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Canada, the United States, and Biological Terrorism

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Canada, the United States, and Biological Terrorism University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies Legacy Theses 2001 A plague on both our houses: Canada, the United States, and biological terrorism Winzoski, Karen Jane Winzoski, K. J. (2001). A plague on both our houses: Canada, the United States, and biological terrorism (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/13326 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/40836 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca I UNEVERSrrY OF CALGARY A Plague on Both Our Houses: Ca- the United States, and BiologicaI Terrorism by Karen Jane Winzoski A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARWFULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE CALGARY, ALBERTA APRIL, 200 t Q Karen Jane Wioski 200 1 National Library Bibiiothbque nationale du Canada A uisitionsand Acquisitions et ~aog~hiiSewices sewices biblographiques 395WolAng(ocrStreel 385. we WePingttm OuawaON KtAW -ON KlAW Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accorde me licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive pennettant a la National hiof Canada to Bibliotheque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduke, prk,distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette these sous paper or electronic formats. la foxme de microficheffilm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format electronique. The author retains owner@ of the L'auteur conserve la proprikte du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui prot6ge cette Use. thesis nor substantial extracts Eom it Ni la these ni des extrah substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celIe-ci ne doivent 6tre imprimes reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autoxisation. The United States and Canada have developed remarkably different responses to the bioterrorist hat.This study attempts to ascertain which response mtegy is best suited to combating that threat The first chapter compares the threat of biotogical terrorism to the United States and Canada It determines that the threat of biological terrorism is much greater to the United States, and tbat the most likely acts to occur in either country are hoaxes. Macroterrorist attacks are the Ieast Likely. The second chapter examines both states' responses to the threat. It reveals that the American approach is poorly organized with many redundant programs, whiIe the Canadian strategy fails to adequately respond to the threat of macroterrorism. The third chapter offers suggestions for improvement to both states' response strategies, and attempts to determine which state's response is most appropriate. However, it is conchded that neither response strategy is inherentfy better than the other. - .4 great number ofpeople includingfmii'y, f)iends, and acquaintances (and we all know who the acquaintmces are. Ha ha.) have proven to be insh~mentalm the completion of this study. For the most part they know who they are and how much their mpport has mennr to me. Two people, however, bear special mention: Peter, lgor this done in spite of you and that sale on Corona; and Jim Keeley, you have proven to be more of a kite string than an anchor or a ball and chain, andfor [hat I thankyou. TABLEOFCONTENTS .. Approval Page ............................................................................................................... ..... u Abstract ............................................................................................................................. 111 Acknowledgements........................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... .v. List of Tables .................................................................................................................. vll... List of Abbreviations ...................................................................................................... VIII INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................1 Notes to Introduction ............................................................................................ 12 CHAPTER ONE: THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM TO CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES ........................................................................................................... 14 The Many Faces of the Bioterrorist Threat ......................................................... 16 Motivational Bartiers .......................................................................................17 Technical Barriers ............................................................................................ 17 Hoaxes.. .............................................................................................................. 23 Assassma~onand Murder ................................................................................ 25 Small Scde Attacks ........................................................................................ 29 Product Tampering ........................................................................................ .13.1 .) Agricultural Terrorism ..................................................................................... 36 Non-Lethd Bioterrurism ......... .. ................................................................... 39 Macroterrorism .......................... ..,...... .................................................... 42 The Potential Bioterrorists .................................... ........................................... 44- - The Target State ....................................................................................................... 33 Does the target state engage in activities that might be objectionable... ? ....... 55 Does the target state have businesses that engage in practices... ? .................. 57 How closely connected is the target state to other states... ? ........................... 59 How has the target state responded to the threat of bioterrorism ...? ............... 61 Is the state reliant on a single crop or species of livestock? ............................ 63 Does the target state have effective programs ... ? .......................................... 64 How open is the target state? ........................................................................... 64 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 66 Notes to Chapter One ............................................................................................... 69 CHAPTER TWO: RESPONSES TO THE BIOTERROEUST THREAT ....................... 74 A General Strategy to Follow ..............................,. ............................................... 74 The United States' Counter-Biotemrism Strategy ................................................. 77 International Efforts ......................................................................................... 78 Domestic Preventative Efforts ................... .. ................................................. 88 Domestic Consequence Mitigation Efforts ................................................... 92 Canada's Counter-Bioterrorism Strategy ............................................................... 114 International Efforts ....................................................................................... 115 Domestic Preventative Efforts .................... .................................................. I I 8 Domestic Consequence Mitigation Efforts ........................................................... 120 Dual-Use versus the DeIta ..................................................................................... 129 Notes to Chapter Two ............................................................................................ 131 CHAPTER THREE:RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ...................... 138 Possible Improvements to the United States' Counter-Biotenorism Strategy ....... 139 Domestic Consequence Mitigation Efforts .................................................... 142 Domestic Preventative Efforts ................................................................. 157 International Efforts .................... ..., .............................................................. 160 Possible Improvements to Canada's Counter-Bioterrorism Strategy..................... 163 Domestic Consequence Mitigation Efforts .................................................... 165 Domestic Preventative Efforts ................................................................... 173 International Efforts ....................................................................................... 173 Concluding Remarks......................................................................................... 175 Notes to Chapter Three .......................................................................................... 181 REFERENCES .............................................................................................................
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