ALLIES IN EMPIRE
The US & Portugal in Africa
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Vol. 17, No. 4 JUL Y-AUGUS.T 1970 Price $1.50 AFRI[A
JULY-AUGUST, 1970 About the Cover R VOL. 17, NO. 4 and this Issue TABLE OF CONTENTS The cover depicting an African guerilla appeared on the New Years card of the Mozambique Liberation Front
EDITORS: Georee W. Shepherd, Jr., Tilden LeMelle, Ezeldel Mphablele, Univ. of Denver Book Review Editor: W. A. E. Skurnik, Univ, of Colorado Maeaglag Editor: Shirley Shepherd Editorial Contributors Board: Robert Browne-Black Economic Research Council John Marcum-Univ. of Denver Fred Burke - SUNY at Buffalo Robert I. Rotberg- MIT Kenneth Carstens- National Council of Churches Donald Rothchild - UC at Davis Leo Cefkin- Colorado State Univ. James Scarritt- Univ. of Colorado Stanley Diamond - New School for Soc. Research Richard L. Sklar - UCLA William H. Friedland - UCSC Richard Stevens - Lincoln Univ. Collin Gonze- UAW Sheldon Weeks - Harvard Univ. George Houser - American Committee on Africa Peter Weiss - American Committee on Africa Betsy Landis- U. N, Immanuel Wallerstein - Columbia Univ,
The oplnlons expressed In AFRICA TODAY are not necessarily those of the Graduate School of International Studies or of the Center on International Race Relations. Published bi-monthly by Africa Today Associates in association with the Center on International Race Relations, University of Denver, University Park Campus, Denver, Colorado 80210. Founded by: The American Committee on Africa. Subscriptions: one year, $6.50: two years, $12.50; three years, $18.00 students: one year, $4.50. Foreign (except Canada and Pan America) add $2.00 per year. Sterling zone checks accepted. Advertising: Rates on request. Change of Address: Notify four weeks in advance advising old and new address, Unso licited manuscripts will not be returned unless requested and accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. @1970, Africa Today Associates, c/o Graduate School of Inter national Studies, University of Denver, University Park Cam pus, Denver, Colorado 80210. . -·- .. ~'}'-..}-.. ' : _t. UPDATE: ALLIES IN EMPIRE ..
···.;
Allies in Empire, an examination. of the support given by 'the US to Portu.-: · guese coJ,.onialism was written in ·1970. Some of' the .statisticar':ma'terial is now out of date, but the pamphlet still provides a useful guide tb the basic ·nature. of US policy towards Portuguese colonialism and the struggle of the African poeple for liberation. The trends identified in the pamphlet did. not change - they were simply accelerated in the fottr years until the April 1974 coup in Portugal brought to power a Government which responded to the African call for independence an~ initi.ated a rapid process of decolonization.
We have updated below some of the m_ost important statistical material in the pamphlet. .
US CORPORATIONS IN ANGOL~. (Page 7 seq. and pages 20-21)
1970-74 saw ·inc-rc.ssing US interel?t in_ the exploration of Angola 1 s signif icant oil resources. Several US firms obtained oil concessions. The Portuguese responded to the greater interest by increasing their demands on the Corporations. Thus new contracts all contained a clause that in times of emergency all oil produced would be supplied to the Portuguese Government.
Gulf Oil, Cabindd~
Gulf remained the largest single US investor,' in Angola~ with an invest ment totalling ~?333 ·million by 1975. In 1973 Cabinda Gul:t signed a new agree ---men-t >'lith 1ffie Po-rtuguese GO";ernmen-t-guaranteeing i ~essi-o-:r-, rights over some 5000 sq km on and off shore.
According to Gulf, by 1974 the Cabinda operation represented 6'{:; of. the ._ company 1 s total profits aid lop of their proved reserves.
Gulf continued to discover new -oil sources but also attempted to conceal the si.z.e of such discoveri.es. - Oil p~oduction increased steadily, reaching an estimated 150,000 ·:.. 170,000 barrals a day by 1975.
By 1973, Gulf continued to.make larger and larger payments to the Portu guese Government, providing vital income to the hard-press-ed regime. By 19 73, Gulf had paid $175 million to the Portuguese Government - $90 million of that being payments made in 1973 alone. (The Angolan Government military budget estimates for 1973 were $60 million, for 1974 they were .$70:miJ,.lion). The value of 1974 exports was $539 million; payment to the Portuguese had jumped to $392 million and it was estimated that in 197.5 the value of tibi:; royalty and other· payments to the Portuguese Government would reach·$500 million.
Gulf's oil exports in 1974 accounted.fof approximatel1 50% of all Angolan exports. ·.. , · ·o
Gulf continued production in 1975,-making some payments to the Transitional Goverrin1-ent. Gulf went on operating after the November-11th establishment of the 'Peeiples 1 Repub'J1ic of Angola - but in December anno-unced that it was sus- - pending operations and p'ayments at the urging of the -tis "State Department. $125 million was due the Angolan Government in taxes and royalties - but Gulf refused to.make these payments. Texacu.
Texaco continued to act as a major distributor in Angola, selling some 800,00 barrels cf petroleum in 1973. It also extended its exploration program, acting as the operator in a consortium with Petrangol and Angol. This consortium began to develop oil production, anS.,, in 1974 was producing some 13,000 barrels a day...... ·... .. -. .:. '..._"!·-' ~ ... ··.; Most sign::.ficafi.t how~~~r - 'v,¢fi -the ,Ve:ty gua,:pd,ed announcements relating to a major oil strike·' in·:: T~~aco r ?>. :6.e;J _: ( 1974) · coi:i<;:essiori area in tte San Antonio do Zaire area; while ·Te-Xai!:p· wqu)_d give only the most cautipus estimates of potential output tr~e Seiut l;l;: .t\frica,rt Fin1').ndai" Ma.il was predicting a d&ily ·--.- ·'-· output of 75,000 baricie§lq,J~: ~~ dB:Y . · . ~ · , •1·r:'; Jl :- .. , , <.-' ·. . ·. .. . .·.· •.r :·· · · .:·· z ; ·-~1 ·: . ··.··...... ;'
. . . .~ Other Oil Co~porations.
A number of US oil ~~~orations were granted exploratory concessions in 1974. Among these were Amoco Cuanza Petroleum Co. (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of Indiana) in a consortiumwith Continental Oil Co. and Occidental Petroleum; Esso Exploration (a subsidiary of Exxon); Amerada Hess Corporation, Cities Service Co -~ and Sun Qil Co. in a consortium. : ·t .... . These concessions· ran all the way ~p the coast, starting. at Benguela; and going as high as Santo . -~tonic do Zaire.
The Rockefellers.
Rockefeller -interests _have been reported to own a one third share in a large phos:rL'>:-.·· conce~sion covering most of Cabinda. The company, ·known as Companhia do·s Fosf~tos de~· Angola {COFAN ) started prospecting in 1969 and by 1972 was reported clos·e to beginning actual, exploitation.
: ,. ·. . . US TRADE WITH ANGOLA. ( Pages 16, 17)
US trade w:' . t;h Angola continued to grow. In 1973, the US overtook · Portugal to become the largest single market for Angolan products, buying 28% of the total value of exports, and 5o% of Angolan coffee. In 1974, for the first time, oil became Angolars largest single export, followed by coffee (27%), diamonds and iron ore, The US bought ..almost 50% of the oil exported - oil produced by Cabinda Gulf. In 1973, the US supplied 9% of Angola's imported products -mainly machinery, heavy earth moving ~quipment, aircraft.
US POLITICAL AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT.
In 1971, the US signed a new agreement with the Portuguese Government allowing the US continued use of the Azores Islands as a base iri ·exchapge for over $400 million in grants and Ex-Im loansand credits. Under attack for this action, the US denied that the credits could be used for military purposes, but the funds were used, inter el:ta,for the purchase of large Boeings, which -vwre used as troop transports by the r ortuguese. Critics of the Agreement suspected that there was almost certainly a "bidden clause" in the Agreement which allowed for the relaxation of the arms embargo . In the years that followed, there continued torbe evidence - well concealed but occaqionally visiole in small part-of significant military co-operation between the US .and the Portuguese regime. ALLIES IN· EMPIRE PART 1-U. S. Economic ·lnvolveme·nt
acceptance of brutal oppression; recognizing this, BY JENNIFER DAVIS the people turned to armed struggle. Wars of liberation began ip. 1961 in Angola, in 1963 in I wonder if we could contrive . . . some Guinea, and in 1964 in Mozambique. The Portu magnificent myth that would in itself guese have met the people with a massive and carry conviction to our whole community. well-equipped army, navy and air force, with a Plato on the art of ruling in The network of vicious secret police, and with armed Republic. settlers. As for the Portuguese Territorities, we In the face of this reality, U . . S. insistence shall continue to believe that their peo on the mythology of peaceful change loses any ples should have the right of sE!lf·deter innocence and acquires sinister implications. The mination. We will encourage peaceful U. S. appears to be shaping its policy primarily progress toward that goal. The declared in response to a concern for stability. A stable Portuguese policy of racial toleration Portugal in Europe, where, as part of NATO it is an important factor in this equation. is seen as part of the. so-called "free world" al We think this holds genuine hope for the liance against Communism; a stable Portugal in future. Africa, providing a known and friendly govern U. S. and Africa in the 70's, policy ment in an area which promises an increasingly statement signed by Secretary of profitable future. State Rogers and President Nixon, The U. S. Government . might well feel hap March 28, 1970. pier were Portugal to adopt a more flexible at titude to the African people of the three terri President Nixon's declaration . . . of tories--,government by co-option being prefer a pragmatic and peaceful American pol able to ·· government by force-but it has made icy is, in particular, a diplomatic victory increasingly clear that it will not support the for ·Ll.sbon, which has for nine years peoples' militant attempts at change. Thus the been fighting not only African rebels in U. S. Ambassador to the U. N., speaking against .its three African territories but a tor the December 1969 General Assembly condem rent of international censure for holding nation of Portugal's occupation of Africa, said: on to these territories. "We find in Paragraph 5 a new concept . . . a The Star, Johannesburg, South Af condemnation of the 'colonial war' which is al rica, April 4, 1970. legedly being waged by Portugal against people The benign tone of the Nixon statement is in its African territories. This type of blanket not new. It echoes a constant U. S. theme of condemnation is hardly likely to achieve a con the last 15 years that the Portuguese are making structive ·dialogue with the Government of progress, however slow, toward fundamental and Portugal."2 peaceful change in Africa. In one breath the U. S. legitimizes Portu In fact the myth of Portuguese non-racism gal's presence in Africa, denies its presence and reasonableness had been cle,arly shattered there as a "colonial" power, dismisses the three a decade ago when the peaceful demands of the liberation wars as "alleged" wars, implies that people for · basic economic and political rights the struggle is being carried ·on by a handful of the vote, the right to form trade unions, more agitators, and decrees "constructive dialogue" education-were met with bloody repression as the method any responsible group of people while most of. Africa moved toward political in would take to seek change. dependence. It was the Portuguese who chose The aim of this article is to show in some violence. In Angola in a protest march in 1960, detail: following the arrest of many political dis&dents, A. That Portugal's "declared policy of racial thirty people were killed, two hundred wounded toleration" and its willingness to partici and two villages were destroyed. In Mozambique pate in constructive dialogue leading to more than five hundred unarmed people were change are simply convenient myths. mowed down as they demonstrated for "more B. That Portugal intends to hold on to her liberty and more pay" at Mueda in 1960.1 In colonies and is deriving increasing eco Guinea-Bissau in 1959 dockworkers at Pidgiguiti nomic benefit from them. began a strike for higher wages; fifty men were C. That Portugal cannot hold on by herself shot by the police before the strike was broken. against the determined strength of the Clearly, peaceful protest meant the continued people of Angola, Mozambique, and
AFRICA TODAY 1 Guinea-Bissau, and is thus increasingly BACKGROUND turning to her Western Allies for aid. D. That despite its often declared policy of Portugal today rules the largest old-style support for the right of self-determina colonial empire left in the world. Her colonies. tion, the actual role played by the United mainly in Mrica, cover an area 22 times larger States, public and private, is that of com than her own. The empire is more than four mitted support for Portuguese. colonial hundred years old, though effective control of ism. Once again U. S. power is coming the three Mrican territories was established only down on the wrong side of the battle in the twentieth century, against tremendous line. opposition from the people. Colonialism is never a benevolent institution, for it binds two countries and economies togeth er in a master-and-servant relationship in which the needS of the "master" dominate and shape development in the "servant" country, inevitably distorting and crippling the economic, social, and political life of the subordinate people; but the nature and extent of the colonial effect can vary greatly, reflecting the degree of development of the metropolitan country. For some colonies the dynamically expanding needS of their metropoli Guine.a (Bissau) tan rulers brought subsidiary development lo cally. Until the last decade the Portuguese col onies had not seen even this limited measure of economic growth. The entire history of Portu gal's presence in Mrica has been that of wealth extraction at the most primitive level. Until 1836 the major economic activity was slave trading. The Portuguese tore ·some three million people out of Angola alone. So merciless were their depredations that while in. 1591 an Portuguese official assured the Portuguese Crown that the Colonies in densely populated country around Luanda would Africa - offer a plentiful supply of slaves "until the end Other white minority of the world," a century later local authorities dominated countries were deploring the serious decline of the popu lation and slave traders "had to travel for three months into the interior before reaching markets where slaves were sold."3 The internal economic system of Portuguese Africa wa:s based on slave labor until late in the nineteenth century. Official slavery ended in POPULATION 1875, but it was replaced by a forced-labor sys tem nearly as vicious. The law declared that Portugal 9,335,000 every man had the obligation to work: "if they Angola do not fulfill it, public authority may enforce 5,528,000 a fulfillment."4 (350,000-400,000 white) Mozambique 7,176,000 (150,000 white) People were driven to work on the planta tions, diamond mines, and public projects under Guinea 600,000-800,000 threat of imprisonment, beatings, and worse. Al (few thousand white) ternatively, particularly in Mozambique, Mricans There are no accurate census figures; esti were forced to cultivate crops such as cotton on mates vary tremendously. White settlement their own land under duress. Mozambique found has greatly increased in recent years after another source of profit in the export of men intensified effort by the Portuguese Gov to the South African gold mines. Under an agree ernment to encourage white settlement as ment first signed in 1901, and still in force, the a counter to the liberation movement suc mines' recruiting agency may recruit 100,000 men cesses. Thus Angola: 79,000 whites by 1950; from Mozambique a year. The South Mrican 209,000 whites by 1959; 400,000 whites by Government in turn guarantees that 47.5 percent 1968. (Sources: Portuguese Government In of all imports and exports for the Transvaal will formation Bureau, New York Times, July 7, be channeled through the Mozambique port, Lour 1968.) enco Marques. Mozambique also receives a bonus payment per head for each recruit. Wages in the
2 gold mines for these workers are less than $1 a there is growing opposition to tne regime, and day, but better than wages in Mozambique, and to the wars in ·Africa. Many have been arrested, thousands of men are still compelled to leave thousands .of young men have left Portugal to home and to work in South Africa to avoid the evade the draft and an unknown number are forced-labor levees of the Portuguese. in prison, and the protest continues to swell. Thus the African colonies provided the met ropolitan country with raw materials, an external, sheltered market and foreign exchange. Any INSIDE AFRICA-THE POLICE STATE money made in the colonies came from agricul The grim economic and political conditions tural products, cotton, coffee, cashews, peanuts existing in Portugal are intensified for the people . . . and the plantations and concessionary trad of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau by ing companies were all owned by Portuguese. the colonial situation. Industrial production was discouraged to avoid Forced labor was legally ended only in 1960. competition with metropolitan factories. Until then there were criminal penalties for Development of the colonies as a source of breaking a labor contract. Strikes are still illegal wealth was slow and the white settler population and the general tax levied on every male between remained small. Well into the middle of the 18 and 60 years of age forces men out into the 1950s the stagnation and political repression that labor market. gripped Portugal were reflected in the colonies Added to the general rigid political control in Africa. of the population is a passbook system little INSIDE PORTUGAL-POVERTY AND A different from that operative in South Africa. POLICE STATE "The Civil Identification Archives issues per Paradoxically, Portugal, although a colonial sonal identity cards. . . . On certain occasions power, is itself among the poorest countries in the cards must be presented to the local ad Europe, with a per capita Gross National Product ministration or the local PIDE representative. of only $457 in 1967.5 Industrial development is Proper identification aids one, for example, to coming late to a basically sluggish economy in obtain permission to move from one district to which the stagnating agricultural sector now con another, or to obtain a labor permit for a new tributes about 18 percent of G. N. P. while it is job. In the major cities the movement of Afri the sole income source for 35 percent of the cans in certain quarters is restricted by a working population. curfew."9 Wages are extremely low: 65 percent of the In contrast to South Africa, racial discrimina working population earns between $7.50 and tion is not enforced by law but the long years $21.50 weekly; 25 percent earns less than $7.50 of colonial rule have set a pattern similar in a week.6 Living conditions are grim. As late as practice. Portugal claims to be building a unified 1969, out of the 2.2 million dwellings in Portugal multi-racial society where social difference flows 12 percent had no kitchen, 72 perc·ent had no only from variation in education and achieve running water, 60 percent had no electricity and ment. After four hundred years of Po-rtugal's 62 percent had no sewerage.7 "civilizing mission," of the entire African popu Rigid political control is still wielded by the lation less than 5 percent in Guinea-Bissau, 10 coalition of commercial, military and church in percent in Angola and 15 percent in Mozambique terests put together by Salazar in the late 1920s. have managed to acquire bare literacy, and many Strikes and political protest are illegal . . . and Mozambicans learned to read during their labor there are hundreds of political prisoners in jail. stint in South Africa_Io The press is censored. opposition is silenced by The scorn for Africans inherent in the Portu the much feared PIDE (renamed the General guese attitude can be seen in the mechanism Directorate of Security in November 1969, but established for attaining tbis "multi-racial Portu unchanged in function). The law permits police guese nation." That mechanism is "assimilation," to hold citizens up to six months without making in other words abandoning' one's own heritage charges, and to re-arrest them for further six and becoming Portuguese, absorbing Portuguese month periods after a few hours of freedom. culture and adopting the .Portuguese language. The prisoner may be held incommunicado, not Until shortly after the beginning of the war being allowed to see a lawyer; even his family in Angola (1961), acquiring assimilado status in may not know that he has been arrested. Torture volved a complicated legal procedure which in is freely used to extract confessions; in addition cluded proof of ability to speak correct Portu prison conditions are so bad that Portugal is the guese, proof of a certain income level and proof only country in Western Europe which refuses of "good character;" numerous documents and to allow the Red Cross to scrutinize its cells.s certificates had to be submitted to the authorities No political parties are allowed apart from and a fee had to be paid. Only thus could an the official National Union, and the right to African become a Portuguese citizen and even vote is restricted to those who can read and then he had to carry a special identity card to write Portuguese. (There is an estimated 30 per7 prove he was a citizen. The white settlers had cent illiterll
AFRICA TODAY 3 Africans did not qualify for assimilation and alliance of efforts in which the races collaborate lived under a special set of regulations for ... ". He spoke of the wars as "a police action" indigenas. In 1961 this special system was abol being carried out to prevent "the terrorists from ished on paper, and all Africans were made carrying out their subversive activity."l6 Em Portuguese citizens. Despite the technical im phasis is on continuity with past policy rather provement in African status, true relationships than on change. Recent months have seen a new continue unchanged, with a network of laws, wave of political arrests.17 and, above all, de regulations and procedures designed to ensure fense spending remains the ma:jor s•ingle pri the control of a large African population by a ority in the 1970 Portuguese budget. white minority regime. Increasing emphasis in the African educational system on Portuguese as a major language, and the herculean attempts DEFENSE EXPENDITURE-THE HIGH COST being made to attract white settlers are further OF THE WAR indications of a basic determination to maintain Portugal's military expenditure has been ris Portuguese (and white) supremacy. ing ste·adily since 1961, and had reached 48 per As in Portugal, so in the colonies, the fran cent of central government expenditure by 1965. chise is dependent on literacy. This effectively This is very high. Comparable figures for other disenfranchises almost the whole African popu countries are: U. S. 42 percent, U. K. 34 percent, lation. In the 1969 elections for the National France 32 percent, West Germany 26 pe·rcent, Assembly it is estimated that at best 4 percent and Italy 17 percent.lS The 1968 budget initially of the total population in Angolan qualified as allocated 35 percent (some $273 million) of all voters; in Mozambique only 1.15 percent of the expenditure to military costs. Final appropria total population was registered to vote.l2 tions that year mounted to 48.7 percent19 of the Wage levels for white and black vary signifi total once emergency allocations had been added cantly. In Mozambique the average white. indus in. The Portuguese budget is very complex, mak trial worker currently earns more than ten times ing it difficult to ascertain the precise amounts the wage of the black industrial worker.l3 In involved in military expenditure. The central 1967, by order of the Governor-General, the mini budget i~ divided into Ordinary and Extra-ordin _mum mixed (cash and kind) wage for workers ary expenditure, the latter co·vering Defense, over the · age of 18 in Luanda was fixed at 25 Security and Development. By 1969 allocations escudos a day (just under $1).14 There are fre under the Extra-ordinary Budget had already quent reports of equally qualified people, such reached two thirds of Ordinary expenditure. In as doctors, nuPSes and others, carrying out ex addition it has become increasingly common to actly the same functions but being paid differ find emergency allocations made for defense ently according to their racial extraction.l5 spending during the year; thus it is now com monly estimated that approximately 50 percent of Portugal's annual government revenue is be THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE ing soaked up by the war. Each colony also adds its own budget allocations for military defense. The advent of Caetano as Prime Minister of Such vast military expenditure would be dif Portugal signalled a burst· of speculation about ficult for any country to sustain. Portugal, a very the chances of liberalization inside Portugal and poor country, can only survive because it has the likelihood of a changed poHcy in Africa. found a way to ease the burden-foreign military Commentators pointed to the mounting pressures aid, investments, and loans. inside Portugal caused by the great cost of the war, to inflation and a severe labor shortage, to growing political unrest; to these factors they THE STRUGGLE TO HOLD THE COLONIES added the increasing drive from among a section Dete11mined to stay in Africa, Portugal is us of the new industrialists for closer economic ing the two-pronged strategy characterized by links with Europe and they concluded that Lis Amilcar Cabral, leader of the struggle in Guinea bon might well loosen its stranglehold on the Bissau and Cape Verde, as a "policy of smile and people at home and in Africa. blood."20 There has in fact been little liberalization Portugal has an expeditionary force of be and no sign at all of a loosening of the grip on tween 130,000 and 150,000 men in Africa. Esti the colonies. Portuguese President Tomas in a mates place 60,000 in Angola, 40,000 in Mozam speech prior to the 1969 elections stressed: "The bique and 37,000 in Guinea. In addition an in future of Portugal is not to be debated but de creasing number of African troops and militia fended." Candidates in the general election were (possibly 40,000 or more) are now being used not permitted to discuss colonial policies. Premier alongside Portuguese troops.21 Caetano, commenting on his African policy in April 1970, said, "Self-determination cannot be These three Portuguese armies far outnum expressed by sheets of paper put in the hands ber estimates of the liberation movements' gueril of natives in the bush. It is rather proved by la strength in the three countries: Angola: 7,000 in peaceful living under the Portuguese flag in an the East, 7,000 in the North;22 Mozambique: 20,000
4 well-trained, 10,000 of them well-equipped;23 support given them by the African population in Guinea-Bissau: less than 10,000 armed persons.24 the countryside. The Portuguese also have vastly superior Recognizing this, the Portuguese have devel fire-power, making constant use of helicopters, oped new techniques to fight the wars. bombers, and naval boats on the rivers of all Today the possession of territory is three territories and in the estuaries of Guinea unimportant, it is the population that is Bissau. A major part of the equipment, airplanes, important.... The object of war remains boats, arms, napalm and bombs, comes from the same but the means of waging war Portugal's NATO allies. have changed. Yet the liberation armies have won signifi Admiral Rogerio de Castro e Silva; cant victories in the last few years. They have director, Naval Institute of War, liberated large areas in each of the three terri Lisbon. 1969. tories, as. much as two-thirds of the whole coun try in Guinea-Bissau. They have built schools If the liberation army draws its strength and clinics, improved agricultural techniques,. set from the people then it becomes necessary to up markets and involved the people in establish remove the people. Thus there is now wide· ing local government. Their strength lies in the spread regroupment of the population in the Portuguese zones into strategic villages known as aldeamentos. For example, in the Cabo Del gado district of Mozambique the Portuguese es tablished a cordon sanitaire, destroyed all crops and herded 250,000 people into settlements de fended by troops and militia. People are being LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN driven into such hamlets all over Angola, Mo zambique and Guinea-Bissau. The effect is vividly "PORTUGUESE AFRICA" described by a New York Times reporter writing from Angola: "Today from a small plane flying Angola: GRAE (Revolutionary Govern over the East the countryside appears virtually ment of Angola in Exile) deserted. Hundreds of abandoned huts run par B. P. 1541 allel to scratches of deserted corn and manioc Kinshasa, Republic of planting. . . . The slow life of east Angola has the Congo been stopped short by the war and made to move hesitantly in a new direction."25 MPLA (Peoples' Movement for the Liberation of An intensive effort is now being made ·by Angola) the Portuguese to win the support of the people P. 0. Box 1595 in the aldeamentos and in the urban areas. Edu Lusaka, Zambia cation, health facilities, and other modernizing programs have been significantly speeded up. UNITA (National Union for At the same time, however, Portugal is trying the Total Independence of desperately to increase the number of white Angola) settlers. Soldiers are being offered various in 25 Osprings Road ducements to stay in Africa after their tour of London, N. W. 5, U. K. duty ends; several large agricultural settlement schemes for whites are being developed in con Mozambique: FRELIMO (Mozambique junction with the construction of the big dams Liberation Front) at Cabora Bassa in Mozambique and the Kunene P. 0. Box 15274 River in Angola; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania The stresses generated by the wars have forced the Portuguese to streamline and up-date Guinea: PAIGC (African Party for the their administration. The future may well bring Independence of Guinea decentralization of decision-making, with the and Cape Verde) white settlers, even ultimately some co-operative Box 298 Africans, being given some share in the process Conakry, Republic of Guinea of government. In December 1969, the Minister Some of the liberation movements have for Overseas Territories for the first time held representatives and offices in the United joint meetings with the Govemors General of States. For more information write directly Angola and Mozambique on African soil. This to the movements or to ACOA, 164 Madi may herald some structural change in the system son Avenue, N. Y., N. Y. 10016. of government. But it is liberalization as a sur vival technique of the goveming elite. It 'is an attempt to consolidate colonial control, not end it. Ironically a major effed of the peoples'
AFRICA TODAY 5 fight to shake off colonial shackles has been to ous subsidiary services needed to be established expose the tremendous potential wealth of the or developed rapidly. Thus at the outbreak of areas involved and thus heighten Portugal's de the rebellion in Angola in 1961 there were less termination to stay. than 200 miles of tarred roads in the entire col The colonies have always played an impor ony, making it difficult to shift troops rapidly; tant role in the Portuguese economy, supplying by the end of 1969 the government had built raw materials cheaply and providing a sheltered 3,750 miles of paved road, spending 763 million market for Portuguese goods. They also play an escudos ($27 million) in 1967 and 1968 to reach important role in lightening Portugal's adverse that total.27 trade balance by their large role as importers of Once Portugal projected increasing economic metropolitan products.* The African territories activity in the colonies, it was clear that the weak still take about 24 percent of all Portuguese ex and inefficient infra-structures would have to be ports and supply about 13 percent of her imports. rapidly strengthened and expanded and the gov More important still, the colonies, because of ernment was hard-pressed to find the necessary their trade with the rest of the world, have funds. Increasingly it sought aid from foreign proved a valuable SQUrce of foreign exchange governments and financial groups and it found to the escudo zone; the export of Angolan dia an early and sympathetic response to its needs monds and coffee and the invisible exports of in the United States. railway and harbor services from Mozambique In 1967 General Electric provided the Portu playing the major role in earning such exchange; guese with a credit loan of $1.2 million. At the but the level at which wealth was generated was, same time the U. S. Export-Import Bank granted until recently, very low_ The prize was small. a loan of $7.9 million, the full amount being It is the discoveries made since the wars allocated to the purchase of diesel locomotives began that now make the .colonies really precious for the transport of ore from the rapidly expand possessions. Forced by the costs of the wars to ing Cassinga iron mines in Angola. In 1968 the seek new sources of revenue, lacking the capital, Angolan Government purchased more diesels ! the organizational and the technological knowl from General Electric, at a cost of $34.5 million, ! edge necessary for engaging in resource explora to be repaid in 12 semi-annual payments at an tion and exploitation, the Portuguese were driven interest rate of 7.25 percent.28 I to open the doors of their colonies to foreign Loans for the construction of roads, airports, investment. In 1965 restrictions on non-Portu and a hydro-electric power project in Angola I guese investment were relaxed and foreign in were reported to have been arranged in 1966 t terests moved in rapidly, soon uncovering great and 1967 by the Inter-American Capital Corpor potential wealth; oil wells and iron mines are ation.29 already in production, deposits of sulphur, phos Repeated loans were made available to the I phates, diamonds, and copper are being explored. Portuguese Airways Corporation, TAP, by the In July 1969 an enthusiastic expert commented, U. S. Export-Import Bank; amounts involved in I "the little that is already known of Angola's clude $6.5 million in 1966, $4.8 million in 1968, mineral resources makes it one of Africa's po another $2.7 million in 1968 and a new credit tentially richest territories."26 Huge hydro-electric of $4.1 million in 1969 for the purchase of 2 projects, Kunene in Angola, Cabora Bassa in Mo Boeing 707s.3o The liberation movements claim zambique, are being jointly developed by the that TAP planes are frequently used to fly army Portuguese and the South Africans and will pro officers from Portugal to the war zones. This vide a vast flow of power-some to be sold, much accusation seems substantially confirmed by a to be used in further development, especially en recent report that the Mozambique Military couragement of white immigration. The prospects Region has signed a contract with DETA and for profit are exciting. Small wonder that the EMAC (commercial airlines in Mozambique) Portuguese want to keep their colonies now. which are to provide regular air transport for military personnel and equipment between the THE NEED FOR FOREIGN AID primary logistic complexes at Lourenco Marques, Beira, Nacala, Nampula and Porto Amelia with Portugal's own economic backwardness makes the secondary and tertiary complexes at Tete, it difficult for her to carry out the projects im Nova Freixo, Vila Cabral, Marrupa and Mueda, mediately necessary to maintain control of the and from these to all combat units. In 1969 DETA colonies and impossible to organize and finance purchased two Boeing 737s from the United long-term resource development. States, and the first plane, delivered in February The government in Lisbon found that the 1970, has already begun flights.31 cost of a war in Africa could not be counted simply in escudos spent on the military. Numer- THE THIRD DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 1968-1973 Portugal has recently made increasing efforts • Foreign trade plays an important role in Portugal's economy, but its over-all balance of trade with the outside world has to systematize and order economic development become increasingly unfavorable; a favorable balance of at home and in the colonies by the construction payments has been maintained because of large private re mittances from Portuguese living outside Portugal and be of elaborate development plans. In general few cause of foreign exchange earned by the tourist industry. of the goals have been achieved, but the most
6 recent plan throws interesting light on Portu ?perating in Mozambique and Angola, most hav gal's view of the direction of colonial develop ~ng come on the scene after 1965. Their activity ment and on the crucial role assigned to foreign IS concentrated in a few major fields most notice capital in that development. ably mineral prospecting and partic~larly oil ex The Plan envisages a total investment target ploration and production.33 of $5.86 billion, $4.3 billion in metropolitan Por tugal and $1.6 billion in the overseas territories. U.S. COMPANIES IN ANGOLA TABLE 1: Investment Allocations under the Third There are already at least 25 U. S. corpora Development Plan, by Province, in Mil· tions active in Angola. Among these are three lion Dollars 32 c~mpanies with diamond prospecting concessions .. Angola Mozambique D1versa Inc. of Dallas, in May, 1969, was granted Mining and Manufacture 508.6 221.1 prospecting rights over more than 10 000 square Transportation and miles for 35 years. The Portuguese Government Communications 128.6 185.7 is ent_itled to a 10 percent ownership, without Agriculture, Forestry cost, m the company. Diamond Distributors of and Livestock 69.4 72.6 New York was also granted, at the same time a Education and Research 46.2 34.1 v~st diamond prospecting concession, stretchlng Power 42.1 34.7 r1ght down to the border of South West Africa. Fishing 18.0 Diamond Distributors holds a 73 percent interest Health 16.3 14.0 in the prospecting company called Oestdiam; the Housing and Urbanization 12.7 15.6 Portuguese Government has 10 percent free Local Improvements 12.6 3.9 equity, Portuguese partners hold the rest. The Distribution Network 4.7 3.5 company is required to spend more than $2 Tourism 3.9 .3 million on-shore and $1 million off-shore in in itial exploration. The third diamond prospecting Total 863.1 585.5 company, Diamul, combines U. S. and other capi tal. In Angola 57.3 percent will come from Portuguese sources, but only 7.9 percent (about Several major oil companies are prospecting. $70 million) from the Portuguese Government Of these Gulf Oil is the most important. The itself. The other 42.7 percent ($283 million) is largest single U. S. investor, Gulf, had already to come from foreign sources. by 1969 invested $130 million. Production from its off-shore field in Cabinda should reach 150,- In Mozambique the Portuguese Government 000 barrels per day (bbpd) by the end of 1970. will contribute about 13 percent ($78.5 million) Gulf is also prospecting for phosphates in Ca of the total, and foreign sources are expected to binda. Texaco too is oil prospecting and was provide at least $171.7 million. granted its first concession in 1968. It has a joint Major objectives of the plan, according to agreement with Angol (a Portuguese and South the Portuguese, are to accelerate the develop African controlled company) for oil prospecting ment of mineral resources, primarily with pri in the Congo area of Angola, on- and off-shore. vate money; to strengthen the basic infrastruc Initial minimum investments will total $15.5 mil ture, and to improve the standards and produc lion. Essex Corporation, Union Carbide, Mobil tivity of agriculture and animal husbandry. In and Standard Oil of California are also in the oil general, to date, fund allocations in agriculture race; and again there are several oil industry ser have been devoted primarily to projects involving vicing firms, subsidiaries of U. S. firms, such as white settlers; little attention has been given to Tidewater Marine of New Orleans, Schlumberger the problems of traditional agriculture.32 Ltd., Halliburton Company, now active in the THE ROLE OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT busy oil prospecting boom in Angola. In the struggle to maintain the empire, Por Tenneco was granted a. concession for sul tugal has had to assign a major role to foreign phur, gypsum and anhydrite prospecting and investors in the future of her colonies. Her own mining near Benguela in December, 1968. By position has been reduced to that of junior part May, 1969, there were reports of rich sulphur ner; the giant corporations of Western Europe deposits and Portuguese officials reported that and America are the new senior partners. Tenneco intended to spend $50 million develop In 1962 Portugal began a reform of the laws ing the deposit. Tenneco has a contract fairly which stringently restricted foreign investment; typical of all current mining contracts in the by 1965 these laws had been redesigned to act Portuguese territories, making provision for set as an incentive to forei g-n investors. Foreign en minimum expenciiture by the company, giving terprises ilre no longer bound to have participat the Portuguese Government a 50 percent share ing Portuguese capital and administration; they of profits and a direito de concessao (right to a may repatriate capital, profits and dividends share of the production or its value). Tenneco freely; there are tax holidays of up to ten years, has also been seeking oil rights in its sulphur customs exemptions on plant and raw material, prospecting areas. and various other concessions. Various U. S. companies are involved in dis By 1970 more than 30 U. S. companies were tributing their products: Singer Sewing !'4achines.
AFRICA TODAY 7 Pfi~er Laboratories, National Cash Register, Cat illustrate most clearly how the activities of the erpillar Tractor Co., and several others. U. S. corporations serve the interests of the The General Tire and Rubber Company is cJlonial government. one of the few U. S. companies involved in manu Finally it is interesting to note that several facturing; it participated with a 10 percent in U. S. corporations have played an active role in terest iii. the building of a $5 million tire and Angola and Mozambique indirectly, through sub compressor factory in 1967, which accounted for sidiaries operating in the Republic of South Af 19 percent of all new industrial capital that year. rica. Kaiser Jeep S. A., a subsidiary of Kaiser The target is tire production for the whole of Jeep International, has been selling jeeps to the Angola and the group, known as Mabor, has been Portuguese army in Mozambique for several guaranteed a ten-year monopoly by the govern years, despite the U. S. official prohibition on ment. the supply of arms to Portuguese Africa. Chase Manhattan has an interest in the Standard Bank of South Africa, which in turn, in collaboration U.S. COMPANIES IN MOZAMBIQUE with the Banco Totta Alianca of Portugal, has Most U. S. invE;stment is currently concen established banks in Angola and Mozambique under the title Banco Standard Totta. trated in resource exploration and development, Ingersoll Rand, S. A., another American sub with a heavy emphasis on oil p·rospecting. sidiary, is reported to be supplying material for In October 1967 a consortium formed by the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam. Clark Oil, Skelly Oil and Sunray (the operating The absolute size of U. S. investment in An partner) was granted a three year on- and off gola and Mozambique is, as yet, fairly moderate; shore oil concession. In January 1970, after two but its impact is great because the economies of years of exploration the drilling ship Glomar the two countries are so small and undeveloped. Conception began work on the first of six pro Both are still primarily agricultural subsistence jected exploratory wells off-shore. Work is si economies with small, highly organized export multaneously being conducted on-shore in the sectors in the hands of the white settlers. · 15-million-acre concession. The consortium, op 1967 Gross Domestic Product in Angola was timistic about its prospects, estimated .the cur officially estimated at 29,500 ·million escudos·. rent drilling program would cost $ti to $7 million. ($1,000 million).34 Per 'capita G.N.P. is no higher Gulf Oil and the Pan American Oil Com than $90. Ninety percent of the population is pany have a joint concession and have been pros still engaged in agriculture, which until 1969 pecting since 1958; expenditure to date has been accounted for more than 60 percent of all ex some $22 million. When the contract was re ports--coffe·e alone accounting for more than 50 newed recently, the companies agreed to invest percent of the total value of all exports. The a further $9% m"illion by 1970, making them industrial sector is still very small, the total the largest individual participants in the Mo value of industrial production in 1968 being only zambique oil drive. This group has found natural $163 million; industry is still primarily concerned gas at Pande, near Beira, and has re·cently com with the processing of agricultural products- missioned a giant drilling platform for off-shore 25.9 percent in 1967. New capital investment in work. Hunt International (a Placid Oil subsidi industry, while rising, is still restricted and is ary) and Texaco are other active oil concession mainly supplied by Portuguese funds; new in aires in Mozambique. Texaco has prospecting dustrial investment in 1965 totalled $4.2 million rights in the north, from the Tanzanian border and by 1968 the annual increment was $17.1 to 13° 45', inland along the Rovuma River and million. (See Table IV.) off-shore. The major portion of this area is now Even the value of output from major mining inside the zone controlled by Frelimo, the Mo operations in Angola is still relatively insignifi zambique Liberation Front. The Continental Ore cant, though this is the area in which growth is Corporation has been granted prospecting conces most spectacular. sions in Tete, close to the Cabora Bassa scheme. TABLE II: Angolan Mineral Production, 1968 All the. oil concessions are very recent, many and 196935 contracts post-dating the inception of the libera 1968 1969 tion movements' armed struggle; several prom Product Output Value S Output Value $ Diamonds 1,667,000 carats 56,273,630 2,021,000 carats N/ A ising areas lie in ground now being hotly con Iron Ore 3,218,212 tons 16,324,350 5,000,000 tons (est) N/A tested. AU oil contracts contain standard clauses Crude Oil 749,514 tons 12,429,970 N /A N/ A in which the Portuguese Government undertakes to ensure the security of the company and its In 1968 export of diamonds, iron ore and petrol operations against any "third parties." Other eum products accounted for 28 percent of the clauses cover payments to be made to the gov total value of all exports. Available provisional ernment in the form of taxes, shared profits, de figures for 1969 indicate that for the first time fense payments, Mining Fund contributions and the total value of mineral exports may surpass royalties. The detailed study of Gulf Oil's opera that of agricultural commodities. tion in Oabinda which follows should serve to (Continued on Page 14)
8 U.S. CORPORATIONS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE u.s. Corporations Mozambican/ Angolan & Addresses Subsidiary & Address Comments Source Allis Chalmers Angola i:leported to have 9 branches in An- U.N. A/ 6868/ Add. Wisconsin gola, contract to process iron concen- trates. American Cyan American Cyanamid Directory American amid Company Company Firms Cyanamid Inter Luanda, Angola (1) national, Wayne, N. Jersey California Texas Caltex Oil S. A. Ltd. Primarily engaged in fuel distribution. Directory American Oil Company Lourenco Marques Firms (Caltex) N. Y. Mozambique ' (1) Caterpillar Caterpillar Tractor Supply of agricultural & other heavy Directory American Tractor Company Company equipment. Firms Peoria, Illinois Luanda, Angola (1) Chase Manhattan BaQco Totta-Standard Chase is a minority share-holder in Multi-National Bank· Bank do Angola S.A.R.L.; Standard Bank and active in South ing Directory issued New York Banco Standard-Totta Africa; Standard in turn associated by Chase Manhattan, de Mozambique with Banco Totta Alianca of Portugal. January, 1970 S.A.R.L. Clark Oil Mozambique In consortium with Skelly & Sunray. Wall Street Journal September 25, 1969 Continental Ore Tete Province Prospecting for fluorites with Inter- Mozambique Revolu- Corporation Mozambique minas Fluorites do Mozambique. tion (FRELIMO), Jan. New York March, 1970
Diamond Dis Oestdiam (West An Concession granted May 1969 vast area Portuguese Govern~ tributors Inc. golan Diamond Com right down to border with South West ment Gazette New York pany) Africa and off-shore. The first concern May 2, 1969 Luanda, Angola with U. S. financial backing to receive a new diamond prospecting concession in Angola, thus breaking Diamang monopoly. Diamond Distributors have 73% share of company. The Portu guese partners have 13%. Portuguese Government has 10%; balance un known. Minimum expenditure on-shore prospecting over $2 million, off-shore $1 million in first period. Diamul - Companhia Organized for diamond prospecting, Qiario de Luanda, Ultramarina de Dia granted concession June 21, 1969, re June 22, 1969 & De mantes S.A.R.L. ported to have foreign capital, includ partment of Economic Luanda, Angola ing U. S. capital. Affairs, Angola Diversa Incor Diversa Internacional Granted prospecting rights over more South African Finan· porated do Exploracao de than 10,000 sq. miles for 35 years for cial Mail, August 15, Dallas, Texas Diamantes S.A.R.L. diamosds. Concessionaire to invest a 1969. Luanda, Angola minimum $17% million in prospecting. New York Times, The Portuguese Government is en June 8, 1969. titled to a 10% ownership (without cost) in the company. Essex Corporation Apparently extending operations Department of Eco· Angola Ltd. northwards from its prospecting for nomic Affairs, Angola Luanda, Angola oil in South Africa. Reported as U. S. investment by Angolan Dept. of Econ omic Affairs.
AFRICA TODAY 9 U. S. CORPORATIONS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE (Continued)
Firestone Tire & Firestone Portu U. ~~- reports Firestone plan to invest U.N. Rubber Company guesa, Mozambique 150-m esc. ($5% million) in a factory A/6868, 1967 Akron, Ohio to have a productive capacity of 60,000 to 100,000 tires annually. Ford Dodge Lab Fort Dodge Labor Directory oratory (Division atory American Firms of American Luand<;t, Angola (1) Home Products) Fort Dodge, Iowa General Electric Angola The Portuguese ·Government in asso U. N. Document ciation with Krupp (of Essen) & other foreign investors has ·been developing rich iron mines at Cassinga. In 1967 G. E. provided a credit loan of $1.2 million, at the same time as an Export/ Import Bank loan of $7.9 million was granted, the full amount to go for the purchase of 30 diesel locomotives to transport the extracted ore. General Tire & Mabor Angolana Participated with 10% interest in S. A. Financial Mail Rubber Company Luanda, Angola building of $5 million dollar tire & August 15, 1969. Akron, Ohio air-compressor factory, 1967, which Primeiro de Janeiro accounted for 19% of all new industri July 14, 1968 al capital that year, aimed to produce Portuguese Africa all tires required in Angola, went into p. 306 (2). production 1968, and has been granted a 10-year-monopoly by the govern ment. Gulf Oil Gulf Oil Cabinda See special paper: "Gulf Oil in Cabin U. N. Document Pittsburgh Cabinda, Angola da." A/6000 Mozambique Gulf Oil Have had joint concession for oil & Rev. 1 with Pan American gas & have been prospecting since S. A. Financial Oil Co. Mozambique. 1958. Agreed with Portuguese Gov Gazette ernment to send at least further $9% July 19, 1968 million by 1970, making them largest The Star (S.A.) participants in Mozambique oil drive. March 22, 1969 Spent $22 million by 1967 for pros African Development pecting. Sept. & Nov. 1969 Have found natural gas in signifi cant quantities at Pand & Buzi (near Beira) and late in 1969 began off shore drilling, some reported success. Portuguese government entitled to 50% share of all products mined & sold. Halliburton Halliburtons Opera Through their subsidiary Brown & Moody's Industrial Company tor Inc. Root are engaged in world-wide con Manual 1969 Luanda, Angola struction activity, including building Department Economic of off-shore rigs; also provide special Affairs, Angola ized oil well drilling & maintenance Standard & Poor's, services. Industry Surveys "Oil" Jan. 29, 1970 Holiday Inns Mozambique Holiday Inns are closely associated S. A. Financial Mail with Amalgamated Hotels of South Several dates. Africa. Latter plans to construct S'er ies of motels in Mozambique.
Hunt Interna Hunt International First concession 1967 for natural tional Petroleum Co. gas. Renewed concession, including Dallas Mozambique oil rights for 300 km south of 18° S. Subsidiary of (Quelimane to Beira) Placid Oil
10 U. S. CORPORATIONS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE (Continued)
I. B. M. World I. B. M. World Department Economic Trade Corpora Trade Corporation Affairs, Angola tion Luanda, Angola New York Inter-American Angola 19661oan 70-m esc. ($2lh -m) to Portu U.N. Capital Corpor guese Corporation for new textile fac A/ 6300/ Rev. 1 ation tory. 1965 loan 130-m esc. ($4:1;2-m) New York for Hydro Electric power station at Alto Catumbela. Inter-American has financed other projects in Angola, in cluding road & airport construction. Reportedly the President of Inter American Frederick J. Evans is also President Of Evans & Dell Company which supplied ail the heavy equip ment used. Intercontinental Intercontinental Department of Marine Drilling Marine Drilling Economic Affairs, Luanda, Angola Angola Loffland Loffland Brothers Petroleum exploration Directory American Brothers Inc. Inc. Firms Tulsa, Oklahoma Beira, Mozambique (1) Marine Services Marine Services Department of Inc. Inc. Economic Affairs, Cabinda Angola · Mobil Oil Mobil Oil Mainly engaged in distribution. New York Southern Africa Lourenco Marques, Mozambique Mobil Oil Company Was building a 15-m esc. ($500,000) Bank of Portugal Luanda;. Angola plant in Luanda .for oil storage & pro Information cessing of lubricating oil to come February 19, 1969 (1) into production end 1969. Applied for prospecting rights. National Cash National Cash Regis Department of Register Com ter of Portugal Economic Affairs, pany Angola Angola Dayton, Ohio Ocean Drilling & Angola Applied for concession for petroleum Actualidade Eco- Exploration Co. . exploration nomica, Oct. 16, 1969 Charles Pfizer Laboratories Pfizer Distribution of pharmaceuticals Directory American & Co. Luanda, Angola Firms New York Mozambique (1) Place Gas Oil Co. · Angola U. N. A/ AC. 109 L. 625/ Add 1. op. cit. The Singer Singer Sewing Distribution Directory American Company Machine Company Firms New York Lourenco Marques, (1) Mozambique Schlumberger Schlumberger Over Largest supplier of "wireline" testing Department of Ltd. seas services for logging, perforation, cove Economic Affairs, New York Luanda, Angola sampling & related work in oil well Angola drilling. Also manufactures electronic & electrical investments & components for industrial, military & aerospace ap plications.
,\J•'IUCA TODAY 11 U. S. CORPORATIONS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE (Continued)
Skelly Oil (An Mozambique In consortium with Clark & Sunray. Wall Street Journal indirect sub Sept. 25, 1969 sidiary, via Mission Corp. of the Getty Oil Company) Sunray D. X. Sunray Mozambique Sunray (operating partner) with Skelly Department State (Sun Oil Oil Company Oil Company & Clark Oil & Refining Airgram Company) Corp. granted 3 year, 14.4 million acre Oct. 24, 1967 Philadelphia oil on- and off-shore prospecting con cession by Portuguese Government Wall Street Journal Oct. 1967, contracted to spend $31h Sept. 25, 1969 million in 3 year period, by January 1970. After 2 years of exploration The Star (S.A.) Sunray was test drilling off-shore, was January 17, 1970 optimistic about prospects & estimated a cost of $6-$7 million for its current Clark, Annual drilling program. Report 1969 Off-shore drilling from the rig "Glo mar Conception," January 1970. Standard Oil Angola Reported in oil search. Wall St. Journal of California Jan. 5, 1970 Standard Portugal & Salazar himself opened the new Primeiro de Janeiro Electric (a Mozambique Standard Electric plant employing June 27, 1968 subsidiary 1,000 worke·rs manufacturing transis of I.T.T.) tors, electronic components, radio re Diario de Lis'boa ceivers, built at Cascais., near Lisbon June 26, 1968 1968. Press reported Standard Elec tric had already invested English £2.6 million (over $6 million) and would in vest a further English £12.9 million ($36 million plus) in Portugal & the over seas territories during the course of the Third Development Plan. First fruits seem to be a large contract to supply equipment for expanding the communications system in Lourenco Marques & Beira. Tenneco Oil Tenneco Angola Ltd. In December 1968 the Portuguese Gov Diario de Lisboa Houston, Texas Luanda, Angola ernment granted Tenneco-Angola pros Jan. 10, 1969 (A subsidiary pecting & mining rights for sulphur, of Tenneco gypsum & anhydrite near Benguela. S. A. Financial Mail Corporation By May 1969 there were reports of August 15, 1969 Wilmington, rich sulphur discoveries & Tenneco Delaware) engineers were reported planning to Standard Bank Review build a pipeline to transport liquified May, 1969 sulphur to the coast. Tenneco 3 year contract followed the usual pattern, Wall Street Journal making provisions for minimum ex January 1, 1970 penditure by the company, giving Por tuguese Government 50% of the prof its and a share of the concession of 5% of value of production. Portuguese officials are quoted by Wall Street Journal as saying that Tenneco will spend $50 million-$75 million develop ing the sulphur deposit. Also seeking oil rights in its sulphur prospecting areas.
12 U. S. CORPORATIONS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE (Continued)
Mozambique Has also applied for prospecting rights U.N. A/ AC. 109/L. 625/ for all minerals except diamonds and Add. 2, Part II hydrocarbons. May 15, 1970 Texaeo Inc. Texaco Granted 3 year oil prospecting con New York Mozambique cession along coast from Tanzania to 13° 45'. This whole are'a lies inside the area now liberated by FRELIMO. Terms include a minimum expendi ture of close to $2 million for pros pecting, the 50% profit sharing, etc. Texaco also has sulphur rights in the area. Texaco Petroleos Concessions granted January 1968, re Diario de Lisboa de Angola vised January 1969. Texaco has joint January, 1969 Luanda, Angola agreements with Angol (Portuguese and South Africa controlled Oil Com pany) and with Petrangol (Portuguese, Belgian control) for oil prospecting in Congo area of Angola, on- and off. shore. Joint Angol-Texaco group to invest $5 million in deep sea research by 1975. Joint Texaco Petrangol group to invest $10.5 million in period from June 1968 to June 1971. Texaco is also a large fuel distributor in Angola. Tidewater Tidex Inc. Reported as operating in Angola by Department Marine Luanda, Angola Angola Department Economic Affairs Economic Affairs, Service Inc. but no details of nature of operation. Angola New Orleans Tidewater is internationally involved in transporting supplies to off-shore Moody's Transpor· drilling rigs, and in crewing and main tation Manual taining and chartering vessels for off-shore oil and gas drilling. Union Carbide Angola Reported in oil search. Wall Street Journal Corporation Jan. 5, 1970 New York Universal S.E.T.A. (Sociedade S.E.T.A. is an organization represent Tobacco Exportadora de ing Universal Tobacco & Portuguese Tobacos de Angola) interests. it holds a marketing mon Angola opoly over the output of the main to bacco grower co-operatives.
(1) Directory of American Firms Operating in Foreign Countries, 7th edition 1969. This directory includes only companies in which U. S. firms or individuals have a substantial capital investment in the form of stock or operate under a sole ownership or as a partnership. Unfortunately its" list is very incomplete, omitting such giant investors as Gulf in Angola. (2) Portuguese Africa. A Handbook. Abshire & Samuels, eds. 1969. General: This list has been constructed from a great variety of sources .. In many cases such sources gave no information on the size of capital invested, or on the · criteria used for defining a corpora tion as a subsidiary. The U. S. Department of Commerce, which used to make available information on U. S. firms operating in Portuguese Africa, will no longer do so.
AFRICA TODAY 13 TABLE Ill: Gross Industrial Production in An- The picture in Mozambique is very similar, gola by Sectors. (Values in thousand although the special role of the port of Lourenco escudos: 1,000 esc. equals $35) Marques as a major gateway from the outside world for the Transvaal, Rhodesia, and Swazi 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 land has mitigated its isolation and provided an Foodstuffs 732,329 814,735 928,278 976,474 1,413,412 Drinks 368,314 429,704 456,893 510,888 607,756 important sphere of development. About 21 pe:r Tobacco 204,746 226,454 243,916 271,469 293,127 cent of Mozambique's international payment re Textiles and finished goods 302,920 389,619 413,252 477,325 593,736 ceipts were derived from transit earnings in Timber industries 9,291 10,961 12,678 12,736 15,141 1965.36 Ne•vertheless at least 70 percent of the Furniture (b) 9,147 10,452 10,489 11,322 12,939 Pulp, paper economically active population is still engaged and by-products 109,059 111,141 117;084 150,839 167,063 in agriculture, much of it on a subsistence level.37 Rubber goods 25,750 26,839 25,820 32,476 147,466 Chemical products 339,768 409,113 448,386 547,220 386,262 As was indicated earlier many men leave their Petroleum derivates 425,175 289,939 440,856 399,214 514,484 homes each year as temporary migrant workers; Non-metallic mineral products 173,041 226,857 258,738 265,778 317,028 per capita G.N.P. is estimated at only $80. Ex Metallic products (c) 37,047 71,430 89,748 110,880 95,299 isting mineral p-roduction is negligible, earning Electrical Equipment 13,773 17,555 25,311 29,545 35,076 Transport Equipment (d) 5,140 4,671 7,886 12,350 less than $2.5 million annually.38 Manufactur Miscellaneous (e) 14,003 8,857 16,050 56,732 46,062 ... ing industry employs about 3 percent of the TOTALS 2,764-:363 3MS.796 3,492,170 ·:~;rio,784 4,657,570 country's population, produces less than 9 per ($million) $96 $106.7 $122 $132 $163 cent of G.N.P., but is now exhibiting a steady growth rate, reflecting inter alia rising South Covering only the production of plywood (b) Covering only the production of spring mattresses African investment.39 (c) With the exception of machinery and transport equipment (d) Covering only simple bicycles and motorized cycles The effect of any sizeable U. S. investment (e) Covering only plastic goods will be considerable on either of the two econo Source: Notes on the Economy of Angola, edited, mies. Constant newspaper reports already refer to the boom developing in Angola as a result of Department of Economic Affairs, Prov recent foreign investment activities. ince of Angola, Portugal, 1969. TABLE V: Mozambique: Value of Manufacturing TABLE IV: Investment in Angola by Sector Industry 1965 1966-1968 ______-;19M ------· 19.-=6=-'--~1.::967 ('000 escudos) (100 esc. equals $35) (During 1968 investment in the manufacturing sector in Food 999,860 1,154,111 1,474,704 1,411,456 new installations and improvements amounted to esc. 491 mil Beverages 205,615 193,614 255,648 281,086 lion ($17.1 million), some esc. 151 million ($5.2 million) less Tobacco 177,792 185,538 201,543 253,559 than in 1967. In all 318 manufacturing units were affected and Textiles 240,522 230,120 222,571 484,022 6,877 new jobs were created. The spread of this new invest Footwear and made-up-tex- ment is shown below.) tiles except clothing 103,858 95,512 96,775 106,810 <1,000 esc. equals $35.) Timber 19,407 25,899 32,724 32,965 Metal furniture 18,197 15,577 18,198 25,073 Rubber 48,840 34,304 36,504 43,514 ------~-.1966 1967 1968 542,447 455,738 511,810 ---- Chemical products 405,904 Number ofunitsinstalled or improved 374 335 318 Petroleum derivatives 326,135 336,941 486,710 579,739 Non-metallic minerals 176,771 215,775 223,733 239,081 Total capital-investe 14 sibly for Mozambique and Portugal. Angola's process will ensure them future control over the balance of payments swung into deficit in 1967 resources of their own country. The new wealth with heavy imports of capital equipment. In created will flow out, split between the Portu creased production of iron ore and oil have al guese and the U. S. investors. ready shown up in increased export figures. Oil Increased income iii Portuguese hands may exports were expected to reach $15 or $20 mil buy some houses, schools and clinics for the lion in 1969, then rise to $70 million from Ca people. It is unlikely to strengthen their chances binda alone in 1971 (on the basis of 150,000 bbpd.) of self-determination. and, according to government officials, oil ex Much .has been made by the Portuguese and ports from all sources are expected to reach by corporations such as Gulf of the fact that 250,000 bbpd. in 1972. Mricans will ·be trained in new skills, and that Capital has been draining out of the Portu new jobs will be created. That may be true in a guese economy for military use fOir ten years. few cases, though the pattern of differential op Premier Caetano described the process himself: portunity and differential wages is well estab "all the military effort overseas has been and lished in both Angola and Mozambique. The cen will go on heing supported by resources coming tral issue remains that of colonialism; no people from the ordinary income, which before was can share equally in the wealth of their country largely used to cover development expenses. while it is a colony. Even so conservative a com Now we have to face many of these expenses mentator as the London Financial Times saw with money obtained by loans."40 An increasing little hope of a true sharing of the benefits of flow of wealth from mining development in the the new wealth. colonies will help dam the drainage; it may even For the time being-and probably for reverse the tide, allowing for greater domestic the next five years, Angola's boom will investment from Portuguese resources. prove of major benefit to a primarily The gain for the people of Angola and Mo European elite in Angola and in Portu zambique is much less certain. Nothing in the gal itself. 41 WAR/PEACE REPORT An independent monthly magazine presenting fact and opinion on progress toward a world of peace with justice. 'War I Peace Report is one of the most· perceptive and responsible periodicals devoted to rna tters of war and peace'. U Thant Up to date coverage of the world's crisis areas as well as the long term problems of achieving peace; reports on the United Nations, development, population, environment and arms controL' In Recent Issues: A Radical Approach to Peace and Security: National Defense Without Armaments ... Gene Sharp; The Movement to Replace Thieu-Ky With a 'Reconciliatory Government' ... Michael Morrow; Toward Ending the Cold War in Europe ... James Avery Joyce; Zero Population Growth by the Year 2000? .. . William H. Draper, Jr.; We Need a New Global Agency to Confront the Environment Crisis ... Senator Gaylord Nelson Subscription to War I Peace Report51 year, 10 issues) $5.00. WAR / PEACE REPORT, Dept. WS, 218 East 18th St., New York, N.Y. 10003 U.S.A. AFRICA TODAY 15 U. S. Trode with Angola and Mozambique The workings of the monetary system bind COFFEE GROWING IN ANGOLA ing Portugal and its colonies ultimately channel The largest coffee-growing region is in the foreign exchange earned by Angola and Mo north, around Carmona; this area was the scene zambique into Portugal's coffers. Each territory of the 1961 revolt, and there have been frequent ~as its own annual budget, tax system, currency, confrontations between the Portuguese and lib Issuing bank and individual foreign exchange eration movement groups since then. Plantations f:.md which 2cts as the central trustee for re maintain small private armies of security guards, serves of gold and foreign exchange. The com homes are often ringed with barbed wire, search mon factor is the unit of exchange-the metro lights and dogs add to the constant tension. Yet politan escudo. The payments' system basically coffee production increased during the '60s from consists of a multilateral clearing operation 2,675,800 bags in 1960 to a peak of 3,750,000 bags among the various territories, backed by a mon in 1967. Production is now stabilized by the gov etary fund to facilitate it. The Bank of Portugal ernment which restricted new coffee plantings in Lisbon acts as agent of the system and of the in 1966 after the harvest overshot the 2.25 mil fund. lion-bag International Coffee Agreement alloca Every month the Bank of Portugal registers tion by 300,000 bags.44 the transactions of each territory with other Estimates vary on the exact acreage under members, striking a balance showing any debit crop and on the percentages grown by Mricans or credit outstanding. Settlement has to be made and by Europeans; but while details vary the in metropolitan escudos. A reserve account is pattern that emerges is always similar. kept by the bank in the name of each territorial exchange fund, into which go all the particular In 1967 and 1968 Mrican-grown coffee sold territory's metropolitan escudo holdings and its in the rural markets amounted to 74,000 tons and gpld and foreign-exchange holdings. At .the end 68,000 tons respectively, averaging about 33 per of the month any territory with a debit bal cent of total Angolan production.45 More than ance settles up with the bank by drawing on the 70 percent of the coffee-producing land is in metropolitan escudos in its reserve account. European hands and the bulk of the exported Where these holdings are insufficient the terri coffee crop comes from the European-owned tory will settle by buying metropolitan escudos plantations.46 There are very few small settler with its gold, or with foreign-exchange holdings. farms; most are medium or large plantations, The adverse trade balances of Angola and Mo owned either by individuals, small companies or zambique result in a constant payments' deficit. a few large financial interests such as the Portu Through the working of the system outlined guese corporation CADA which operates the above their deficit is made up by foreign-ex largest coffee farm in the world, Fazenda Boa change, thus strengthening the reserve position Entrada, on some 40,000 acres, and employs of Portugal itself. more than 10,000 workers.47 According to the Portuguese themselves, there are some 2,340 In 1968 the over-all balance of payments with medium and large European-owned plantations foreign countries for the escudo zone showed a while 58,000 African peasant farmers cultivate surplus of 4,115 million escudos. Of that total an average of 5 acres each.48 surplus Angola accounted for 1,268 million es cudos, Mozambique for 1,072 million escudos, An estimated 180,000 to 200,000 people are and Portugal itself, 1,820 million escudos.42 engaged in coffee cultivation, some 50,000 to 60,000 peasant farmers and about 123,000 Mri The U. S. is not the largest trading partner cans working on European-owned plantations. for either Angola or Mozambique, but it plays Wages and conditions of work on the plantations a very special role in relation to Angola. It buys have always been very poor. In recent years, the more than 50 percent of Angola's biggest export, government, in an attempt to defuse the mili robusta coffee, which is used for the production tancy of the people, has laid down a scale of of instant coffee. minimum wages ranging between 50 cents and Since 1946 coffee has been Angola's most $1 a day and has appointed labor inspectors to important export, accounting for more than 50 enforce the minimum. It is reported that many percent of all exports in most years. In 1968 of the planters were so incensed at this that they major customers were the U. S. (51 percent) and accused the labor inspectors of "stirring up the Holland (19.9 percent). Portugal took only 6.2 workers and operating in league with the percent. The coffee crop earned $63 million in guerillas."49 the U. S. alone in 1968, the value of total Thus when the U. S. buys coffee from An coffee exports reaching more than $124 gola it is again helping to entrench colonialism, million.43 16 both by the direct income it creates for the the total available in 1968, worth $9.6 million, white settler farmers and by the foreign ex was sold to U. S. buyers.52 Cashew nuts, formerly change which it pumps into the escudo zone. gathered from uncultivated plantings, are in creasingly becoming a plantation crop, but small In 1968, 6.9 percent of all coffee imported African farmers still provide about 80 percent into the U. S. came from Portuguese Africa, of the total supply. The government has fixed which thus ranked third in the list of U. S. cof minimum prices to be paid to traders for cashews fee suppliers, following Brazil (32.8 percent) and purchased from the traditional (i. e. African) sec Columbia (12.0 percent). The coffee producers of tor, but most of the trading is in non-African the world, mainly underdeveloped countries, have hands and African income from the crop is very for several years been faced with the constant ~ow. The Industrial Association of. Mozambique, threat of drastically falling prices caused by m a recent survey, found that the average in growing world production. In an attempt to coun come for the. 800,000 persons who collected the ter this price fall, the coffee-producing countries, 120,000 tons produced outside the plantation including Angola, have become signatories of sector was only 375 escudos a year ($13.20).53 the International Coffee Agreement which allo cates a yearly export quota to each producer. Mozambique's cashew production is the larg Countries just beginning to develop their coffee est in the world, and output is growing. Until potential find it difficult to get allocations, or 1964 the unshelled nuts were exported to India to break into new markets. It might well be ar for the labor-intensive process of decortication. gued that the coffee in U. S. cups would taste The recent development of mechanized tech better from the fields of the independent coun niques has led to intensive investment by South tries of Africa than from those of the Portuguese African and other interests in decorticating fac colonialists. tories, and the export of nuts to India is falling while exports to consumer markets such as the United States rise. TABLE VI: Angola-External Trade, 1968 The failure of all this new wealth to produce (1,000 esc. equals $35) any significant benefit for the people of Mozam bique is vividly illustrated by a recent interview Imports Exports between a New York Times reporter and a rep from: to: resentative of one of the large new factories: Countries Million Percent Million Percent- There is "a new $5-million cashew plant in the Esc. age of Esc. age of total total Port of Nacala in Northern Mozambique, owned Metropolitan by C.U.F., a Portuguese consortium. Portugal 3,176.5 35.91 2,676.2 34.33 u.s. 1,040.2 11.76 1,851.9 23.75 "The plant originally employed 3,000 work West Germany 979.3 11.07 426.7 5.47 ers, but an official explained that new machinery Britain 788.9 8.92 France 457.5 5.17 would soon cut the payroll by 1,000. Asked what Holland 312.8 3.54 774.8 9.94 th_ose discharged would do, he replied 'Why, they Japan 291.8 3.30 379.8 4.78 Belgium and will go back to the bush.' He was somewhat sur Luxembourg 249.7 2.82 prised at the question."54 Spain 187.3 2.40 Canada 176.1 2.26 Mozambique 138.0 1.77 GUINEA-BISSAU Total 8,844.8 100 7,796.4 100 $Million 309 273 Very little has been said in this article about Source: Notes on the Economy of Angol•. Guinea-Bissau, the country in which the fiercest war has been fought in the last few years. Here the P AIGC (African Party for the Independence The U. S. rise into second place as a source of Guinea and Cape Verde), having rooted itself of imports is very recent; Britain had held that among the peasant population long before the place for some time, but was replaced by the day of the first armed attack on the Portuguese, U. S. and West Germany, largely owing to mas· has won tremendous victories. It now controls sive purchases of equipment for Gulf Oil's Ca at least two-thirds of Guinea; the Portuguese binda development and the delivery of Krupp are confined to armed camps and a few towns. equipment for the Cassinga iron mine.5o The Portuguese seem to stay on because of their own version of the domino theory. Guinea-Bissau Figures for the first half of 1969 indicated is small and poor; there has never been a large a drop in the value of U. S. participation in total white settler population; there has been none of Angolan exports to 14".33; this reflects some fall the intensive search for new wealth that charac in the value of coffee exports. terizes Angola and Mozambique. ESSO has kept Mozambique's trade with the United States alive its off-shore oil concession, but there are is still small,, but it is growing. The U. S. took no promises of instant profits for foreign in 7.6 percent of all exports in 1967; by 1968 this vestors or for Portugal in Guinea-Bissau. Yet figure was 11 percent.Sl the Portuguese hang on doggedly, partly because The major U. S. purchase in Mozambique is of the potential strategic value of Cape Verde shelled cashew nuts; more than 80 percent of islands in the Atlantic arena, but primarily be- .\FRICA TODAY 17 cause they recognize that to grant independence 24. Amilcar Cabral, Congressional Hearing, February 26, 1970. p. 16. to one colony would be to sign their own death 25. New York Times, August 6, 1969. warrant in Africa. 26. Financial Times, July 23, 1969. 27. Portugal, Department of Economic Affairs, Province of CONCLUSION Angola, Notes on the Economy of Angola, 1969, p. 13. 2a. United Nations, General Assembly. Report of the Special It is clear that U. S. economic connections Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implemen with Angola, Mozambique, and Portugal itself tation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. A/7752/ Add. 1, Novem are rapidly becoming more dense and complex. ber 25, 1969, p. 43. 29. United Nations, General Assembly. Report of the Special When this happens the colonial powe!I" is strength Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implemen ened immediately. It gains not only new finances tation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. A/6300/ Rev. 1, 1966, to fight its wars, but also the increasing assur p. 313. ance that once American economic interests are 30. Diario de Lisboa, January 6, 1970. 31. United Nations, A/AC. 109/ L. 625/Add. 2, (Part 1), May 12, at stake, the United States will stand firmly on 1970. Contract reported by a U. N. official. the side of stability and the government in power 32. All figures for the section on the Third Development Plan against the growing attacks of the· liberation from: i Banco National Ultramarino, Boletim Trimestral, No. 7', movements. New Vietnams are being built in 1968. Africa today. ii Notes on the Economy of Angola. iii Journal of Commerce, (New York), January 15, 1969. There are some discrepancies in the figures given by these FOOTNOTES three sources, but the general pattern is consistent. 1. Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, (Balti· 3:l. The information in this section on specific U. S. corporate more: Penguin African Library, 1968), pp. 117-18. investment in Angola and Mozambique is drawn from a 2. U.S./U.N. Press Release No. 160, November 14, 1969. State· a study prepared for the Africa Fund (164 Madison Av· ment by Ambassador Seymour M. Finger before Committee enue, New York) and published in May 1970. See chart. IV (Decolonization) of the U. N. General Assembly. 34. United Nations, A/ AC 109/L. 625/ Add. 1, May 8, 1970, Para. 3. John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I, (Cambridge: 94. M. I. T. Press, 1969), p. 2. 35. Compiled from Notes on the Economy of Angola and United 4. D. M. Abshire and M. A. Samuels. (eds.), Portuguese AI· Nations, A/ AC. 109/L. 625/ Add. 1. rica-A Handbook, (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 168. 36. Africa Report, November, 1967, p. 28. 5. Ibid., p. 348. 37. United Nations, A/AC. 109/L. 625/Add. 2, (Part II), May 15, 6. Vida Mundial, (Lisbon), November 7, 1968. 1970, para. 86. 7. Seara Nova, (Lisbon>, October, 1969. :a. Ibid., para. 121. a. Mark B. MacGuigan, Toronto Globe and Mail, February 28, 39. Standard Bank Review, "Supplement on Mozambique," 1968, 1967, PP. 8·9. . 9. Area Handbook for Mozambique, (Washington: U. S. Gov· 39a. Statistics issued by even ostensibly responsible sources ernment Printing Office, February 1969), p. 313. such as the banks tend to be unreliable, reflecting the lack 10. Portuguese Africa, p. 185. of systematization within the economic data gathering and 11. United Nations, General Assembly. Special Committee on processing departments of the government itself. Thus the the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Barclay's Overseas Review, March, 1970 gives the gross Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial value of industrial production in Mozambique as esc. Countries and Peoples. Territories Under Portuguese Ad· 6,900 m. in 1967 and esc. 7,500 m~ in 1968. Even this higher ministration. A/ AC. 109/L. 625/ Add. 1, May 8, 1970, Para. figure reveals the poverty of the economy: esc. 7,500 mil 34, million is only $262 million. 12. I bid., Add 2, May 12, 1970, Para. 34. 40. United Nations, A/7623/ Add. 1, September 25, 1969. 13. Area Handbook for Mozambique, p. 266. 41. Financial Times, July 23, 1969. 14. United Nations, A/7200/ Add. 3, October 17, 1968, paras. 168- 42. Bank of Portugal, Report of the Board of Directors-196a, 173. (Lisbon, 1969), pp. 134, 136, 141. 15. Portuguese Africa, p. 212. 43. Notes on the Economy of Angola, p. 27. .16. Financial Times, (London), April 10, 1970. 44. Portuguese Africa, p. 258 . 17. Le Monde, May 17-18, 1970. 45. United Nations, A/AC. 109/L. 625/Add. 1, para. 106. 1a. O.E.C.D., National Account Statistics, 1956-65. 46. World Coffee and Tea Survey, June, 1969. 19. Portuguese Africa, pp. 349-350. 47. Financial Times, July 23, 1969. 4a. Notes on the Economy of Angola, pp. 22-27. 20. u. 5., Hearing before ttie Subcommittee on Africa of the 49. New York Times, August 8, 1969. Committe_e on Foreign Affairs, ""Report on Portuguese 50. Financial Mail, (South Africa), August 15, 1969. Guinea and the Liberation Movement;u House of Repre 51. Standard Bank Review, 1968, and sentatives, 91st Congress, February 26, 1970, p. 22. Barclay's Bank Overseas Review, December 1969. 21. United Nations, A/AC. 109/L. 625/Add. 1, May 8, 1970, 52. United Nations, AIAC. 109/L. 625/ Add. 2, (Part II), para. para. 62, 101. 22. New York Times, February 1, 1970. 53. Ibid., para. 90. 23. FRELIMO spokesman, New York, 1970. 54. New York Times, August, 1969. 18 COLUMBIA COLUMBIA Population, Migration, and The Geography of Urbanization in Africa Modern Africa William A. Hance William A. Hance 498 pages SBN 231-03166-1 $15.00 653 pages SBN 231-02576-9 $13.50 African Rural- Urban Population and Migration-The Movement Political Systems to Ghana's Towns in Tropical : Africa John C. Caldwell Robert F. Stevenson 257 pages SBN 231-03269-2 $10.00 320 pages SBN 231-03052-5 $10.00 The Ruler's Imperative: The Population of Strategies for Tropical Africa Political Survival Edited by J. C. Caldwell and Chukuka Okonjo in Asia and Africa 449 pages SBN 231-03149-1 $10.00 W. Howard Wriggins 288 pages SNB 231-03314-1 $10.00 The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan The New Nations in the Political Elite- A Study United. Nations, "1960-1967 in Segmented Politics DavidA. Kay John Waterbury SBN 231-03350-8 $10.00 380 pages SBN 231-03326-5 $10.00 Columbia University Press Address for orders: 136 So. Broadway Irvington, N.Y.10533 AFRICA TODAY 19 GULF OIL IN CABINDA Gulf Oil is the largest single American in the Portuguese had to re-establish their control, \"estor in Portuguese Africa; it began prospecting commenting on the crucial importance of air in Cabinda (the Angolan enclave between the support in the struggle and on the constant use two Congos) in 1954, made its first important of U.S.-built planes in the battles he saw. Of c il strike in 1966, and had invested $130 million Gulf itself, he says, "Although they were obliged by the end of 1969 to suspend operations during the worst of the in developing the terrorist raids in 1961, machine-gun muzzles were GULF$ HELP most profitable oil barely cold before they moved in again."4 venture in Portu Portugal intensified its efforts to pacify Ca PORTUGAL guese Africa, and binda after the first Gulf strikes in 1966. Extra KILL ANGOLANS was planning fur troops were moved into the area and the cor ther massive ex doning off of the population into aldeamentos pansion (a project was speeded up. In 1967 Cabinda received the ed $76 million) in largest of the budget allocations in the colonies the immediate fu for its rural re-grouping program. Thus the ture.l In 1967 Ca Portuguese were carrying out their side of their binda Gulf set it contract with Gulf Oil, for in that contract they self an export tar specifically agree "to undertake such measures get of 150,000 bar as may be necessary to ensure that the Company rels a day (bbpd) may carry out its operations freely and efficient by 1970; by June ly, including measures to permit the Company 1969, production the use of and free access to public land and was moving rapidly such measures as may be necessary to prevent past 30,000 bbpd. third parties from interfering with the Com Recent finds both pany's free exercise of its contractual rights."5 FIGHT FOR on- and off-shore Further, the authorities "agree to provide mili make it likely that tary guards to protect the oil fields if special PEOPLE'S CONTROL previous production security measures prove necessary." Complemen OF RESOURCES e s t i m a t e s will tary to these security measures all foreign com prove conservative. pany contracts now stipulate that the company 20 cent of all annual expenditure to the war. Still are highly trained, skilled men. Very few, if any, mere money was needed-and Gulf proved to be Africans would qualify for such posts, because at least one good source of such revenue. Thus the Portuguese educational system has made it the new contract was drastically revised, giving almost impossible for blacks to acquire any edu the government considerable extra financial cation until recently. Thus the technicians·' jobs benefits.? (whatever their number) will go to whites, while Surface Rent was raised retroactively to the Africans fill the unskilled labor vacancies 2,0(}0 escudos ($70) per square kilometre for the at wages that normally average $1 a day. period January 1, 1967 to December 31, 1970, the New houses have been built in Cabinda since unpaid balance to be paid in advance within 30 the oil finds, but even the Portuguese officers days of the signing Of the contract. complain that competition with the Americans Minimum Investment was set at 25 million has driven prices beyond their reach. Few Af escudos ($875,000) on development for the first ricans can afford those new houses. five-year period plus 75 million escudos New roads have been built in booming Ca ($2,625,000) to be spent annually on prospecting. binda; they serve to move troops quickly across Royalties were set at 10 cents (U. S.) a barrel the country, making attacks on the liberation to be paid monthly fmm January 1, 1969, in the · groups easier to mount. currency actually earned. (The expected 150,000 If Cabinda is a boom town, its boom is for bbpd. output would thus provide the government whites only. Any wealth created by the Gulf with an annual royalty payment of $5.5 million; operation that does not flow into the hands of or $15,000 a day.) the Portuguese Government for defense expen Income Tax paid by the company was to be diture is mopped up by the local settler popu 50 percent of its net profit. The estimated lation. amounts due for 1971-1973 had to be paid in ad Finally, it is important to recognize the par vance, within 30 days of the signing of the con ticular significance of the , product Gulf is ex tract. tracting from Cabinda: oil~ a crucial strategic Mining Development Fund payments re material. Portugal has, in its contract with Gulf, quired from the company totalled 20 million retained the right to a large percentage of the escudos ($700,0{)0) for the period 1968-1977 with oil produced. Current Portuguese oil consump an estimated half paid in advance, within 30 days tion is 78,000 bbpd. When Gulf reaches its pro of the signing of the contract. jected 150,000 bbpd production, it will be able Direito de Concessao is a concession right to provide Portugal with a source of oil silfe enjoyed by the government equivalent to 12.5 from all threats of international sanction, a fact percent of all petroleum produced, in addition to which the Portuguese have been quick to recog- the 50 percent tax on profit. The government has nize. As Rebocho Vaz, Governor-General of An the option of taking the value, calculated on the gola stated: posted price, instead of the petroleum. As you know, oil and its derivatives A recent United Nations' study estimated are strategic materials indispensable to that the Portuguese Government probably ob the development of any territory; they tained total payments amounting to 563 million are the nerve-centre of progress, and to escudos (more than $20 million) from Gulf in possess them on an industrial scale is 1969.8 (It seems relevant to point out that the to ensure essential supplies and to dis provisional Angolan budget allocation for mili pose of an important source of foreign tary expenditure for 1969 was double that exchange. amount, 1,250 million escudos-$44 million.) Apart from this, in the mechanized Two other aspects need to be examined in wars of our times, its principle deriva relation to Gulf's role in Cabinda. tive-petrol-plays such a preponderant The first is the classic development argu part that without reserves of this fuel ment which contends that any large investment it is not possible to give the Anny suf in an underdeveloped economy must be good ficient means and elasticity of movement. for the mass of the people, even if only indirect The machine is the infrastructure of ly, through spill-over effects. Cabinda is now modern war, and machines cannot move commonly described as a boom town, but in fact without fuel. Hence the valuable sup the boom is very circumscribed. Gulf is variously port of Angolan oils for our armed reported to have employed between 2,000 and forces.1o Christian FOOTNOTES 500 people in its operation. A recent 1. World Petroleum, Annual, 1969. Science Monitor reporter says, "Gulf has installed 2. Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 1970, Financial Times, May 6, 1970, workshops and accommodation for 400 techni 3. New York Times, January 12, 1969. cians, mainly Americans."9 Gulf officials, in an 4. At J. Venter, The Terror Fighters, (Capetown: PurnelL 1969), pp. 84, 91. interview in March 1970, said they were employ 5. United Nations A/6868, 1967; A/7752/Add. 1, November 28, ing 64 expatriate employees (mainly American) 1969, p, 27; A/7200/ Add. 3, October 17, 1968, p, 79; A/7623/ Add. 3, September 25, 1969, p, 53. and 182 Portuguese, both white and black. All 6. New York Times, July 28, 1969. sources agree that wages for the technicians are 7. U. N. Conference Room Paper SCI/69/3, June 24, 1969, p, 7. 8. Ibid., p. 10. high; Venter describes them as more than $2,800 9. Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 1970. a month. In the nature of the case technicians 10. African World Annual, 1967-68, p, 29. AFRICA TODAY 21 ANGOLA CONGO Main road Railway District boundary 100 zoo MILES 100 zoo KILOMETRES The boundaries shown on thls map do not lmplg oHicial endorsement or acceplllnce by the United NodtJN. 24" CONGO D.R. SOUTH WEST AFRICA l. The M 22 ZAMBIA ' MOZAMBIQUE 0 24" Main rO.d 0 100 JI!L£S 0 100 KILOMETRES Tho""""""""',_ ... doio mat> .dO ... ,.q, oiHdal....w-- .. - hv lheu.u-1- 23 tWRlCA TODAY r-iA LANGE ... +~+~... .,...... + + + .,.+ ++++.,. C.M.L. CONCESSIONS - EXISTING RAILWAYS POR ...... PROJECTED RAILWAYS r---J MINING CENTRES .+++•'IL ~++ ~~ ... ~++++++++++++++++++++'IL w 'IL ,&. ... ++++++.,. "'""".,. ... JtJt++"" ... +~ United Nations, May, 1965 C01~cess£ons -T of the Companhia Mineira do Lobito and the Sociedade Mineira do Lom.bige C\1 > ~ ~ ANGOLA >-3 CONGO 0 NEW MINING CONCESSIONS t:::' DEM. REP. > ~ 0 50 100 150 mi 0 sao Salvador 0 50 100 150 km Carmona o + + + ATLANTIC Salazar OCEAN 0 Henrique de Carvalho CONGO 0 DEM. REP. COMPI.HHII. DE FOSFI.TOS DE I.HGOLI., S.I..R.L. --Main road ,. +-+- Railway + r--r--"1 10 20 km + 0 Serpa Pinto + ('..,. 0~0 ~·-·-·-·-·-·-·-·~ -7-· ·~--- -·~.--·--· NAMIBIA The boundaries sh~n this map do t1of imply official or acceptance b11 lhe United Naliont; "'01 MAP NO. 1908 UNITED NATIONS JULY 1969 ZAMBIA + ,; ( j ,.,; .-·..'-'),. . ·-·- \ ..,...-, ...... - -· .I 0 Nampula ...... ,+ ·-• COMPANHIA rAOootl>~i•<~<••·· ~DE -, 'J SOUTHERN l i RHODESIA ) THE MESSINA TRANSVAAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY," LTD. '"'· + SOCIETE NATIONALE DES PETROLES D'AQUITAIHE, ENTRE PRISE DE RECHERCHES ET D'ACTIVITES PETROLIERES ANGLO.AMERICAN CORPORATION OF SOUTH AFRICA SOUTH MOZAMBIQUE AFRICA MINING CONCESSIONS 100 200 MILES 0 100 200 KILOMETRES The· boundariea 1hown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nation•. MAP NO. 1909 JULY 1969 26 PUBLISHED BY THE FABIAN SOCIETY 4s SPANISH AFRICA Konstantin Bazarov explains how Spain has shed her colonies PORTUGUESE AFRICA Frank Judd reviews a recent pamphlet, 'Portugal and NATO'. He is bewildered that an alliance created in the name of freedom should compromise itself so badly by aidl.ng Portuguese aggression. PORTUGAL AND THE UN Gustav Polito shows that all is not quite the same since Caetano succeeded Salazar: there are many-possibly significant-changes against Portugal in the annual UN vote on her overseas territories. MOZAMBIQUE WAR Edouardo Mondlane, leader of FRELIMO (the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), describes the .s~tuation in the area his organisation controls and asks Britain to stop backing Portugal. ANGOLA Alberto Histroio a -leading representative of the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola), now thought by the OAU to be the most effective .guerilla movement in the territory, gives a report on the situation there. PORTUGAL'S AFRICA Basil Davidson on the assistance Portugal gets from other European countries. British and Swedish policy compared. MOZAMBIQUE The Portuguese report capture of a leading Frelimo commander. Gustav Polito reports on the facts behind this report. EDUARDO MONDLANE Our editorial examines FRELIMO, following the assassination of its first president. We believe that the organisational structure he created is strong enough to continue fully effective. r-~~~s~dm;v~~~~~~ar~~eoclo~------1 0 40S ($5) for one year, post free 0 65s ($8)foroneyearbyair,postfree 1 name------~------1 address------1 I Please make out cheques or postal orders to "The Fabian Society", and send I them to Venture· (subscriptions), 11 Dartmouth Street, London SWl (tel 01-930 I 3077) •------~----· AFRICA TODAY 27 ALLIES IN EMPIRE PART 11-U. S. Mili'tary Involvement BY WILLIAM MINTER such clear distinction. They see the mtSISlon of their armed forces as the defense of the national On the face of it, the rhetoric of self-deter territory. The national territory includes, by defi mination and America's close military ties with nition, the "overseas provinces." At present the Portugal seem contradictory, but American dip chief preoccupation of the Portuguese armed lomats deny the contradiction in the following forces is Africa. Portugal is fighting no other argument: wars. The whole character of the defense estab American relationships to Portugal lishment is molded by its mission overseas. and to NATO have nothing to do with An examination of Portugal's military bud the wars Portugal is fighting in Africa. get confirms the impression that Europe and Af NATO is a purely defensive alliance rica are inseparable in the eyes of the Portu whose territorial boundaries are con guese. The accounting is so mixed that it is im fined to Europe and the North Atlantic. possible to distinguish what is for where. Each Its concern is exclusively the defense of territory has its own armed forces budget, and Europe. Moreover, there are no such Portugal itself has not only an "Ordinary" de things as "NATO" arms; arms are pro fense budget, but also a budget for "Extra-ordin duced by individual countries, not by ary" defense expenditures. The budget of each the alliance. That one ally may sell or territory includes both receipts from local taxes give arms to another member of the al and from the central government, and the cen liance does not make those arms tral budget, both Ordinary and Extra-ordinary, "NATO arms." Charges which seek to includes expenditures relevant to the who~e of implicate NATO in Portugal's colonial the "national territory," and for all three forces wars are therefore. misdirected, based (army, navy and airforce). on ignorance and prejudice. The deployment of Portuguese force·s also Moreover, the bilateral American mili defies a clear-cut division between Europe and tary relations with Portugal deal exclu Africa. Of an estimated 1969 total of some sively with American and European de 180,000 troop.s, only about 18,000 are assigned fense. Maybe in 1961 Portugal did use to NATO; 125,000 to 150,000 troops are in Africa. American equipment allocated to NATO A given unit in the army generally serves two use in Africa instead; but now Portugal years overseas, and then is rotated back to Por gives assurances that new equipment tugal. Although the law provides that the normal received is only for use in Europe. term of military service is two years, the recruit Therefore it's not necessary to have an generally spends time in uniform both before arms embargo. Such action would even and after his service in Africa. A major function be an illegitimate interference in the of the navy, and to .some extent the air force, right of the North Atlantic nations to is transport between Europe and Africa. The air organize for self-defense. force displays a similar bias towards Africa; only In the abstract, the argument seems logical for one Neptune anti-submarine reconnaissance obviously, Europe is not Africa. The Portuguese squadron is assigned to NATO. Both navy and unfortunately do not agree with this apparent air force have regional commands in metropoli truism. tan Portugal and overseas. The Portuguese military also play an im portant political role. Salazar came to power as PORTUGAL'S MILITARY: ORGANIZED FOR the result of a military coup, and the support of COLONIAL REPRESSION the military was a key bulwark of his regime. Even if it were true that no newly supplied The armed forces have grown since· 1961, and U. S. weapons are being used by the Portuguese their influence, with their special interest in the in Africa, the U. S. argument would still depend colonies, continues to be very important. Even on the assumption that the role of Portugal's the wishful thinkers who see the new Premier military in Europe is quite separate from its Caetano as a liberal recognize that he· is severely role in Africa, so that cooperation in one area limited in the role by the ultra-right factions in has nothing to do with cooperation in the other. the military. The military will allow no soften The assumption is false. ing of policy in relation to the "overseas prov It is false, because the Portuguese make no inces." In the elections held in Portugal in late 28 1969, candidates were forbidden to discuss the the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, noted wars in Africa. that the aid to Portugal "is designed to trairi key On January 19, 1970, the Portuguese Minis Portuguese military personnel and to provide ter of Army and Defense, General Sa Viana maintenance support material." The number of Rebelo, stated that the fimdaanental objectives students involved is classified; but the following of the army in Portugal were the maintenance areas at least are included in the training: oper of "internal security and public order."l The ations, communications/ electronics; maintenance, colonial wars are matters of internal security, administrative, professional specialists, orienta for Portugal's "overseas provinces" are consid tion, and missiles. The training may be in Por ered part of one unitary nation. This then is the tugal or in the United States. State Department mission of the military establishment which has figures indicate Portuguese armed forces trained had the friendly advice of !Ul American Military in the U. S. as follows: Assistance Advisory Group since 1951. Fiscal year 1968 lf11 (5 army, 95 navy, 7 air force) Expendit!ife $120.000 AMERICAN AID AND MILITARY COOPERA· Fiscal year 1970 TION- HOW MUCH? 33 (4 army, 26 navy, 3 air force) Expenditure $88,000 Since its inception in 1951, U. S. military aid In 1970 one man from the army was at Fort to Portugal has not been large when compared Bragg studying psycl10logical operations and to the massive quantities dispensed in countries counter-insurgency. The State Department has such as Vietnam or Taiwan. In the fifties, it was a general policy of not allowing Portuguese more restricted than the aid given to other counter-insurgency training in the U. S. How countries in Western Europe. Yet now U. S. mili ever, since· the Kennedy era all military courses tary aid makes Portugal almost unique iri Europe. have a number 6.f classes in counter-insurgency, Tbe United States devoted much energy to en so all Portuguese trainees will acquire some ex couraging Western Europe to achieve defense perience while in the U. S. '(Special NATO pro independence. By and large, the effort has been grams are an additional category.) The Military successful. Now only Portugal and Spain con Assistance Group in Portugal, involved in supply, tinue to benefit regularly from the Military As administration, and training, consists of 25 Amer sistance Program. In 1959 the Clay Committee icans, 20 military and five civilian. expressed the opinion that the two countries had Material supl>ort in the form of equipment already ·been adequately compensated for Ameri is given to the army's NATO division, to the can bases on their territory. The aid to Spain navy, and to the air force. The NATO division and Portugal could have been phased out; but is equipped with American-supplied M-47 tanks, it was not, in spite of Portugal's growing involve 105-Illli.llimeter and 155-millim.eter guns, trucks, ment in three colonial wars. jeeps, and engineer and technical machinery and The precise figures on aid given are diffi vehicles.2 Light weapons and munitions are cult to obtain. Sources differ, and money allo largely manufactured in Portugal from NATO cated for a given year may represent. deliveries patterns. In 1961, it was admitted, some time spread out over several subsequent years. The after the event, that equipment frQm the NATO following figures are from the Statistics and division was used in Angola. Since then, Ameri Reports Division, Agency for International De can officials state, Portugal has given assurances velopment; they represent actual deliveries dur that equipment supplied for this division will ing the indicated fiscal years. not be transferred ·to use in Africa. Responsibil ity for AFRICA TODAY 29 gola or Mozambique waters. There is no attempt large acquisitions have been from Germany and to maintain any pretense in the case of French France. Among planes supplied by Germany are and German equipment. Although West Germany 40 Fiat G-91 fighters, a plane designed originally now declares that its aid is for NATO use only, for NATO use, built in German factories under the Revista de Marinha (June, 1969) speaks open Italian license for American use. The German ly of the intended use overseas of German ves Ministry of Defense stated in 1966 when the sels. planes were supplied that "the planes are to be The Portuguese air force, although now re used exclusively in Portugal for defense pur ceiving German and French aid, still has many poses within the framework of the North Atlan American planes. These include 50 F-84 Thunder tic Pact." A spokesman for the Portuguese For jets, 50 F-86 Sabre Jets; C-47, C-54, and DC-6 eign Ministry gave this interpretation: transports; several hundred T-6 and 30 T-37C The transaction was agreed within the trainers; some 20 B-26 bombers, 18 PV-2 Har spirit of the North Atlantic Pact. It was poon bombers, and 12 P-2V Neptune bombers. agreed that the planes would be used Only the Neptune bombers are assigned to only for defensive purposes within Por NATO. The United States contends that the ma tuguese territory. Portuguese territory jority of the airplanes were supplied before 1961 extends to Africa-Angola, Mozambique, (which is true), and that none of those supplied and Portuguese Guinea.s since 1961 are being used in Africa (which is Portugal has also arranged to get Alouette heli doubtful). copters from France. Edgar Cardoso, in an official publication of the Portuguese Aeronautics Secretariat, des cribed the aircraft used in 1961 against the rebel WHAT ABOUT THE AZORES?* attacks.3 He referred to the· use of F-84s and In 1968 Vice-Admiral L. C. Heinz reported PV-2s for "offensive support" of ground troops, that "our modest military assistance has helped to the use of the T-6s for "armed reconnais to foster close working relationships with the sance," and to the use of C-54s for transport of Portuguese militacy."6 The "close working re troops and paratroopers. The T-6 trainer, con lationship" means continued American use of verted to anti-guerrilla use, has served as the the Azores Island base. workhorse of the war overseas. American in or The Azores, principal reason for Portugal's igin, the~ are on sale in other countries; most admission to NATO originally, were important at recently Portugal is reported to have been buy the end of World War II and subsequently as a ing from France. stopover point for Europe and the Middle East. On May 17, 1964, at the Alverca air show in Now, according to an article inserted in the Portugal, a squadron of F-86 Sabre Jets displayed Congressional Record by Senator Pell of Rhode its proficiency with napalm bombs and rockets Island (June 5, 1969), "the basic mission of the for the entertainment of observers.4 Accusations USAF in the Azores . . . is to maintain Lajes that F-86s were being used in Guinea-Bissau re (Field) as a bastion of defense in case of global sulted first in denials; in a 1967 statement an war. The mission also calls for the United States American representative in the United Nations to assist Portugal in local defense, to maintain admitted that the F:86's "previously stationed in a Navy air-sea rescue operation and a center of Africa had been withdrawn at the· request of his operations for antisubmarine warfare and to run government." Also appe,aring at the Alverca a weather station operation. The Military I Airlift show were the T-37C pilot trainers recently re Coonmand also uses Lajes as a shuttle point for ceived from the United States. Training aircraft, mail, supplies, and personnel to our forces in they are especially equipped for anti-guerrilla Europe." The base is now unnecessary for its warfare and extensively used in Vietnam. original purpose. James Reston noted in the New Whether or not they are oow being used in Af York Times, March 5, 1969, that Washington rica is not known; certainly pilots trained in "needs the Azores no longer, but the old ar them are. rangements go on." All bases are important to The United States does not deny that other the Pentagon; it is always possible to find a new planes such as the C-47 and C-54 transports or the use for an old base. F-84 fighters are being used in Africa. It is not cle!iar whether this includes five C-54s newly sup plied to Portugal in 1965. In any case, the planes NATO: WHAT DOES IT DO FOR PORTUGAL? already supplied have to be maintained, and the The cooperation of the United States with majority of the work is done in the Portuguese Portugal is set within the wider context of the Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronautica, which NATO ·alliance. In the United Nations, the United has facilities for work on all planes involved. States has made much of the fact that the legal One doubts whether parts going into planes head boundaries of the NATO area do not include ed back to Africa are carefully separated out so Portuguese territories in Africa. Therefore, that no parts bought from or supplied by the •Africa Report, May 1970 contains an excellent review of the United States could possibly end up there. role of the Azores in U.S.-Portnguese relations by R. A. As in the case of the navy, more recent Diamond and David Fouquet. 30 NATO has nothing to do with the wars in Africa. from other NATO countries learn about what is Portugal, we have seen, does not agree. happening in Africa from the Portuguese point Nor is a "strict" interpretation of NATO's of view. territorial limits always agreed to by American Symbolic of NATO sentiment towards Portu military men. A handbook on NATO prepared by gal is the fact that in 1967 Portugal's status in USAF Brigadier-General Monro MacCloskey, who the alliance was upgraded. The NATO Atlantic served with .the NATO command, points out that Command Headquarters is in Norfolk; but when "the definition of the military area in which the NATO offices had to move from Paris, advantage Treaty is applicable in no way implies that po was taken of the reorganization to put into effect litical events occurring outside it cannot be the a plan to establish an Iberian Atlantic Command subject of consultations within the Council."7 On with headquarters in Portugal. This meant mov May 8, 1963, the Commander of Allied Forces in ing from Norfolk, not from Paris. The Richmond Europe, Lyman Lemnitzer, while on a visit to Times-Dispatch hailed the establishment of IBER Lisbon, revealed the spirit in which the Ameri LANT (as the command is called) as a healthy can military seems to interpret its relationship sign of improved relations with Portugal.l3 to the Portuguese. He said, "Portuguese soldiers, while fighting for the defense of principles, are UNOFFICIAL MILITARY AID defending land, raw materials, and bases, which Bilateral aid, NATO cooperation, and the are indispensable not only for the defense of Azores base represent official and public U. S. Europe, but for the whole Western world."8 involvement with the Portuguese military, al Portugal derives· a number of continuing ben though the attempt is made to deny the link :with efits from NATO. One is a detailed triennial re Africa. Other channels also exist. One such is view, updated annually, which "leads to compre ordinary business ties; another is the Central In hensive exchanges of views on the overall prob telligence Agency. lems facing countries in the defense field and to a multilateral discussion based on the full THE SINEWS OF WAR and detailed information supplied by each mem ber country concerning the state of its forces, A modern army needs a wide variety of future defense plans, and its economic and fi transport as well as specifically military equip nancial situation."9 More detailed consultations ment. It needs vehicles, tires, and gasoline. are also held, such as the annual meeting for American and Western European companies are Study of Ammunition and Light Weapons (the eager to supply what is needed, as is quickly re May 1966 session was held in Lisbon). Portugal vealed by a glance at some of the advertisements now produces most of its light weaponry, but in Portuguese military journals. Advertisements consultation with NATO countries ensures that for jeeps, "the all-terrain vehicle preferred. by it can keep abreast of new development, and the armed forces," compete with Land Rover and adjust production to NATO standards. NATO Mercedes Benz. Mabor, associated with the Gen standards are also applicable to much equipment eral 'l'ire and Rubber Company of Ohio, brags sold bilaterally to Portugal from Belgium, Ger that it "is present on the wheels of all vehicles, many, or Italy; the United States says, however, contributing to the renovation and maintenance that NATO has nothing to do with such bilateral of the equipment of our Armed Forces." Mobil arrangements. Oil claims that "it has participated with pride in the struggle for the defense of the province The NATO Defense College in Paris admits (Angola), pledging itself to assure the supply of 50 students per six-month term for upgrading fuels and lubricants necessary for the Armed of the officer corps of the member nations. Por Forces and the people." Gulf Oil does not have tuguese officers attend along with officers from to advertise; it has the advantage of having dis other NATO countries. Other special courses are covered oil in Angola. arranged at NATO level or bilaterally. One such course open to NATO countries involves train ing in chemical and biological warfare, at the AIRPLANE SMUGGLING FOR THE CIA Vilseck sehool in West Germany.lo A recent list The credibility of U. S. denials of involve of officers promotedn illustrates Portuguese par ment was further damaged when, in 1965, CIA ticipation. One officer, now in Mozambique, had complicity in a plan to smuggle 20 B-26 bombers completed a NATO course in cryptography. An to Portugal was revealed. Seven of the. bombers other had spent time at the Command Staff Col had already been shuttled to Portugal from lege in Fort Leavenworth, at the headquarters Tucson, Arizona, when U. S. Customs, evidently of the U. S. First Infantry Division in Germany, not in on the plot, caught up with the smugglers. and then in Angola. A third had gone from NATO The pilot, John Hawke, an RAF veteran, and a to the Portugue.se General Staff in Mozambique, French count; Henri de Montmarin, were bTooght and then back to NATO. The result is not only to court in Buffalo, New York, to stand trial that the Portuguese officers "maintain a broad for munitions SilliUggling. Their defense was that outlook and are up to date in military develop they had been hired by the CIA. ments and techniques"12 but also that officers The story that emerged from the trial AFRICA TODAY 31 seemed to confirm their account. The deal was uncannily accurate.'' The United States did not set up originally by the owner of Aero Asso demand the return of the bombers from Por ciates, Inc., of Tucson, a man named Gregory tugal. Board. Board, in conversation with Portuguese Government officials, had arranged to deliver "GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIPS" 10 B-26 bombers (the order was later increased to 20). The Douglas B-26 bombers have been used, One final indicator of the good working re since World War II, in counter-insurgency opera lationships between Portuguese and American tions in Vietnam, Laos, the Bay of Pigs, and the military are the frequent visits back and forth, many of which are reported in the Portuguese Congo. CIA involvement in these operations is press. Once or twice a year, the U. S. military well-known. attaches in Lisbon make a tour of one or more At the trial Lawrence Houston, the CIA gen of the "overseas provinces," to observe and ad eral counsel, testified that the CIA knew about vise. In March, 1962, USAF Commander-in-Ghlef the shipments at least five days before they be Curtis LeMay was in Portugal visiting the bases gan. Even so, he denied that the CIA had any of the Portuguese Air Force. In December of involvement in the affair. Judge John Henderson the same year the Portuguese· Minister of the informed attorneys that "any questions calcu Navy visited naval installations in the United lated to improperly discredit the United States States, and received the Legion of Merit award. and its representatives will be disallowed," and In 1963, seven high-ranking officers of the U. S. questioning along these lines was cut short. Industrial College of the Armed Forces visited Between June and September 1965, seven Portuguese industrial enterprises; 34 U. S. of bombers were taken to Portugal. They went from ficers participated in an official study tour of Tucson to Rochester, New York, then to New Angola; and Rear-Admiral J. A. Tyree, Jr. visited foundland, the Azores, and finally to Tancos Air Mo2lambique with units of the U. S. Fleet of the Base in Portugal. Hawke was questioned several South Atlantic. More recently, General Kaulza times, by FBI, FAA, and Canadian Customs of de Arriaga, before being transferred from Por ficials, but in each case reference to the code tugal to command the military region of Mozam word "Operation Sparrow" quickly produced a bique in mid-1969, made a two-week visit to the gq-ahead. Even when, on his second flight, he United States at State Department invitation. buzzed the White House (in a bomber) by mis His talks with Vietnam-veteran General West take, he was allowed to continue and no charges moreland and Air Force General Ryan were fol were brought, an unheard-of exception. lowed by a tour of military installations around Contact between Board and Hawke was made the country. In May, 1970, U. S. National War originally by Martin Caidin, a writer on aeronaut College officers visited Africa and en route home ics and space, twelve of whose books are used stopped off in Lisbon for discussions with Por as textbooks by the U. S. military. Several, such tuguese and U. S. officials.14 U. S. warships en as a book on the Hercules trans·port plane, have route to the Pers~an Gulf make regular stops in been produced in special editions for U. S. In Angola and Mozambique. formation Service distribution overseas. At the American identification with Portugal is trial he testified that in September he warned solidified by "business as usual" contacts, and the CIA that "somebody's going to blow the lid the close working relationships fostered by Amer on this." Evidently rivalries within the intelli ican aid. gence community finally brought the case to the surface. In the fall of 1965, the United States FOOTNOTES 1. Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin, April, 1970. testified at the U. N. that the smuggling had 2. Military Review, August, 1964. been a purely private affair which the govern 3. Presenca da Forca Aerea em Angola, 1963. 4. Revista Militar, June, 1964, p. 376. ment had stopped. 5. Flying Review International, April, 1966, p, 459. Articles detailing the CIA involvement ap 6. United States, Appropriations Committee Hearing, House of Representatives 90th Congress 32 STUDIES IN RACE :AND NATIONS CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL RACE RELATIONS ' ~. -- .· .. ".•···.····. ·. THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES .. UNIVERSITY OF DENVER 1itr • Analytic!ll and policy oriented monographs on domestic and international racial conflict. · ·· • Foilr studies published each year (September to September) PUBLISHED STUDIES: VOL. 1, No. 1, "Applying a New Theory of Human Relations to the Comparative Study of Racism," by Manfred Halpern. Application of a new theory of conflict and collaboration to U.S. Black / White relations. VOL. I, No.2, "The RacialLegacy of British Imperialism," by Ali A. Mazrui. A comparative analysis of the effect of ethnic and racial stratification of British Colonial policy on post imperial English speaking Africa and the United Kingdom, with reference to U.S. Black I White conflict. VOL. 1, No. 3, "Race and non-Black Minorities in British East Mrica," by Donald Rothchild. A study of the crisis of non-Mrican citizenship in Kenyan national integration. VOL. 1, No.4, "Race in United States Foreign Policy," by George W. Shepherd, Jr. An analytical survey of the absence of the racial variable in past and present approaches to the study of U.S. foreign policy with suggestions for new approaches. FUTURE STUDIES: VOL. 2, No. 1, "Namibia. The Beginning of Disengagement," by Elizabeth Landis. A discussion of South African involvement in South West Africa (Namibia) and United Nations' policy. EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD Robert Browne-Black Economic Research Council Josef Korbel - University of Denver St. Clair Drake- Stanford University · c. Eric Lincoln- Vassar College and Union Theological Sem. Ragaei El Mallakh- University of Colorado John Marcum-Univ. of Denver E. V. Essien-Udom- University of . Ibadan John McCamant - University of Denver Wayne Frederick,.__Ford Foundation Charles Micaud - University of Denver Arthur Gilbert - University of Denver Jewel Prestage- Southern University Kenneth Grundy - Case Western Reserve University Peter Rose - Smith College Charles V. Hamilton- Columbia University James Rosenau- Rutgers University Vincent Harding -Spelman College Donald Rothchild- University of California, Davis Geo111e Houser- American Committee on Africa Hyman Shevelew- University of California, Davts Guy Hunter - Overseas Development Institute, London Pierre Van den Berghe- University of Washington Harold Isaacs- Massachusetts Institute of Technology Editor - Tilden J. LeMelle ORDER REQUEST FORM Send me Vol. -No. l Enter my subscription of one year for the Studies in Race and Nations series. Bill me. Payment enclosed. Single copies-$2.00. Subscriptions--$7.00 a year. Mail order request to Managing Editor. Studies in Race and Nations Center on International Race Relations, University of Denver. Denver. Colo. 80210 ALLIES IN EMPIRE PART 111-America·n Foreign Policy and Portuguese Colonialism BY WILLIAM MINTER tudes. It is necessary to ask the question "Who is involved in making policy?" Until 1961 Portuguese Africa was given no The general public is certainly not. Even independent weight in American foreign policy Congress plays only a secondary role. It is the considerations--it was treated simply as a part executive branch of the government, the large of Portugal, and the TJ. S. attitude to Portugal corporations, and such elite clusters as the Coun itself was determined by that country's role as cil on Foreign Relations that set the assumptions a NATO ally. The fact that Portugal was both and make policy. a fascist country and a colonial power was ir Within these groups are strong forces acting relevant to foreign policy designers. The 1961 to maintain current policy; such forces severely revolt in Angola made it impossible for the new limit the ways in which policy might change, Kennedy Administration, eager to build political even under considerable pressure. The two most capital in the Third W odd, to avoid taking some obvious loci of inertia are the military establish stand on Portuguese actions in Africa. Thus ment on the one hand and the dominantly Euro American policy was advanced one small step to pean perspective of the foreign policy elite on verbal support of self--determination for the peo the other. ple in Portuguese Africa with accompanying as The interest of the military is clear.. Portu surances that American weapons would no longer gal is included in America's most important mil be supplied to Portugal for use in A~rica. U. S. itary alliance-NATO. It is anti-communist, policy has not shifted since th~ adoptwn of that "stable" and friendly. It controls a number of posture. As the conflict contmued and world strategic island bases in the Atlantic and the opinion hardened, the U. S. refused ~o go_ be:,:ond colonies provide valuable resources. In addition, verbal disassociation from Portugal; it mamtamed there seems to be a growing tendency to assign its military ties and stepped up investments. -:'-s an important role to the whole of Southern Af sisted by its Western allies, it blo~ked effective rica (including the Republic of South Africa) as U. N. adion, labeling any resolutwn that went a counter to the perceived threat of the Soviet beyond mild verbal condemnation of the Portu Navy in the Indian Ocean following the withdraw guese as "unrealistic." al of the British. Further, many military men are Any attempt to assess prospects for ch~ge clearly sympathetic to Portugal's view on its in this policy must first identify the for~e.s whlC~ problem in Africa. shaped and maintain the current offiCial attl- In fact the military rarely have to defend their view of Portugal. and there has been little challenge from the ranks of the "civilian" foreign At a July 4th party given by the U. S. policy echelons. This is consis~ent. with th.e as Consulate General in Luanda, a foreigner sumption which generally prevails m such crrcles was taken hospitably from one group to that European interests automatically take prece another and given repeated accounts of dence over African interests, even when the Portugal's multi-racialism and of the efforts European country involved is a small, unimport made to bring blacks along. But there were ant one such as Portugal. Europe, Asia, and Latin no black guests. A member of the consul.ar America are recognized as primary areas of U. S. staff explained later that two had been m responsibility; Africa is peripheral. George Ball, vited but were in Europe. former Undersecretary of State, has suggested It is apparent to anyone who talks with that we should "recognize that Africa (is) a them that neither the Consulate General special European responsibility just as today the nor members of his staff are segregation European nations recognize our particular re ists. They drew up their invitations to re sponsibility in Latin America."! This does not flect the social status quo, not to challenge mean that the U. S. has no interest in Africa, it. And in Portuguese Africa, this means but simply that the desire of the policy makers in effect admitting whites and some mul is to keep open involvement "low-profile." . attoes but bypassing nearly every black According to this view, the former colomal in Angola. powers are important stabilizing forces. Hence New York Times the Department of State Publication 8074 (Octo August 8, 1969 ber 1968) states that "the United States recog nizes the contribution made in Africa by Portu gal, and believes it is important that Portugal 34 continue to contribute to the stability and pro gress in that continent." The difference between the Portuguese and the U. S. position lies simply ACTION NOW in assessment of how best Portugal can guarantee * The military alliance with Portugal should its continued influence in Africa. Thus the U. S. be elided and the Azores base relin position paper goes on to say, "However because quished. of rapid political changes in Africa in the last decade, the United States believes that continued * All U. S. trade, loans and investment in Portuguese presenee in the continent can best the Portuguese colonies should stop. be assured if it undertakes an accelerated pro * Education about and protest against U. S. gram of political,' economic and social reform, support for the military and economic designed to advance all the peoples of the terri Portuguese Empire will take a variety of tories toward the exercise of self-determination." forms such as action relating to U. S. As G. Mennen Williams makes clear in his book, government officials; campaigns such as ironically entitled Africa for the Africans, "this that against Gulf Oil Corporation; local does not necessarily mean that independence and campus actions against corporate in would be the end result of such a program."2 vestment in all of southern Africa. Such a policy, which requires a peaceful * Support should be given for the libera transition to political self-determination in which tion struggle including direct aid to the Portuguese interests are safeguarded, is obvious movements and aid to the educational, ly contradictory to the present realities of Por medical and economic programs. tuguese intransigence and the protracted guerril la wars underway in Angola, Mozambique, and For more information, write directly to Guinea-Bissau. The contradiction can, however, the movements or to the Africa Defense easily be tolerated by policy-makers as long as and Aid Fund of the ·American Commit little attention is given to Africa and gue-rrilla tee on Africa, 164 Madison Avenue, New victory does not appear imminent. Pro forma York, N. Y. 10016. idealistic statements in the United Nations can continue to co-exist with "business as usual" mil itary ties and economic investment. create future greater U. S. leverage towards a The contradiction is a less tolerable one for peaceful compromise settlement. some of those among the policy elite specifically Such a readjustment of U. S. policy is un concerned with Africa. At the moment American likely to be more than an emergency "fallback" interests, both business and political, seek con position, as long as the possibility of maintaining tinued involvement in the white-ruled South, the status quo appears possible. But the three while at the same time they attempt to strength reasons which Nielson gives for his proposed en ties with the newly independent countries to changes show the conditions under which this the north. The same multinational mining com changed policy might be considered essential. panies play large roles on both sides of the line He talks of "ideals," of the necessity to keep separating. politically independent from minority out extremist and Communist influence, and of controlled states. the divisive danger of black and youth reaction A man like Waldemar Nielson, President to another Vietnam in Southern Africa. of the African-American Institute, looking a The drive to consistency with "American little further into the future, recognizes that ideals," particularly those of racial equality and while it is still possible to play both sides self-deter.mination, seems unlikely to produce at the mome·nt, wisdom dictates more support any real shift in policy. Foreign policy responses for the African side than has been given to the fear of ''extremism". are already develop to this d:ate. His recent book, The Great Powers ing, and no doubt will grow as the liberation and Africa, and the previous African Battleline, movements in Southern Africa make substantial both stem from discussion groups in the Council gains. President Nixon's attempts to generalize on Foreign Relations, and must be taken as rep support for the moderate Lusaka Manifesto is resenting a significant, if still a minority, view sued by some of the inde·pendent African States among the foreign policy elite. indicate that the desire to mould the direction In particular Nielson suggests a reexamina of African independence is already an active fac tion of American ties with white southern Africa. tor in U. S. foceign-policy making. But such at He indicates that sound policy may involve Por tempts to gain influence with the African states tugal's exclusion from NATO, and restriction on supporting the liberation movements, and with the flow of American private investment. He the liberation movements themselves, are still also advocates non-military aid to the liberation unimpressive when compared with the impetus movements, thus "checking the drift of the. na for maintaining good relations with the white tionalist movements into bitterness, extrerrusm, South. If relationships with the rest of Africa and growing dependence on Communist sup begin to weigh more heavily and tip the balance port."3 The resulting situation would, he argues, in the direction favored by Nielson, the manipu- AFRICA TODAY 35 lative possibilities of U. S. interference and the one that WQuld pose new dangers for the people dangers to the liberation movements of U. S. in Africa. Any other· and more healthy alterna policy based on stopping ''extremism" can be tive policy will depend largely on the extent to easily envisaged. The history of the Congo illus which the black and the student community, the trates some of the dangers quite graphically. white left, sections of the churches and other In summary, U. S. foreign policy in Southern groups who oppose oppression in southern Af Africa is unlikely to change until the success rica, can mobilize their forces to provide real of the liberation movements forces a new Ameri support to the liberation struggle in Africa. can response. The possible nature of any response FOOTNOTES is uncertain. There might be more explicit sup 1. George Ball, The Discipline of Power, (Boston: Atlantic Little Brown, 1968), P. 241. port for the white regimes; liberal manipulation 2. G. Mennen Williams, Africa for the Africans, (Grand Rap of the type proposed by Nielson appears, on the ids: Eerdmans, 1969), p. 132. 3. Waldemar Nielson, The Great Powers In Africa, BRING THE. TROOPS HOME* * FROM* THE AZORES TOO (A LEAFLET ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH THE NATIONAL MOBILIZATION TO BRING THE TROOPS HOME.) PORTUGAL wages war against 14 million African people with the support of NATO countries in cluding the United States. U. S. MILITARY defends the Portuguese alliance because it wants the Azores base as a staging area for possible U. S. troop landings in the Middle East or Africa. AFRICAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS in their struggle for self-determination pin down 150,000 Portu guese troops in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. These colonies would be free if Portugal did not receive military, economic and diplomatic aid from the Western Powers. Newsweek 8/25/69 The New York Times 1017/69 "Portugal, in return for renewing the lease of "Perched on a bookcase behind Mr. Rebello from U. S. military installations in the Azores, is ask the Mozambique Liberation Front was a red-and ing for a weapons-modernization program which gray fragment of an American napalm canister a piece of mute evidence to be set be,side Portu could cost $200 million over the next 5 years. gal's denial that she uses armam.ents supplied Current U. S. military aid to Portugal, a NATO by the U. S. under the North Atlantic Treaty ally, is $1,030,000 a year." Organization in her wars against the rebels in Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea." THE UNITED STATES ALSO HELPS PORTUGAL WITH - specialized training for her troops -supplies for NATO purposes which free Portuguese material for colonial wars -abstentions at the United Nations on anti-colonial issues - economic investments which further entrench the Portuguese colonial system THE PORTUGUESE DICTATORSHIP IS AT WAR WITH THE PORTUGUESE PEOPLE, TOO Portugal is a police state. In a "free" election campaign, the police initiated criminal pro ceedings (10/8/69) against candidate Maria Barroso for remarks about Portugal's col onial wars. Nearly half the Portuguese budget goes for ..military purposes while Portugal has the lowest standard of living and the highest illiteracy rate in Europe. Hundreds of young Portuguese are in prison for refusing to serve in the African wars. SOLIDARITY WITH THE WAR RESISTERS OF PORTUGAL! SUPPORT THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS OF AFRICA! END THE U.S.-PORTUGAL ALLIANCE! EVACUATE THE AZORES! ABOLISH. THE WAR MACHINE! American Committee on Africa, 164 Madison Avenue, New ·York. N. Y. lOOle 36 NAS HORAS BOAS A ~aga~e~=ds~q~~a~~::;,amente alacau $@$~~iii fo~:~~,~~d:~g8ol~ 5 i;~;~lo~~~!~icios her6icos Os --IIOo;-odl A Mobil que desde 1914 serve a Provincia; que ~~~dut~~o;~;~H7~:os18t~~u i~p~0;a0:te~ 5 p~u,~or:s s;~ desenvolvimento ; que, nos heros boos e m6s, sempre acompanhou a sorte de Angola e dos sues popula~Oes - nao podia ester ousente desses socrificios. ~.::~~i~~·~,~~~~~:,o:~pC.,Onho~~o~~~o e": ~~:::u~:~ o obostecimento de combustiveis e lubrificontes necess6rios Os Fon;:os Armadas e Os popula~Oes . MAIS DE MEIO SECULO AO SERVICO DO PAiS. This MOBIL ad was taken from the Portuguese Military journal, Jornal do Exercito, November December, 1964. It graphically shows the alliance between U.S. corporations and the Portuguese colonial war machine. A translation of the ad reads: IN THE GOOD HOURS AND IN THE BAD ... The wave of terrorism which treacherously attacked the North of Angola imposed heroic sacrifices on the Armed Forces and the people. Mobil, which has served the province since 1914; which pioneered in bringing in all places the petroleum products so important for its development; which, in the good hours and the bad, always joined in the destiny of Angola and its people- Mobil could not be absent from these sacrifices. Mobil has participated with pride in the struggle for the defense of the province, pledging itself to assure the supply of fuels and lubricants necessary for the Armed Forces and the people. MORE THAN HALF A CENTURY AT THE SERVICE OF THE COUNTRY Africa Today SECOND CLASS POSTAGE Associates PAID c/ o Graduate School of AT International Studies University Park Campus DENVER, COLO. Denver, Colorado 80210 .... ---~