Document of The World Bank Public Disclosure Authorized

Report No: 32900

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-31930 PPFI-Q0970 TF-22271)

ON A Public Disclosure Authorized CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 10.3 MILLION (US$14.4 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

INDEPENDENT STATE OF SAMOA

FOR AN

INFRASTRUCTURE ASSET MANAGEMENT PROJECT Public Disclosure Authorized IN SUPPORT OF PHASE ONE OF AN

INFRASTRUCTURE ASSET MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

February 2, 2006 Public Disclosure Authorized

Transport Sector Unit East Asia and Pacific Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2004) Currency Unit = Samoa Tala (WST) WST 1.00 = US$ 2.67 (2.99 at inception February 1999) US$ 1.00 = 0.37 (0.33 at inception February 1999)

FISCAL YEAR July 1 to June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AGO Office of the Attorney General APL Adaptable Program Loan AusAID Australian Agency for International Development CIM Coastal Infrastructure and Management COEPs Codes of Environmental Practice DLSE Department of Lands, Surveys and Environment GDP Gross Domestic Product GIS Geographic Information System HDM-4 Highway Development and Management model, Version 4 IAM-1 Infrastructure Asset Management Project (Phase 1, Cr. 3193-WSO) IAM-2 Infrastructure Asset Management Project (Phase 2, Cr. 3848-WSO) IAMP Infrastructure Asset Management Program IATA International Air Transport Association ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICT Information and Communications Technology IDA International Development Association MNRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment MWTI Ministry of Works, Tranport and Infrastructure PIRAMS PWD Institutional Reform and Asset Management Services PMU Project Management Unit PWD Public Works Department RSAP Road Safety Action Plan RTAS Road Transport Administration System SAA Samoa Airport Authority SAMS Samoa Asset Management System SOE State-owned Enterprise TCB Transport Control Board

Vice President: Mr. Jeffrey S. Gutman, Acting Country Director: Mr. Xian Zhu Sector Director: Mr. Jitendra N. Bajpai Task Team Leader: Mr. William D.O. Paterson

SAMOA Infrastructure Asset Management Project (Infrastructure Asset Management Program (Phase 1))

CONTENTS

Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 5 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 14 6. Sustainability 15 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 16 8. Lessons Learned 18 9. Partner Comments 19 10. Additional Information 22 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 23 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 24 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 26 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 30 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 32 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 33 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 34 Annex 8. Illustrations 36 IBRD Map 32860R

Project ID: P052293 Project Name: WS-Infrast. Mgnt (APL) Team Leader: William D. O. Paterson TL Unit: EASTR ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: February 7, 2006

1. Project Data Name: WS-Infrast. Mgnt (APL) L/C/TF Number: IDA-31930; PPFI-Q0970; TF-22271 Country/Department: SAMOA Region: East Asia and Pacific Region Sector/subsector: Aviation (40%); Central government administration (34%); Roads and highways (26%) Theme: Infrastructure services for private sector development (P); Pollution management and environmental health (S)

KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 09/02/1998 Effective: 05/31/1999 02/28/2000 Appraisal: 11/12/1998 MTR: 12/06/2000 12/06/2000 Approval: 04/15/1999 Closing: 12/31/2002 03/31/2004

Borrower/Implementing Agency: Independent State of Samoa/Dept of Public Works; Independent State of Samoa/Dept of Lands Surveys and Environment; Independent State of Samoa/& Samoa Airport Authority. Other Partners: Australian Agency for International Development

STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Jeffrey S. Gutman Jean-Michel Severino Country Director: Xian Zhu Klaus Rohland Sector Manager: Jitendra N. Bajpai Jitendra N. Bajpai Team Leader at ICR: William D. O. Paterson William D. O. Paterson ICR Primary Author: William D.O. Paterson; Richard Leonard

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: HS Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: H Bank Performance: HS Borrower Performance: S

QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S HS Project at Risk at Any Time: No 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: Context. Prior to the preparation of the Infrastructure Asset Management Program in 1998, the International Development Association (IDA) had been supporting emergency recovery from the double major tropical cyclones Ofa in 1990 and Val in 1991 which inflicted a substantial economic shock on Samoa with damages worth about four times the annual GDP. In 1996, the Government launched an active public sector reform program in a Statement of Economic Strategy, which sought to expand the private sector role, liberalize the financial sector and strengthen human resource development. Four issues shaped the concept for this Program. First, in the coastal zone where the economy is concentrated there was a need to find a balance between protection from natural hazard risks and preservation of the vulnerable coastal ecology and environment. Second, the island nation, remote from its markets, is highly dependent on efficient and secure air transport communications for resilience to economic shocks. Third, the Public Works Department (PWD), which had been the implementing agency of the emergency project, was actively beginning a reform program to adopt a more commercial model of service delivery, in concert with emerging national economic reforms. Finally, the Bank’s lending operations in the Pacific had a record of problematic performance and cofinancing, and their small scale, high risk nature required a new business model to respond to regional requests for continued support. Against this backdrop, it was decided to employ an Adaptable Program Loan (APL), the first in the East Asia and Pacific region, for a phased infrastructure program.

Objectives. The objective chosen for the Program was “Transport and coastal infrastructure assets are economically, environmentally and socially sustainable and managed by an effective partnership of stakeholders.” The first phase had four sub-objectives: (i) International air transport infrastructure is sustainably adequate for economic growth; (ii) Reliability and safety of road system assets is improved; (iii) Environmentally and socially sustainable management of coastal infrastructure is initiated; and (iv) Management of infrastructure assets is becoming service-oriented involving public, private and community stakeholders.

Assessment of Objectives. The Program objective matched the Government’s Statement of Economic Strategy objectives, that investments should be economically feasible, development should be environmentally sustainable, the private sector involved in service delivery, and the government role reduced. The two phases covering an 8-year period reflected an essentially “vertical” design in the two objectives, first laying the foundations for asset management capacity and then supporting additional investment in infrastructure, i.e.: (i) Phase 1 – Meeting vital priorities and strengthening management; and (ii) Phase 2 – Investing for sustainable growth and protection.

The reform objective was appropriate because the APL structure provided a basis for a progressive longer-term partnership with some flexibility to match actual achievements. While the four sub-objectives were a seemingly complex combination, integration was achieved by the inter-agency Steering Committee and there was clear ownership by each implementing agency for their various sub-objectives and tasks, as follows:

(a) Air Transport Infrastructure: As airport operations were already commercialized and separate from the national airline, the key demands were the large capital investment needed to raise the operational and safety standards to pending international civil aviation standards and facilitate more long-haul flight operations. Through reinforcing the financial responsibility of the Samoa Airport Authority (SAA) for the investment and for achieving financial viability in its operations, the Project was consistent with Government's economic reform agenda. IDA support was

- 2 - appropriate to make the model of commercialized operation for infrastructure service delivery work in the ‘thin market’ conditions of low demand and high intrinsic costs due to the country’s remote location.

(b) Road Infrastructure: As the standards of much of the primary road system had been raised by the post-cyclone investments, the challenges for the road sub-sector included first, better management of the assets to reduce the demand on public funds and dependence on foreign aid and second, improved traffic management in the face of growing motorization and safety concerns of a village-based traditional culture. The focus of Phase 1 on road asset management processes, and on bridge and pedestrian safety, therefore was highly appropriate for balancing priorities and building management capacity before an investment phase in Phase 2.

(c) Coastal Infrastructure: Though not a formal sub-sector, infrastructure to protect the coastal zone from natural hazards became a highly visible priority after the major cyclones. This sub-objective essentially introduced risk management as a key tool of public sector management - in this case, an approach to mitigating the risks of economic disruption from storms and other natural hazards which are highly prevalent in Samoa. This objective was highly innovative and crucial for an island economy where so many of its assets are at high risk. It aimed to involve community interests and traditional control of lands, a systematic assessment of risk and evaluation of options for reducing those risks, and minimizing the irreversible impacts of hard protection on sensitive coastal ecosystems.

(d) Public Sector Reform: The sector reform identified for each subsector was strongly in support of the Government's macroeconomic policy, and designed to progress at different paces depending on capacity in the individual sectors. Public Works was the primary focus for Phase 1 and the biggest challenge for the Government’s program and commitment – the flexibility of the APL structure allowed room for both the targets and the timing to adjust as consultations and political will developed, and to ensure continuity through Phase 2. Natural resources and environment, were a lower priority at preparation and had many public interest issues, but their inclusion provided the opportunity for reform to develop during the Project.

These objectives were also consistent with the Bank’s regional and country strategy, supporting a more efficient and effective public sector, increased participation of the private sector, and limiting focus to a few key sectors. The new lending model, by combining sub-sectors and including a full sector reform program, proved to be a suitable instrument. Partnership with the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), whose program focused on institutional strengthening, proved mutually very effective. The limited cofinancing reflected the Government’s approach of aligning development partners with specific sectors.

3.2 Revised Objective: No change.

3.3 Original Components: The Project had four components matching the four sub-objectives plus one for project management, as follows:

A. Air Transport Infrastructure (US$8.78 million). Upgrading of the Faleolo International Airport as a national gateway with modern international standards suitable for low traffic demand. This included: (i) rehabilitation and extension of the runway to 3,000 m length, including taxiway apron

- 3 - lights drainage and seawall protection; (ii) Improvement of the passenger terminal, emergency services and air traffic control; (iii) Supply of emergency fire and rescue vehicles; and (iv) Engineering and architectural services for design and supervision.

B. Road System Infrastructure (US$3.85 million). Improving the reliability and safety of the primary road network through: (i) Bridge rehabilitation and replacement of six narrow unsafe bridges; (ii) Road rehabilitation of the West Coast Road, in the key airport corridor; and (iii) Road safety measures and construction of 4.7 km of footpaths in key pedestrian areas.

C. Coastal Infrastructure and Management (CIM) (US$2.43 million). Developing an approach to the management and mitigation of natural hazard risks in coastal areas, strengthening environmental management, enhancing geographical information and constructing protection for warranted priority coastal areas.

D. Institutional Development (US$3.28 million). Support for public sector reform in (i) Public works, through asset management systems, restructuring and private sector participation; (ii) Asset and information management national protocols; (iii) Road traffic and safety administration system; (iv) Functional review of Department of Lands, Survey and Environment; and (v) Samoa Airport Authority through business process improvements.

E. Project Management (US$1.46 million). (i) A Project Preparation Facility to finance the preparation of the Program; and (ii) Technical assistance for a central Project Management Unit (PMU).

Assessment of Components. The design and structure of the components supported the objectives very clearly and also aligned well with the implementing agency responsibilities. The codification of components and sub-components matched the outputs and contracts thus allowing efficient and reliable monitoring of implementation and results.

3.4 Revised Components:

There were no formal amendments, but some reductions in the scope of components due to cost increases in excess of the contingencies. The increase in the airport component, the largest in the Project, was 35 percent after applying value engineering, and there were increases in the order of 20-29 percent in other components also. Through prioritization, the Project Steering Committee deferred a substantial portion of the Road component (B) to Phase 2, i.e.: (i) Construction of Fagalii and Falefa Bridges under B.1; (ii) Rehabilitation of the Apia-Faleolo West Coast Road corridor under B.2; (iii) Improvements to pedestrian facilities on Fugalei Street and Lelata area streets under B.3; and (iv) Construction and supervision of coast protection works at Mulunuu, Fasitoo-uta and Manono-uta under C.3. All these activities have been implemented but were financed under IAM-2.

3.5 Quality at Entry:

The Bank’s Quality Assurance Group (QAG) reviewed the Project after approval, rating it Satisfactory overall, and highly satisfactory in poverty and social aspects. The panel highlighted excellent preparation work, strong ownership by the Government, donor partnership, stakeholder consultations, indigenous people aspects, institutional framework and the skill-mix of the preparation team. The following factors contributed significantly to project readiness for implementation: (i) Government’s approval of the Letter

- 4 - of Development Program on February 16, 1999; (ii) Advance procurement of the engineering and design services for the major airport component; (iii) Establishment of the passenger departure tax at Faleolo; and (iv) Advance procurement for the civil works for two bridges.

The project team rated quality at entry as highly satisfactory, giving more weight to project design aspects than the QAG rating, based on the following:

(a) The broad scope, focused on infrastructure but covering three subsectors and involving multiple implementing agencies, was given cohesion by well-designed implementation arrangements. Coordination was effected by a multi-agency steering committee and a contracted-in centrally based project management team. Implementing agencies were empowered through procurement responsibilities and an individual project manager assigned to each main agency. (b) The objectives and components were highly resonant with Government priorities. The Adaptable Program (APL) framework allowed the subsectors to progress at different appropriate paces. (c) Preparation of the major investment components (airport and bridges) was well advanced by Project approval, including detailed engineering for the airport component, resulting in a rapid start to implementation and disbursement; (d) A strongly participatory approach was adopted in the design and preparation of the project, which continued through implementation and resulted in a sustained momentum until the latter stage of the project period; (e) Procurement arrangements focused on developing domestic industry capacity and country systems, resulting in effective knowledge transfer, so that the resultant effort required in the procurement of numerous small packages was also productive in capacity development; (f) Environmental and social safeguards were fully addressed, the consultation process was extensive and active attention was given to cultural and indigenous aspects; (g) Some project elements were innovative and progressive, such as the introduction of hazard risk management and the full public works reform, which grew from lessons learned under the earlier emergency projects and donor-suported programs; and (h) The project design and successful performance became a model for improving portfolio performance in small-scale countries such as the Pacific Islands.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The overall outcome for the first Phase is rated as highly satisfactory, as it achieved three of the four sub-objectives to a highly satisfactory degree and one satisfactorily. Some sustainability issues remain to be addressed under Phase 2. The key achievements include: (a) International airport infrastructure is sustainably adequate for economic growth: Highly satisfactory. The upgrading of Faleolo International Airport for both air and passenger operations was fully successful, consistently met performance targets, met international standards, and established a leading example in the Pacific. (b) Reliability and safety of road system assets is improved: Satisfactory. Key bridge and pedestrian facilities were improved in critical or congested locations, with enhanced functional and environmental standards. However, nearly half of the planned scope had to be deferred to Phase 2 for budgetary reasons. (c) Sustainable management of coastal infrastructure is initiated: Highly satisfactory. The approach to coastal risk management and protection was pioneering for the Pacific and the three elements - national strategy, community participation, and coastal infrastructure management (CIM) plans that are based on rigorous hazard risk assessment and community choice – provide a

- 5 - good basis for a sustainable result. The Project covered more than three times the expected number of Districts, and Phase 2 will complete the coverage of CIM Plans. (d) Management of infrastructure assets becomes service-oriented. Highly satisfactory. The management of infrastructure assets under Ministry of Works, Transport and Infrastructure (MWTI), and land and asset information under Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), is now more service-oriented and involves public and private stakeholders. Reform of the Public Works Department (PWD) successfully completed the transition from traditional service provider to asset manager, with the transfer of services to the private sector, commercialization of major plant operations, and a significant downsizing of staff, without significant social disruption. The automation of motor vehicle registration and driver licensing greatly facilitated road transport administration and improved service to road users. The Airport Authority improved business processes, and is progressing well towards financial viability with operating costs fully covered and an increasing amount of capital costs being absorbed.

4.2 Outputs by components:

A. Airport Improvements This component upgraded the Faleolo International Airport to international standards for a 10-year horizon, including extension and resurfacing of the runway, a new taxiway, upgrading the terminal building, and construction of new air traffic control tower and emergency services. Airport facilities and operations now comply with International Civil Aviation Organization standards and the terminal facilities satisfy International Air Transport Association requirements for Category C operations (Small airports). It is rated highly satisfactory. There were four sub-components (see photographs in Annex 8):

A.1 Airport Paving and Civil Works The runway was extended from 2,700 m to 3,000 m and resurfaced with a 50 mm thick asphalt overlay. The whole length of the runway was transversely grooved to provide improved skid resistance in tropical storm conditions. A new taxiway was constructed to link the parking apron with the runway extension. Some drainage improvements and other minor works were also carried out. Because the bid price was considerably higher than the Project Appraisal Document estimate, the works were delayed to coincide with a new fiscal year. A Partnering Charter which governed the consultant, contractor and client, helped to reduce costs and contractual conflicts - through this and using Value Engineering, the Contractor identified substantial cost savings which were shared with the Client. Highly satisfactory.

A.2 Airport Building Works The original terminal building, constructed in 1987, was completely refitted with a new internal layout, facilities, ceiling and roof, including new baggage handling equipment, designed to increase the capacity for handling passengers of large aircraft. A cultural feature of the design was the use of a signature color scheme relating to the phase of passenger processing. Much of the work was completed in time for the influx of visitors for the 1999/2000 Millenium celebrations. The new control tower was constructed to improve visibility to each end of the runway and was set back from the runway to comply with International Civil Aviation Organization requirements. Improved avionics and traffic control equipment were installed. The new Emergency Fire and Rescue Station was constructed near the midpoint of the runway to provide better service in the event of an emergency, and includes accommodation facilities for the duty crew. Satisfactory.

- 6 - A.3 Emergency Fire Equipment The existing equipment was replaced with two new high performance fire and rescue tenders at a very competitive price. The performance of the equipment is excellent. Highly satisfactory. A.4 Design and Supervision Services The services covering the design and supervision of all the works under the airport component were generally satisfactory, except regarding control of material changes during construction which resulted in cost increases and in some cases subsequent remedial maintenance. The services also included retention of a local artist and art institute who created excellent cultural theming of the terminal building, comprising fixed and movable artworks, including mosaics, murals, stained glass and carved wooden pieces depicting Samoan themes - the artwork is popular and fostered a cultural pride in the national gateway. Satisfactory.

B. Road System Infrastructure The investments served to improve the reliability and safety of the existing road network. Nearly all works and services were provided by the private sector in small packages in order to stimulate the local industry and support the reform agenda. The overall rating is satisfactory.

B.1 Upgrading primary road bridges Four bridges were reconstructed - Tua’efu and Lelata Bridges in the Apia area, Falevao Bridge on Upolu and Saleia Bridge on Savaii. The design work for Tua’efu and Lelata Bridges was procured by PWD using local funds before the start of the project. The reconstruction of two other bridges at Fagalii and Falefa was designed under the Project but implemented under IAM-2 because of design delays and budgetary reasons. The reconstruction works for the four bridges proceeded well and resulted in reasonable quality of workmanship. Costs were only slightly higher than budget estimates. As part of the transition to private sector delivery, all construction supervision and remaining design services were undertaken by local consultants. Construction supervision by local firms was generally satisfactory but the capacity of local firms requires considerable improvement in quality. The design services of an international firm for the Saleia and Falevao Bridges performed poorly with extensive delay and deficiencies in the documents, but eventually these were fully remedied. The design services for the Fagalii and Falefa Bridges performed somewhat better, with a small delay due to a design change. Rated satisfactory.

B.2 Road preservation works Rehabilitation of the West Coast (Airport) Road was originally planned for Phase 1 because of traffic safety issues. The feasibility study conducted as part of the design showed that a new shorter inland route would be feasible in the medium term and thus confirmed that only periodic repairs should be made to the existing road. Thus, instead of major rehabilitation, the works were designed to comprise reinstatement of weak spots, drainage improvements, resealing and safety provisions in residential areas, in three packages. Due to delay in the design services and cost overruns in other components the work is being implemented during Phase 2.

- 7 - B.3 Road safety and pedestrian facilities The works to improve pedestrian facilities in the Apia area comprised: (i) Beach Rd.; (ii) Vailele St., Vaivase Rd. and To’omatagi Rd., collectively referred to as Lelata area streets; (iii) Convent St.; and (iv) Fugalei St. The design standards of the footpaths were raised and substantial landscaping was incorporated by MWTI so the overall impact has been effective and environmentally attractive (see Annex 8). The Beach Road works also were expanded to include traffic management in the central business area. The works were located in areas of high pedestrian traffic such as near schools, were generally of good quality and provided a safe and attractive environment for pedestrians. The design work by local consultants for the Lelata area and Fugalei Street footpaths proceeded very slowly, and the financing was shifted to IAM-2 due to the delays and to cost overruns. Moderately satisfactory.

C. Coastal Protection Infrastructure This component established an approach to protecting coastal communities against natural hazards that was environmentally and socially sustainable, by developing a national strategy, mapping coastal hazard zones, and preparing detailed management plans with the active participation of coastal communities for 15 out of 43 districts. Image data of the entire land area was collected and made available in a geographic information system to improve the quality and availability of land information. The component as a whole is rated as highly satisfactory. This will be expanded to cover the remaining districts under Phase 2, and the concepts are being shared around the region as a model approach (see Policy Note 2006, ref. 43, Annex 7). There were three sub-components:

C.1 Coastal and Environmental Management Technical assistance under one consultancy contract was provided to develop and implement a CIM strategy for managing hazard risks in coastal zones, based on a methodology developed during project preparation, and for strengthening environmental management and regulations. Due to its success, the contract was extended to increase the number of districts covered by management plans from 5 to 15. It is rated as highly satisfactory. The results are documented in seven reports and a video, including the following activities and outputs (see also Annex 8): (a) Coastal Hazard Zone Mapping - Hazard zones were identified and mapped for three prevalent hazard risks, erosion, flooding and landslip. The entire coastline of Samoa was mapped using aerial photographs and detailed field work of surveys and villager interviews. The mapping showed that 82 percent of the coastline was sensitive to these hazards, with erosion and flooding being the main hazards affecting the two main islands, and landslip being the chief hazard on some of the smaller islands. (b) Coastal Infrastructure Management Strategy - The CIM strategy, with a theme of making communities resilient to natural hazards, was made a national policy document endorsed by the Cabinet. It outlines policies and objectives for managing natural hazard risks and the planning of coastal infrastructure. Importantly, the strategy encourages the use of appropriate interventions, including non-structural interventions to preserve coastal ecosystems. (c) Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans - The CIM Plans are the key tool for realizing the strategy in practice. They were developed through extensive consultation with all villages in a District, through traditional consultations with elders (matai and pulenuu) using annotated aerial photographs and inspections to identify assets at risk and intervention options. Each Plan was endorsed by the Minister for Lands and all village heads as a pact guiding land use management and coastal protection. The Plans help communities and government improve resilience by identifying preferred management actions and solutions. Fifteen CIM Plans were produced in the local and

- 8 - English languages. (d) Coastal/Environmental Advisory Services - The services provided guidance and training on environmental management and design of coastal works to staff of DLSE and PWD in a series of six visits. Interim Codes of Environmental Practice (COEPs) were produced and formally adopted by PWD/MWTI to support environmental specifications in road planning, design, construction and maintenance, and in coastal protection works. Their purpose is to ensure that minimum environmental standards are met and appropriate procedures are undertaken to reduce the environmental impact of various activities related to road works and services.

C.2 Updating Geographical Information This sub-component procured the land information and systems needed for enhancing the effectiveness of other parts of the project: Aerial Photography and GIS. It is rated highly satisfactory. (a) Aerial Photography: In order to provide a reliable basis for asset management maps, and for mapping natural hazard zones, up-to-date topographical information was obtained through aerial photography of the whole territory (other forms of remote sensing such as satellite imagery were less cost effective at that time). As the value of the photographs and maps became evident, more maps and features were requested, so the contract was revised and completed 26 months after the original date of completion with a cost increase of 53 percent. The main outputs included: (i) 1:50,000 orthophotos with contours of the entire territory; (ii) 1:5,000 orthophotos with and without contours for the coastal zones; (iii) 1:50,000 topographical maps of Samoa; and (iv) GIS Data at 1:10,000 scale in electronic format. (b) Geographical Information Management: A computer and GIS (MAPInfo) software were purchased to access, analyse and print the orthophotos and GIS layers for the coastal hazard mapping work. GIS layers included: contours, buildings, cultivation, hydrology, land use, localities, roads, relief, off-shore, text and vegetation. Staff were trained in the use of design and GIS software. MNRE also established a service in providing land images and data in various formats to the public and goverment, including protocols for intellectual property rights.

C.3 Extending Coastal Protection This sub-component was implemented by PWD/MWTI. The two sections of coastal protection works, at Fagalii and Faga, originally planned to be carried out under IAM-1, were taken out of the project - Fagalii was carried out by PWD with local funds, and the Faga works were withdrawn due to adjacent developments. Three sites were added to the program as local priorities - Manono-Uta, Fasitoo-Uta and Mulinuu (completion of a gap at the end of the Japan-funded wall). The evaluation and design were conducted by a local consultant trained under the Coastal Environmental Advisory Services (C.1), however, the design services were so slow that final documents were delivered about 32 weeks late on a 10 week contract period. This severely affected the construction programme which was deferred to Phase 2. Overall, the component was only moderately satisfactory, because PWD/MWTI showed little commitment to adopting the environmentally sustainable approach to the design and construction of the protection at the original sites, and at Manono-Uta resisted an action required to conserve a mangrove area.

- 9 - D. Institutional Strengthening This component addressed the core long-term development objective of reforming public sector management and increasing the role of the private sector, in ways specific to each agency. The main component reformed the PWD from a traditional service provider to an asset manager and policy office, while transferring services and assets to the private sector. To improve budget and programming capacity, an asset management system was established covering all publicly owned roads, bridges and sea defences. For lands and environment (DLSE), an institutional review was followed by restructuring under a Government-wide plan. Road Traffic Administration and Road Safety were improved with more efficient administration tools, support for legislation and enforcement, and safety education programs. The business practices of SAA were upgraded including corporate planning capacity, and minor airport operations were reviewed. Overall this component is rated as highly satisfactory.

D.1 PWD Institutional Reform and Asset Management Services (PIRAMS) Prior to the Project, the PWD was a traditional public works department and a large employer, providing all services for roads, coastal infrastructure, public buildings, and general civil works including emergency works, strongly influenced by the Minister. The management of heavy equipment had been established under a separate state-owned corporation which was performing poorly. Previous studies (funded by AusAID and the IDA Emergency Road Rehabiliation Project) had recommended devolution of services to the private sector and conversion of PWD into a state-owned enterprise, but Ministry of Finance had required the development of reliable financial and project management capacity as a pre-requisite. The task aimed to introduce this major reform progressively - including first a strengthened department and second a statutory authority or state-owned enterprise if determined feasible and appropriate - by making use of the phasing afforded by the APL instrument. Due to social concerns, specific requirements were made for the process to incorporate traditional cultural values. It was cofinanced by the Australian Agency for International Development which had provided much prior institutional strengthening and which sought more effective implementation by partnership in a major project. The Phase 1 task had two objectives: (a) Redefine the role of the PWD to include commercial operations and encourage development of the private sector; and (b) Implement procedures and systems for asset management, financial management and environmental management, and strengthen human capacity. The competitively selected international consultant team was led by a local former senior government official experienced in corporate reform. On the reform issue, extensive consultations were conducted with staff at all levels under the strong leadership of the Director. Although political changes early in the contract restricted the pace and extent of reform under discussion, preparation continued. During Phase 1, a large portion of the PWD expenditure program was contracted out to the private sector in relatively small packages for qualified contractors and consultants. Sound plans were prepared for out-sourcing most works and engineering services, for the creation of business units for key capital resources such as workshop, quarry and asphalt operations, and for redeployment of staff. Later in October 2002, with new ministerial leadership, the full reform measures were implemented rapidly, with a good transition plan, generous social support and a minimal period of disruption. Staff were given options to stay, form businesses or leave, and received training in business management. Some established business enterprises for building maintenance and for road maintenance, which were then given direct contracts renewable annually for up to two years. Most assets were divested, except two that were considered vulnerable to monopoly - quarry and quality assurance services - which became business units. Staffing was downsized by 83 percent from 403 to 58, with a focus on professional and managerial skills. The process was well supported by the staff and public, and considered highly successful by Government and a model for other public sector reform. Subsequently in June 2003 under a Government-wide plan, the organization was merged into the MWTI which covers all modes of transport and infrastructure.

- 10 - The team was also successful in delivering key business processes. A simple computerized system for annual budget and program preparation was developed, named the Samoa Asset Management System (SAMS). A full inventory and condition survey was conducted of all road and coastal protection infrastructure assets, and a traffic survey on representative road links - data was geo-referenced to integrate with the GIS land image data collected under Component C (this revealed a referencing discrepancy which is being addressed under Phase 2). Although a financial management system was recommended, the Government required a standard package. For environmental management, the COEPs were adopted in an Memorandum of Understanding with the DLSE/MNRE in 2001 and are now required by specifications for all works executed by MWTI. A 10-year Road Sector Plan was prepared, using the SAMS data in the Bank-supported Highway Development and Management (HDM-4) model and endorsed by Cabinet - this identified the annual maintenance needs and priorized capacity expansion needs which formed the basis for major investments to be made under Phase 2 and other programs. This component was well-acclaimed nationally and achieved much more than planned for Phase 1 - it is rated as highly satisfactory.

Road Feasibility Study Services Detailed study of sub-project candidates from the Road Sector Plan was performed by local consultants, and was intended also to build capacity among local consultants for evaluating economic feasibility. Three remote roads were selected for improving basic access to remote communities (Fagaloa Bay, Tiavea, and Sauniatu) and the expert guidance and training was part of the PIRAMS contract (above). In the event, the selected local consultants included a competent transport economist and the input from the PIRAMS consultant was usefully redirected elsewhere. The Fagaloa Bay Road was found the most feasible and became a candidate for improvement under IAM-2, while the other two roads lacked justification for upgrading. Future feasibility work will need to ensure adequate assessment of alternatives for intermediate improvements so that appropriate solutions are found for all roads. This sub-component is rated as satisfactory.

D.2 Asset Information Management Advisory Services This component was open-ended at appraisal and aimed at providing the Government with a basis for expanding the concepts of asset management and information and communications technology Government-wide, beyond the sector focus of the Project. At the time there was no Information Communications Technology (ICT) policy in Government and computerization was occurring on an ad hoc basis in individual departments. The Steering Committee and Ministry of Finance opted to focus the services on developing a framework for the establishment of a Government-wide area computer network and asset information management system. The report outlined a framework of ICT policy and protocols, and recommendations for wide area network communications between departments. As a result of the report, the Government proceeded to establish a national commission on ICT and to develop an ICT policy and protocols. Also, detailed specifications were prepared for the procurement of ICT hardware that would connect the four Project implementing agencies to a Wide Area Network and provide internal network communications and these formed the basis for a consolidated procurement of ICT under components C2 and D for each agency. No specific steps were taken to disseminate the concepts of asset management to other sectors. The subcomponent is rated satisfactory.

- 11 - D.3 Traffic and Road Safety Administration Under the Department of Transport and Department of Police, vehicle and driver administration were paper-based and unreliable, and accident rates were rising especially in child fatalities. This component comprised three activities, and is rated highly satisfactory overall, i.e.:

(a) Road Traffic Administration System (RTAS): This comprsied: (i) Computer system to record accident data, vehicle registrations, inspection records, driver testing and licensing records and vehicle ownership records; (ii) Improve driver training and testing; (iii) Upgrade vehicle inspection procedures; (iv) Develop and introduce road safety education; (v) Review relevant legislation; and (vi) Improve work site traffic management. The scope and cost estimate were revised upwards at the time of procurement reflecting a re-assessment of the needs and value of the services. The consultant team brought useful experience from Australia and Fiji and produced an economical and sound system. The contract was extended in scope by 46 percent, and the final report was endorsed by all involved parties. The Department of Transport adopted the findings quickly, however the Police were slow to adopt the new system and full implementation has begun only since the transfer of transport administration to the new MWTI. Further work needs to be done in the area of traffic and road safety administration, such as better data collection, improved ICT for the Police, more training in all aspects, better funding and new traffic legislation.

(b) Road Traffic Safety: An education campaign was designed and conducted by the secretariat of the Transport Control Board (TCB). The campaign used the communications vehicle and audio-visual equipment procured under the Project to conduct a road-show around all primary and secondary schools, and was very successful both in the effectiveness of the message and in building capacity in the TCB.

(c) Traffic Management and Road Safety Equipment: This included: Motorcycles for the traffic police (2); Hand-held radar speed detectors (2); Blood alcohol testing unit (1); Road Safety Education vehicle; Computers and electronic whiteboard for educational aids.

D.4 DLSE Institutional Review An Institutional Review of DLSE was carried out as part of the contract for Coastal and Environmental Management (see above) with a view to formalising the reorganisation of the Department in the future. The review showed the capacity constraints and the distribution of resources within DLSE and proposed planning, restructuring and outsourcing of some activities. The Department then undertook internal review and consultations, and developed a new structure to accommodate additional responsibilities after a merger into a larger organization, the MNRE, as it was at the end of the Project. The developments were led internally and the task is rated as satisfactory.

D.5 Institutional Strengthening of Samoa Airport Authority Under this sub-component, advisory services were provided to SAA to improve their business processes and performance, with the aim of becoming financially self-sustaining. Business and corporate plans were prepared, including suggestions for reducing operating costs and enhancing revenues to assist in cost recovery, based on analysis of the airport operations and services. Guidance was given on strengthening financial management and a computer-based accounting system was installed. The Business Plan was well received and has guided the commercial development of SAA. With an increase in air traffic tariffs, the passenger departure tax and concessions, the SAA already recovered 78 percent of total costs (operations and capital, including the on-lending interest on the IDA Credit) in 2003/04 and forecasts breakeven by

- 12 - 2007/08. Calls were made for the Government to fully fund public service obligations made on SAA, and pass on the upper airspace revenues to contribute towards air traffic control costs. Finally, a study of the business case for the three minor airports was carried out as follow-up to the preparation study for the airport component. This showed the high costs of maintaining all minor airport operations, and recommended, inter alia, closure of the Fagalii Airport near Apia for safety and environmental reasons and because it substitutes for services that could be provided from Faleolo. The Government closed Fagalii at the end of 2004, which has improved the viability of Faleolo and realized substantial savings for SAA, and upgraded Maota airport on Savaii to international status for regional trips. Satisfactory. E. Project Management Project oversight was the responsibility of a multi-agency Steering Committee that comprised all participating agencies. In order to ensure good quality of management in a Project of this size and complexity, involving four implementing agencies, a PMU employing a local independent consulting firm was created to act as project manager. A project component manager was also appointed for each of the three main implementing agencies (MWTI, MNRE and SAA) to assist in implementation and all decisions were authorized by the line management in each agency. The PMU reported to the Ministry of Finance and supported the Steering Committee. This model of outsourcing project management performed extremely well and was instrumental in achieving the objectives of both project performance and internal capacity. Capacity was developed in each of the agencies through the direct line reporting relationships and the accountability required on the Steering Committee. The model also served to strengthen the concept of private sector support in Government services, and to build capacity in local consultants. The services included successful preparation of the second Phase Project. Highly satisfactory.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

Airport component: This was justified originally on the basis of the adverse impact on the economy if the airport had to be closed even temporarily (a loss of about $3 million for a 1-month closure), and on value of individual components. As-built with a 34 percent cost increase to $8.8 million, the airport was still fully justified on a cost effectiveness basis and fully met or exceeded operating standards. The financial sustainability of the Airport Authority is positive in operating cash flow and improving in overall net income with forecast breakeven by 2010. Sustainability is likely because the traffic growth of 11% p.a. and passenger growth of 6.8% p.a. have exceeded the threshold of 4-5% assumed in the original analysis.

Bridge component: For four bridges completed: NPV = USD 24.5 million. B/C = 10.6 (compared with NPV US$ 19.9 million and B/C = 10.3, originally after adjustment for reduced scope).

Road safety and pedestrian facilities: The costs were three times higher than estimated but the switching value is still less than the statistical compensation value for fatalities, e.g.: Cost US$520,600 (v. US$160,000); Switching value = US$10,180 per fatality (v. US$3,218 originally, and US$13,300 for statistical compensation). The intangible benefits of environmental enhancement and flood mitigation were considered substantial but were not quantified.

Coastal risk mitigation strategy and institutional capacity development components provide significant intangible benefits that were not quantified. At a macroeconomic level, the impact of Tropical Cyclone Heta in January 2004 (9% of GDP) was only one tenth of the impact of cyclones Ofa and Val in 1990 and 1991 respectively, in large part because of the coastal protection and risk mitigation which had been put in place under the ongoing risk mitigation program. The institutional reform impacts may be measurable over

- 13 - coming years through increased efficiency and productivity in the public works sector.

4.4 Financial rate of return: Not applicable

4.5 Institutional development impact: The Institutional Development Impact has been high. The impact was high in public works, where the PWD was reformed and downsized from a service-provider role to become the MWTI with a role as policy maker and asset manager. PWD divested itself of its operational role and key assets, and out-sourced the execution of public works and services to the private sector. While the organizational and staff changes were large, the preparations and social safety net provisions were excellent and the change in role was achieved smoothly. An asset and information management system for infrastructure assets and codes of environmental practice were also developed and established. A significant risk remains in the staffing of the new organization where filling all the manager and professional level posts at the available remuneration is a challenge that is also noted in other sectors. However, there are reasonable grounds for confidence that in time the necessary personnel will be hired and the momentum of maintaining and using the asset management system will resume. The upgrading of systems and procedures in road transport administration has had a substantial impact, especially since its transfer from the Departments of Police and of Transport to the new Ministry (MWTI) where it is coordinated with road transport policy and road management. The vehicle registration and driver licensing process has been made much more efficient for road users, and these have also enhanced the monitoring of vehicle ownership, the size of vehicle fleet, and their registration as assets against financial transactions. The related programs on road safety education reached thousands of school children and families with a high degree of coverage, and most importantly the awareness campaign was undertaken by the oversight agency, the TCB, greatly increasing their capacity and confidence. The institutional development impact in the airport authority (SAA) was both timely and substantial - the strengthening of financial management, installation of a new accounting system, preparation of business and corporate plans, improvement of the structure of concession contracts and more proactive outreach by SAA to tourism and business groups, has been applied in three successive annual business plans, and revenues have been increased. Follow-up surveys of the travelling public show improved service performance in most respects. For lands and environment, the institutional impacts have been high. The coastal infrastructure component established natural hazard risk management and the national CIM strategy as a key focus area in the new Ministry MNRE, and reinforced the traditional consultation procedures to be applied in coastal protection cases. Although the advisory service inputs on organizational change were modest, the department (DLSE) made very effective progress with only internal resources.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: A lack of major economic shock during the project period enabled the project to be implemented without disruption. A lack of capacity in the private sector caused delays in the delivery of design services, which contributed to the delays and deferrals of some of the works. The close attention and support provided by the donors' team from IDA and AusAID assisted in resolving

- 14 - issues as they arose and focused on results.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: The government was very supportive of the project, especially the Ministry of Finance. Adequate counterpart budget was provided, sound budgetary measures were taken in response to cost over-runs, and very progressive decisions were taken in support of the public works reform. The roll-over of some activities to financing under Phase 2 reflected a sound approach to prioritization, and sound fiscal management. The Steering Committee operated well, met regularly and gave good joint leadership of the Project. Procurement was handled well and with good integrity. The procurement authorization process however showed mixed performance in the latter stages of the Project, with excessive delays in clearance times and changes being made to the tendered conditions of contract after award.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: On the airport component, the partnering arrangement between the client, consultant and the contractor was effective in avoiding disruptions and for the horizontal works in controlling costs. A significant cause of Project delay in the latter stages was the slow performance of some of the international and domestic consultants employed to carry out studies and design work. Not one design assignment was completed on time and many went several months beyond the end of the contract period. Unclear institutional arrangements within PWD for the management and supervision of contracts resulted in some confused communication between Client and Consultant. Verbal agreements and statements were not always confirmed in writing, resulting in disputes later in the process. Poor internal communications within PWD were also a contributory factor.

5.4 Costs and financing: Project costs and financing followed the original structure, however there were cost increases in the range of 21 to 35 percent in each component except the road component which was adjusted to absorb the other increases (see Annex 2). Although appraisal estimates were based on local historical costs, some of them were too low, especially for the airport component. Some cost increases were caused by conscious decisions to raise a design standard or expand the physical scope at the request of the Client - in each case, these were reviewed by the joint Steering Committee and by the Bank's team. In all, a total of about $4 million worth of works (or 20 percent of the final project cost) was rolled over to IAM-2. The Government contributed an additional $1.6 million in counterpart funds to address part of the over-run. The AusAID grant of AUD 2.3 million was fully disbursed without change - due to depreciation, the AusAID share of financing declined slightly during the Project.

6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Sustainability is rated as Likely for the following reasons: (a) The Government has demonstrated a high level of commitment to a long-term strategy of infrastructure asset management, including implementation of the priority projects identified under the road sector plan through Phase 2 of the Program. Furthermore, their output-based budget approach reinforces the use of the asset management approach and systems by MWTI; (b) The reform of MWTI was completed with full Government support, and there remains strong commitment in MWTI and the Public Service Commission to ensuring that staffing complements are filled. Some difficulty with filling professional positions is common across all professional

- 15 - sectors in Samoa and in the region, and some adjustments have been made in the remuneration scales to reduce the disparity with the private sector which is a primary factor. In the meantime, MWTI is filling the two key vacancies with staff on consultant contracts. (c) SAA has been applying the business and corporate plans and business recommendations developed under the Project, and has also further increased tariffs recently - its financial status continues to improve and is close to the original forecast trends for the Project outcome, and the service levels of the airport operations are meeting the expected performance standards. (d) The effectiveness of the strategy for managing coastal hazard risks is dependent on the effective utilization of the management (CIM) Plans and compliance of coastal works with them. This requires the ongoing commitment and support of district and village leaders and communities in those districts covered to date, and more importantly, compliance by the MWTI when planning or implementing works in those areas. Under Phase 2, MNRE is tasked with strengthening the authority of the CIM Plans in the planning consent process under legislation, and these issues will be addressed further under Phase 2, including ongoing public awareness raising. The risk management approach is used as a model for the South Pacific region (ref. 43, Annex 7). (e) The road traffic administration improvements in vehicle and driver administration, and in traffic management, are being implemented more effectively now since the transfer of responsibilities from the police to MWTI during the 2003 rationalization of ministry portfolios. The road safety awareness campaign was led and staffed internally and this is expected to continue; and (f) This project is followed by the second phase, IAM-2, which is building on the activities started under this project and reinforcing the outcomes.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: The residual activities of IAM-1 have already been implemented by the agencies responsible and financed under IAM-2. In regard to MWTI staffing, urgent action needs to be taken to fill two vacant positions so that the long-term planning and implementing of the infrastructure maintenance plan can continue and annual budgets and work programs can be prepared through the SAMS asset management systems. The SAA Board is responsible for updating and authorizing the SAA business plan. The financial forecasts will be reviewed by MOF, SAA and the Bank in relation to the Program targets. Some further refinements and minor changes need to be made to the works carried out on the passenger terminal, but these have been phased into normal maintenance planning. The organizational structure and responsibilities for road transport administration, traffic management and road safety have been redefined in the new MWTI, and these will be reviewed and strengthened as part of the Phase 2 progression to statutory authority, such as a Land Transport Authority. MNRE has adopted the CIM planning process and it has become part of their regular operations. A program for regular monitoring of coastal features and infrastructure needs to be maintained. The services for managing geographic information have been incorporated into the new MNRE organization.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: Performance was highly satisfactory. Because Samoa is a small country with limited resources, it was necessary to identify a project with several different though related components in order to make it of a

- 16 - worthwhile size. IDA's team identified these components jointly with Government and developed the concepts to ensure that they were consistent with the Government and IDA strategies for the country. IDA assigned a team well experienced in working in small Pacific islands, and worked jointly with AusAID who assigned consultants to the team and provided consular coordination. The joint team delivered a well-designed project, focussing on the sound management of infrastructure assets as its core and including components that addressed the country's greatest needs in maintenance, replacement of old structures, coastal hazard management and improving air access for residents and a growing tourist trade. The project also supported the Government's efforts to restructure the public sector and strengthen investment selection procedures, IDA's lending strategy which emphasized institutional and policy changes to encourage public sector reform, private sector participation, and the infrastructure sector, and AusAID's program of institutional strengthening.

7.2 Supervision: Performance was fully satisfactory. Throughout the project IDA supervised this project closely, and jointly with AusAID. The project team had the same team leader throughout and, on average, two supervision missions were mounted each year. An AusAID staff consultant joined one mission each year and changed at mid-term. The project components needed some fine tuning as implementation progressed and this was carried out by the experienced project team without disruption to the smooth running of the project. As needed, the necessary specialists were brought in to deal with the aspects of aviation, coastal risk management, social issues, environment and financial management, under the leadership of the engineering speciality of the team leader.

7.3 Overall Bank performance: The overall performance was highly satisfactory. Through paying close attention to detail in the preparation and supervision of the project, giving good support during implementation and maintaining joint operation with the cofinancier, the outcome of this very complex, though small, project was very successful. This bodes well for the second phase project.

Borrower 7.4 Preparation: Performance was satisfactory. The Government was actively involved in the preparation of the project as it fitted well with its long-term strategy in the various sectors. They established an effective Steering Committee with broad representation and provided prompt strong support in authorizing the various stages of the Project and related budgets. However, a number of cost estimates were low because they did not adequately reflect contemporary engineering standards, best practices and site conditions.

7.5 Government implementation performance: Performance was satisfactory. The Government, as represented by the Ministry of Finance, was very supportive during the implementation of the project. The project administration arrangements worked effectively and short-comings were generally addressed in a reasonable time. Project accounting and disbursement management were generally very good. Procurement processing was slow on a number of occasions and required special attention, especially late in the Project. On those occasions when additional funds were needed to complete a component satisfactorily, the necessary funds were provided by Government.

7.6 Implementing Agency: Performance of the various implementing agencies was satisfactory overall. SAA performed very well, and

- 17 - expedited implementation of the airport components. DLSE, after an ineffective start, performed well and the coastal hazard management and information components were competently managed by the Project Component Manager, and became well institutionalized under a new Director. PWD performance was generally uneven, with strong leadership in the reform agenda but substantial delays in processing activities and appointment of the Project Component Manager - however the appointee was an experienced engineer and finally facilitated the multiple number of procurements involved. The PMU provided a skilled team and, when there was a sudden loss of the team leader and sale of the firm at mid-term, the Government was effective in managing the transition.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Overall the performance of the Borrower was satisfactory.

8. Lessons Learned Lessons learned from Phase 1 cover project design issues, policy issues, and project implementation issues, as follows: Project design: The project design concept of combining related subsectors in a broader sector project has worked satisfactorily, despite involving a total of five agencies. Keys to success include: (i) An effective multi-agency steering committee, empowered to make project cost and coordination decisions - in this case, with MOF in the chair, balanced coordination between implementing agencies was feasible, but only if the agency representatives were also empowered; (ii) A Project Management Unit, supplemented by specific project support in each implementing agency, proved critically important in this multi-agency project, and was still effective in building capacity due to the line reporting and accountability of each agency head for authorizing project expenditures; (iii) intensive monitoring and supervision with a good skill range, by both Bank and Government; and (iv) well-defined indicators relevant to each agency and some to the project. Adaptable Program Lending: The two-phase APL structure is working well from the Project perspective. Especially in respect of the public sector reform activities, the phasing has been helpful because for two agencies (PWD and DLSE) the pace and targets differed from that expected at appraisal, with both in the end exceeding the targets. In the case of public works, the merger with transport also had not been envisaged and thus the objectives and scope of Phase 2 have been adapted to the changed situation. For the roads and coastal components, the phasing has enabled a rolling program approach to be adopted, with some road activities being deferred for cost reasons and roll-out of the coastal management plans being advanced from 12 percent to 30 percent The Government had reservations concerning fiscal space when approaching Phase 2 due to changed financial commitments, however the long-term Program structure and some flexibility with the project size resolved those issues. Public Sector Reform in Small Island States: The public works experience shows that sector reform can be introduced smoothly when the timing can be chosen - in this case, alignment of a national reform agenda, sector political will, committed executive leader, comprehensive consultations and a sound, well-designed plan. Built-in support of fledgling business units for the transition period was successful. Stronger attention needs to be paid to the staffing continuity, skills and experience needed to launch the new organization, and the shallow market for professional and managerial staff in small island states is a significant risk to be addressed. Emergency Risk Management: The introduction of hazard risk management into public sector management needs a number of elements to be successful. The model developed here comprised (i) a national strategy for natural hazard risks, (ii) a series of community-based management plans that are based on objective risk assessments and active community participation and jointly authorized by leaders and the Government; and (iii) a specific short-term program and budget for activities and works. These

- 18 - proved successful in the preparation stage, however it is recognized that sustainability depends also on other stakeholders. Stakeholders such as construction and business interests can pre-empt the sustainable solution if there are inadequate controls over private development and private incentives. In regard to financing, the support of a Program of this size, continuity and duration has enabled the momentum and the resources to be mobilized to implement the whole strategy and implementation - typical regional initiatives generally have difficulty progressing past a pilot stage due to the challenge of scaling up, and thus international or bilateral agencies have a vital role to play in helping to implement a complete and effective risk management framework in practice. Lastly the Project experience emphasizes the importance of incorporating a risk prevention and mitigation approach in infrastructure planning, including sustainable nonstructural solutions, to minimize costly damages and economic disruption in the event of an emergency. Project Implementation Issues: The preparation of fiduciary arrangements such as procurement and financial management needs to cover the whole transaction cycle in order to streamline the process. In this case, the authorization of standard procurement documents and processing needs to be agreed through the line agency, the procurement oversight body, and the legal authority/advisor in advance so that micro-managing, revision and delays are avoided. This should aim at harmonization of documents and procedures, with a stable country system.

9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency:

1. Project Objectives, Design and Implementation

The Borrower feels that the project was well designed and acknowledges the assistance of the Bank in helping to bring cohesion to such a diverse project with four different implementing agencies. We have come to appreciate that good design and preparation were crucial elements for the overall success of the project. The only concern with the project preparation would be that some of the estimates were well below the subsequent tender prices.

The project fitted the Government’s policy framework as set out in the Statement of Economic Strategy (1996) which involves the enabling of the private sector, strengthening of human resources and the reform of the public sector. The use of an adaptable programme loan has been invaluable for the transfer of service provision from the public to the private sector. The steady supply of opportunities to supply infrastructure design, supervision and construction services over a period of several years is helping to build capacity in the private sector. It has also allowed opportunities for the project to be adjusted between phases and synchronized to suit the ongoing developments in public sector reforms.

The objectives of the project were simply stated and provided a clear focus for the overall purpose of the project which for the purposes of implementation was broken down into 97 separate components. The large number of components sometimes seemed a daunting procurement challenge in terms of maintaining the overall schedule. However, given the diverse nature of the project, the number of implementing agencies (4), and the need to provide plentiful opportunities to the fledgling local private sector we believe it was appropriate and perhaps unavoidable that the procurement was packaged in this manner.

Part A of the project being the works at Faleolo International Airport got off to an excellent start with rapid appointment of the design and supervision services in 1999. For financial reasons some works components under Part A had to be deferred to 2000 but everything was substantially complete by November 2000. There were delays with the delivery of fire engines from Europe leading to the deduction of liquidated damages and insurance claims but this component was successfully concluded in April 2001.

- 19 - Part B Components were hampered by a delay in the recruitment of a suitable Project Component Manager for PWD, and the redirection of funds to airport works in the first year of the project. Subsequently things improved but increases to the cost of components (including those in parts A, C and D) above the original project estimates caused a number of the B components to be deferred to the second phase. They will however all be completed in the overall IAMP.

Part C: This component proceeded satisfactorily throughout. The scope was amended to increase the number of CIM Plans from 5 to 15.

Part D: Some initial delays were encountered with the procurement of the services for the significant D1 component while the TOR were carefully reviewed and refined. After the services were procured the consultants developed two alternative strategies for the reforms. One envisaged the establishment of business units within the PWD for later privatization and the other, eventually adopted, was for a more direct transfer of most functions to the private sector. Implementation proceeded very smoothly thereafter.

Part E: The arrangements that were eventually adopted for the management of this project were initially questioned by the Borrower which led to some delay in the procurement of the PMU and the Credit being declared effective. However, the implementation of the project has demonstrated that the model that was adopted, (using an interdepartmental Steering Committee supported by a full time PMU provided by a private firm, and individual consultants as Project Component Managers in each Implementing Agency), has been a very effective means of delivery.

2. Achievement of Objectives

The Borrower is satisfied that the project has been successful in achieving its objectives.

(i) International air transport infrastructure is sustainably adequate for economic growth: The project has brought Faleolo International Airport to compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and improved the level of customer satisfaction amongst travellers. Airport capacity has been enhanced. The financial viability of SAA is improving with 69% of costs covered by income at December 2004. This is expected to further improve following the closure of Fagalii Airport in January 2005.

(ii) Reliability and Safety of Road Assets is improved: Due to the deferral of a number of components due to lack of financial resources this objective cannot be considered to be entirely achieved. However, four priority bridge replacements were completed and two areas with heavy pedestrian traffic were made much safer due to the construction of pedestrian facilities. Design work was completed on all other components. This objective will still be met within the overall IAMP.

(iii) Environmentally and socially sustainable management of coastal infrastructure is initiated: An excellent database of maps, aerial photographs with GIS layers for topography and hazards has been established. A substantial inroad has been made on putting in place sustainable planning for the improvement of resilience in coastal communities through the preparation of CIM Strategy and CIM Plans which respect Samoan culture and customs. EIA processes have been applied to all components under IAM-1 and to a number of other projects as well. COEPS have been developed and used in contract specifications.

(iv) Management of Infrastructure Assets is becoming service oriented involving public, private and

- 20 - community Stakeholders: It is considered that a major reform was implemented under this component with the service provision for road infrastructure design, construction and maintenance transferred totally to the private sector and the establishment of asset management capabilities and a road sector plan in the new Ministry of Works. This was achieved with support from all stakeholders including staff of the former PWD. The final outcome gave the private sector an even more significant involvement as the service provider than was envisaged during project preparation. Road user management services were also strengthened and restructuring of DLSE was facilitated.

3. Major factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes:

The major factors affecting implementation were as follows:

(i) Delay in appointing the PMU while the Borrower reconsidered the model proposed during project preparation. The establishment of the PMU was a condition for effectiveness of the Credit and so this delayed the effectiveness date which was extended twice. This had no serious effect on project outcomes as an interim project manager was appointed.

(ii) The delay in identifying a suitable candidate for the position of Project Component Manager in the PWD led to an almost corresponding one-year delay in the implementation of the part B components. As a result of the slow start, part B had to absorb the full impact of cost increases in parts A, C and D that had proceeded in advance, as well as increases in the cost of part B. This meant that the outcome was affected as there were insufficient financial resources to implement the full scope of part B.

(iii) Actual costs substantially exceeded estimates in all parts of the project. Although the Borrower increased its contribution to the project finances a number of components still had to be deferred to phase 2.

(iv) Delays in procurement towards the end of the project caused some slippage on the programme. The main causes were a misunderstanding between the Implementing Agencies and the Attorney General’s Office on the appropriate timing for legal review, and the duration of the legal reviews. It is considered that there will be a better understanding of the procedural steps in Phase 2.

(v) Delays in submissions of designs by both international and local consultants caused major slippage to the implementation schedule. This, together with (iv) above, led to a request for an extension of the loan period from 31 December 2002 to 31 March 2004.

(vi) Capacity constraints in the implementing agencies meant that counterparts could not always work alongside consultants. This was partly overcome by training workshops to build capacity but staff shortages are recognized as a threat to sustainability, particularly in the reformed Ministry of Works.

4. Bank and Borrower Performance

The Borrower was highly satisfied with the performance of the Bank. It was particularly beneficial to have continuity of Bank personnel from the time of preparation through to completion. Clearances were for the most part timely and supervision was enthusiastic and comprehensive. We were given considerable assistance by the Bank staff and found the approach to be helpful and flexible rather than critical and

- 21 - pedantic.

We consider the Borrower’s performance to be highly satisfactory. Counterpart funds have always been made available to suit the implementation programme except in FY99/00. That year the budgeted amount was insufficient to the increase of the cost of airport works tender prices compared to the pre-bid estimates. The problem was resolved by using value engineering to reduce the cost of the contract combined with some re-scheduling. The final contribution of the Borrower exceeded the original financing plan by about 33 percent.

Procurement was carried out reasonably effectively in a completely open and transparent manner as required by Bank guidelines and the Government of Samoa procedures. It is acknowledged that there were some delays in obtaining legal clearances for contract award but this was partly due to a misunderstanding about the timing of the legal review, which has subsequently been rectified. The administration procedures for the project and the financial management system worked effectively and efficiently throughout. The Steering Committee met regularly and took prompt action to overcome any constraints that were impeding progress.

5. Lessons Learnt

(i) The value of good project design and preparation.

(ii) The need for clear lines of communication between implementing agencies and consultants providing design or supervision services.

(iii) In the reformed agency for public works, the need to adequately empower the supervision consultants with sufficient authority to administer the construction contracts on behalf of the agency.

(iv) The value of an overall PMU to co-ordinate activities and provide support to the implementing agencies in a project that has more than one implementing agency.

(v) The value of strong consultative procedures and the value of local involvement in the project. (b) Cofinanciers: Partner Comments By AUSAID:

While acknowledging the overall achievements of the project, it was not entirely successful from an AusAID perspective. AusAID is of the view that the emphasis was on "getting the job done" on time and the opportunity to develop the PWD staff by using consultants to coach and mentor the staff was lost. Time pressures on consultants meant that they actually carried out tasks which - under a different project design - could have been done by staff. AusAID needs to be sure that in any future institutional strengthening projects (ISPs) co-financed with other donor partners, it ensures that the lessons learned in other ISPs are taken into account in the initial project design. (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):

10. Additional Information N/A.

- 22 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome / Impact Indicators: 1 Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR Actual/Latest Estimate Key transport and coastal infrastructure 100% Airport 100% assets upgraded Road and bridges 70% Coastal and environmental 100% (except seawalls 20%) Institutional development 100%

Output Indicators: 1 Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR Actual/Latest Estimate International Airport Upgraded to 15-yr Overall 100% Overall 100% capacity and ICAO standard - Main runway 3000 m, grooved surface - Air Traffic Control upgraded, resited - ICAO Safety standards Cat. 9 - Terminal performance IATA Cat. C Road, bridge and pedestrian facility works Overall 70% 4 bridges built (67%). program implemented Road rehabilitation (0%) (deferred) 2 footpaths, related works (50%) Implementation of coastal infrastructure Number of Districts adopting CIM Strategy National CIM Strategy adopted. management strategy and Plans = 3 - District CIM plans implemented = 15 (500% of target, 43% of country) Coastal hazard and land maps available 100% coverage - 100% coastline (700 km) mapped x 3 hazards - Aerial photos, topographical & contour maps available 100% coverage of country - Coastal protection built - 0 of 3 sites 0 of 3 seawalls (deferred) PWD reform stage of adoption Downsizing complete; Downsizing (83 percent staff reduction) - Asset mgt (SAMS) & financial mgt systems complete 100% operational - 3 Business units operational - SAMS installed, operational - Accounting system installed Road Safety Action Plan implemented RSAP implemented RSAP implemented 2000-2003 (RASP). RTAS systems applied by Police - RTAS (registration and licensing systems) - Vehicle registration and Driver licensing operational in MWTI and applied. system operational MNRE (DLSE) institutional review Completed MNRE reorganized based on review.

- SAA financially viable 69% full costs covered - Operating income/expenses = 126% - Total income/expenses = 77% Financial progress (% of total) 100% revised cost 100% Revised cost = WST 61.08 million. Cost transferred to Phase 2 = WST 13.15 million. Revised cost full scope = WST 74.15 million.

1 End of project

- 23 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Appraisal Component US$ million US$ million A. Airport Infrastructure 6.52 8.78 135 B. Road System Infrastructure 4.04 3.85 95 C. Coastal Infrastructure Provision 2.01 2.43 121 D. Institutional Development 2.67 3.28 123 E. Project Management 1.13 1.46 129 Total Baseline Cost 16.37 19.80 Physical Contingencies 1.61 Price Contingencies 0.86 Total Project Costs 18.84 19.80 Total Financing Required 18.84 19.80

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost NCB Other 1. Works 5.40 4.90 0.00 0.00 10.30 (3.70) (3.50) (0.00) (0.00) (7.20) 2. Goods 1.90 0.30 0.20 0.00 2.40 (1.90) (0.30) (0.20) (0.00) (2.40) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 4.80 1.30 6.10 (0.00) (0.00) (4.80) (0.00) (4.80) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 7.30 5.20 5.00 1.30 18.80 (5.60) (3.80) (5.00) (0.00) (14.40)

- 24 - Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost NCB Other 1. Works 6.95 3.07 0.00 0.00 10.02 (4.73) (1.91) (0.00) (0.00) (6.64) 2. Goods 1.55 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.69 (1.48) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (1.62) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 6.56 1.53 8.09 (0.00) (0.00) (5.48) (0.00) (5.48) 4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 8.50 3.21 6.56 1.53 19.80 (6.21) (2.05) (5.48) (0.00) (13.74)

1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies. 2/ Includes civil works and goods procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to statutory authority.

Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Percentage of Appraisal Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. A. Airport Infrastructure 5.11 1.64 5.84 2.94 114.3 179.3 B. Road System 3.20 0.98 2.75 1.10 85.9 112.2 Infrastructure C. Coastal Infrastructure 1.68 0.52 1.71 0.72 101.8 138.5 Provision D. Institutional 1.43 1.30 1.98 1.30 138.5 100.0 Development E. Project Management 1.18 1.46 123.7 Unallocated 1.80 0.0 Total Financing 14.40 3.14 1.30 13.74 4.76 1.30 95.4 151.6 100.0

- 25 - Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

1. Introduction. The methodology used for re-evaluation of the project economic analyses was the same as used at appraisal, which is cost-effectiveness for the airport component and cost-benefit approach for the road component. The key assumptions were also the same as used at appraisal, with traffic flows and construction costs updated to reflect actual flows and costs in 2004.

2. Component A. Airport Infrastructure. The component as a whole was justified on the basis of the extent of the impact and adjustments that would be imposed on the economy if the airport had to be closed, even temporarily, as a result of failing to maintain the airport infrastructure, at the pending safety and technical standards. This basis is confirmed by recent information, e.g.: (i) 95 percent of tourist expenditure comes from tourists arriving by air: in 2002, 75 percent of these entered through Faleolo, and this rose to over 90 percent from 2005 when Fagali’i airport was closed; (ii) Tourism directly accounted for 5.5 percent of the Gross National Product, and 10 percent when tourism-related services (tourism accommodation and restaurant services and other domestic transport services) are included; and (iii) Tourism and related services accounted for 14 percent of employment.

The scope of work was substantially as appraised. Since the operational safety and technical standards are governed by International Civil Aviation Authorities for which there are limited technically feasible alternatives, the basis of assessment is cost-effectiveness, as follows:

(a) Operational and Safety Standards. The Faleolo Airport improvements are evaluated in Table A3.1. The airport facilities now comply with ICAO standards. A safety Audit Report (SAR, 2001) of the SAA and its airports, including Faleolo International Airport, conducted by the New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority in 2001 certified the airport to be well maintained with no safety issues. The runway was certified to be in excellent condition. Regarding the rescue fire services, the new fire station had faster response times thereby removing the need for vehicles to go to standby during aircraft operations, and with the new emergency vehicles, Category 9 coverage was available in the airport as compared to the ICAO requirement of category 8 (and the original category 7). The new air traffic control tower facility was certified to be of a high standard. Air navigation aids were upgraded by SAA in 2004 to complete all requirements.

(b) Airport Service Delivery. The passenger processing performance includes passenger and baggage processing times, baggage claim and customs inspection times. The performance standards conform to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) requirements for Category C operations, small international airports. An opinion survey of airport terminal users conducted in 2001 reported very high rates of passenger satisfaction with the arrival and departure services and overall impression of the airport following the terminal works improvements. The average processing rates following the improvements were reported to be on average: (i) Immigration 10.5 seconds/person (ii) Baggage handling (a close indication of total processing time from immigration to exit)- 23 minutes total (iii) Customs clearance 17 seconds/person.

- 26 - Table A3 1. Faleolo Airport Improvements

Infrastructure Cost (USD ‘000) Traffic Annual Condition and Status Growth Rate Remarks (1998-2002) Estimated Actual Paving and Ancilliary 2, 470 3,892 Aircraft movements Recommended by Safety works (including (+58%) 11% FIA v. 0% ICAO safety audit requirements rehabilitation and national total (1998) complies with extension of the runaway (tripled to >9,000 from ICAO from 2,700m to 3,000m, 2005 when Fagalii requirements since lightning/Taxiway and closed) Nov 2000 apron) Passenger movements 6.8% Buildings (includes 2,200 3,059 Raise passenger Passenger terminal, ATC Tower and (+39%) processing processing Fire Station) standards to IATA performance Category C complies with IATA operations standards for Category C operations since April 2001 Equipment (includes fire 1,200 894 ICAO category 7 Complies with tenders) (-26%) raise to Category 8 ICAO category 9 requirements. standards from Jan 2000. 5,870 7,845 (+34%)

(c) Commercial viability of Samoa Airport Authority (SAA). The capacity development assistance aimed to help SAA operate on a commercially viable and self-financing basis. Table 3.2 presents a financial summary of SAA from 1997/98 to 2003/04. This shows that SAA now has a positive operating cash flow and is gradually absorbing debt servicing since 2001/02, as follows: (i) Operating income increased consistently by about 8 percent p.a. due to increases in airport landing charges, building rentals, ground handling and passenger departure charges (an increase from WST 20 to WST 30). However, over 90 percent of revenue comes from tariffs, and little additional revenue was gained from concessions and other sources. (ii) Operating expenses increased substantially by about 50 percent with the new facilities, due in part to higher operating standards and in part to higher maintenance costs. SAA took cost reduction measures from 2003/04 onwards. (iii) Since 2000/01, expenses increased due to debt servicing in respect of on-lending from the IDA credit – SAA is one of few State-owned Enterprises required by MOF to repay a foreign loan sourced through the Government. (iv) After years of operating losses, the airport showed an operating surplus from 1999/2000 onwards. Although the overall net income has been negative since 2001/02 when debt servicing began, the net income is improving steadily and the operating cash flows are positive (operating cash flows is approximated by deducting depreciation charges from operating losses).

- 27 - Table 3.2. Financial Summary of the Samoa Airport Authority (years ending June 30,1996 through June 30, 2004 (in WST million, nominal prices)

Profit and Loss 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 (actual) (actual) (actual) (actual) (actual) (budget) Income Departure Tax 1.886 1.804 2.704 3.308 2.986 2.958 4.133 Landing Fees 1.354 1.370 2.421 2.736 2.435 2.659 2.650 Concessions 0.110 0.075 0.352 0.520 0.439 0.320 0.461 Other 0.144 0.244 0.197 0.141 0.120 Subtotal -- 5.621 6.809 6.056 6.325 7.636 (operating income) Other 0.110 0.150 0.149 0.137 0.113 0.141 0.120 Total Income 3.664 3.524 5.770 6.946 6.169 6.467 7.756 Expenses Operating Expenses 1.525 1.643 3.395 3.957 4.913 5.059 4.800 Depreciation 2.400 2.400 1.977 2.576 3.422 3.628 3.700 Interest ------0.321 1.163 1.213 1.250 Other ------0.079 0.076 0.155 0.241 0.250 Total Expenses 5.441 5.431 5.451 6.931 9.654 10.151 10.000 Net Income (Loss) (1.777) (1.887) 0.319 0.015 (3.485) (3.684) (2.244)

3. Component B.1 Bridge Replacement. The economic evaluation was based on benefits arising from avoiding the costs of bridge collapse. Four of the six bridges included at appraisal were constructed and financed under Phase 1, namely Tua’efu, Lelata, Saleia and Falevao, completed by December 2002. The actual costs were close to estimates except for the Lelata bridge, where a more substantial structure was required. The benefits evaluated include savings in vehicle operating cost and time from avoiding the need for detour and from widening capacity from one lane to two. Road safety was also enhanced but has not been represented in economic terms. Table 3.3 presents a summary of the replacements and the results of the cost-benefit analysis. The overall economic rate of return (EIRR) is 42 percent. The overall economic net present value (NPV), based on a 12 per discount is WST 73.4 million with an overall benefit/cost ratio of 10.6.

Table 3.3. Key Characteristics of Bridge Replacements

Bridge Cost AADT Outturn Function / Remarks (WST ,000) (Veh/day) Benefit:Cost Ratio Estimated Actual Tua’efu 1,200 1,310 1,176 11.1 1-lane steel truss replaced by 2-lane (+9%) concrete bridge Lelata 1,200 2,597 4,670 5.9 2-lane concrete bridge (+116%) Saleia 1,500 1,302 150 5.2 2-lane concrete bridge (-13%) Falevao 2,500 2,431 250 11.9 2-lane concrete bridge (-3%) Overall 6,400 7,640 10.6 NPV = WST 73.4 million (+19%)

4. Component B.3 Pedestrian Traffic Schemes. Two of the four pedestrian traffic schemes were completed under Phase 1, at Beach Road and Covent Street completed in December 2002. The actual costs

- 28 - were five times higher than the estimated costs because (i) design standards were raised by the Borrower to include concrete paved sidewalks and improved drainage; and (ii) substantial landscaping was incorporated to enhance the environmental impact of the urban center.

For the pedestrian facilities, the cost-benefit evaluates the expected savings deriving from reduction in accident fatalities as the switching value relative to the cost of works. The switching value on average (assuming 50 percent reduction in accidents and costs averaged over 20 years facility life, with a discount rate of 10 percent) is = WST 30,540 per fatality (compared with the Accident Compensation Board guide of WST 40,000 for statistical compensation of fatalities). This basis understates the full benefits on account of the substantial positive externalities associated with the drainage improvement and the environmental enhancement.

Table 3.4: Pedestrian Traffic Schemes

Prior accident rate Pedestrian Location Cost (WST ,000) (fatalities/yr) Traffic Remarks Est Actual Beach Road 170 938.5 3 High Main road within Apia business district Covent Street 120 623.4 5 High Parallel to Beach Road, servicing businesses 290 1,561.9 8

4. Component C, Coastal Infrastructure Risk Management. As the two seawall facilities appraised for the project were changed and deferred to Phase 2, no re-evaluation is made. Substantial benefits are expected to accrue from the institutional impact of the introduction of a risk management strategy (CIMS) and its implementation through Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans (CIM plans, or the current Sustainable Management Plans), but no attempt has been made to quantify these. There was a significant reduction in the damage incurred from tropical cyclone Heta in January 2004 which was attributable to the many coastal risk reduction measures that had been adopted under previous programs.

- 29 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 9/5/1997 3 Task Team Leader/Engineer (1) Sr. Financial Analyst (1) Transport Economist (1) 11/30/1997 3 Task Team Leader/Engineer (1); Country Officer Samoa (1), Coastal Engineering Specialist (Consultant) (1). 05/01/1998 7 Task Team Leader/Engineer (1) Sr. Economist (1), Environmental Specialist (1), Highway Engineer (Consultant) (1), Coastal Engineering Specialist (Consultant) (2), Road Safety Specialist (Consultant) (1)

07/24/1998 7 Task Team Leader/Engineer (1), Sr. Economist (1), AusAID Team Leader (1), AusAID Institutional Specialist (Consultant) (1), Environmental Specialist (1), Highway Engineer (Consultant) (1), Coastal Engineering Specialist (Consultant) (1)

Appraisal/Negotiation 12/11/1998 2 Task Team Leader/Engineer (1), Road Safety Specialist (Consultant) (1) 02/23/1999 4 Task Team Leader/Engineer (1), Counsel (1), Disbursement Officer (1), Safeguards Specialist (1). Supervision

06/01/1999 3 Team Leader/Engineer (1), S S Aviation Specialist (1), Coastal/Environmental (1), AusAID Engineeer (1). 12/16/1999 2 Team Leader/Engineer (1); S S AusAID Engineer (1) 05/20/2000 2 Team Leader/Engineer (1); S S Coastal/Environmental Specialist (1). 12/06/2000 4 Team Leader/Engineer (1); S S AusAID Engineer (1),

- 30 - Coastal/Environmental (1), Information Technology Consultant (1) 06/28/2001 3 Team Leader/Engineer (1); S S AusAID Engineer (1), Coastal/Environmental (1). 11/14/2001 2 Team Leader/Engineer (1); S HS Aviation Specialist (1) 03/11/2002 3 Team Leader/Engineer (1); S HS AusAID Infrastructure (1); Aviation Specialist (1) 08/24/2002 2 Team Leader/Engineer (1); S HS AusAID Representative (1) 02/10/2003 7 Team Leader/Engineer (1); Sr. S S Transprt Economist (1); Sr. Social Scientist (1); Sr. Financial Management Specialist (1); Coastal & Risk Management (1); AusAID First Secretary (1); AusAID Project Manager (1) 06/13/2003 5 Team Leader/Engineer; Asset S HS Management Spec. (1); Environment & Risk Management (1); Sr. Social Scientist (1); AusAID First Secretary (1) 03/12/2004 1 Team Leader/Lead Highway S HS Engineer (1) ICR 07/22/2004 1 Transport Engineer S HS (Consultant) (1)

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 56 316.4 Appraisal/Negotiation 8.8 48.9 Supervision 32.1 204.1 ICR 3.1 48.4 Total 100.0 617.8

- 31 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating Macro policies H SU M N NA Sector Policies H SU M N NA Physical H SU M N NA Financial H SU M N NA Institutional Development H SU M N NA Environmental H SU M N NA

Social Poverty Reduction H SU M N NA Gender H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Private sector development H SU M N NA Public sector management H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA

- 32 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating Lending HS S U HU Supervision HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating Preparation HS S U HU Government implementation performance HS S U HU Implementation agency performance HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU

- 33 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

1. Coastal Component Terminal Report (May 2003) 2. Samoa Transport Sector Review - Final Report (June 2003) 3. Samoa Airport Authority Faleolo International Airport Upgrade 2000 - Component Completion Report (February 2004) 4. Completion Report For the MWTI (ex-PWD) Project Components (July 2004) 5. Monitoring of Coastal Hazard Zone Stations of Samoa Islands - Final Report (February 2005) 6. Project Completion Report for PWD Institutional Reform and Asset Management Services (Pirams) Project (March 2004) 7. PWD Institutional Reform and Asset Management Services Road Sector Plan for Samoa 2002–2012 (March 2003) 8. IAMP Project Video and Script (May 2003) 9. Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Bill Final Report (May 2003) 10. Road Transport Administration & Safety Project Draft Completion Report (May 2002) 11. Strategy Reports Supporting the Samoa Airport Authority Business Plan 2001 (May 2002) 12. Minor Airports Economic, Financial and Policy Study - Incorporating Environmental & Social Impact Study - Fagalli, Maota And Asau Airports -Their Role, Use And Costs (2001) 13. Remote Road Feasibility Report (July 2003) 14. Alternative Routes WCR (July 2003) 15. SAA Business Plan November 2001) 16. D2.01 : ICT Conceptual Framework for Asset Information Management & Sharing (October 2001) 17. C1.01 : CIM Strategy Background Reports (October 2001) 18. RTAS Project - Legislative Review Report (October 2001) 19. Coastal Hazard Zone Mapping Final Report - Volume I (September 2001) 20. Coastal Hazard Zone Mapping Final Report - Volume II (September 2001) 21. DLSE Institutional Review Phase 1 Report - C1.01- Final (July 2001) 22. Minor Airports Economic, Financial & Policy Study - Fagalii, Maota & Asau Airports - Their Role, Use & Costs - Second Edition (June 2001) 23. Coastal, Environmental & Institutional Services - C1.01 - GIS System Specifications - Final version (April 2001) 24. PWD Institutional Reform & Asset Management Services - IT Needs Assessment (April 2001) 25. Coastal Hazard Zone Mapping Stage 2 Report (with attached letter) (April 2001) 26. Letter from DLSE re C1.01 Coastal Infrastructure Management Strategy (English & Samoa) (February 2001) 27. Coastal, Environmental & Institutional Services - C1.01, January 2001 (language - Samoan) (February 2001) 28. Stage I & II Coastal Hazard Mapping Reports (January 2001) 29. Asset Register (May 2000) 30. Press Release – Samoa Coastal Hazard Zone mapping field work (June 2000) 31. DLSE: CHZM stage II Report (April 2001) 32. ICT Conceptual Framework for Asset Information Managemetn and Sharing (October 2001) 33. CIM Strategy Background Report 1 - Existing Info & Env Review (October 2001) 34. CIM Strategy Background Report 2 - Conclusion (Consultation) (October 2001) 35. CIM Strategy Background Report 3 - Review of Project Components (October 2001) 36. CIM Strategy Background Report 4 - Principles and Assessment (October 2001) 37. CIM Strategy Background Report 5 - Preliminary Implementation Plan & Program for the

- 34 - Strategy (October 2001) 38. E1.02 Minor Airports Economic, Fin & Policy Study report (2nd Edition) and D5.01 SAA Business Strenghtening Study Report (May 2002) 39. PWD Institutional Reform & Asset Mgmt Services - Final Rd Sector Plan Vol. I & II (March 2003) 40. PIRAMS PWD Institutional Reform D1.01 (March 2004) 41. SAA Component February 2004 (May 2004) 42. WB Quality Assurance Group 'Quality At Entry' report of IAM-1 43. Not If But When - Adapting to Natural Hazards in the Pacific Islands Region, Policy Note, World Bank, 2006

- 35 - Additional Annex 8. Illustrations

Faleolo International Airport Departure Concourse

Cultural Artwork in Airport Passenger Terminal

Airport Fire and Rmergency Vehicles and Building

- 36 - Lelata Bridge, Apia

Convent Street footpaths under construction, Apia

Beach Road footpaths and traffic management, Apia

- 37 - Consultations with Pulenu’u at Solosolo village using hazard maps and aerial photographs

Aerial photo with hazard mapping and consultation annotations

Damaged seawall at Solosolo village

- 38 - - 39 - 13˚40' 14˚00' 10 Island Nuutele I. Nuulua Samusu FEBRUARY 2006 FEBRUARY IBRD 32860R Lalomanu Tiavea 5 Lepa Fagaloa Bay Uafato Saletele Musumusu Lotofaga Falefa Saluafata Fall Loan Number CR 3193 WSO CR 2132 WSO, 951 CR 535 WSO, 1657 WSO Saluafata MILES 0 Salesatele Falevao Sopo'aga Falevao Rivers and Villages Selected Towns National Capital Airports International Airport KILOMETERS 0 4 8 12 16 Salesatele Solosolo Solosolo 171˚40' 171˚40' Sapunaoa Lauli'i Saleilua UPOLU Lauli'i Current Project Earlier Projects Mt. Fito 1113 m. Fagali'i Fagali'i Airport Moataa Lelata Utumapu Mt. Vaito'a 800 m. APIA Tiavi Si'umu Road Rehab. Vaitele Mulinuu SAMOA Tua'efu Afiamalu 700 m. Lotofaga-Uta Mt. Fiamoe Fale'ula

Malie Coastal Le'auva'a Protection

Aleisa Sale'imoa 867 m.

Sa'anapu-uta Utuali'i Lotofaga-uta Sataoa-tai Mt. Siga'ele

Lepale Faleasi'u Unimproved Roads Unpaved Roads Paved Roads Elevations > 300 meters Salamumu Matautu Vaipapa Fasitoo-uta Savaia Tanumalala Rehab. Bridges Airport Fasitoo-uta Falelatai Falease'ela 172˚00' Leulumoega 172˚00' Airport Faleolo Manono-uta INFRASTRUCTURE ASSET MANAGEMENT PROJECT Mulifanua Island Apolima Island Manono ferry Manono-uta Tuasivi Safotulafai SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN SOUTH PACIFIC Saipipi Salelavalu Faga Asaga Tafuatai Lalomalava Tafuauta Vaiola Pu'apu'a Salelologa This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information Bank on the part of The World shown on this map do not imply, or any Group, any judgment on the legal status of territory, endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Airport Ma'ota Samalaeulu Satupa'itea 172˚20' 14˚00' 172˚20' Saleia Manase (Fr) Vaipouli French Sili Polynesia Ologogo Safotu Manase Gautavai Gataivai Palmyra Atoll (US) (NZ) Cook Islands Sasina Jarvis (US) SAVAI'I Ocean American Samoa (US)

North Pacific

(NZ) Sasina Niue KIRIBATI Letui 1858 m. LINE DATE

Mt. Silisili

Tokelau (NZ) Tokelau INTERNATIONAL SAMOA A'opo Baker (US)

Howland(US)

TONGA Taga SUNDAY

Is. (NZ) MONDAY Kermadec FIJI NEW ZEALAND Wallis and Wallis Futuna Is. (Fr) Sala'ilua TUVALU Utuloa Asau Airport (Aus) Tropic of Capricorn Tropic Norfolk ISLANDS Asau MARSHALL 'Auala ISLANDS SOLOMON Ocean (Fr) New 172˚40' 172˚40' South Pacific VANUATU Caledonia Lord (Aus) Howe Sataua Fagasa Satuiatua & Sala'ilua Papa N. Mariana Is. (US) NEW Falelima Guam (US) PAPUA GUINEA Neiafu Falelima OF MICRONESIA FEDERATED STATES FEDERATED AUSTRALIA Falealupo INDONESIA 13˚40' PALAU