The Australian-Led Mission Te East Timor
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The Australian-led mission to East Timor Lieutenant Colonel J. Blaxland* The skillful leader subdues his enemies adapted tbr the mass-media informa- Timor merits attention and compari- without fighting. tion era. The .successtul result in East son, particularly as it happened when Sun Tsu Timor, coming after a decade of many of the difficult lessons faced by mixed results in the Balkans and else- the international community in the where, suggests that this innovative Balkans were finally being absorbed. Introduction method is valid for the military chal- Consequently, it serves as an interest- lenges of today and beyond. ing contrast, a decade after the end of everal recent international mili- However, the similarities and differ- the Cold War, of how some of the tary operations have been criti- ences with peace support operations lessons, once learnt, could be applied. cized, but one success story in Bosnia, suggest broad lessons need Like the countries of NATO with Ss tands in contrast - the Australian-led to be applied carefully. regards to Bosnia in the early 1990s, mission to East Timor. Australia has a Australia had not considered deploy- history of seeking to 'punch above its ing forces to East Timor until events weight' with stealth, and battle cun- The success in East Timor left them with little option. n'ng, backed up with, but not driven by, kinetic capabilities. One of the most remarkable of the Believing it could win, Indonesia Post-Cold War conflicts occurred in agreed to let the United Nations Australia's disciplined, restrained and 1999 in the Indonesian-controlled ter- supervise a ballot on the future of self-deprecating approach helped ritory of East Timor, shortly after the East Timor, a former Portuguese bind together a 22-nation coalition of situation in the Balkans reached a colony it had forcibly annexed during the willing, demonstrating the appli- crescendo with the bombing cam- the Cold War. On 30 August 1999 cation of a manoeuvrist philosophy paign in Kosovo. The reader may the East Timorese voted overwhelm- wonder why East Timor merits con- ingly in favour of separation from sideration when the focus is on Bos- Indonesia. Indonesian-sponsored mili- The author is a serving Australian Army nia. Given the difficulties experi- tia forces raised to help ensure an out- Officer posted as Australia's t'irsl Visiting enced in other post-Cold War peace come favourable to Indonesia were Defence Fellow at Queen's University and support operations, including in Bos- let loose in early September in an War Studies PhD candidate at the Royal Military College, Kingston. He was the nia and Kosovo, the success in East attempt to spoil the outcome.' This Intelligence Officer and principal staff officer responsible tor Information Operations in 1 Headquarters 3rd Brigade, 1998-99. His pu- See for instunce: James Dunn, Crimes olicatiom include Organixinff an Armv: The Af>uinst Huinanity in East Timor, January to Publishers, Boulder 2001; Damien Kingsbury AiutrnUon Experience 1957 to I9fi.t (1989); (hlober 1999: Their Nature anti Causes, 14 (ed.), Guns and Ballot Boxen: East Timor's Swift and Sure: A History of the Royal February 2001 (http://www.etan.org/news/ votefor independence, Monash Asia Institute, Australian Corps of SlgHOls 1947-1972 2<X)la/dunnl.htm, downloaded 8 July 2001).; Clayton, 2000; H. MacDonald et al., Masters (1999); and Information Era Manoeuvre: The Don Greenless and Robert Garran, Deliver- of Terror: Indonexia'x Military and Violence Australian Leil Misxion to East Timor, unce: The Inxide Story of East Timor's Fi<>ht in East Timor in 1999, Canberra Papers on (2002). This article is his personal opinion. for Freedom, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2002; Defence and Strategy No 145, Strategie and The views expressed do not necessarily re- lan Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor: Defence Studies Centre, Canberra 2002; John Present the views of the Australian Army, or The United Nations, the Ballot, and Martinkus, A Dirty Little War, Random 'hè Australian Department of Defence. International Intervention, Lynnr Reinner House, Sydney 2001. JRG171 9-2002 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR 413 situation triggered an Australian-led would appear before the world and by ating with a unified command and evacuation operation from 6 to 14 12 September, facing intense interna- robust mandate, arrived on 20 Sep- September. Known as Operation tional diplomatic and economie pres- tember. The Force swiftly restored Spitfire, it used mostly Royal sure, agreed to accept a UN-mandated order in what has been described as a Australian Air Force (RAAF) C-130 international force to restore order. 'by the book' or model operation Hercules aircraft to evacuate hun- authorised under Chapter VII of the dreds fleeing the terror, including UN Charter, that has set the bench- unarmed UN staff and associated East INTERFET mark for peace enforcement opera- Timorese. tions.- Since the handover to the The Australian-led International United Nations in February 2000, Indonesia appears not to have appre- Force East Timor (INTERFET) under several publications have been ciated just how transparent the events Major General Peter Cosgrove, oper- released providing detailed descrip- tions of the conduct of Operation Stabilise in East Timor.' The Australian Deployable Joint Force Headquarters or DJFHQ (dual- rolled as Headquarters Ist Division) was renamed and expanded to form Headquarters INTERFET, commanding a force of over 11.000 troops from twenty-two countries, including key regional Asian neighbours that added to the credibility of the force. The initial deployment The initial deployment into Dili by sea and air consisted primarily of an Australian combined-arms, light- infantry brigade with naval and air supporting elements, special forces, and smaller attached British and New 2 See lan Bostock, '"By the Book": East Timor - An Operational Evaluation', Jane's Defence Weekty, 3 May 2000. ' See for instance Bob Breen, East Timor, Mission Accomnlished, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001; Alan Ryan, Primary Res- ponMhilities anti Primary Risk* — Australian Defence Force Parlicipation in the Interna- tional Force East Timor, Study Paper No. 304, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, November 2(K)0; David Horner, 'Testing the Austraiian Defence Force, in Making the Australian Defence Force, in the series 'The Australian Centenary History of Defence', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; and Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army, in the series 'The Australian Centenary History of Defence', Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. For a detailed description of the foreign poli- cy background to the events, see East Tinu» in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, Australian Department of Foreign Aftairs and Trade, Canberra, 2000. A unindentified East Timorese voter reads a local newspaper while waiting The economie and national interest dimen- in a queue for his turn to vote at a school in Dili, 30 August 2001. sions aru also explored in Nicholas J. Wheeler East Timor's voters went to the polls Thursday to elect a 'consistuent and Tim Dunne, 'East Timor and the new assembly' which will draw up a constitution in preparation for indepen- humanitarian interventionism'. International dence by mid-2002 (Source: EPA/ANP) Affain, vol. 77, no. 4 (2001), pp. 805-27. 414 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JRG171 9-2002 Zealand contingents. Initially troops Australia's contribution ders have often weighed the long- had the responsibility of providing a term political ramifications of mili- secure environment in Dili in accor- For a medium-sized power, Australia tary action against short-term expedi- dance with UN Security Council features prominently on the world ency. Resolution 1264. map, but like with Canada, the size of its land mass belies its limited eco- While prepared to apply kinetic force This task involved disarming the mili- nomie and military power and influ- - or firepower - when necessary, and tia while avoiding inadvertent con- ence.4 The Australian Defence Force structuring its defence force accor- frontation with Indonesian troops still has long taken pride in being a rela- dingly to include tanks, warships and in East Timor - many only grudging- tively high-technology force in a low- fighter-bombers, Australia has always ly accepting the force's international technology neighbourhood. In addi- looked for ways to achieve its mili- mandate. Within three weeks, Dili tion, the small population base has tary objectives with minimal collate- was secure and a light-infantry long driven Australian defence plan- ral damage. It has sought to keep its brigade had deployed to secure the ners' thinking towards fighting own casualties to a minimum and to border with Indonesian West Timor, smarter • 'punching above our contain the negative effects of force- effectively opening the way for the weight'. ful action on the nation's long-term restoration of basic services, provi- strategie interests, including its rela- sion of humanitarian assistance and During World War II, Australia con- tions with its neighbours. preparations for full independence. tributed to Allied efforts to outsmart enemies with such 'soft' capabilities Advances in information technology The contribution of 5500 personnel to as psychological operations, intelli- have been touted as triggering the the East Timor operation at its peak gence operations, deception and elec- most recent Revolution in Military was the largest single deployment by tronic warfare.' During the Vietnam Affairs,7 and the term