The True Cost of Nuclear Power in South Africa Report 2011 for More Information Contact: [email protected]

The True Cost of Nuclear Power in South Africa Report 2011 For more information contact: [email protected] Written by: Ferrial Adam, Dr. David Fig (chapters 2; 3.4; 4; 5), Dominique Gilbert (chapter 5.3), Mike Kantey (chapter 5.5), Fiona Musana, Nina Schulz, Melita Steele, Dr. Rianne Teule, Professor Steve Thomas (chapters 3.1-3.3; 3.5-3.7) Edited by Dr. Rianne Teule and Fiona Musana Acknowledgements: Rod Gurzynski, Nkopane Maphiri Published in August, 2011 Greenpeace Africa 10A and 10B Clamart House, Clamart Road, Richmond Johannesburg, South Africa Postal Address: Greenpeace Africa PostNet Suite 125 Private Bag X09, Melville Johannesburg, 2109 South Africa Tel: +27 (0)11 482 4696 Fax: +27 (0)11 482 8157 Website: www.greenpeaceafrica.org Designed by: Kai.Toma Creatives Printed on 100% recycled post-consumer paper with vegetable based inks. © Greenpeace Africa, 2011 Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, Cape Town, South Africa. Town, Station, Cape Nuclear Power © Greenpeace Africa, 2011 Koeberg Foreword 4 1. Introduction 5 2. South Africa’s nuclear industry 6 2.1 The beginning 6 2.2 South Africa’s nuclear bomb 7 2.3 Disarming apartheid’s nuclear bomb 7 2.4 Nuclear trafficking 8 2.5 The start of democratic flirtation with nuclear 8 2.6 The Integrated Resource Plan 2010 8 2.7 South Africa’s nuclear establishment today 9 3. Ignoring the writing on the wall 10 3.1 The legacy of the apartheid government 11 3.2 The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor: 1998-2010 11 3.2.1 Poor budgetary control and unrealistic time schedules 11 3.2.2 Lack of investors 11 3.2.3 Lack of markets 11 3.2.4 Failure to develop a final design 11 3.2.5 Failure to monitor the programme 12 3.3 Conventional nuclear reactors: 2006-2011 12 3.4 Eskom in crisis 12 3.5 Earlier generation reactors: 2010 onwards 13 3.6 The new call for nuclear tenders 13 3.7 Experience elsewhere in the world 14 4. The nuclear fuel chain in South Africa 15 4.1 Uranium mining and milling 15 4.2 Conversion 15 4.3 Enrichment 15 4.4 Fuel fabrication 16 4.5 Reactors in South Africa 16 4.6 Disposal 16 4.7 Reprocessing 17 5. Eye witnesses to nuclear dangers 19 5.1 Introduction 19 5.2 Living in the shadow of nuclear waste 19 5.3 Nuclear workers and health issues 20 5.3.1 Pelindaba occupational health impacts 20 5.3.2 Workers’ legal cases 21 5.4 The National Nuclear Regulator 23 5.5 Rising resistance to new nuclear power reactors 24 6. Leaving nuclear power behind 26 6.1 A true Energy [R]evolution 27 6.2 Towards a renewable future 27 6.3 Time is up 27 7. Glossary 29 8. References 30 Foreword Nuclear power is dangerous. The world looked on aghast at the mushroom clouds over Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945. A less destructive use of nuclear technology was sought in the production of nuclear power. However, history has shown that nuclear power is a failure: it is expensive, dangerous, polluting and non-democratic. Insisting on the use of nuclear power for South Africa’s energy crisis is simply insane. Nuclear power is not cheap. It’s not safe. It’s not clean. Chernobyl and Fukushima are all the proof anyone ever needs of that. And yet there is an alternative; Greenpeace’s Energy [R]evolution - a blueprint for the world’s energy future that focuses on renewable energies, like solar and wind. The alternative is not only sustainable and cheaper, but provides almost 100,000 green jobs within 30 years in the energy sector. The Energy [R]evolution protects the environment and is safe. Very safe. The question is whether anyone in power has the courage to pick up this ball and run with it. As the South African government continues its fatal attraction of nuclear power, we present this report on the true cost of nuclear power. Read it, be emboldened to take action and let’s commit ourselves to the Energy [R]evolution in our country. Kumi Naidoo Executive Director, Greenpeace International © Greenpeace Africa, 2011 Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, Cape Town, South Africa. Town, Station, Cape Nuclear Power © Greenpeace Africa, 2011 Koeberg 4 The True Cost of Nuclear Power in South Africa 1. Introduction Six days after the nuclear catastrophe at Fukushima in reliable, has become expensive and unreliable, blighted by Japan in March 2011, South Africa’s Minister of Energy power cuts and the infamous ‘load shedding’. Dipuo Peters declared her country’s intention to add 9,600 MW of nuclear electricity - or six new nuclear reactors. The lessons have not been learnt. The South African government is now wooing nuclear power station pedlars, South Africa already has 1,844 MW of nuclear generated most of whom have neither the track record nor the capacity electricity - while countries such as Germany, Switzerland to deliver cutting edge nuclear technology. Instead South and Italy have completely rejected nuclear energy in Africa is likely to get cheaper outdated nuclear technology response to the Fukushima disaster. But, speaking at the with none of the safety guarantees demanded by an second regional conference on energy and nuclear power increasing sceptical and scared world. in Africa in Cape Town on May 30 this year, Ms Peters went even further, trumpeting the development of a nuclear- In parallel, paying lip service to government’s stated export market to the rest of Africa, supported by both commitment to renewable energy, Eskom has secured the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the African funding to finance the massive coal-fired plants, Medupi and Union. Kusile, which will generate 4,800 MW each. Together they will cement South Africa as the leading cause of carbon South Africa spent 13 years pursuing the Pebble Bed emissions on the continent, to say nothing of air pollution Modular Reactor, wasting billions of rands in the process and acid mine drainage linked to the coal sector. (R9-billion was spent on research and development and another R22-billion would have been needed to complete a Instead of learning from the 2008 electricity supply crisis, demonstration model) as investors across the world shied South Africa is mortgaging its environmental future on old away from having anything to do with it. Eventually the and risky technology to support its economy, including state cancelled the project and wrote off the monies it had potential reinvestments in the apartheid government’s spent. The government and its wholly owned power utility nuclear programme of uranium enrichment, conversion, Eskom remain hell bent on securing what it believes will reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities, opening the door be a cheap and sustainable nuclear solution for its energy to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. supply crisis. This report outlines South Africa’s nuclear history, its failure If the same money had been poured into other lower risk to learn from its mistakes, and its current nuclear facilities. options such as energy efficiency and renewable energy In addition, it presents four case studies from eye witnesses generation, the country would have secured cheaper, to the historic and ongoing nuclear impacts in this country. sustainable, reliable and indeed, greener, solutions. And finally, an alternative nuclear-free future for South Instead, South Africa’s energy situation, once cheap and Africa is described. The True Cost of Nuclear Power in South Africa 5 2. South Africa’s nuclear industry 2.1 The beginning South Africa might be on the tip of Africa, but its mineral By the 1920s it was known that uranium, a by-product of wealth has always ensured its voice has been heard across Witwatersrand gold, had been dumped with other tailings on the globe – and its uranium stocks made it a significant the huge mounds which dominated the landscape around player in worldwide atomic developments. Johannesburg. Suddenly it had a value and a purpose. Using refining technologies which included sulphuric acid, it was During the last stages of World War II, the Manhattan Project possible to extract the uranium from both the mine tailing was the code name for British and US efforts to develop the dumps and also from the gold-bearing ores. Prime Minister atomic bomb. It was originally intended to be used on Nazi Jan Smuts’ government secretly signed agreements to offer Germany – before the Nazis could develop and deploy their the uranium exclusively to the USA and UK in a ratio of own version – but the war ended in Europe by conventional 2:1. These agreements allowed 17 gold mines to open up means before either side was ready with the weapon. uranium extraction plants in the Johannesburg area.4 For at least a decade, all of the uranium ended up in the weapons In the end, the bomb was used with devastating conse- programmes of the USA and UK.5 quences on Japan.1 In this way, South Africa was guaranteed of never being The tenuous world peace that followed was dominated by a ignored in the nuclear race. Replacing the outdated War debate about what to do with the newly developed weapons Measures, which had governed the use of uranium, Smuts of mass destruction. One solution was to internationalise created a Uranium Research Committee in 1945, which and neutralise their future use. Another was to add the was duly replaced in 1949 by the Atomic Energy Board, weapons to the arsenals of those countries which had in terms of the brand new Atomic Energy Act (1948). The developed them. board comprised officials, scientists and representatives of the mining industry.

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