Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice © 2014 American Psychological Association 2014, Vol. 1, No. 2, 139–152 2326-5523/14/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/cns0000014 and Cognition

John F. Kihlstrom University of California, Berkeley

This article summarizes the contributions of hypnosis to our understanding of cogni- tion. These contributions have been especially salient in the study of memory, and include source and the distinction between episodic and semantic memory; the occurrence of semantic priming in implicit (unconscious) memory; and paramnesia (false memory). Posthypnotic amnesia shows that explicit and can be dissociated even under optimal encoding conditions. The hypnotic alterations of per- ception may expand the scope of central executive control over “low-level” sensory and perceptual processes, and offer a new perspective on perceptual couplings. Implicit (unconscious) perception in hypnosis is not subject to the same analytic limitations encountered in masked priming. In the study of “high-level” thought processes, hypnosis has played an important role in understanding the formation of delusional beliefs, and of intuitions in problem-solving. Studies of hypnosis suggest that automatic processes can be “de-automatized,” as in the reversal of Stroop interference by for hypnotic agnosia. In social cognition, Orne’s analysis of demand characteristics laid the foundations for the cognitive revolution in social psychology, by underscoring the status of subjects—and people outside the laboratory—as active, sentient, problem-solving agents. The search for correlates of hypnotizability led to the incorporation of openness to experience as a major cognitive dimension in the structure of personality. One topic for future research is the relationship between hypnotizability in children and their development of a theory of mind. Studies of hypnosis in children may shed new light on the development of the imagination.

Keywords: hypnosis, implicit memory, implicit perception, intuition, automaticity

Throughout the history of psychology, re- notized; and when the hypnotist gives a prear- searchers of many different theoretical stripes ranged cue, they carry out some activity that have found hypnosis to be intrinsically interest- had been suggested to them earlier, without ing. This interest only seems natural. In re- knowing what they are doing or why. Hypnosis sponse to the suggestions of the hypnotist, hyp- is one of the few things you can do in a labo- notizable subjects appear to lose control over ratory that both experimenter and subject find voluntary motor activities; they do not feel pain enjoyable. or touch, they go deaf or blind; they hear voices Early in its history, hypnosis was little more speaking to them that no one else hears; they than a phenomenon to be studied with the lab- fail to see things that are right in front of them; oratory methods of the then-new science of they feel like children again; they fail to recog- psychology, the primary goal being to deter- nize objects that are objectively familiar to mine the limits of hypnotic suggestions—as in

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. them; they emerge from hypnosis unable to the pioneering research of Young (1927). This

This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individualremember user and is not to be disseminated broadly. what they did while they were hyp- was also, in large part, the view of Hull (1933), who simply assumed that hypnosis was a “habit phenomenon” that improved with practice. In The point of view presented in this article is based on much the same way, the “Golden Age” of mod- research supported by Grant MH-35856 from the National ern hypnosis research, which ran from the late Institute of Mental Health. 1950s into the 1990s, was primarily concerned Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed with applying established paradigms and theo- to John F. Kihlstrom, Department of Psychology, MC 1650, University of California, Berkeley, 3210 Tolman Hall, Berke- ries to the understanding of hypnotic phenom- ley, CA 94720-1650. E-mail: [email protected]; http:// ena. To be sure, the Golden Age investigators socrates.berkeley.edu~kihlstrm had theories about hypnosis; but for the most

139 140 KIHLSTROM

part they had methods to match their curiosity memory (Kihlstrom, 1997a). In this respect, about an intrinsically interesting phenomenon. pride of place goes to source amnesia; a phe- At the same time, the project of understand- nomenon of considerable interest to cognitive ing hypnosis in terms of what was already psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists, known coexisted with another project, which which was initially discovered, and named, in was to study hypnosis for the unique light it the context of hypnosis (Evans, 1979; Evans & might shed on mind and behavior. This second Thorne, 1966). Under the guise of a test of project has an even longer history, reaching general information, Evans and Thorne (1966) back to the clinical work of Charcot and Janet, taught subjects obscure facts, followed by a where hypnosis served as a laboratory model for standard for posthypnotic amnesia. understanding the mysteries of hysteria (Kihl- When the subjects came out of hypnosis, they strom, 1979; for additional coverage of hypno- had little memory for the things they had done sis and psychopathology, see the article by while hypnotized, including the general- Barnier, Cox, and McConkey in this issue, information test. However, when asked about Barnier, Cox, & McConkey, 2014). Similarly, the topics tested earlier, a substantial portion of William James devoted an entire chapter of the these otherwise amnesic subjects nonetheless Principles of Psychology (James, 1890/1980)to answered correctly. Further, when asked where hypnosis, precisely because he thought that the they had acquired the information, they either new scientific psychology could benefit from said that they did not know, or they confabu- the insights it provided (Kihlstrom & McCon- lated the source of their knowledge—hence the key, 1990). James’s interest in hypnosis had its label. origins in his interest in the will, and he thought Evans’s observations were inspired, in turn, that hypnosis could shed unique light on how by even earlier observations on hypnotically ideas, in the form of suggestions, generated induced paramnesia by Banister and Zangwill action, in the form of hypnotic behaviors. Ad- (1941a, 1941b). In these experiments, amnesic ditionally, of course, James was interested in subjects recognized items that had previously consciousness. He thought that consciousness been presented to them during hypnosis, but and thinking were identical, and that uncon- confabulated the context in which they had en- scious thought was a kind of oxymoron. Still, he countered them. Evans’s observation was some- was persuaded by Janet’s observations, and his what controversial within some hypnosis circles own, that in hypnosis things could be uncon- (Spanos, Gwynn, Della Malva, & Bertrand, sciously felt but not consciously perceived, and 1988; Wagstaff, 1981), but later similar obser- that mental activity could be divided into mul- vations were made on neurological patients tiple streams, only one of which was accessible with amnesia (Schacter, Harbluk, & Mc- to phenomenal awareness at any given time. Clachlan, 1984; Shimamura & Squire, 1987, In the years since James, Young, and Hull, 1991) and normal aging memory (Glisky, Ru- hypnosis has offered much to psychological bin, & Davidson, 2001). Source amnesia is theory, and particularly to our understanding of now firmly established as a phenomenon of consciousness (Kihlstrom, 2007). In this article, memory—an example of what might be called I focus on the contributions of hypnosis to our the irony of self-reports, which is that too understanding of various aspects of cognition, many psychologists take self-reports seri- broadly construed to include social cognition ously only when they are made by people who This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. and cognitive development. For coverage of are brain-damaged. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. hypnosis and cognitive neuroscience, see Kihl- Source amnesia is commonly interpreted as strom (2013a) and the article in this issue by revealing a dissociation between two different Halligan and Oakley (2014). forms of memory, episodic and semantic. Aside from discriminating between short-term and Memory long-term memory, the earliest cognitive theo- ries considered memory to be a unitary storage Posthypnotic amnesia gave hypnosis its name system (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Later the- (Kihlstrom, 1992b), and so it is proper that a oretical developments, however, drew further discussion of the contributions of hypnosis to distinctions between declarative (fact-based) our understanding of cognition begin with and procedural (rule-based) memory, and then HYPNOSIS AND COGNITION 141

between two forms of declarative memory, ep- in which the cue presented on the priming test is isodic and semantic. Much of the evidence for wholly or partly a recapitulation of the physical these structural distinctions in long-term mem- stimulus presented for initial study. For exam- ory was derived from studies of amnesia, in- ple, a subject might study the word ashcan and cluding posthypnotic amnesia. For example, then be asked to complete the stem ash___ with Tulving (1983) cited a study of posthypnotic a legal English word. Repetition priming is ob- amnesia (Kihlstrom, 1980) as one of four ex- served when the subject completes the stem periments demonstrating the distinction be- with ashcan as opposed to some other possibil- tween episodic and semantic memory. In this ity, such as ashtray. Spared repetition priming experiment, subjects memorized a list of words supported a number of competing hypotheses during hypnosis, and then received a suggestion about implicit memory: for example, that it was for posthypnotic amnesia. “Virtuoso” hypnotic mediated by a perceptual representation system subjects showed a dense amnesia for the studied (Schacter, 1990); by perceptually driven pro- wordlist, but they were still able to use list items cessing (Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989); as responses in word-association and category- or by spared automatic processing (Jacoby, generation tasks. Thus, posthypnotic amnesia 1991). The problem for these approaches is that affected episodic memory for the memorized the spared priming observed in posthypnotic wordlist, but spared semantic memory for the amnesia includes not only repetition priming words themselves. If truth be told, this particu- but also semantic priming. In the original ex- lar dissociation had been observed before (Bar- periment, for example, subjects who memorized ber & Calverley, 1966; Williamsen, Johnson, & a word like girl during the study phase were Eriksen, 1965), but in the context of earlier presented with a word like boy as a cue for free “unistore” theories of memory, its relevance to association; or they studied a word like foot, and broader questions of cognitive architecture went were cued to generate instances of the category unnoticed. human body part. Such priming effects are not More important, however, the subjects in this based on physical similarity between cue and experiment were more likely to respond with target; rather, they are based on semantic relat- list items to word-association or category- edness (McNamara, 2005). generation stimuli, compared with control items Semantic priming cannot be mediated by a that they had never studied at all; and this was perceptual representation system that does no true even for the subjects who were amnesic for more than create a representation of the physical the list. This “priming” effect had not been attributes of a stimulus, and it cannot be medi- noted in the earlier experiments, but it has since ated by perceptually driven processing; nor, for been replicated and extended (Barnier, Bryant, that matter, can it be a product of automatic & Briscoe, 2001; David, Brown, Pojoga, & processing, so long as automatic processing is David, 2000). Priming effects were already fa- confined to low-level “perceptual” analyses of miliar in the study of semantic memory, and had physical appearance. Therefore, to the extent served as a basis for various theories of spread- that semantic priming occurs in the absence ing activation, but the significance of priming in of conscious recollection (whether by virtue of various forms of amnesia was not yet fully brain damage or something else), theories of appreciated. Only later did we come to under- implicit memory that focus on perceptual rep- stand that spared priming in amnesia could be resentations, perceptually driven processing, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. an instance of what would come to be called and the like must be incomplete. Unfortunately, This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. implicit memory (Schacter, 1987; Schacter et those investigators who study implicit memory al., 1984)—that is, as an expression of uncon- have hardly ever used semantic priming para- scious memory. digms. There are exceptions (Blaxton, 1989; Although posthypnotic amnesia did not play Gardner, Boller, Moreines, & Butters, 1973), a prominent role in the discovery of implicit including some (but not all) studies of source memory, it nonetheless sheds unique light on amnesia, but these are very few in number. the nature of the phenomenon. Almost all stud- Posthypnotic amnesia also underscores other ies of implicit memory, whether in brain- features of priming that would be of consider- damaged patients or neurologically intact sub- able relevance to theories of implicit memory. jects, have used a repetition priming paradigm For example, most demonstrations of implicit 142 KIHLSTROM

memory, whether in amnesic patients or normal because the articulation of “neodissociation” subjects, have used rather impoverished encod- theories of hypnosis (Hilgard, 1977; Kihlstrom, ing conditions—either by virtue of brain dam- 1992a), inadvertently lent credence to the idea age (as in the case of the amnesic syndrome, that traumatic memories could be blocked from electroconvulsive shock, or dementia), normal consciousness, but still affect a person’s expe- aging, or “shallow” processing by college stu- rience, thought, and action in the form of “body dents. However, in the hypnotic case the amne- memories” and the like (Kihlstrom, 1996b, sia affecting is not a result of 1997b). However, careful research has undercut impoverished encoding. In the first place, post- this aspect of clinical lore: if anything, trau- hypnotic amnesia is reversible, marking it as a matic memories are likely to be better remem- product of retrieval factors, rather than encod- bered than ordinary ones (Kihlstrom, 2006; Mc- ing or storage. In the second place, posthypnotic Nally, 2003). In this respect, the contribution of amnesia can be suggested for materials that hypnosis was to vividly underscore the prob- have been deeply processed by subjects during lems, in psychotherapy and the courtroom, cre- the course of deliberate memorization— ated by the reconstructive nature of memory invoking the elaborative and organizational ac- (for fuller coverage, see the article in this issue tivity that forces subjects to go beyond percep- by Mazzoni, Laurence, & Heap [2014]). tually driven processing and perceptual Returning to the positive side of the ledger, a representations. Memories can be rendered un- series of experiments by Bower and his col- conscious by processes that operate after deep leagues revealed the role of emotion in memory, encoding, affecting the accessibility of stored such as mood-congruent encoding and retrieval traces. This is an instance where attention to the (Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978; Bower, findings from the hypnosis laboratory might Gilligan, & Monteiro, 1981). These studies well have led implicit memory researchers to helped return emotion to the attention of cogni- overcome the kind of methodological tunnel tive psychologists, and helped set the stage for vision that led them to focus almost exclusively what has become an “affective revolution” (or, on shallow processing and repetition priming, to perhaps, a counterrevolution) in psychology. the detriment of a comprehensive theory of un- conscious memory. Sensation and Perception Enhanced memory, or hypermnesia, has also been claimed for hypnosis. In contrast to post- Hypnotic suggestion can also dramatically hypnotic amnesia, however, empirical evidence alter sensation and perception, although these for hypnotic hypermnesia has never been par- effects have not drawn as much attention from ticularly convincing. There is no evidence that experimental psychologists as the effects on hypnotic suggestions enhance memory, over memory have. The salient exception is hypnotic and above the hypermnesia that occurs naturally analgesia, which has been well-studied in both in the normal waking state (Register & Kihl- the laboratory (Hilgard, 1969) and the clinic strom, 1987, 1988); and there are good reasons (Hilgard & Hilgard, 1975), and has enjoyed to be concerned that hypnotic suggestions can considerable practical application (Jensen & enhance retrieval biases that induce false recol- Patterson, 2014). Hilgard’s studies of hypnotic lections (Kihlstrom, 1994). False recollection, analgesia also gave rise to the idea that con- along with other sins of commission (Schacter, sciousness could be divided without resort to This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. 1999), illustrates the reconstructive nature of commissurotomy—a major milestone in the This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. memory (Bartlett, 1932). “consciousness revolution” that occurred in False memory was not discovered in hypno- cognitive psychology beginning in the late sis (Loftus, 1974; Roediger, 1996), but many 1970s (Hilgard, 1977). psychotherapists resorted to hypnosis to stimu- As with hypnotic hypermnesia, some author- late the recovery of ostensibly “repressed,” ities have long asserted that hypnotic suggestion “dissociated,” or otherwise forgotten memories could improve sensory acuity, especially in vi- of sexual abuse and other childhood traumas, sion or audition. Early studies along these lines causing considerable difficulty when these suffered from a number of methodological memories proved to be unverifiable, unreliable, problems (Raz, Marinoff, Zephrani, Schweizer, or outright wrong. There is some irony here, & Posner, 2004). However, a later study by HYPNOSIS AND COGNITION 143

Graham and Leibowtiz (Graham & Leibowitz, account for failures to perceive objects that, 1972) took considerable care to rule out periph- given the state of both the stimulus and the eral changes, and a further study by Sheehan et perceiver, are clearly perceptible (Kihlstrom, al. confirmed these findings using signal- 2007). detection methods (Sheehan, Smith, & Forrest, In particular, hypnotic blindness speaks to a 1982; Smith, Forrest, & Sheehan, 1983). Even long-running debate concerning the analytic though these changes occur only subjects who limits of unconscious perception. Although it is are myopic in the first place, if confirmed they generally agreed that unconscious perception would illustrate the role of central, “top-down” can include the analysis of the physical proper- processes on even low-level sensory functions. ties of a stimulus, the famous experiments by The hypnotic alterations in perception, in- Marcel (1983)—demonstrating, for example, cluding both positive and negative hallucina- that masked presentation of word such as doctor tions, are also relevant to the problem of per- could prime lexical decisions concerning se- ceptual couplings. These are apparently mantically related words such as nurse— inviolable links between one perceptual organi- stimulated a vigorous debate over whether zation and another (Epstein, 1982; Hochberg, masked could be processed for meaning as well. 1981; Kihlstrom, Barnhardt, & Tataryn, 1992). A long debate over this issue was definitively In the Ponzo (railroad tracks) illusion, for ex- resolved by a series of experiments by Green- ample, seeing lines converging in the distance wald and his colleagues, who conclusively dem- forces the observer to see horizontal bars that onstrated masked affective priming—that is, cross the converging lines to be unequal in priming that required analysis of the connota- length. Perceptual couplings illustrate the role tive if not denotative meaning of the words of unconscious inferences in perception, and (Draine & Greenwald, 1998). At the same time, thus, are highly relevant to the debate between Greenwald’s systematic research revealed ana- “constructivist” and “ecological” views of per- lytic limitations on semantic priming. That is, ception. A number of studies indicate that one affective priming occurred for single-word coupled element is not abolished when the other stimuli such as enemy or loses, which are each is covered by a suggested negative hallucination negatively valenced, but not for two-word (Jansen, Blum, & Loomis, 1982; Miller, Hen- phrases such as enemy loses, which is positively nessy, & Leibowitz, 1973). This does not al- valenced (Greenwald, 1992). Moreover, as ways happen, though (Blum, Nash, Jansen, & Marcel and others had shown, masked priming Barbour, 1981), so the fate of perceptual cou- of even single words does not last very long, plings needs to be straightened out. The result with optimal stimulus-onset asynchronies might well indicate whether the inferences (or (SOAs) between prime, mask, and target on the computations) that generate the coupled ele- order of only a few seconds at most. ment must be performed on a conscious percept. At least some of these rules were apparently Negative alterations of perception, including broken in a pair of studies by Bryant and Mc- the sensory anesthesias as well as negative hal- Conkey (Bryant & McConkey, 1989, 1995). lucination, also bear on the nature of implicit, or Inspired by Eich’s (1984) study of unconscious unconscious, perception (Kihlstrom, 1996a; perception in dichotic listening, they showed Kihlstrom et al., 1992). In both cases, the sub- subjects pairs of words consisting of a homo- ject is not consciously aware of some object in phone such as window and a disambiguating This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. the perceptual field. The object itself is in no context word such as pane. Half the trials were This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. sense subliminal, as it is presented as supralim- conducted under conditions of ordinary vision, inal intensity and duration; nor is it presented in and half following a suggestion for hypnotic an unattended portion of the sensory field; nor is blindness. On a later memory test, the subjects there any interference by a forward or backward generally failed to recall the items that they had mask. The fact that subjects can fail to perceive been presented while they were blind (as pre- stimuli that are presented under conditions that dicted, given that the items were not con- are optimal for conscious perception would sciously seen in the first place); nevertheless, seem to have implications for theories of con- they showed significant priming effects on both sciousness in general. That is, any theory of a homophone-spelling test and a word-fragment perceptual consciousness is going to have to completion test. These count as semantic prim- 144 KIHLSTROM

ing effects, and they occurred long after the cluded that the hypnotized subject was, essen- SOAs that are typical in studies of masked tially, deluded about the actual stimulus state of priming; and they occurred even though the affairs—in other words, that the world around stimuli were not degraded in any way. them is the same as suggested by the hypnotist In the past, studies of unconscious perception (Sutcliffe, 1960, 1961). However, subjects can have been based on three major paradigms: also generate delusions by constructing expla- neuropsychological, as in the case of blindsight, nations for their anomalous experiences. This prosopagnosia, and hemispatial neglect; “sub- appears to be a general process, not limited to liminal” perception, including masked priming; hypnosis. In an early textbook of psychopathol- and attentional manipulation, as in parafoveal ogy, Jaspers distinguished between primary de- presentation, dichotic listening, and both atten- lusions, which reflect an individual’s anomalous tional and inattentional blindness (including the subjective experiences, and secondary delu- attentional blink, repetition blindness, and sions, which represent his attempt to interpret change blindness). Hypnosis adds a fourth ar- and explain his primary delusions (Jaspers, row to this quiver. Although Bryant and Mc- 1923/1962; see also Reed, 1972). Similarly, Conkey did not use Greenwald’s two-word Maher (1974) argued that schizophrenic delu- phrases, the message from these studies is sions did not reflect a thought disorder, but clear. At least under some conditions, implicit rather the patient’s more-or-less rational at- perception supports even complex semantic tempt to explain an experiential disorder. As analyses—complex enough to decode the re- such, hypnosis offers a means for inducing dis- lationship between window and pane. Fur- orders of perception, memory, and the volun- thermore, the priming effect created by an tary control of action, and thus, a window on the unperceived visual stimulus can last for an formation of delusions in real time (Kihlstrom appreciable period of time. Apparently, the & Hoyt, 1988). For example, when Zimbardo analytic limits on implicit perception depend and his colleagues surreptitiously induced par- on how the percept is rendered unconscious. tial deafness in normal hypnotic subjects by means of a posthypnotic suggestion (itself cov- Thinking ered by amnesia), the subjects showed increas- ing levels of paranoia, including delusions of For the most part, the phenomena of hypnosis secrecy and conspiracy (Zimbardo, Andersen, involve alterations in conscious perception and & Kabat, 1981). memory, but subjects also think about these In fact, the results of hypnosis research actu- anomalous experiences. In a classic article, ally led to the revision of the most prominent Orne (1959) drew attention to a peculiar form of contemporary theory of delusions. Based on thinking observed in hypnosis, which he called observations of delusions in schizophrenia and “trance logic,” and which he often informally other disorders, Coltheart and his colleagues (alas, however, never in print) characterized as have proposed a two-factor theory of their ori- “the peaceful coexistence between illusion and gins: first, anomalous experiences seed the for- reality.” In the double hallucination, for exam- mation of delusions; and then, these aberrant ple, a subject will interact with a hallucinated beliefs persist in the face of logic and evidence confederate; when their attention is drawn to the (e.g., Coltheart, Langdon, & McKay, 2011). real confederate sitting elsewhere, they may The theory is consistent with the earlier views This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. maintain both the hallucination and the percep- of Jaspers and Maher (among others), but it This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. tion and show confusion about which is which. resists formal experimental test in pre-post de- Although trance logic is not unique to hypnosis signs that observe subjects both before and after (McConkey, Bryant, Bibb, & Kihlstrom, 1991), the anomalous experiences occur. In a large- anyone who has worked with highly hypnotiz- scale program of research, Barnier and her col- able subjects has observed it in one form or leagues have used hypnotic suggestion to just another. Trance logic would be an interesting this end, using hypnotic suggestions for mir- medium for studying how subjects resolve cog- rored self-misidentification, alien control, and nitive dissonance generally. the like (Connors, Barnier, Coltheart, Cox, & One way they do this, apparently, is by con- Langdon, 2012; Connors et al., 2013). An in- structing delusions. Long ago, Sutcliffe con- teresting finding was that the results of this HYPNOSIS AND COGNITION 145

research have already forced a revision of the Kihlstrom, 1996; Kihlstrom, Shames, & Dorf- theory. Although the prior anomalous experi- man, 1996; Myers, 2002). Indeed, intuitions are ence is indeed critical, it is also important that commonly held to reveal the role of uncon- the subject is ignorant of the true source of the scious processes in reasoning, problem-solving, experience (this was also critical in Zimbardo’s judgment, and decision-making (Gladwell, study of suggested deafness). 2005; Wilson, 2002). This more favorable view Further use of hypnosis as a laboratory model of intuitions has its origins in research by Bow- of clinical delusions may also shed light on the ers and his colleagues using a variant of the second factor, by which the delusion is main- Remote Associates Test (RAT), in which sub- tained, which raises the question of precisely jects must generate the word that three stimulus how the delusion is maintained in the face of words have as a common associate (Bowers, contrary logic and evidence. It seems likely that Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990). These in- the persistence of delusions can be explained by vestigators found that subjects could distinguish exaggerations of ordinary errors in reasoning. between coherent RAT triads (that actually have This possibility, too, can be studied with hyp- a remote associate in common) and incoherent nosis—either by tracking the formation of sec- ones (that do not), even though they could not ondary delusions as they naturally occur, or by identify the remote associate itself. making additional suggestions aimed at exacer- Bowers’ research, in turn, had its origins in bating these sorts of errors and biases. In the early research on the effects of posthypnotic sug- present context, though, the really important gestion on attitudes (Bowers, 1975, 1984). On a fact is that the evidence of hypnosis was not series of trials, the subjects were asked to state rejected out of hand, simply because it was their preference between two pictures, one a por- evidence from hypnosis. To the contrary, it was trait and the other a landscape. All subjects were actively embraced, and the theory modified ac- reinforced for picking a picking whichever picture cordingly. was paired with a serial number that had a “7” in A somewhat more indirect influence of hyp- it, following standard verbal-conditioning proce- nosis occurred in the study of intuition. The dures. However, half the subjects had previously literature on problem-solving abounds with an- received a posthypnotic suggestion to this effect, ecdotal accounts of the role of intuition in prob- covered by posthypnotic amnesia. When the ver- lem-solving—where the problem-solver feels bal reinforcement was discontinued, the subjects’ that a problem is actually solvable, or that he is preferences reverted to baseline—except for those on the verge of a solution. In one of the earliest subjects who had received the posthypnotic sug- models of problem-solving, Wallas posited a gestion, who continued to prefer paintings paired stage of “intimation” (intuition), occurring to- with a 7. Apparently, the subjects in the posthyp- ward the end of the incubation stage, and im- notic condition made internal rather than external mediately before the “illumination” of full- attributions concerning their preferences— fledged insight (Wallas, 1926). Such intuitions although, by virtue of posthypnotic amnesia, they were incorporated into the General Problem did not know why they had those preferences. Solver model as “feelings of warmth” (Newell & Simon, 1973), and into memory as the “feel- Automatic and Controlled Processing ing of knowing” (Hart, 1965) or “tip-of-the- tongue” state (Brown & McNeill, 1966). How- One of the landmarks of the cognitive revo- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. ever, later theorists argued that intuitions could lution in psychology was the distinction be- This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. be misleading (Metcalfe, 1986)—and, indeed, a tween automatic and controlled processes whole tradition has cognitive and social psy- (Moors & DeHouwer, 2006). In the classic case, chology arose based on the alleged shortcom- automatic processes are like reflexes: inevitably ings of intuitive judgments (e.g., Chabris & evoked by particular stimuli, running incorrigi- Simons, 2010; Ross, 1977). bly to completion, consuming few or no cogni- Nevertheless, intuition has recently experi- tive resources, and causing no interference with enced a reversal of fortune—and in a good way, other cognitive processes. They are unconscious toward a more balanced view which acknowl- in the strict sense of the term, because they edges the validity of intuitions under a wide operate outside of conscious awareness and in- range of circumstances (Dorfman, Shames, & dependently of conscious control. Originally 146 KIHLSTROM

postulated to resolve the debate between early- components of an attitude should be consistent and late-selection theories of attention, the dis- with each other. Rosenberg (1960) pretested tinction between automatic and controlled pro- subjects’ attitudes on a variety of contemporary cesses forms the foundation for a large number social issues, and then gave them posthypnotic of “dual-process” theories popular in personal- suggestions for affect reversal regarding two of ity, social, and clinical psychology as well (e.g., these issues—for example, that shifting from a Chaiken & Trope, 1999). In fact, some theorists mayoral to a city-manager form of government have gone so far as to argue that automaticity so would fill the subject with “loathing and dis- dominates mind and behavior that there is little gust.” The affective component of the targeted room left for conscious control (for a critique, attitudes changed radically, and so did the cog- see Kihlstrom, 2008). nitive structure associated with these attitudes. Some automatic processes appear to be innate, This was true regardless of whether the attitude part of our genetic and evolutionary endowment, was of high or low importance to the subjects while others have become automatized by virtue themselves. This was a major early test of bal- of practice and overlearning. However, whatever ance theory, and Rosenberg did not hesitate to their source, one (usually unstated) implication use hypnosis to construct it. has been that, once established, automatization is Wheatley and Haidt (2005) performed a similar permanent—that automatized processes remain experiment to demonstrate the role of intuitions in forever free of conscious control (their effects moral judgments. Inspired by earlier research in might be counteracted in a post hoc fashion, but which hypnosis had been used to manipulate sub- that is not the same as control of their execution). jects emotional states (Bower et al., 1981)— Recently, however, the prospects for de-automa- though not, apparently, by the Rosenberg study— tization have been improved by evidence from they gave subjects posthypnotic suggestions to hypnosis. In a series of experiments, Raz and his feel disgust when they read a particular word. That colleagues have demonstrated that subjects given cue later appeared in some vignettes (e.g., about hypnotic suggestions for agnosia (or maybe alex- incest with a cousin or bribery of a legislator), ia)—that the letter strings presented to them look about which they were to make a moral judgment. like gibberish—show a reduction or elimination of Those vignettes which contained the critical cue Stroop interference (Raz et al., 2003). Although word were rated as more disgusting and more most of Raz’s studies have focused on the Stroop morally wrong, compared with the same vignettes effect (for a review, see Kihlstrom, 2011), he and without the cue. Previous arguments for moral his colleagues have recently extended his obser- intuitionism had been based on observational vations to the McGurk effect as well (Lifshitz, studies using such tasks as the Trolley Problem, Bonn, Fischer, Kashem, & Raz, 2013). In both which ostensibly precluded rational judgment cases, hypnotic suggestion virtually eliminated the strategies (Greene & Haidt, 2002; but see Kihl- effect. Although de-automatization has been strom, 2013b). This study was the first to show discussed and observed before, chiefly in the con- that moral intuitions could be manipulated di- text of meditation (Deikman, 1966; Wenk- rectly. Sormaz, 2005), the dramatic effects of hypnotic The most important contribution of hypnosis to suggestion reveal a hitherto unappreciated dimen- the study of social cognition, however, was more sion of automaticity: that it is possible to regain conceptual than instrumental: Orne’s analysis of conscious control of a process that has been au- the social psychology of the psychological exper- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. tomatized. Now that the concept of automaticity iment (Orne, 1962, 1969, 1970, 1973) see also This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. has been well-established, this fact will need to be (Kihlstrom, 2002). Orne’s concepts of ecological incorporated into cognitive theory. validity (derived from Brunswik) and demand characteristics (derived from Lewin and Koffka) Attitudes and Social Cognition were central to his critique of experimental re- search in social psychology, particularly those The hypnotic manipulation of affect was also studies involving deception. In his view, research- used in an early test of the balance theory of ers all too often viewed subjects as passive re- social attitudes. Whether they invoke disso- sponders to experimental manipulations. To the nance or balance, a major prediction of these contrary, Orne argued that subjects did not leave theories is that the cognitive and emotional their brains at the laboratory door. They were HYPNOSIS AND COGNITION 147

better viewed as the sentient, curious beings they quickly came to be incorporated into a larger were, actively thinking about what is happening to dimension of “openness to experience,” which is them, evaluating the proceedings as they went on, now recognized as one of the “Big Five” dimen- figuring out what they were supposed to do, and sions of personality, along with extraversion, neu- planning their responses accordingly. Orne then roticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. In proceeded to illustrate his points with a series of contrast to the other dimensions of the Big Five, brilliant experiments on such topics as age- openness is a cognitive disposition (McCrae & regression and antisocial behavior, often using the Costa, 1990). real-simulating design that he invented (Orne, The story does not necessarily end there. 1979). Openness, as currently defined, includes not However, the implications of Orne’s research only hypnotic-like imaginative involvements, went farther than methodological niceties. The but also intellectance (or culturedness) and so- view of research subjects as passive stimulus- ciopolitical liberalism. The operating assump- response machines echoed the view of people in tion appears to be that absorption, intellectance, general that prevailed at the time, as social psy- and liberalism are three “facets” of a single chology adopted the stance of stimulus-response broad trait of openness. On the other hand, some behaviorism (Zimbardo, 1999), and transformed research indicates that hypnotizability is corre- itself from the study of the individual in society to lated with the absorption facet of openness, but the study of social influence—that is to say, the not with liberalism or intellectance (Glisky & control of experience, thought, and action by the Kihlstrom, 1993). It may turn out that the inter- presence and behavior of other people. Orne ar- correlations among absorption, liberalism, and gued for the same view of people in the real world intellectance are weak enough to raise the ques- as he had for subjects inside the laboratory: that tion as to which of them is the true “fifth factor” they were actively engaged in interpreting the in the Big Five structure of personality. How- situation, forming impressions of other people and ever that research turns out, hypnosis will have managing other people’s impressions of them, de- played a role by adding an explicitly cognitive veloping expectations and acting on them. In a dimension to the structure of personality, and very real sense, the cognitive revolution in social clarifying the nature of that dimension. psychology begins with his work. Cognitive Development Personality and Cognition One area of cognition that has been left virtu- The first fact about hypnosis is that there are ally untouched by hypnosis is cognitive develop- wide individual differences in hypnotizability, and ment. Early attempts to use hypnotic age regres- the kinds of effects described earlier in this article sion to reverse cognitive development, and thus, are confined to that relatively small portion of the explore developmental processes without having population known as “hypnotic virtuosos” (for to perform longitudinal studies (Reiff & Scheerer, more on highly hypnotizable subjects, see Barnier, 1959) suffered from a number of problems, and Cox, & McConkey, 2014). This, in turn, has stim- were misguided from the start (O’Connell, Shor, ulated a large body of research on the cognitive & Orne, 1970). Although hypnosis has been suc- and personality correlates of hypnotizability—a cessfully used in the clinic with children (HIlgard search which proved fruitless until researchers be- & LeBaron, 1984), systematic research on hypno- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. gan to develop scales measuring the occurrence of sis in children has been limited to assessments of This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. “hypnotic-like” experiences outside the hypnotic hypnotizability in different age cohorts (Cooper & context that were not well represented in extant London, 1971, 1978; London & Cooper, 1969; personality inventories such as the Minnesota Morgan & Hilgard, 1973)—and there has not Multiphasic Personality Inventory and the Califor- even been very much of that. nia Psychological Inventory (or, for that matter, in The emergence of the “theory of Mind” opens the lexicon of personality traits). The principal up new and as yet unexplored possibilities for the product of this line of research was Tellegen’s study of hypnosis and cognitive development. As “Absorption Scale” (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), the child develops, he or she begins to appreciate which was directly inspired by Tellegen’s reading mental states as such—among other things, that of the hypnosis literature. Absorption, in turn, our mental states control our actions; that our 148 KIHLSTROM

mental representations may differ from external Barnier, A. J., Cox, R. E., & McConkey, K. M. reality; that our mental states may differ from (2014). The province of “highs”: The high hypno- those of other people—and, perhaps most criti- tizable person in the science of hypnosis and in cally, that fantasy is different from reality, and our psychological science. Psychology of Conscious- imagination of something is different from our ness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 1, 168–183. Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in ex- perception of it. Central to these developments is perimental and social psychology. Cambridge, the appreciation of dreams for what they are, and United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. the ability to disentangle imagination from reality Blaxton, T. A. (1989). Investigating dissociations (e.g., Lillard et al., 2013; Markman, Klein, & among memory measures: Support for a transfer Suhr, 2008; Taylor, in press). Hypnosis is of ob- appropriate processing framework. Journal of Ex- vious relevance here. Systematic study relating perimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and children’s response to hypnosis to their achieve- Cognition, 15, 657–668. doi:10.1037/0278-7393 ment of a theory of mind may well throw unique .15.4.657 light on cognitive development in general. Blum, G. S., Nash, J. K., Jansen, R. D., & Barbour, J. S. (1981). Posthypnotic attenuation of a visual The Relation of Hypnosis to Other Things illusion as reflected in perceptual reports and cor- tical event related potentials. Academic Psychol- ogy Bulletin, 3, 251–271. That is for the future, are so many other issues, Bower, G. H., Gilligan, S. G., & Monteiro, K. P. (1981). such as neuroscientific studies and the broadening Selectivity of learning caused by affective states. Jour- the empirical support for hypnotic interventions in nal of Experimental Psychology: General, 110, 451– medicine and psychotherapy. In the period since 473. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.110.4.451 Young and Hull, much has been learned about Bower, G. H., Monteiro, K. P., & Gilligan, S. G. hypnosis—what it can do and what it cannot, who (1978). Emotional mood as a context for learning can experience it and who cannot, the roles of and recall. Journal of Verbal Learning & Verbal altered consciousness and social context. Further- Behavior, 17, 573–585. doi:10.1016/S0022- more, while shedding light on the nature of hyp- 5371(78)90348-1 nosis, hypnosis research has also enhanced our Bowers, K. S. (1975). The psychology of subtle understanding of mind and behavior in general, by control: An attributional analysis of behavioural persistence. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Sci- shedding light on phenomena that might other- ence, 7, 78–95. doi:10.1037/h0081898 wise go unnoticed. Bowers, K. S. (1984). On being unconsciously influ- enced and informed. In K. S. Bowers & D. H. References Meichenbaum (Eds.), The unconscious reconsid- ered (pp. 227–272). New York, NY: Wiley- Atkinson, R. C., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1968). Human Interscience. memory: A proposed system and its control pro- Bowers, K. S., Regehr, G., Balthazard, C., & Parker, cesses. In K. W. Spence & J. T. Spence (Eds.), The K. (1990). Intuition in the context of discovery. psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 2, pp. Cognitive Psychology, 22, 72–110. doi:10.1016/ 89–195). New York, NY: Academic Press. doi: 0010-0285(90)90004-N 10.1016/S0079-7421(08)60422-3 Brown, R., & McNeill, D. (1966). The “tip of the Banister, H., & Zangwill, O. L. (1941a). Experimen- tongue” phenomenon. Journal of Verbal Learning tally induced olfactory paramnesia. British Journal & Verbal Behavior, 5, 325–337. doi:10.1016/ of Psychology, 32, 155–175. S0022-5371(66)80040-3 Banister, H., & Zangwill, O. L. (1941b). Experimen- Bryant, R. A., & McConkey, K. M. (1989). Hypnotic This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. tally induced visual paramnesias. British Journal blindness: A behavioral and experiential analysis. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is notof to be disseminatedPsychology, broadly. 32, 30–51. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 98, 71–77. doi: Barber, T. X., & Calverley, D. S. (1966). Toward a 10.1037/0021-843X.98.1.71 theory of “hypnotic” behavior: Experimental anal- Bryant, R. A., & McConkey, K. M. (1995). Hypnotic yses of suggested amnesia. Journal of Abnormal blindness and the priming effect of visual material. Psychology, 71, 95–107. doi:10.1037/h0023096 Contemporary Hypnosis, 12, 157–164. Barnier, A. J., Bryant, R. A., & Briscoe, S. (2001). Chabris, C. F., & Simons, D. J. (2010). The invisible Posthypnotic amnesia for material learned before gorilla: How our intuitions deceive us. New York, or during hypnosis: Explicit and implicit memory NY: Harmony. effects. International Journal of Clinical and Ex- Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (Eds.). (1999). Dual- perimental Hypnosis, 49, 286–304. doi:10.1080/ process theories in social psychology. New York, 00207140108410079 NY: Guilford Press. HYPNOSIS AND COGNITION 149

Coltheart, M., Langdon, R., & McKay, R. (2011). Delu- the task. Cortex, 9, 165–175. doi:10.1016/S0010- sional belief. Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 271– 9452(73)80025-5 298. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131622 Gladwell, M. (2005). Blink: The power of thinking Connors, M. H., Barnier, A. J., Coltheart, M., Cox, without thinking. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. R. E., & Langdon, R. (2012). Mirrored-self mis- Glisky, E. L., Rubin, S. R., & Davidson, P. S. R. identification in the hypnosis laboratory: Recreat- (2001). Source memory in older adults: An encod- ing the delusion from its component factors. Cog- ing or retrieval problem? Journal of Experimental nitive Neuropsychiatry, 17, 151–176. doi:10.1080/ Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 27, 13546805.2011.582287 1131–1146. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.27.5.1131 Connors, M. H., Barnier, A. J., Langdon, R., Cox, Glisky, M. L., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1993). Hypnotiz- R. E. F., Polito, V. P., & Coltheart, M. (2013). A ability and facets of openness. International Jour- laboratory analogue of mirrored-self misidentifica- nal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 41, tion delusion: The role of hypnosis, suggestion, 112–123. doi:10.1080/00207149308414542 and demand characteristics. Consciousness and Graham, C., & Leibowitz, H. W. (1972). The effect Cognition, 22, 1510–1522. doi:10.1016/j.concog of suggestion on visual acuity. International Jour- .2013.10.006 nal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 20, Cooper, L. M., & London, P. (1971). The develop- 169–186. doi:10.1080/00207147208409288 ment of hypnotic susceptibility: A longitudinal Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002). How (and where) does (convergence) study. Child Development, 42, 487– moral judgment work? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 503. doi:10.2307/1127482 6, 517–523. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(02)02011-9 Cooper, L. M., & London, P. (1978). The Children’s Greenwald, A. G. (1992). New look 3: Unconscious Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale. American Journal cognition reclaimed. American Psychologist, 47, of Clinical Hypnosis, 21, 170–185. doi:10.1080/ 766–779. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.47.6.766 00029157.1978.10403970 Hart, J. T. (1965). Memory and the feeling-of- David, D., Brown, R., Pojoga, C., & David, A. knowing experience. Journal of Educational Psy- (2000). The impact of posthypnotic amnesia and chology, 56, 208–216. doi:10.1037/h0022263 directed forgetting on implicit and explicit mem- Halligan, P. W., & Oakley, D. A. (2014). Hypnosis ory: New insights from a modified process disso- and beyond: Exploring the broader domain of sug- ciation procedure. International Journal of Clini- gestion. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Re- cal and Experimental Hypnosis, 48, 267–289. doi: search, and Practice, 1, 105–122. 10.1080/00207140008415246 Hilgard, E. R. (1969). Pain as a puzzle for psychol- Deikman, A. J. (1966). De-automatization and the American Psychologist, 24, mystic experience. Psychiatry, 29, 324–338. ogy and physiology. Dorfman, J., Shames, V. A., & Kihlstrom, J. F. 103–113. doi:10.1037/h0027146 (1996). Intuition, incubation, and insight: Implicit Hilgard, E. R. (1977). Divided consciousness: Mul- cognition in problem solving. In G. Underwood tiple controls in human thought and action. New (Ed.), Implicit cognition, (pp. 257–296). Oxford, York, NY: Wiley-Interscience. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Hilgard, E. R., & Hilgard, J. R. (1975). Hypnosis in Draine, S. C., & Greenwald, A. G. (1998). Replicable the relief of pain. Los Altos, CA: Kaufman. unconscious semantic priming. Journal of Exper- Hilgard, J. R., & LeBaron, S. (1984). imental Psychology: General, 127, 286–303. doi: of pain in children and adolescents with cancer. 10.1037/0096-3445.127.3.286 Palo Alto, CA: William Kaufman. Eich, E. (1984). Memory for unattended events: Re- Hochberg, J. (1981). On cognition in perception: membering with and without awareness. Memory & Perceptual coupling and unconscious inference. Cognition, 12, 105–111. doi:10.3758/BF03198423 Cognition, 10, 127–134. doi:10.1016/0010- Epstein, W. (1982). Percept-percept couplings. Per- 0277(81)90035-4 This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. ception, 11, 75–83. Hull, C. L. (1933). Hypnosis and suggestibility: An This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individualEvans, user and is not to be disseminated broadly. F. J. (1979). Contextual forgetting: Posthypnotic experimental approach. New York, NY: Appleton. source amnesia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 88, Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process dissociation frame- 556–563. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.88.5.556 work: Separating automatic from intentional uses Evans, F. J., & Thorne, W. A. F. (1966). Two types of memory. Journal of Memory and& Language, of posthypnotic amnesia: Recall amnesia and 30, 513–541. doi:10.1016/0749-596X(91)90025-F source amnesia. International Journal of Clinical James, W. (1890/1980). Principles of psychology. and Experimental Hypnosis, 14, 162–179. doi: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 10.1080/00207146608412959 Jansen, R. D., Blum, G. S., & Loomis, J. M. (1982). Gardner, H., Boller, F., Moreines, J., & Butters, N. Attentional alterations of slant specific interference (1973). Retrieving information from Korsakoff pa- between line segments in eccentric vision. Percep- tients: Effects of categorical cues and reference to tion, 11, 535–540. doi:10.1068/p110535 150 KIHLSTROM

Jaspers, K. (1923/1962). General psychopathology. perspectives (pp. 259–291). New York, NY: Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9780470756232.ch12 Jensen, M. P., & Patterson, D. R. (2014). Hypnotic Kihlstrom, J. F. (2007). Consciousness in hypnosis. approaches for chronic pain management: Clinical In P. D. Zelazo, M. Moscovitch, & E. Thompson implications of recent research findings. American (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of consciousness (pp. Psychologist, 69, 167–177. doi:10.1037/a0035644 445–480). Cambridge: Cambridge University Kihlstrom, J. F. (1979). Hypnosis and psychopathol- Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511816789.018 ogy: Retrospect and prospect. Journal of Abnor- Kihlstrom, J. F. (2008). The automaticity juggernaut. mal Psychology, 88, 459–473. doi:10.1037/0021- In J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman, & R. F. Baumeister 843X.88.5.459 (Eds.), Psychology and free will (pp. 155–180). Kihlstrom, J. F. (1980). Posthypnotic amnesia for re- New York, NY: Oxford University Press. cently learned material: Interactions with “episodic” Kihlstrom, J. F. (2011). Prospects for de-automatiza- and “semantic” memory. Cognitive Psychology, 12, tion [commentary on “Can Suggestion Obviate 227–251. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(80)90010-9 Reading? Supplementing Primary Stroop Evidence Kihlstrom, J. F. (1992a). Dissociation and dissociations: with Exploratory Negative Priming Analyses” by A comment on consciousness and cognition. Con- A. Raz & N. K. J. Campbell]. Consciousness and sciousness and Cognition, 1, 47–53. doi:10.1016/ Cognition, 20, 332–334. doi:10.1016/j.concog 1053-8100(92)90044-B .2010.03.004 Kihlstrom, J. F. (1992b). Hypnosis: A sesquicenten- Kihlstrom, J. F. (2013a). Neuro-hypnotism: Pros- nial essay. International Journal of Clinical and pects for hypnosis and neuroscience. Cortex, 49, Experimental Hypnosis, 40, 301–314. doi:10.1080/ 365–374. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2012.05.016 00207149208409663 Kihlstrom, J. F. (2013b). Threats to reason in moral Kihlstrom, J. F. (1994). Hypnosis, delayed recall, and judgment. Hedgehog Review, 15, 8–18. the principles of memory. International Journal of Kihlstrom, J. F., Barnhardt, T. M., & Tataryn, D. J. Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 42, 337–345. (1992). Implicit perception. In R. F. Bornstein & doi:10.1080/00207149408409363 T. S. Pittman (Eds.), Perception without aware- Kihlstrom, J. F. (1996a). Perception without awareness ness: Cognitive, clinical, and social perspectives of what is perceived, learning without awareness of (pp. 17–54). New York, NY: The Guilford Press. what is learned. In M. Velmans (Ed.), The science of Kihlstrom, J. F., & Hoyt, I. P. (1988). Hypnosis and consciousness: Psychological, neuropsychological the psychology of delusions: Delusional beliefs and clinical reviews (pp. 23–46). London, United (pp. 66–109). New York, NY: Wiley. Kingdom: Routledge. doi:10.4324/97802033 Kihlstrom, J. F., & McConkey, K. M. (1990). Wil- 60019_chapter_2 liam James and hypnosis: A centennial reflection. Kihlstrom, J. F. (1996b). The trauma-memory argu- Psychological Science, 1, 174–178. doi:10.1111/j ment and recovered memory therapy. In K. Pezdek .1467-9280.1990.tb00192.x & W. P. Banks (Eds.), The recovered memory/ Kihlstrom, J. F., Shames, V. A., & Dorfman, J. false memory debate (pp. 297–311). San Diego, (1996). Intimations of memory and thought. In CA: Academic Press, Inc. L. M. Reder (Ed.), Implicit memory and metacog- Kihlstrom, J. F. (1997a). Hypnosis, memory and am- nition (pp. 1–23). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. nesia. In L. R. Squire & D. L. Schacter (Eds.), Lifshitz, M., Bonn, N. A., Fischer, A., Kashem, I. F., Biological and psychological perspectives on & Raz, A. (2013). Using suggestion to modulate memory and memory disorders. Philosophical automatic processes From Stroop to McGurk and Transactions of the Royal Society: Biological Sci- beyond. Cortex, 49, 463–473. doi:10.1016/j.cortex ences, 352, 1727–1732. .2012.08.007 Kihlstrom, J. F. (1997b). Suffering from reminis- Lillard, A. S., Lerner, M. D., Hopkins, E. J., Dore, cences: Exhumed memory, implicit memory, and R. A., Smith, E. D., & Palmquist, C. M. (2013). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. the return of the repressed. In M. A. Conway (Ed.), The impact of pretend play on children’s develop- This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is notRecovered to be disseminated broadly. memories and false memories (pp. ment: A review of the evidence. Psychological 100–117). Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Uni- Bulletin, 139, 1–34. doi:10.1037/a0029321 versity Press. Loftus, E. F. (1974). Reconstructing memory: The Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Demand characteristics in the incredible eyewitness. Psychology Today, Decem- laboratory and the clinic: Conversations and col- ber, 117–119. laborations with subjects and patients. Prevention London, P., & Cooper, L. M. (1969). Norms of & Treatment [Special issue honoring Martin T. hypnotic susceptibility in children. Developmental Orne], 5, Article_36c. Psychology, 1, 113–124. Kihlstrom, J. F. (2006). Trauma and memory revis- Maher, B. A. (1974). Delusional thinking and per- ited. In B. Uttl, N. Ohta, & A. L. Siegenthaler ceptual disorder. Journal of Individual Psychol- (Eds.), Memory and emotions: Interdisciplinary ogy, 30, 98–113. HYPNOSIS AND COGNITION 151

Marcel, A. J. (1983). Conscious and unconscious implications. American Psychologist, 17, 776– perception: Experiments on visual masking and 783. doi:10.1037/h0043424 word recognition. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 197– Orne, M. T. (1969). Demand characteristics and the 237. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(83)90009-9 concept of quasi-controls. In R. Rosenthal & R. Markman, K., Klein, W., & Suhr, J. (Eds.). (2008). Rosnow (Eds.), Artifact in behavioral research Handbook of imagination and mental simulation. (pp. 143–179). New York, NY: Academic Press. New York, NY: Psychology Press. Orne, M. T. (1970). Hypnosis, motivation, and the Mazzoni, G., Laurence, J.-R., & Heap, M. (2014). ecological validity of the psychological experi- Hypnosis and memory: Two hundred years of ad- ment. In W. J. Arnold & M. M. Page (Eds.), ventures and still going! Psychology of Conscious- Nebraska symposium on motivation (pp. 187–265). ness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 1, 153–167. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. McConkey, K. M., Bryant, R. A., Bibb, B. C., & Orne, M. T. (1973). Communication by the total Kihlstrom, J. F. (1991). Trance logic in hypnosis experimental situation: Why it is important, how it and imagination. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, is evaluated, and its significance for the ecological 100, 464–472. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.100.4.464 validity of findings. In P. Pliner, L. Krames, & T. McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1990). Conceptions Alloway (Eds.), Communication and affect (pp. and correlates of openness to experience. In S. R. 157–191). New York, NY: Academic. Briggs, W. H. Jones, & R. Hogan (Eds.), Hand- Orne, M. T. (1979). On the simulating subject as a book of personality psychology (pp. 65–102). New quasi-control group in hypnosis research: What, York, NY: Academic. why, and how. In E. Fromm & R. E. Shor (Eds.), McNally, R. J. (2003). Remembering trauma. Cam- Hypnosis: Developments in research and new per- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. spectives (pp. 519–565). New York, NY: Aldine. McNamara, T. P. (2005). Semantic priming: Per- Raz, A., Landzberg, K. S., Schweizer, H. R., Zephrani, spectives from memory and word recognition. Z. R., Shapiro, T., Fan, J., & Posner, M. I. (2003). New York, NY: Psychology Press. doi:10.4324/ Posthypnotic suggestion and the modulation of 9780203338001 Stroop interference under cycloplegia. Conscious- Metcalfe, J. (1986). Premonitions of insight predict im- ness and Cognition, 12, 332–346. doi:10.1016/ pending error. Journal of Experimental Psychology: S1053-8100(03)00024-2 Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 12, 623–634. doi: Raz, A., Marinoff, G. P., Zephrani, Z. R., Schweizer, 10.1037/0278-7393.12.4.623 H. R., & Posner, M. I. (2004). See clearly: Suggestion, Miller, R. J., Hennessy, R. T., & Leibowitz, H. W. hypnosis, attention, and visual acuity. International (1973). The effect of hypnotic ablation of the back- Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 52, ground on the magnitude of the Ponzo perspective 159–187. doi:10.1076/iceh.52.2.159.28097 illusion. International Journal of Clinical and Ex- Reed, G. (1972). The psychology of anomalous ex- perimental Hypnosis, 21, 180–191. doi:10.1080/ perience: A cognitive approach. London, United 00207147308409122 Kingdom: Hutchinson University Library. Moors, A., & DeHouwer, J. (2006). Automaticity: A Register, P. A., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1987). Hypnotic Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis. Psychologi- effects on hypermnesia. International Journal of cal Bulletin, 132, 297–326. doi:10.1037/0033- Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 35, 155–170. 2909.132.2.297 doi:10.1080/00207148708416051 Morgan, A. H., & Hilgard, E. R. (1973). Age differ- Register, P. A., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1988). Hypnosis ences in susceptibility to hypnosis. International and interrogative suggestibility. Personality and Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, Individual Differences, 9, 549–558. doi:10.1016/ 21, 78–85. doi:10.1080/00207147308409308 0191-8869(88)90152-3 Myers, D. G. (2002). Intuition: Its powers and perils. Reiff, R., & Scheerer, M. (1959). Memory and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. hypnotic age regression: Developmental aspects This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1973). Human problem of cognitive function explored through hypnosis. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is notsolving to be disseminated broadly. . Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. New York, NY: International Universities Press. O’Connell, D. N., Shor, R. E., & Orne, M. T. (1970). Roediger, H. L. (1996). Memory illusions. Journal of Hypnotic age regression: An empirical and meth- Memory and Language, 35, 76–100. doi:10.1006/ odological analysis. Journal of Abnormal Psychol- jmla.1996.0005 ogy Monograph, 76, 1–32. Roediger, H. L., Weldon, M. S., & Challis, B. H. Orne, M. T. (1959). The nature of hypnosis: Artifact (1989). Explaining dissociations between implicit and essence. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy- and explicit measures of retention: A processing chology, 58, 277–299. doi:10.1037/h0046128 account. In H. L. Roediger & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), Orne, M. T. (1962). On the social psychology of Varieties of memory and consciousness: Essays in the psychological experiment: With particular honour of Endel Tulving (pp. 3–42). Hillsdale, NJ: reference to demand characteristics and their Erlbaum. 152 KIHLSTROM

Rosenberg, M. J. (1960). Cognitive reorganization in evidence and methodology. International Journal response to the hypnotic reversal of attitudinal affect. of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 8, 73–101. Journal of Personality, 28, 39–63. doi:10.1111/j doi:10.1080/00207146008415837 .1467-6494.1960.tb01601.x Sutcliffe, J. P. (1961). “Credulous” and “skeptical” Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his views of hypnotic phenomena: Experiments in es- shortcomings. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in thesia, hallucination, and delusion. Journal of Ab- experimental social psychology (Vol. 10, pp. 173– normal and Social Psychology, 62, 189–200. doi: 220). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 10.1037/h0046745 Schacter, D. L. (1987). Implicit memory: History and Taylor, M. (in press). Oxford handbook on the de- current status. Journal of Experimental Psychol- velopment of imagination. Oxford, United King- ogy: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13, 501– dom: Oxford University Press. 518. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.13.3.501 Tellegen, A., & Atkinson, G. (1974). Openness to Schacter, D. L. (1990). Perceptual representation absorbing and self-altering experiences (“absorp- systems and implicit memory: Toward a resolu- tion”), a trait related to hypnotic susceptibility. tion of the multiple memory systems debate. In Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 83, 268–277. A. Diamond (Ed.), Development and neural basis doi:10.1037/h0036681 of higher cognitive function. Annals of the New Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of episodic memory. Oxford, York Academy of Sciences, 608, pp. 543–571. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Schacter, D. L. (1999). The seven sins of memory: Wagstaff, G. F. (1981). Source amnesia and trance Insights from psychology and cognitive neurosci- logic: Artifacts in the essence of hypnosis? Bulle- ence. American Psychologist, 54, 182–203. doi: tin of the British Society of Experimental and Clin- 10.1037/0003-066X.54.3.182 ical Hypnosis, 4, 3–5. Schacter, D. L., Harbluk, J. L., & McClachlan, D. R. Wallas, G. (1926). The art of thought. New York, (1984). Retrieval without recollection: An experi- NY: Harcourt Brace. mental analysis of source amnesia. Journal of Ver- Wenk-Sormaz, H. (2005). Meditation can reduce ha- bal Learning & Verbal Behavior, 23, 593–611. bitual responding. Advances in Mind-Body Medi- doi:10.1016/S0022-5371(84)90373-6 cine, 21, 33–49. Sheehan, E. P., Smith, H. V., & Forrest, D. W. Wheatley, T., & Haidt, J. (2005). Hypnotic disgust (1982). A signal-detection study of the effects of makes moral judgments more severe. Psychologi- suggested improvement on the monocular visual cal Science, 16, 780–784(785). acuity of myopes. International Journal of Clini- Williamsen, J. A., Johnson, H. J., & Eriksen, C. W. cal and Experimental Hypnosis, 30, 138–146. doi: (1965). Some characteristics of posthypnotic am- 10.1080/00207148208407379 nesia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 70, 123– Shimamura, A. P., & Squire, L. R. (1987). A neuro- 131. doi:10.1037/h0021934 psychological study of fact memory and source Wilson, T. D. (2002). Strangers to ourselves: Dis- amnesia. Journal of Experimental Psychology: covering the adaptive unconscious. Cambridge, Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13, 464–473. MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.13.3.464 Young, P. C. (1927). A general review of the litera- Shimamura, A. P., & Squire, L. R. (1991). The rela- ture of hypnotism. Psychological Bulletin, 24, tionship between fact and source memory: Find- 540–560. doi:10.1037/h0071891 ings from amnesic patients and normal subjects. Zimbardo, P. G. (1999). Experimental social psy- Psychobiology, 19, 1–10. chology: Behaviorism with minds and matters. In Smith, H. V., Forrest, D. W., & Sheehan, E. P. A. Rodrigues & R. V. Levine (Eds.), Reflections on (1983). Suggested improvement, music, and the 100 years of experimental social psychology (pp. visual acuity of myopes: A reply. International 135–157). New York, NY: Basic Books. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis,

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. Zimbardo, P. G., Andersen, S. M., & Kabat, L. G. 31, 241–242. doi:10.1080/00207148308406619 (1981). Induced hearing deficit generates experi- This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Spanos, N. P., Gwynn, M. I., Della Malva, C. L., & mental paranoia. Science, 212, 1529–1531. doi: Bertrand, L. D. (1988). Social psychological fac- 10.1126/science.7233242 tors in the genesis of posthypnotic source amnesia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 97, 322–329. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.97.3.322 Received March 14, 2014 Sutcliffe, J. P. (1960). “Credulous” and “skeptical” Revision received April 10, 2014 views of hypnotic phenomena: A review of certain Accepted April 11, 2014 Ⅲ