: form of discourse, when Jacques Derrida and when discourse can b. 1930 1thing, it is because all ted and exchanged their tto the silent interiority of Jacques Derrida was born in Algiers in 1930. He was educated in Algeria and in ~f ~ France; in France, he studied philosophy at the Ecole Normale Superieure 1 of the founding subject, nary experience, and in a (1952- 1956) and at the University of Paris, Sorbonne, earning his doctoral degree al mediation alike, dis- in 1967. Derrida also studied at Harvard for a year (1956-1957) and in the sixties a play, of writing in the was associated with the avant-garde journal Tel Que[. He taught for four years at the ,. .... ,· :f,, :i.•' ~.

1 the second, and of ex- Sorbonne and then, since 1964, at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences So­ •..- ...... II this exchange, this read­ ciales, becoming directeur d'etudes (director of studies) in 1984. He has also served put anything at stake ex­ as visiting professor at Yale, Johns Hopkins, the University of California at Irvine, ' discourse is annulled in and Cornell. disposal of the signifier. j, .... I ,..i. In his many books and articles, Derrida persistently attacks the idea that lan­ l• ' as ever appeared to be guage is or can be referential. He finds this idea an active premise in philosophy, in ..•.,, ., ... ;ourse than ours? Where most discussions of language, and in everyday thought. For Derrida, as for Friedrich honored, or better hon­ !r been, seemingly, more Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and others, including the Sophists, language does not 1 its constraints, and uni­ mediate our relationship to a more or less knowable world. Rather, Derrida main­ ts to me that beneath this tains that "il n 'ya pas de hors-texte" - there is nothing outside of the text.' By this discourse, under this ap­ he means that our knowledge of the world is constructed from language, and lan­ rtain fear is hidden. It is guage is not a transparent medium of reference or of thought. Language cannot be barriers, thresholds, and transcended to reach the thing signified while disposing of the signifier. This effort "-"'-,.(__+'-,4- ~ .. n order to master, at least to reach past language to the reality it names is what Derrida calls "the metaphysics bc.\M:o~~.~ feration of discourse, in of presence." \ l ~ ~"'-' 4 S.f._..... ,. its richness the most dan­ In his attack on the metaphysics of presence that dominates philosophy, Derrida L-t,Plato was the first of many philosophers who distrusted writing. It is as if we had tried to ·uption into the activity of Speech, those philosophers claimed, is immediate, in the sense that it takes place at No doubt there is in our the moment of interaction between people who are exchanging their thoughts. Thus , in all others, but follow- it is an expression of thought. It is clearly the expression of the speaker, who is, of and different rhythms, a course, present, and it is directed to the interlocutor, who is also present. Speech is a sort of mute terror an attempt to represent something else, to transfer thoughts, to communicate ideas. gainst this mass of things In this sense, it is an attempt to overcome language. Plato distrusted both rhetoric mg-up of all these state­ and writing because they subverted the attempt of speech to transcend itself. could be violent, discon - Rhetoric focused on motives for speaking that were not intended to reach the ab­ 1sorderly as well, and per ­ solute truth. Moreover, it made a virtue of linguistic facility, attending to the mater­ ainst this great incessant ial effects of style and structure. Plato similarly distrusted writing, which com­ of discourse. -I would not say, efface pounded the problems introduced by rhetoric in that it allowed the writer to manage : it in its conditions, its ac- the language, to review and revise, to polish-and then to disappear. Because the must, I believe, resolve to author of written discourse does not utter the words, complains Plato, the speech sit­ >Jhich our thinking today uation is absent; therefore, also absent is the possibility of the kind of dialogue that ch correspond to the three prompts clarification, probing of premises, corrections, and so on. ,ich I have just mentioned: , ,tion our will to truth, re- \l iaracter as an event, and fi­ 1 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. G. Spivak (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, ereignty of the signifier. 1976), p. 158. -w,.\'h""""' * JACQUES DERRIDA 1471 ~f Derrida finds this sort of argument repeated frequently through the history of guage as purposeful di philosophy: Writing is taken to be a representation of speech, but even if it is a Derrida for neglecting faithful representation, writing somehow falsifies speech, simply by being at a fur­ tribute to the formatior ther remove from the "original" signifying intention. rhetorical situation tha Derrida attacks this presumption by reversing the argument. Writing, he claims, topic. He seeks instead is prior to speech-not historically, of course, but conceptually, in that writing metaphysics of presenc shows more clearly than speech does how language is different from what it sup­ In "Signature Event posedly represents. Writing is undeniably a sign function, representing sounds and help to account for me words. But the very fact that writing is at one remove from speech, that it escapes course to some settled """k..&\.--"-~ the speech situation, draws attention to the fact that speech, too, is a sign function. he concisely summariz i's ...... ~ 1,\.-..,:, Writing is both distant from the moment of "utterance" and different in form from Even in the speech situ --a...~ ~e.s.,l-.~~ the utterance it supposedly represents. But in speech, too, verbal signs are distant able. The same holds tt "'·~ d.,..\M.. - .f-, ...... ,;~l-,"band different from what they signify. Once the distance and difference are acknowl­ ing always escapes cor """'"'~ w ~. l-~ '1~:.... edged, speech can be seen as a form of writing. Language itself operates by distance this exploded notion of f....- Sp <.c.c..k. and difference, functions that Derrida combines in his coinage differance, "different not as far from speech­ and deferred." Thus "writing" serves for Derrida the purpose that "rhetoric" served the general idea that ti for Nietzsche: All language is writing (or rhetoric). There is no speech that effaces are in and of themselv{ itself in the presence of truth. The metaphysics of presence is, says Derrida, the ethical consequences ­ llNl ~ IM4k"l>.f\.."l'\~ manifestation of a desire to hide or repress the absence of knowable referents for lief in the availability c b~ pr-t.sU\C,c, C,tl(A,,Sc.,s language, the gap or differa11ce that constitutes language. Derrida's work has I h--~'4 : P.U A 16l""C4- In his own writing, Derrida makes this argument in two principal ways: (a) by an­ in literary criticism. Hii alyzing or "deconstructing" texts that contribute to the metaphysics of presence and approach, and his spec (b) by adopting a style that resists the habit of assuming truth's presence behind lan­ theoretical projects. De guage. In deconstructing texts, Derrida finds and analyzes presuppositions about or commentators have se{ arguments for the priority of speech and the fundamental referentiality of language. flict between philosop ' . •"¥t~ • .:...... ,~~. • Jt .. Here he reveals contradictions, betrayals of the premise by the premise itself, and ev­ means, primarily, trope idence of absence in assertions about presence. In Of Grammatology (1967), for ex­ ogy: Metaphor in the T ample, Derrida finds that Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for all his insistence on the primacy to make from a volume of speech, relies on the distance he can attain through writing in order to represent his mount it, or rather to h, ideas "truthfully." In Dissemination (1972), Derrida analyzes the Phaedrus to show if from itself, come rou how far language always remains from any clear representation of ideas. But in con­ away, in the (dare we s, structing his analyses, Derrida resists the trap of claiming that he has at last found the tions is understandable right way to understand the relationship of language to idea. He avoids the binary op­ .. . is sedimented-an positions that are, he says, manifestations of the metaphysics of presence: good/evil, danger of using rhetori1 nature/culture, speech/writing, man/woman-all versions of presence/absence. In­ ogy and categories of r stead, Derrida tends to rely on exorbitantly extended metaphors, elaborate and am­ work, however, is one < biguous syntax, and a special vocabulary (differance, for example) that emphasizes, problematizes, and finally collapses (or so he claims) binary distinctions. Selected Bibliography Derrida is at once rhetorical and antirhetorical, as "Signature Event Context" (in­ cluded here) demonstrates. On the rhetorical side, Derrida argues that language is "Signature Event Contex , neither referential nor transparent; it is, rather, always metaphorical and ambiguous, de Langue Fram;:aise in I\ always in need of interpretation. Ultimately, there is nothing (no knowledge, that is) Mehlman, appeared in G beyond this "text" of language. We might expect Derrida to conclude, then, that Margins of Philosophy 1 knowledge depends not on logic or reason that reaches through or past language to 2 Jacques Derrida, "Whit the truth but on the negotiated meanings brought by persuasion and interpretation. phy, trans. Alan Bass (Chica But Derrida does not draw this conclusion. He does not concern himself with Ian- 1 Derrida, p. 228.

1472 MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC y through the history of guage as purposeful discourse. Indeed, Michel Foucault and others have criticized Jeech, but even if it is a Derrida for neglecting the political, social, and historical circumstances that con­ simply by being at a fur- tribute to the formation of particular interpretations or methods of persuasion. The rhetorical situation that might explain a particular interpretation is not Derrida's ment. Writing, he claims, topic. He seeks in!.tead to reveal the way in which any explanation tends toward the :eptually, in that writing metaphysics of presence. fferent from what it sup­ In "Signature Event Context," Derrida in fact attacks the idea that "context" can . representing sounds and help to account for meaning. How, he asks, can we specify the context without re­ F.. ~'-\-~ ,m speech, that it escapes course to some settled notions about the conditions of meaning? In this discussion, I k."'--l,"-.'l - h, too, is a sign function. he concisely summarizes his argument about the "primacy" of writing over speech. L..{-o"""'...... ,_ nd different in form from Even in the speech situation, he maintains, the meaning of an utterance is undecid­ ~'"'- so~ ,, verbal signs are distant able. The same holds true for a reader reading written discourse. In this sense, writ­ d difference are acknowl­ ing always escapes context. Derrida then criticizes speech-act theory for relying on itself operates by distance this exploded notion of context. A number of critics have pointed out that Derrida is 1age differcmce, "different not as far from speech-act theory as he seems to suggest here. He appears to accept ose that "rhetoric" served the general idea that there are "performative" utterances-that is, statements that is no speech that effaces are in and of themselves actions or necessary parts of actions with legal, social, and :nee is, says Derrida, the ethical consequences-even though he rejects what he takes to be an absolute be­ Jf knowable referents for lief in the availability of context or intention as specifiable conditions for these acts. Derrida's work has been tremendously influential, not only in philosophy but also principal ways: (a) by an­ in literary criticism. His method of deconstructing texts has become a popular critical taphysics of presence and approach, and his speculations about language have stimulated a number of related 1th's presence behind Ian­ theoretical projects. Despite Derrida's general avoidance of the term rhetoric, several , presuppositions about or commentators have seen his critique of philosophy as part of the long-standing con­ referentiality of language. flict between philosophy and rhetoric as ways of knowing. By rhetoric, Derrida the premise itself, and ev­ means, primarily, tropes and figures. Here is how he begins his essay "White Mythol­ nmatology (1967), for ex­ ogy: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy": "From philosophy, rhetoric. That is, here, , insistence on the primacy to make from a volume, approximately, more or less, a flower, to extract a flower, to 1g in order to represent his mount it, or rather to have it mount itself, bring itself to light-and turning away, as zes the Phaedrus to show if from itself, come round again." 2 Rhetoric is the flower, the ornament, one that turns ation of ideas. But in con ­ away, in the (dare we say) literal meaning of trope. Derrida's hesitation with these no­ hat he has at last found the tions is understandable: "The opposition of meaning ... to its metaphorical signifier l. He avoids the binary op­ ... is sedimented-another metaphor - by the entire history of philosophy."3 The ll ~ l,\0141J'", ics of presence: good/evil, danger of using rhetoric to designate an alternative to philosophy is that the terminol­ °"'-~,; is Q, ; of presence/absence. ln­ ogy and categories of rhetoric have already been colonized by philosophy. Derrida's ~p,c.,Llt~ aphors, elaborate and am ­ work, however, is one of the signs of liberation. ..'ct'...... _r :xample) that emphasizes, y distinctions. Selected Bibliography rnture Event Context" (in­ la argues that language is "Signature Event Context" was read at the Congres International des Societes de Philosophie aphorical and ambiguous, de Langue Fran9aise in Montreal in 1971. Our text, translated by Samuel Weber and Jeffrey ng (no knowledge, that is) Mehlman, appeared in Glyph 1 (Baltimore, 1977). Another translation, by Alan Bass, is in fa to conclude, then, that Margins of Philosophy (1972; Chicago, 1982), which also contains "White Mythology." rough or past language to 2Jacques Derrida, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," in Margins of Pliiloso­ ,uasion and interpretation. p/iy , trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 209. concern himself with Ian- ' Derrida, p. 228. JACQUES DERRtDA 1473 John Searle answers Derrida's criticisms of speech-act theory in "Reiterating the Difference~ : A Reply to Derrida," also in Glyph I. And Derrida answers Searle in "Limited Jnc abc" in Signature-' Glyph II (Baltimore, 1977). "Signature Event Context" and "Limited Inc abc" arc reprinted, with an additional essay by Derrida, in Limited Inc, ed. Gerald Graff (Evanston, 111.,1988). Derrida discusses writing and speech in Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Spivak (1967: Still co11ji11i11gours, Baltimore, 1977). Spivak's introduction is very helpful. Speech and Phenomena and Other u1tem11ce. Essays nn Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. David Allison ( 1967; Evanston, 111.,1973), con ­ - AUSTIN, tains the essay "Diffcrancc" as well as an excellent introduction by Newton Garver . Writing Is it certain that t a11dD([ference, trans. Alan Bass ( 1967; Chicago, 1978), contains an C%ay on Foucault and corresponds a conce1 the fascinating "Freud and the Scene of Writing." Dis.1e111i11a1io11,tran\. Barbara Johnson rigorously controllab (1972; Chicago, 1981), contains "Plato's Pharmacy" and other essays; the translator's intro ­ word, communicable duction offers a good overview of Derrida's idea~. Posi1io11s,trans. Alan Bass (1972 ; a strange figure of dh Chicago, 1981 ), is a collection of interviews with scholars. ask oneself whether , Deco11s/ructio11in a Nlllshe/1: A C01111ersa1io111vi1!, .Ja cques Derrida, ed. John Caputo "communication" co (New York, 1997), is an edited transcript of a rounStructuralism and Since: From Levi-Straus.1·to Derrida, ed. John Stur ­ irreducible, it would rock (London, 1979). Edward Said compares the thcorie:, of Derrida and Foucault in "The communication a pri, Problems of Tcxtuality: Two Exemplary Positions" (Critical Inquiry 4 !summer 1978]: meaning, even suppo: 673-714). Richard Rorty's "Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida" (New what each of these \ Literaty Hislol)' IO [fall 1978]: 141-60) locates Derrida in a modern non-Kantian tradition of ing, etc.) involved. A1 philosophy. Frank Lentricchia places Derrida in modern literary theory and abo discu~:,e:, his thorization for negle influence in After the New Criticism (Chicago, 1980) . .John Llewclyn take:, up the bsuc of word, or for impoveri signs, semiotics, and speech acts in Derrida 0111he Thre.1/wld Deconstruction in the Context of Rhetorical and semiotics, and even Communication Theory" (Quarterly .loumal

Translated by Samuel \I

1474 MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC 'Reiterating the Differences : 1rle in "Limited fnc abc" in Signature Event Context nited Inc abc" are reprinted, raff (Evanston, 111.,1988). .rans. Gayatri Spivak (1967; Still co11fi11ingourselves for simplicity to spoken dealing neither with a semantic or conceptual a11dPhenomena and Other utterance. content, nor with a semiotic operation, and even •; Evanston, Ill., 1973), con­ - A USTIN, How to Do Things with Words less with a linguistic exchange. We would not, however, assert that this non­ by Newton Garver. Writing Is it certain that to the word communication semiotic meaning of the word communication, as 1s an essay on Foucault and corresponds a concept that is unique, univocal, it works in ordinary language, in one or more of io11,trans . Barbara Johnson rigorously controllable, and transmittable: in a the so-called natural languages, constitutes the ssays; the translator's intro- word, communicable? Thus, in accordance with literal or primary [primitif] meaning and that 1·, trans . Alan Bass (1972; a strange figure of discourse, one must first of all consequently the semantic, semiotic, or linguistic ask oneself whether or not the word or signifier meaning corresponds to a derivation, extension, , Derrida, ed. John Caputo "communication" communicates a determinate or reduction, a metaphoric displacement. We Jeconstruction at Villanova. content, an identifiable meaning, or a describable would not assert, as one might be tempted to do, 1terviews in this period, in value. However, even to articulate and to propose that semio-linguistic communication acquired its ~y is A Derrida Reader: Be- this question I have had to anticipate the meaning title more metaphorico, by analogy with "physi­ contains "Signature Event of the word communication: I have been con­ cal" or "real" communication, inasmuch as it also uctions to each piece and an strained to predetermine communication as a ve­ serves as a passage, transporting and transmitting hicle, a means of transport or transitional something, rendering it accessible. We will not ida's ideas, see Christopher medium of a meaning, and moreover of a unified assert this for the following reasons: lier Deconstruction : Theory meaning . If communication possessed several 1ction is Jonathan Culler's meanings and if this plurality should prove to be 1. because the value of the notion of literal ,s to Derrida, ed. John Stur ­ irreducible, it would not be justifiable to define !rrida and Foucault in "The meaning [sens propre] appears more problemati­ communication a priori as the transmission of a cal than ever, and lnqui,y 4 [summer 1978]: even supposing that we could agree on meaning, 2. because the value of displacement, of \n Essay on Derrida" (New what each of these words (transmission, mean­ em non-Kantian tradition of transport, etc., is precisely constitutive of the ing, etc.) involved. And yet, we have no prior au­ concept of metaphor with which one claims to heory and also discusses his thorization for neglecting communication as a welyn takes up the issue of comprehend the semantic displacement that is word, or for impoverishing its polysemic aspects; brought about from communication as a non­ if Sense (New York, 1986). indeed, this word opens up a semantic domain in "Heidegger and Derrida: semio-linguistic phenomenon to communication that precisely does not limit itself to semantics, as a semio-linguistic phenomenon. Context of Rhetorical and semiotics, and even less to linguistics. For one [1991]: 152-75) . See also characteristic of the semantic field of the word :m" in (/11ter)views: Cross­ communication is that it designates nonsemantic (Let me note parenthetically that this commu­ try Olson and Irene Gale movements as well. Here, even a provisional re­ nication is going to concern, indeed already con­ course to ordinary language and to the equivoca­ cerns, the problem of polysemy and of communi­ ~ ..\ . David Wood (Cambridge, cation, of dissemination-which I shall oppose tions of natural language instructs us that one '•' : ard Rorty, who has engaged can, for instance, communicate a movement or to polysemy-and of communication. In a mo­ orty and Denida, see Decon ­ that a tremor [ebranlement], a shock, a displace­ ment a certain concept of writing cannot fail to >). For a broader account of ment of force can be communicated- that is, arise that may transform itself and perhaps trans­ , 011 Jacques Derrida (Cam- propagated, transmitted. We also speak of differ­ form the problematic under consideration). ent or remote places communicating with each It seems self-evident that the ambiguous field other by means of a passage or opening. What of the word "communication" can be massively takes place, in this sense, what is transmitted, reduced by the limits of what is called a context communicated, does not involve phenomena of (and I give notice, again parenthetically, that meaning or signification. In such cases we are this particular communication will be concerned with the problem of context and with the ques­ Translated by Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman. tion of determining exactly how writing relates to

DERRIDA I SIGNATURE EVENT CONTEXT 1475 context in general). For example, in a philo­ prehensible in terms of communication, at least the interpretation of \ sophic colloquium on philosophy in the French in the limited sense of a transmission of meaning. proper to philosophy. language, a conventional context-produced by Inversely, it is within the general domain of writ­ single example, but I a kind of consensus that is implicit but struc­ ing, defined in this way, that the effects of se­ counter-example can turally vague-seems to prescribe that one pro­ mantic communication can be determined as ef­ tory of philosophy as pose "communications" concerning communica­ fects that are particular, secondary, inscribed, and that contradicts, essen tion, communications in a discursive form, supplementary. Condillac, under the < colloquial communications, oral communications ton, in the Essay on ti; destined to be listened to, and to engage or to WRITINGAND TELECOMMUNICATION edge (Es.mi sur l'oril pursue dialogues within the horizon of an intelli­ niaines). I have chos, gibility and truth that is meaningful, such that ul­ 1f we take the notion of writing in its currently contains an explicit r timately general agreement may, in principle, be accepted sense - one which should not - and function of the writtt attained. These communications are supposed to that is essential - be considered innocent, primi­ not to be found in evf confine themselves to the element of a determi­ tive, or natural, it can only be seen as a means of ticular conditions bot! nate, "natural" language, here designated as commwzication. Indeed, one is compelled to re­ eclipse must be analy French, which commands certain very particular gard it as an especially potent means of commu­ here within a philoso1 uses of the word communication. Above all, the nication, extending enormously, if not infinitely, case and throughout I object of such communications is supposed, by the domain of oral or gestural communication. simplicity of the orig priority or by privilege, to organize itself around This seems obvious, a matter of general agree­ rivation, of all produc communication qua discourse, or in any case qua ment. 1 shall not describe all the modes of this ex­ homogeneity of all di signification. Without exhausting all the implica­ tension in time and in space. I shall, however, is a major concept in tions and the entire structure of an "event" such pause for a moment to consider the import have also chosen this as this one, an effort that would require extended [valeur] of extension to which I have just re­ sis, "retracing" the or preliminary analysis, the conditions that J have ferred. To say that writing extends the field and is placed, in a rather 1 just recalled seem to be evident; and those who the powers of locutory or gestural communica ­ authority of the cate doubt it need only consult our program to be con­ tion presupposes, does it not, a sort of homoge­ men write it is: ( 1) b1 vinced. neous space of communication? Of course the nicate; (2) because \1 But are the conditions [Les requisits] of a con­ compass of voice or of gesture would encounter cate is their "though! text ever absolutely determinable? This is, funda­ therein a factual limit, an empirical boundary of sentations. Thought, mentally, the most general question that I shall space and of time; while writing, in the same and governs comm, endeavor to elaborate. ls there a rigorous and sci­ time and in the same space, would be capable of the "idea," the signifi entific concept of context? Or does the notion of relaxing those limits and of opening the same are already in a state context not conceal, behind a certain confusion, field to a very much larger scope. The meaning or nicate their thought philosophical presuppositions of a very determi­ contents of the semantic message would thus be other when, in a con nate nature? Stating it in the most summary man­ transmitted, co1111111micated,by different means, the particular means ner possible, I shall try to demonstrate why a by more powerful technical mediations, over a Here is a passage fn context is never absolutely determinable, or far greater distance, but still within a medium ond Part ("On Langu rather, why its determination can never be en­ that remains fundamentally continuous and self­ tion ("On the Origim tirely certain or saturated. This structural nonsat­ identical, a homogeneous element through which writing is thus a mo< uration would have a double effect: the unity and wholeness of meaning would not be a continual progressi affected in its essence . Any alteration would communication), pm I. it would mark the theoretical inadequacy therefore be accidental. "Men in a state of c of the current concept of context (linguistic or The system of this interpretation (which is by means of sounds, nonlinguistic), as it is accepted in numerous do­ also, in a certain manner, the sy1,tem of interpre­ ing new signs cai: mains of research, including all the concepts with tation, or in any case of all hermeneutical inter­ which it is systematically associated; pretation), however cmTently accepted it may be, 1Thc Rousscauist the also introduced under ti 2. it would necessitate a certain generaliza­ or inasmuch as it is current. like common sense, ("On the diverse means tion and a certain displacement of the concept of has been represellfed through the history of phi­ the title of the first chaptf writing. This concept would no longer be com- losophy. l would even go so far as to say that it is 1111ages).[Au.]

MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC \ I•

,f communication, at least the interpretation of writing that is peculiar and thoughts and of making them known to persons a transmission of meaning. proper to philosophy . I shall limit myself to a who are absent" (I underscore this value of ab­ he general domain of writ­ single example, but I do not believe that a single sence, which, if submitted to renewed question­ ay, that the effects of se­ counter-example can be found in the entire his­ ing, will risk introducing a certain break in the ho­ t can be determined as ef­ tory of philosophy as such; I know of no analysis mogeneity of the system). Once men are already ·, secondary, inscribed, and that contradicts, essentially, the one proposed by in the state of "communicating their thoughts," and Condillac, under the direct influence of Warbur­ of doing it by means of sounds (which is, accord­ ton, in the Essay on the Origin of Human Knowl­ ing to Condillac, a second step, when articulated edge (Es.mi sur l'origine des connaissances hu­ language has come to "supplant" [suppleer] the ,ECOMMUNICATION maines). I have chosen this example because it language of action, which is the single and radical of writing in its currently contains an explicit reflection on the origin and principle of all language), the birth and progress which should not-and function of the written text (this explicitness is of writing will follow in a line that is direct, simple, :onsidered innocent, primi­ not to be found in every philosophy, and the par­ and continuous. The history of writing will con­ only be seen as a means of ticular conditions both of its emergence and of its form to a law of mechanical economy: to gain or d, one is compelled to re­ eclipse must be analyzed) which organizes itself save the most space and time possible by means y potent means of commu­ here within a philosophical discourse that, in this of the most convenient abbreviation; hence writ­ ormously, if not infinitely, case and throughout philosophy, presupposes the ing will never have the slightest effect on either r gestural communication. simplicity of the origin, the continuity of all de­ the structure or the contents of the meaning (the a matter of general agree­ rivation, of all production, of all analysis, and the ideas) that it is supposed to transmit [vehiculer]. ibe all the modes of this ex­ homogeneity of all dimensions [orders]. Analogy The same content, formerly communicated by n space. I shall, however, is a major concept in the thought of Condillac. I gestures and sounds, will henceforth be transmit­ t to consider the import have also chosen this example because the analy­ ted by writing, by successively different modes of to which I have just re­ sis, "retracing" the origin and function of writing, notation, from pictographic writing to alphabetic ;ting extends the field and is placed, in a rather uncritical manner, under the writing, collaterally by the hieroglyphic writing ·y or gestural communica­ authority of the category of communication.' If of the Egyptians and the ideographic writing of the s it not, a sort of homoge ­ men write it is: (1) because they have to commu­ Chinese. Condillac continues: "Thus the imagin­ nunication? Of course the nicate; (2) because what they have to communi­ ation will represent to them only the very same >f gesture would encounter cate is their "thought," their "ideas," their repre­ images that they had already expressed through , an empirical boundary of sentations. Thought, as representation, precedes actions and words, and which had, from the very vhile writing, in the same and governs communication, which transports beginning, rendered language figural and meta­ space, would be capable of the "idea," the signified content; (3) because men phorical. The most natural means was thus to de­ and of opening the same are already in a state that allows them to commu­ pict [dessiner] images of things. To express the rger scope. The meaning or nicate their thought to themselves and to each idea of a man or of a horse, one represented the 1tic message would thus be other when, in a continuous manner, they invent form of the one or of the other, and the first at­ cated, by different means, the particular means of communication, writing. tempt at writing was nothing but a simple paint­ ::hnical mediations, over a Here is a passage from Chapter XIII of the Sec­ ing" (my emphasis - J. D.). but still within a medium ond Part ("On Language and Method"), First Sec­ The representational character of the written ntally continuous and self ­ tion ("On the Origins and Progress of Language"; communication -writing as picture, reproduc­ ous element through which writing is thus a modality of language and marks tion, imitation of its content - will be the invari­ ss of meaning would not be a continual progression in an essentially linguistic ant trait of all progress to come. The concept of ,ce. Any alteration would communication), paragraph XIII, "On Writing": representation is here indissociable from those of l. "Men in a state of communicating their thoughts communication and of expression that I have em­ is interpretation (which is by means of sounds, felt the necessity of imagin­ phasized in Condillac's text. Representation, of ner, the system of interpre ­ ing new signs capable of perpetuating those course, will become more complex, will develop of all hermeneutical inter - supplementary ramifications and degrees; it will mently accepted it may be, 'The Rousseauist theory of language and of writing is become the representation of a representation in also introduced under the general title of c01111111111icatio11various systems of writing, hieroglyphic, ideo­ urrent, like common sense, ("On the diverse means of communicating our thoughts" is through the history of phi- the title of the first chapter of the Essay 011 tire Origin of Lan­ graphic, or phonetic-alphabetical, but the repre­ 1 go so far as to say that it is guages). [Au.I sentative structure which marks the first degree

DERRIDA I SIGNATURE EVENT CONTEXT 1477 i.-.,...,,.,.,.u\ t)~ .. ot.~ d..,.,.L•~ ....:i) ...,_a'ii:,"""- ""'';"" L..~.....,? ll>~ .j, ..\- ,.:.: ~ t,...;\.t'\o(.c..)

2 of expressive communication, the relation concepts in Condillac's Essay ), this operation of ifies and, on certain idea/sign, will never be either annulled or trans­ supplementation is not exhibited as a break in tion in his letters h formed. Describing the history of the types of presence but rather as a continuous and homoge­ operation that Condi writing, their continuous derivation from a com­ neous reparation and modification of presence in sists in reversing, by mon root that is never displaced and which estab­ the representation. tinuous decomposit lishes a sort of community of analogical partici­ derivation that lead pation among all the species of writing, I am not able to analyze, here, everything pre­ present perception t Condillac concludes (in what is virtually a cita­ supposed in Condillac's philosophy and else­ resentation: from o tion of Warburton, as is most of this chapter): where, by this concept of absence as the modifi­ guage of the most fc "Thus, the general history of writing proceeds by cation of presence. Let us note only that this It would be eas, simple gradation from the state of painting to that concept governs another operational notion (for mentally, this type· of the letter; for letters are the final steps that are the sake of convenience I invoke the classical op­ cation neither begin left to be taken after the Chinese marks which, on position between operational and thematic) I call this analysis · the one hand, participate in the nature of Egyp­ which is no less decisive for the Essay: tracing to oppose its notion tian hieroglyphics, and on the other, participate and retracing. Like the concept of supplanting to appeal to the do in that of letters just as the hieroglyphs partici­ [suppleance], the concept of trace would permit ideological-usage pate both in Mexican paintings and Chinese char­ an interpretation quite different from Condillac's. ogy" is often put, v. acters. These characters are so close to our writ­ According to him, tracing means "expressing," the various possibili ing that an alphabet simply diminishes the "representing," "recalling," "rendering present" to serious consider[ inconvenience of their great number and is their ("Thus painting probably owes its origin to the as those of Condi!! succinct abbreviation." necessity of tracing our thoughts in the manner cause, against the b Having thus confirmed the motif of economic described, and this necessity has doubtless con­ 1 r vast, powerful, and reduction in its homogeneous and mechanical tributed to reserving the language of action as that ,,(. _ dition dominated b: character, let us now return to the notion of ab­ which is most readily depictable" l"On Writing," ' ':''' . (eidos, idea), they d sence that I underscored, in passing, in the text p. 128]). The sign comes into being at the same .f,\·.: " of the French "ideo of Condillac. How is that notion determined time as imagination and memory, the moment it is ..:, ., Condillac elaborate, there? necessitated by the absence of the object from 1~l11 resentation of the i present perception [/a perception presente] ,~::.*the object perceived 1. It is first of all the absence of the ad­ ("Memory, as we have seen, consists in nothing nication is that whi, dressee. One writes in order to communicate but the power of recalling the signs of our ideas, as an ideal conten something to those who are absent. The absence or the circumstances that accompanied them; and ; a species of this of the sender, of the receiver [destinateur], from this power only takes place by virtue of the anal­ IIspecies: a commur the mark that he abandons, and which cuts itself ogy of the signs [my emphasis - J. D.: the con­ specificity within a; off from him and continues to produce effects cept of analogy, which organizes the entire sys­ If we now ask ou independently of his presence and of the present tem of Condillac, provides the general guarantee is the essential pre, actuality of his intentions [ vouloir-dire], indeed of all the continuities and in particular that linking ence, we rediscover even after his death, his absence, which more­ presence to absence] that we have chosen; and by I offer here the f over belongs to the structure of all writing­ the order that we have instituted among our idea~, hypotheses: and I shall add further on, of all language in the objects that we wish to retrace are bound up general- this absence is not examined by Con­ with several of our present needs" 1, II Ch. iv, I . since every si dillac. #39). This holds true for all the orders of signs of action" or in artic 2. The absence of which Condillac speaks is distinguished by Condillac (arbitrary, accidental, the intervention of\ determined in the most classic manner as a con­ and even natural, distinctions that Condillac qua!- presupposes a certai tinuous modification and progressive extenuation the absence within 1 of presence. Representation regularly supplants 2 Language supplants action or perception: articulated lan­ will have to be of a [supplee] presence. However, articulating all the guage supplants the language of action: writing supplant, ar­ ticulated language. etc. [Au. I [The word, s11pplee,u,ed by to grant any specific moments of experience insofar as it is involved Derrida and here by Rousseau, implies the double notion of sign; in signification ("to supplant," suppleer, is one of supplanting, replacing, and also ~upplemcnling, bringing lo 2. if perchance 1 the most decisive and most frequent operational completion, remedying. - Tr.] to characterize the a

MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC PH,SC.""(A;I ~ ~ ct&.,o,,l•~ ...:>I a.lfSCAA-£.l.., .\.l.\.. l.,,l,..~? ~iJ5cA-•(' - ',..;i,. t'- '-4,) ~

2 ~ssay ), this operation of ifies and, on certain points, even calls into ques­ writing were to find itself no less appropriate to exhibited as a break in tion in his letters to Cramer) . The philosophical every species of sign and of communication, the :ontinuous and homoge­ operation that Condillac also calls "retracing" con­ consequence would be a general shift: writing dification of presence in sists in reversing, by a process of analysis and con­ would no longer be one species of communica ­ tinuous decomposition, the movement of genetic tion, and all the concepts to whose generality derivation that leads from simple sensation and writing had been subordinated (including the ~e, here, everything pre- present perception to the complex edifice of rep­ concept itself qua meaning, idea or grasp of philosophy and else­ resentation: from ordinary presence to the lan­ meaning and of idea, the concept of communica­ - absence as the modifi­ guage of the most formal calculus [calcul]. tion, of the sign, etc.) would appear to be noncrit­ us note only that this It would be easy to demonstrate that, funda­ ical, ill-formed, or destined, rather, to insure the operational notion (for mentally, this type of analysis of written signifi­ authority and the force of a certain historical dis­ invoke the classical op- cation neither begins nor ends with Condillac. If course. 1tional and thematic) I call this analysis "ideological," I do so neither for the Essay: tracing to oppose its notions to "scientific" concepts nor Let us attempt, then, while still continuing to concept of supplanting to appeal to the dogmatic-one might also say take this classical discourse as our point of depar­ : of trace would permit ideological-usage to which the term "ideol­ ture, to characterize the absence that seems to in­ 'erent from Condillac's . ogy" is often put, while seldom subjecting either tervene in a specific manner in the functioning of g means "expressing," the various possibilities or the history of the word writing. ," "rendering present" to serious consideration. If I define notions such A written sign is profferred in the absence of owes its origin to the as those of Condillac as "ideological" it is be­ the receiver. How to style this absence? One houghts in the manner cause, against the background [sur le fond] of a could say that at the moment when I am writing, ;ity has doubtless con- vast, powerful, and systematic philosophical tra- the receiver may be absent from my field of pres­ 1guage of action as that 1,r,. dition dominated by the prominence of the idea ent perception. But is not this absence merely a ctable" ["On Writing," 1:;,;·. (eido s, idea), they delineate the field of reflection distant presence, one which is delayed or which, into being at the same :•,,1 of the French "ideologues," who in the wake of in one form or another, is idealized in its repre­ !mory, the moment it is · ;".~,Condillac elaborated a theory of the sign as rep­ sentation? This does not seem to be the case, or ce of the object from ·'" resentation of the idea which itself represented at least this distance, divergence, delay, this de­ 1 perception presente] ~ :Wathe object perceived . From that point on, commu- ferral [dijferance] must be capable of being car­ !n, consists in nothing nication is that which circulates a representation ried to a certain absoluteness of absence if the the signs of our ideas , as an ideal content (meaning); and writing is structure of writing, assuming that writing exists, ccompanied them; and , a species of this general communication. A is to constitute itself. It is at that point that the : by virtue of the anal- 1 species: a communication admitting a relative dijferance [difference and deferral, trans.j as 1asis- J. D.: the con­ specificity within a genre. writing could no longer (be) an (ontological) ~anizes the entire sys- If we now ask ourselves what, in this analysis, modification of presence. In order for my "writ­ the general guarantee is the essential predicate of this specific differ­ ten communication" to retain its function as writ­ 1particular that linking ence, we rediscover absence . ing, i.e., its readability, it must remain readable e have chosen; and by I offer here the following two propositions or despite the absolute disappearance of any re­ uted among our ideas, hypotheses: ceiver, determined in general. My communication · retrace are bound up must be repeatable-iterable-in the absolute 1t needs" I, 11 Ch. iv, I . since every sign, whether in the "language absence of the receiver or of any empirically de­ II the orders of signs of action" or in articulated language (before even terminable collectivity of receivers. Such iter­ (arbitrary, accidental, the intervention of writing in the classical sense), ability - (iter, again, probably comes from itara, 1s that Condillac qua!- presupposes a certain absence (to be determined), other in Sanskrit , and everything that follows the absence within the particular field of writing can be read as the working out of the logic that percept ion: articulated lan­ will have to be of an original type if one intends ties repetition to alterity) structures the mark of :tion: writing supplant s ar­ ,e word, l't1pplee, used by to grant any specificity whatsoever to the written writing itself, no matter what particular type 1plies the double notion of sign; of writing is involved (whether pictographical, upplementing, bringing to 2. if perchance the predicate thus introduced hieroglyphic, ideographic, phonetic, alphabetic, to characterize the absence peculiar and proper to to cite the old categories) . A writing that is

DERR IDA I SIONA T URE EVENT CONTEXT 1479 wnt•~o0,~(i\ \loW Wt (l'A.6,(,o?i'IM~ Pfp\,'c,.bu. not structurally readable - iterable- beyond the sition more immediately acceptable. I ought to be nized in the classical, r death of the addressee would not be writing. Al­ able to say my disappearance, pure and simple, writing, are generaliza l though this would seem to be obvious, I do not my non-presence in general, for instance the non­ for all orders of "sign want it accepted as such, and I shall examine the presence of my intention of saying something general but moreover final objection that could be made to this proposi­ meaningful [man vouloir-dire, man intention -de­ communication, for th tion. Imagine a writing whose code would be so signification], of my wish to communicate, from losophy would call e> idiomatic as to be established and known, as se­ the emission or production of the mark. For a ence of being: the abo, cret cipher, by only two "subjects." Could we writing to be a writing it must continue to "act" What are in effect I maintain that, following the death of the receiver, and to be readable even when what is called the minimal determinatior or even of both partners, the mark left by one of author of the writing no longer answers for what writing? them is still writing? Yes, to the extent that, orga­ he has written, for what he seems to have signed, nized by a code, even an unknown and nonlin­ be it because of a temporary absence, because he I. A written sign. guistic one, it is constituted in its identity as mark is dead, or, more generally, because he has not this word, is a mark ti by its iterability, in the absence of such and such employed his absolutely actual and present inten- not exhaust itself in ti a person, and hence ultimately of every empiri­ tion or attention, the plenitude of his desire to say and which can give r cally determined "subject." This implies that what he means, in order to sustain what seems to sence and beyond the there is no such thing as a code-organon of it­ be written "in his name." One could repeat at this determined subject ~ erability-which could be structurally secret. point the analysis outlined above this time with emitted or produced The possibility of repeating and thus of identify­ regard to the addressee. The situation of the us, at least tradition: ing the marks is implicit in every code, making it writer and of the underwriter [du souscripteur: ten" from an "oral" c into a network [une grille] that is communicable, the signatory, trans.] is, concerning the written 2. At the same I transmittable, decipherable, iterable for a third, text, basically the same as that of the reader. This r,. , with it a force that br and hence for every possible user in general. To essential drift [derive] bearing on writing as an it- l\tl~tlf.t with the collectivity be what it is, all writing must, therefore, be ca­ erative structure, cut off from all absolute respon- l>W

1480 MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC wri~w~()~~c.l \-it.w Wt, 11ro~,!- 10 Con\t."-\-C&V\Vlb\- (u \l"1 a.1,U,wiu.,.~! 6'frh'u,hu. w ....\- l""cf' C1>11\\-rb\Cl>M~1A,11tc.,a.hci,V\. (toWl.N-"~L~t h \1,IA(.t:.14l~J ceptable. I ought to be niLed in the cla!-.sical, narrowly defined concept of tirely enclose it. Nor any code, the code here nee, pure and simple, writing, are generalizable. They are valid not only being both the possibility and impossibility of I, for instance the non- for all orders of "signs" and for all languages in writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/al­ of saying something general but moreover, beyond semio-linguistic terity). 'ire, 111011intention-de­ communication, for the entire field of what phi­ 3. This force of rupture is tied to the spacing to communicate, from losophy would call experience, even the experi­ lespacementJ that constitutes the written sign: n of the mark. For a ence of being: the above -mentioned "presence." spacing which separates it from other elements of ' ,, nust continue to "act" What are in effect the essential predicates in a the internal contextual chain (the always open . . hen what is called the minimal determination of the classical concept of possibility of its disengagement and graft), but nger answers for what writing? also from all forms of present reference (whether seems to have signed, past or future in the modified form of the present ..,: y absence, because he I. A written sign, in the current meaning of that is past or to come), objective or subjective. f, because he has not this word, is a mark that subsists, one which does This spacing is not the simple negativity of a la­ '' tual and present inten- not exhaust itself in the moment of its inscription cuna but rather the emergence of the mark. It .··,, 1de of his desire to say and which can give rise to an iteration in the ab­ does not remain, however, as the labor of the sustain what seems to sence and beyond the presence of the empirically negative in the service of meaning, of the living ne could repeat at this determined subject who, in a given context, has concept, of the telos, supersedable and reducible above this time with emitted or produced it. This is what has enabled in the Atdhebung of a dialectic. The situation of the us, at least traditionally, to distinguish a "writ­ iter [du souscripteur: ten" from an "oral" communication. Are these three predicates, together with the oncerning the written 2. At the same time, a written sign carries entire system they entail, limited, as is often be­ hat of the reader. This , with it a force that breaks with its context, that is, lieved, strictly to "written" communication in the • • • (llW\1 ng on wntmg as an 1t- ll~\l~ with the collectivity of presences organizing the narrow sense of this word? Are they not to be m all absolute respon- b\.J.W moment of its inscription. This breaking force found in all language, in spoken language for in­ ·s as the ultimate au- !~ lforce de rupture] is not an accidental predicate stance, and ultimately in the totality of "experi­ ·ated at birth from the ~:~ /l but the very structure of the written text. In the ence" insofar as it is inseparable from this field of precisely what Plato "IA:S case of a so-called "real" context, what I have the mark, which is to say, from the network of ef­ . If Plato's gesture is, 0 ~~ just asserted is all too evident. This allegedly real facement and of difference, of units of iterability, cal movement par ex- context includes a certain "present" of the in­ which are separable from their internal and exter­ vhat is at stake here. scription, the presence of the writer to what he nal context and also from themselves, inasmuch -re precisely the in- has written, the entire environment and the hori ­ as the very iterability which constituted their hese nuclear traits of zon of his experience, and above all the intention, identity does not permit them ever to be a unity ireak with the horizon the wanting-to-say-what -he-means, which ani­ that is identical to itself? nmunication of con- mates his inscription at a given moment. But the Let us consider any element of spoken lan­ and as linguistical or sign possesses the characteristic of being read­ guage, be it a small or large unit. The first condi­ sire to mean what one able even if the moment of its production is irrev ­ tion of its functioning is its delineation with re­ disengagement of all ocably lost and even if I do not know what its al­ gard to a certain code; but I prefer not to become or hermeneutic hori- leged author-scriptor consciously intended to say too involved here with this concept of code they are horizons of at the moment he wrote it, i.e., abandoned it to its which does not seem very reliable to me; let us ·] by writing; [3] the essential drift. As far as the internal semiotic say that a certain self-identity of this element from the concept of context is concerned, the force of the rupture is (mark, sign, etc.) is required to permit its recog ­ :!Where called dissem- no less important: by virtue of its essential iter­ nition and repetition. Through empirical varia ­ : concept of writing; ability, a written syntagma can always be de­ tions of tone, voice, etc., possibly of a certain ac­ 1e limiting of the con- tached from the chain in which it is inserted or cent, for example, we must be able to recognize 'real" or "linguistic," given without causing it to lose all possibility of the identity, roughly speaking, of a signifying heoretical determina­ functioning, if not all possibility of "communi­ form. Why is this identity paradoxically the divi­ saturation is rendered cating," precisely. One can perhaps come to rec­ sion or dissocation of itself, which will make of by writing), I would ognize other possibilities in it by inscribing it or this phonic sign a grapheme? Because this unity rails that can be recog- grcif'ting it into other chains. No context can en- of the signifying form only constitutes itself by • <.

DERRIDA I SIGNATURE EVENT CONTEXT ,'. I ;·:.,: ·. . ., !>,.'; 1, . ;, • ~ '·' . ' J... ~ ;.,.•J\'• '!"1 • ,. . ~· ·.. ',: ..! ... • ~ • ., ) '. ' ·'. t" ' ),,

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virtue of its iterability, by the possibility of its 2. The absence of the signified. Husserl ana ­ considers that 1 being repeated in the absence not only of its "ref­ lyzes this as well. He judges it to be always pos ­ more, or al least erent," which is self-evident, but in the absence sible even if, according to the axiology and tele ­ cognitive langu . of a determinate signified or of the intention of ology that governs his analysis, he judges this strues in a tele actual signification, as well as of all intention of possibility to be inferior, dangerous, or "critical": guage accorded present communication. This structural possibil­ it opens the phenomenon of the crisis of mean­ ition of object ity of being weaned from the referent or from the ing. This absence of meaning can take three signified in tn111 signified (hence from communication and from forms: with a decisive , its context) 1oeemsto me to make every mark, in- a. I can manipulate symbols without animat­ to deal with it, ·~ eluding those which are oral, a grapheme in gen- ing them, in an active and actual manner, our discussion c ., era!; which is to say, as we have seen, the non- with the attention and intention of signifi­ that the primary :r1f': present remainder [restancel of a differential cation (crisis of mathematical symbolism, analysis to wh l(A.. l"'- mark cut off from its putative "production" or according to Husserl). Husserl insists on (while precisely ~ origin. And I shall even extend this law to all the fact that this does not prevent the sign tain point, from "experience" in general as it is conceded that from functioning: the crisis or the empti­ cal and metaphy there is no experience consisting of pure pres­ ness of mathematical meaning does not which itself ou ence but only of chains of differential marks. limit its technical progress (the intervention how and why it Let us dwell for a moment on this point and of writing is decisive here, as Husserl him­ claim rigorous!) return lo that absence of the referent and even of self remarks in The Origin of Geo111et1y). a certain degre the signified meaning, and hence of the correla­ b. Certain utterances can have a meaning al­ phenomenon of tive intention to signify. The absence of referent though they are deprived of objective sig­ sis of the sign is a possibility easily enough admitted today. nification. "The circle is squared" is a druck) as signi l This possibility is not only an empirical eventual­ proposition endowed with meaning. It has say something (, ity. It constructs the mark; and the potential pres­ sufficient meaning at least for me to judge ence of the referent at the moment it is desig­ it false or contradictory (widersinnig and Let us return to 1 nated does not modify in the slightest the not si,mlos, Husserl says). 1 place this ex­ Sinnlosigkeit. What in­ structure of the mark, which implies that the ample under the category of the absence of cal Investigations is ti· mark can do without the referent. Husserl, in his the signified, although in this case the tri­ versa! grammar, not logical Investigations, analyzed this possibility partite division into signifier/signified/ view but from a logic, very rigorously, and in a two-fold manner: referent is not adequate to a discussion of In an important note the Husserlian analysis. "Squared circle" r. An utterance [enonce] whose object is not marks the absence of a referent, certainly, impossible but only possible can very well be as well as that of a certain signified, but '"Up lo now, we have communicative function. 1 made and understood without its real object (its not the absence of meaning. In these two fact that expressions opera! referent) being present, either to the person who cases, the crisis of meaning (nonpresence also assigned to expression produced the statement or to the one who receives in general, absence as the absence of the as it is not engaged in a rel, it. If while looking out the window, I say: "The referent - of the perception-or of the that this modification of ll makes expressions express sky is blue," this utterance will be intelligible (let meaning - of the intention of actual signi­ Bede1111111ge11and the same us say, provisionally if you like, communicable) fication) is still bound to the essential pos­ (logical /11vestigatio11s/, ( even if the interlocutor does not see the sky; even sibility of writing; and this crisis is not an plies the interpretation that if I do not see it myself, if I see it badly, if I am accident, a factual and empirical anomaly procedure on this point. I tf mistaken or if I wish lo mislead my interlocutor. of spoken language, it is also its positive and Phe110111e11011(La Voix, 4 "ln the first edition I i Not that this is always the case; but the structure possibility and its "internal" structure, in that was conceived on the a of possibility of this utterance includes the capa­ the form of a certain outside [delwrs]. in Kant, and expressly desi bility to be formed and to function as a reference c. Finally there is what Hus~erl calls Si1111!0- that it cannot be affirmed tll that is empty or cut off from its referent. Without sigkeit or agrammaticality. For instance, t1111ge11englobcs all gramm ity, since for example rel a "'~ ,~ this possibility, which is also that of iterability in "the green is either" or "abracadabra" [le psychic subjects, which arc ~,.h \,e.. general, "generable," and generative of all marks, vert est au; the ambiguity of au or m) is their own a prioris , the exr ,t...+., there would be no utterance. noted below, trans.]. In such cases Husserl deserves priority .. ." (LI II -,'f\·,;. ' ~ <.,n.~,·~ ~ """" MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC u! ~O\,\. l5 °' "f"''>:~ ...... t'o,.-;",.i.,;A~ ., 1ified. Husserl ana­ considers that there is no language any specifies that his concern is with a pure logical t to be always pos- more, or at least no "logical" language, no grammar, that is, with the universal conditions of axiology and tele­ cognitive language such as Husserl con­ possibility for a morphology of significations in sis, he judges this strues in a teleological manner, no lan­ their cognitive relation to a possible object, not erous, or "critical": guage accorded the possibility of the intu­ with a pure grammar in general, considered from .he crisis of mean­ ition of objects given in person and a psychological or linguistic point of view. Thus, ng can take three signified in truth. We are confronted here it is solely in a context determined by a will to with a decisive difficulty. Before stopping know, by an epistemic intention, by a conscious )ls without animat­ to deal with it, I note a point that touches relation to the object as cognitive object within a and actual manner, our discussion of communication, namely horizon of truth, solely in this oriented contextual intention of signifi­ that the primary interest of the Husserlian field is "the green is either" unacceptable. But as matical symbolism, analysis to which I am referring here "the green is either" or "abracadabra" do not con­ Husserl insists on (while precisely detaching it up to a cer­ stitute their context by themselves, nothing pre­ 10t prevent the sign tain point, from its context or its teleologi­ vents them from functioning in another context :risis or the empti ­ cal and metaphysical horizon, an operation as signifying marks (or indices, as Husserl would meaning does not which itself ought to provoke us to ask say). Not only in contingent cases such as a c:ss (the intervention how and why it is always possible), is its translation from German into French, which ::re, as Husserl him­ claim rigorously to dissociate (not without would endow "the green is either" with grammat­ gin of Geomelly). a certain degree of success) from every icality, since "either" (oder) becomes for the ear have a meaning al­ phenomenon of communication the analy­ "where" [ot't] (a spatial mark). "Where has the ed of objective sig­ sis of the sign or the expression (Aus­ green gone (of the lawn: the green is where)," ! is squared" is a druck) as signifying sign, the seeking to "Where is the glass gone in which I wanted to vith meaning . It has say something (bedewsames Zeichen).J give you something to drink?" ["011 est passe c!ast for me to judge le verre da11s lequel je voulais vous do1111era ry (widersinnig and Let us return to the case of agrammatical lJOire?"] But even "the green is either" itself still .ys). I place this ex­ Sinnlosigkeit. What interests Husserl in the Logi­ signifies an example of agrammaticality. And >ry of the absence of cal Investigations is the system of rules of a uni­ this is the possibility on which I want to insist: in this case the tri- versal grammar, not from a linguistic point of the possibility of disengagement and citational signifier/signified/ view but from a logical and epistemological one. graft which belongs to the structure of every :e to a discussion of In an important note to the second edition,4 he mark, spoken or written, and which constitutes is. "Squared circle" every mark in writing before and outside of every a referent, certainly, horizon of semio-linguistic communication; in ' "Up to now, we have corn,idered expres,ions in their writing, which is to say in the possibility of ertain signified, but communicative fum:tion. This derives e,,entially from the !aning. In these two fact that expressions operate as indexe, . But a large role b its functioning being cut off, al a certain point, !aning (nonpresence also a,signed to expressions in the life of the ~oul ina~much from its "original" desire-to-say-what-one-means ; the absence of the as it is not engaged in a relation of communication . It i, clear [vouloir-dire] and from its participation in a sat­ that thi, modification of the function does not affect what urable and constraining context. Every sign, lin­ ception-or of the makes expressions expre s~ions. They have, as before, tl1t:ir ntion of actual signi­ Bede1111111ge11and the same Bede1111111ge11as in collocution." guistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the to the essential pos- (Logical /11vestigatio11.1·I, Ch. I, #8). What I assert here im­ current sense of this opposition), in a small or l this crisis is not an plies the interpretation that I have offered of the Husserlian large unit, can be cited, put between quotation procedure on this point. I therefore refer the reader to Speech j empirical anomaly marks; in so doing it can break with every given ) a11dPhe110111emm ( La Voix et le phe110111e11e). [Au.] context, engendering an infinity of new context s \ t is also its positive •"In the lirst edition I spoke of 'pure grammar,' a name 1ternal" structure, in that was conceived on the analogy of 'pure science of nature' in a manner which is absolutely illimitable. Thi s utside [dehors]. in Kant, and expressly designated as such. But to the e,ctent does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a Husserl calls Sinnlo­ that it cannot be affirmed that the pure morphology of Bede11, context, bu.t on the contrary that there are only ) \ Bot>IV\.~ 11111ge11englobes all grammatical a prioris in their universal­ contexts without any center or absolute anchor - ~ cality. For instance, ity, since for example relations of communication between or "abracadabra" [le psychic subjects, which are so important for grammar, entail ing [a11crage].This citationality, this duplication guity of ou or 011 is their own a prioris, the expression of pure logical grammar or duplicity, this iterability of the mark is neithe r [n such cases Husserl deserves priority ... " (LI II, Part 2, Ch. iv). [Au.J an accident nor an anomaly, it is that (normal/ 11 \v. \-._, -h.hil -1,k;lf01L.\. 4 fo-y a t.t-11:(,...,\-l,u..- ai-.,-Ol.i..,11

DERRIDA J SIGNATURE EVENT CONTEXT 1483 abnormal) without which a mark could not even not have its referent (but here that word is cer ­ blurs [brouille] all the have a function called "normal." What would a tainly no longer appropriate, and this precisely is oppositions whose pe mark be that could not be cited? Or one whose the interest of the discovery) outside of itself or, Austin has unsuccessf origins would not get lost along the way? in any event, before and in front of itself. It does In order to demon not describe something that exists outside of lan­ granted the fact that A guage and prior to it. It produces or transforms a require a value of co1i PARASITES. ITER, OF WRITING: situation, it effects; and even if it can be said that exhaustively determir THAT IT PERHAPS DOES NOT EXIST a constative utterance also effectuates something cally; the long list of I now propose to elaborate a bit further this ques­ and always transforms a situation, it cannot be variety may affect the tion with special attention to-but in order, as maintained that that constitutes its internal struc­ comes back to an ele well, to pass beyond-the problematic of the ture, its manifest function or destination, as in the the total context. 6 O pe1for111ative.It concerns us here for several rea­ case of the performative. ments-and not one sons: 4. Austin was obliged to free the analysis of classically, consciom the performalive from the authority of the truth ence of the intention 1. First of all, Austin, through his emphasis value, from the true/false opposition,s at least in the totality of his spe, on an analysis of perlocution and above all of il­ its classical form, and to substitute for it at times mative communicatic locution, appears to consider speech acts only as the value of force, of difference of force (illocu­ communication of an acts of communication. The author of the intro­ tionary or perlocutionary force). (In this line of f if that meaning has n duction to the French edition of How to Do thought, which is nothing less than Nietzschean. thing or of a prior or Things with Words, quoting Austin, notes as this in particular strikes me as moving in the di­ conscious presence o much: "It is by comparing constative utterances rection of Nietzsche himself, who often acknowl­ ticipating in the acco (i.e., classical "assertions," generally considered edged a certain affinity for a vein of English tive, their conscious as true or false "descriptions" of facts) with per­ thought.) the totality of the o formative utterances (from the English "perfor­ l"ts~ cally that no residue mative," i.e., allowing to accomplish something For these four reasons, at least, it might seem totalization. No residt through speech itself) that Austin is led to con­ that Austin has shattered the concept of commu­ the requisite convent sider eve,y utterance worthy of the name (i.e., in­ nication as a purely semiotic, linguistic, or sym­ linguistic context, or tended to communicate-thus excluding, for ex­ bolic concept. The performative is a "communi­ in the semantic deter ample, reflex-exclamations) as being primarily cation" which is not limited strictly to the ployed; no irreducibl, and above all a speech act produced in the total transference of a semantic content that is already semination" escaping situation in which the interlocutors find them­ constituted and dominated by an orientation to­ meaning. I quote frc selves" (How to Do Things with Words, p. 147, ward truth (be it the unveiling of what is in its How to Do Things wi G. Lane, Introduction to the French translation, being or the adeq11ation-co11gr11e11cebetween a Speaking generally, 19). judicative utterance and the thing itself). p. circumstances in , 2. This category of communication is rela­ And yet-such at least is what I should like should be in some , tively new. Austin's notions of illocution and to attempt to indicate now-all the difficulties it is very commo, perlocution do not designate the transference or encountered by Austin in an analysis which i~ pa· speaker himself or passage of a thought-content, but, in some way, Lient, open, aporetical, in constant transforma­ form certain other the communication of an original movement (to tion, often more fruitful in the acknowledgement "mental" actions 01 be defined within a general themy of action), an of its impasses than in its positions, strike me as words. Thus, for nm operation and the production of an effect. Com­ having a common root. Austin has not taken ac­ I should be the per: municating, in the case of the performative, if count of what - in the structure of locution (thus (Christian) marryini such a thing, in all rigor and in all purity, should before any illocutory or perlocutory determina­ exist (for the moment, I am working within that tion)-already entails that system of predicates I 6 He says, for example hypothesis and at that stage of the analysis). call graphematic in general and consequently total speech situation is ti would be tantamount to communicating a force in the last resort, we arc [Au.I through the impetus [impulsion] of a mark. •Austin name, the "two fctishe~ which I admit to an incli­ 7Which occasionally 3. As opposed to the classical assertion, to nation to play Old Harry with. vi7 .. ( 1) rhe truc/fal~e fcti,h. criterion of truth in his d1 the constative utterance, the performative does (2) the value/fact fetish'" (p. 150). [Au. I ii example, pp. 50-52 and p /l Lo-.,...,.- "'-""'-'I MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC ' :¥:-\ 'IL'\ \""'l oliJ hl/\thb;.. {o.,-'t,,,1-""h·cltv

here that word is cer- blurs lbrouille] all the oppositions which follow, be already married with a wife living, sane and un­ 1te, and this precisely is oppositions whose pertinence, purity, and rigor divorced, and so on; for a bet to have been made, it :ry) outside of itself or, Austin has unsuccessfully attempted to establish. is generally necessary for the offer of the bet to n front of itself. It does In order to demonstrate this, I shall take for have been accepted by a taker (who must have at exists outside of lan­ granted the fact that Austin's analyses at all times done something, such as to say ·'Done"), and it is hardly a gift if I say "I give it you" but never hand roduces or transforms a require a value of collfext, and even of a context it over. ten if it can be said that exhaustively determined, in theory or teleologi­ So far, well and good. (pp. 8--9) J effectuates something cally; the long list of "infelicities" which in their situation, it cannot be variety may affect the performative event always In the Second Lecture, after eliminating the :itutes its internal struc ­ comes back to an element in what Austin calls grammatical criterion in his customary manner, or destination, as in the the total context. 6 One of those essential ele­ Austin examines the possibility and the origin of ments-and not one among others-remains, failures or "infelicities" of performative utter­ I to free the analysis of classically, consciousness, the conscious pres­ ance. He then defines the six indispensable-if e authority of the truth ence of the intention of the speaking subject in not sufficient-conditions of success. Through opposition,s at least in the totality of his speech act. As a result, perfor­ the values of "conventional procedure," "correct­ substitute for it at times mative communication becomes once more the ness," and "completeness," which occur in the :erence of force (illocu ­ communication of an intentional meaning,? even definition, we necessarily find once more those of , force). (In this line of j if that meaning has no referent in the form of a an exhaustively definable context, of a free con­ ~ less than Nietzschean, thing or of a prior or exterior state of things. The sciousness present to the totality of the operation, ne as moving in the di­ conscious presence of speakers or receivers par­ and of absolutely meaningful speech [vouloir­ elf, who often acknowl ­ ticipating in the accomplishment of a performa­ dire] master of itself: the teleological jurisdiction I for a vein of English tive, their conscious and intentional presence in of an entire field whose organizing center re­ the totality of the operation, implies teleologi- mains intention. 8 Austin's procedure is rather re­ Ji....,cally that no residue [reste] escapes the present markable and typical of that philosophical tradi­ , at least, it might seem ris totalization. No residue, either in the definition of tion with which he would like to have so few ties. the concept of commu- the requisite conventions, or in the internal and It consists in recognizing that the possibility of 1otic, linguistic, or sym­ linguistic context, or in the grammatical form, or the negative (in this case, of infelicities) is in fact rmative is a "communi ­ in the semantic determination of the words em­ a structural possibility, that failure is an essential limited strictly to the ployed; no irreducible polysemy, that is, no "dis­ risk of the operations under consideration; then, c content that is already semination" escaping the horizon of the unity of in a move which is almost immediately simulta­ !d by an orientation to­ meaning. I quote from the first two lectures of neous, in the name of a kind of ideal regulation, veiling of what is in its How to Do Things with Words: it excludes that risk as accidental, exterior, one -congruence between a which teaches us nothing about the linguistic he thing itself). Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the phenomenon being considered. This is all the cirrnmstances in which the words are uttered more curious-and strictly speaking, unten­ 1st is what I should like should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and able-in view of Austin's ironic denunciation of ow - all the difficulties it is very commonly necessary that either the an analysis which is pa­ speaker himself or other persons should also per­ the "fetishized" opposition: value/fact. in constant transforma­ form certain other actions, whether "physical" or Thus, for example, concerning the conven­ in the acknowledgement "mental" actions or even acts of uttering further tionality without which there is no performative, s positions, strike me as words. Thus, for naming the ship, it is essential that Austin acknowledges that all conventional acts Austin has not taken ac­ I should be the person appointed to name her; for are exposed to failure: "it seems clear in the first ructure of locution (thus (Christian) marrying, it is essential that I should not place that, although it has excited us (or failed to · perlocutory determina­ excite us) in connexion with certain facts which at system of predicates I 6 He says, for example, thal "The total speech act in lhe are or are in part acts of uttering words, infelicity neral and consequently total speech situation is the 011/yactual phenomenon which, is an ill to which all acts are heir which have the in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating" (p. 147). general character of ritual or ceremonial, all [Au.j conventional acts: not indeed that eve,y ritual is ishes which I admit to an incli­ 7Which occasionally required Austin to reintroduce the , viz., ( 1) the true/false fetish, criterion of truth in his description of performative~. Cf., for o). [Au.] example, pp. 50-52 and pp. 89-90. [Au.J "Pp. 10-15. [Au.J ~'. J DERRIDA J SIGNATURE EVENT CONTEXT *- ( - ' ,1-k,'> ,A,.... , ~ L...."""..t I,, I\ -, Pl>"',.._ \,. "''"'-'- , ( ~ t>c...... ,,~v ... l...... '-1....-t. If- Hu.T"~

liable to every form of infelicity (but then nor ~ tions containin g a performative utterance - in a "etiolation," "the 00111 is every performati ve utterance)" (pp. T8-19, single doctrine: but we are not including this kind whole general theory Austin's emphasis). of unhappine ss- we must just remember, though, accounting for them, that features of this sort can and do constantly ob­ In addition to the questions posed by a notion erned by those opposit as historically sedimented as "convention," it trude into any case we are discussing. Features of this sort would normally come under the heading of ertheless recognizes a should be noted at this point: "extenuating circumstances" or of "factors reduc­ to every act of utteranc ing or abrogating the agent's responsibility,'' and so asite" that writing has I. that Austin, at this juncture, appears to on. (p. 2 r, my emphasis) philosophical tradition consider solely the conventionality constituting case is by no means co the circumstance of the utterance [enonce1, its The second case of this exclusion concerns our I would therefore pi contextual surroundings, and not a certain con­ subject more directly . It involves precisely the is this general possib ventionality intrinsic to what constitutes the possibility for every performative utterance (and failure or trap into w speech act [locution] itself, all that might be sum­ a priori every other utterance) to be "quoted." lose itself as in an aby marized rapidly under the problematical rubric of Now Austin excludes this possibility (and the front of itself? What "the arbitrary nature of the sign," which extends, general theory which would account for it) with a sitism? In other word aggravates, and radicalizes the difficulty. "Rit­ kind of lateral insistence, all the more significant admitted by Austin . ual" is not a possible occurrence [eventualite1, in its off-handedness. He insists on the fact that kind of ditch or extern but rather, as iterability, a structural characteris­ this possibility remains abnormal, parasitic, that speech [la locution] c tic of every mark. it constitutes a kind of extenuation or agonized but which it can escar 2. that the value of risk or exposure to infe­ 1\0~ succumbing of language that we should strenu- "'"<- by and in itself, in th licity, even though, as Austin recognizes, it can ously distance ourselves from and resolutely ig- s~ telos? Or, on the con affect a priori the totality of conventional acts, is nore. And the concept of the "ordinary," thus of c internal and positive i not interrogated as an essential predicate or as a "ordinary language," to which he has recourse is that outside its inside. 'h'"t) 1\law. Austin does not ponder the consequences is­ clearly marked by this exclusion. As a result, the .n its emergence? In thi: '''1r~~11suing from the fact that a possibility-a possible concept becomes all the more problematical, and meant by an "ordinar: ~~~ risk - is always possible, and is in some sense a before demonstrating as much, it would no doubt exclusion of the very I necessary possibility. Nor whether-once such be best for me simply to read a paragraph from ing the general theo a necessary possibility of infelicity is recog­ litl~) the Second Lecture: sitism, does not Austi nized - infelicity still constitutes an accident. to describe the fact· What is a success when the possibility of infelic­ ii. Secondly, as utterances our performances are language, pass off as c ...... -. , ity [echec] continues to constitute its structure? also heir to certain other kinds of ill, which infect ological determinatior all utterances. And these likewise though again ance fenonce1- that I they might be brought into a more general account, ... .I'•·"-' The opposition success/failure [echec] in illo­ [pp. 72- 73] remains cution and in perlocution thus seems quite insuf­ we are deliberately at present excluding. I mean, for example, the following: a performative utter­ the presence to self o ,,.;,.,..J.. ficient and extremely secondary [derivee]. It pre­ ,,. ance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow parency of intentions supposes a general and systematic elaboration of or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if intro­ l vouloir -dire] to the the structure of locution that would avoid an end­ duced in a poem, or spoken in a soliloquy . This ap­ ness of a speech act, e less alternation of essence and accident. Now it is plies in a similar manner to any and every utter­ For, ultimately, is, highly significant that Austin rejects and defers ance-a sea-change in special circumstances. excludes as anomaly that "general theory" on at least two occasions, Language in such circumstances is in special citation (on stage, in specifically in the Second Lecture. I leave aside ways-intelligibly - used not seriously, [my em­ the determined modifi the first exclusion. phasis, J. D.] but in many ways parasitic upon its ality-or rather, a g normal use-ways which fall under the doctrine of which there would r I am not going into the general doctrine here: in the etiolations of language. All thi~ we arc exclml · perfonnative? So th; many such cases we may even say the act was ing from consideration . Our performative utter­ "void" (or voidable for duress or undue influence) ances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as is· and so forth. Now I suppose some very general sued in ordinary circumstances . (pp. 2 r-22) !>Austinoften refers to high-level doctrine might embrace both what we rious" (cf., for example, Pl have called infelicities and these other "unhappy" Austin thus excludes, along with what he calls linked to what he says el: features of the doing of actions-in our case ac- a "sea-change," the "nonserious," "parasitism," 70-71) and mime. [Au.J

'1DI.\.c,o "' \..l. ~ 1>u--w.2... "T .k:. '-,.. MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC V ;~I.AA...... \ -\\,v.. ~ ~ ..p. ~.\-.~I~ 1 ' w\\o I&-~WU-~ +~~ '' ~- ~h,...... , . . ' .. ,, plw\S,C... \,. \..,.,....._ I ... · J .., :.'·· L>· c."r-~i--~s,·h.," t... ~ If- Hu.-toti.<.'.. >, L. • ~-....' • \ ' .. - native utterance - in a "etiolation," "the nonordinary" (along with the avoidable conclusion - a successful performa- ~ ( not including this kind whole general theory which, if it succeeded in tive is necessarily an "impure" performative, to just remember, though, accounting for them, would no longer be gov­ adopt the word advanced later on by Austin when 1 and do constantly ob­ erned by those oppositions), all of which he nev­ he acknowledges that there is no "pure" perfor­ discussing. Features of ne under the heading of ertheless recognizes as the possibility availabl e mative.10 " or of "factors reduc­ to every act of utterance. It is as just such a "par­ I take things up here from the perspective of s responsibility," and so asite" that writing has always been treated by the positive possibility and not simply as instances of philosophical tradition, and the connection in this failure or infelicity: would a performative utter­ case is by no means coincidental. ance be possible if a citational doubling [dou­ clusion concerns our I would therefore pose the following question: blure] did not come to split and dissociate from 1volves precisely the is this general possibility necessarily one of a itself the pure singularity of the event? I pose the native utterance (and failure or trap into which language may fall or question in this form in order to prevent an objec­ nee) to be "quoted." lose itself as in an abyss situated outside of or in tion. For it might be said: you cannot claim to ac­ possibility (and the front of itself? What is the status of this para­ count for the so-called graphematic structure of account for it) with a sitism? In other words, does the quality of risk locution merely on the basis of the occurrence of I the more significant admitted by Austin surround language like a failures of the performative, however real those 1sists on the fact that kind of ditch or external place of perdition which failures may be and however effective or general ormal, parasitic, that speech [la loc11tionl could never hope to leave, their possibility. You cannot deny that there are !nuation or agonized • but which it can escape by remaining "at home," also performatives that succeed, and one has to at we should strenu- "':::t'4 by and in itself, in the shelter of its essence or account for them: meetings are called to order >m and resolutely ig- ~ te/os? Or, on the contrary, is this risk rather its (Paul Ricoeur did as much yesterday); people e "ordinary," thus of s ""2"' internal and positive condition of possibility? ls say: "I pose a question"; they bet, challenge, ch he has recourse is that outside its inside, the very force and law of christen ships, and sometimes even marry. It tsion. As a result, the its emergence? In this last case, what would be would seem that such events have occurred. And re problematical, and meant by an "ordinary" language defined by the even if only one had taken place only once, we ch, it would no doubt exclusion of the very law of language? In exclud­ would still be obliged to account for it. ·ad a paragraph from ing the general theory of this structural para­ I'll answer: "Perhaps." We should first be sitism, does not Austin, who nevertheless claims clear on what constitutes the status of "occur­ to describe the facts and events of ordinary rence" or the eventhood of an event that entails in our performances are language, pass off as ordinary an ethical and tele­ its allegedly present and singular emergence the nds of ill, which infect ological determination (the univocity of the utter­ intervention of an utterance [enonce1 that in itself likewise though again ance [enonce]-that he acknowledges elsewhere can be only repetitive or citational in its struc­ 1 more general account, ent excluding. I mean, [pp. 72-73] remains a philosophical "ideal" - , ture, or rather, since those two words may lead to : a performative utter- the presence to self of a total context, the trans­ confusion: iterable. I return then to a point that 1 a peculiar way hollow parency of intentions, the presence of meaning strikes me as fundamental and that now concerns >n the stage, or if intro­ [vouloir-dire] to the absolutely singular unique­ the status of events in general, of events of in a soliloquy. This ap­ ness of a speech act, etc.)? speech or by speech, of the strange logic they en­ o any and every utter­ For, ultimately, isn't it true that what Austin tail and that often passes unseen. special circumstances. excludes as anomaly, exception, "nonserious," 9 Could a performative utterance succeed if its 1stances is in special citation (on stage, in a poem, or a soliloquy) is formulation did not repeat a "coded" or iterable not seriously, [my em­ the determined modification of a general citation­ .vays pamsitic upon its ality-or rather, a general iterability-without 111under the doctrine of 1°From this ~landpoinl, one might question the fact, rec­ All this we are excl11d- which there would not even be a "successful" ognized by Austin, that "very commonly the same sentence is 1ur performative utter­ performative? So that-a paradoxical but un- used on different occasions of utterance in both ways, perfor­ to be understood as i~­ malive and constative. The thing seems hopeless from the :es. (pp. 21 - 22) start, if we are to leave utterances as they stand and seek for a 9Austin often refers to the suspicious status of the "nonse­ criterion." The graphematic root of citationality (iterability) b rious" (cf., for example, pp. 104,121) . This is fundamentally what creates thb embarrassment and makes it impossible, as ~ with what he calls linked to what he says elsewhere about oratio obliq11a(pp. Austin says, "to lay down even a list of all possible criteria." rious," "parasitism," 70-7 I) and mime. [Au.] [Au.]

DERRIDA J SIGNATURE EVENT CONTEXT 5 ...~Q' \.'4...... , ~~;_ C--Y-1,;{sL !,...~

~ ~ "'-'- a,.\.\ - ..LI. • .. ._..~ '' C:..\lC...liS; r.. ., .. '"'--~ r .....~ ~-=-, utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pro­ the context. In order for a context to be exhaus­ constative utterances . nounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship tively determinable, in the sense required by critique of linguistici or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming Austin, conscious intention would at the very the code, a critique b with an iterable model, if it were not then identi­ least have to be totally present and immediately guage, that most inter fiable in some way as a "citation." Not that cita­ transparent to itself and to others, since it is a de­ Austin's undertaking tionality in this case is of the same sort as in a termining center [foyer] of context. The concept tify, with non-lingui~ theatrical play, a philosophical reference, or the of-or the search for-the context thus seems to he has shown in the a recitation of a poem. That is why there is a rela­ suffer at this point from the same theoretical and the forms of the first tive specificity, as Austin says, a "relative purity" "interested" uncertainty as the concept of the "or­ tive, the active voic of performatives. But this relative purity does not dinary," from the same metaphysical origins: the final instance, is the emerge in opposition to citationality or iterabil­ ethical and teleological discourse of conscious­ what Austin calls the ity, but in opposition to other kinds of iteration ness. A reading of the connotations, this time, of terance . This notion within a general iterability which constitutes a vi­ Austin's text, would confirm the reading of the stake in it is clear- l olation of the allegedly rigorous purity of every descriptions; I have just indicated its principle. follows and govemi event of discourse or every speech act. Rather Differance, the irreducible absence of inten­ phase we are exami than oppose citation or iteration to the non-itera­ tion or attendance to the performative utterance, not doubt that the sc tion of an event, one ought to construct a differ­ the most "event-ridden" utterance there is, is the present indicativ, ential typology of forms of iteration, assuming what authorizes me, taking account of the predi­ terance [enonciation that such a project is tenable and can result in an cates just recalled, to posit the general graphe­ (I have attempted to exhaustive program, a question I hold in abey­ matic structure of every "communication." By no not to believe so), bu ance here. In such a typology, the category of in­ means do I draw the conclusion that there is no the equivalent of thi~ tention will not disappear; it will have its place, relative specificity of effects of consciousness, or simply evident in am but from that place it will no longer be able to of effects of speech (as opposed to writing in the Where there is , govern the entire scene and system of utterance traditional sense), that there is no performative utterance, a referen [l'enonciation]. Above all, at that point, we will effect, no effect of ordinary language, no effect ing, and so the acti, be dealing with different kinds of marks or of presence or of discursive event (speech act). It ~ (or by his personal chains of iterable marks and not with an opposi­ is simply that those effects do not exclude what is "referred to" in one tion between citational utterances, on the one generally opposed to them, term by term; on the a. In verbal utt1 hand, and singular and original event-utterances, contrary, they presuppose it, in an asymmetrical who does th on the other. The first consequence of this will be way, as the general space of their possibility. the utterance the following: given that structure of iteration, in any systerr the intention animating the utterance will never b. In written u SIGNATURES his appendi, be through and through present to itself and to its done becaus content. The iteration structuring it a priori intro­ That general space, is first of all spacing as a dis­ are not teth, duces into it a dehiscence and a cleft [brisure] ruption of presence in a mark, what I here call spoken ones which are essential. The "non-serious," the ora­ writing. That all the difficulties encountered by tio obliqua will no longer be able to be excluded, . Austin intersect in the place where both writing An analogous funct as Austin wished, from "ordinary" language. and presence are in question is for me indicated the formula "hereby And if one maintains that such ordinary lan­ in a passage such as that in Lecture V in which From this point c guage, or the ordinary circumstances of lan­ the divided instance of the juridic signature lyze signatures, thei guage, excludes a general citationality or iterabil­ [seing] emerges. the source. I shall c1 ity, does that not mean that the "ordinariness" in Is it an accident if Austin is there obliged to the analysis that ev question - the thing and the notion-shelter a note: "I must explain again that we are flounder­ be equally valid fo1 lure, the teleological lure of consciousness ing here. To feel the firm ground of prejudice tuted-or aspired (whose motivations, indestructible necessity, and slipping away is exhilarating, but brings its re­ "author" as a "pers1 systematic effects would be subject to analysis)? venges" (p. 61). Shortly before, an "impasse" had to the production of Above all, this essential absence of intending the appeared, resulting from the search for "any actuality of utterance, this structural uncon­ single simple criterion of grammar and vocabu­ "Austin's term is sciousness, if you like, prohibits any saturation of lary" in distinguishing between performative or (source) is hereafter tran

1488 MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC 'or a context to be exhaus ­ constative utterances. (I should say that it is this By definition, a written signature implies the in the sense required by critique of linguisticism and of the authority of actual or empirical nonpresence of the signer. :!ntion would at the very the code, a critique based on an analysis of lan­ But, it will be claimed, the signature also marks y present and immediately guage, that most interested and convinced me in and retains his having been present in a past now i to others, since it is a de­ Austin's undertaking). He then attempts to jus­ or present [maintenant] which will remain a fu­ r] of context. The concept tify, with non-linguistic reasons, the preference ture now or present [maintenant], thus in a gen­ - the context thus seems to he has shown in the analysis of performatives for eral maintenant , in the transcendental form of n the same theoretical and the forms of the first person, the present indica­ presentness [maintenance]. That general mainte­ f as the concept of the "or­ tive, the active voice. The justification, in the nance is in some way inscribed, pinpointed in the ! metaphysical origins: the final instance, is the reference made therein to always evident and singular present punctuality 1 ti discourse of conscious­ what Austin calls the source (p. 60) ' of the ut­ of the form of the signature. Such is the enig­ connotations, this time, of terance. This notion of source-and what is at matic originality of every paraph. In order for the :onfirm the reading of the stake in it is clear-frequently reappears in what tethering to the source to occur, what must be re­ t indicated its principle. follows and governs the entire analysis in the tained is the absolute singularity of a signature­ ducible absence of inten­ phase we are examining. Not only does Austin event and a signature-form: the pure reproduci­ he performative utterance, not doubt that the source of an oral utterance in bility of a pure event. :n" utterance there is, is the present indicative active is present to the ut­ Is there such a thing? Does the absolute singu­ king account of the predi­ terance [enonciation] and its statement [enonce1 larity of signature as event ever occur? Are there posi t the general graphe­ (I have attempted to explain why we had reasons signatures? r "communication." By no not to believe so), but he does not even doubt that Yes, of course, every day. Effects of signature onclusion that there is no the equivalent of this tie to the source utterance is are the most common thing in the world. But the ffects of consciousness, or simply evident in and assured by a signature: condition of possibility of those effects is simul­ opposed to writing in the taneously, once again, the condition of their im­ Where there is not, in the verbal formula of the there is no performative possibility, of the impossibility of their rigorous utterance, a reference to the person doing the utter­ linary language, no effect ing, and so the acting, by means of the pronoun "I" purity. In order to function, that is, to be read­ rsive event (speech act). It ~ (or by his personal name), then in fact he will be able, a signature must have a repeatable, iterable, :cts do not exclude what is "referred to" in one of two ways: imitable form; it must be able to be detached 1em, term by term; on the a. In verbal utterances, by his being the person from the present and singular intention of its pro­ )Se it, in an asymmetrical who does the uttering-what we may call duction. It is its sameness which, by corrupting ~e of their possibility. the utterance-origin which is used generally its identity and its singularity, divides its seal in any system of verbal reference-coordinates. [sceau]. I have already indicated above the prin­ b. In written utterances (or "inscriptions"), by ciple of this analysis. his appending his signatllre (this has to be To conclude this very dry discussion : done because, of course, written utterances rst of all spacing as a dis­ are not tethered to their origin in the way a mark, what I here call spoken ones are). (pp. 60-61) 1. as writing, communication, if we retain 1fficulties encountered by that word, is not the means of transference of place where both writing An analogous function is attributed by Austin to meaning, the exchange of intentions and mean­ :!stion is for me indicated the formula "hereby" in official documents. ings [vouloir-dire], discourse and the "communi­ ,at in Lecture V in which From this point of view, let us attempt to ana­ cation of consciousness." We are witnessing not of the juridic signature lyze signatures, their relation to the present and to an end of writing that would restore, in accord the source. I shall consider it as an implication of with McLuhan's ideological representation, a \ustin is there obliged to the analysis that every predicate established will transparency or an immediacy to social relations; ~ain that we are flounder­ be equally valid for that oral "signature" consti­ but rather the increasingly powerful historical ex­ firm ground of prejudice tuted-or aspired to- by the presence of the pansion of a general writing, of which the system 1rating, but brings its re­ "author" as a "person who utters," as a "source," of speech, consciousness, meaning, presence, before, an "impasse" had to the production of the utterance . truth, etc., would be only an effect, and should be >m the search for "any analyzed as such. It is the exposure of this effect of grammar and vocabu­ 11 Austin's term is "utterance-origin" ; Derrida's term that I have called elsewhere logocentrism; between performative or (source) is hereafter tram.lated a~ "source." [Tr.] 2. the semantic horizon that habitually gov-

DERRIDA I SIGNATURE EVENT CONTEXT ems the notion of communication is exceeded or necessities to be analyzed. It is those predicates WayneC. split by the intervention of writing, that is, by a (I have recalled several of them) whose force of b. 1921 dissemination irreducible to polysemy. Writing is generality, generalization, and generativity is lib­ read; it is not the site, "in the last instance," of a erated, grafted onto a "new" concept of writing hermeneutic deciphering, the decoding of a that corresponds as well to what has always re­ Wayne C. Booth meaning or truth; sisted the prior organization of forces, always 3. despite the general displacement of the constituted the residue irreducible to the domi­ Brigham Young Uni, classical, "philosophical," occidental concept of nant force organizing the hierarchy that we may in 1962 as professor c writing, it seems necessary to retain, provision­ refer to, in brief, as logocentric. To leave to this long and distinguishe ally and strategically, the old name. This entails new concept the old name of writing is tanta­ and served as the pre~ an entire logic of paleonymics that I cannot de­ mount to maintaining the structure of the graft, Booth's prominen velop here. 12 Very schematically: an opposition the transition and indispensable adherence to an publication of The RI, of metaphysical concepts (e.g., speech/writing, effective intervention in the constituted historical imagined ideal audier presence/absence, etc.) is never the confrontation field. It is to give to everything at stake in the op­ on the role assigned t of two terms, but a hierarchy and the order of erations of deconstruction the chance and the tion - was thus a co subordination. Deconstruction cannot be re­ force, the power of communication. continued his analys stricted or immediately pass to a neutralization: it Rhetoric of Irony and must, through a double gesture, a double science, But this will have been understood, as a mat­ a double writing - put into practice a reversal of ter of course, especially in a philosophical collo­ of Assent. Booth's c 0.. :t',:su.,,leiv the classical opposition and a general displace­ quium: a disseminating operation removed from rhetoric may be foun, \ ment of the system. It is on that condition alone the presence (of being) according to all its modi­ critical Ex-Missionar ~-h.v that deconstruction will provide the means of in­ fications: writing, if there is any, perhaps com­ I've been learning ti ../ tervening in the field of oppositions it criticizes municates, but certainly does not exist. Or barely, ologism, "rhetorolo , ~Si$ and that is also a field of nondiscursive forces. hereby, in the form of the most improbable sig­ probing of the essen Every concept, moreover, belongs to a system­ nature. or about other impc atic chain and constitutes in itself a system of "dialogical" efforts, predicates. There is no concept that is metaphysi­ (Remark: the-written - text of this-oral ­ skillful diplomats, rl cal in itself. There is a labor-metaphysical or communication was to be delivered to the Asso­ and then "bargain." not - performed on conceptual systems. Decon­ ciation des societes de philosophie de langue search together for t struction does not consist in moving from one fran<;aise before the meeting. That dispatch of mind about mon committed to the po. concept to another, but in reversing and displac­ should thus have been signed. Which I do, and ing a conceptual order as well as the nonconcep­ counterfeit, here. Where? There. J. D.) The beginnings of ti tual order with which it is articulated. For ex­ Rhetoric of Assent. ample, writing, as a classical concept, entails Modern Dogma a predicates that have been subordinated, excluded, tures delivered by Be or held in abeyance by forces and according to Booth explains that h tions on the protest m 12 Cf La Dissemi11atio11and Positions. [Au.] J. DERRIDA. covered deeply held gagement. These as: founded on a deep di. entific "fact" as the o or demonstrated, as lief. The former Bo, these assumptions, I when we should cha

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1490 MODERN AND POSTMODERN RHETORIC