Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Power, Interests, and Intellectual Traditions Author(S): Javier Corrales and Richard E

Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Power, Interests, and Intellectual Traditions Author(s): Javier Corrales and Richard E. Feinberg Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Mar., 1999), pp. 1-36 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600963 . Accessed: 19/08/2011 13:06

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http://www.jstor.org InternationalStudies Quarterly (1999) 43, 1-36

Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Power, Interests,and Intellectual Traditions

JAVIERCORRALES AmherstCollege

AND

RICHARD E. FEINBERG Universityof California,San Diego

The 1994 Summitof the Americas marked a high point in hemispherism-our label for the active attemptby the nations of the Western Hemisphereto formregimes of cooperation with one another.To explain whyhemispherism has not been a more powerfultrend in the last 200 years,structural, interest, and culturalvariables are relevantbut insuffi- cientfactors. An importantand oftenoverlooked obstacle to hemispherism has been contrarianideas. Specifically,constellations of intellectual traditionsthat question the value of hemisphericcooperation have damp- ened both the demand forand supplyof such regimes.Only when these antihemisphericintellectual traditions were in retreat-the late nineteenth century,the mid twentiethcentury, and the early 1990s-has hemispherismflourished. We posit three mechanisms through which intellectualtraditions can decline, thus generatinga modifiedcognitivist argumentthat can supplementpower-based and interest-basedexplana- tionsof regimeformation and robustness.

In 1990, Mexico made a daring proposal to the United States: the establishment of a free trade zone between both nations. Historically, this was not the firsttime that a Latin American nation approached the United States with a request for securing a special bilateral relationship or economic alliance. What was new, however, was that the U.S. accepted. First, President George Bush embraced Mexico's proposal to negotiate'a free trade agreement, and in his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), envisioned expanding free trade throughout the hemisphere. Then, Presi- dent Bill Clinton completed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and obtained congressional ratification. Clinton went further: in 1994 he invited the democratically elected presidents and heads of governments of the Americas to a summit to discuss ways of deepening hemispheric cooperation. Latin Americans accepted the invitationwith one condition: that free trade should be the centerpiece

Authors'note: We would like to thankPaul Drake, PeterHaas, PeterH. Smith,Joseph S. Tulchin,and the anonymous reviewersfor their comments on earlierdrafts, and Adam Wolf,for his researchassistance. None is responsiblefor any errors. (? 1999 InternationalStudies Association. Publishedby Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street,Malden, MA 02148,USA, and 108 CowleyRoad, OxfordOX4 1JF,UK. 2 Regimesof Cooperation in theWestern Hemisphere ofthe Summit agenda. Neverbefore had mostLatin American nations been so keen on includinghemispheric free trade in discussionsof regime formationwith the United Statesand Canada. Initiallyreluctant, the United Stateswent along. Both the decision by the U.S. to engage Latin America and Latin America's insistencethat free trade be part of such cooperative effortsconstitute the most far-reachingsteps by the nations of the hemisphere to build an encompassing regime of cooperation.' This effortculminated in the December 1994 Summitof the Americas,where the nations of the hemisphere signed a set of Agreements committingthemselves to cooperate towardan impressivearray of goals in politics (advancementof democracy,good governance),in economics (free trade in the hemisphere,financial coordination), and in security(the fightagainst the drug trade,the collectivedefense of democracy).The Miami Texts also include commit- mentsin "new areas": the promotionof sustainabledevelopment, anticorruption practices,human rights,energy and the environment,women's issues, etc. (see WhiteHouse, 1995; Feinberg,1997:161-84). What explains these momentousdecisions? Why did thirty-fournations of the hemisphereagree to sign the most far-reachingdocument on intrahemispheric integrationin 1994? Whatexplains therise in the 1990s ofwhat we call "hemispherism"-the activeattempt by the nationsof the hemisphereto redirecttheir foreign policies in favorof closer and coordinatedcooperation with one another?2 To answerthis question, we firstsituate the 1994 Summitin historicalcontext. We show thatthe 1994 Agreementsconstitute the farthestthat the nations of the hemisphere have ever come in their effortsto build regimes of inter-American cooperation.Interest in such regimesdates back to the late eighteenthcentury, but it was not until the 1990s that these regimes were possible. We thus ask the question-why the delay? The 1994 Summit,however, is not the onlyinstance of hemisphericrapprochement. On two previous occasions-in the late nineteenthcentury and the mid twentiethcentury-the nations of the hemisphere made regime inroads. While modestin comparisonto the 1994 Agreements,these instances marked new heights in inter-Americancooperation and rule-formation.Our second question is therefore: What explains these previous regimes of cooperation and why were they modest,or at least,not as far-reachingas the 1994 regime? This articleis thus concernedwith questions of regime formation.Under what conditionsdo nationsattempt to establishprinciples, norms, and rules intendedto promoteinternational cooperation? It is also concernedwith questions of "regime robustness."Do regimeshave any stayingpower once theyare created?We argue thatthe major regimesof cooperationin theAmericas prior to 1994 were followed byperiods of relativedecline in robustness.During the earlytwentieth century and duringthe Cold War, inter-Americanrelations became noticeablyestranged, and at times,hostile. And yet,these declines in robustnesswere of limitedmagnitude. Despite the pressuresthat befell these regimes,inter-American cooperation never

1 We adhere to Keohane's (1989:4) lean definitionof internationalregimes: "Regimes are institutionswith explicit rules,agreed upon by governments,that pertain to particularsets of issues in internationalrelations." 2 Hemispherism,as we defineit, is a typeof regionalism.Gamble and Payne (1996:258) defineregionalism as state effortsto "deepen the integrationof particularregional economic space." Like others(e.g., Fawcettand Hurrell,1995; ECLAC, 1994), Gamble and Payne rightlypoint out thatregionalism in theWestern Hemisphere in the 1990s is better describedas "open regionalism"because itdid notemerge as an alternativeto globalization(as regionalismstraditionally tend to be). Althoughthis regionalismis based on regional preferences,and membershipis closed to extraregional countries,it is trade-creatingand potentiallyconsistent with General Agreement on Tariffsand Trade (GAlTT)-World Trade Organization(WTO) principles.In addition,the Summittexts call forhemispheric cooperation as a step toward globalization.In fact,they go beyond traditionalconceptions of open regionalismbecause theyare not exclusively concernedwith economic issues; theyalso tackle politicaland social concerns.That is one reason we preferto use a differentlabel forthis concept. For a more skepticalview on thissee Bhagwati(1997) and Naim (1994). JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 3 fell below the level that existed prior to the creationof the regime. In short,the historyof regime formationand robustnessin inter-Americanaffairs since the nineteenthcentury can be characterizedbroadly as repeatedinstances of many steps forwardfollowed by some stepsbackward. We argue thatthis evolution of regimesof cooperationcannot be explained fully byonly one setof theoriesof regime formation. Hypotheses derived from neorealist and neoliberalschools of thoughtcan accountfor some momentsof thisevolution, but not forthe entirestory. We thuspropose supplementingneorealist and neoliberal argumentswith an examinationof the role of intellectualtraditions, which we defineas the setof ideas, values,and imagesthat prevail in a givensociety. We argue that intellectualtraditions shape the formationof regimesof cooperation,and to some extent,their robustness.3 A necessarycondition for regime emergence is a favorableintellectual climate. In theAmericas, however, the intellectualclimate has been mostlyunfavorable to hemispherism.Specifically, since the nineteenthcentury,a set of antihemisphericintellectual traditions has dominated the region, impedingthe rise of hemispherism.Inroads towardhemispheric cooperation were possible only when these intellectualtraditions lost appeal. Thus, we argue, the greaterthe decline of thisintellectual tradition, the more far-reachingthe regime cooperation. But how do intellectualtraditions decline? We suggestthree ways: (1) through the riseof competing intellectual traditions; (2) throughempirical invalidation; and (3) throughwhat we call institutional"de-embeddedness," i.e., the processwhereby intellectualtraditions lose institutionalhomes at thestate, transnational, and societal level. Each of these threeprocesses erodes the politicalinfluence of an intellectual tradition.We expect to findmore robustand encompassingregimes of cooperation the more these conditionsare met.

Regimes of Cooperation in the Americas in the Last 200 Years Three broad points can be made about the historyof regime formationin the Americassince the late eighteenthcentury. First, a full-fledgedregime of cooperation took a long time to form-200 years to be exact. Originallyproposed in the late eighteenthcentury, the idea of greaterinter-American cooperation continu- ouslyfaced formidable obstacles. Second, beforethe 1990s,there were two moments duringwhich significantcooperative inroads were nonethelessmade: 1889-1906 and 1933-1954. Third, each of these hemisphericmoments, in turn,was followed by periods of significant-butnot total-regime decline.

TheRise and ImmediateDecline of the "Western Hemisphere Idea," Late Eighteenthand EarlyNineteenth Centuries Even before the birth of most American nations, the demand for regimes of inter-Americancooperation was alreadyalive. The intellectualunderpinning of this demand was what Whitaker(1954) labels the "WesternHemisphere Idea"-the propositionthat the peoples of thishemisphere stand in a "special relationshipto one another"that sets them apart fromthe rest of theworld. According to thisview, the societiesof the hemisphereshare more than a geographic location; theyalso share common political values that go beyond a preferencefor nontyrannical,

3 Ideas, in turn,can be thoughtof as "social knowledge,"or theoriesemployed by intellectualsto explain social phenomena (Hall, 1989:361). Values are the set of "ideological and ethicalpreferences" that shape theway individuals makenormativejudgments about theworld(Lagon, 1995:67). Images are "patternsof perception" or "cognitiveprisms" thatallow individuals to filter,organize, and simplifythe information received from the environment (Cottam, 1994:18). 4 Regimesof Cooperation in theWestern Hemisphere

republican institutionsfree from the vestiges of European feudalism.4It also includesthe belief that inter-American cooperation and integrationmakes domestic politicalinstitutions healthier and domesticeconomies more prosperous. The Western Hemisphere Idea was also predicated on a common security concern-the realizationthat the worldas a whole was not especiallyhospitable to nontyrannicalsocieties. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1814), the European powers were keen not only on keeping a balance-of-powersystem (Craig and George, 1990:28-48), but also on conquering or reconqueringterritories in the Americas-somethingthat seemed quite dauntingto the youngand feeblenations of theAmericas. Even thebigger United States,encircled by European powers,had reasons to be concerned:England was presentin the Northand theAtlantic, Russia had claims to the PacificNorthwest, Spain dominated the Southwestand the Gulf of Mexico, France dominatedthe Midwestand Quebec, and England, France, the Netherlands,and Spain controlled the Caribbean (see Bolton, 1933:458). This encirclementexplains, to some extent,the No-TransferResolution (1811), whereby the United Statesstipulated that it "cannotwithout serious inquietude see any part of the said territorypass into the hands of any foreignpower." It also explains the Monroe Doctrine(1823), wherebyPresidentJames Monroe declared:

Americancontinents ... are henceforthnot to be considered as subjectsfor future colonization by any European powers.... With the movementsin thishemisphere we are ofnecessity more imme- diatelyconnected.... The politicalsystem of the allied powers[in Europe] is essentially different... from that of America.... We should consider any attempton theirpart to extend theirsystem to any portionof thishemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

Withthese pronouncements, the U.S. came veryclose to embracingfully the Western Hemisphere Idea (Atkins,1995:113). Likewise,Latin Americansshared similarsecurity concerns, which explains why many proposed formal hemispheric political and economic alliances against Europe.5 During thisperiod, LatinAmericans' esteem for the U.S-.was high. Some even consideredthe United Statesa naturalally (de Onis, 1952; Rama, 1975). The Mexican statesmanLucas Alaman argued,for instance, that while nature had made the countriesof America neighbors, "the similarityof theirpolitical institutions has bound them even more closelytogether, strengthening in them the dominion of just and liberal principles" (in Whitaker,1954:2). Those who took note of the Monroe Doctrine (e.g., the governmentof Argentina)approved of it. The independence leader Simon Bolivar praised it. Brazil and Colombia even suggested institutingthe Monroe Doctrineas a hemisphericdoctrine. The firsthemispheric

4 The WesternHemisphere Idea was quite revolutionarywhen it was born in the eighteenthcentury. Until then, thinkersfrom both sides of the Atlantictended to avoid establishingdifferences between the New World and the Old-the Americaswere considered simply an extensionof Europe. But in themid eighteenthcentury, some Europeans began to disparage the New World as a "degenerateand monstrousland." In response,intellectuals from both North and South Americabegan. to exalt the uniquenessof the New World,thus giving rise to theWestern Hemisphere Idea (e.g., Molina, 1776; Clavigero,1780-81;Jefferson, 1787; Hamiltonand Madison, 1787). 5 Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico proposed to the United States the establishmentof formalbilateral alliances (Gil, 1971:62). Chilean FranciscoBilbao even called fora commoncitizenship, a federalunion, and the abolitionof custom duties in the Americas.In 1810, the Lima-born,Chile-resident intellectual Don Juan Egafia conceiveda "Plan forthe General Defenseof the EntireAmerica," calling for hemispheric governments to contribute"arms, money, and men in case of the slightestattack from, or seditionoriginating in, Europe" (in Balseiro, 1969:41-42). JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 5 congress ever proposed, the 1826 Congress of Panama, was a Latin American initiative.6 In the earlynineteenth century systemic conditions were thusripe forsome kind of hemisphericrapprochement. For a while,it even seemed as ifit would happen. Given the revivalof a powerfuland land-hungryEurope, the idea of an American Delian League againstthe Holy Alliance seemed to make sense. Nevertheless,the nationsof the hemisphereended up rejectinghemispherism, preferring instead to spend mostof the nineteenthcentury either estranged from one anotheror going to war against each other. The U.S. remained neutral during the wars of independence in LatinAmerica, was slowin grantingrecognition to newnations, rejected alliances withLatin Americans,almost missed the 1826 Congress of Panama, and forthe nextsixty years, essentially failed to enforcethe No-TransferResolution and the Monroe Doctrine.7Latin Americans,for their part, could nevermake up their mindwhether they wanted inter-American cooperation, and ifso, whetherit should be based on the principle of culture (Latin-Catholiccountries only), language (Spanish-speakingcountries only), regional (Andean nationsonly, Central Ameri- can nations only), or strategicinterest (include a European guarantor,exclude nationswith territorial disputes). The fewattempts at regimecreation (the 1847-48 Lima Congress,the 1856 Santiago Congress,and the 1865 Second Lima Congress) tended to exclude the U.S. and otherLatin American nations, were thinly attended, and produced forgettableresults. In short,hemispherism went into a coma from the 1820s to the 1880s.

TheFirst Great Hemispheric Moment, 1889-1906 Everythingchanged in the 1880s when U.S. Secretaryof State James G. Blaine persuaded his boss,President Cleveland, and more surprisingly,the U.S. Congress, to adopt a resolutionauthorizing a conferenceof American states in Washington.8 Aftervirtually ignoring most of the southerncontinent for sixty years, the U.S. now exhibiteda newinterest in "Pan-Americanism."This time,the renewed U.S. interest came witha broader agenda: enlargingthe scope of the Monroe Doctrine.Rather than simplyseeking to keep extrahemisphericactors out, the U.S. now wanted to create formalinstitutions to facilitatecommon political, economic, and security objectives-the establishmentof a hemisphericpeacekeeping system,including arbitrationfor the settlementof disputes,and the developmentof trade-enhancing rules,including a customsunion (see Mecham, 1962). Latin Americanswelcomed the U.S. invitation. Althoughthe resultswere not far-reaching,9the 1889 Pan-AmericanConference was an historiclandmark in inter-Americanaffairs. It not only marked the end to

6 In defianceof Bolivar,who wanted the Congress to be a forumof Spanish-speakingcountries, the presidentsof Colombia, CentralAmerica, and Mexico invitedthe United Statesand Brazil to participate,thereby transforming the Congressinto a Pan-Americanaffair. 7 It is truethat some ofthe most serious violations of the No-Transfer Resolution and theMonroe Doctrineoccurred, not coincidentally,at a time when the U.S. was too busy with domestic problems: during the Civil War (e.g., the F-rench-British-Spanishinvasion of Mexico; the Spanish reannexationof the Dominican Republic). It is also truethat the U.S. lacked the militarycapacity to challenge the most serious violator-England. However,the U.S. remained remarkablypassive even when it had the capacityto do something:e.g., the Britishinvasion of the Falkland Islands in 1833, the Frenchblockade of Buenos Aires in the 1840s, the Spanish attackon Chile in 1866, the Swedishsale of the island of St. Barthelemyto France in 1878. During each of theseepisodes, the U.S. had militaryvessels in the area that could have been used as a deterrent,but were not. 8 This was not easy. Between 1883 and the FirstPan-American Congress (1889), more than fivebills authorizing such a Congresswere turneddown (Calcott, 1968). PresidentCleveland did not even sign the finalresolution. 9 Latin Americannations, for instance, were not terriblyenthusiastic about hemispherictrade, preferring instead theirsecure commercialties withEurope over uncertainNew World markets.In addition, territorialdisputes (e.g., betweenChile and itsneighbors) thwarted efforts to create peacekeeping norms. 6 Regimesof Cooperation in theWestern Hemisphere

the long period of estrangement(1820s-1880s) but,more important,constituted a regionalprecursor to a League-of-Nations-likesystem of inter-Americanrelations, includinga formalorganization (with a permanentseat in Washington).In addition, a newnorm of inter-American conduct emerged-regardless ofthe level ofpolitical and militarydiscord among members,or of cultural-linguisticdifferences, mutual consultationwould be expected. For the firsttime, all nations of the hemisphere agreed to put aside territorial,political, and culturaldifferences to attemptto create internationalrules of hemisphericgovernance. However modest, this was the first real hemisphericregime of cooperation.

Reversal(but Not Death) of Hemispherism, 1906-1928 The modestlevel of hemispherism achieved in thelate nineteenthcentury went into declinebetween 1906 and 1928. Hemisphericmeetings continued to takeplace, but progresson manyissues was scant.Lofty calls forcloser cooperation became nothing more thantimid peacekeeping agreements(see Mecham, 1962). By the timeof the thirdPan-American congress (the 1906 Rio de Janeiro meeting),Latin American nations and the United Stateswere adopting increasinglyirreconcilable positions (Peck, 1977a: 170-71). The Latin Americansardently defended the principle of nonintervention(the Calvo Doctrine) and the principle of equal treatmentto foreigners(the Drago Doctrine),while the United States stronglyresisted both, callinginstead for steps to constructregimes of mutual security and peace enhance- ment. As a result of these differences,each Pan-Americanmeeting was more contentiousthan the previousone. Latin America's reaction to World War I is indicativeof the decline of regime robustness.Only eight Latin American nations (mostly the smallCaribbean nations) followed the U.S. in declaring war against the Central Powers; seven nations remainedneutral.10 Moreover, most Latin American nations after the war were far more eager to participate in the League of Nations (in contradictionof U.S. preferences)than in Pan-Americancongresses. By the 1920s, a Harvard professor of LatinAmerican History who was a guestat one Pan-Americanmeeting wrote that he "received the distinctimpression that the Congress was in realitya purely Latin-Americangathering, the United Statesbeing toleratedbecause of itsbigness and the politicaland economicpower it wielded, but ratheras a spectatorthan as a participant. . . . The American delegation, it may be said, made no effort to exercise any sort of leadership in the deliberationswhile on the other hand an undercurrent,not ofunfriendliness, but of mistrust, was easilyperceptible" (Haring, 1929:116-17). The 1906-1928 period constitutesa retreat-but not the demise-of hemispherism. No Latin Americannation sided withthe Great Powersduring World War I. And while the League of Nations lured the Latin Americans,it never completely decimatedthe appeal ofPan-Americanism, which, however weakened, survived long afterthe demise of the League of Nations. Few Latin Americansexpressed interest in exitingthe inter-Americansystem, whereas manybegan to exit the League of Nationsby the 1930s (Peck, 1977a: 183). 11 In addition,the norm of consultation was never abandoned, as evidenced by the fact that six internationalconferences of Americanstates took place between 1889 and 1928. Moreover,progress in rule- makingand cooperationduring these conferences was modest,but not nonexistent

10Brazil, Cuba, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama declared war.Argentina, Chile, Colombia,Mexico, Paraguay,El Salvador,and Venezuela remainedneutral. Bolivia, the Dominican Republic,Ecuador, Peru,and Uruguayonly broke relationswith Germany. 11 By the 1930s, Costa Rica, Honduras,Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Brazil officiallywithdrew from the League. Peru and Bolivia ceased to participatein the League between1921 and 1929; Argentinadid not participateuntil 1933. JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 7

(e.g., the 1923 Gondra Treaty).12Latin Americannations were facingthe rise of a regionalhegemon-the UnitedStates-but theydid not respond bybalancing in a Waltziansense (i.e., by internalmilitary buildup and alliance formation).They did not even respond by "hiding,""transcending," or "bandwagoning,"as some small European nationshave done under similarconditions (see Schroeder,1994). Instead, LatinAmericans insisted on relyingon Pan-Americaninstitutions to deal withthe U.S. (and one another)and codifyingthe norm of noninterventionand consultation.

A SecondHemispheric Push (1933-1954) Followedby Decline Again (theCold WarYears) Despite the collapse ofworld trade duringthe 1930s, inter-Americanpolitical and securityrelations improved steadily after 1933. U.S. and Latin Americanleaders began to see one another as partners(Good Neighbor Policy, 1933), and talked about continentalsolidarity based on democraticvalues against militaryassault (Declaration of Lima, 1938). During and immediatelyafter World War II, they formulateda common policy against European perils,built a systemof collective security(the Rio Treaty, 1947), and created a formal organization to address hemisphericaffairs (the Organizationof American States, OAS, 1948). In termsof politicsand securityissues, inter-Americancooperation was in fullbloom by the 1950s.13 Yet, once again, regime robustnessdeclined thereafter.14After 1954, hemi- sphericeuphoria gave wayto a period ofhemispheric mistrust that lasted throughout the restof the Cold War. Most Latin Americannations relaxed theirloyalty to the United States,with which some even developed seriouspolitical differences. At the United Nations,Latin Americansbegan to vote againstthe United States.The United States,in turn,became less inclinedto resortto hemisphericinstitutions for resolvinginternational disputes. As in the earlytwentieth century, Latin American nations developed preferencesfor alignmentwith extrahemisphericactors. For instance,Venezuela was a foundingmember of OPEC, Brazil deepened itsties with socialist (Luzophone) Africa,Argentina increased trade with the USSR, and a nationalistPeruvian military government made huge purchases of Soviet military equipment.By the 1970s, mostLatin Americansreestablished relations with Cuba. The OAS, a pillar of the postwarinter-American system, also failed to live up to its expectations,playing roles in onlya fewpeacekeeping initiatives(Wilson and Dent, 1995). By the mid 1980s,the inter-Americansystem was moribund.Latin American nationsdid not regardtheir interests as harmoniouswith those of the United States (Wesson,1986). The OAS was mired in dissentand inaction(Scheman, 1988). And as Kurth (1990) argued, the principleof noninterventionbecame the practiceof unilateralintervention, and the principleof collectivesecurity became the practice of collectivenonintervention. Despite a seriesof treatiesand organizationscreated to fomenthemispheric trade (e.g., the 1960 Treaty of Montevideo, the Latin AmericanAssociation of Free Trade), U.S.-Latin Americantrade as a proportion of total U.S. trade declined steadily.

12 The Gondra Treatystipulated that controversies not settledthrough diplomatic channels or arbitrationunder existingtreaties would be submittedto a commissionof inquiry,and no nationwould mobilizeor make attacksuntil six monthsafter the commission made itsreport. Itwas ratifiedby most countries except Chile and Peru (Peck, 1977a: 185). 13 There was, however,one "deficit"-economics.Latin Americansrefused to embrace the U.S. call foropen trade and open economics,and the U.S. refusedto extend significanteconomic aid to Latin America. 14 The 1954 Caracas Declarationconstitutes the turningpoint in hemisphericcooperation. This declarationaligned Latin Americansbehind U.S. containmentefforts. But to get Latin Americansupport, the United Stateshad to water down the resolution,and yetmost Latin American delegates emerged from the Caracas meetingfrustrated and feeling thatthey had grantedthe U.S. a blank check to resumeinterventionism (see Burr,1973:xxxv). 8 Regimesof Cooperation in theWestern Hemisphere

But once again, thisdecline in robustnessdid not entaila retreatto the low levels of cooperation of the 1906-1933 period. Integrationorganizations and norms managed to survive(Atkins, 1995:197-229; Montesinos,1996). The inter-American systemremained intact, and in some cases, produced usefulinitiatives. Work toward the creationof protocols,consultative commissions, technical meetings, etc., never stopped. Two Summitsof the Americastook place (1956 in Panama and 1967 in Punta del Este,Uruguay). Only one LatinAmerican nation (Cuba) proudly"exited" the inter-Americansystem. Thus, the inter-Americansystem did not thrive,but it nonethelessdisplayed some stayingpower.

The ThirdHemispheric Peak (Late 1980s toMid 1990s) This picturechanged dramaticallyagain in the late 1980s. Latin Americannations began to adopt increasinglypro-hemispheric policies, includingclose alignment withthe United States.In addition,most began to pursueeconomic integration with theirneighbors and to press the U.S. forfree trade. In 1990, PresidentBush also turned his attentionto the hemispherewith his EAI. Even the moribund OAS underwenta revival,playing crucial roles in the defense of democracyin various countries(Corrales, 1993; Kaysenet al., 1994; Farer, 1996). All of thisculminated in the 1994 Summitof the Americas.The Summit"Decla- rationof Principles"begins as follows:

The elected Heads of State and Governmentof the Americasare committedto advance the prosperity,democratic values and institutions,and securityof our Hemisphere.... Althoughfaced with differingdevelopment challenges, the Americas are united in pur- suing prosperitythrough open markets,hemispheric integration, and sustainabledevelopment. We are determinedto consolidate and advance closer bonds of cooperation and to transformour aspirationsinto concreterealities. (White House, 1995:63)

The Declarationand AssociatedPlan ofAction list a set oftwenty-three agreements, includingpolitical and militaryaffairs (as was the case in the 1940s), and more notably,economic affairs(for the firsttime ever). Latin America moved towarda foreignpolicy of "institutionalizedbandwagoning" (Hurrell, 1995:273). And the U.S., once again, committeditself to act throughhemispheric institutions. As a result,the Summit reshaped and expanded the institutionalframework of the inter-Americansystem. A new three-legsystem emerged. The firstleg consistsof the regionalinstitutions: the OAS, the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank, ECLAC. The second leg is theseries of ministerial meetings and workinggroups set in motion by the Miami Summit.The thirdleg is the growingarray of partnershipsbetween public sectoragencies and civilsociety organizations, forged in some instancesto implementthe Miami texts (Leadership Council, 1998:10). In short,in termsof issue area, ruleformation, and institution-building,the 1994 Summitrepresents the richestlevel of hemispherismto date. The power of the new inter-Americanregime of cooperation becomes clearer when compared to a similarregime of regional coordination-the Associationof South-EastAsian Nations (ASEAN). The ASEAN has proven ineffectivein dealing withvarious regional political and economiccrises since the late 1980s.l 5 In contrast,

15 ASEAN was inactiveduring the 1988 coup in Myanmar,and eventuallyallowed Myanmarto join the group. ASEAN also failedto deterthe bloody coup in Cambodia inJuly1997, shortlybefore Cambodiawas about tojoin ASEAN. ASEAN has also proven ineffectiveat handling the 1997-1998 currency-crisis-turned-economic-crisisof the region, provingunable to coordinatea concertedeconomic response to thecrisis (The Economist, February 28, 1998:43-44, and March 14, 1998:16). JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 9 the new inter-Americansystem, while farfrom perfect, has had notable successes. In 1996, inspiredby the Summittexts, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, the OAS, and the United Statesintervened politically in Paraguayto neutralizean ongoingcoup. Brazil and Argentinathreatened to intervenemilitarily and expel Paraguayfrom Mercosur;the United States and the OAS provided dailyadvice, and even refuge, to the Paraguayanpresident during the crisis(Aiguade, 1996:187-94; Valenzuela, 1997). In March 1998, similarpressures dissuaded the Paraguayanpresident from canceling presidential elections. Likewise, the hemisphericresponse to recent economic crises has also been quite rule-conforming.Rather than eschew adjust- ment,as some ASEAN membershave done, the nationsof theAmericas responded to the economiccrises of the 1990s forthe mostpart by adhering to "Miami-norms" of economic governance (open economies, stable exchange rates, fiscal equilib- rium),and in some cases, deepening the reforms(e.g., in the financialsector). In fact,rule-adherence has extended into otherareas. A recentreview of progresson key Miami initiatives(democracy/human rights, civil society, corruption, narcotics and money laundering, trade, capital market liberalization,education, health, sustainabledevelopment), co-authored by leading hemisphericleaders, concludes that progresshas ranged somewherebetween "modest" and "good" (Leadership Council, 1998). Thus, the historicalevolution of hemispherismsince the late eighteenthcentury is characterized,first, by a veryslow forward progression that has takenalmost two centuriesto reach itspresent peak. Second, along theway, there were twomoments of significanthemispheric strides (1889-1906, and 1933-1954). In termsof norm- creation,institution-building, and issue areas, each regime was richer than the previousone. This is shownin Table 1. Each ofthese regimes was followedby periods of decline in robustness(1906-1928, and the Cold War years),but these declines nevermatched the previouslow points.

Explaining Regime Formationand Robustness: Power- and Interest-basedArguments How would theoriesof international regimes explain themany-steps-forward-some- steps-backwardtrajectory of regimeformation in the Americas?Following Hasen- clever et al. (1997), we can divide the literatureon regime formation,one of the mostextensive in IR theory,into threeclusters: (1) power-basedtheories (neorealism), (2) interest-basedtheories (neoliberalism), and (3) knowledge-basedtheories (cognitivism).16Although carrying out fulltests of each of these sets of theoriesis beyondthe scope of thisarticle, it is nonethelesspossible to outlinehow each school of thoughtwould fare.

Power-basedTheories of Regime Formation (Neorealism) Power-basedtheories generally posit thatthe concernfor distribution of power in an anarchicworld leads nationsto focusmore on self-helpand relativegains than on cooperation (Grieco, 1988, 1993). Nevertheless,power-based theories do not rule out the possibilityof cooperation.Neorealists acknowledge that, under certain conditions,regimes will happen. Specifically,most realists agree thatinternational cooperationis contingenton the actionsof hegemons.They disagree,however, as

16 Cognitivists,in turn,are divided betweenweak and strongcognitivists. Weak cognitivistsstress that ideas play a causal role in political outcomes. Strong cognitivists,on the other hand, argue that ideas influencenot only actor behavior, but also the understandingof the observer.Whereas weak cognitiviststreat ideas as a supplement to rationality-basedtheories, strong cognitivists reject the whole enterprise of rational, positivist social science(Hasenclever et al., 1997). In thisarticle we examine onlyweak cognitivism. 10 Regimesof Cooperation in theWestern Hemisphere

TABLE 1. Breadth and Scope of Regimes of Cooperation in the Americas

IssueAreas

Creationof Regime Rule-Creation FormalInstitutions Politics Security Economics Other

1889-1906 Yes Yes Modest Modest Modest 1933-1954 Yes Yes Significant Significant Modest 1990s Yes Yes Significant Significant Significant Significant to whichactions of a hegemon engender or erode cooperation.Regardless of the versionadopted, neorealismcannot totally account for the history of hemispherism.

Balance-of-PowerTheories. One strandof realismargues thatthe mere rise of a hegemon hurtscooperation because it induces secondarynations to turnto "balancing" (Waltz,1979). Weak statesreact to the riseof a disproportionatelypowerful nation by boosting their militarycapacity (internalbalancing) or seeking allies against the risingpower (external balancing). This formulationcan account for importantmoments of hemispherism.17 For instance,in thelate nineteenthcentury, the hemisphere experienced a true "systemicchange" in Gilpin's (1981:42-43) sense: the U.S. emergedas theundisputed hegemon, far outstripping its main rivals in the region. The decline of hemispherismafter 1906 has somethingto do with Latin America'sunease withthe disproportionaterise of U.S. power. There are, however,some problems.This uneasinessdoes not exactlyqualify as balancing,in theWaltzian sense. First,except for Cuba between1960 and 1989 and, to a lesser extent,Peronist Argentina in the 1940s, Grenada brieflyin the early 1980s, and SandinistaNicaragua in the 1980s,no LatinAmerican country balanced againstthe U.S. througheither internal or externalmeans. LatinAmerican nations did resist U.S. power, but principallythrough symbolic gestures and economic, nationalismthat manifest itself through efforts to enhance economicindependence. Second, a balance-of-powerargument would have a difficulttime explaining the repeated effortsby Latin Americato deepen hemispherism,construct institutions, and refuseto let these institutionsdie even during tense momentsof U.S.-Latin Americanrelations. Finally, and perhaps more telling,Waltzian neorealism cannot explain the sharp variationsin levels of hemisphericcooperation since the late nineteenthcentury, given that U.S. hegemony has been a structuralconstant. Specifically,it cannot explain why U.S.-Latin Americancooperation peaked during those very times when U.S. hegemonic standing rose (late nineteenthcentury, shortlyafter World War II, and the early 1990s).

HegemonicStability Theory. Anotherstrand of realism predicts the exact opposite dynamic:the rise of a hegemon actuallyincreases the possibilityof international cooperation,for at least tworeasons. First, hegemons promote cooperation because theyare willingto absorbthe costs of cooperation. This "hegemonicstability theory" sees internationalcooperation as a public good: cooperation requires nations to bear certaincosts, but because the benefitsof cooperation are neitherexcludable nor rivalrous,actors face few incentives to absorbsuch costs.Only all-encompassing actors(Olson, 1982), such as a large hegemon thathas the most to gain fromthis public good, will be willingto pay for such a good (Kindleberger,1986; see also Keohane, 1980, 1984). Second, hegemons foster cooperation because power

17 For a recentrealist-structuralist account of inter-Americanaffairs see Smith,1996. JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 11 attracts.Small nationsmight find it in theirinterest to "bandwagon"with big powers, in part, because resistingis futile,but also because they realize that there are enormousgains to be derivedfrom close associationwith a powerfulnation. Applied to inter-Americanaffairs, this strand of realismovercomes some of the shortcomingsof Waltz's neorealism. For instance,it helps to explain the rise of hemispherismin the late nineteenthcentury and shortlyafter World War II-moments of hemisphericadvance that coincide with leaps in U.S. hegemony. In addition, the regimes of the 1940s and 1990s followedcomparable changes in structure:a regionalcrisis (trade depression and debtcrisis) followed by a resurgent United States (the end of World War II and Korea, the Cold War). However, a "hegemonic stability"argument cannot explain the decline of cooperation in the earlytwentieth century and during the Cold War,when the U.S. made enormous effortsto "buy"cooperation (Dollar Diplomacy in the earlytwentieth century and the 1956 Panama Summit,the creationof the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank and the Eximbankto tradewith Latin Americain the late 1950s, the 1961 Alliance forProgress, the 1967 Puntadel Este Summit,and the 1977 Carter-TorrijosTreaties duringthe Cold War).18

Balance ofThreat. Yet another version of realism posits that cooperation de- pends not on variationsin power asymmetry,but on conditionsof threat.Walt (1987), forinstance, argues thatthe rise of a powerfulhegemon is not a sufficient conditionfor balancing (as Waltz maintains)and that the rise of a cost-absorbing hegemon is not a sufficientcondition for cooperation (as Kindlebergerargues). Instead, bandwagoningis contingenton low levels of hegemonicthreat. Recently, Schwellerand Priessrestated this argument: "If the hegemon adopts a benevolent strategyand createsa negotiatedorder based on legitimateinfluence and manage- ment,lesser stateswill bandwagon with, rather than balance againstit" (1997:24). To testthis argumentwe need clear indicatorsof "benevolent"or "legitimate" actions,which are difficultto develop. However,theorists in this traditionwould probablyaccept thatan indicatorof nonbenevolence is activemilitarism on thepart of the hegemon. Does inter-Americancooperation decline accordingto increases in U.S. militarismin the region?Sometimes the answeris yes,as in the 1906-1933 period. By 1906, the U.S. became a militarybully, fightingSpain (the 1898 Spanish-AmericanWar), the British (the 1902 Venezuelan crisis),and Colombia (the 1903 Panama revolution).The U.S. also applied militarilythe RooseveltCorollary in the Dominican Republic (1905), and establishedprotectorates in Cuba, Puerto

18 At the 1956 Panama Summit,the United States sought to revivehemispheric allegiance to U.S. containment efforts.However, the Summitproduced onlya vague statementof support,prompting the New YorkTimes to describe the eventas a mere "informalparley." The 1961 Alliancefor Progress was a more seriouseffort at integration.Like the 1994 Miami Summittexts, the Charterof the Alliance called for greaterinternational cooperation, deep domestic structuralreforms, sustained economic development, more equitable economicdistribution, and betterpublic services. Ifanything, U.S. commitmentto the hemispherewas higherduring the Alliance than during the Miami Process,at least in termsof foreignassistance: the U.S. allocated $20 billionto theAlliance. But bythe mid 1960s, U.S.-Latin American relationswere back in disarray.For the 1967 Summit,Latin Americans(Argentine president Arturo Illia and Chilean president Eduardo Frei) took the initiativeand proposed a more substantiveagenda than in 1956, including the possibilityof greatertrade integration.Some crucialagreements were reached,mostly on scientific,technological, and technicalissues. Also, the signatoriesadopted the Generalized Systemof Preferences(whereby industrial groups grant temporarytariff advantages to developingcountries), which was lateradopted bythe world trading system. Nevertheless the centralobjectives of the 1967 Summitwere not achieved.The proposed LatinAmerican Common Marketfailed to prosper,the Alliance for Progress did not revive,and hemisphericloyalty toward the United Statescontinued to decline thereafter(Gordon, 1967; Tulchin, 1994). The 1977 Carter-TorrijosTreaty transferring the Canal Zone to Panama was also supposed to bringthe hemispheretogether, but it too turnedout to be a disappointment.The U.S. public failed to understand President Carter's concessions,while Latin Americansrefused to relinquish their penchant for an independentforeign policy. Few Latin Americannations, for instance, went along withthe U.S. boycottof the 1980 OlympicGames in Moscow. Even Torrijos refusedto cut offarms shipmentsto the Sandinistarebels in Nicaragua, as Carterhad begged him to do in 1979 (see, e.g., Pastor,1992; Hogan, 1986; Moffett,1985). 12 Regimesof Cooperation in theWestern Hemisphere

Rico, Panama, and throughoutthe Pacific-a clear rise in hegemonicthreat which mightexplain whythe thirdPan-American Congress (1906 Rio de Janeiro)was so contentious.U.S. interventionismthereafter-seven military interventions in six northernLatin American countries between 1906 and 1928 (Kryzanek,1995)-also coincideswith regime decline between 1906 and 1928. Inversely,the transformation of the U.S. into a noninterventionisthegemon in the 1930s (the Good Neighbor Policy)and in the years immediatelyafter World War II also coincideswith rising hemispherism. And yet,the balance-of-threat argument would failto explain whyhemispherism does not disintegrateduring periods of rising militarism.If Walt's theorywere entirelycorrect, hemispherism should have reached its lowestpoint in the early twentiethcentury, the peak yearsof U.S. militarismin the region. But, as argued, theregime retained some robustness.Finally, Walt would probably have a hard time explaining the rise of hemispherismin the 1990s, which came on the heels of renewed U.S. militaryactivism in the region (the 1989 unilateral invasion of Panama, the 1994 United Nations-accreditedinvasion of Haiti, the increased militaryspending to fightthe drug trade). A final reformulationof the balance-of-threattheory would sustainthat inter- Americancooperation rose in response to the securitythreats posed by nonhemi- sphericactors. The argumentwould be thatthe U.S. and Latin Americannations are more likelyto cooperate withone anotherin the presence of externalthreats. This perspectivemight help to explain the rise of hemispherismduring and after WorldWar II, when manyLatin Americannations regarded, first, the Axis power, and then,the Soviet bloc, as real threats.It mightalso explain hemisphericunity duringthe 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,which was the mostblatant Soviet incursion in the Americas.19Nevertheless, the extrahemispheric-threathypothesis is not flawless.It cannot explain whylate in the 1960s, despite Cuba's renewedcommit- mentto the USSR and armed struggle,Latin American nations began to normalize relationswith Cuba and the USSR, at thecost of upsetting the U.S. More important, the theorycannot explain the collapse of hemispherismin the 1820-1880 period, when the Great Powersof Europe posed gravethreats to theAmericas. In short,the hypothesisthat lesser states balance as a resultof hegemonicthrQats also fallsshort of providinga fullexplanation for variations in hemispherism.

Interest-basedTheories One ofthe strongestcriticisms of neorealism is thatit downplaysthe extent to which economic interdependenceraises the demand for internationalcooperation, a criticismthat dates back to Immanuel Kant but which Keohane and Nye (1977) popularizedin recenttimes. Baldwin (1980:484) definesinterdependence succinctly as "relationshipsthat would be costlyto break."The generalargument is thatunder strong interdependence nations develop an interestin cooperative initiatives. Regimesof cooperationemerge to resolvecollective action problems, coordination problems,and transactioncosts that stand in the way of such interests(Keohane, 1984). Can these argumentsexplain the evolutionof hemispherism?

19On October 23, 1962, in the nmidstof the Cuban Missile Crisis,the OAS unanimouslycalled all membersto take whateveractions necessary to ensurethe immediate dismantling and withdrawalof Soviet missiles from Cuba. Venezuela and Argentinasent warships to Cuban waters.In thenext fewyears, as Cuba's involvementin revolutionarymovements in Latin Americaincreased, the Rio Treatyimposed trade sanctionson Cuba; only Mexico refusedto break relations withCuba (Dominguez, 1989:26-29). JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 13

Interdependence.One simpleand commonindicator of interdependenceis levels of trade. 0 Figure 1 plots U.S. importsfrom and exports to Latin America as a proportion of total U.S. trade. Several observationscan be made. First, U.S. interdependencewith the Americas has variedsignificantly (unlike power structures, whichvaried little), but it has neverbeen veryhigh. In the last 200 years,exports to Latin America seldom reached 25 percentof total U.S. trade (imports,however, have been considerablymore important). At one level,this explains why hemispher- ismhas had suchan arduoushistory-the U.S. has nothad a strongeconomics-based interestin close cooperation with its neighbors.Second, there are two moments duringwhich there is some correlationbetween share of exports(one indicatorof interdependence)and hemispherism:between 1933 and 1960, exports to Latin America expanded, reaching almost 30 percent during several of these years. In addition, the fact that the share of exports declined throughoutmost of the nineteenthcentury and the Cold War period correlateswith the stagnationof hemispherismduring these years. However,the interdependence hypothesis is disconfirmedby other aspects of the data. For instance,it cannot explain the emergenceof hemispherismin the 1880s, a time of historicallylow levels of exports.It cannot explain the decline of hemispherismin the earlytwentieth century, when exportlevels increased,and the rise of hemispherismstarting in the 1930s, when exportsdeclined.21 More important, it has a difficulttime explaining the hemisphericpeak of the 1990s. Although exports increased in the 1990s, they hardly reached a historicalpeak. Exports duringthis period barelyreached 20 percent,and importsreached an all-timelow. In fact,export levels between 1985-1994 and 1965-1985 differonly marginally, and yetthe differences in degreesof hemispherism are substantial.Even where there seems to be a strongcorrelation between economic interdependenceand regime formation(1940s and 1950s), a question arises: Whyis economic integrationthe "missing"issue in the regimeof cooperationthat emerged duringthis period? Historicaldata on LatinAmerica's level of interdependence on theU.S. is difficult to assemble. However,data fromrecent years is available,and this,too, showsthat Latin America's recent turn towardhemispherism cannot be explained easily by changes in the structureof trade links.Table 2 showsthe structureof trade forthe nine largest Latin American countries,broken down by destinationtrading regions-Asia, Europe, the U.S., and LatinAmerica. Was the turntoward hemispherism a resultof changes in levels of tradewith the U.S.? The answeris, hardly.First, the U.S. was the numberone destinationregion of onlythree countries (Colombia, Mexico,and Venezuela). Second, Table 3 showsthat, while most countries increased theirlevel of tradewith the United Statesbetween 1986 and 1994, the change was forthe mostpart very modest (with the exceptionof Argentina). Thus, hemispherism in the 1990s cannot be easilyexplained as the resultof growingtrade interdependence withthe U.S. Was the turn toward hemispherisma result of a fear of being left out from prevailingtrade blocs, what Fawcett (1995) calls "fearof economic marginalization"? The realizationthat European marketswould be closed was an importantmotive in Mexico's decision to negotiatea freetrade with the U.S. and Canada. But can the argumentbe extended to the rest of the hemisphere?On the one hand, Table 3

20 In a reviewof the literatureon interdependenceand conflict,McMillan (1997:53) findsthat there is significant variationin theway trade is operationalized(e.g., tradevolume, trade values, systemic trade levels)and thatthis might have an impacton the differentfindings. For the sake of simplicity,we use percentageof world tradeas a measure of interdependence. 21 Between 1928 and 1938, the traderatio (the sum of exportsand importsdivided by the grossdomestic product) of almostall Latin Americannations declined significantly,in some cases by more than 50 percent(Bulmer-Thomas, 1994). 0 0

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TABLE 2. Latin America's Structure of Trade, by Regional Trading Partner, 1986-1994 (percent of total trade)

Differencebetween 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1986 and 1994

Argentina Asia 9.2 10.3 11.4 8.2 9.6 15.3 13 12.9 10.9 1.7 Europe 34 37.2 34 32.2 31.4 26.6 27.2 27.3 31.3 -2.7 LA 34.1 30.3 33.2 33.3 33.1 31 33.7 32.6 31 -3.1 U.S. 17.6 16.5 16.7 21.2 20.1 18.1 21.7 23 22.8 5.2 Brazil Asia 26.4 31.4 29.6 28.3 29.7 21.6 22.3 20.8 17.5 -8.9 Europe 29 28 28.3 26.2 25.7 27.4 27 26.9 30.6 1.6 LA 12.7 11.8 12.5 17.8 17.6 18.2 18.4 18.8 19.8 7.1 U.S. 22 20.1 20.1 20.3 20.1 23.5 24 22.9 23.1 1.1 Chile Asia 13.7 15.9 13.2 17.5 12.6 16.2 17.2 16.7 17.4 3.7 Europe 29.4 29.7 27.1 25.3 29 23 23.5 23.8 22.7 -6.7 LA 26.5 26 29 27.2 24.8 27.9 25.8 23.3 26.7 0.2 U.S. 22 20.4 21.2 20.7 19.5 21.2 21 23.5 23.7 1.7 Colombia Asia 10.1 13.7 11.8 11.4 11.4 12.3 11.6 15.2 14.4 4.3 Europe 29.2 27.6 26 24.9 26.5 24.6 22.2 21.2 22.4 -6.8 LA 18 16.5 19.1 20.8 20.2 22.7 24.1 24.4 23.4 5.4 U.S. 36.1 34.5 36.2 36 35.4 35 35.8 33.3 32.1 -4 Ecuador Asia 15.5 19.1 16.8 9.8 11.1 12.6 15.5 16.6 19.2 3.7 Europe 29 29.2 24.9 26.3 27.7 27.1 24.5 26.5 18.7 -10.3 LA 17.8 16 18.3 22 22.2 20.8 20.5 17.3 28 10.2 U.S. 30.3 29 33.1 33.9 32.6 31.9 32.5 31.7 26.2 -4.1 Mexico Asia 7 8.1 8.7 6.4 7.3 6.5 7.6 7.7 10.7 3.7 Europe 16 19.1 17.4 15 18.6 17.2 12.9 12.3 12.3 -3.7 LA 2.7 2.6 3.5 3.5 4 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.7 1. U.S. 70.7 64.7 66.7 68.3 67.1 68.6 73.8 74.1 69.1 -1.6 Peru Asia 11.3 11.1 5.6 7.7 6.5 9.7 12.5 14.3 16.2 4.9 Europe 27.8 33.8 23.1 24.1 22.6 20.8 17.3 15.9 18.1 -9.7 LA 25.8 24.6 23.6 31.7 35.7 37.1 35.3 33.5 31.9 6.1 U.S. 27.2 22.5 22.2 30.9 28.2 25.7 27.5 29.6 28.1 0.9 Uruguay Asia 10.5 9.5 8.9 8.2 11.5 12.7 19.1 12 9.8 -0.7 Europe 24.8 25.2 26.6 23.5 23.4 20.5 18.2 24.1 20.8 -4 LA 50.3 48.6 51 50.1 48.8 48.4 46.5 49.3 54.4 4.1 U.S. 8.5 8 7.9 12.1 9.9 9.3 9 9.7 9.9 1.4 Venezuela Asia 8.4 7.4 6.8 5.6 5.7 6.6 9.6 10.5 8.2 -0.2 Europe 30.3 31.4 32.1 32.9 28.8 25.2 23.4 23.1 22.3 -8 LA 8.5 10.3 11.3 11.1 12.5 14 14.4 14.1 16.2 7.7 U.S. 45.9 44.6 42.6 44.3 46.7 47.8 46.6 46.2 46.1 0.2 Source: United Nations, 1996.

showsthat the percentage of Latin Americantrade withEurope declined during this period, in some cases quite dramatically(Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela), suggestinga European closure. On the other hand, there is littleevidence of an Asianclosure: a significantnumber of LatinAmerican nations increased their levels of tradewith Asia, in some cases quite dramatically(Colombia, Peru). And except 16 Regimesof Cooperation in theWestern Hemisphere

TABLE 3. Changes in Structureof Trade (differencebetween percentage in 1986 and percentagein 1994)

Increases

Asia Europe USA Intra-LA

Arg 1.7 Bra 1.6 Arg 5.2 Bra 7.1 Chi 3.7 Bra 1.1 Chi 0.2 Col 4.3 Chi 1.7 Col 5.4 Ecu 3.7 Per 0.9 Ecu 10.2 Mex 3.7 Uru 1.4 Mex 1 Per 4.9 Ven 0.2 Per 6.1 Uru 4.1 Ven 7.7

Decreases Bra -8.9 Arg -2.7 Col -4 Arg -3.1 Uru -0.7 Chi -6.7 Mex -1.6 Ven -0.2 Col -6.8 Ecu -4.1 Ecu -10.3 Mex -3.7 Per -9.7 Uru -4 Ven -8 Source:Calculations based on United Nations, 1996. for Brazil, those nations that experienced a decline in trade with Asia did so modestly.The mostnotable change in the structureof Latin Americantrade is the expansion of intra-LatinAmerican trade. Latin Americanexports to other Latin American nations increased in value over 135 percent between 1986 and 1992 (Naim, 1994:54). Thus, it is not easy to statethat the turnto hemispherismon the part of Latin Americais the resultof closed doors. The closure factor,however, might have played a bigger role at the level of expectations.In the 1980s, the United Statesbecame fearfulof being discriminated against by European and Asian blocs, and had reasons to fear that the Uruguay Round of tradetalks might collapse. These concernsprompted the U.S. to support regional(as opposed to multilateral)trade negotiations, as bothan insurancepolicy in case Europe and Asia closed themselvesfurther and as pressuremechanisms to get other nations to take the Uruguay talks more seriously (Wyatt-Walter, 1995:84-88). Likewise,Latin Americans in the 1990s did regardthe U.S. as themost attractivemarket, but also the mostprone to closure(either through U.S. exclusive attentionto NAFTA or throughthe rise of protectionism). Given the Latin American gamble ofjettisoning protectionism in favorof an export-orientedmodel in the 1990s, a closure of the U.S. (or NAFTA) marketswould have been a devastating blow,which might explain whyLatin Americanswere keen on lockingU.S. interest in the entireregion. However, this expectation-of-closureargument cannot explain the 1994 U.S. decision to proceed withfree trade in the Americas.This decisionwas made after the U.S. secured access to importanttrading clusters: NAFTA, ASEAN, and after the successfulcompletion of the Uruguay Round. In addition, this explanation overstatesthe role ofeconomics in LatinAmerica's recent interest in hemispherism. It cannot explain why Latin Americanswere also interestedin other political, security,and social issues. JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 17

In sum,trade appears to be a significantvariable in explaininghemispherism in the 1940s and 1950s and in explaininglow hemispherism in thenineteenth century. However,changes in trade patternsseemed to have played lesser roles in the two other periods of regime formation-the late nineteenthcentury and the 1990s. Therefore,trade alone offersan incompleteexplanation for hemispherism (see also Hurrell, 1995:272). The levels of hemispherictrade dependence have not varied sufficiently-orin the hypothesizeddirection-to account for the variation of regimeformation and robustnessin theAmericas.

FunctionalInstitutionalism. A differentversion of interest-basedtheories is what Keohane (1990) has denominated"sophisticated liberalism" (as opposed to republican, commercial,and regulatoryliberalism). Accordingly, cooperation flourishes insofaras there are accompanyingrules that assist nations in coordinatingtheir behavior, resolving collective action problems, and avoiding suboptimal outcomes.22Regimes thus emerge to fulfillspecific functions. They reduce uncertainty and transactioncosts (Keohane, 1984). And once these regimes emerge, nations develop an interestin maintainingthem even when the factorsthat brought them into being are no longer operative. There is no doubt that the regimes of cooperation in the Americas had a functionalistorigin. At each Pan-Americangathering, actors had concretegoals they wanted to pursue and problems to resolve. They deliberatelydiscussed specific norms and institutionalmechanisms to achieve such objectives.Moreover, Keo- hane's argumentabout the stickinessof regimes helps to explain the survivalof hemispherismduring periods of duress (e.g., 1906-1933 and 1954-1980s). The main problem is that this argument,as many criticsof this traditionhave made abundantlyclear, cannot explain the supplyof regimesas well as it can explain the demand. Whyhas the supplyof institutionsof cooperationfallen short of expectations,especially in the nineteenthcentury? Why, despite these shortages,do we observe differentlevels of regime formationin the last 100 years? Whywas the 1889-1906 regimemore modest than subsequentones? Finally,functional institu- tionalismcannot explain whysimilarly rich and sophisticatedinter--American insti- tutionscreated in the 1940s produced such differentdegrees of cooperation(close cooperation between 1945 and 1954, estrangementbetween 1954 and the late 1980s).

Idea-based Arguments A third set of theories explains regime formationas the result of ideas and knowledgeacquired by actors.Actors hold beliefs,which are oftenindependent of objective material and environmentalconditions. Actors maximize utility,but perceptionsof utility depend on prevailingideas and knowledge.By acting as "road maps" or "focal points,"ideas influencethe extentto which actors are willingto pursue internationalcooperation (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). Ideas tend to have greaterpolitical impact the more theybecome embedded in institutions(Hall, 1989; Goldsteinand Keohane, 1993; Dominguez, 1997) or come to be shared by keypolicymakers through "epistemic communities" (Haas, 1992). To what extent have intellectualtraditions shaped trends in inter-American cooperation? We argue-significantly,but oftenas impediments.Ever since the late nineteenthcentury, ideas thatdiscount the benefitof cooperationhave circu- lated widelythroughout the WesternHemisphere, constantly impeding the rise of

22 For a recentargument that cooperation in theAmericas has been hurtas a resultof "inadequate organizational forms"and "weak institutionalarrangements" see Montesinos,1996. 18 Regimesof Cooperation in thzeWestern Hemisphere

hemispherism.However, as is the case with the other two schools of thought,a single-mindedfocus on ideas is also insufficientto account for the variationof hemispherism.

IntellectualTraditions That Hindered Hemispherism Most argumentsabout the role of ideas in regimeformation are predicatedon the notion of convergence.That is, regimesform when actors and institutionsadopt convergentideas about goals and solutions.But in inter-Americanaffairs, the most importantobstacle to the rise of hemisphericregimes has not been the lack of convergence.Moments of enormousconvergence on ideas did not resultin strong regimes of cooperation. Instead, a decisive obstacle has been an oversupplyof "antihemispheric"intellectual traditions.

The No-BenefitDoctrine in theU.S. In the United States, a constant antihemisphericintellectual tradition has been what we label "the No-benefitdoctrine"-the idea thatthe United States has nothingto gain, and probablya lot to lose, fromties with the nationsof the hemisphere. The No-benefitdoctrine erupted in the late 181Os during the debates concerningthe appropriateU.S. foreignpolicy towardthe wars of independence in Latin America.A leading advocate of hemispherism,Rep. Henry Clay, stronglycondemned the administrationfor its hesitation to recognize and supportthe independence of the new Americannations. In his privatediaries, PresidentJohn Quincy Adams (thenSecretary of State) explained the reasons forthis hesitation:

So far as [Latin Americans]were contendingfor independence, I wishedwell to theircause; but I had seen and yetsee no prospect thatthey would establishfree or liberalinstitutions of government. They are not likelyto promotethe spirit either of freedom or order by theirexample. They have not the firstelements of good or free government.Arbitrary power, militaryand ecclesiastical,was stampedupon theireducation, upon theirhabits, and upon all their institutions.... I had littleexpectation of any beneficialresult to this countryfrom any futureconnection with them, political or commercial.We should deriveno improvementto our own institu- tionsby any communionwith theirs. (in Karnes, 1972:17)

This No-benefitdoctrine differed from isolationism, the then-officialforeign policy ofthe UnitedStates, because itwas specificallydiscriminating. Whereas isolationism made no distinctionsacross countries(ties with any nationwere to be avoided), the No-benefitdoctrine singles out Latin Americanrepublics as particularlyobjection- able partnersbecause theyare prone to bad governments. The No-benefitdoctrine essentially killed any enthusiasmin the U.S. forhemi- spherismin thenineteenth century. It helps explainwhy the United States remained neutralduring the wars of independence in SouthAmerica and was slowin granting recognitionto the new republics,and whythe Monroe Doctrinewas stipulatedin such noncommittalterms. It helps to explain whythe U.S. failed to participatein the firsthemispheric congress-the Congress of Panama. PresidentJohn Quincy Adams wanted to send delegates, but Congress resisted.Congressman Robert Y. Haynes (S.C.) argued: "No man can deny that the Congress of Panama is to be composed of deputies frombelligerent states, and that its objects are essentially belligerent"(in Karnes, 1972:49). To get approval,Adams had to assure Congress thatthe United Stateswould remainfree of any commitments. In theend, Congress JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 19 authorizedthe mission,but the delay preventedthe U.S. delegate fromarriving in time.No otherhemispheric congress took place until 1889. In the earlypart of thiscentury, Latin America's growing instability, especially in the Caribbean,fueled the No-benefitdoctrine in the U.S. This instabilitycorrobo- rated the U.S. viewof Latin Americaas a land of vulnerabilitiesand thusopportu- nitiesfor Europeans to make comebacksinto the Americas(often to collectdebts). Consequently,the U.S. adopted a policy of sovereignty-denialin northernLatin America-since these nations, as sovereignrepublics, provided more headaches than benefits,the U.S. should rationallymove to wipe out theirsovereignty. During the Cold War, the antihemisphericsentiment in the United Stateswas refueledby the rise of North-Atlanticism-apreference for strongrelations with Europe. This neworientation challenged the Western Hemisphere premise that the UnitedStates had a "specialrelation" with the Americas. Furthermore, the No-benefitdoctrine became a favoriteof Cold War hawks,who saw LatinAmerica as an area of littlegeopolitical importance compared to Eurasia. The region had to be safe fromthe Soviets,but (except forthe Caribbean) it lacked sufficientstrategic value to play a major role in the East-Weststruggle.23 In the 1950s, forinstance, Latin Americawas the last of the major world areas to receiveFord Foundation funding forarea studies(Skidmore, 1998:107). And the intensificationof illiberalpolitics in LatinAmerica after the 1950s furtherreaffirmed negative images ofthe region (see, e.g., Packenham,1973).

AntihemisphericIntellectual Traditions in LatinAmerica. The WesternHemisphere Idea also had potentopponents in Latin America.Unlike the United States,which was born with a consensus on foreignpolicy, Latin Americannations were born severelytorn over a numberof foreignpolicy doctrines in addition to the Western Hemisphere Idea: Bolivarism, Latin-Americanism,Europeanism, Internalism, Land-deprivationism,and later on, Yankeephobia. Every one of these directly challenged the WesternHemisphere Idea. Bolivarism,the main thesisof LatinAmerica's liberator Simon Bolivar,is the call for unityof Spanish America under a European tutor.Bolivar argued that Latin American unity-maybe even merger-was necessary to preserve the region's independence.But thisunion mustexclude Brazil and theUnited States.Brazil was to be excluded because ofits non-Spanish heritage and non-Republicanregime; the United Statesbecause of its non-Spanishheritage and most important,its general militaryunreliability. A more effectiveand committedprotector, Bolivar argued, was England.24 Latin Americanismis the idea thatthe Americasare fundamentallydivided into separate ethnic-culturalgroups: those of Latin descent (includingSpanish, Portu- guese, and French) and the Anglo-Saxon. Rather than natural allies, the Anglo- Saxons and the rest of the hemisphere are incompatiblecivilizations. Whereas hemispherismcalls forintegrating the Americas on thebasis ofcommon values and goals, Latin-Americanismwould separate the Latins and the Anglos on the basis of ethnicity.25

23 Cold War hawkstended to neglectLatin Americafor at least tworeasons. One was balance-of-powerassessments: the feelingthat U.S. hegemonyin the regionwas secure,or at least more so than elsewhere,and the assumptionthat the Soviet Union respected this arrangement.The other was a derivationof the No-benefitdoctrine: losing Latin Americawas not as "costly"as losing otherstrategically more importantregions. 24 Various Bolivarian-typecongresses took place in the nineteenthcentury: the Lima Congress (1847-1848) attendedby Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador,New Granada,and Peru; theSantiago Congress(1856) attendedby Chile, Ecuador, and Peru; and the Second Lima Congress (1864-1865) attended by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. 25 Latin-Americanismdiffers from Bolivarism in thatit calls forunity among all nationsof LatinAmerica, including Brazil,and rejectsthe inclusionof Great Britain. 20 Regimesof Cooperation in theWestern Hemisphere

Europeanismis the idea thatbilateral ties with European powersare preferable to closer ties across the hemisphere.After independence, many Latin American eliteswanted, more than anything,to be accepted in the international(European) communityof nations(Davis, 1977). Since then,the fixationon securingEurope's blessing has been a recurrentintellectual tradition in Latin America.26In the nineteenthcentury, it made Latin Americansavoid decisionsthat might upset the Europeans, such as pursuingintrahemispheric alliances, and insteadprefer formal alliances withEuropean powersas a betterdefense against neighbors or domestic enemies,or as a means of fulfilling"manifest destiny." Internalismis the idea thatdomestic state-building takes precedence over international activism.As in the United States,internalism has been appealing to Latin Americasince the earlynineteenth century, but forslightly different reasons. Latin Americanisolationists rejected hemispherism not because iteroded sovereignty,but ratherbecause it posed a distractionfrom the nation'smost urgent tasks: domestic unificationand pacificationin the nineteenthcentury, development and counter- insurgencyin the twentiethcentury. Land-Deprivationismis the idea thatthe nation has been a victimof territorial usurpation.Most Latin Americannations were born withuncertain borders. In a regionthat gave rise to twenty-twonations out ofonly four major territorialcolonial clusters(viceroys), it is not surprisingthat feelingsof land deprivationprolifer- ated.27 The uncertaintyof territorialsettlements, and the violence produced by secessionisttrends of the earlynineteenth century, instilled mistrust among Latin Americannations. This, in turn,gave riseto a preferencefor a quarrel-thy-neighbor foreignpolicy in many nations-yet another antihemisphericintellectual tradition.28 Yankeephobia emerged in the second half of the nineteenthcentury as a most powerfulantihemispheric intellectual tradition. Except in Mexico, this Yankee- phobia was initiallynot a reactionagainst the militaryand economic power of the United States (for Latin Americans,the Europeans, not the U.S., were the real powers). Instead, it was firstthe resultof a conservative,Latin-Catholic, cultural rejectionof Anglo-Saxon,Protestant, liberal values.29 Second, nineteenth-century Yankeephobia was also a resentmentagainst the cautiousneutrality of the United States,which consistently refused to implementthe Monroe Doctrineduring most Euro-Americanconflicts, or to take sides withany Americancountry involved in a territorialdispute.30 In manyways, this was a Bolivariantype of anti-Americanism, a feelingthat the United Stateswas unreliable.Many Latin Americansinterpreted

26 The Europeanistswere themselveshighly divided over which European powerto seek tieswith: England, France, Spain, or Germany(at least untilWorld War II). 27 Mexico lost Texas and CentralAmerica; CentralAmerica, in turn,broke up into fiverepublics; New Granada broke up into Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador; and La Plata broke up into Uruguay,Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia. 28 This reveals how complicated the relationshipbetween Latin-Americanismand hemispherismis: although Latin-Americanismposes a challenge to hemispherism,some degree of Latin-Americanism(i.e., a feelingof "sister- hood" among Latin nations)is also a preconditionof hemispherismbecause it counteractsthe veryantihemispheric, quarrel-thy-neighborintellectual traditions. 29 The Uruguayan philosopherJos6 Enrique Rod6 ([1900] 1988), to this day obligatoryreading in most Latin Americanhigh schools,epitomizes this intellectual tradition. Rod6 urged his fellowLatin Americansto resistthe U.S. because it was a half-educated,spiritually deficient, and culturallymediocre nation and to reinforceinstead their Latinism-Hellenism.In the Portuguese-speakingworld, another influential Yankeephobe was the Brazilianmonarchist Eduardo Prado. His book TheAmerican Delusion (1893), which indictsPan-Americanism and all the republicsof the Americas-whetherLatin or Anglo-for settingthe example forthe establishmentof the new Brazilianrepublic, sold out a fewhours afterits publication (in Haring, 1929). 30 Argentina,for instance, resented the United Statesfor refusing to take itsside duringits conflicts with Brazil and duringthe Britishoccupation of the Falklandsin the 1830s. In the 1860s, the United Statesfailed to deterthe Spanish militaryincursions against Valparaiso (Chile) and the Chincha Islands (Peru). Cuban insurgentswere frustratedby U.S. refusalto help in the 1868-1878 war againstSpain. JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 21

thisas a sign that the United States cared littleabout the region,or at least their own country.Third, Yankeephobia had a peer-rivalrydimension. Sectors of some Latin American nations (e.g., in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina)saw the United Statesas a competitorfor hegemony in the regionand thusan obstacleto theirown manifestdestiny (see Peck, 1977b). Thus, in the nineteenthcentury, Yankeephobia was not based on a victimizing-victimview of U.S.-Latin Americanrelations. LatinAmerica's antihemispheric intellectual traditions also increasedin the early twentiethcentury because Yankeephobia experienced a major boost and transformation.It was thenthat Yankeephobia finallyadopted a classic"balance-of-power" dimension.Latin Americans began to fearthat "the big fishwould eat thelittle ones," as the Peruvianpolitician Victor Rauil Haya de la Torre (1984) succinctlystated it. In turn,this new Yankeephobia was fueledby the arrival in LatinAmerica of socialist ideas circa the 1910s (see Hale, 1986). Socialism changed the ways many Latin Americanslooked at intrahemisphericrelations. Rather than harmony of interests, U.S.-Latin Americanrelations were now seen throughthe prism of class conflict and exploitation,encouraging an image of the U.S. as the embodimentof every- thinginimical to the region's progress.In sum, a new and more powerfultype of Yankeephobia emerged in the earlytwentieth century that was a compositeof the old conservativerepudiation of U.S. culture and newer concerns about power asymmetries. One consequence ofthis new Yankeephobia was the emergencein LatinAmerica of a preferencefor absolute principles of nonintervention.This preferenceproved devastatingfor hemispherismbecause it ruled out collectiveactions on behalf of basic tenets of the WesternHemisphere Idea (democracy,free trade, collective security,etc.). From now on, U.S. effortsto keep extrahemisphericcountries out of the region-which Latin Americans would have applauded in the nineteenth century-became objectionable.A no-winview toward U.S. policyspread throughout the hemisphere:U.S. engagementwas condemned as imperialistic;U.S. inaction as indifference.31 While the United Statesbegan to see theworld in termsof the East-Westconflict after World War II, Latin American nations began to see it in terms of the North-Southdivide (a typeof Universalismminus the industrializedWest). Rather thanbettering the South, contacts with the North produce "structuraldependency," and hence, chronicunderdevelopment. This took Yankeephobia to new heights. Whereas Haya de la Torre in the 1920s spoke of the "big fish"eating the "small fish,"Juan Jose Arevalo in the 1960s spoke of "the sharkvictimizing the sardine" (1961:13). Arevaloargued, "Internationaltreaties are a farcewhen theyare pacted betweena sharkand a sardine,"and dismissedPan-Americanism as nothingmore than an "instrumentat the serviceof the shark."Latin Americanslost respectfor U.S. foreignpolicy, seeing containmentas irrelevantto their concerns and a diversionof resources(Wesson and Mufnoz,1986; Biles, 1988). Energized by the Cuban Revolution,Latin American historians wrote "patriotic histories" and "Marx- ist megahistories"(Skidmore, 1998:119). Calls were made for "self-reliance,"i.e., diminishingas much as possible the ties withthe West in order to regain control over one's own resources (Galtung, 1981). Inward-orientedmodels of economic

31 The 1926 Pan-AmericanCongress, celebrating the centennialof the Congressof Panama, exemplifiedthe riseof antihemisphericintellectual traditions in the early twentiethcentury. Although a proposal was draftedto fortify hemisphericorganizations, the UnitedStates and mostlarge LatinAmerican nations rejected it (isolationism/no-benefit tradition).The Mexican delegation proposed that the Spanish monarch AlfonsoXIII be elected presidentof the Congress,and the motionto include the sovereignsof Great Britainand the Netherlandspassed amid greatapplause (Bolivarism,Europeanism, Universalism).At the opening ceremony,the most applauded speech came from the Honduran delegate,who argued thatthe Congressrepresented an opportunityto "test"the fraternal sentiments of the "colossusof the North"(New and Old Yankeephobia). 22 Regimesof Cooperation in theWestern Hemisphere developmentspread throughoutthe region (see Corbo, 1992; Bulmer-Thomas, 1994). Many Latin Americans also developed an acute case of aid addiction, a derivativeof the very North-Southnotion that poor countries are entitled to never-endingcompensation for past wrongsand entrenchedinequalities. Insofar as LatinAmericans had an interestin trade,they wanted subsidized rather than free trade (see ECLAC, 1994). Thus, while economic liberalismgained prestigein the U.S. (Goldstein,1993), it virtuallydisappeared fromthe largestcountries of Latin America.As a result,the idea thattrade was advantageousfor all-one of the least controversialpoints in WesternHemisphere thinkingsince the 1850s-became one of the most divisiveissues in U.S.-Latin American relations afterthe 1940s, which explains the absence of an economic dimension in the postwarregime of cooperation. Latin Americansalso changed theirview of sovereignty-no longer defined as merelythe preservation of independence (as was thecase in thenineteenth century), but now as the capacityto exhibita "nonaligned" foreignpolicy. Latin Americans thusrushed to deepen tieswith nations outside the hemisphere,democratic or not. The U.S., in turn,changed itsview of self-determination-nowdefined as staying freeof communism.The need to preventa second Cuba superseded the need to defend democracy.As Kennedy declared in his analysisof the 1961 crisisin the Dominican Republic: "There are threepossibilities in descendingorder of preference: a decentdemocratic regime, a continuationof the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime.We ought to aim at the first,but we reallycan't renounce the second until we are sure thatwe can avoid the third"(in Packenham,1973:165). The resultwas a generalizeddecline in hemisphericinterest in defendingdemocratic values, with everynation of the hemispheresolidifying relations with authoritarian regimes. Yankeephobia acquired not only extra fuel, but also extra institutional homes-state bureaucraciesand political parties. In the early twentiethcentury, Yankeephobic nationalismwas prevalentmostly among intellectuals;during the Cold War, however,the Latin Americanstate became "the chiefpropagandist for nationalism"(Johnson, 1986:94). Not just foreignministries, but also education,; ministriesand militaryinstitutions became filledwith nationalists. In addition,most Latin Americanpolitical parties-left or right-adopted some typeof Yankeepho- bia. Competingfor the nationalistlabel, no partywanted to be seen as advocating too close tieswith the United States.Institutional entrenchment not onlysolidified the stayingpower of ideas, but also expanded theirreach across society.Given the dramaticexpansion of state institutionsand the proliferationof partyactivity in Latin Americaafter World War II, antihemisphericintellectual traditions began to reach a growingnumber of nonelitesectors: students, soldiers, and partymembers. It should be stressed,however, that pro-hemispheric modes of thinkingcontin- ued to circulateduring the Cold War. In Latin America,for instance, conservative forcesoften toned down theirold Yankeephobia because they,too, shared the U.S. interest in containment. Moreover, not all Latin American leftists were Yankeephobes: some anticommunist,social-democratic parties emerged (e.g., in Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and PuertoRico), which were eager to fight"both the oligarchsand communists"and stillbe friendsof the UnitedStates (Schlesinger, 1975). In the United States, hemispherismwas sustained by "developmental- ism"-the idea that U.S. fundingof economic developmenttranslates into more moderate,stable, and consensual political outcomes-and by a minorityof Cold War hawkswho consideredLatin America a crucialbattleground in thefight against communism.32

32 In 1963 RichardNixon, for instance, emphasized the need to payattention to LatinAmerica and otherdeveloping regions:"Communism is on the move.... Where in theworld today do we expect trouble?In the communistsatellites JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 23

However,most of the pro-hemisphericintellectual traditions circulating during the Cold War were predicated,paradoxically, on notionsthat directly contradicted basic tenets of hemispherism.In Latin America, for instance,actors in favor of hemispherismvalued it not foritself but simplyas a means to other,more oppor- tunisticends: conservativeswanted U.S. blessing for theirauthoritarian designs; leftistswanted more room formaneuvering and greaterforeign aid. In the United States,both developmentalists and pro-hemisphericCold Warriors justifiedincreasing ties based on negative images and preemptiveintentions. A stunningexample ofthis was a long memorandumin 1950 bythen-counselor of the State DepartmentGeorge F. Kennan to the Secretaryof State. From itsgeography to its social customs,Latin Americais describedas a source of "problems"for the United States: "It seems to me unlikelythat there could be any otherregion of the earthin whichnature and humanbehavior could have combinedto produce a more unhappy and hopeless backgroundfor the conduct of human life than in Latin America." Because of its fragilesocial fabric,Latin America is vulnerableto com- munistpenetration. In the eventof a war betweenthe United Statesand the Soviet Union, Kennan concluded,Latin American nations cannot be countedon to become U.S. allies (as theydid duringWorld War II) since theywould succumbto civilwar or communisttakeover (U.S. Dept. of State, 1976:598-624). In short,Kennan adapts Adams's No-benefitdoctrine to the Cold War. Giventhat Latin societiesare not culturallyinclined toward democracy, why bother with promoting democracy? Interestingly,both developmentalistsand Cold War hawkscame to accept this permissiveattitude toward noncommunist authoritarianism. For developmentalists, authoritarianismwas a passing phase; forCold Warriors,it was preferableto the alternatives.33Engagement was necessarynot because Latin Americanswere seen as reliable partners,but quite the opposite, because theywere seen as unreliable, trouble-prone,illiberal, and vulnerable. Thus, fornearly 200 years,antihemispheric intellectual traditions overshadowed theWestern Hemisphere Idea. In the nineteenthcentury, there routinely emerged a nationor an intellectualleader readyto questionthe motivesof any hemispheric initiativeor resentthe inclusion or exclusionof the United States, Brazil, a neighbor, or any European power. In the twentiethcentury, not even the vigorousintentions of a hegemon or other strongLatin American nationswere able to defeat these intellectualtraditions.

RefiningIdea-based Arguments:The Concept of Idea-Decline The previousargument, like most idea-based approaches, is not immuneto criti- cism.Weber (1997), forinstance, criticizes idea-based arguments,or what he calls "reflectivistapproaches," because they fail to explain change, i.e., variation in structuresand regimes over time (p. 247). In addition, he argues that these argumentsare "no more precise (and possiblyless so) than the rationalistview in explainingthe selection of one among manypossible institutions," e.g., votingrules, varietyof definitionsof propertyrights, variety of conceptions of sovereignty (pp. 240-41). That is, a reflectivistapproach cannot offera theoryof selection(p. 257). To some extent,we agree. As presentedso far,antihemispheric intellectual traditions cannot explain the variation in regime formation prior to 1994-the many-steps-forward-some-steps-backwardevolution of hemispherism.

of Eastern Europe? No, in the freenations of Latin America,Africa, and Asia" (in Taubman, 1973:7). In the 1980s, Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick(1981), U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations under PresidentReagan, also criticizedthe Pentagonfor being obliviousto the rise of Sovietinfluence in Latin Americaduring the 1970s. 33 This disregardfor democracy is the essence of the 1964 Mann Doctrine,whereby the United Statesdeclared that itwould tolerateany regimeas long as it met two(easy) criteria:oppose communismand welcome U.S. corporations. 24 Regimesof Cooperation in theWestern Hemisphere

If antihemisphericintellectual traditions were pervasiveall along, what then ac- countsfor these ups and downs? Nevertheless,an idea-basedapproach is not thateasy to dismiss.While they might not offera theoryof selection,intellectual traditions do offera theoryof rejection-they explain whyregimes based on hemisphericintegration were rejected moreoften than not. Moreover, our idea-basedargument can be modifiedto explain variationsin regime formation.We have argued thathistorically there has always been a demand (based on security,interests, and ideas) forregimes of hemispheric cooperation,but that this demand was repeatedlyhampered by more powerful antihemisphericintellectual traditions. It follows,therefore, that a necessarycondition for hemispherismis some decline in antihemisphericintellectual traditions. But,under whatconditions do intellectualtraditions lose appeal? We suggestthree ways. First,an intellectualtradition can lose appeal ifrival intellectual traditions gain prestige.The rise of a rivalintellectual tradition serves as a counterweightagainst the prevailingparadigm. Second, an intellectualtradition can lose appeal ifit fails to pass empiricaltests. When a series of historicalevents disconfirm or challenge some of the centraltenets of an intellectualtradition, its appeal erodes. Finally,and most important,an intellectualtradition can lose appeal if it undergoes a process ofinstitutional de-embeddedness, i.e., ifit is debunkedfrom the political institutions thatare homes to these intellectualtraditions. Given thatinstitutionalization mag- nifiesthe power of ideas (Hall, 1989), it followsthen that de-embeddedness should produce the opposite result. These threeprocesses-rise of rivals, empirical invalidation, and de-embeddedness- underminethe power of intellectualtraditions. Independently, each of these proc- esses is insufficientto corrode antihemisphericintellectual traditions, but in com- bination,they create the space forthe emergenceof regimes.The more these pro- cesses are present,the deeper and richerthe regimesof cooperationought to be. We believe thatthis argument can explain much of the evolutionof hemispherism.

Idea-DeclineThrough the Rise ofRival IntellectualTraditions: TheLate 1800s The 1889-1906 period exemplifiesthe resultsof idea-decline throughthe rise of rivalintellectual traditions. In the late nineteenthcentury, one of the mostserious rivals to antihemisphericintellectual traditions made enormous stridesin Latin America-political liberalism.Latin American liberals admired U.S. republican institutionsand believed in open economics.Although Latin American liberals had fewersuccesses in politics than in economics, the late nineteenthcentury was nonetheless a period of liberal ascendancy.34Consequently, the long-standing hegemonyof antihemisphericintellectual traditions in Latin America eroded, so thatthe U.S. proposal forcreating the 1889 Pan-AmericanCongress found more welcomingears in Latin America. However, the rise of rivals is not necessarily the most powerful antidote to an intellectualtradition. The 1889-1906 case of regime formationshows the

34The rise to power of Domingo Sarmientoin Argentinais indicativeof thisrise of liberalism.Sarmiento was an Argentineversion of Alexis de Tocqueville-he traveledthrough the U.S. in searchof clues on how to build democracy back home. In 1887, shortlybefore his death, he said that "I studied the reasons for the [U.S.'s] extraordinary development,and the bases of its liberties,in order to apply themto our lands. Thus the twoextremes of America are linkedin a single thought,and are moved by the hope thatall the restwill soon followin thisgreat movement" (in de Onfs,1952:196). Sarmiento'sability to win the presidency-againstenormous conservative odds-reveals the growing prestige of liberalismat the time. But Sarmiento,like most other Latin American liberals,failed to consolidate liberal-democraticpolitics, even though they managed to consolidate liberal, export-orientedeconomics in their countries(Bulmer-Thomas, 1994). JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 25 limitationsof idea-declinethrough a processof rise in rivals.Whether one intellectual traditiongains or loses strengthtells us littleabout the statusof alternative intellectualtraditions. In fact,opposing sets of intellectualtraditions could gain strengthsimultaneously, which is preciselywhat happened at the end of the nineteenthcentury. In the U.S., forinstance, the rise of imperialistsentiments rose in tandemwith interest in Pan-Americanism.U.S. imperialistseven came to support Pan-Americanismbecause theysaw it as a mechanismfor amplifying the capacity of the United States to maneuver in the region and challenge England and Germany. Other Americans supported Pan-Americanismas a way to replicate Prussia's Zollvereinin the Americas-a customsunion under a single hegemon. Thus, not all Pan-Americanistsin the United Statesvalued associationwith Latin America forits own sake. And in Latin America,as argued, the rise of liberalism produced a backlash in the formof old Yankeephobia. In short,pro-hemispheric intellectualtraditions were becomingstronger in the,Americas, which explains the steps thatwere taken towardcooperation. But antihemisphericintellectual tradi- tionswere also rising,which explains whythe breadthand scope of the emerging regimewere so limited.

Idea-DeclineThrough Empirical Invalidation: 1933-1954 As duringthe late nineteenthcentury, the 1933-1954 period witnesseda resurgence of liberalism,this time in the formof antitotalitarianthinking. A record numberof democratictransitions took place in Latin America between 1944 and 1945, producingagain a hemisphericconvergence around democraticvalues. Even the Latin American Left became impressedwith the U.S. foreignpolicy toward fascism.But again, this liberal revival was nota sufficientantidote to antihemispheric intellectualtraditions, since the latteralso acquired strengths,as previouslyargued. Whatmade possiblethe emergence of a richerregime of cooperation in the 1940s was instead the presence of anothermechanism of idea-decline-empirical invalidation. In the 1930s and 1940s,two tenets of antihemispheric intellectual traditions sufferedserious empirical challenges. First,the "New Yankeephobia" was challenged by U.S. adoption of the Good Neighbor Policy in 1933. Once Roosevelt declared,"The definitepolicy of the UnitedStates from now on is opposed to armed intervention,"the U.S. proceeded to withdrawarmed forcesfrom Nicaragua (1933) and Haiti (1934). Despite the rise of securitythreats (e.g., Germanexpansionism in theAmericas) and the rise ofpolitical instability and economicnationalism in Latin Americain the 1930s (e.g., the 1933 revolutionin Cuba; the 1937 expropriationof Standard Oil concessionsin Bolivia; the 1938 expropriationof foreignoil holdings in Mexico), the U.S. adhered to its new policyof no militaryinterventions. In the early twentiethcentury, these circumstanceswould have unleashed hard-linere- sponses fromthe U.S.35 But in the 1930s, the U.S. showed restraint.The Good Neighbor Policythus disqualified an importantantihemispheric intellectual tradition: the notion thatthe United Stateswas a menace to the region. In that sense, the Good Neighbor Policyturned out to be a major contributorto inter-American cooperation.3 Second, Latin America'sactive cooperation with the Allies duringWorld War II, in starkcontrast to itsaloof response during World War I, challengedthe No-benefit

35 U.S. antimilitarismhad a negative side effecton hemispherism:as Pastor has argued, Roosevelt "swung the pendulum fromthe extremeof interventionismto absolute silenceon internalpolitical issues," opening the space for the rise of dictatorsin Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic (1992:188). 36 Not all scholarsbelieve thatthe Good Neighbor Policywas much of a departure.Smith, for instance, sees it as "the culminationof trendsin U.S. policy towardthe region," in essence, "a declarationof triumphin the imperial conquest" (1996:65-66). 26 Regimesof Cooperation in theWestern Hemisphere doctrine. Latin American nations became one of the most reliable suppliers of primarycommodities and defensesupplies to theAllies during World War II. Even Mexico contributedby sending an expeditionaryforce to the Philippineswhich actuallyengaged the Japanese in 1945. Latin America'sbehavior during the war disconfirmedthe notionin the U.S. thatLatin Americanstates are unreliableallies thatcannot be counted on forsecurity-oriented commitments. In short,several empirical tests invalidated important tenets of antihemispheric intellectualtraditions. Combined with the rise of rivals, empirical invalidation created the space and motivationfor a deeper case of hemispherismin the 1940s.

Idea-DeclineThrough Institutional De-embeddedness: The Late 1980s As in the previoustwo episodes of regime formation,hemispherism in the 1990s was also the resultof a process of idea-declinethrough the rise of rivalintellectual traditions.Once again, liberalismmade a comeback,first in politics(the democra- tization of all Latin American nations except Cuba in the 1980s), and then in economics (the turnto marketeconomies in the 1990s). It was also the resultof idea-declinethrough empirical invalidation. Perhaps the mostimportant empirical invalidationwas the resolutionof the debt crisis.When the crisiserupted in 1982, neitherparty wanted to take mutuallyagreeable positions. Latin Americanses- cheweddomestic economic reforms, and the United Statesoffered little debt relief. However,after 1989, each partyyielded (Cline, 1995). Latin America embraced economicadjustment, disproving the U.S. notionthat Latin American nations were economicallyunreliable, and the U.S. began to offerdebt relief(e.g., the Brady Plan), disprovingthe Latin American notion that the U.S. cared littleabout the region. Nevertheless,the mostimportant feature of the late 1990s regimeis idea-decline throughinstitutional de-embeddedness. Crucial political institutionsat the state, transnational,and societal levels began to shed their antihemisphericmodes of thinking,paving the way for the most far-reachingregime of cooperation in the Americas.

De-embeddednessat the State Level. In both the U.S. and Latin America,institutions at the governmentlevel relinquished antihemisphericthinking. This was especiallynoteworthy at the state agencies in charge of economics-ministriesof the economyin LatinAmerica and the TreasuryDepartment in the U.S. In the late 1980s a new class of pro-hemispheric"technopols" took charge of Latin America's ministriesof economics,and througha process of deep staffand policychanges, convertedthese ministriesfrom bastions of economic nationalisminto bastionsof economic liberalism(Dominguez, 1997; Silva, 1997). These ministries'preference for"trade as aid" was replaced witha preferencefor "trade instead of aid" (ECLAC, 1994). In the U.S., agencies withjurisdiction over trade policy (e.g., the Trade Representative,the Treasury,Commerce) also changed positions,shifting away froman exclusivepreference for globalism (whichwas hostile to hemispherism) towardan acceptance of regional trade agreements. De-embeddedness of antihemisphericintellectual traditions also took place, albeit to a lesser extent,in stateagencies in charge of politicaland securityissues. Latin Amnerica'sministries of foreignrelations adopted less absolute notions of nonintervention.As newdemocracies, Latin American governments discovered that absolutenonintervention deprives them of international allies in the eventof a coup attempt. Governmentscame to understand that collective involvementin the supportof democraticefforts abroad is desirable in part because they,too, might need it. Evidenceof thisis the 1991 SantiagoResolution of the OAS, whichcalled for a meetingin the eventof a "sudden or irregularinterruption of the democratically JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 27 elected governmentin any of the Organization'smember states." This Resolution is more thanjust an unprecedentedcode of conductfor the defenseof democracy in theregion. It is also themost remarkable ever relaxation of the thus-far sacrosanct principleof noninterventionin the twentiethcentury. The factthat this Resolution was adopted by the OAS, an organismunder the jurisdictionof Latin American foreignrelations ministries, indicates the extent to which one crucial antihemisphericintellectual tradition became de-embeddedfrom political/security-oriented statebureaucracies. Likewise, security-oriented agencies of the executivebranch in the United States also shed theirpreference for authoritarian clients. By the time ofthe second Reagan administration,for instance, U.S. foreignpolicy leaders began to promotedemocratic transitions, against the wishesof authoritarianclients (e.g., in Chile and in Haiti).

De-embeddednessat the Transnational Level. Antihemispheric intellectual traditions were also de-embedded from knowledge-disseminatinginstitutions at the transnationallevel. By the early 1990s, regional thinktanks that were preeminent champions of North-Southmodes of thinking(e.g., the United Nations Economic Commissionfor Latin America and the Caribbean,ECLAC, and the LatinAmerican Economic System,SELA) also began to advocate structuraleconomic reforms along the "WashingtonConsensus" (i.e., freemarkets, privatized public services,macro- economic stability,trade liberalization,deregulation, fiscal discipline) (see, e.g., ECLAC, 1994; Williamson, 1994; Edwards, 1995; IDB, 1996). Much has been writtenon whetherthis new model was imposed on LatinAmerica by external actors or not. It is less oftenrecognized, however, that Latin Americansdid not embrace theWashington Consensus blindly, but rather made theirown amendment: the state should be fortifiedin some areas such as tax collection,anti-trust regulation, and provisionof social servicesfor free markets and macroeconomicstability to endure politically(Bresser Pereira et al., 1994:204; Dominguez, 1997). Many multilateral lendinginstitutions have come to accept thisLatin American amendment (see, e.g., World Bank, 1997). In short,transnational institutions dropped old antihemisphericintellectual traditions, giving rise to new epistemiccommunities of reform- minded practitionersthat converged around a modified,pro-integration version of the WashingtonConsensus.

De-embeddednessat the Domestic Level. Finally,antihemispheric intellectual tradi- tionslost significantinstitutional homes at the domesticlevel. In LatinAmerica, the most significantchange occurredat the level of politicalparties in the opposition. Historicallyin Latin America, once a party entered the opposition, it almost automaticallyturned antihemispheric.This was because nonincumbentpolitical parties,regardless of ideology, tended to regardstate-to-state contacts between their countryand the United States as advantageous to incumbentsonly. The old view was thatthe strongerthe internationalrelations of the incumbent,the smallerthe chances of defeatingthe incumbents.In the late 1980s, oppositionpolitical parties began to rejectthis view. They discoveredthat hemispherism could actuallyresult in greater pressure on incumbentforces to adhere to democratic procedures, protect human rights,respect oppositions' rights,and be more accountable in general.In essence,hemispherism can enhance,rather than block, the opposition's chance of winningoffice. The resultwas an increase in politicalparty demand for hemispherism.This change in the viewsof opposition parties in Latin America is one of the mostcrucial factors explaining Latin America'sturn toward hemispherism in the 1990s. Althoughnot nearlyas dramaticallyas in Latin America,society-based demand forhemispherism also increasedin the United States.With the end ofthe Cold War and the rise of multiculturalism,old and new thinktanks, research centers,and 28 Regimesof Cooperation in theWestern Hemisphere advocacy groups in the United States adopted pro-hemisphericpostures (see Wiarda, 1995; Skidmore,1998:121). Duringthe Cold War,most think tanks in favor of U.S. involvementabroad were dividedalong twofault-lines: pro-containment vs. pro-humanitarian,and pro-strongties withLatin America vs. pro-strongties to otherregions of the world.With the end of the Cold War and the rise of multicul- turalismin the United States,the firstfault-line disappeared and the second one became less significant.The resultwas a greaterconvergence among U.S. think tanksand advocacygroups in favorof involvementin Latin America.In addition, the aversionto hemispherismon the part of "border"states such as Texas, Florida, Louisiana, and California also subsided. Traditionally,ties with Latin America appeared more threateningto the more conservative,agribusiness-oriented border states than to the more cosmopolitan,manufacturing-export-oriented northern states.But in the late 1980s, border statesfound theirown export niches in Latin America:California, Texas, and Florida,for example, were among thetop fourU.S. statesin termsof dollar gains in exportsto Latin Americabetween 1987 and 1993, whichin turncontributed to an expansion in tradewith Asia.37 In sum,the inter-Americanregime of cooperation that emerged in the 1990s was more encompassingthan previousregimes because the assault against competing antihemisphericintellectual traditions was the most encompassingin 200 years. Competing intellectualtraditions, empirical invalidation,and institutionalde- embeddedness (at multiplelevels) all combined-for the firsttime ever-to under- mine importanttenets of antihemispherism.As a result,the path was cleared for the formationof the broadestregime of cooperationever.

Lingering AntihemisphericIntellectual Traditions and the 1998 Summit The assault against antihemisphericintellectual traditions was powerfulbut not definitive.Intellectual traditions can have a fairdegree of stickiness.Although the implementationof the 1994 SummitAgreements has exceeded the expectationsof manyanalysts, there are clear signs of a comeback of antihemisphericintellectual traditionsthroughout the Americas.In part, this is a resultof the success of the integrationeffort so far.Hemispherism is, afterall, a formof opening to globalization, which has an ugly side-unwanted flowsof migrants,drugs, illegal trade, volatilecapital movements,etc. All of thiscan erode societal demand forinterna- tionalintegration. For some leaders ofthe Left in theU.S., hemispherismis nothing less than renewedimperialism, a threatto the environment,and an opportunityto exploitpoor labor conditionsabroad. For workersand ownersin sectorsthat cannot compete, free trade is a threat to their livelihoods. For right-wingpopulists, hemispherismundercuts sovereignty, and builds ties withunworthy nations. As a result,an antihemisphericalliance of strangebedfellows-leftists, organized labor, some businesses,and populistnationalists-has capturedimportant political posi- tionsin both the Republican and Democraticparties. In Latin America,likewise, mistrust of the U.S. persists,including parts of the foreignpolicy establishment and bureaucraciesof the largestcountries (Mexico and Brazil). Led by Brazil, Latin America's preferencefor free trade seems to be changing toward a preferencefor "free-ish"trade, i.e., maintain exceptions for crucialindustries and slowdown tradebarrier reduction (Katz and Pearson, 1998).

37 Texas topped the list(sales to LatinAmerica and theCaribbean were up by US$8.7 billion),followed by Michigan (up $4.9 billion),California (up $4.4 billion),and thenFlorida (up US$4.3 billion) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce,1994). In addition,Asian corporationshave expanded theirpresence in border statesin the 1990s. For instance,by 1995 more than seventeenfirms from Korea, forty-fivefromJapan, and seventy-fivefrom Taiwan had opened up storesin Miami (see Thuermer,1996; Smithand Malkin, 1997). JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 29

In addition,the decline of antihemispheric thinking has been farless pronounced among nonelites than among elites. In the United States,for instance,while an impressivenumber of elites (public leaders, governors,leading newspapereditors, business leaders, policymakers,etc.) came to support NAFTA, the U.S. public remainedundecided about the desirabilityof freetrade with developing countries. In Latin America,while the intensityof antihemisphericthinking has declined among citizensat large,nationalist antihemispheric leaders continueto elicitbroad public support.38The persistenceof antihemisphericthinking among nonelitesis a lingeringimpediment to hemispherism. The thrustof this article says more about the conditionsunder which elites develop preferencesfor hemispherismthan about the conditionsunder which nonelitesdevelop such preferences.A paradigm shiftat the level of elitesneed not translateinto a paradigmshift among nonelites.Clearly, the processof idea-decline has spillovereffects across nonelite societal actors.Insofar as institutionswith ties to society(e.g., thinktanks, political parties,NGOs) shed their antihemispheric thinking,nonelite societal actors can be expected to be less antihemispheric.By the same token,the factthat crucial institutions have yetto experiencede-embeddedness also explains the persistenceof antihemisphericthinking across society.39Never- theless,the process of idea-decline specifiedin thisarticle is neithersufficient nor necessaryto bringabout changes among nonelites.Sometimes, a change ofideas at the elite level mightproduce an opposite reactionamong nonelites,as is the case when resentfulcitizens deliberately take counterelitepositions. At othertimes, it is conceivablethat nonelites come to embrace ideas forreasons thathave nothingto do withthe factors that shape paradigmshifts by elites. The conditionsunder which nonelitesshift intellectual paradigms thus remain a topic of furthertheoretical and empiricalresearch. The point remains nonetheless that antihemisphericintellectual traditions, among elites and nonelites,continue to pose a threatto inter-Americanregime development. Signs of a decline in the integrationprocess emerged after 1995 (Inter-AmericanDialogue, 1997). The congressionallyanimated process of unilat- erally "decertifying"countries in the fightagainst drugs contradictsthe norm of regional cooperation. The congressional denial of fast-trackauthority in 1997 forcedthe Clintonadministration to falteron its 1994 pledge to incorporateChile into NAFTA and deepen hemisphericfree trade. The need to rescue Mexico after its 1994 Peso crisisgave new fodder to the No-benefitdoctrine. Not surprisingly, these sour notes triggeredantihemispheric choruses from Latin America. Latin Americanshave oftendenounced the decertificationprocess as imperialist(a return of Yankeephobia and absolute notions of nonintervention).In response to U.S. wobblingon freetrade, Latin Americans began to pursuetrade agreements "around the U.S., not withthe United States,"as the U.S. Trade Representative,Charlene Barshefsky,aptly described it. The previouslyhemispheric-enthusiastic Chile turnedits attention to Asia and Mercosur,the regionaltrade bloc made up ofBrazil, Argentina,Paraguay, and Uruguay, with a combined GDP of US$1.1 trillion. Mercosur,in turn,is beginningto lure thefive nation-members of theAndean Pact,

38 Since the mid 1990s, Latin Americahas witnessedthe rise of a numberof nationalistleaders who embrace some typeof antihemisphericrhetoric and obtain significantpublic support,sometimes doing quite well in elections(e.g., General Lino Oviedo in Paraguay,Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, SubcomandanteMarcos in Mexico, Hugo Banzer in Bolivia). 39 For instance,Latin America'seducation ministries,one of the strongestbastions of antihemisphericintellectual traditions,have been relativelyexempted from the recentwave of stateand economicreforms that swept Latin America in the 1990s (IDB, 1996). The difficultyof changingstaff and curriculumin Latin America'seducation systemmeans thatpre-existing antihemispheric thinking has lingered.Given thatthese ministries are crucialconduits through which intellectualtraditions are passed on to citizens,it is less surprisingthat antihemispheric thinking continues to linger among nonelites. 30 Regimesof Cooperation in the WesternHemisphere flirtingwith the idea ofa SouthAmerican (rather than hemispheric) free trade area. In February1998, shortlyafter the defeatof fast-track, the mostinfluential political bloc in the region,the Rio Group, agreed to forgeahead withplans forcloser links withthe European Union.40In sum,new formsof Yankeephobia, Latin American- ism,Bolivarism, and Universalismhave resurfacedin Latin America. These trendsalmost imperiled the 1998 Summitof the Americas held in Santiago, Chile. Leading nationsof the hemispherecame to the Summitwith less enthusiasm forhemispherism than in 1994. The United Stateswas constrainedby the lack of fast-track,Mexico and Brazil were at odds over leadership among Latin American countries,Brazil seemed more keen on deepening Mercosurthan advancingfree trade throughoutthe Americas,many countriescame with increased distrustof neighbors as a result of unresolved border disputes (see Table 4), and many governmentswere reluctantto adopt strongeranticorruption and antinarcotics regimes.As a result,the 1998 Summitproduced less spectacularadvances than its Miami predecessor.The more benign goal ofuniversal primary education replaced the more ambitiousgoal of freetrade forall.41 Nevertheless,at Santiago, the nations reaffirmedand in some areas enhanced the process of cooperation initiated in 1994. The basic tefnetsof hemispherism-democratic governance, regional economic integration,and social jus- tice-were reaffirmedand specificinitiatives were adopted to advance collectively these shared goals. Moreover,whereas the 1994 Summithad closed withouta clear vision of the futureof summitry,the 1998 Summitmandated "periodic" summits. Summit participantsagreed that Canada would host the third Summit of the Americas in two to fouryears. In short,the Santiago Summit demonstratedthe continuingrobustness of the 1990s regime of cooperation despite the resurgence of some ominous antihemispherictrends.

Conclusion The one-size-fits-alltheoretical approach to the studyof regimesin theAmericas is inappropriate.As Table 5 shows,power-based theories offer contradictory predic- tionsregarding the emergenceof cooperation,none ofwhich fully accounts for all aspects of regime formationin the Americas.Neoliberal institutionalism,with its focus on interdependence,can account forinterest in regime formationon some occasions (especiallyimmediately after World War II) and forthe relativestaying power of regimesonce formed,but it cannot fullyexplain the variationin depths and scopes of regimes.And a cognitivistargument, positing that a convergence around the "WesternHemisphere Idea" (i.e., that hemisphericcooperation is desirablefor domestic well-being) is a necessarycondition for the rise of hemispherism,is also insufficient.It cannot explain the manytimes in whichcommonality of values failedto generatestrong regimes of inter-Americancooperation. This article integratesthese three approaches along the lines suggested by Hasencleveret al. (1997:217): ratherthan replace rationalistapproaches, cognitivist approaches fillin gaps. Ideas act as interveningvariables between"preferences" (whichmay or may not be accountedfor in cognitivistterms) and "outcomes"such as regimeformation. In the Americas,the sourcesand strengthsof the preferences on behalfof regimes of cooperationhave differedover time. Some times,the source has been external securitythreats (early nineteenthcentury, immediately after World War II). Other times the source has been an intereston the part of the hegemon to supplya public good (mostof the twentiethcentury) or an intereston

40 The Rio Group includesArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,Peru, Panama, Uruguay,and Venezuela, plus one representativeof CentralAmerica and one of the Caribbean. 41 For the textsof the Summitvisit or . JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 3 1

TABLE 4. MilitarizedDisputes InvolvingLatin AmericanCountries, 1995-1997 1995 Ecuador/Peru Ecuador/Peru Colombia/Venezuela Nicaragua/Honduras Nicaragua/Colombia

1996* Nicaragua/Honduras Nicaragua/ElSalvador Honduras/ElSalvador

1997 Honduras/Nicaragua Nicaragua/CostaRica El Salvador/Honduras Venezuela/Trinidadand Tobago Venezuela/Colombia Belize/Guatemala *Excludes the Cuban shootdownof U.S. registeredcivilian planes flownby Cuban exiles. Source:Mares, 1998.

the part of secondarynations to bandwagon (the late 1940s and early 1990s). On yetother occasions, the preferencestemmed from a desireto createinstitutions that lubricatehemispheric trade (late nineteenthcentury and maybeeven early 1990s) or tame unilateralU.S. militaryinterventions (early twentieth century). Yet on still other occasions, the preferencehas been the result of commonalityof values, especiallyliberalism (early nineteenth century, late 1940s, and early 1990s). However,between preferences and outcomes,ideas alwaysstood in the middle, specificallyantihemispheric intellectual traditions, which questioned the desirability of hemisphericintegration: the No-benefitdoctrine in the U.S.; Bolivarism,Latin Americanism,Europeanism, Universalism, Internalism, Land-deprivationism, and Yankeephobia in Latin America. Power asymmetriesor "clashes of civilization" alone did not explain the repressed demand forinter-American cooperation, but rathercontrarian ideas. In thisconceptualization, ideas do not play a prescriptive role, or as Weber (1997) would stateit, provide a "theoryof selection."Ideas did not specifythe typeof regimethat nations would select(although they did provide a menu of options). However, ideas did provide a theoryof rejection: under conditionsof strongantihemispheric intellectual traditions (nineteenth century, earlytwentieth century, and the Cold War), deep inter-Americancooperation was ruled out. Moreover,ideas also played a crucialrole in shaping the "net" demand for such regimes.Even when a significantnumber of internationalactors wanted regimes of cooperation, their goals were impeded by lingeringantihemispheric intellectualtraditions. Only when these intellectualtraditions declined did the net demand forhemispherism increase. For regimesto emerge, therefore,obstructionist intellectual traditions need to decline,whether as a resultof a rise of competingintellectual traditions, empirical invalidation,or institutionalde-embeddedness at the state, transnational,and societallevels. By developingan understandingof how ideas decline,we explained gradationsin regime formationthat power-basedand interest-basedarguments could not easilyelucidate. Regime formationin the late nineteenthcentury was the most modestbecause the process of idea-declineduring this period (rise of rivals) was the most modest of all three. Regime formationin the mid twentiethcentury wentdeeper because theprocess of idea-decline that preceded itwas moreprofound (empiricalinvalidation plus the riseof rivals). Finally, regime formation in the early 1990s was the richestof all because the assaultagainst intellectual traditions was the CZ

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bi 7E JAVIERCORRALES AND RICHARD E. FEINBERG 33 mostencompassing ever (institutional de-embeddedness, together with rise of rivals and empiricalinvalidation). Finally,we argued that,although ideas have quite a powerful(obstructionist) impact on "regime formation,"their impact is less pronounced on the issue of "regimerobustness." Ideas do not seem to undermineexisting regimes to the same degree as theyhamper theirformation. When antihemisphericintellectual tradi- tionsmade dramaticcomebacks in the Americas(early twentieth century, the Cold War),they took a toll,but did not destroy,existing regimes. Regimes never became "wastedassets," even under unfavorableintellectual climates. Since 1994, the intellectualclimate has turneda bit more antihemispheric.But the 1998 Summit of the Americas shows that institutionalarrangements can be effectivein counteractingthis trend. Summitsin particularsend strongpolitical signals that nations are eager to defend existing regimes (Dominguez, 1998), somewhatneutralizing the force of new waves of antihemisphericthinking. Ulti- mately,however, the future of inter-American cooperation will depend-as italways has-on the extentto whichits proponents advance the hemisphericideal in public debates, embed pro-hemisphericinitiatives in effectiveinstitutions, and adopt policies thatkeep antihemisphericintellectual traditions at bay.

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