the public in more vulnerable countries expresses higher commitment to proactive climate policies, including greater willingness to pay and stronger support for changing energy policy. While climate change may more commonly be viewed as a global risk rather than as a domestic problem, a country’s higher climate vulnerability affects personal commitment and support for certain climate policies.

Conclusion Scientiªc evidence of the dangers associated with climate change has accumu- lated rapidly during the past decade, and many more people around the world have been exposed to dramatic footage of melting ice caps, severe droughts, and other climate events. Greater exposure and media attention, however, has not led to uniformity in international public attitudes. As a uniquely global issue in terms of both causes and consequences, climate change has created unprecedented debate about the responsibility and capacity of different groups of countries and about policy alternatives. Any serious international agreement on climate change will have to be im- plemented at the national level and ultimately by industries, businesses, and individuals. It is therefore crucial to understand public willingness to address the issue. Our analysis of international attitudes on climate change indicates that rising global awareness and knowledge have yet to be fully translated So Young Kim and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias • 101

into greater willingness to bear the costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation. To uncover the causes of this gap between concern and sincere endorse- ment of costly climate actions, more theoretically guided research is necessary. In this study, we examined the inºuence of two macro-level factors—economic afºuence and climate vulnerability—on variation in international public opinion on climate change. Other factors not included in our study, such as political leadership and media framing, are also likely to be relevant and should be in- corporated in future research. Additional data collection will facilitate analysis of a fuller set of explanatory variables, providing a more comprehensive evalua- tion of the relative weight of different factors. It is not obvious why the public in developing countries is showing higher rates of strong concern and, in some cases, greater willingness to address climate change. This may reºect a combination of weaker capacity and less political disagreement about climate change. One way to examine this proposi- tion is through a comparative study of a sample of countries at the high, me- dium, and low range of concern and willingness to pay in order to examine domestic and structural differences among developed and developing countries. Understanding cross-national variation in public opinion toward climate change is important for designing politically feasible climate policies. Our ªnding that citizens in less afºuent countries often express greater support for climate policies is signiªcant because effective global action requires the broad participation of developing nations. Likewise, our ªnding that vulnerability only correlates moderately with support for international climate policy suggests that broad international coalitions are possible. These results are promis- ing because climate change must be addressed by all nations, not just by countries that happen to be the most afºuent or the most vulnerable. Appendix Data Information

Surveys Available on World Public Opinion (WPO)

Poll Organizations Short Name Observations* Field Dates Report Headlines on WPO

World Bank 2009WB n ϭ 13518, Sept–Oct 2009 Multi-Country Poll Reveals That Majority of People Want Ac- N ϭ 15 (13) tion on Climate Change World Public Opinion 2009WPOJ n ϭ 18578, Apr–Jul 2009 (1) Publics Want More Government Action on Climate N ϭ 19 (14) Change (2) As Hu Jin Tao, Obama Prepare to Meet, World Public Gives China, US Low Marks on Climate Change BBC World Service 2007BBC n ϭ 22182, May–Jul 2007 (1) Most Would Pay Higher Energy Bills to Address Climate Poll/GlobeScan/PIPA N ϭ 25 (16) Change (2) Developed and Developing Countries Agree: Ac- tion Needed BBC World Service 2006BBC n ϭ 19579, May–Jun 2006 Current Energy Use Seen to Threaten Environment, Econ- Poll/GlobeScan/PIPA N ϭ 19 (12) omy, Peace Chicago Council for 2006CCGA n ϭ 21828, 2006–2007 (1) Poll Finds Worldwide Agreement That Climate Change is Global Affairs N ϭ 13 (8) a Threat, (2) World Publics Willing to Bear Costs of Com- bating Climate Change GlobeScan 2006GS n ϭ 33237, Nov 05–Dec 08 30-Country Poll Finds Worldwide Consensus that Climate N ϭ 30 (21) Change is a Serious Problem Appendix (Continued)

Other Surveys

Poll Organizations Short Name Observations* Field Dates Full Name

Pew Research Center 2007PGAP n ϭ 45239, Apr–May 2007 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Project Poll N ϭ 37 (25) Pew Research Center 2006PGAP n ϭ 16710, Apr–May 2006 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project Poll N ϭ 15 (9) HSBC 2008HSBC n ϭ 12000, Sept–Oct 2008 Climate Conªdence Monitor 2008 N ϭ 12 (6) HSBC 2007HSBC n ϭ 12000, 2007 Climate Conªdence Monitor 2007 N ϭ 12 (6) World Values Survey 2005WVS n ϭ 67208, 2005–2009 World Values Survey Fourth Wave (2005–2009) N 5 47 (36) HOP Survey 1992HOP N ϭ 24 (13) 1992 R. Dunlap, G. H. Gallup & A. M. Gallup. 1993. Health of the Planet Survey. Gallup International Institute. III. Aggregate Data Sources IMF IMF-WEO N ϭϳ200 Annual World Economic Outlook SOPAC EVI N ϭ 235 2004 Environmental Vulnerability Index by South Paciªc Applied Geoscience Commission German Watch CRI N ϭ 176 1990–2008 Global Climate Risk Index

*n: total observations, N: # of countries, # of developing countries in parentheses (actual number of countries varies by survey question). 104 • Cross-National Public Opinion on Climate Change

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