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Dugway Proving Ground DCN: 9798 Dugway Proving Ground COL GARY R. HARTER Commander U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground Dugway, Utah April 22, 2004 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Dugway Proving Ground Site Familiarization Briefing to The Army Basing Study Group COL GARY R. HARTER Commander U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground Dugway, Utah April 22, 2004 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Agenda • Size and Location • Organization • Chem-Bio Test Mission and Capabilities • Tenant Missions and Capabilities • Dugway Quality of Life Assets • Potential for Growth • Summary 3 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Take-away Message • Acknowledged experts in Chem-Bio testing • 1,300 sq. miles of controlled access, remote real-estate with no encroachment GWOT support Airfield On-Site Positioned for Vast remote areas for future growth testing and training EPA WDTC Environmental Capability to Expert work Infrastructure in permits support DOD force place with state-of- Established working transformation the-art equipment relationships 4 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Global War on Terrorism Contingency Operations - Afghanistan and Iraq • Scientist deployment and reach-back • Chem-Bio Urgent Need equipment testing • Met forecasting • SOF mission rehearsals Anthrax • Hart Senate Office Building decon Olympics • Analysis of environmental samples • WMD hazard prediction UTTR Missions • Afghanistan and Iraq mission rehearsals • Classified testing 5 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Remote Location • 1,300 sq. miles of sparse desert environment 30 Miles • 85 miles from metro Salt Salt Lake Lake City City Free from urban • 52 Miles encroachment • Surrounded on three sides by mountains and desert terrain • Salt flats for 90 miles north • Acoustically & electronically quiet • Free of light pollution 6 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Remote Location UTTR • Dugway is part of the Utah Test and Training Range 207 UTTR Salt Lake Miles Airspace - 19,161 sq. miles City Restricted air space - 9,158 sq. miles Military operations area - 10,004 sq. miles DOD exclusive use land - 3,078 sq. miles Government owned land - 92 Miles 16,686 sq. miles 7 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Zero Encroachment 8 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Dugway Environment • 801,027 acres total Granite Mountain 7,080 ft • Environmental Permits in place • EIS pending • Pristine air quality • < 8 inches rainfall a year • No endangered species 59,078 acres mountain terrain 279,768 acres desert terrain (sage and sand dune) 462,180 acres playa (mud and salt flats) Salt Flats 4,230 ft 9 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Key Dugway Locations English Village Combined Chemical Test Facility Life Sciences Test Facility Material Test Facility USAF Tracking Radar Test Grid Defensive Test Chamber 10 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Dugway Partners 11 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Utah Support of Dugway • Strong outreach program to local Chambers of Commerce and State agencies • Exemplary working relationship with State Environmental Office • Cooperative Agreements with local universities • The State of Utah provided Dugway $2M to repair runway at MAAF • Participation in special events (Winter Olympics, Veteran’s Day) • House Resolution No. 14, Resolution Recognizing Dugway Proving Ground, Tooele Army Depot, Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah National Guard, and U.S. Military Reserves 12 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” History 32-14,000 10,000 1776 - Years Years 1845 Lake Bonneville covers The lake recedes and Explorers Dominguez & the area that will become and the first nomadic Escalante, Jim Bridger, and Dugway Proving Ground humans populate the John C. Fremont survey and under several hundred arid region. map the region. feet of water. 13 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” History Utah becomes Pioneers arrive in Transcontinental the 45th state the Salt Lake Valley. Railroad completed. in the Union. 1847 18601869 1870 1896 The Pony Express and Miners and ranchers invade the Overland Stage routes region. Special wagon roads, follow Dugway’s future called “dugways” are cut into southern border. nearby mountainsides. 14 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” History 19001915 1919 1930 WWI engulfs Europe. The transcontinental Army Motor Transport Mustard Gas is first Expedition cuts across future Dugway test used against the grids, with a young MAJ Eisenhower in tow, Allies at Ypres. on the route of the famous Lincoln Highway. 15 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” History Pearl BRAC Harbor Commission 9-11 1941 1942 1995 2001 Today President Roosevelt withdraws an Dugway continues to serve initial 127,000 acres of Utah land for America's soldiers, citizens, and use by the War Dept. and Dugway allies as the nation's chemical and Proving Ground is officially activated. biological defense Proving Ground. 16 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Structure ArmyArmy Test Test & & Evaluation Evaluation Command Command (ATEC) (ATEC) MGMG Robert Robert E. E. Armbruster Armbruster DevelopmentalDevelopmental Test Test Command Command (DTC) (DTC) BGBG Marvin Marvin K. K. McNamara McNamara DPGDPG ATTCATTC WSMRWSMR YPGYPG ATCATC RTTCRTTC DugwayDugway ProvingProving GroundGround COL Gary R. Harter COL Gary R. Harter • National Guard • Tech Escort • 388th AF Range Squadron • Clinic/Medical WestWest DesertDesert BaseBase SpecialSpecial TenantTenant Test Center Support Staff Units • DTRA Test Center Support Staff Units • TMDE (IMA) (IMA) • AFFES • DECA 17 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Vital Statistics FY 04 0$40.1M Operations 0$04.3M Technology 0$10.3M OSD Mission 0$04.5M OSD Modernization 0$04.5M Air Force Mission March 2004 Population Data 0$01.1M NAF 254 Military (Including Tenants) 0$58.1M Reimbursable 652 DOD Civilians 0$05.3M Other 539 Full-time Contractors 159 NAF, USPS, Tooele County $128.2M Total Annual Budget Schools, Credit Union, etc. 1,604 Total Work Force 18 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Work Force – Structure Installation Admin. 11% Test Center 57% Scientists Engineers Admin. 41% 20% IMA Base Operations 32% Technician 39% 19 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Chem-Bio Test Mission and TitleCapabilities Page 20 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Dugway Mission Statement • To test U.S. and Allied chemical and biological defense equipment and systems. Perform NBC survivability testing of defense materiel. Test environmental characterization and remediation technology. Develop procedures, methodology and technology necessary for chemical and biological testing. • Act as the DOD joint Chem-Bio defense contact point in support of Combatant Commanders. Provide support to chemical and biological weapons conventions. Provide for testing of smoke, illumination and incendiary munitions. Conduct the Army’s Meteorology Program. Conduct a surety program. Support training. • Safeguard the environment. • Operate and maintain an installation to support the test mission. 21 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Combined Chemical Test Facility Capabilities • 35,000 square feet of multifunctional chemistry laboratories • 47 agent certified fume hoods in 27 Surety-capable test suites • Supports chamber and field testing of Chem-Bio defense systems • Aerosol, vapor, and droplet testing with all chemical agents • Support of Homeland Defense Chemical Agents & Simulants Agent Simulant -G Agents 13 licensed -VX simulants -H-Series -Lewisite 22 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Combined Chemical Test Facility $25,000,000 $20,000,000 $15,000,000 $10,000,000 $5,000,000 $0 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 Growth in Chemical Testing • Increased CBDP support • $13.7M test technology • Support of WMD-CST training 23 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Chemical Test Capabilities • Super Chamber decontamination or IPE testing • Detector Test System Chamber, chemical point detector testing • Passive Standoff Detector test chamber • Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy (NMR) • Gas Chromatograph (GC) • GC/Mass Spectrophotometer • Smartman Mask Test Chamber • AVLAG material swatch test chamber • CBART material swatch test chamber (in development) • Field sampling, assay and safari capability 24 “Draft Deliberative Document – For Discussion Purposes Only. Do Not Release Under FOIA” Materiel Test Facility Capabilities • Stainless Steel Chamber (30’x50’x50’) • Full environmental control • Two (30’x25’x25) test chambers • Upgrade for BSL-3 Bio agent testing •
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