Naming as Survival: Law, Water and Settler Colonialism in Palestine
A thesis presented to
the faculty of
the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University
In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts
Abigail R. Mulligan
April 2021
© 2021 Abigail R. Mulligan. All Rights Reserved. 2
This thesis titled
Naming as Survival: Law, Water and Settler Colonialism in Palestine
by
ABIGAIL R. MULLIGAN
has been approved for
the Department of Law, Justice and Culture
and the College of Arts and Sciences by
Haley Duschinski
Associate Professor of Sociology and Anthropology
Florenz Plassmann
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3
Abstract
MULLIGAN, ABIGAIL R., M.A., April 2021, the Department of Law, Justice and
Culture
Naming as Survival: Law, Water and Settler Colonialism in Palestine
Director of Thesis: Haley Duschinski
Israel and Palestine have been the subject of debate and controversy for decades.
Israel settlement activity has displaced, oppressed and killed Palestinians on their native land, resulting in settler colonialism and the denial of water resources. The deliberate and violent pattern of restricting water serves to demonstrate the settler colonial intent of
Israel. Though there have been many pleas and negotiations for Israel to withdraw and end settlement activity, and restore access to water under international law, none have resulted in a resolution. Through textual analysis, I demonstrate how the international framework of occupation that the UN HRC has adopted, has perpetuated a routinized, ritualized maintenance of the status quo and entrenched Palestine in violent subjugation.
Further, any attempt at a resolution between Israel and Palestine must involve a reckoning with uncommon goals of the two nations, as well as the various positionings of power and understanding of the settler colonial regime. I show how literature is a tool of resistance, survival and imagining for Palestinians by providing a platform for collective memory and perspective to be voiced. This project highlights the necessity of naming settler colonial violence for what it is, if Palestinian suffering is to cease.
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Dedication
To Palestinians everywhere, from the river to the sea.
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Acknowledgments
Special thanks to Dr, Duschinski for sharing her knowledge and shaping me into a scholar, as well as Dr. Taylor and Dr. Ross for their guidance, patience and expertise.
Additional thanks to Dr. Tahrir Hamdi and Yehuda Shaul for sharing their perspectives and knowledge. Of course, thanks to my parents, my partner and friends for their unwavering support and encouragement.
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Table of Contents
Page
Abstract ...... 3 Dedication ...... 4 Acknowledgments...... 5 Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 8 Aim and Scope ...... 9 The Question of Palestine ...... 12 Settler Colonialism, Survivance and International Law in Palestine ...... 14 Law, Power and Water ...... 18 Methods...... 22 Chapter 2: A Hundred Years Later: The History of the Palestine Question ...... 27 Introduction ...... 27 Planting Settler Colonial Roots in Palestine ...... 28 Settler Colonial Mechanisms at Work ...... 41 Chapter 3: The Cost of Insufficient Language at the Human Rights Council ...... 49 Introduction ...... 49 The Human Rights Council: Inevitably Political ...... 51 An Agenda Item for a Nation, but Not a State ...... 53 Palestinian Water at the UN HRC ...... 57 NGO Framings of Water in Palestine ...... 59 Representations of Israeli Domination at the UN HRC ...... 61 Addressing the Underlying Cause: Discussions of Settler Colonialism at the UN HRC ...... 61 The Apartheid Analogy: Classifying Racialized Segregation and Legal Pluralism in Palestine ...... 66 The Misnomer of Occupation at the UN HRC ...... 67 Discussion ...... 73 Conclusion ...... 76 Chapter 4: The Failure of Oslo II: Imbalanced Power, Unfit Tactics and Disregarded Roots ...... 77 Introduction ...... 77 Oslo Accords: Good Intentions? ...... 80 7
Oslo II: Contextualizing Negotiations ...... 82 The Facade of Fairness: The Role of Power Dynamics in Negotiation ...... 88 Doomed from the Start: The Consequences of Ignoring Fundamental Flaws ...... 92 The Shortcomings of Western Strategies ...... 93 Conclusion ...... 96 Chapter 5: People in the Sun” Survival Through Popular Resistance Literature ...... 98 Introduction ...... 98 Literature as Survival: More Than Abstract Stories ...... 100 A Brief Summary of Kanafani’s Men in the Sun ...... 107 Water Symbolism: A Vessel of Life and Death...... 109 Why Didn’t You Knock on the Sides of the Tank? ...... 112 The Guise of Obligation...... 113 Literature as Enduring, Survival and Imagining ...... 115 Conclusion ...... 117 Chapter 6: Conclusion...... 118 References ...... 122
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Chapter 1: Introduction
On a small farm in the West Bank, an Al Jazeera video captures Israeli officials destroying pipes that supply a farmer with enough water to run his farm, citing improper permits. They are surrounded by several armed guards, so personal confrontation could result in serious injury or death. Shortly after, the farmer lost half of his crops. Several hundred farmers in the region also had to move because their water sources were reallocated to Israeli settlements, leaving their crops and livelihoods to be destroyed.
Nearby, another farmer relies on expensive water deliveries, because he is prohibited from accessing water from the pipeline he can see from his farm (Al Jazeera 2018).
Since 1967, when Israel gained control of water in Palestinian territories, this is what life has looked like for not only Palestinian farmers, but all Palestinians living under
Israeli settler colonialism. Water is close enough to touch, but always out of reach. This lack of access forces Palestinians to move or suffer the consequences of inadequate water supply. Despite decades of international resolutions, pleas and negotiations to end the settler colonial deprivation of resources, displacement and disempowerment, there has been little progress in confronting Israel’s ethnic cleansing and forced displacement of
Palestinians. This systemic, intentional and violent deprivation of resources has major consequences for Palestinian health, wellbeing and economic mobility. It is just one of many ways in which the Palestinian experience is intertwined with suffering, injustice and elimination. Despite such deprivation, Palestinians have found ways to endure settler colonial violence and remember their own history and culture. Both the deprivation and 9 endurance are indicative of settler colonialism, a violent and enduring process that seeks to eliminate native Palestinians in order to establish a fully Israeli state in its place.
In Palestine, these attempts to eliminate and erase Palestinians do not go unnoticed. This deprivation has been widely condemned at the United Nations Human
Rights Council (UN HRC) and several political negotiations have resulted from attention to the violent structure that is imposed on Palestine. However, this attention does not and has not warranted legitimate intervention by international actors or the nation states involved. In this thesis, I examine legal and political processes that have involved condemnation and negotiations addressing various forms of Israeli violence, as well as
Palestinian resistance literature in order to analyze the nature of discussions surrounding settler colonial violence as well as Palestinian resistance through survival.
Aim and Scope
My aim in this project is to demonstrate that if legal interventions and political negotiations do not name the settler colonial violence in Palestine, then they will fail every time. Through naming settler colonialism, Palestinians are able to resist and survive the oppression that they live under. The prolonged nature of the violence systematically perpetuated against Palestinians exists within a unique settler colonial context. By analyzing UN resolutions and NGO pleas for Israel to uphold the obligations established by the UN for occupying powers, as well as negotiations between US-backed Israel and
Palestine that seek to provide a framework to end the conflict, but never do, this project analyzes the failure to resolve the continued dispossession, displacement and disenfranchisement that constitutes settler colonial violence. My goal is to show the 10 necessity of challenging the existing framework of occupation by acknowledging the extent to which atrocity occurs due to the systemic nature of settler colonial violence, and also to emphasize the role of Indigenous people in the greater structure of settler colonialism as one of survival, resistance and collective restoration of history and culture.
Through this acknowledgement, the root cause of water deprivation, and all other injustices done to Palestinians can be considered in the process toward resolution.
The role of the international actors has become ritualized and routinized in the discussion of human rights without any resolution to the intentional and systematic forms of oppression which are present in Palestine and have been present in Palestine for decades. The misuse and incorrect interchangeability of the terms occupation and settler colonialism has allowed a disconnect in the collective international consciousness between settler colonialism and what is occurring in Palestine. This includes indiscriminate bombing, resource deprivation, denial of citizenship, killing, mass displacement, erasure of history, increased surveillance and physical barriers to land and travel. In refusing to acknowledge that all of these separate instances and oppressions are all connected to the larger goal to erase and ethnically cleanse Palestinians from their land, none can be addressed, and all persist.
By rejecting the framework of occupation, the illegality of Israel’s settlement activity is understood and can be discussed as a root cause and addressed accordingly.
This will allow for new frameworks that adequately address and work against the systemic, racialized violence and discrimination against Palestinian people. Further, a new framework clearly defines who is responsible for suffering and that it is not a 11 conflict, or a two-sided issue. This framework would also dispel any misgivings about the intentions behind such dispossession, displacement and disempowerment, while highlighting the intentions of the settler colonial regime and necessitating intervention that does not assume each side has an equal stake in peace.
This project seeks to answer the following questions:
• How does the framing of settler colonial violence by legal actors affect the status
quo of human rights in Palestine?
• Why do political negotiations between settler colonial regimes and those they
subjugate fail to reach peaceful resolutions?
• How does Palestinian resistance literature fit into collective voice and memory for
Palestinians?
Here, “legal actors” refers to NGOs with special floor permissions, member states, concerned countries and designated human rights officials at the UN HRC.
This project emphasizes the role of water as a means of settler colonial violence, and to demonstrate Israeli intent to displace, disempower and ultimately eliminate
Palestinians from the land. The dynamics of settler colonial violence and questions of
Palestinian survivance ultimately pivot around water as an essential resource for giving and taking away life. The nature of water as a necessary resource for the sustenance of life makes restrictions on access to water a demonstration of Israeli intent to displace and eliminate Palestinians from the land. Water and water rights were originally a larger consideration in this project, and while it remained a critically important part of this 12 project, it too, can not truly be addressed in its own right without first addressing settler colonialism.
This project illustrates the need to recognize the underlying causes of what legal and political actors are to intervene against and negotiate, which is the intentional ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from their native land, while carefully considering Palestinian peoples’ refusal to allow their history and identity to be eliminated. By providing a glimpse into historical and cultural representations from Palestinian points of view, this project demonstrates the power of collective memory and history of those who are not afforded space to express this elsewhere. The following chapters will consider these questions as they have been discussed, negotiated and presented by international and political actors, activists and Palestinians themselves.
The Question of Palestine
The Palestine Question has been at the forefront of human rights disputes for decades. In 1917, the British Government issued the Balfour Declaration, which expressed support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The League of
Nations then approved the British mandate, helping to establish a Jewish state in
Palestine. In 1949, at the end of the Palestinian war and following WWII, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced to flee from Palestine by Israeli forces and their allies (Long 2018; Sayigh 2018; Woodward 2013). Since then, Palestinians living in
Gaza and the West Bank have been subject to strict surveillance, police brutality, unequal rights and limited access to land resources (Feldman 2019; Kassem 2019; Lyon 2012). 13
As Israeli colonization of the West Bank and Gaza has persisted and evolved, so have the means of colonization. Oppression manifests as unsafe drinking water, agricultural violence, disproportionately high prices for water use in Palestine and restrictions on Palestinian water access (Abouali 1998; Kassem 2019; Zeitoun & Warner
2006). Israel has used water, not only a form of social control, but also as a mechanism of oppression (Kassem 2019).
Despite scholars’ past perceptions of the legitimacy of international legal bodies and frameworks generally, Israel has purposefully and with impunity violated international law (Stephen 2018; Hopgood 2013). This is evident through Israel’s continued occupation of Gaza despite its prohibition by the Oslo Accords (1993, 5).
Further, Israel is forbidden by the Hague Regulations (1907) and Fourth Geneva
Convention (1949) from using natural resources in Palestine. Because of the consistent failures of Israel to live up to obligations of indiscriminate and equal water access, and extra attention given to, “individuals and groups who have traditionally faced difficulties in exercising this right,” (6) established by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights adopted General Comment No. 15 (2003).
Regardless of the attention that has been placed on this issue, it has been difficult for international bodies to successfully enforce their own laws. As Hopgood (2013) points out, this signifies the failure of human rights. While Palestinians still continue to make legal claims and appeals to various international bodies, they also turn to informal legal devices. All of these circumstances make Palestinian life inextricable from politics, 14 creating critiques of settler-colonialism and rights claims that permeate the culture in colonized territories.
Settler Colonialism, Survivance and International Law in Palestine
Critical academic scholarship on settler colonialism has emerged in the past few decades from Native American and Indigenous studies that critique postcolonial studies by pointing out that colonial systems of domination and erasure of Indigenous peoples are very much present in modern societies (Cox 2017). Settler colonialism and
Indigeneity are inextricable. Indigenous perspectives on settler colonialism allow for the strengths of various Indigenous movements to align with one another and grants access to various tools used in the struggle for liberation, self-determination and against all colonialism (Salamanca et al. 2012). This emphasizes the role of Indigenous people in settler colonialism and their endurance throughout. The concept of survivance was born from Indigenous studies. Vizenor (2008, 1) describes the concept of survivance as, “The heritable right of succession or reversion of an estate.” Vizenor expands on this, describing the cultural domination associated with settler colonialism which occurs through narratives depicting indigenous people as victims, rather than people who resist and survive (Vizenor 2009). Further, “Native survivance is an active sense of presence over absence, deracination, and oblivion; survivance is the continuance of stories, not a mere reaction, however pertinent” (Vizenor 2009, 85).
Indigenous writing contributes to this challenge as it demonstrates the complex and transformative nature of Indigeneity, while dispelling the narrative that native people are uncivilized or need saving. Scholars engaged with Indigenous literature challenge the 15 very notion of, “the Indian” as a colonial construct and reframe Indigeneity as an identity that is elusive and constantly transforming (Marandi and Hanif 2013; Vizenor 2008)., It is also important to consider that, in addressing the civilized or savage binary, these definitions are dependent on dominant constructions, which must also be challenged
(Powell 2002).
Veracini (2011) distinguishes colonialism from settler colonialism, noting that colonialism has two inherent characteristics: original displacement and unequal power.
Shoemaker theorizes that settler colonialism is a type of colonialism, rather than at odds with it (2015). While these characteristics are also inherent in settler colonialism, it is important to acknowledge the difference between them, which is the “want” of the colonizer. In cases of settler colonialism, the colonizer seeks to eliminate the native and establish an entirely new culture, as if the claimed land were unoccupied upon arrival.
These distinct “wants” warrant distinct responses from Indigenous populations, making survival and resistance to assimilation crucial in resisting settler colonialists (Veracini
2011; Wolfe 2008).
Because the goal of settler colonialism is to eliminate a culture or Indigenous group, racial invalidation is crucial, and it is achieved through mass death and assimilation (Wolfe 2008). Settler colonialism is also a land-centered project, meaning there must be viable land and resources to sustain settler populations as they grow. With these points in mind, scholars theorize that settler colonialism is a structure, not an event
(Feldman 2019; Wolfe 2008). This is exemplified through “spatial reorganization,” which erases indigenous populations through displacement (Bhan & Duschinski 2020; Yiftachel 16
2009). Fanon (1957) inspired this idea of colonialism as involving spatial reorganization and, more specifically, a sectioning of populations, by pointing out that the colonial world is a world divided into compartments — native and settler — segregated by the state actors. Feldman (2019) highlights the physical manifestation of these ideas in the walls, checkpoints and permits that compartmentalize Palestinians, which their Israeli counterparts are not subject to. This is also manifested in the major components of settler colonialism: denial of citizenship, racial discrimination and resource exploitation (Sālim
2018). The various components of settler colonial tactics contribute to, and are the result of, relationships of violence and domination which originate from and persist through hegemonic systems. These hegemonic systems normalize and make the dynamics of settler-colonial relationships seem predestined and natural. Hegemonic systems both legitimize settler colonialism and disenfranchise Indigenous populations and can exist through consent — but consent can be achieved through force (Gramsci 1991; Della Fave
1980).
Settler-colonial tactics are often tied to emergency doctrine through which states suspend1 laws or ways of governance that protect against exceedingly intrusive or harsh treatment of its citizens. These tactics are justified in the name of some type of security threat. In the case of Israeli rule, Palestine is in “a permanent state of emergency,” allowing the state to use repressive tactics to originate political, cultural and economic subordination (Reynolds 2017, 10). The language of emergency doctrine is used to
1 For more on emergency doctrine and the derogation of law, see Schreuer (1982). 17
“other” Palestinians, perpetually codifying them as a threat. This threat is then used as a form of legitimation for violence and hyper-legality while rendering resistance as illegitimate (Hussain 2007). This becomes embedded in international law, as the emergency doctrines that arise from colonial context become universally accepted. Israel is unique in this sense as it was legally framed as a persistent state of emergency since its founding (Reynolds 2017; Hussain 2007; Khalidi 2006) The denial of colonized peoples as such is one way that labeling them as terrorists is justified, as resistance is an integral part of colonialism (Feldman 2019). The Palestine Mandate itself, as Feldman (2019) points out, played a role in settler colonialism by failing to recognize Palestine as a national community with political rights, contributing to the elimination of the indigenous identity. While military occupation is inextricable from states of emergency, every aspect of Palestinian life is entrenched in racialized emergency doctrine. Everything from transportation and border security, to jobs and resources, to, in particular, water, is either restricted, of lower quality or unavailable. This exemplifies the colonial form of occupation through legal concentration and power hierarchies (Reynolds 2017; Hussain
2003).
With all of the above being true and crucial to the understanding of Palestine’s relationship to Israel, it is also important to understand that native identities are extricable from settler colonialism. As Kēhaulani Kauanui (2016) points out, “Settler Colonial
Studies does not, should not, and cannot replace Indigenous Studies.” The endurance of
Indigenous people forces settler colonialism to hold out against it and vice versa.
Palestinians exist outside of the bounds of their identities as displaced and eliminated, 18 and it is by their own resilience and culture, which existed long before the Balfour declaration, that they live despite such atrocity. Further, the law is a part of this resistance in some ways (Erakat 2019). As Rowe and Tuck (2017) point out, settler colonialism also seeks to totally erase the Palestinian, physically and otherwise. This occurs through the production of alternate historical narratives. Indigenous narratives and accounts are crucial to understanding Palestine as well as its relationship to Israel, therefore they must be centered in discussions of it, otherwise even academic work intended to draw attention to settler colonial violence will contribute to the perpetuation of it (Rowe and Tuck
2017). In order to center Palestinians in these discussions, there must be an understanding of the meaning of land to Palestinians as a place of belonging, not the hegemonic idea of real estate with strict boundaries and borders (Erakat 2019).
Law, Power and Water
Power hierarchies are entrenched and maintained through legal mechanisms, such as racial classifications, and legal institutions, such as special tribunals and commissions.
Hussain (2007) describes the use of these mechanisms as hyperlegality in order to distinguish between emergency law, as described earlier, and a calculated, intentional method of governance and oppression. These processes and classifications label
Indigenous people as terrorists or enemy combatants, which then justifies resource deprivation (Hussain 2007).
Water, as we know, is the basis of all life. Water also exists in a hydrosocial context, meaning there is a deep association between the water itself and the power relations that manage it (Swyngedouw 2015; Budds et al. 2014). Decisions regarding 19 water access are steeped in controversy and are often disputed (Zeitoun 2006). At the international level, human rights to water, in theory, are widely agreed upon but do not exist in treaty legal framework. However, absence of treaty law does not eliminate the need for water. Scholars point out three state obligations for water rights, according to international law: “to respect, protect and fulfill” (Klawitter 2007; McGraw 2010, 26).
Water rights are further defined by positive law as “the intellectual origin of the right to water in international relations, its legal basis, scope and obligations are all comprehensively treated,” (McGraw 2010, 137). Policy declarations of water rights are not implemented effectively, regardless of feasibility. Currently, Israel rules and regulates
water and water transfer, extraction, consumption, sale and distribution,
the control of water use, water sharing and rationing, consumption of
water, the construction of water installations, the drilling of wells, the
granting of permits and all matters regarding water resources, whether
groundwater or surface water, including springs, ponds, streams and
rivers, as well as the setting of prices and quantities allowable for use by
Palestinian inhabitants and farmers in the occupied territory. (Economic
and Social Commission for Western Asia 1990; as cited by Braverman
2019, 531).
Israel’s control of water on Palestinian land leads to the illusion of water scarcity. As scholars have pointed out, water in Palestine and Israel is not scarce. In fact, the abundance of water was used as justification for Jewish occupation, as settler use would 20 not overwhelm the natural resources of the indigenous people (Alatout 2008). The construction of water scarcity as “fact” led to, according to Alatout (2008, 959),
centralized policy-making institutions as most “efficient”; centralized
technologies as `appropriate'; the national space as the only source of
identity; the national scale of water management as `necessary'; a strong
and centralized state as `legitimate'; legal precedents for the use of state
apparatus for surveillance, discipline, and control over water resources;
and, consequently, a form of citizenship that is seen as at once heroic and
disciplined.
The construction of water as a resource that must be regulated contributes to the notion that state oppression is legitimate and inevitable. Further, the enactment of rights often creates unequal experiences of citizenship thus shapes legal consciousness (Mehta et al.
2014). Wealth and power often play a role in who does and does not have access to clean water. Further, state control of water is not always in the best interest of its citizens
(Howsam 1998).
While for some water is a mundane part of everyday life, for others water is used as a means of social control. Water can be used to contaminate agriculture and spread disease. Water privatization deprives certain populations of water or displaces people from their homes. State- and privately-owned water can also limit economic prosperity for marginalized groups (Kassem 2019; Wessels 2015). When referencing Indigenous populations, water rights frameworks are rooted in a rejection of colonial water law and practices and emphasize the recognition of rights and traditional Indigenous knowledge 21 and practices on the land (Curley 2019). However, Indigenous water claims are often ignored by both the international community and the dominant, occupying group.
Because water decisions happen from the top-down, the construction of ideology, international support, and brute force all work to delegitimize indigenous claims to water
(Zeitoun & Warner 2006).
These frameworks relate to one another as the nature of settler-colonial societies are entrenched in unequal power, maintained through hegemony, legal legitimacy, social control and denial of rights. It is evident that the law is capable of being both a means of liberation and a mechanism of oppression, a paradox that has become embedded in the
Palestinian consciousness as well as the existing legal frameworks (Kostiner 2003;
McCann 2018). Through attention to these complex relationships among law, politics and power, this project examines how water rights, and their allocation are an extension of settler colonial violence, and what this reveals about the positions, strategies, and motivations of these actors, as well as the hierarchies of power writ large. It considers the workings of law in international and political arenas, how these discussions and debates shape possibilities and limitations of international intervention, and the role of Palestinian survival and resistance that result from settler colonial structures.
Project Significance
Current critical scholarship includes a thorough discussion of settler colonialism and the contentious past and present of Israel’s colonization of Palestine. Although there is a wide range of literature regarding transnational water rights and agreements, there is a gap in literature regarding the importance of naming in both legal and political 22 negotiations, with a consideration for the successful mobilization in social settings where the settler colonial violence is named for what it is. This project is significant because it reveals how the inner workings of political and legal negotiations are affected by framing, truth and survival within the context of a colonized territory and vice versa.
These concepts are well studied, but there is more room for these relationships to be explored in the context of a settler colonial society. This study contributes a perspective of how the varying framings are successful in ending the ongoing patterns of settler colonial violence or whether they fail.
Because of the nature of settler-colonial relationships, it is crucial to understand the dynamics of power and how they affect decision making in both the international legal system and in the everyday lives of Palestinian people. Further, it is crucial to understand the importance of sincerely naming settler colonialism for what it is in order to reckon with it in a real way.
Methods
This research employs discourse analysis in order to study the various writings, submissions and statements within three contexts related to the Palestine Question. The analysis will reveal the effects of language use and its political nature.
Chapter 3 utilizes discourse, legal and political analysis of submissions and statements at the United Nations Human Rights Council in regard to Agenda Item 7: The
Human Rights Situation in Palestine. This project uses textual analysis to identify, code and discern the implications of specific language used in this setting. It analyzes the perspectives of various countries, nongovernmental organizations, concerned countries 23 and international actors from 2016-2020 to reveal the routinized and ritualized discussion of human rights which maintain the status quo as well as the political agendas of the various representatives engaging in such discussions. This data is used to answer the first research question, “How does the framing of settler colonial violence by legal actors affect realization of human rights in Palestine?” While analyzing this data, I will employ a coding system that focuses on the specific naming of what is going on in Palestine.
Specifically, I analyze language use to construct three categories in which the reality of
Palestine is placed into: occupation, apartheid and colonialism. I also acknowledge the mention of water throughout the human rights documents and its link to the classifications utilized by various representatives. I then perform a legal and discursive analysis of the various ways in which Palestine’s relationship to Israel is discussed by the international actors.
Chapter 4 analyzes the Oslo II agreement, which is one agreement contained in the Oslo Accords which attempted to create a legal framework intended to resolve violence and tension between Israel and Palestine in the early 1990s. This document is analyzed to reveal how the language in it addresses the goals and concessions of both
Palestine and Israel as well as how the power differential between the countries is reflected in the verbiage of the document itself. This chapter addresses the research question, “In what ways are political negotiations affected by power and truth?” This analysis is presented in conjunction with other scholarly interpretations of the agreement which ground the argument that because the Oslo Accords were based in a fundamental 24 lie regarding the status of the relationship between Palestine and Israel, it was never going to create any meaningful framework or peace process.
Chapter 5 examines Ghassan Kanafani’s Men in the Sun, a novella contained in the subgenre of Palestinian resistance literature. Using textual analysis, I will highlight the symbolism employed by Kanafani in order to critique Palestinians and the structure of settler colonialism. The textual analysis also reveals the place of literature and art in resistance movements and the survival of Palestinians by providing a perspective on settler colonial violence through the eyes of a Palestinian writer. This data answers the question, how does Palestinian resistance literature fit into collective voice and memory for Palestinians? Further, it demonstrates the persistence and refusal of Palestinians to permit the complete erasure of their collective memory and allow settler colonialism to prosper.
Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 provides a brief historical background that provides context for understanding the historical and relevant details of this research. This chapter describes the history and development of the relationship between Israel and Palestine from the signing of the Balfour declaration in 1918 until the present day. This chapter then explores this history through a settler colonial lens and how this affects the lives and culture of Palestinians. This chapter also details the influence that settler colonialism has on narratives surrounding water, the legal infrastructure surrounding human rights in
Palestine and the state of water for Palestinians. I then examine the United Nations 25
Human Rights Council and its involvement in the political and legal processes which are intended to intervene in human rights violations.
Chapter 3 focuses on the framing of water rights and how that is affected by the structure of international legal bodies, through special attention to the UN Human Rights
Council (HRC). This chapter examines how the dynamics of the UN HRC that involve the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights on Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, the nation-state representatives, civil society groups and NGOs lead to discuss the human rights situation in Palestine and shape pathways of international response. It examines the routines and traditions of the UN HRC, the way the body operates and how this produces certain types of framings which then affect the status quo.
The way that human rights in Palestine are discussed and debated provides insight into the processes of the UN HRC, and how they shape conflict resolution or perpetuation. I consider resolutions, NGO reports, member state and concerned country submissions and the Special Rapporteurs reports in this chapter. I chose this data because it signals attempts at intervention by the international community that are doomed to fail. I also analyze documents and responses from various NGOs and member states with special floor permissions at the UN HRC in order to understand the motivations and priorities of the groups, and how they compare to actions taken both in political negotiations and legal interventions.
Chapter 4 examines the Oslo Accords, with a special focus on Oslo II made between Israel and Palestine and mediated by the United States. An analysis of Oslo II will reveal whose interests are really being represented, how they came to be represented 26 and what implications that may have for both the relationships of the countries and their respective citizens. The data for this chapter includes the finalized document of the agreement, which will be considered alongside analyses from various scholars. I chose this particular water agreement as a critical event because it provides insight into how the negotiations which attempt to address settler colonial violence, but never address settler colonialism itself, are doomed to fail.
Chapter 5 focuses on the survival of Palestinians resisting settler colonial domination. This chapter provides a brief background on Palestinian literature as a tool of resistance and empowerment. I approach these issues through popular culture, focusing on a novella by foundational resistance writer, Ghassan Kanafani. This chapter focuses on Kanafani’s 1956 novella, Men in the Sun. I also discuss the banning of the novella, as well as Kanafani’s assassination by an Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad. I chose
Kanafani’s novella because it reveals the importance of resistance art and literature as it is rooted in restoration and survival. The novella tells the story of three Palestinian refugees who die hiding in a water tanker on their journey out of the war-torn country. In his novella, Kanafani criticizes colonialism and identifies the international community’s failures. This analysis is presented in conjunction with an interview of Palestinian author and literature professor, Dr. Tahrir Hamdi. This chapter demonstrates how popular literature provides a platform for Palestinians to restore their own history and culture while imagining a liberated future.
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Chapter 2: A Hundred Years Later: The History of the Palestine Question
Introduction
The history of colonialism has inevitably shaped the legal and political landscape of modern Palestine, while trapping it in the past. This background chapter describes the history of Palestine since 1918 up until the present day. This chapter also outlines various violent conflict and mass displacement projects as well as attempts at restoring peace and the effects of shifts in power and relations caused by changes in political leadership.
History is necessary for understanding the circumstances which amount to settler colonialism in Palestine. This understanding is tied to the settler-colonial context in which Palestine exists, and how the current Palestinian existence is partially rooted in both the framing of and the experienced resource deprivation and exploitation. Further, this demonstrates how all of things interact with, influence and exacerbate the living conditions of Palestinians and their forms of redress.
This chapter begins with a description of the origins of settler colonialism in
Palestine and key factors which contribute to it. It then details the establishment of Israel and the various violent attacks that followed, which were the catalysts of major
Palestinian resistance, known as intifadas. It also details the tenures of important political leaders like Yasser Arafat, Benjamin Netanyahu, Ariel Shannon and Mahmoud Abbas.
The chapter concludes by describing recent developments in Israel and Palestine and the state of affairs today. 28
Planting Settler Colonial Roots in Palestine
The origins of Israeli settler colonialism are rooted in military control, but there are other means that bolstered Israel’s efforts in gaining and maintaining a colonial grip on Palestinian territories (Reynolds 2017; Hussain 2003). One of these ways is through resource control (Feldman 2019; Kassem 2019; Lyon 2012). As previously discussed in
Chapter 1, the goal of settler colonialism is to eliminate the native. This is accomplished through various means, including mass death, exodus and displacement. One of the most effective but least salient things that cause any of the three means is resource deprivation.
Often accompanying resource deprivation used to perpetuate settler colonialism is the framing of the issue itself.
It is also important to highlight race as a factor in settler colonialism. Wolfe’s
(2008) point that race is essential in considering issues of settler colonialism because the end goal is to eliminate the native, and that survival is resistance. Wolfe also points out that by seeking to eliminate the native, settler colonialists actually help preserve
Indigenous identity.
None of this happens in a vacuum. Israel’s establishment was largely due to
British assistance, and the current state of Israel has a lot to do with its alignment with the
United States. The international community also plays a hand in Israeli-Palestinian relations but relies on its member states to take tangible action. The relationship between the United Nations and Israel is unique in the sense that, resolution after resolution, Israel ignores mandates to cease activity--something almost no other countries do, especially countries claiming democratic forms of government. 29
As mentioned in the first chapter, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the longest enduring and most controversial conflicts in modern history. However, there was a time where Jewish people and Palestinians lived in harmony. Before the mandate that established the necessity for a Jewish state was created, the Ottoman Empire was in control of the land. In 1918, British backed Arab forces drove out the Ottoman Empire, and the land remained under British control. The League of Nations backed this control.
In 1917, a letter from Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, which became known as the Balfour Declaration, mandated Palestine to be a “national home for the Jewish
People” (Balfour 1917).2
Throughout the next decade, more Jewish settlers arrived in Palestine, quickly heightening tensions between Zionists and Palestinians. In the 1930s, the tension culminated in both violent and nonviolent resistance, which was met by British and
Zionist forces.3 In 1937, a British commission of inquiry suggested a partitioning of
Israeli and Palestinian land. Palestinian and other Arab representatives rejected this idea, instead demanding an end to Jewish settlement. Despite their efforts, the British military ousted the current violent resistance (Sherman 1998). However, this did not signify and
2 For more on the Balfour Declaration, including its own history and politics, see Veret�
1970.
3 For more on Palestinian resistance, politics and the aftermath of the Balfour declaration in the 1930s see Abboushi 1977.
30 end to the conflict. In 1947, the British government relinquished solving the issue to the
United Nations. The conflict had become much more complicated following World War
II, in which hundreds of thousands of Jewish people were displaced and millions were killed. In order to mitigate Jewish displacement, the UN recommended a partitioned state, giving just over half of the territory to Palestinians and just under half to Jewish settlers.
The partition plan was again rejected by Palestinian and Arab leaders and accepted by their Jewish counterparts. The plan passed with a majority vote at the United Nations general assembly but was never implemented due to Palestinian rejection. All of these efforts seemed only to worsen the tension and set the stage for many violent outbreaks between Palestinian and Jewish people. These violent outbreaks worsened Palestine’s status in the western eye and prevented the end of the British Mandate, which the British government set for May 15, 1948. In December 1947, the first clearing efforts of
Palestinian villages by Zionist forces took place.
On May 14, 1948, Israel was officially established with Tel Aviv as its capital city. The following day, British troops withdrew from the territory and the Nakba began.
Al-Nakba, which translates from Arabic as, “catastrophe,” marked the massacre and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. Palestinian military resistance was futile and only 25% of the land of the British Mandate was able to be kept under
Arab control. The Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem and the West Bank comprised the small portion (Sayigh 2018; Ghanim 2011). 31
In 1959, Yasser Arafat founded the Fatah, which was a unified, independent
Palestinian organization. The Fatah4 was secretly founded and had gained notoriety for its success in resisting Israeli troops in Jordan and the West Bank. After almost two decades of dealing with violent conflict and the persecution of Palestinians, along with the residual effects of the Nakba, Arab leaders decided that it was time for a unified
Palestinian entity. Thus, creating the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The
PLO was originally intended to be under the control of the Arab states which voted to create it, but Palestinians wanted their own independent entity, which had previously existed as the Fatah. The founder of the Fatah, Yasser Arafat, became the chairman of the
PLO in 1969, two years after the six-days war.
The six-days war was the result of a perpetual and growing tension with no real solution in sight. In June of 1967, Israeli forces seized Gaza, the Syrian controlled Golan
Heights, and expelled Jordanian troops from the West Bank and East Jerusalem. This doubled Israeli-controlled territory in the middle east and bolstered Israeli nationalism and momentum toward ethnically cleansing Palestinians from their land. More than half a million Palestinians were displaced after the six-day war (Morris 2011). Following the war, resolution 242 was passed by the UN Security Council and called for the,
“withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in recent conflict”
4 The Fatah is a faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and became a global symbol of organized Palestinian resistance. For more on the Fatah and the PLO, see
Bröning 2013.
32
(S/RES/242, 1). It also called for respect of sovereign boundaries and the right to live in peace and freedom.
The United States has played a major role in bolstering Israel as a military superpower. Following the 1973 Yom Kippur war, which was an attempt by Egypt and
Syria to regain Israeli-occupied land, Israel was left dependent on US financial, diplomatic and military aid. This resulted in an oil embargo on Israeli allies by Saudi
Arabia and caused American gas prices to skyrocket. This led to international peace talks and a resolution passed by the UN Security Council which mandated a cease fire and a beginning of negotiations aimed at achieving peace (Morris 2011).
Arafat’s first appearance at the peace talks took place at the United Nations where he condemned Zionism and threatened to continue attacking Israeli military if Palestinian needs were not acknowledged.5 A year after his appearance in 1974, Palestinian concerns were legitimized at the international arena and were included by Americans in the discussions for the first time. In the late 1970s, Israel and Egypt made peace and Egypt recognized Israel as a legitimate and sovereign country. Part of the peace agreement, known as the Camp David Accords, included more, but still limited, freedoms for
Palestinians.6 This agreement, however, only heightened the tension between Israel and
5 Yasser Arafat’s presence at the United Nations marked a new era for Palestinian presence in the international community. For more on the importance of this event, see
Neff 1994.
6 See Quandt 1986 for a comprehensive history of the Camp David Accords. 33 other Arab states, which boycotted Egypt for their participation.7 In the following years,
Israel continued to invade and occupy more Arab land, killing and displacing thousands of Palestinians in the process.
By the 1980s a new intifada had begun resisting. Aside from a few displays of stone-throwing demonstrations, peaceful protest, strikes, boycotts and other civil disobedience comprised the resistance. However, it was met with deadly force by the
Israeli army. Over 1,000 were killed by 1993.8 Despite this violence, the Israeli army was not able to fully suppress the intifada.
Along with the independent Palestinian efforts of resistance, the exiled Palestinian
National Council met and accepted a two-state solution which was based on the terms of the UN resolution from 1947. This helped with relations between PLO and the US, but the Israeli government still refused to interact, reasoning that the PLO was a terrorist organization. This is due, in part to a decades-long strengthening of a right-wing Likud party, and a distancing from the long-standing labour party ideology of the Israeli government (UN n.d).
One of the places that many Palestinians fled throughout the conflict was Kuwait, which was then occupied by Iraq. Following the 1991 Gulf war, Kuwait was freed from
Iraqi occupation. Arafat’s alliance with Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s leader at the time, had
7 The treaty between Israel and Egypt marked a turning point for relations within the greater middle east and north African regions. For more on this treaty, see Lavy 1984.
8 For a detailed history on the first intifada, see PBS 2019.
34 consequences for refugees living in Kuwait and led to a displacement of an estimated
400,000 Palestinians. The invasion of Kuwait is a crucial point in the history of the
Palestinian question as it was, for a moment, a safe haven for Palestinians and a beacon of hope for improved relations but turned out to be another segment of suffering for
Palestinians (Haddad 2010; Le Torquer & Al-Outdate 1999).
Despite all of this, peace was still an option. With the election of the labour party, serious negotiations were prioritized, and these efforts were matched by the PLO. Israel ended the ban on PLO members participation in American negotiations and peace talks mediated by Norway were in the works. These peace talks were known as the Oslo
Accords and were made up of several agreements, which created a framework for independent Palestinian rule. The accords also included PLO acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist and renouncement of terrorism. Israel also recognized the PLO as the unified representative of Palestine. Israel would give up military occupation and responsibility of Palestinian people, while still controlling the land, and Palestinians would have the right to self-government. This also included a vow to fight against terrorism and a renunciation of Palestinian state violence. This would create a Palestinian police force and open the door to US foreign aid. The negotiations concluded with a historic handshake between Arafat and Rabin on the White House Lawn. These talks were opposed by both the Likud and Hamas, which committed violent attacks against
Jewish settlements and killed many people. The agreement to implement the peace accords was also almost halted when an Israeli citizen killed 29 Palestinians while they were praying. These violent acts heightened tension despite the peace agreement on paper 35 and led to Rabin closing borders into Israel from Palestine. Tens of thousands of
Palestinians could not work due to the border closures. More violent conflict ensued, leading to the assassination of two Hamas leaders, one of which, took place in Gaza
(Watson 2000).
As religious nationalist sentiment and Palestinian resistance grew, the Oslo II agreement was underway. The agreement, which divided the West Bank into three zones, passed by only one vote in the Knesset, which displayed a significant loss in support for
Rabin. Oslo II was signed and then countersigned only days after. In an attempt to gain back support from Israeli citizens, Rabin planned to host a series of political rallies.
However, after the first rally, he was assassinated by a Jewish radical. This caused a period of reflection and mourning in both Arab countries and Israel. Rabin’s death caused a surge of support for peace and moved Oslo II forward. Right-wing groups continued to push back and by 1996, negotiations were stalemated, and violence was at the forefront of the conflict (Watson 2000).
Arafat easily won re-election, but things were changing in Israel. With an election looming and uncertainty permeating the public, the Likud party capitalized on an opportunity to gain power. Benjamin “Bibi” Netanyahu was elected, which changed attitudes and policy regarding the Palestine question. Netanyahu almost immediately resumed settlement expansion and opened an ancient tunnel to the Palestinian holy site
Al-Aqsa mosque, a wildly offensive action to Palestinians which essentially canceled the little progress that had been made toward a peace process. Netanyahu’s first term in office was riddled with scandal and disarray. His close colleagues were charged with 36 bribery and fraud, which only further undermined his effectiveness in the eyes of Israeli citizens. Because of all this, he lost in the 1999 election to another member of the Likud party, Ariel Sharon. Despite new leadership, the damage had been done by Netanyahu’s first term. Meanwhile, Arafat was moving away from a peace agreement between two states and toward a unilateral approach to Palestinian sovereignty (Britannica 2021).
Despite five years of Palestinian cooperation, per the Oslo Accords, there was little to show for it. Settlement activities were back in full swing and a new prime minister, Ehud Barak, focusing solely on peace with Syria, tensions began to rise again.
Barak did oversee Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, which put the next steps toward peace in Arafat’s hands. Barak and United States President Clinton were pressuring
Arafat to negotiate an all-out effort to establish a permanent settlement agreement, rather than stick to the plan of gradual progress. Two weeks of negotiations between the three states were fruitless. During this time, former prime minister Sharon toured Al-Aqsa, which was offensive to Palestinians and launched what would come to be known as the
Al-Aqsa Intifada.
As violence rapidly grew and relations soured, the current Knesset and Barak’s presidency lost support rapidly. This caused him to resign, and he was replaced by
Sharon. Sharon and his new Knesset took a different, much harsher and less peace- focused approach to Palestinian relations. Violent policies were reinforced by Sharon and the number of deaths increased exponentially. This was met by retaliatory bombings of
Israeli cities by Palestinian militants. The US attempted to mitigate the situation but was unable to stop the violence and bloodshed (Espositio 2005). 37
In 2002, on the eve of the Jewish holiday of Passover, Hamas killed 18 people and injured over 100 in a suicide bombing at a hotel. According to a Hamas member, the bombing was intended to undermine peace proceedings in Beirut. The timing of the bombing was especially offensive to the Israeli government, which vowed to respond quickly. Keeping their vow, the Israeli government besieged Arafat’s compound, issued a curfew on Palestinians only and re-occupied the West Bank. Israel also began building a barrier wall, which caused Palestinians to fear annexation. Violence and attacks continued, eventually leaving only remains of Arafat’s compound. More violence ensued, and Israel intensified their efforts against Hamas, killing its leader. Meanwhile, Israel and the US were becoming even closer allies and refused to negotiate with Arafat, in turn, creating an even more powerful enemy for Palestine. However, the countries did continue with the peace process. Arafat appointed Mahmoud Abbas to represent Palestine and the
US introduced a multi-step plan toward peace between the countries. The plan was supposed to commence with Israel, ending all settlement activity and Palestine ceasing violent attacks. It was endorsed by Israel with much criticism. At a summit later that year,
Abbas and Sharon called for an end to the violence and the creation of two democratic states. The summit progressed successfully for both Israel and Palestine, which secured a ceasefire and retrieval of Israeli forces, for each respective country. The peace did not last. Just a few months later, in August, bombings and killings resumed. Abbas resigned and was replaced by Ahmed Qurei, who was far more loyal to Arafat. Construction of a barrier in the West Bank also resumed, and Israel threatened to take back full control of
Palestine if the violence did not stop. 38
Things took a slight turn in 2003 when the labour party removed themselves from
Sharon’s coalition. This was following criticism by Sharon and the Likud on proposals of withdrawal from the settlements. Sharon had to adjust his views after the number of
Israeli casualties in the settlements grew. Soon after, Sharon introduced his own plan to withdraw all settlers and troops from the Gaza strip and, with US pressure, some from the
West Bank.9 This plan was met with expected criticism from the Likud but proceeded anyway. By September 2005, the plan was complete. Despite this, construction of a barrier wall continued in the West Bank which was declared illegal by the International
Court of Justice in the Hague, which was ignored by Israel (UN News 2004). The cycle of heightened tension and violence was underway again, and several bombings by
Palestinians and military violence by Israel resumed, with an especially deadly attack in the West Bank.
Tragedy struck Palestine once again when Arafat was taken to a French hospital where he subsequently died. Arafat fell sick at his compound with a mysterious blood disorder which caused him to die of a stroke. Because of the nature of his death, there was speculation that Arafat was poisoned with polonium-210, a radioactive element (Dr.
Y 2013). Years later, his remains were exhumed in order to perform an investigation into whether or not his death was a murder, but the findings only, “moderately support the proposition that the death was the consequence of poisoning with polonium-210” (BBC
2013).
9 For more on Sharon’s tenure and legacy as Prime Minister, read Aronoff 2010. 39
Arafat was replaced by Mahmoud Abbas, who formerly served as prime minister.
Abbas was re-elected shortly after and played a key role in negotiating peaceful relations with Israel, and a two-state solution (UN 2009). Abbas was a member of the Fatah movement which is a faction of the PLO. While progress was made between Israel and
Palestine, inter-PLO tension was rising between the Fatah and Hamas. In 2007, Hamas ended up taking control of the Gaza Strip while Fatah controlled the West Bank. The
Gaza Strip was subsequently raided by Israeli forces. This split control and split leadership in the party led to criticism of Abbas being neglectful of the Gaza Strip.
A few years later, amid ongoing peace talks and a new election within the Israeli government, Benjamin Netanyahu rose to power again. After being elected prime minister in 2009, Netanyahu refused to meet with Abbas or to halt Israeli settlement activity. Netanyahu’s leadership is marked with mass Palestinian casualty and a refusal to work with Palestinian leadership in order to reach a solution. This caused Abbas to shift toward appealing to the international community for support in recognizing Palestine as a sovereign nation and Palestinian right to self-determination. Abbas lobbied for individual state entry of Palestine at the United Nations, which was opposed by the US and Israel
(UN 2012). His efforts were not futile, as General Assembly Resolution 67/19 changed
Palestine’s status from, “permanent observer” to “non-member observer state,” but still did not reach recognition of full statehood.
Meanwhile Netanyahu, backed by the Likud, launched an attack on pro-
Palestinian activists in Turkey, killing nine. This weakened relations between Turkey and
Israel, which were strong prior (Morris 2011). Nevertheless, peace talks resumed amid 40 violence and mass social disruption. Israel continued to launch deadly offensives and continue settlement expansions and Netanyahu began replacing religious Jewish groups with centrist and secular parties in the government. Peace talks and violence simultaneously waxed and waned, leading to essentially nothing but more casualties.
Netanyahu continued fortifying Israel’s alliance with the US as well as forming a right-wing coalition to back his leadership. Netanyahu then halted relations with the
European Union after the EU pushed for labeling of goods coming from settlements to be labeled as such, rather than as coming from Israel. Just one year later, Israel ended its ties with several countries on the Security Council that it was supposed to be working after the council condemned settlement expansion efforts. The “State of Palestine” was recognized by the International Criminal Court in 2015 (ICC, 2015).
Following the US’s 2016 election, relations between the US and Israel were strengthened. The US announced it would be giving Israel its largest military aid package, at 38 billion USD to be distributed over 10 years (Sharp 2020). President Trump recognized sovereign Israeli control of the Golan Heights. Trump also recognized
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and moved the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and considered Israeli settlements to be legal, all of which were met with significant protest and eventually violent outbreaks.
Turmoil was present within the Israeli government as well. In 2018, the Israeli police had discovered sufficient evidence to charge Netanyahu and his close advisors with bribery and fraud. The allegations were denied by the Prime Minister and he refused to resign. Netanyahu was later formally charged, but his trial was delayed due to COVID- 41
19 restrictions. Netanyahu also won re-election, but failed to assemble a coalition for the government, resulting in a second election (Romo & Estrin 2018). Netanyahu later agreed to work in unity with Benny Gantz, who is a member of the Israeli Resilience Party and is the alternate prime minister, in order to address COVID-19. The global pandemic seems to have only exacerbated conditions for Palestinians, and the disproportionate effect the virus is having on Palestinians living under Israeli rule serve as an indictment of the lack of adequate medical care, access to resources and economic means (BBC 2020).
Settler Colonial Mechanisms at Work
At the outset of the colonization process, early Zionist leaders needed to have a reason for settling in Palestine. When North America was colonized by Europeans, several justificatory narratives work to legitimize the structure of elimination imposed on the Indigenous people inhabiting the land. These narratives included the idea that no
Indigenous people were inhabiting the land, and if they were, then they were savages, needing to be civilized, which only meant that they needed to assimilate to Western culture. This was accompanied by the myth that the land was not taken, it was discovered as well as the false narrative that the empty land’s resources were not properly utilized by the native people, so European settlement was not only necessary, but morally correct
(Geisler 2012). Gasteyer and Flora (2000) add that there is a combined effort on the behalf of the state, private business, NGOs and sometimes even religious organizations to introduce and perpetuate these narratives.
Similar justifications for illegal settlement can be found in Palestine. The idea that
Palestinians are uncivilized, terrorists, need to be saved, or are unfit stewards of the land 42 are found in many instances of Israeli settler colonization. In order to “save” the land and create a society which fits the hegemonic ideas of correctness, the settler colonial power must erase Indigenous people (Muir 2008).
Israeli colonization both exploits the land and people for economic gains, while also pursuing the violent erasure of the people from the land to create a Jewish state. In order to do so, Palestinians must be eliminated or fully displaced, aligning the type of colonialism with settler colonialism (Mitchell 2000; Said 2000). Once a justification can be found, settler colonial activities can begin. As discussed in the introduction, settler- colonialism is rooted in changing the geographic nature of the land as well as the displacement or elimination of the Indigenous population. In relation to water, this includes the disenfranchisement of small farmers, consequences of military occupation, bombings that destroy water mains or treatment centers, control of water resources by the
Israeli military and reclamation by the Israeli government of fertile landscapes and accessible water resources.
While this interrupts Palestinian geography, culture and everyday activity pertaining to water, it reimagines and reconstructs the landscape into one that is Israeli.
Everything from the economy to the political structure to the technology necessary for re- allocating water resources becomes rooted in a newly formed state, consequently erasing what had previously existed and reshaping what water means (Alatout 2009).
Water Deprivation as a Means of Settler Colonialism
Water access is limited in various ways. First and most salient is the destruction of infrastructure. Palestinian pipelines and wells are often bulldozed, halting the already 43 limited flow of water to Palestinians. Because of this, building wells to access water seems like a feasible alternative. However, it is incredibly difficult to get a permit from the Israeli government, and if they are built illegally, the wells are destroyed. There are other mechanisms which limit access to water that don’t directly involve water. Things like the construction of border walls and security checkpoints delay significantly or eliminate access to water altogether.
Palestinians that do have access to water do not always have access to clean water. Water is often polluted from untreated sewage, manure and wastewater, which affects health. Large numbers of households suffer from water related illness, with 25% of households in the West Bank suffering from diarrhea. More than half of the households don’t have regular access to sufficient bathing water. Contaminated water also affects agricultural opportunities.
Water has been recognized in international human rights law, which also necessitates safe drinking water. As of January 2021, the United Nations water web page states that water rights include the right to drinking water for personal and domestic uses, defined as “(water for) drinking, personal sanitation, washing of clothes, food preparation, and personal and household hygiene.” Water rights also necessitate the ability to access and afford such water sources. The language of water rights also prohibits systematic discrimination.
Water rights also include the clear relationship between water rights and the duties necessary to fulfill them. The Human Rights Council established water as a human right and also established that countries with colonial rule have the duty of upholding 44 basic human rights to those living in occupied or colonized territories. Some of these duties, which have been established in part by the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights Article 2 (1), include economic, technical and dedication of all other resources to ensure that water rights will be met, including the legislative adoption of international mandates.
Because of Israel’s refusal to uphold its duty regarding water rights, there have been several resolutions specific to determining that Israel always has been and still is responsible for ensuring water needs of both Israelis and Palestinians are met. Because of this, there is a common narrative among supporters of Israel and Israel itself that the international community is singling Israel out.
This is countered by the concrete examples of Israel ignoring its obligations and the sheer necessity of water in sustaining human life. Further, Water is also a crucial element in economic gains, maintaining sanitary living conditions and environmental protection. Therefore, water rights are important, especially in a settler colonial context, in determining whether or not people have agency and control over a resource which is necessary for survival.
Another important consideration is that water rights are not limited to what has been recorded and finalized as the law. Water rights also exist in the tacit knowledge which is implicit in the legal and physical infrastructure of water rights and water access.
This is controlled and determined by the state. These geographic and institutional factors are perhaps even more crucial in access to water rights than the written laws themselves. 45
However, acknowledgement of rights is often the first step to their full realization and builds a foundation for rights reform which ensures justice.
Water also plays a role in many other human rights such as, education, housing, health, life, work and protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It is clear that water and other resource exploitation is central to the perpetuation of settler colonial violence. Palestinian access and sovereignty over water resources on their own land is not only a significant step toward survival, but also a symbolic recognition of their rights to self-determination, freedom and equality.
The construction of a massive Israeli water infrastructure project, known as the
National Water Carrier, was finished in 1964. The network of pipelines, reservoirs and pumps diverted three-fourths of the Jordan river to Israel, while prohibiting Palestinian access to it. Shortly after, Israel had control over all existing water resources and prohibited the construction of Palestinian wells.
Israeli military rule in Palestinian territories makes it illegal to construct the development of any new water infrastructure without getting a permit from Israel. The permits themselves are incredibly difficult to obtain, leaving hundreds of Palestinian communities without access to running water. Fewer than 30 Palestinian well permits have been granted since 1967. Even some towns which are connected to a clean water supply simply do not receive any. Methods of collecting rainwater as an alternative source are destroyed by the Israeli army.
During the 1980s, Mekorot took control over all Palestinian water while destruction of access points for Palestinians continued, and water quotas for Palestinians 46 decreased. Mekorot is an Israeli-owned water company which intentionally interferes with water collection in occupied territories by Palestinians. Mekorot has destroyed wells and tapped Palestinian springs to divert and completely eliminate water sources in
Palestine. Mekorot does supply some water to Palestinian territories, but they still limit access and charge disproportionately higher prices. Some of these prices are so high that half of a family’s monthly income will be spent just on water. In the 1990s, the
Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) was established, but Israel still controlled all of the available resources. The PWA could only control distribution of the allotted amount given to them by Israel. Following the turn of the century, Israel has maintained its destruction of water access for Palestinians.
This lack of access is not rooted in scarcity. Israeli citizens consume, on average, four times the amount of water that Palestinians do. Palestinians, on average, consume less than the WHO recommended 100 liters of water per day, with many consuming less than 20 liters per day (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA). Meanwhile, the average Israeli person consumes 300 liters per day.
According to a 2011 report from Al-Haq and the Emergency Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Group, “the UN Human Rights Council reaffirmed that the right to drinking water and sanitation was legally binding and linked to existing human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” And
“that the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation is derived from the right to an adequate standard of living and inextricably related to the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, as well as the right to life and human dignity.” 47
Hanging in the Balance: The Contributions of the International Community
The international community for this project refers to various nation states, nongovernmental actors and organizations and the United Nations writ-large that are involved with Israeli/Palestinian relations. The United Nations, and the various bodies that comprise it, regards itself as an intergovernmental organization that maintains international peace and security. Harsher critics of the international community call the
United Nations’ lack of intervention in regard to human rights violations and ethnic cleansing, which it is obligated to protect, a failure (Mukuki 2020). However, Armstrong
(2009) argues that it never even had the chance to fail. The UN Security Council had made the preparations, dedicated itself to restoring rights and order in Palestine, but never had the chance to implement any sort of actual change. Where the fault lies in this lack of action is still being debated today. Scholars also highlight the UN HRC was born out of failure of the former Commission on Human Rights, which was too political, inconsistent and had bizarre reform processes (Alston 2006). Alston (2006) adds that these are all fundamental changes necessary for the success of the UN HRC. With this in mind, along with the current state of the UN HRC as a highly politicized entity, it can be predicted that success is uncertain at best.
Scholars note that water access can only be achieved through the end of the occupation (Klawitter 2007). They cite myriad resolutions which passed but were never implemented or ignored, the role of water in maintaining the status quo, the ineffective nature of international water agreements, a lack of information and awareness, 48 institutional discrimination which leads to a lack of access, and a lack of commitment to human rights-based approaches to governance.
NGOs call upon news outlets and other media sources to draw attention to the lack of access to water for Palestinians, which is different than most strategies, which implore Israel to uphold its responsibilities and the international community to intervene.
In addition, NGOs recommend educational tools to address water inaccessibility.
The history of settler colonialism, violent conflict and displacement all influence
Palestinian resistance and foreign relations. The entrenched division between Palestine and Israel along with Israel’s settler colonial roots make the attempted peace processes unproductive and futile. With the historical context of the settler colonial domination and displacement by Israel in mind, the mechanisms and framings intended to interrupt such violence can be examined. The next chapter examines United Nations Human Rights documents to discern the effect of language use and framing strategies on international interventions and tangible change.
49
Chapter 3: The Cost of Insufficient Language at the Human Rights Council
Introduction
At the 33rd Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Bolivia submitted a statement voicing the nation’s support for displaced, dead and oppressed
Palestinians living under settler colonial occupation. The statement began with an
Aymara greeting “Jallallah,'' which means “for life.” One of several surviving Indigenous populations in Bolivia, the Aymara represent the persistence, resistance and survival of
Indigenous people in Bolivia.10 This chapter begins with the same greeting, in the native tongue of Palestinian Arabic.
للحياه
(Lil haya), For life.
The settler colonial violence inflicted on Palestine by Israel violates human rights laws and perpetuates oppression toward Palestinian people. Despite much conversation, debate and agreement at the international level, the violence persists. This is due to the international framework of occupation that renders any intervention or attempt at intervention at the UN HRC a failure in regard to resolving perpetual patterns of resource deprivation, mass displacement, killing and erasure. This framework influences the terminology that representatives use at the UN HRC in describing the violations of human rights. The UN recognizes Israel as an occupying power under the law of armed
10 For more on Indigenous groups in Bolivia, see IWGIA n.d.
50 forces, which is a branch of international humanitarian law. This obligates Israel, as occupying power, to ensure that Palestinians have access to resources, as well as safety and security of the occupied territory and its inhabitants. This recognition sets the standard for classifying the Palestine question as a matter of occupation, and this classification maintains the status quo by framing Israel as a temporary, military presence rather than a regime attempting to ethnically cleanse Palestine (Bhan and Duschinski
2020; Hussain 2007). Further, this framing allows Israel to ignore international law regarding settlement practice, simultaneously shifting the focus of the international community to human rights violations instead of the fact that the occupation is illegal
(Bhan and Duschinski 2020; Erakat 2019; Kauanui 2018).
This chapter utilizes archival data analysis of several documents from the UN
HRC, including reports from the Special Rapporteur, draft resolutions, statements from
NGOs with special floor permission and oral statements from member states and observers. The documents analyzed are those from the 31st through the 45th sessions addressing Agenda Item 7, the human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied
Arab territories, which were submitted during the tenure of the current Special
Rapporteur from 2016-2020. This time frame was chosen in order to analyze the status of conversation surrounding Palestine in the present and to demonstrate the past four years as a routinized performance of human rights discussion rather than progress toward resolving settler colonialism in Palestine. The occupation of Palestine began nearly a century ago, and an analysis of the present-day framings will provide insight into why it has persisted and where it may go in the future. The analysis of these documents focuses 51 on the language used to describe the nature of the relationship between Israel and
Palestine, as well as the descriptions of water rights and allocation.
This chapter begins by providing background on the UN HRC, the role of the
Special Rapporteur and Agenda Item 7, and the historical significance of Palestine’s positioning within the UN HRC. In this section I emphasize the key themes of language use and the political nature of the UN HRC. I follow this with an analysis of the documents in order to identify and explain the use of language in describing both water rights and the various classifications of the relationship between Israel and Palestine as settler colonialism, occupation or apartheid or a combination of these terms. My analysis demonstrates the politics and power dynamics at play, as well as how the UN HRC has adopted the framework of occupation, causing a ritualized discussion of human rights, rather than an implementation of them.
The Human Rights Council: Inevitably Political
The Human Rights Council is an entity within the United Nations system made up of multiple governments working in conjunction with one another. It was intended to replace the overly politicized and divisive Commission on Human Rights. The HRC’s goals include “strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations and making recommendations on them” (OHCHR n.d) The HRC discusses all of the thematic human rights issues that are brought forth by its member states. There are three session meetings per year in the UN headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. Forty-seven UN Member States, elected by the UN General Assembly for three-year terms, comprise the HRC. The HRC 52 also works with the UN Special Procedures mandates which are made up of special rapporteurs, special representatives, independent experts and working groups who are responsible for observing, investigating, reporting and advising on thematic issues or specific human rights issues occurring throughout the world.
Despite the fact that it was created to address the problematic politicization of the
Human Rights Committee, the UN HRC is itself a highly politicized entity. The politicization of the UN HRC is due to the nature of its membership. The UN HRC is made up of ever-changing member states, each entering into the institution with their own agendas, ideologies and priorities. These factors contribute to various allyships and antagonistic relationships with other member states. Boyle (2009, 122) describes this as the, “global divisions between the major powers, other states, regions and political blocs have come to dominate.” Further, human rights themselves are inherently political.
Human rights require institutions and legal systems to establish, power to implement, and agency to contest (Ingram 2008). There is no consensus on who deserves human rights and what qualifies as human rights, and the answers to those questions are often politically motivated. While there is some consensus on what they are at a very basic level, the problem lies within their implementation (Ingram 2008). This is where the UN
HRC comes into the picture, particularly in regard to Palestine. At the UN HRC, there is much recognition of human rights, specifically water rights in Palestine, but there is little evidence that discussion has led to rights implementation. 53
An Agenda Item for a Nation, but Not a State
Myriad human rights issues are discussed at the UN HRC. Within the Human
Rights Council, there are ten permanent agenda items that structure the proceedings of each session. Agenda Item 7, which pertains to the human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, is the only agenda item dedicated to a single nation.
Despite the disproportionate attention to human rights violations by Israel, there has been little success in halting the violations themselves, and Israel has faced hardly any tangible sanctions.
Because Agenda Item 7 is the only permanent agenda item that is reserved for a country, there has been much discussion regarding whether or not it should even be a permanent agenda item. In 2016, 2018 and 2020, the United States, Israel and several
European countries boycotted Agenda Item 7 by refusing to attend sessions or speak on the agenda item at all, and when they did speak on it, they framed it as an antisemitic singling out of Israel (OHCHR 2020; Lazarhoff 2018). These complaints are also politically motivated, as the US is one of Israel’s strongest allies and providers of military aid, and many countries in Europe are closely allied with the US.
Several countries participating in the boycott of Agenda Item 7 belong to the
European Union, which takes a “both sides” approach. In several interactive dialogues with the Special Rapporteur, the EU has referred to the violence and then referred to the importance of giving respect to each country (44th session 2020; 40th session 2019). In the interactive dialogues, the EU has referred to the situation as an occupation but focused most of its attention on how both countries need to cooperate and how Israel 54 needs to allow the Special Rapporteur into the occupied territories (44th session 2020;
40th session 2019).
The resolution to create Agenda Item 7 passed with 27 votes in favor, 12 against and 5 abstentions on June 30, 2006 (24th session). The purpose of the resolution was to draw attention to the prolonged suffering of Palestinians and other Arab people as a result of Israeli action. The resolution, “decides to undertake substantive consideration of the human rights violations and implications of the Israeli occupation of Palestine and other occupied Arab territories at its next session and to incorporate this issue in following sessions” (24th session, 1). Notably, the countries that voted against the creation of
Agenda Item 7 are all Western/European countries with the exception of Japan.
Another important figure at the UN HRC, specifically in regard to Agenda Item 7, is the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, which originated from a resolution passed in 1993 (OHCHR 2021).
The UN has various Special Rapporteurs responsible for specific topics. Each Special
Rapporteur is considered to be an independent expert on whatever topic they address.
However, they are not United Nations employees, nor do they receive a salary for their work or work for any government.
The position for the Special Rapporteur for Palestine was created to address the ongoing crisis in Palestine. The Special Rapporteur communicates with NGOs regarding witnesses and events and to report conclusions and recommendations from findings to the 55
Human Rights Council for the duration of the occupation.11 The role of the Special
Rapporteur on Palestine is generally to, “assess the human rights situation in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, report publicly about it, and work with governments, civil society and others to foster international cooperation,” (OHCHR 1996-2021). This is accomplished through missions, investigations and cooperation with other governments,
NGOs and independent reports submitted to the Special Rapporteur. The Special
Rapporteur examined in this chapter is Michael Lynk, who is a constitutional, labor and human rights law professor in Canada. Lynk has also worked for the UN on human and refugee rights in Jerusalem.12
Year after year, the same countries and NGOs repeat pleas for international intervention to ensure accountability and bring an end to Israel’s colonization of
Palestine. Israel and its allies claim that there is active anti-Israeli bias present at the UN
HRC, which is the only reason Agenda Item 7 exists in the first place. Despite this, a number of Middle Eastern and North African nation states at the UN HRC emphasize not only the importance, but also the necessity of Agenda Item 7 (Bahrain 36th session 2017;
Qatar 36th session 2017; Algeria 35th session 2017; Qatar 34th session 2017; Oman 34th session, 2017). In an interview Yehuda Shaul, a former IDF soldier and activist dedicated to restoring accurate history in Israel and Palestine, pointed out to me that even if there is
11 Reference to “occupation” is due to the language the United Nations uses to describe the relationship between Israel and Palestine.
12 For more on Special Rapporteur Lynk, visit see OHCHR 2021.
56 a singling out, it is justified and necessary to call attention to Israel’s apartheid regime in
Palestine, as long as the content of the discussions remain fair. Shaul also mentioned the necessity of disproportionate attention to other crises throughout history, like South
African apartheid.
The analysis of special rapporteurs’ reports, NGO statements and submissions and member state dialogue reveals a routinized, ritualized form of engagement with rights at the UN HRC. Ritualization is defined by Charlesworth and Larkin (2015, 10) as the,
“Acceptance of institutionalized means for securing regulatory goals while losing all focus on achieving the goals or outcomes themselves.” The political nature of the UN
HRC’s state-based membership lends itself to this ritualization because it assumes states are the primary right’s bearers and fails to recognize the various positionings and motivations of member-states which allows and denies access to the implementation of human rights (Cowan 2015). It also takes the position that states will voluntarily comply with mandates, recommendations and resolutions reached at the UN HRC. This, along with the language of occupation, renders any intervention or attempt at intervention at the
UN HRC useless because the language of occupation has become ritualized and routinized in order to maintain the status quo.
Discussions about the necessity for human rights to be met in Palestine allow for the assumption that action will follow. This assumption ignores the apparent politics and motivations of different member states, as well as their cooperation with one another, obvious inequalities are dismissed and erased which allows them to persist. The ritualized performance of human rights enforcement further allows powerful countries, and 57 powerful alliances, to seemingly accept recommendations from the UN HRC, even if their intention and ultimate result is to reject them (Charlesworth 2014). Further, ritualization also prevents identifying root issues or causes of human rights violations by primarily focusing on the routines and rituals of the institutions themselves over the goals or progress itself.
Palestinian Water at the UN HRC
The right to water for all people was established as a human right by a resolution titled “the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation” (33rd session 2016). The right to drinking water, specifically, has been highlighted as the responsibility of states to ensure respect, eliminate discrimination and to cooperate in providing its citizens with water.
Several resolutions were introduced from 2016-2020 addressing water deprivation and the right to water in Palestine. There are several phrases and complete paragraphs which are exactly the same or nearly the same in various resolutions passed by the UN
HRC. In 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020, several resolutions detailed the “detrimental impact of the Israeli settlements on Palestinian and other Arab natural resources, especially as a result of the confiscation of land and the forced diversion of water resources” and the
“dispossession of land and the denial of access for farmers to agricultural areas, water resources and domestic and external markets owing to the construction, consolidation and expansion of Israeli settlements” (43rd session 2020; 40th session 2019; 37th session
2018; 34th session 2017). In the same years, the resolutions discuss the effects water deprivation: “The expropriation of Palestinian land, the demolition of Palestinian homes, 58 demolition orders, forced evictions … aimed at the forcible transfer of the Palestinian civilian population, … including the denial of access to water and other basic services by
Israel to Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory” (43rd session 2020; 40th session 2019; 37th session 2018; 34th session 2017).
In 2016, 2018 and 2019, the resolutions urge Israel to “ensure that water resource allocation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is not discriminatory and does not result in water shortages disproportionately affecting the Palestinian population of the West
Bank, and to take urgent steps to facilitate the restoration of the water infrastructure of the West Bank.” Each resolution “condemns all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction, especially the excessive use of force by the Israeli occupying forces against Palestinian civilians...where bombardment of populated areas has caused extensive loss of life…massive damage and destruction to … vital infrastructure, including water…” (40th session 2019; 37th session 2018; 31st session 2016). In 2017, 2018 and 2019, the resolutions require Israel “to bring to a halt all actions, including those perpetrated by Israeli settlers, harming the environment, including the dumping of all kinds of waste materials in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory...which gravely threaten their natural resources, namely water and land resources, and which pose an environmental, sanitation and health threat to the civilian population” (40th session 2019; 37th session 2018; 34th session 2017).
Despite these resolutions and their intentionally similar language, there has been little progress. This repetitive language creates the performance of condemning human 59 rights violations without any real sanctions or interventions to stop or prevent violence and resource deprivation.
NGO Framings of Water in Palestine
Settler colonial violence, displacement and oppression are so pervasive that it draws statements from water equality-based NGOs that did not mention water and instead commented on the dire state of human rights situation (Global Institute for Water,
Environment and Health 39th session 2018). The Maarij Foundation for Peace and
Development, a human rights NGO, also took a different approach in 2016 when it called upon news outlets and other media sources to draw attention to the lack of access to water for all, rather than trusting the UN HRC to fulfill its purpose. Maarij also implored every nation to uphold its responsibilities and the international community to intervene (agenda item 3, 33rd session 2016).
NGOs bring up water in Palestine several times as a specific talking point. The data reveals that water is often a consequence of other physical attacks and misinformation on the availability of water in Palestine. As mentioned in the resolutions above, efforts to expand colonization and to expedite the displacement of Palestinians are pervasive, expansive and varied. The Norwegian Refugee Council, a humanitarian NGO focused on the rights of displaced peoples, pointed out that restrictions on materials to improve water infrastructure as well as physical barriers and checkpoints all impede
Palestinians from accessing water (35th session 2017; 31st session 2016). Other NGOs have included that the bombing of electric plants has led to improper water sanitation and disease, as well as the destruction of property which damages water infrastructure and 60 access points while displacing Palestinians from their homes (Al Mezan 39th session
2018; Badil Resource Center for Palestinian residency and refugee rights 31st session
2016). Several NGOs pointed out the disproportionate costs Palestinians must pay for the same water that Israeli citizens do not (Al Mezan 39th session 2018; EAFORD 36th session 2017; EAFORD 37th session 2018). This further suppresses attempts to achieve economic stability or mobility for both individual Palestinians and the Palestinian
Authority as a governmental entity.
There are several resolutions detailing Palestinian water rights and condemning the current state of access to water for Palestinians, water-related violence, and Israel’s responsibility as an occupying power to provide water to Palestinians (37th session 2018;
37th session 2018; 40th session 2019; 40th session 2019; 43rd session 2020; 43rd session
2020). The Special Rapporteur has also discussed the inaccessibility of water for
Palestinians in his reports. In his annual report presented to the 37th session in 2018, Lynk acknowledged the compounding effects of lack of access to electricity and sanitation, which further inhibits safe water use as well as the consequences of contaminated water on Palestinians’ physical and mental health (37th session 2018). The following year, the
Special Rapporteur’s report for the 40th session was dedicated specifically to water and environmental degradation. In his report, Lynk discussed water as a well-established human right and the various violations that Israel has committed. The report specified that Israel has obligations it needs to uphold as an occupying power and recommends that military blockades be lifted and that all practices prohibiting or hindering the realization of human rights in Palestine must end (40th session 2019). 61
Representations of Israeli Domination at the UN HRC
This section contains three subsections that highlight the specific words chosen by states and NGOs at the HRC to describe the displacement, dispossession and disenfranchisement of Palestinians. The relationship between Israel and Palestine is framed in three distinct ways: as a settler colonial relationship, as an occupation and as apartheid. Sometimes, these terms are used interchangeably. These choices reveal the underlying viewpoint each entity has regarding the Palestine Question.
At first glance, the materials being analyzed in the project may not seem to be coded or framed with any intention. The point of the speakers and submissions is to explicitly state the stance of the associated entity in the most clear and succinct way possible. This makes word choice and structure crucial to delivering the message.
However, the framework of occupation adopted by various entities matters because the terms used to classify the Question of Palestine imply vastly different relationships between Israel and Palestine, while further entrenching Palestinian suffering in a ritualized narrative. The use of inadequate language and framing may not communicate the true causes of the human rights crisis in Palestine, causing it to continue (Erakat
2019). Further, it distracts from the illegal nature of Israeli settlements (Kauanui 2018) and shapes the global meanings and understandings of Palestine, while revealing the motivations and interests associated with word choice (Peteet 2016).
Addressing the Underlying Cause: Discussions of Settler Colonialism at the UN HRC
The distinct goal of settler colonialism is to eliminate the native population
(Veracini 2011; Wolfe 2008). The term is associated with suffering and turmoil, so the 62 use of the word is not taken lightly. There have been various approaches to addressing and the situation in Palestine and how it should be characterized. Scholars point out that the words used to describe Palestine matter and are often intentional because of their implications (Erakat 2019).
The BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights frames the question of Palestine as a settler-colonial society. Colonization is discussed as the root of all human rights violations in Palestine and describes property destruction, unsanitary conditions, health disparities, violence, denial of resources as a means of perpetuating settler-colonial activity (31st session 2016). Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (EAFORD), an NGO which is based in achieving equality, dignity and rights for all peoples, along with other NGOs link resource depravation to settler colonial displacement and military violence. In a joint written statement in 2017, multiple
NGOs stated that “forced displacement is a result of Israel’s recurrent military actions and its colonialist and apartheid activities disproportionately affecting the Palestinian population. Israel has fragmented the Palestinian people, which it submits to distinct policies and practices that share in common racial oppression and discrimination” (35th session, 2).
The Palestinian Return Centre, an NGO that advocates for the historical, legal and political basis for Palestinian refugees’ right of return, also explicitly describes water as a tool of “colonial domination” (PRC 2021; 33rd session 2016, 3) In 2016, Palestinian
Return Centre stated that Mekorot, the national water company of Israel, deprives
Palestinians of their own water sources, adding that nearly 200,000 Palestinians do not 63 have access to running water in the West Bank alone. They also have no means of retrieving water themselves due to hyper legality and physical barriers to collection. This creates an environment with few options but to leave, which allows for a further perpetuation of colonial violence. This removes legal agency from Palestinians and further entrenches them into the abyss of state-sanctioned suffering (33rd session 2016, p.
3).
BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights states on their website that it, as of 2017, is, “an independent, human rights non-profit organization committed to protect and promote the rights of Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons,” and Al Mezan also highlight the importance of terminology when discussing the question of Palestine (35th session 2017). The NGOs are very intentional about the use of this word:
To address the situation in the oPt as one of colonization is not only a
matter of terminology, but a decision with legal and practical
consequences for third parties. Belligerent occupation does not accurately
reflect the ongoing Israeli policies and, thus, it is more appropriate to
adopt accurate and legally grounded terminology and apply the analytical
lenses of population transfer and colonialism when reviewing Israeli
actions affecting the oPt. This clarification also would emphasize the need
for more concerted efforts from third-party states to put an end to this
illegal situation and implement the rights of the Palestinian people (35th
session 2017). 64
This sums up the importance of language and framing choices (35th session 2017). The use of colonial language is also rooted in settler-colonial theory. In a joint statement,
BADIL and Al Mezan list the policies of “sovereignty change, demographic manipulation, coercion, apartheid, suppression and fragmentation are not mere violations of the laws of occupation but aim at permanently changing the status of the oPt and erasure of Palestine as pillars of the Israeli colonial regime” (35th session 2017).
BADIL also highlights the ubiquity of water deprivation. The NGO points out that water scarcity or a lack of access to water is the result of other uses of coercive force, specifically the demolition of buildings, which not only limits water access and sanitation, but also pushes the boundaries of Israeli colonization and exacerbates violence and harassment of Palestinians living in those areas (31st session 2016). This reasoning aligns with scholarly arguments that the language of occupation obscures the intentional and systematic nature of violence and ethnic cleansing in Palestine (Erakat 2020).
The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), an intergovernmental organization that represents 57 member states that describes itself as “the collective voice of the Muslim world,” also uses the language of colonialism to describe the situation in
Palestine.13 They use this term in regard to the specific legal structures set and implemented by Israel. The OIC also argues that “Israel is more interested in colonizing
Palestinian land, rather that achieving a just peace and security” (42nd session 2019, 2).
13 For more on the OIC, see Organization of Islamic Cooperation 2021. 65
This description is indicative of the question of Palestine being discussed at the UN HRC in a settler-colonial context.
There are a few member states that use the language of colonialism and settler colonialism as well. One example is Bolivia, that explains why it is crucial to frame this situation as colonialism and states that the repetitive discussions held at the UN HRC in calling attention to Agenda Item 7, despite the lack of tangible intervention, only maintains the status quo of Palestinians subject to colonial violence and dispossession
(33rd session 2016). Bolivia also describes the proceedings at the UN HRC as
“government aphonia and transnational impunity” (Bolivia 33rd session 2016, 1) which creates a cycle of meaningless claims and only work to maintain the status quo. It is important to note that Bolivia is also politically motivated and acting on behalf of those interests.
In a joint written statement, several NGOs highlighted the fact that legal attempts to restore human rights in settler colonial contexts often do not work. They stated, “Israeli colonization is fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order, and triggers obligations on third-party states” (35th session 2017, 2). The recognition of the importance of the framing of the question of Palestine is brought up by those who use colonialism to describe what is going on.
Morocco (34th session 2017) does not use any of the term’s occupation, apartheid or colonialism to describe the situation. Instead, it only uses the word illegal. It condemns
Israeli violations of international law, calls the blockades and violence illegal and states that the goal of Israel policies is to eliminate the Islamic identity through the destruction 66 of holy sites. This would be indicative of settler-colonial framing, but they never specifically frame the issue as such.
The Apartheid Analogy: Classifying Racialized Segregation and Legal Pluralism in
Palestine
The roots of apartheid as a legal framework lie in the racialized legal pluralism and discrimination in South Africa from 1948-1990. The Apartheid Convention defined apartheid as, “Inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination” (Art. 1). The legal framework of apartheid is important in the case of Palestine because it considers race as a key factor in the nature of discrimination and allows for legal protection against racialized violence, torture, arbitrary arrest, deliberate imposition of oppressive conditions and legislature. By invoking the language of apartheid in their discussions of
Palestine, legal actors are able to highlight that the racialized discrimination that occurs against Palestinians is a crime against humanity and in violation of the Apartheid
Convention (Dugard 2008).
The language of apartheid was also used by four member states from 2016-2020 when describing the situation in Palestine. Apartheid refers to the separation of society and was used to describe the racial conflict and colonization of South Africa from the late
1940s through 1994. As UN HRC member state from 2017-2020, South Africa used the language of apartheid instead of occupation to describe the situation, arguing that physical separation, fragmentation and annexation is an apartheid policy. South African representatives described Israeli action as worse than the apartheid regime formerly in 67 their home country. They also mentioned water rights when speaking of apartheid policy as a significant health crisis and label the lack of access and sanitation as a means of oppression and denial of human rights (43rd session 2020; 42nd session 2019; 41st session 2019; 36th session 2017). Nicaragua also used the language of apartheid as a violation of human rights law and international law and describes the oppression faced by
Palestinians as, “apartheid-like oppression” (Nicaragua 34th session 2017). Both South
Africa and Nicaragua highlighted the fading potential of a two-state solution being the result of apartheid (Nicaragua 34th session 2017; South Africa 36th session 2017).
The Misnomer of Occupation at the UN HRC
The majority of member states and NGOs adhere to the international framework of occupation in relation to human rights in Palestine. Just like there are several framings of the Palestine Question, sometimes the terms used to describe it are used interchangeably, or in conjunction with one another. A joint NGO statement describes
Israel as an occupying power that is “intricately linked” (EAFORD, Arab Organization for Human Rights, Tupaj Amaru, International-Lawyers.Org, Union of Arab Jurists 34th session 2017) with a system rooted in apartheid with the goals of “degrading, displacing and discriminating against Palestinians.”
The legal framework of occupation can also be used as a legal strategy. By invoking the language and framework of occupation, legal actors are able to access certain protections, rules and laws that may be effective in achieving legal goals for the subjects of occupied territories. As outlined in Article 47 of the Geneva Convention, the protections afforded to civilians in occupied territories include protection against 68 violence, being held hostage, extrajudicial punishment and degrading treatment, while ensuring access to basic needs being met and healthcare for the sick and injured.
Occupation law also forbids the annexation of land, seizure of private property, and displacement of the population in occupied territories. While these protections close some of the gaps in legal protections for those living in occupied territory and all of these rules are routinely violated with impunity by Israel. Though the legal protections are invoked with the framework of occupation, they are not upheld.14
Another joint statement submitted by several NGOs states that the socioeconomic indicator of access to water is exceedingly low, meaning that because of Palestinian people’s positioning existing on a lower hierarchical plane, their access to water, among other resources is extremely low (EAFORD et al. 35th session 2017). The NGOs urged
Israel to end policies of apartheid as well as an end to occupation (EAFORD et al. 34th session 2017). The NGOs also describes the legislative framework employed by Israel as falling in line with an apartheid system which intentionally displaces and silences
Palestinians and further disguises the apartheid framework to the rest of the world.
Water and other natural resource deprivation and exploitation is also described as a “tool of Israeli domination” by NGOs in a joint written statement (EAFORD et al. 37th session, 2018) -- which is similar to the phrase used by the Palestinian Return Centre, which invoked the language of colonialism rather than occupation, but still frames the
14 For more on the framework of occupation, see the International Committee of the Red
Cross (2012). 69 situation as an illegal occupation (33rd session 2016). The United Arab Emirates, which also describes the situation in Palestine as a settler colonial society, but labels it an occupation, also highlights the degradation of a two-state solution (34th session 2017) and points out that a complete withdrawal of Israel from Palestinian territory is the only option for lasting international peace. Describing colonialism while naming occupation is a common theme throughout the various statements that use different terms but apply the same definitions. This pattern is apparent in many submissions and further demonstrates the importance of word choice in describing the Palestine Question.
Water deprivation and lack of access is also invoked as evidence that international law has been violated. Defending Victims of Violence (36th session 2017), which also classifies Palestine as an occupied territory, does not describe water as a means of further expansion, systemic violence or displacement by Israel. Instead, it separates it from a larger picture and simplifies the issue as a mere failure to uphold international law. This simplification is damaging to the lives of Palestinians and ignores the inadequacy of using the language of occupation.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) specifically described the situation as,
“systematic, deliberate and illegal” yet still refers to it as an occupation (33rd session,
2016). In 2017, UAE used the language of occupation, again, describes the deprivation of citizenship, resources and violent subjugation by using the definition of settler colonialism, stating that it is deeply concerned about the “growing arbitrary measures
(Israel) seeks to accelerate the Judaization of Jerusalem, stripping its residents of their identity and separating them from the West Bank.” (34th session, 1). The occupation is 70 also described as brutal and illegal in a joint statement that describes the settlement activity as a “siege of Gaza,” which reaches beyond the term of occupation (EAFORD et al. 35th session 2017, 4).
Venezuela categorized Palestine as being occupied and stated that it “contains features of apartheid such as the restriction of freedom of movement and other basic rights on the grounds of nationality, religion and ethnicity” (37th session 2017, 3)
Pakistan also utilized this logic, and described the various apartheid laws, and components of apartheid and colonialism that are present in Palestine, but used the language of occupation as opposed to the language of colonialism to describe the human rights situation (36th session 2018).
Al-Haq, Law in the Service of Man, invokes the language of occupation. Al-Haq also frequently discusses specific examples of oppression and water deprivation. Al-Haq discusses water similarly to BADIL, in that it is both a tool used to displace and oppress
Palestinians as well as a consequence of other forms of Israeli violence (35th session
2017). Al-Haq describes water deprivation as a means of further rooting the Palestinian experience in a lack of agency and the status quo. Al-Haq is intentional in describing the lack of access to resources as a “man-made” humanitarian crisis, which differs from past descriptions which frame resource access as natural or scarce (2017, 35th session).
In 2016, Al-Haq referred to Israeli actions as working toward goals of “overall dispossession” and “permanent control over territories occupied” (31st session, 1). Al-
Haq (32nd session, 2016, 1) referred to Israeli actions as part of an “expansionist agenda” which again is more consistent with definitions of colonialism rather than occupation. 71
Despite the similarities in describing and yet the differences in labeling the situation in Palestine, BADIL and Al-Haq released joint statements on the situation in
Palestine which refer to it as an occupation (38th session 2018). In a joint statement from
2019 (42nd session), Al-Haq, BADIL and Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies use the terms occupation and colonialism interchangeably. They also referred to the situation as demographic engineering, which is a key element of settler colonialism (Wolfe 2008).
Sweden (31st session 2016) also invoked the language of occupation in describing the status of human rights in Palestine. Sweden called for an end to the violence and aligned itself with the European Union. This is important considering several member- states of the EU are allied with Israel and have directly funded military violence and displacement efforts occurring. As previously mentioned, there is also a current boycott of Agenda Item 7 by several member-states of the European Union as well as the United
States and Israel, which the European Union has also not condemned.
Pakistan (40th session 2019) Bangladesh (40th session 2019) and Turkey (40th session 2019) use the exploitation of and deprivation from water as an example of Israel failing to meet its responsibilities as an “occupying power.” This is a common theme found in framings of the issue as an occupation, and it persists as a theme session after session, year after year. It is irresponsible to attribute so many complaints and so much attention to the agenda item to a mere failure to meet responsibility, instead of an intentional tactic used to displace Palestinians from the land and erase their existence entirely. 72
Malaysia also called out key failures that perpetuate human rights violations and violent displacement and dispossession of Palestinians. They call out the international community’s failures as well as Israel’s intentional ignorance regarding its legal obligations as well as its implementation of apartheid policies (38th session 2018). Chile also highlights the need to end the status quo of Palestine (31st session 2016). Despite this awareness of the status quo, perpetual suffering and routine discussions regarding
Palestine, they see no connection between the international framing and all of the aforementioned things.
Many countries and NGOs referred to Israeli dominance as an occupation implementing apartheid or colonial policies. This suggests a shift in framing, but a hesitancy that comes with labeling the situation as something more severe than occupation. This also indicates a difference in thinking and speaking about the intentions of Israel. Though the label of colonial or apartheid is not found, the description of human rights violations amounts to what colonial and apartheid are defined as. Entities that described Palestine as an occupied territory also often called upon the international community to urge Israel to stop implementing policies of apartheid.
Occupation was also the term of choice for representatives that called for a two- state solution as the remedy for these violations. This failed to acknowledge the obvious intentional and systemic tactics that are used to displace, kill and assimilate Palestinians.
This inconsistency in rhetoric highlights the inadequacy of the international framework of occupation when discussing the Palestine question. In contrast, countries that use the language of apartheid and colonialism do not call for a two-state solution, only that Israel 73 fully withdrawals and Palestinian self-determination is fully recognized. Qatar emphasizes the apartheid state only lends itself to the degradation of peace and the further de-legitimization of the international community’s power (34th session 2017).
Discussions that framed Palestine as an occupied territory demonstrated the least variance in narrative. The same issues of impunity, failure regarding the international community and human rights violations were brought up session after session, year after year. Such discussions also shared a position on the reality of Palestine with countries that place the onus on Palestine and Israel equally while highlighting obligations to comply with international human rights law. This contrasts with representations of
Palestine as colonized or subject to an apartheid regime, which raise specific issues, their consequences and are candid about responsibility.
Discussion
The framework of occupation has contributed significantly to the way that speakers and representatives discuss the question of Palestine. The choice to frame the relationship between Palestine and Israel in a way that only condemns the state of human rights, rather than the illegality of Israeli settlements maintains the status quo. By accepting the existing framework, the international community cannot have frank discussions regarding the underlying causes of human rights and international law violations. Nor will the international community be able to establish appropriate frameworks for confronting the systemic, racialized violence experienced by Palestinians.
Settler colonial framings are clear about the state of human rights in Palestine as well as who or what is responsible and why their current state is subject to dispossession, 74 displacement and disenfranchisement. NGOs point out that addressing the question of
Palestine as a settler colonial relationship has real consequences for both Israel and
Palestine, as well as third parties and international law itself. Therefore, those involved in international discussions of Agenda Item 7 have an obligation to adopt accurate and intentional language that goes beyond the framework of occupation (35th session 2017).
The reluctance to use more explicit terms yet describe every facet of colonialism or settler-colonialism, by definition, is evidence of this ritualized narrative which is tied to the existing framework of occupation. This is evident though descriptions of the situation being an occupation with colonial or apartheid-like policies or using colonial tactics.
There are consequences to this. Aside from the obvious violence and suffering that is perpetuated by the lack of adequate intervention and appropriate framing, improper framing signals that one country is sovereign and entitled to human rights and even entitled to violate the human rights of others in order to maintain their status, while the other’s human rights are up for debate.
The adoption or rejections of the existing framework are also indicative of what a realistic end to this conflict looks like. Many of the countries that frame the situation in
Palestine as an occupation also call for a two-state solution, failing to recognize that the goal of Israel is not to reach a solution, but to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from their native land. This major, intentional oversight in framing highlights the inappropriate use of the language of occupation when discussing the Palestine question. Most of the countries that use language of colonialism do not call upon this unrealistic solution to fix the ethnic cleansing taking place. While a few of the countries that use the language of 75 apartheid and colonialism call for a two-state solution, they also point out that the reality of the violence and the nature of Israel’s control erodes this possibility.
Emphasis on the importance of language regarding the situation in Palestine is only mentioned by those who use colonialism to describe it. Less importance is placed on the specific language used by those who are classifying it as a matter of occupation and not using appropriate language. There does not seem to be any correlation between those that use the language of colonialism and countries that are currently also occupied by
Israel, like Syria and Lebanon.
Water is discussed similarly in both occupation and colonial framings. It is brought up as both a consequence of violence and settlement expansion, as well as a means of further domination. The difference, again, is the inconsistency between the definition and the term that is used to classify what is going on. Using words like domination, expansionist, permanent systematic and displaced is indicative of much more than occupation, which is typically characterized by control of power, but an upholding of both human rights and established obligations.
Water deprivation and lack of access, like many other forms of Israeli violence and expansion, is spoken about, condemned, deplored, considered detrimental, concerns member states and NGO speakers, but rarely are talked about in ways that shift toward legitimate and tangible solutions. There does not seem to be much dispute over what is going on, nor that there are numerous violations of international law. There is also little disagreement that Israel acts with impunity due to both the failures of the international 76 community and Israel’s complete disregard for established law. There is only discrepancy in the willingness of entities to appropriately discuss the issues for what they truly are.
There are some common arguments made by several speakers/representatives.
The most common is the failure of the international community and UN HRC to enforce international law, resolutions and treaties. Linked to those failures is Israeli impunity and the country’s failure to uphold its obligations to the Palestinian people living in occupied territories. This is also an indicator of the disconnect between recognizing the true nature of Israeli action as being colonial practice intended to eliminate the native. The right to self-determination is also often reaffirmed by the various nations and NGOs as well as the clear violations of international human rights. All statements which mention the
Special Rapporteur Lynk call upon Israel to allow him into the Palestinian territory in order to fulfill his responsibilities.
Conclusion
Because of the international framework of occupation that the UN HRC has adopted, discussions regarding agenda item 7 perpetuate a routinized, ritualized maintenance of the status quo. If international bodies, whose sole purpose is to uphold international law and restore and maintain justice and peace, fail to intervene session after session, year after year, there must be a challenge to the existing framework of occupation and a reckoning with its implications. Despite all of the failures to resolve patterns of violence, displacement and oppression, Palestinians survive.
77
Chapter 4: The Failure of Oslo II: Imbalanced Power, Unfit Tactics and
Disregarded Roots
Introduction
On September 13, 1993, Bill Clinton opened negotiations for Oslo II, the second major set of agreements contained in the Oslo Accords, by describing the colonization of
Palestine as “one of history's defining dramas, a drama that began in the time of our ancestors when the word went forth from a sliver of land between tide river Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea.”15 In describing the situation in Palestine as a “drama,” Clinton minimizes and almost romanticizes the horrific reality of settler colonial violence. He frames it as a spectacle to be watched on network television, rather than a real-life event embedded in tragedy, loss and ethnic cleansing. President Clinton’s dismissive and derogatory word choice is a foreshadowing of Oslo’s failures, and his intentional brushing off of millions of Palestinians who have been displaced or have died as a result of settler colonial tactics serves as its own representation of the problems embedded in the misunderstandings of the Palestine question.
Many international agreements have been made throughout history to resolve severe conflicts, including Palestine. The Oslo Accords, which took place from 1993 until 1995, was a series of agreements decided in its namesake city, Oslo, Norway. Oslo
II, which followed Oslo I, was a meeting of the United States, Israel and Palestine intended to reach a resolution regarding the strife and disaster which permeated the two
15 For a transcript of Clinton’s full speech, see Jewish Virtual Library 2021. 78 latter countries. The Oslo Accords were referred to as a peace process. There had never been such an extensive, international effort to confront the settler colonial project in
Palestine and establish a peace-making framework. This framework was largely influenced by the United States and strategies familiar to the Western powerhouse.
The Oslo Accords are, of course, entirely political. The power dynamics and representation at play in the first Oslo agreement became even more stark in its implementation. Considering what is at stake for each country highlights the different power positionings they occupy. Scholars point out that the success of these agreements for Israelis will bring a greater sense of personal security, but for Palestinians will bring sovereignty, opportunity and recognition (Rouyer 1999). This chapter argues that political negotiations must acknowledge the structures and conditions of settler colonialism if they have any chance at success, and as long as they do not identify power imbalances, the settler colonial conditions and historical context, then they are doomed to fail.
The Oslo Accords and the misrepresentation of Palestine throughout their negotiations remind us that Palestinian identities and politics are often, and unfortunately, framed as inextricable from the Israeli crisis. While scholars point out that the Palestinian identity and politics has been shaped by centuries of their own development, not just their relationship to Israel, Palestinian politics exist within a settler colonial context, which is a key consideration in evaluating them (Hilal 2004).
Perhaps one of the most damning aspects of Oslo II is its failure to address the root causes of the settler colonial violence, displacement and ethnic cleansing. Truth and 79 reconciliation are key in initiating any sort of successful peace process (Hill 2008). If the agreement does not name the systematic elimination of Palestinians, there can be no steps toward real progress or peace. Instead, scholars argue, the Oslo peace process chose to take an “interest based” approach instead of a “justice based” one (Hill 2008, 154). The underlying logic for this choice was that if the negotiations were removed from the more polarizing issues of the conflict, they would be more successful and lead to incremental change, rather than continuing a stalemate. While this idea seems reasonable, it fails to address the fundamental cause of conflict. By neglecting to address settler colonial domination, the processes become futile. Instead, Oslo II addresses the context of
Palestine as a land dispute. This includes the geographic and cultural differences of water disputes in Palestine that require a different set of protocols that actually address how the settler colonial strategy of resource deprivation contributes to the elimination of native
Palestinians (Rouyer 1999).
By reducing settler colonial patterns of disempowerment, disenfranchisement and dispossession to a land dispute, none of the root problems are able to be resolved.
Further, referring to the land as simple real estate erases the racial and historical context of the Palestine Question and highlights the priorities of the Western powers involved and their failure to consider priorities other than capital gains (Hill 2008, 155). This also creates a false equivalence between Palestine and Israel regarding their role and power in resolving the conflict --forcing Palestine to negotiate within the existing status quo, further subjecting them to oppression and silencing any objection or suggestion they 80 have. In order for Palestinians to even have a seat at the table, they must accept Israel's legitimacy, which is responsible for Palestinian oppression (Hill 2008).
This chapter demonstrates the failures of the Oslo Accords and attributes their failure to the settler colonial context in which the two powers exist. In this chapter, I argue that there is nothing for Palestine to gain from negotiations if they are targeted for elimination. Inversely, there is nothing for Israel to lose if they seek to eliminate
Palestinian people, and they already hold all of the power. In order to make any progress regarding settler colonial violence, it must be named and reckoned with, then an approach must be constructed within a logical framework for the expectations, ultimate goals and values of the parties involved.
This chapter provides a brief overview of Oslo I, which is important to understand as a failed negotiation preceding Oslo II, followed by a brief overview of Oslo II. The chapter then describes Oslo II’s provisions, including water provisions, in detail. The chapter ends by demonstrating that the agreement was doomed to failure because of the power differences, and the assumption that this agreement would ever address the root causes of Palestinian disempowerment, displacement and disenfranchisement.
Oslo Accords: Good Intentions?
The Oslo Accords are a series of agreements between Israel and Palestine, with some participation by outside countries such as the United States. Oslo I (1993), also known as the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, was the first agreement of the Oslo Process which served as a framework of principles designed to promote peace between Israel and Palestine. Both Yasser 81
Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) at the time, and
Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the agreement. Former President Bill
Clinton witnessed the signing and participated in the negotiations.
The Oslo peace process was essentially created out of thin air. It was not based on any past peace processes and was left to American negotiators and officials to create.
Chomsky & Pappe (2010, 30) describe the outcome as “disastrous fruits” born from
“theoretical games” which had devastating consequences that are still present today.
Although the Oslo accords initially had very little US involvement, they became a political tool used for the benefit of the unpopular President Clinton. Scholars add that at the time, it was one of the few positively perceived actions of Clinton’s presidency, and it looked like it would work considering the pressure the US and Israel put on Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (Chomsky & Pappe 2010). This is indicative of the power relations and politics that shape peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine. It further implicates the role of the U.S. government as a known ally with Israel in assisting in the misrepresentation of Palestinian needs in the Oslo Accords.
One of the important agreements included in Oslo I, Article V, dictated that
Israeli troops would withdraw over a five-year period from Gaza and Jericho, allowing a smooth transition into a two-state solution after the finalization of all negotiations. This provided incentive for Arafat to agree. However, the withdrawal did not happen as settlements expanded, and conflict continued, leading to the signing of Oslo II.
According to Kelman (1998), the Oslo Accords contained two simultaneous processes: first, “distributive bargaining between two parties with unequal power,” which 82 describes the Declaration of Principles (DOP); and second, “an initial, rudimentary stage of a process of reconciliation,” which is related to the exchange of letters between Arafat and Rabin containing mutual recognition of each state’s legitimacy (Kelman 1998, 37).
The two main agreements were intended to serve as an introduction and layout of the agreements to follow as well as their goals, followed by the negotiations themselves.
Focusing on the latter, this chapter emphasizes that the negotiations never took place and the settler colonial violence which is the root cause of the ongoing crisis in Palestine, was never addressed.
The diplomatic framework of the Oslo Accords included “negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration” as well as the “methods of conflict resolution that emphasized not the content of the negotiating positions but the process of interaction confidence building, education for mutual understanding, and the pursuit of superordinate goals, including economic incentives” (Sabet 1998). The DOP outlined the main goals of the negotiations, which included an interim Palestinian Authority in hopes of permanent statehood. With at least potential statehood on the horizon, Palestinians held onto hope for a sovereign and peaceful future. Analysis of the terms and dynamics of Oslo II indicates that peace was never an option.
Oslo II: Contextualizing Negotiations
Oslo II, also known as the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip, was one of the agreements that followed the framework set up by Oslo I. Despite its namesake, Oslo II was signed in Taba, Egypt. The main conditions agreed to by
Yasser Arafat were the creation of a Palestinian National Authority (PNA or PA), the 83 creation of a Palestinian police force, which would bring in aid money from the US, a vow against terrorism and the recognition of Israel by Palestinian leaders. In exchange,
Prime Minister Rabin agreed to demilitarize the territories while maintaining rule over the territory. Palestinians were not granted statehood, but negotiations hinted at the potential for statehood following successful self-government. Oslo II also included several sets of environmental and water provisions.
There are many outside forces which contribute to both Israeli and Palestinian positions of power. Military force, resource scarcity, appropriate legal frameworks and media framing all contribute to the politics and power dynamics of an agreement like
Oslo II. The documents of the agreement also very explicitly demonstrate the unequal power and exploitation of Palestine. In the case of the Oslo Accords, this unequal power is exacerbated by the heavy involvement of the US, Israel’s ally, in the peace process.
The preamble of Oslo II, which is similar to the Declaration of Principles contained in
Oslo I, reflects this differential reading:
Recognizing that the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the
current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, i.e. the elected Council
(hereinafter "the Council" or "the Palestinian Council"), and the elected
Ra'ees of the Executive Authority, for the Palestinian people in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years
from the date of signing the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho 84
Area (hereinafter "the Gaza-Jericho Agreement") on May 4, 1994, leading
to a permanent settlement.
However, potential for statehood and limited autonomy is not what Palestine has been fighting and advocating for from the beginning of settler colonial activity, through the
Oslo Accords, until the present day. Already, the document makes clear that Palestine has had to and is expected to make concessions. Palestine does not want, nor has ever wanted, a nongovernmental authority. It is very clear that Palestinian goals are rooted in full sovereignty and the restoration of the right to self-determination. The goal is not the potential for statehood, the goal is statehood, but that is simply not an option for Arafat, and Palestinian leaders have little to no leverage throughout these negotiations. Arafat was forced to choose between little progress and no progress (Kelman 1998). Israel was not forced to make these types of concessions or reckon with the lesser of two evils, despite its goals being less integral to Israeli identity, existence and survival.
There are several provisions of Oslo II that detail the specific terms of water agreements, most importantly Israeli recognition of Palestinian water rights. Other provisions include both sides recognizing the necessity of continuing to develop water resources, the sharing of water and sewage in each authority’s respective areas, and responsibility for the maintenance, protection, sustainability, sanitation and respect for their own and the others’ water and water infrastructure. Although this appears to be progress, the vague language and rudimentary development of each provision indicates otherwise. In Article 40, the first two principles recognize Palestinian water rights, but only say that “these (water rights) will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations 85 and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement relating to the various water resources.”
These negotiations never took place.
Further, the agreement is riddled with ambiguity. Oslo II contains many phrases to the effect of “in a manner which will ensure” followed by whatever abstract notion has the potential to lead to progress but does not actually lay out steps or solutions to doing so. Another principle which utilizes such language is Principle E which reads, “Taking all necessary measures to prevent any harm to water resources, including those utilized by the other side” (1995, 144). By failing to provide detail regarding what “necessary measures” may look like or what counts as “harm to water resources” and then never parsing this out as the accords progressed, the agreement leaves room for exploitation and varying interpretation. It allows for an easy excuse or cover-up for human rights abuses or breaches in the agreement. It also does not address Israeli domination as one of the main threats to Palestinian water, again missing the point that Palestinians do not need protection as much as they need sovereignty and an end to settler colonial occupation.
The use of vague language and the failure to address the root causes of water deprivation constitutes a refusal to acknowledge the atrocity that occurs due to the systemic nature of settler colonial violence. This indicates an intentional erasure of not only the power imbalance, but also the historical suffering and persistent struggle of
Palestinians. All of these things are indicative of a settler colonial context, as the goal is to eliminate the native Palestinian, as well as their culture, history and memory (Feldman
2019; Sālim 2018; Veracini 2011; Wolfe 2008). The Oslo Accords are a part of this settler colonial structure, made obvious by Bill Clinton’s description Palestinian suffering 86 at the outset, as well as the vague language throughout the accords which reflect the power imbalance and concessions of Palestinian wants, needs and goals. Perhaps more devastating, the Oslo Accords also erase the violence of settler colonialism, allowing a new, more digestible narrative to be perpetuated by the colonizer, denying any contradiction from the oppressed and vulnerable, allowing the violence to continue (Cox
2017).
There are specific conditions included in the water accords that, at face value, seem like legitimate steps in the right direction, but all of it operates under the assumption that each side not only will uphold their end of the deal but also that they have the resources and shared understanding necessary to do so.
A joint Israeli-Palestinian water authority was established by Article 40 of Oslo
II, known as the Joint Water Committee (JWC). The JWC was intended to manage water and sewage related infrastructure in the West Bank, which included considering proposals and making decisions surrounding new and existing Palestinian and Israeli water infrastructure. The JWC represented both Palestine and Israel equally and granted both veto powers. However, since there is already so much existing and well-functioning water infrastructure and supply to Israel, most proposals that would be presented to the committee, and later were, are Palestinian (Rouyer 1999). Therefore, they would need
Israeli approval, which Rouyer (1999) points out is rare. The discrepancy in who is proposing what opposed to who is approving what only creates a facade of fairness. A truly fair system would consider the needs and existing infrastructure of each party and would factor that into the decision-making process. The false perception of fairness 87 perpetuates water instability and resource deprivation. It also silences peaceful compliance as well as Palestinian attempts to work within a system which is inherently against them, thus highlighting the pervasive nature of settler colonial strategies embedding themselves in international agreements. The JWC also included a trilateral committee containing Israel, Palestine and the US, which would oversee projects pertaining to water. This created another opportunity for US insertion and the reinforcement of Israeli decisions, given their relationship, between the conflicting countries.
One of the more seemingly progressive aspects of the establishment of the JWC was that both Palestine and Israel would have an equal number of representatives and that decisions would be reached by consensus along with equal veto power. However, this cannot create an equal system of decision making, because it relies on the assumption that each side is committed to both their own, and the other party’s wellbeing. This is not true due to the settler colonial context in which these two parties exist. Settler colonial oppression does not allow for equality in addressing the dominant and oppressive structures imposed on Palestinians when creating a strategy to address water deprivation.
It also failed to consider that because one side already has a robust water and sewage infrastructure, it does not need to propose as many, nor as crucial plans to build wells, pipe systems and mains, in order to have water access. Yet Israel was able to use the veto to halt Palestinian progress in creating infrastructure without losing many opportunities to build infrastructure necessary for upholding the rest of the agreement as it is dictated in the accords. 88
Oslo II dictates that “both sides have agreed that in the case of purchase of water by one side from the other, the purchaser shall pay the full real cost incurred by the supplier, including the cost of production at the source and the conveyance all the way to the point of delivery” (1995, 146). However, this fails to consider the difference in economic strength or the ability to increase and sustain economic growth, along with the fact that Israel has the ability to subsidize water for its own people, while Palestine does not. There is also no mention of any type of oversight that leads to the assumption that that responsibility falls on each respective country. To anyone considering the context and history of the question of Palestine, it is crucial to consider the position of power that the nation occupies, particularly in relation to Israel. There is a known power differential between the two countries which must be considered when approaching peace negotiations.
The Facade of Fairness: The Role of Power Dynamics in Negotiation
Despite the obvious imbalances of power in decision-making, Oslo II did allow for a Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) to take form, which is a step toward a more organized front in regard to water access in Palestine. The PWA was funded with its own budget and was able to create infrastructure where it had not previously existed.
Palestinians now had a means of repairing old or damaged pipes, manes and wells. They could also build new, if they were able to get a permit. As previously mentioned, permits are incredibly difficult to obtain, not only because of Israeli veto power, but also because of the complicated and strenuous process of submission (Rouyer 1999). This cumbersome process delays and ultimately deprives Palestinian’s access to natural 89 resources on their own land. Article 40 also dictated that more water would be allocated for Palestinian use, but Palestinians would have to pay the full commercial rate, unlike the subsidized rate paid by Israeli citizens. Palestinian experts argue that the permit is unsuccessful due to the slow nature of progress originating from Oslo II, pointing out the lack of tangible results. Rouyer (1999) argues that the delayed process has exacerbated the lack of water access. Palestinian critics point out the abuse of the veto power by Israel and claim that these delays and outright denials undermine the peace process writ large
(Rouyer 1999).
Aside from the abstract and imbalanced stakes, the agreement itself is riddled with reminders of the unequal status of Palestinians. Palestinians were widely excluded from having any real or legitimate say in the Oslo agreements -- particularly Indigenous and ethnic Palestinians, who make up a significant portion of the population in Israeli controlled territories (Nasasra 2019). Palestinian ethnic identity excludes them from realized human rights, sovereignty, land and identity. Unfortunately, all Palestinians are subject to violence, discrimination and oppression from Israel.
Nasasra (2019, 1) describes Palestinian identity as “straddled between being equal bearers of democratic rights in a non-liberal democratic state and being members of a shunned and discriminated against minority.” This citizenship by word but not practice is the basis of their exclusion from the Oslo accords and subsequent negotiations.
Scholars note that the refugee crisis following 1948 was not addressed until the final stage of negotiations, while many topics important to Palestinians were never even discussed. 90
These topics, including “the concerns of the Palestinians in Israel, their internally displaced persons, land claims, Internally Displaced People (IDPs), rights, prisoners, and family reunification,” were not included in any of the negotiations or addressed by the countries involved (Nasara 2019, 2).
It is important to keep in mind that the DOP did not explicitly grant independent statehood to Palestine, nor did it prohibit the expansion of Israeli settlements or address the refugee crisis. These exclusions indicate the power differential between the negotiating countries. Kelman (1998) adds that the intentional vagueness included throughout the Oslo Accords also played to Israel’s position as the more powerful party, as it created the circumstances for unsavory issues talked about ambiguously which later allowed Israel to resolve them to their benefit.
The aftermath is also indicative of whose interests mattered throughout negotiations. There is a disregard for the slow progress and continued suffering that persists decades later. Right wing politicians opposed Oslo from its conception and continue to deny the need for any peace agreements with Palestine short of their full surrender.
Because of this established power differential, any concessions made by Israel are really only mitigating concessions made by Palestinians. In other words, Israel does not have to concede any of their expectations or goals, because their concessions are just allowing Palestinians to concede less. This reduces the negotiation process to the powerful imposing a resolution that benefits the powerful onto the powerless. This imposition leads to a reality in which Palestinians lose every time if the negotiation 91 framework is not constructed to ensure equality and fairness. Further, if the framework neglects the fact that this is not a Western problem and all of the nuance that is associated with addressing such systematic violence in non-Western contexts is lost.
Allowing the United States to play such an active role in creating the diplomatic framework for the Oslo Accords compromised the core subjects of concern to
Palestinians (Sabet 1998). Whether or not this was intentional is irrelevant, as it serves to further prove that by failing to approach these negotiations through a Palestinian lens, rather than a Western one, the peace process was doomed to fail from the outset. This shift requires considering the difference in values between Palestinians and Westerners.
Palestinians are motivated by the content of the process and the entitlement to the land, while Westerners are focused on the process of the negotiations. Sabet (1998) notes that these differing focuses can work together as long as they exist within the same logical framework.
Arab states wanted to exchange the return of their land for peace, which is a concise and simple agreement. This type of agreement involves a conditional exchange: if no land is returned, violence will not cease (Sabet 1998). If this approach would have been utilized more readily, Palestinians would have had more power throughout the process. However, this power cannot come from Islamist resistance, as disorganized and random attacks cannot be classified as war violence and can be quelled by police forced in Israel, rendering negotiations for peace irrelevant. 92
Doomed from the Start: The Consequences of Ignoring Fundamental Flaws
By maintaining the status quo, domination through settler colonialism relies, in part, on respectability politics regarding “good Palestinians” who are peaceful and not terrorists (Hackl 2020). To many familiar with the project to eliminate Palestinians from their land, the notion of terrorist/civilized binary seems absurd, but its efficacy as a narrative remains dangerous. These self-serving narratives of terrorism imply that where there are good, submissive, peaceful Palestinians, there are also Palestinians who are inherently the opposite, excluding context for which non peaceful resistance is the result of circumstance, not inherent savagery (Mamdani 2002). Further, any challenge to the status quo is viewed as “extremist” -- a framing that serves as further justification for the exclusion of Palestinians from the dialogue (Hill 2008, 157). This is also an extension of settler colonialism, as Palestinians’ placement within such a binary makes them eligible for participation in negotiations, citizenship, discourse and access to things you are entitled to, but kept from otherwise (Hackl 2020).
Another failure of the approach Oslo II took is that it did not involve the public to take part in this new type of relationship between Israel and Palestine. Rather than gain insight from the public on what future and long-term relations and resolution had the potential to look like, the leaders prioritized their own image as pragmatists. This led to a lack of education regarding both the context necessary to understand why the Oslo
Accords were necessary and the efforts to work as partners.
The dialogue itself is a crucial condition to discussing what truth and reconciliation look like, and, according to Hill (2008, 157), “‘dialogue' (is) a means of 93 monopolizing and securing that discourse against awkward questions of power, history and politics.” Oslo was never going to be a successful step toward peace, because it never even acknowledged the root problem it was trying to address. Instead, it was an agreement formed through coercion and without legitimacy.
The Shortcomings of Western Strategies
Throughout Oslo and Netanyahu’s subsequent Israeli administration, reciprocity was a term often used to center Israeli demands. However, as scholars point out, in order to have reciprocity, each party’s rights and obligations need to be met. There is an established pattern of Palestinian rights not being met and Israeli obligations being ignored (Kelman 1998). There is no question that Israel is the party with disproportionate power and control, therefore obligated to initiate the acknowledgement of the other state’s legitimacy Kelman (1998). Israel is also the party mainly responsible for obstructing the peace process. Inversely, if Palestine is unable to meet its own needs, it cannot even begin to acknowledge what the other party is asking them to reciprocate. In other words, “to create the atmosphere required for negotiating a principled peace, Israel will have to declare and demonstrate that it attaches value to the lives and welfare of
Palestinians and respects their rights and dignity” (Kelman 1998, 48).
Another important strategy utilized throughout Oslo was negotiation., the use of language to resolve conflict. Sabet (1998) elaborates on this stating that the main principle of negotiation as a tool for conflict resolution is for one party to exploit its adversary’s weakness and capitalize on its own strengths. This makes negotiation both something that can lead to great gains but can also exacerbate existing violence and 94 oppression. The power dynamics, politics and outside influence which each party is subject to all play a role in how negotiations turn out, typically resulting in whichever party has the most power getting what it wants.
When negotiating, concessions are always involved. However, to be “fair,” (Sabet
1998, 11) concessions cannot change what each party is expecting to get out of negotiations in the first place. This is applicable to Palestine in the Oslo Accords. Before negotiations even began during the Oslo Accords, Palestine had reduced its expectations down to being granted statehood which was located in most of the West Bank and Gaza.
This expectation was further diluted by conceding to no promise of statehood at all, instead, only the potential for statehood.
Negotiation also requires the application of the same rules equally to each party.
Again, if the power dynamic is unequal and one party is able to take advantage of this, negotiation ceases to exist, and coercion takes its place. The “negotiations”' changed to unilateral decisions being made by the party in power which is in this case, Israel.
Scholars note that this is not indicative of the change to Netanyahu’s administration, rather a reflection of Israeli strategy and a tactful mirage which makes Arab leaders think that a change back to a labor administration will bring about progress (Sabet 1998).
The context of negotiation matters in determining the proper strategy for handling conflict (Donohue and Hoobler 2002). Donohue and Hoobler argue that the question of which context depends on the “ripeness,” refers to two conditions which make 95 negotiation necessary.16 Those two conditions are a mutually hurting stalemate and a mutually enhancing opportunity, meaning, both sides have something to gain through negotiation, and will continue to lose if they refuse. The Palestinian situation lacks these conditions, so negotiation was not, nor ever would have been, an appropriate way to handle the conflict (Donohue and Hoobler 2002).
As the conditions necessary for fair negotiations were not present, Palestinians were largely excluded from the dialogue through concession, and the inherent power differentials and ignoring the settler colonial context led to the failure of the Oslo peace process. (Morrison 2020; Hill 2008; Rothstein 2006; Kelman 1998; Sabet 1998). The step-by-step approach did not fit the needs of Palestinians, regardless of leadership change or attitudes or recognition of rights. This is because the approach was a Western one, with inherently different values and goals in mind. A Western approach cannot solve a non-Western dispute because it will never address what is deemed necessary by the parties involved.
To Westerners, the Oslo accords were viewed as legal documents rather than a partnership, which could have led to real progress; the accords were not viewed as the latter due to anxieties surrounding extremist Islamic ideology (Kelman 1998; Sebat
1998). Sebat (1998, 17) argues that the attitude of fear surrounding Islam “reflects the fear that Western settlement mechanisms do not and cannot meet the basic human needs
16 Ripeness is defined by Zartman (2000) as “a condition” which “indicates when conflicting or third parties can fruitfully initiate negotiations.” 96 of the region's people.” This outcome seems almost inevitable, because Western countries have simply never had to consider the wants or needs of the colonized, because they are always the more powerful colonizer.
Another fundamental issue with Western involvement is the efforts put forth by the US to construct common goals between Israel and Palestine. The two nations do not have common goals, in fact, their goals are polar opposites, which will not change by forcing them into a peace process that assumes there is common ground to be shared.
Sabet (1998, 15) adds that “this is especially true when conventional Western conflict resolution principles hold that ‘peacemaking’ is not possible until conflicts have ripened, that is, until costs have escalated to the point where parties are prepared to settle.”
The Palestinian perspective registers this as an unwinnable endeavor, such that any semblance of peace according to American Israeli control will “constitute the region's new interest [and] will require the transformation of the region's identity” (Sabet 1998,
16). The total transformation of the region’s identity would be the result of a completed settler project and the total erasure of Palestinian people.
Conclusion
The failure of Oslo II is more than a failed land negotiation. It is the blatant dismissal of the settler colonial violence which permeates the lives of Palestinians every day. The Oslo Accords are highly political as they represent the interests of distinct nations whose relationship is based on one oppressing the other. The clear power gap between Palestine and Israel precludes negotiations from mitigating violence, restoring international relations or upholding human rights. By refusing to acknowledge this 97 reality, and promised negotiations never happening, the status quo is maintained. Further,
Israel is allowed to rewrite the historical narrative to benefit the version of history that benefits its goals. All the while, Palestinians are forced to choose between remaining powerless, stateless and oppressed and the potential for survival.
Any attempt at problem-solving between Israel and Palestine must involve a reckoning with the fact that the two nations do not currently share common goals, power or understanding of the settler colonial regime. Further, there must be an inclusive dialogue of both governments and the people they serve, especially Indigenous
Palestinians. If political negotiations fail to do this, there will never be an end until
Palestinians are silenced forever.
Though intervention is necessary and there is no question that Palestinians do suffer, they also have agency and power in their individual and collective voices. The only way to defeat settler colonialism is to persist and survive, which is done physically, but also through art, history and culture. In an attempt to restore their own memory while drawing attention to the settler colonial violence, Palestinians write resistance literature. The next chapter contains a textual analysis of Ghassan Kanafani’s, “Men in the Sun.” The textual analysis will reveal the role that Palestinians’ perspectives play in survival, resistance and imagining a liberated future.
98
Chapter 5: People in the Sun” Survival Through Popular Resistance Literature
Introduction
Why didn’t you knock on the sides of the tank? Why didn’t you say anything? Why?
The desert suddenly began to send back the echo.
Why didn’t you knock on the sides of the tank? Why didn’t you bang on the sides of the tank? Why? Why? Why?
Ghassan Kanafani, Men in the Sun (1962)
“And then what?”
Then What? A woman soldier shouted”
Is that you again? Didn’t I kill you?
I said: You killed me … and I forgot, like you, to die.
Mahmoud Darwish, In Jerusalem (2007)
The final lines of Kanafani’s novella and Darwish’s poem both speak to survival as resistance. In Men in the Sun, the question “Why?” is a plea to the lifeless bodies inside the water tanker which represent the many who have fled or died at the hands of settler colonial violence. This lack of agency serves as a warning to Palestinians everywhere to resist and to carry on, rather than become yet another faceless refugee or a memory erased by a tragedy.
Darwish takes a different approach to a similar end. He represents the ability of life to exist through literature, legacy and land. Death in the physical form does not always indicate an end to these three things. This powerful notion is representative of the meaningful relationship Palestinians have with their land and identity. If the settler 99 colonial regime accomplishes its goals to eliminate native Palestinians, there will only be one narrator of Palestinian history and identity, but resistance literature provides alternate perspectives.
Kanafani’s passage is juxtaposed by Darwish’s poetry, which does not critique a lack of agency, but emphasizes the ability of Palestinians to survive and resist settler colonialism. Despite the different messages contained in each of these excepts, both serve as reminders that Palestinian history, culture and life is contained in literature. Both
Darwish and Kanafani were born in Palestine and became refugees as a result of Israeli domination. Both men are diaspora writers, who lived in terrible refugee camps and experienced different kinds of suffering and loss at various stages in their lives as
Palestinians. These complex and traumatizing life experiences inevitably influence their writing styles in distinct ways.
This chapter examines Ghassan Kanafani’s novella Men in the Sun as a form of resistance in order to understand how rights are spoken about by writers and understood by everyday people. Resistance writing is a unique form of survival and resistance in its ability to withstand the test of time as well as to mobilize the masses. In order to understand the circumstances which, make resistance literature necessary and relevant, I offer a brief overview of the history and context of Palestinian resistance literature along with an overview of methods used to analyze the text and the actual analysis, highlighting three key themes and concludes with its findings. All of this contributes to the idea that literature is not only a political tool, but also an effective means of combating settler colonialism and surviving through the restoration of history, culture and identity. 100
This chapter explores literature as a significant form of resistance for Palestinians and reveals the key factors in resistance writing, its history, and its use among everyday people. Palestinian resistance literature is also typically written in Arabic, the native language of Palestinians, which further contributes to the preservation and transmission of culture. Through a textual analysis of Ghassan Kanafani’s novella, Men in the Sun, this chapter examines the collective restoration of memory by Palestinians through popular resistance literature as it has been and is influenced by colonization, water rights and the literature itself. The textual analysis also reveals the salient themes of Palestinian survival and resistance through restoration, reclamation and resilience. The data is presented with an interview with Dr. Tahrir Hamdi, a Palestinian resistance literature expert.
Literature as Survival: More Than Abstract Stories
Palestinian resistance to domination through settler colonial force takes many forms. As scholars point out, settler colonialism is achieved through complete elimination of the native, this includes their history, culture and narrative (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016;
Veracini 2011; Wolfe 2008). A popular form of resistance among Palestinians developed through literature. Literature is a recorded account of culture and truth through the writer's eyes and offers a glimpse into the historical context in which they exist.
Literature prevents a permanent erasure by preserving such important narratives and perspectives which also triumph over settler colonialism, even if Palestinians in the present are being silenced. Palestinian resistance literature creates a form of survival separate from the physical body, allowing Palestinians to endure settler colonialism
(Wolfe 2008; Veracini 2011). 101
While all Palestinian resistance literature is rooted in a similar struggle, scholars note the difference between native and diaspora writing. Diaspora writing, while not always pulling from first-hand accounts of Israeli oppression, is rooted in refugee status due to displacement. Refugee accounts often discuss the overcrowded, unsanitary and degrading conditions in which they are forced to live and incorporate this into their narrative when writing. Diaspora Palestinians are not a monolith, of course, so there are notable differences within it as well. Class differences also play a role in narrative formation. Many Palestinian refugees were able to overcome class struggle by obtaining educations or by moving up through hard work. Many Palestinians who moved to oil-rich
Arab countries allowed for entrepreneurship and class mobility (Mir 2013).
Many diaspora Palestinians also have been able to find community in their new homes, which shapes the experiences apparent in their writing. Despite their differences and nuance, diaspora and native Palestinian writing is rooted in a shared struggle that has become central to their identity. Further, both diaspora and native Palestinian writers use
Arabic to express themselves through literature (Mir 2013).
The origins of resistance writing in Palestine lie in journalism. Due to the consistent chaos in the life of Palestinians, it made the most sense. According to Mir
(2013), cultural writing did not take much of a form until the nineteenth century. At that time, it was focused on poetry, historical writing and religious texts. About halfway through the century, Arab writers began translating texts from around the world which connected Eastern and Western literature tradition. This popularized novels, short stories 102 and literary criticism (Mir 2013). However, with the exception of a few poets, most of the political writing remained journalistic.
Following the 1950s, though Palestinian literature was still influenced by Western traditions, its own distinct form started to emerge. Despite the popularity of poetry at the time, and its shift toward political criticism, poems could not offer what short stories did.
Mir (2013) points out that short stories were able to produce an aesthetic, informed by new art forms as well as the political context which was imposed by Zionism. Short stories were rooted in reality, rather than abstraction. This is not to say that short story writers and novelists did not have their share of difficulty reaching that point. The formation of the Palestinian political and legal consciousness developed differently, Mir
(2013) suggests, because of the lack of education and opportunities. With no official state to seek guidance from, and no institutions supporting such a state, Palestinians were left to their own devices. The formation of legal and political consciousness, for Palestinians, was informed instead by cultural and historical events, as well as daily life.
One such event was the 1967 war. Diaspora writers dominated fiction and popularized literature after the war. Literature at this time, as well as throughout the twentieth century, was heavily influenced by whatever colonial power had control at the time. Palestinian writing was a form of freedom which allowed for the expression of their own experiences and perspectives in a new form. Palestinians were also empowered through writing to challenge western tradition and classical writing, innovating their own distinct style. Jayyusi (1977) notes that at the beginning of the 1900s, theory and practice 103 were conflicting, with theory having prevalence over practice. This changed in the 1950s in which concrete experiences were informing writers.
A common theme in Palestinian resistance literature, and all resistance literature, is bearing witness (Hamdi 2011). To bear witness means to communicate lived experiences or historical experiences which have been left out by the hegemonic or traditional history. Bearing witness often involves telling stories which include unthinkable tragedy are often used to reclaim both history and personal identity. In the words of Edward Said, bearing witness gives Palestinians “permission to narrate'' their own reality, because they have always been excluded from that historically (1984). Said adds that the collective Palestinian community must be the central messenger of this narrative and to realize the necessity of survival.
Scholars note that by bearing witness, Palestinian resistance literature transforms into something far more profound and powerful than themes and literary devices. In bearing witness through literature, Palestinians create a culture of resistance which lays the foundation for real progress and a united front against settler colonial domination.
Further, it allows for an empowered imagining of Palestine as a liberated nation, separate from oppression, violence and colonial force.
Hamdi (2011) and Mir (2013) point out that this subgenre is influenced by the same thing Palestinian existence is, the threat of erasure and loss. The inevitable shaping of Palestinians by their past and present is what calls them to reconstruct their own history, to be more than faceless refugees or enemies of the state (Mir 2013). Bearing witness is especially important to and for settler colonial societies, because through 104 refusal to be erased or eliminated, the accounts of Palestinians survive, which is the only true way to combat settler colonial forces (Mir 2013). The writer takes on the role of a guardian of the societies’ memory in restoring the history of its people. According to
Hamdi (2011), bearing witness also becomes a tool against the assassination against political writers. Though the writer themself is no longer able to guard the collective memory of Palestinians, they have already immortalized it through literature.
Political ideology also played a role in Palestinian literature. Scholars note that
Marxism provided both inspiration and space for Palestinian resistance literature over several decades (Mir 2013). As previously mentioned, Palestinian literature often involves a call to social movements, which is garnered from Marxist ideology. This ideology allowed for a relationship to be formed with the Israeli Communist party, or the
Rakah, founded in 1965. The Rakah was the only Israeli political party which was not
Zionist or discriminatory of Arabs. This relationship helped to keep Palestinian speech from being censored and allowed Palestinian writers to have a platform and engage with politics. Mir (2013) also points out that the Rakah should not be mistaken for a revolutionary party, as it still worked within the confines of the existing Israeli government and was a small minority. Nonetheless, it provided a crucial platform for
Palestinian self-expression where it did not exist before.
It is clear that literature is a political tool used to provoke thought, aid in the formation of legal and political consciousness and ultimately resist settler colonialism.
Harlow (2012, 13) describes resistance literature as a tool of “renewed struggle to recapture, recall, maybe even 105 relive or revive, the liberatory agendas, strategies, outlines, stories, short and long, visions that once led, could still lead,” to the liberation of Palestine.
Palestinian writing gives voice to and displays diversity among a people and culture that has been and is being systematically erased. According to Mir (2013),
“Palestinian writing emerges as diverse, imaginative and revolutionary in both content and form.” Reflective of the dignity and resilience of its people, Palestinian writing has been shaped by its tumultuous history, but more importantly, by the people it belongs to.
It is the people who heed the call of the past and present needing to be restored in order to ensure a future free from extraordinary struggle.
Ghassan Kanafani: Activist, Theorist and Writer
Hamdi (2011) describes Ghassan Kanafani as writing “the ultimate Palestinian narrative” due to his innovative writing style in the 1960s regarding the contemplation of the past and present in shaping the future. Further, Kanafani explores the inseparability of the past and present, which are inextricable from colonial oppression, but also Palestinian mistakes. Kanafani uses this logic to highlight the use of understanding the past and present to realize self-awareness in order to forge a new path in the future. Kanafani himself thought his identity as a political figure was derived from his identity as a novelist (Bano 2018). Despite the sufferings of many Palestinians, including Kanafani, he believes that after bearing the burden of this knowledge, forgiveness will take its place
(Hamdi 2011). Through his work, Kanafani is thought of as the father of Palestinian resistance literature and is considered “absolutely foundational” to the genre. 106
Ghassan Kanafani was born in 1936 in Acre, Palestine but fled with his family to
Lebanon in 1948 due to Israeli occupation and settlement efforts. Shortly after, his family lived in Damascus, Syria for a while. Later, Kanafani lived in refugee camps and channeled these experiences into his writing (Bano 2018). He eventually became a teacher at the Damascene refugee camp where he once lived (Mir 2013). While teaching,
Kanafani continued his own schooling at the University of Damascus but was expelled due to his political affiliation with Marxist ideology before he could complete it.
Though it did not necessarily help his legacy through traditional means of education, Kanafani’s affiliation with Marxist ideology contributed greatly to his writing.
This affiliation has origins in his involvement with the Movement of Arab Nationalists
(MAN) to which Kanafani was recruited by Dr. George Habash, another person whom
Kanafani drew inspiration from. Kanafani’s ideology was rooted in social revolution based in humanitarian cause (Bano 2018). Throughout his life and affiliation with various political groups, including the Palestine Liberation Movement, The Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Arab Nationalist movement, Kanafani edited several periodicals and newspapers (Bano 2018).
Kanafani thought himself to be a freedom fighter, and he spread messages of national unity which could be used to liberate Palestine. He produced several influential works throughout his life and founded and edited the PLFP newspaper al-Hadaf.
Because of his influence and activism, Kanafani was a threat to the status quo.
Kanafani and his niece were assassinated by the Mossad in Beirut, Lebanon, 1972. The pair were killed by a car bomb explosion. His death serves as a reminder of the many 107 attempts to erase Palestinian resistance literature, though his death in the physical form does not prevent life in his legacy. Kanafani’s story lives on through his writings and his ideology has influenced culture and history alike (Bano 2018, Hamdi 2011).
A Brief Summary of Kanafani’s Men in the Sun
Kanafani’s Men in the Sun centers around the journey of three men who are attempting to be smuggled to Kuwait in order to find work. The story starts with Abu
Qais, an old man who owned an olive grove and made a decent living before the occupation. Now, he is poor, and his wife just gave birth to a second baby, so he has decided to find a way to make money in Kuwait.
The second character is Assad whose uncle lent him money in the hopes that
Assad will return to marry his daughter. However, Assad doesn’t want to marry his cousin, he is not sure if he even wants to marry at all. So, he decides to travel to Kuwait so he can make his own money and have his own life.
The third character is Marwan, a young man with little money who is also looking for work in Kuwait. Marwan needs to support his mother and siblings, who were left by his father so that he could marry a rich woman. He hopes his financial success will make his father regret his decision and cause him to come home. After a failed attempt at negotiating the price of his smuggling, Marwan meets Abul Khaizuran, who will eventually be the smuggler who unites the three men. Abul Khaizuran allows Marwan to only pay five dinars, on the grounds that Marwan does not tell the other two men that he is paying less. 108
Khaizuran informs the men that they will be transported in an empty water tanker.
The men question Khaizuran’s competence and reliability as a driver, but he assures them he is skilled and that they would have been left in the desert by anyone else. After more quarreling, the men start their journey. The men, particularly Abu Qais, are worried about the heat, especially sitting inside the tanker, but Khaizuran again insists it will be only a few minutes until they can get out. While driving, Khaizuran has a flashback to his time as a soldier. He was captured and castrated. He feels physical pain as he remembers the traumatic event.
Finally, the men make it through the first checkpoint. After the first stop, the men are nearly dead and are frustrated with Khaizuran, who insists he was even faster than he originally said he would be. The men reluctantly enter the tank for another leg of their journey. The men are silent this time, each reflecting on their past, present and future.
The men have their last stop before beginning the final leg of their journey. They have grown even more weary and ill from the heat. Nevertheless, Khaizuran assures them everything is going to be fine and that the last leg is the easiest, anyway. As the men are talking, Khaizuran takes a big drink of water and then empties his supply over his head, without offering the men any. Without saying a word, the men get back into the tank.
Only a few minutes later, they make it to the final checkpoint. Khaizuran is welcomed inside, and the guards playfully ask him about his whereabouts. Aware of the time- sensitive nature of the stop, Khaizuran unsuccessfully tries to hurry the guards. The guards demand to hear about Khaizurans alleged escapades with women. Still, Khaizuran tries to get back to the lorry as quickly as possible, but the guards insist he tells them 109 sexually explicit stories from Basra. The length of the stories is enough to worry
Khaizuran about the wellbeing of the men, so he tries to rush through as quickly as possible.
He finally gets his papers signed and rushes back to the tanker. Khaizuran speeds through the desert until he finds a point out of sight to stop. He rushes to the tanker and opens it, yelling for the men. He gets into the tank where he realizes that the men have died. He feels sick and drives into the night, so he can put the bodies somewhere. He thinks about just dumping them, but it doesn’t feel right. Instead, he decides to put them with a rubbish pile, where authorities will find them and then bury them properly. After doing so, he started to walk back to the lorry, but turned around and took the money and valuables off of the men. Overwhelmed by the situation, Khaizuran tries not to scream.
Then, a thought occurred to him. He wondered why they did not knock on the sides of the tank. He repeated the thought aloud, growing more upset each time, until the desert echoed it back to him.
Water Symbolism: A Vessel of Life and Death
One of the novella’s main symbols is water. The symbol of the water tanker is the most obvious of all the references to water. However, there are several instances throughout the text which offer a more subtle look into water in Kanafani’s writing. The opening scene of Men in the Sun describes Abu Qais resting on the damp ground. As he takes a deep breath in, the smell of the damp earth reminds him of his wife, who he loves.
This is not only indicative of the comfort cool water brings, but the needs it fulfills in life. 110
The section about Abu Qais ends with him again lying on the wet ground, breathing it in, this signifies the cyclical nature of life through water.
The structure of the novella also mirrors significant water landmarks to
Palestinians. Kanafani divides the novella into several different parts describing the three travelers, the journey and their deaths. All of these sections have their own significance but also contribute to the larger point of the novella. In the section about Abu Qais, he recalls learning about the Tigris and Euphrates rivers which contribute to the larger Shatt al-Arab, just as the subsections contribute to the larger telling of the story. The Shatt also serves as a physical reminder of all that has been taken away from him due to the occupation. At the beginning of the novella, Abu Qais has a flashback to when he was a child, before the colonization. His teacher, Ustaz Selim, is quizzing him on the geography of the Shatt. As Abu Qais remembered,
This, then, was the Shatt that Ustaz Selim had spoken of ten years before.
Here he was lying thousands of miles and days away from his village and
Ustaz Selim’s school. The mercy of God be upon you Ustaz Selim, the
mercy of God be upon you. God was certainly good to you when he made
you die one night before the wretched village fell into the hands of the
Jews…It is true that the men were too busy to bury you and honor you in
your death. But all the same you stayed there. You stayed there (6).
This is related to the importance of physical and geographic space to Palestinians. A common theme in Palestinian literature, including Kanafani’s work and this novella, is the interdependent nature of the land and the Palestinian. To Palestinians, the land is not a 111 possession, it is a crucial component of their identity, which they have a “mystical affinity” for (Mir 2013, 124). Kanafani is also a diaspora writer, so the physical separation from his land can be reflected through his own life as a refugee.
Perhaps the most obvious and significant symbolism pertaining to water is the vessel in which the men are transported and eventually perish. The water tanker, which typically carries a necessity for life, is devoid of such a resource during the story.
According to Elmahdi and Hezam (2020), the tank being empty of what it is intended to carry makes it empty of life all together. The tank serves as a representation of the seemingly inevitable fate of Palestinians, unless they themselves destroy their own shackles, which bind them to their demise.
The lorry is also described in ways that suggest it is a hellish vessel, almost destined for tragedy. In the section labeled “Sun and Shade,” the narration details the thoughts of each of the three men. After telling what Abu Qais is thinking, Kanafani writes, “The lorry traveled on over the burning earth, its engine roaring remorselessly”
(27) This line is repeated three more times after each character's thoughts are revealed on the journey. This happens for two reasons. First, the passages reinforce the understanding of the awful conditions these men find themselves in, even as they foreshadow the fate that awaits them. Second, the repetition of the passages reflects Kanafani’s understanding of time. Perhaps these thoughts occur simultaneously, displaying the various complexities and contemplations of each character, humanizing the traditionally dehumanized refugee, or perhaps they occur across time, expressing the length of the journey in the hot, hellish vessel and the wicked nature of the universe to allow destruction and keep moving. 112
There is no question that the land is significant to Palestinians and in Palestinian resistance literature. The importance of land is represented through the journey itself, more specifically, through the desert. The desert and the conditions of it, are like the brutal and torturous conditions of Palestinian life. The narrator describes the desert as barren saying, “Abul Khaizuran drove his huge lorry for six hours over that treacherous ground, which looked hard and white because of a fine film of salt that had dried on the surface” (37) the film of salt indicates that there was water there at some point, which can be linked to life, just as there once was life in Palestine.
Why Didn’t You Knock on the Sides of the Tank?
Another key theme that Kanafani uses to critique Israel’s settler colonial violence is agency. The three men are fleeing from their problems in an attempt to make their lives better, instead of making the most of what they have to fight for a better life. Kanafani uses this representation to draw attention to the number of displaced Palestinians, who he thinks should have stayed in order to fight for their homes.
The death of the three men is significant in multiple ways. The first is that the men did not die on the first leg of their journey, despite the conditions being what ends up killing them. A simple explanation of this might just be that it is not logical to kill the three main characters in the beginning of a story, or that the repeated exposure to harsh conditions eventually killed them. However, there is a greater symbolism which Kanafani employs that speaks volumes about his thoughts on agency. The men nearly die from the first leg of the trip, yet they continue, knowing the dire situation they repeatedly put themselves in. The men choose to expose themselves to such conditions, knowing they 113 may perish as a result. This is indicative of the very conditions which Palestinians in the homeland as well as diaspora Palestinians are subject to. They know the risk they take by submitting to the conditions, and it ends up, or will end up as Kanafani warns, killing them.
The men are not the only thing that perishes, though. By leaving, and subsequently dying, the men leave behind “their dreams, their families, their hopes and their ambitions, their misery and despair, their strength and weakness, their past and futures if it were pushing against the immense door to a new, unknown destiny, and all eyes were fixed on the doors surface as though bound to it by invisible threads” (26).
This is another way in which the death of these men is significant. Kanafani highlights the consequences of giving up or fleeing away in submission to the occupation.
In the final pages of the novella, the theme of agency is most apparent. Khaizuran, in the midst of experiencing myriad emotions regarding the death of the three men, has a moment of clarity. He thinks to himself, “Why didn’t they knock on the sides of the tank?” This thought progresses into a scream and then is echoed back to him by the desert. Khaizuran wonders why these men died so willingly, why they did not fight, or risk being caught in order to at least survive. This serves as a warning to Palestinians not to be idle in the face of their own suffering.
The Guise of Obligation
It is important to point out that Kanafani himself was a refugee for the majority of his life, which affects the messaging and criticism he embeds within the novella. His life was shaped by the conflict and he is surely aware that none of it exists in a vacuum. 114
While Kanafani calls out the consequences of limited agency, he does not place the onus on Palestinians alone.
Kanafani uses Abul Khaizuran to represent a leader who is responsible for transporting the men safely to Kuwait. He has a financial and moral obligation to ensure that they survive the journey and to minimize discomfort in their lives along the way.
However, this does not happen. Khaizuran fails to uphold his obligation and the men perish despite his promises of safe travels. This is representative of Arab leadership,
Israeli leadership and the international community’s failure to uphold human rights.
Further, Khaizuran fails to even hear the men out when they voice discomfort or concern. For example, Marwan and Abu Qais question the plan’s safety, saying, “Listen,
Abul Khaizuran. I don’t like the sound of this game. Can you imagine it? In heat like this, who could sit in a closed water tank?” Abul Khaizuran responds, “Don’t make a mountain out of a molehill.” This represents the brushing off of the larger problem of settler colonial violence by the international community and Israel.
In a way, the men themselves represent a failure of obligation, with their wives and children or siblings being the collateral. These men took on the responsibility of caring and providing for their families when they entered that union, yet they are unable to make decent livings. Even in attempting to do so, they fail, leaving their families even worse off than before. This theme is not lost on the men themselves. Marwan has harbored anger and resentment for both his father and brother for seeking out lives that are better for themselves. His father married someone with a wealthy family, eliminating his financial problems but leaving his wife and children as collateral. His brother 115 continued living his own life, making his own family, instead of staying to take care of his mother and siblings. Now, Marwan, too has abandoned his family, and though it was not his intention, he will never return.
The theme of agency is visited by the final few pages, but it is also relevant to critiques of the international community. At the end, readers are left with Khaizuran crying, “Why?” This is Kanafani too, crying, “Why?” As Elmahdi and Hezam (2020) suggest, Kanafani is asking the reader why Palestinians are allowed to die so haphazardly. The silent tank symbolizes Palestinian cries for help, which have been displaced and ignored by the international community. The men are just three more refugees suffocating from unlivable and torturous conditions, only to be lost to oblivion along with the hundreds of thousands of displaced and refugee Palestinians. There is no way to say for certain that the men did not cry out, but no one heard or cared to intervene.
The omniscient narrator chooses to withhold this information in order to uphold
Kanafani’s greater warnings surrounding agency and responsibility.
Kanafani does leave us with a note of optimism. The death of the men, and their lack of banging on the walls, is also interpreted as not needing “the chariot of death, because they will know the way to the sun of real life” (Elmahdi and Hezam 2020, 39).
Death is insignificant, because these men and their story lives on forever, they did not die in vain because their spirit survives, even though their physical bodies have not.
Literature as Enduring, Survival and Imagining
Through literary devices, Kanafani not only tells the story of three men searching for better lives but also offers an allegory, a warning and a call to action. Kanafani’s 116 writing is entrenched in political meaning and criticism of the system that relegates
Palestinians to helpless refugees, or a death toll only to be quickly forgotten. Kanafani bears witness to the Palestinian experience through his writing and fulfills a calling that experts describe as necessary for the culture of resistance to lay a foundation for the imagining of a liberated Palestine.
Resistance literature is one of the ultimate tools against settler colonialism. This story was written decades ago, but the themes and messaging live on alongside
Kanafani’s legacy, which will most likely never be forgotten. Resistance through survival is the only true way to end settler colonialism.
This writing is doing its own part by being remembered several generations after
Kanafani in the fight for Palestinian liberation and offers an opportunity for Palestinians to use their collective voice. Through the use of literature as a means of survival and resistance, Palestinians are able to imagine their identity as liberated people, having nothing to do with oppression. Even if they do not agree with Kanafani, readers are forced to reckon with his critique, symbolism and tragedy with their own reality.
Perhaps the most telling of all evidence that literature allows Palestinians to not only survive, but imagine their liberation, has nothing to do with this particular novella at all. Instead, it is the assassination of Kanafani. Assassinations are inherently political, and though Kanafani was well known for being a Palestinian activist, he is forever remembered as a writer. It is also worth noting that his activism’s most salient form was the writing he produced and the people he inspired. Kanafani’s assassination, while 117 devastating and gruesome, is also evidence of the threat which popular resistance literature poses to settler colonialism and the regimes which perpetuate it.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that popular resistance literature is a political tool as well as a means of survival and resistance to the erasure and elimination of Palestinians.
Perhaps most importantly, resistance literature provides power and voice to groups of people whose cries have gone unanswered. Popular resistance literature in Palestine can be used by anyone who wishes and can also be used to educate those who do not have access to information or accurate history otherwise. It also works against censorship and erasure of Palestinian narratives and history, which is perpetuated today, even in academic settings all over the world.
All of this is necessary for the survival of the Palestinian people. Further,
Palestinian resistance literature makes a difference in how the question of Palestine is discussed, the popular narrative, the international aid and ultimately, the survival of an entire ethnic group. Such a survival is indicative of the success of these efforts by political activists, writers, artists, teachers, historians and everyday people. These efforts also influence the way elected officials and international leaders form allyships, advocate for or simply listen to the plight of Palestinians.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
The framework of occupation is not suitable for resolving settler colonial dispossession, displacement and disempowerment. The framework of occupation does not allow for legal discussions or political negotiations to adequately address the ongoing
Israeli project to eliminate and displace Palestinians from their native land. At the international legal level, this framework creates a routinized and ritualized way of discussing human rights without implementing change or ensuring that “occupying” powers uphold their obligations. At the political level, this framework incorrectly assumes that each negotiating party has shared interest in peace and harmony, while ignoring obvious power imbalances, opposing goals and the history of apartheid law, indiscriminate killing and unjust treatment which Israel has subjected Palestinians to.
By failing to intervene, uphold human rights, ground negotiations in reality and acknowledge the injustices imposed through settler colonial violence, limited access to resources, legal pluralism, heightened surveillance and displacement from the land, the framework of occupation and the human rights discussions as well as political negotiations that adopt it, contribute to both the perpetuation of the physical removal of
Palestinians as well as the erasure of their lived experience, history, culture and personhood outside of being the subjects to a settler colonial regime. This erasure and silencing of Palestinians in the abstract are perhaps one of the most potent extensions of settler colonialism, as it wipes the Palestinian from collective memory and allows for a false narrative to justify such atrocity against native people everywhere. 119
In adopting a new framework, or challenging the existing framework of occupation, the underlying patterns of removing Palestinians from their land by force, racial discrimination and limiting access to resources and denial of citizenship cannot be reckoned with. The goal of Israel is not simply to occupy Palestinian land; it is to fully replace Palestine with Israel. In order to address any singular facet of Palestinian suffering, it is crucial to reframe the relationship between Palestine and Israel as settler colonialism.
By challenging this framework and looking to dismantle settler colonialism,
Palestinian voices, perspectives and experiences must be centered and their collective memory must be restored. Popular resistance literature has played a role in Palestinian endurance of settler colonialism by reclaiming their own narrative, creating historical records and allowing their culture and memory to live on, outside of the physical body or community. Resistance through literature also demonstrates Palestinian agency and persistence, allowing them to be seen as more than a suffering monolith, violent terrorists or fleeing refugees. Further, this form of resistance allows Palestinians to imagine themselves as a liberated people and is a reminder that while Palestinians do suffer, they are extricable from their suffering and they endure it using their own devices.
The implications of this study are applicable to not only nations subject to settler colonialism, but everywhere where injustice occurs and is addressed using inadequate legal or political frameworks, particularly those that do not center the perspectives of those most affected by such injustice. Legal and political frameworks are created for specific circumstances and should only be applied when the situation being considered 120 meets those criteria. In challenging and questioning existing frameworks and refusing to generalize frameworks for the sake of ease, a disservice is done to people everywhere, and institutions lose legitimacy.
The title of this project, Naming as Survival, addresses the fundamental idea that an honest reckoning with oppressive regimes contributes to the survival of marginalized groups therefore any framework created to confront such regimes must be carefully considered and regularly questioned in order to restore justice and peace both inside and outside the bounds of Israel and Palestine. This is particularly relevant to countries that have almost completely eliminated, assimilated and erased their own native populations, and continue to do so, such as the United States, Australia and Canada, among others.
By considering the need for acknowledgement as a step in moving toward the ultimate goal of Palestinian liberation, it is also important to consider the pathways that emerge in between. The UN HRC and human rights as a broader idea allow for discussions to occur where they might not have, or for attention to be drawn to various issues, countries or populations which have no platform elsewhere and no opportunities to form alliances or advance common interests due to a simple lack of exposure. They also allow for the collection of data on human rights violations which records a more complete account of history. However, this platform and these alliances have not advanced Palestine toward liberation over the decades that the Palestine Question has been discussed. Human rights, while they may have some strategic use, are not a tool in the movement toward Palestinian liberation because they were created by and for
Western nations which have no real interest in restoring Palestine’s culture, history and 121 sovereignty. It is time for the international community, politicians and scholars and to imagine a solution outside of the human rights and occupation frameworks for
Palestinians, subjects of settler colonialism and all indigenous people around the world.
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