DOCSLIB.ORG

Beyond Formalism: Kant's Theory Of

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Beyond Formalism: Kant's Theory Of Beyond formalism: Kant’s theory of art Paul Crowther Introduction ant’s theory of art has been neglected to an extraordinary degree. In this K discussion, I want to rectify the situation by arguing that Kant’s theory reaches far beyond the constraints placed on his work by the familiar label of »formalist«. To show this, I will adopt the following strategy. In Part One, I will outline the salient features of Clive Bell’s and Clement Greenberg’s approaches to art, as examples of both formalism’s strategies and its problems. I will then indicate the basis of Kant’s general aesthetic theory, arguing that it suggests a way beyond the limitations of formalism. In Part Two I shall explore this possibility in depth, by means of a detailed exposition of Kant’s theory of art. In Part Three I will make a few critical revisions to the theory; and shall conclude that, unlike the formalist approaches of Bell and Fry, Kant’s theory defines art w ithout severing its connections to life. P a rt o n e The basis of Clive Bell’s aesthetic formalism is his attempt to define art in terms of »significant form« - which he defines as »relations and arrangements of lines and colours«.1 This, it should be noted, does not of itself disqualify representational works from counting as art. As Bell remarks »...a realistic form may be as significant, in its place as part of the design, as an abstract. But if a representative form has value, it is as form, not as representation. The represen tati ve element in a work of art may or may not be harmful; always it is irrelevant. «*■ Bell goes on to claim that the only sort of knowledge required for the appreciation of art is a sense of form and colour, and, to a lesser degree, a knowledge of three-dimensional space. We must also, of course, be aesthetically sensitive. Again, in Bell’s words This is an extended and revised version o f a paper o f the same title which was presented at the International Colloquium on Form, held in Ljubljana October llth-12th 1990. I am grateful to participants in that Colloquium for their useful comments. I am also grateful for comments received in discussion with m y graduate students on the Art in the Context of Philosophy course, at the University o f St. Andrews. 1. Clive Bell, A rt, Chatto and Windus, London, 1931, p. 68. 2 . Ib id , p. 72. 28 Paul Crowther »... to appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions. Art transports us from the world o f man’s activity to a world aesthetic exaltation. For a moment we are shut off from human interests; our anticipations and memories are arrested; we are lifted above the stream o f life. <r* On these terms, then the experience of significant form provokes aesthetic emotion - an emotion wherein we are distanced from the concerns of practical existence. A work only counts as art to the degree that it can arouse such an emotion in us. Now the apparent strength of Bell’s theory is its seeming capacity to establish art’s distinctness form all other human activities and experiences. It is, indeed, this affirmation of the autonom y of art which is responsible for aesthetic formalism’s profound influence on twentieth-century theory and practice in the arts. Bell’s approach, however, is seriously flawed in a number of respects. One area of difficulty is as follows. Every visual object qua visual object has a formal aspect i.e. it can be viewed as a configuration of line, shape, and colour. But why is it that we do not view every such object in these terms? Why is it that some configurations of form arouse aesthetic emotion, but others do not? One presumes that Bell would say »because only some objects (i.e. artworks) have significant form«. But again we must ask what is it that makes such forms significant? Bell’s only answer would be »because they have the capacity to arouse aesthetic emotion«. This, of course, makes the argument into a logically vicious circle. Bell cannot, in other words, provide us with adequate criteria for distinguishing significant artistic form from insignificant non-artistic form. At the heart of Bell’s problem here is the fact that he argues art’s autonomy at the price of a far too rigid distinction between art and life. With the formalist theory of Clement Greenberg somewhat different considerations come into play. Greenberg argues that »Quality, aesthetic value, originates in inspiration, vision, ’content’, not in form. Yet form not only opens the way to inspiration; it can also act as a means to it; and technical preoccupations when searching enough and compelling enough, can generate or discover ’content’.«4. Now as I interpret him, Greenberg’s approach here holds that the aesthetic value of a work resides not simply in the formal configuration as such, but in the way in which the configuration exemplifies the artist’s having had some original ideas about the employment of his or her medium. However, in a recent symposium Greenberg has also emphasised the central role of »taste« in the experience of art. By taste he means »unanalysable« acts of »aesthetic intuition«. Yet, at the same time he also holds that »Value judgements 3. Ib id , p. 72. 4. Clement Greenberg, »Necessity of Formalism«, A rt International, October 1972, p. 106. Beyond formalism: K ant’s theory o f art 29 constitute the substance o f aesthetic experience«, and that »taste at its best, in its fullest sense, likes whatever is good.*? On the one hand, then, Greenberg wants to link aesthetic value to a complex appraisal of the formal configuration’s relation to broader developments within the medium, and on the other hand he wants to say that judgement’s aesthetic value are unanalysable acts of intuition. These two claims are clearly in conflict. Greenberg does, indeed, go one step behind Bell in allowing that aesthetic judgements are logically complex - involving historical factors; but like Bell he is bewitched by the psychology of such judgements. He sees them as private experiences, wholly disconnected from the continuum of life. This is the great problem of all aesthetic formalism in its attempt to comprehend art. To explain why form is aesthetically significant we must account for the aesthetic judgement as a logical complex involving the interplay of perceptual and, in the broadest sense, socio-historical factors. But at the same time we must be able to relate this to the psychology of the experience i.e. its capacity to distance us from the demands of everyday practical existence. Aesthetic formalists such as Bell at one extreme, and Greenberg at the other, fail to make this connection in any adequate way. They dramatically overemphasise the gap between art and life. Kant’s theory of art offers a way of bridging this gap. Before addressing it, however, I must first say something about his own version of aesthetic formalism. The very essence of Kant’s position can be grasped in terms of a few basic points (which I shall outline in a different order from that adopted in the Critique o f Judgement). The first centres on the claim that pure aesthetic judgements have the »form of finality« but are »apart« from any definite »end« or concept.6 By this Kant means that the aesthetic judgement is simply and solely directed to the relation between parts and whole in phenomenal configurations i.e. ones which are immediately present to the senses. Now an object’s relation to the senses can also give rise to pleasure in two other ways. First, when the pleasure is determined by what kind of thing the object is. We might enjoy the look of an object or animal, for example, because they seem to be perfect specimens of their kind; we might enjoy the look of a tool because it promises an efficient performance. In these cases our pleasure arises from the conformity of a particular item to some external »end« or standard. Kant describes this as our pleasure in the »good«. In other cases, our pleasure in the way an item relates to the senses is determined by a purely causal relation. For example, our enjoyment of one particular colour or flavour rather than another is based solely on personal preference - on what one’s eyes or taste buds happen to like coming in contact with. 5. Clement Greenberg, »Art Criticism«, Partisan Review, vol. XLVII no. 1,1981, p. 36. 6 . Kant’s main discussions of this are in the First, Second and Third Movements of the Analytic of the Beautiful, in The Critique o f Judgement. All further citations from Kant in this paper refer to The Critique o f Judgement trans. J.C. Meredith, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973. 30 Paul Crowther The pure aesthetic judgement, in contrast, is determined neither by conformity to a concept or end, nor by mere causal impact on the senses. We may, for example, simply enjoy the relation of balancing shapes and colours in some formal configuration for its own sake. This means that in order to enjoy an object’s formal relations, it is not presupposed that we know what kind of thing the object is, nor even whether it is real or not. Kant thus describes the pure aesthetic judgement as being »apart from any concept« and »disinterested« - in a way that judgements of the good and the agreeable are not.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • AH 302: the Idea of the Aesthetic Syllabus Course Description Texts
    Fall 2020 AH 302: The Idea of the Aesthetic Syllabus The schedule of classes/readings is subject to change. Registered students should consult the syllabus on Google Classrooms, which will be kept updated. Instructor: Katalin Makkai Course times: Monday and Wednesday 15:45-17:15 Email: [email protected] Office hours: TBA Office: P98 004 Course description “Aesthetics” and “aesthetic” are terms that are often taken for granted inside as well as outside academic discourse. We speak of aesthetic experiences and judgments and qualities, and we employ “aesthetics” to designate the study of such matters. Although their root is taken from the Greek, the now-familiar terms (in their now-familiar usages) are, however, comparatively new. They are commonly regarded as having been introduced into the philosophical lexicon in the eighteenth century—a few hundred years ago. This course studies some of the texts that were key to the discovery, or perhaps the invention, of the “aesthetic”. What work was the idea meant to do? How did its evolution retain or reconfigure its original senses and purposes? Is the idea of the aesthetic problematic, ideological, or chimerical? Do we need an idea of the aesthetic to think about art? Texts All readings will be provided during the semester electronically and are to be brought to class as printouts. Electronic devices Students may not use any electronic devices (laptop, tablet, mobile phone) in the classroom, unless an accommodation letter has been issued. Requirements ACADEMIC INTEGRITY ​ ​ ​ Bard College Berlin maintains the staunchest regard for academic integrity and expects good academic practice from students in their studies.
    [Show full text]
  • Art, Clive Bell
    PHI 3240: Philosophy of Art Session 3 September 9th, 2015 Matisse, Henri. (1905) Luxe, Calme, et Volupte. Collingwood & Bell on the Ontology of Art 1 Today we officially begin a unit on the ontology of art, Ø the attempt to answer the question “What is art?” Ø This question is ambiguous. Is it asking: • What is the nature of artworks?, or • What is the nature of the practice of art? Ø We are going to read these authors as if they are answering the question as a claim about artworks. Before discussing Collingwood’s & Bell’s answers, let’s consider a theoretical predecessor. • The earliest views about art we have on record are mimetic, or representational theories: – these say that artworks mimic & depict images/events from the real world. • As Shakespeare’s Hamlet says about plays, artworks were understood to “hold as ‘twere the ‘play within a play’ the mirror up to nature” (Act 3, Scene 2) in Hamlet 2 Representational views were common among the ancient Greeks (e.g. Plato), • and popularized in 18th century Europe (especially by Charles Batteaux, in “The Fine Arts Reduced to a Common Principle” (trans. from French) Why have representational theories of art fallen out of favor? Greek sculpture, Fragonard, Jean-Honoré. nd Ø There are tons of counterexamples 2 -century B.C. (1772) The Reader. to the view, e.g.: – visual artworks which don’t clearly depict any recognizable objects or events (beginning in 1800s), – and purely instrumental music (e.g., symphonies) without lyrics or guiding narratives. • Mozart’s #40 in G Minor (1788): bit.ly/1O2GbSp Turner, Joseph Mallord William.
    [Show full text]
  • The Significance and Insignificance of Clive Bell's Formalism I
    Navorsingsartikels/Research articles The significance and insignificance of Clive Bell’s formalism i Johan Snyman Dept, of Philosophy Rand Afrikaans University JOHANNESBURG Abstract Clive Bell coined the phrase significant form. The way he initially defined the phrase and the way he implemented it were two different matters. In this article Bell's procedure is analysed as a characteristic of late moder­ nist aesthetics, i.e. an attempt to come to terms with the challenge o f the radically new in art. It is suggested that one should bear in mind that formalism in this sense is a theory of artistic material which explains how meaning is communicated and perceived through non-discursive qualities o f the artistic material. That is the relevance o f Susanne K. Longer's re- interpretation o f Bell's phrase. 1. Introduction Clive Bell’s aesthetics does not make for profound reading. Why bother then? The least one can say is that Bell contributed towards the modem aesthetic vocabulary by coining a phrase that has since become a cliché or hackneyed for that matter, viz. significant form. On the other hand, if one reflects from a distance on the Wirkungsgeschichte of Bell’s phrase as well as on the Wirkungs- geschichte of the problem he wanted to solve, significant form has an intriguing logic. Significant form as an aesthetic category has spawned quite a generation of related concepts, from Clive Bell to Susanne K. Langer’s unconsummated symbol, up to Nelson Goodman’s languages of art (Goodman, 1976), Peter A revised version of a paper read at a 2nd International Symposium on Formalism, organized by the Slovenian Society of Aesthetics in Ljubljana, 14-17 May 1992.
    [Show full text]
  • Are We Teaching High Art Or Low Art?
    CHAPTER 7 ARE WE TEACHING HIGH ART OR LOW ART? We are apt to call barbarous whatever departs widely from our own tatse and apprehension; but some find the epithet of reproach retorted on us. (Hume, 1965, p. 3) References to high-art notions span the globe. Centuries of continuous and changing conceptions of high art have involved, for example: ideas about the grand and the common, the technical study of its rhetoric concerns, its indifferent morality or lack of any firm moral basis to it, its notions of beauty, perfectionism, emotion, idealism, formalism, the sublime, taste, academic painting and correctness, can be found in the work of Homer, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, Longinus, Joshua Reynolds, David Hume and Clive Bell. So consequently, we are sometimes asked in art education whether the art we are teaching is: ‘high art’ rather than ‘low art’, ‘high culture rather than low culture’, ‘high art rather than popular art’, ‘high art rather than student-centered art’. What are all these different distinctions with ‘high’ and ‘low’ in them segregating? What are their contrasts? Can we segregate what we teach in art in these ways and ought we to do so? ‘High art’ is poor art if, as Marcel Proust satirically mocks, we confuse art with ‘high society’, ‘social ambition’ and ‘special friendships in the art world’ (Proust, 2001, p. 59–67). Proust was aware that in the history of art no continent, nation and single group of people have a monopoly over what is ‘high art’. The above terms with ‘high’ and ‘low’ in them certainly imply a clash of ideas about teaching in art, but if so, why should popular teenage music necessarily clash with classical instrumental music, since on the one hand classical music can perform in instrumental ways Beatles songs rather well, and popular music can have instrumental orchestral influences that can benefit its music interest.
    [Show full text]
  • The Mosaic of Aesthetics: the Manifestation of Clive Bell's and Roger Fry's Theories in the Waves
    Criterion: A Journal of Literary Criticism Volume 13 Issue 1 Winter Article 8 4-2020 The Mosaic of Aesthetics: The Manifestation of Clive Bell's and Roger Fry's Theories in The Waves Nina Katarina Štular Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/criterion Part of the English Language and Literature Commons BYU ScholarsArchive Citation Štular, Nina Katarina (2020) "The Mosaic of Aesthetics: The Manifestation of Clive Bell's and Roger Fry's Theories in The Waves," Criterion: A Journal of Literary Criticism: Vol. 13 : Iss. 1 , Article 8. Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/criterion/vol13/iss1/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Criterion: A Journal of Literary Criticism by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. The Mosaic of Aesthetics The Manifestation of Clive Bell’s and Roger Fry’s Aesthetic Theories in The Waves Nina Katarina Štular In Roger Fry’s “An Essay in Aesthetics,” published in 1909, he explores the question of what art truly is. A year after the paper’s publication, Fry met Clive Bell on a train and they struck a conversation about aesthetics that marked the beginning of Fry’s life-long friendship with the Bloomsbury group—a group that gave home to many influential modernist thinkers and writers. The aesthetic theory that Fry explains in “An Essay in Aesthetics” influenced Bell’sArt , published in 1914, which in turn affected Fry’s Vision and Design, published in 1920, in which Fry fully elaborates his aesthetic theory.
    [Show full text]
  • “Art” by Clive Bell Table of Contents Ideas of Interest from Art
    “Art” by Clive Bell Table of Contents Ideas of Interest from Art..............................................................................2 The Reading Selection from Art...................................................................3 Related Ideas............................................................................................... 16 Topics Worth Investigating.......................................................................... 17 Index............................................................................................................ 22 Clive Bell, 1908, adapted from Henry Lamb About the author . Clive Bell (1881-1964) studied history at Trinity College, Cambridge where he and many other undergraduates were influenced by G.E. Moore’s method of analysis exemplified in Principia Ethica. Bell writes that the students who met as a “reading group” in his rooms at Cambridge, together with the artist Vanessa Stephen (later his wife) and her sister, the writer and future Vir- ginia Woolf, initiated the circle of friends known as the “Bloomsberries.” The Bloomsbury Group, as it came to be known, was a literary and cultural circle including, among others, the critic and historian Lytton Strachey, the novelist E. M. Forster, the artist Roger Fry, and the economist John May- nard Keynes. Bell’s shaping of a formalistic æsthetic theory along the lines of Moore’s analysis of good strongly influenced early twentieth century art criticism. Quentin Bell writes that his father’s Art, although “more quoted 1 “Art” by Clive Bell than read . is one of the seminal books of its time.”1 About the work . In Art,2 Bell outlines a formalist theory based on his definition of art as “significant form.” True art, he believes, exhibits combinations of lines and colors which engender intellectual recognition and æsthetic experience in persons of taste. The resultant æsthetic emotion, he believes, is unique, morally transcendent, and independent of other kinds of human emotion.
    [Show full text]
  • Old and New in Modernist Art
    Chapter 2: Old and New in Modernist Art Mr. Thomas T. Baxter presents what appears to be a figure of Christ teaching a dickey-bird to chew worms. This work is labelled "St. Francis" (D‟Asise). I cannot concede his background but the face is remarkable; it is painted with very great skill, and the frenetic modernist who rushes by the picture merely because of the demoded subject-matter will miss one of the best pieces of detail in the exhibition. (Ezra pound, writing as B. H. Dias, in The New Age for January 17, 1918--22.12.235, emphasis added) Among the many kinds of artists, it may be that there are some who are hybrid. Some, that is to say, bore deeper and deeper into the stuff of their own art; others are always making raids into the lands of others. Sickert, it may be, is among the hybrids, the raiders. But . he is probably the best painter now living in England. (Virginia Woolf, writing in 1933, The Captain's Death Bed and Other Essays, 201-202, emphasis added) In 1918, we find Ezra Pound worrying about "the frenetic modernist" who will miss something of great beauty because its subject matter, which Pound himself has mocked, is "demoded." And, as late as 1933, we find Virginia Woolf, reporting on a conversation in "Bloomsbury" about Walter Sickert, in which a consensus is reached that this derivative painter, whose work is often naturalistic in its content, and might well have been associated by Woolf with her despised Edwardians, is the best that England has to offer.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 2 the Phantom Aesthetic State
    Chapter 2 The Phantom Aesthetic State Serious defect in aesthetics is the avoidance of considerations as to value. o It is true that an ill-judged introduction of value considerations usually leads to disaster, as in Tolstoy’s case. Some of experiences to which the arts give rise, are valuable This fact is naturally depending upon the theory of value adopted. The phantom problem of aesthetic mode All modern aesthetics rests upon an assumption which has been strangely little discussed, the assumption that there is a distinct kind of mental activity present in what are called aesthetic experiences. “The first rational word concerning beauty” – spoken by Immanuel Kant. o Kant attempt to define the ‘judgement of taste’ as concerning pleasure which is disinterested, unintellectual. o Thus arise, the phantom problem of the aesthetic mode or aesthetic state, a legacy from the days of abstract investigation into the Good, The Beautiful, and the True. Will, Feeling, and Thought: The temptation - will, feeling, and thought was irresistible. The faculties of capacities are reducible to three. Kant said in Critque of Judgement: o The faculty of Knowledge o The feeling of pleasure or displeasure o The faculty of desire Theses faculties stood understanding, judgement and Reason respectively The faculty of Knowledge Understanding The feeling of pleasure or displeasure Judgement The faculty of desire Reason trb.springline.in | Chapter 2 | Principles of Literary Criticism | 1 ‘Between the faculties of knowledge and desire stands the feeling of pleasure ’ just as judgement is intermediate between understanding and reason’ Kant went on to discuss aesthetics as appertaining to the province of judgement, the middle of these three, the first and last having already occupied him in his two other.
    [Show full text]
  • Anti-Essentialism Tom Leddy, San Jose State University
    San Jose State University From the SelectedWorks of Tom Leddy 2014 Anti-Essentialism Tom Leddy, San Jose State University Available at: https://works.bepress.com/tom_leddy/194/ This is a post-print of Thomas Leddy, “Anti-Essentialism,” The Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, 2nd Ed., ed. Michael Kelly (Oxford U. Press, 2014). If you wish to find correct pagination for a quote you should go to the published version. At SJSU The Encyclopedia of Aesthetics is available for students and faculty electronically in MLK Library. http://catalog.sjlibrary.org/record=b4969786~S1 ESSENTIALISM Anti-Essentialism From the late nineteenth century to the 1950s one of the main foci of aesthetic inquiry was the attempt to develop definitions of art and such related concepts as visual art, music, tragedy, beauty, and metaphor. Clive Bell (1958) [orig. 1914] famously stated that either all works of visual art have some common quality or when we speak of “work of art” we speak nonsense. DeWitt H. Parker (1939) argued more generally that the assumption underlying every philosophy of art is the existence of some common nature present in all the arts. This search for a common quality or nature of art was generally take to be a form of essentialism When analytic philosophers came to aesthetics in the 1950s they saw it as dominated by the essentialism of G.W.F. Hegel and such idealist followers as Benedetto Croce (1922) and Robin George Collingwood (1938). It was in this context that John A. Passmore (1954) attacked aestheticians for pretentiously saying nothing and for trying to retain mystery rather than dispel it.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Has Aesthetic Formalism Fallen on Hard Times? David E.W
    University of North Florida UNF Digital Commons Philosophy Faculty Publications Department of Philosophy Fall 2010 Why Has Aesthetic Formalism Fallen on Hard Times? David E.W. Fenner University of North Florida, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/aphi_facpub Part of the Esthetics Commons Recommended Citation Fenner, David E.W., "Why Has Aesthetic Formalism Fallen on Hard Times?" (2010). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 2. http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/aphi_facpub/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at UNF Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UNF Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Digital Projects. © Fall 2010 All Rights Reserved Why Has Aesthetic Formalism Fallen on Hard Times? David E. W. Fenner University of North Florida 1. Introduction Nick Zangwill has done more than any person recently to resuscitate aesthetic formalism.1 I say ―resuscitate‖ because formalism has not been in favor for several decades. Zangwill writes that ―Aesthetic Formalism has fallen on hard times. At best it receives unsympathetic discussion and swift rejection. At worse it is the object of abuse and derision.‖2 The reasons many today believe aesthetic formalism is not viable have been the subject of discussion since the pendulum swing away from New Criticism, via the work of William Wimsatt, Cleanth Brooks, Clement Greenberg, André Levinson, and Heinrich Wolfflin. Most of these reasons have been discussed thoroughly, and those that I will review here that have been discussed I will spend little time reconsidering.
    [Show full text]
  • Considering the Nature of the Aesthetic Through an Imaginary Letter Exchange
    University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Faculty Publications: Department of Teaching, Department of Teaching, Learning and Teacher Learning and Teacher Education Education January 2005 Considering the Nature of the Aesthetic through an Imaginary Letter Exchange Margaret A. Macintyre Latta University of Nebraska-Lincoln, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/teachlearnfacpub Part of the Teacher Education and Professional Development Commons Macintyre Latta, Margaret A., "Considering the Nature of the Aesthetic through an Imaginary Letter Exchange" (2005). Faculty Publications: Department of Teaching, Learning and Teacher Education. 8. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/teachlearnfacpub/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Teaching, Learning and Teacher Education at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications: Department of Teaching, Learning and Teacher Education by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. JournalofjCurriculum Theorizing, Spring 2005 123 conJiiering tbe Nature of tbe Aeotbetic tdrougb an Imaginary Letter Excvbange Margaret Macintyre Latna University of Nebraska-Lincoln DearReader: I propose to consider the nature of aesthetics through the perspectives of three contemporaries of early 20th century England (Virginia Woolf, 1882-1941, Clive Bell, 1881-1964, and Sylvia Gosse, 1881- 1968), with claim to an intimate understanding of the aesthetic. This is an imaginative journey of my own making. I find imagination makes empathy possible.' Imagination allows me to put aside my definitions and distinctions regarding the aesthetic, and give credence to alternative perspectives. Aesthetics is an elusive entity that is used indiscriminately to capture a felt dimension of lived experience.
    [Show full text]
  • The Significance of Form | Nonsite.Org
    3/22/2017 The Significance of Form | nonsite.org nonsite.org - Feature - Issue #20 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FORM SAM ROSE There are drawings by Adolph Menzel (1815-1905) in which the black lead of his carpenter’s pencil has been pressed into the paper with tremendous force, far exceeding the demands of the form or the requirements of the shading in that precinct of the image. I said to Kathrin: What we see here is rst-hand evidence of Menzel’s desire—his compulsion—to make the world as real to him, and at the same time to make himself as real to the world, as it was within his power to achieve. At whatever cost to strict delity to appearances, which was of urgent concern to him but only up to a point. As Kafka notes in another connection, “That is the point that must be reached.” —Michael Fried, “In the Kupferstichkabinett” 1 St Andrews Research Repository http://nonsite.org/feature/the­significance­of­form provided by 1/28 View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk CORE brought to you by 3/22/2017 The Significance of Form | nonsite.org Formalism in the visual arts just won’t quite go away. Ever since the full recognition in the early twentieth century that form could ground a distinct theory of art, writers in search of a denition that would differentiate it from their own views have embraced two premises: the idea that adherents of the theory understand contemplation of the form of an artwork to be both necessary and sufcient for its aesthetic evaluation; and the idea that this contemplation is a univocal, pure, or essentially content-less one.
    [Show full text]