Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa after Meles

Brussels, 15 October 2012

Observatoire de l’Afrique - rapport Africa Briefing

by Jean-Christophe Hoste

The Legacy followed by the 2009 antiterrorism law. The Press bill was intended to  Former Prime Minister of Ethiopia uphold constitutional protections Meles Zenawi has been officially against censorship, prohibit pre- announced dead on 20th of August trial detention of journalists, and 2012. Since 1991, when he was recognise the rights of journalists to appointed president of the form professional associations. A transitional government, he has number of its provisions, like the been at the epicentre of power in right to impound any print his country. Before that, in 1989, he publication deemed a threat to was appointed as chairman of the public order or national security, TPLF and EPRDF and was, in that allowed the government to restrict role, of paramount importance in the independent media, while the removal of the regime of his leaving intact existing repressive predecessor Colonel Mengistu. In statutes that fall well short of 1994 the transitional government international standards. CSO law passed a new constitution, making that inhibited NGO’s with more Meles Zenawi Prime Minister with than 10% external funding to the function of president becoming address questions deemed of largely ceremonial. political importance by the government. The antiterrorism law  Zenawi’s leadership of the with its broad and vague definition TPLF/EPRDF was challenged after of terrorism gave the government the end of the 1998-2000 war with even more power to intervene in Eritrea. Fellow-veterans accused the name of national security. In him of being too soft on Eritrea and 2010 the EPRDF won the elections undermining Tigrayan nationalism. with 99.6% of the votes and Meles From 2001 onwards after having continued as Prime Minister. purged the ranks of the TPLF, the collegial rule, the internal dialogue  Especially in the course of the past and the policy of ethnic federalism decade, Meles played an were set aside and Zenawi became increasingly prominent role on the even more the personification of African and international scene. His power in Ethiopia. The new personality and political relations political leadership had no with the U.S., the EU and emerging constituency of its own and was powers kept the international dependent on Meles Zenawi for community on board in relation to their political survival. That Ethiopia’s development. He was a leadership paired with a well- prominent partner in the fight structured system of oppression. against terrorism for the U.S., Elections in 2005 were followed by received large amounts of aid violently repressed riots in Addis – money from foreign donors for underlining the lack of political Ethiopia’s efforts to achieve the space and equally demonstrating to MDG’s, making Ethiopia the the ruling party the undesirable biggest aid receiver in Africa. On risks attached to any further the African level he was an opening of that space. The regime important figure at the AU, as was especially averse to foreign chairman of the African Group in meddling and interference resulting international negotiations. He had in the 2008 Press bill and CSO law the reputation of being a man “who could get things done”. He also components of the EPRDF and the attracted a lot of direct investments position of the security actors and in infrastructure for Ethiopia. The business interests remains to be Chinese even build and donated the answered. This move represents an new AU headquarters. He was a attempt to return to the era of driving force behind big collegial rule within the party. The development initiatives, including question whether this collegial the Renaissance Dam that was leadership will prove viable still pushed ahead despite the absence remains unknown. The answer will of a new Nile basin agreement. And be determined by the oligarchy the clear Egyptian concern. currently leading behind the scenes. Regional development projects of If they are generally supportive, it this kind have the potential to may be sustainable, but certain change the power relations in the members may also be waiting for region. the right moment to emerge from the pack and become Ethiopia’s  Meles Zenawi had announced to be new strongman. preparing a transition for the next elections in 2015, but his premature  The security forces are an element death prohibited the unfolding of that has to be taken into account in this potential new strategy.. The finding a new equilibrium. Before transition poses an institutional his death Meles Zenawi appointed a challenge, as it was not foreseen in new group of officers reinforcing the constitution. Notwithstanding the strong hold of the Tigre on the the initial hesitation surrounding upper ranks of the security forces, the deputy Prime Minister while the lower ranks mostly Hailemariam Desalegn within the consist of Oromo and Amhara. A EPRDF and its main political actor new group of generals have been the TPLF, he has been appointed by appointed after Meles’ passing, the EPRDF as their new chairman apparently a decision he took during the EPRDF congress on 15 before his death. The vast majority and 16 September 2012. This paved of the latest promoted officials are the way for his selection as the new Tigre as well. These forces play an Prime Minister of Ethiopia, a move important role nationally - and in approved by the Parliament on 21 the absence of Meles may inform September 2012. Hailemariam’s Ethiopian attitude regionally. The deputy Demeke Mekonnen, way security forces dealt with the Minister of Education during the recent Muslim protests illustrated last Meles’ cabinet and chairman of the nervousness of the regime, and the Amhara ethnic party within the that the new leadership has no EPRDF, the ANDM, has also been intention to change its repressive confirmed and replaced tactics of the past. Hailemariam as deputy Prime Minister. The formal – constitutional order therefore seems Scenario’s for the future and their regional to be restored efficiently, despite implications the clear lack of a transitional procedure within the Constitution.  The status quo scenario – The question as to the equilibrium Assuming new Prime Minister between the different constituent Hailemariam Desalegn has fully taken over the Premiership’s level, personality matters a lot - so responsibilities - the key regional it will be very difficult for issues remain the same: the Hailemariam to fill Meles’ shoes. containment of Eritrea, remaining In Africa, South Africa had already on good terms with the two Sudans established a power shift in its and managing the Ethiopian favour at the continental level and involvement in Somalia. The recent without the personal influence of and unexpected landslide victory of Meles Zenawi its position is likely Hassan Sheikh Mohamud against to grow stronger. Ethiopia was an Sharif Sheikh Ahmed in Somalia is important voice in the progressive a new development, as he group within the AU that represents a potential break from challenged the West without the status quo. Yet in order to putting in jeopardy the pro-Western remind everyone that nothing has anti-Islamist policies and the access truly changed, Al Shabaab to development funds. Meles attempted to assassinate Mohamud Zenawi was also an important in Mogadishu, after only one day broker in the relationship with the into his presidency. Hassan Sheikh emerging economies, especially is committed to re-establishing China. These elements will all have ownership of the country’s security, to be closely observed to see how and may look to change Ethiopia’s Ethiopia’s position in Africa will ill-defined military presence in evolve. Western Somalia. An indefinite operation will not be sustainable in  The paralysis scenario – If the Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s vision agreement reached within the party of a post-transition Somalia. As for a smooth transition in favour of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud currently Hailemariam does not end lacks any real capacity, Ethiopia EPRDF’s internal power struggles, would be wise to strengthen its in the short and medium term the internal alliances to make sure that country may become less effective its interests are being met within in pursuing its regional policy. In new governing structures in the this case, containing the tense recently liberated areas of south- relations between Ethiopia and central Somalia. These elements Eritrea could become more will have to be taken into account difficult, as the new leadership will by all parties involved in Somalia. feel its survival is at stake, it may The economic relationship with call for an external threat from Djibouti and the economic and Eritrea to survive its internal political relationship with Kenya struggle. A weaker Ethiopia could are also important to Ethiopia. open up options and change the Kenya will be important on several game in Somalia. There would be fronts: first of all because of the less impact on Ethiopia’s economic impact of its Somalia policy for and political relations with Djibouti Ethiopia and secondly - not less and Kenya. important - that Kenya might try to claim regional leadership in the Horn of Africa.  The extended paralysis scenario - If the ruling party in Ethiopia Beyond the immediate region, at cannot manage the transition there the continental and international is potential for a major powers struggle involving new or emerging political forces or even the possible The political process implosion of the EPRDF. This could profoundly effect the  The international community political relations in the region should observe the political since neighbouring states would developments closely but refrain take sides in the domestic struggle from taking immediate action and and try to affect the outcome. One let the Ethiopian decision-making possibility would be a resurgence process take its course. The of a nationalistic approach at the opening up of the political space in level of the Ethiopian government Ethiopia cannot be established that could re-open the Eritrea through force and international question. This could have agenda’s but issues like the ethnic cascading effects internally as well federalism should be discussed. externally, impacting on the aspirations of other ethnic groups in  Opening up political space in Ethiopia and its relations in the Ethiopia should be supported by the wider region. An other possibility international community. would be a deterioration of the Otherwise there are risks for internal alliances within the internal and regional stability in the EPDRF – with the concomitant mid- long run. The international growth of religious (Muslim) community is making a huge grievances and ethnic tensions. mistake by confusing short-term stability with mid/long term  On the regional and continental sustainability. And if Ethiopia level, Kenya and or Uganda might doesn’t open up, this will affect the try to take over Ethiopia’s position entire region’s stability. as policeman in the region and seek to become the prime interlocutor International aid donors for the international community. Maintaining current levels of  The international aid donors should investments and good relations not withdraw funds now because with emerging powers could this would be counterproductive become difficult. Violent conflict and have consequences for the would result in reduced aid and people of Ethiopia who need that diminish the capacity of the support. authorities to deal with the problems they face.  The international community should reconsider aid to Ethiopia that is not yet attributed. Debate on the role of the international Continuing aid indirectly supports community the continued lack of political opening in the country, because the Different options for the future role of regime clearly relies on this money the international community were put for its political survival. forward and discussed. A diversion of International donors should link opinions arose on the way forward with current and future aid to the regard to the opening up of political opening up of the political space to space in Ethiopia and the way avoid that socio-economical and international donors should act. ethno-political grievances end up turning into a radicalization of extremist ethnic and political visions.