A Powerful Particulars View of Causation

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A Powerful Particulars View of Causation A Powerful Particulars View of Causation This book critically examines the recent discussions of powers and powers-based accounts of causation. The author then develops an origi- nal view of powers-based causation that aims to be compatible with the theories and findings of natural science. Recently, there has been a dramatic revival of realist approaches to properties and causation, which focus on the relevance of Aristotelian metaphysics and the notion of powers for a scientifically informed view of causation. In this book, R.D. Ingthorsson argues that one central fea- ture of powers-based accounts of causation is arguably incompatible with what is today recognised as fact in the sciences, notably that all interactions are thoroughly reciprocal. Ingthorsson’s powerful particu- lars view of causation accommodates for the reciprocity of interactions. It also draws out the consequences of that view for the issue of causal necessity and offers a way to understand the constitution and persistence of compound objects as causal phenomena. Furthermore, Ingthorsson argues that compound entities, so understood, are just as much processes as they are substances. A Powerful Particulars View of Causation will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students working in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and neo-Aristotelian philosophy, while also being accessible for a general audience. R.D. Ingthorsson is an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Helsinki, Finland. He is the author of McTaggart’s Paradox (Routledge, 2016) and co-editor of Mental Causation and Ontology (2013). Routledge Studies in Metaphysics Philosophy of Time and Perceptual Experience Sean Enda Power Fundamental Causation Physics, Metaphysics, and the Deep Structure of the World Christopher Gregory Weaver Eliminativism, Objects, and Persons The Virtues of Non-Existence Jiri Benovsky Thisness Presentism An Essay on Time, Truth, and Ontology David Ingram Metametaphysics and the Sciences Historical and Philosophical Perspectives Edited by Frode Kjosavik and Camilla Serck-Hanssen Authority and the Metaphysics of Political Communities Gabriele De Anna Language and Word A Defence of Linguistic Idealism Richard Gaskin Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Formal Causation Edited by Ludger Jansen and Petter Sandstad A Powerful Particulars View of Causation R. D. Ingthorsson For more information about this series, please visit: https://www. routledge.com/Routledge-Studies-in-Metaphysics/book-series/RSM A Powerful Particulars View of Causation R. D. Ingthorsson First published 2021 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 R. D. Ingthorsson The right of R. D. Ingthorsson to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The Open Access version of this book, available at www. taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Ingthorsson, Rögnvaldur D., author. Title: A powerful particulars view of causation / R.D. Ingthorsson. Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge studies in metaphysics | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020045009 | ISBN 9780367486297 (hbk) | ISBN 9781003094241 (ebk) Subjects: LCSH: Causation. Classification: LCC BD541 .I54 2021 | DDC 122--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020045009 ISBN: 978-0-367-48629-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-09424-1 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by SPi Global, India Contents Preface ix Acknowledgements xii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 The Aims of this Book 1 1.2 The Outline of the Book 4 1.3 Causation, Metaphysics, and Our Understanding of the Natural World 5 1.4 Causation Is Only One of Many Forms of Natural Determination 9 1.5 Standard Approaches to Causation 10 1.6 Powers-Based Approaches 11 1.7 The Challenge from Modern Science 13 1.8 The Empiricist Bias 14 1.9 About the Method of My Project 15 2 Powers-Based vs. Neo-Humean Approaches 18 2.1 Explaining vs. Characterising Causation 20 2.2 Powers-based and Neo-Humean Accounts Compatible on the Level of Characterisation 23 2.3 Hume’s Discussion of Causation 26 2.4 The Tools of the Dominant Strategies 29 2.5 Does It Really Matter? 31 3 Causal Realism 33 3.1 Powers-Based Accounts 34 3.2 Salmon: Causal Production as Interaction Between Causal Processes 36 3.3 The Transmission Account of Causation 37 3.4 Ned Hall on the Generative Conception of Causation 40 vi Contents 3.5 Stuart Glennan: The Mechanistic Account of Causal Production 41 3.6 Causation as a Continuous Process of Production 44 3.7 The Standard View 45 3.8 Action or Influence in the StandardView 49 3.9 Two Types of Empiricism 51 3.10 A Return to the Empiricist Reduction of Causes 52 4 Causal Production 58 4.1 The Standard View: A Reminder 58 4.2 A Fundamental Flaw in the Standard View 59 4.3 Colloquial Language vs. Science: ‘Action’, ‘Reaction’, and ‘Interaction’ 60 4.4 Reciprocity of Interactions 62 4.5 Bunge’s Rejection of Interaction as the Basis of Causation 65 4.6 Interaction Involves Production 68 4.7 Unidirectionality Due to Agency Bias 69 4.8 Interactions are Causally Fundamental 71 4.9 Necessary Connections 72 4.10 Production Requires Endurance and an A View of Time 73 4.11 Simultaneous Causation 74 4.12 Causation a Form of One-Sided Existential Dependence 78 4.13 The Asymmetry of Causation 79 4.14 Conclusion 81 5 Causal Necessity 83 5.1 Causal Necessity as Logical Necessity 84 5.2 The Problem of Action at a Temporal Distance 86 5.3 The Problem of Interference and Prevention 88 5.4 The Standard View Response 91 5.5 Interference and Prevention in Powers-Based Causation 95 5.6 Causal Necessity Without Ceteris Paribus Clause 98 5.7 Conclusion 98 6 Constitution and Persistence 99 6.1 The Incompatibility of Causation, Constitution, and Persistence 100 6.2 Characterisations 101 6.3 A Causal Account of Constitution and Persistence 103 Contents vii 6.4 Problems? 104 6.5 Concluding Remarks 105 7 Substance and Process 106 7.1 Substance Ontology 107 7.2 The Paradigm of Substance Ontology 108 7.3 Aristotelian Substance Ontology 112 7.4 Process Ontology 115 7.5 The Problem of Process Ontology 119 7.6 A World of Processes/Substances 121 8 Powers 123 8.1 Preliminary Remarks About My Treatment of Powers 123 8.2 Different Views of Powers 124 8.3 Are Qualities Observable? 125 8.4 A Priori Reason for Qualities Being Fundamental 127 8.5 Hume’s Separation of Quality and Causal Role 129 8.6 The Powerful Qualities View Implicit in the Scientific Image 131 8.7 Locke’s Powerful Qualities View 134 8.8 Properties and Conditionals 138 8.9 The Determinate Nature of Unmanifesting Powers 140 8.10 Active and Passive Powers 141 8.11 The Problem of Fit 143 8.12 What Is Doing the Work: Powers or Particulars? 144 8.13 Concluding Remark 148 9 A Critique of Counterfactual Theories of Causation 149 9.1 The Appeal of CTCs 149 9.2 Counterfactuals Explain Causation vs. Causation Explains Counterfactuals? 152 9.3 The Ordinary Concepts of Cause and Counterfactual Dependence 155 9.4 Possible Worlds: Truth-Conditions or Truthmakers? 157 9.5 Possible Worlds as Truthmakers: Concrete or Abstract? 159 9.6 Neo-Humean Metaphysics and CTCs 162 9.7 Comparative Similarity and Supervenience 166 9.8 Conclusion 168 viii Contents 10 The Contrast to Alternative Views 170 10.1 The Neo-Humean Contrast 170 10.2 The Causal Objectivist Contrast 171 10.3 The Contrast to the Standard View 172 10.4 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts I: Relational Realism 173 10.5 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts II: Process Realism 174 10.6 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts III: Structural Accounts 174 10.7 Contrast to 20th-Century Friends of Powers 176 10.8 Concluding Remark 177 Bibliography 179 Index 190 Preface There are two things I want to get across to the reader before they begin reading this book: (i) whom I owe thanks to, and (ii) what kind of book this is. Gratitude is first priority, but gratitude to friends and family, i.e. those I owe the most, will be dealt with in privacy. Thanks are due to Riksbankens Jubileumsfond: Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences, for graciously awarding me funds (Grant-ID: P14-0822:1) to devote four years of my life to refine the ideas put forward in this book and then to make it possible for it to appear Open Access in the Routledge Studies in Metaphysics series. It is fantastic that a central bank puts its money where it really matters in the long run: research into the big questions of ‘life, the Universe, and everything’ (hop- ing the answer isn’t actually ‘42’). I also owe thanks to Anna Marmodoro and all the wonderful peo- ple frequenting the seminars in her Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies and Metaphysics of Entanglement projects. I happened to live in Oxford in the period 2010–15 (enjoying the status of Academic Visitor for six months) and could take full advantage of the incredible line-up of invited speakers and reading seminars. As an invited speaker I could also put some of the ideas in this book to the test.
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