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Epistemological Problems in Marketing. Donald Pier Robin Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School 1968 Epistemological Problems in Marketing. Donald Pier Robin Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses Recommended Citation Robin, Donald Pier, "Epistemological Problems in Marketing." (1968). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses. 1617. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/1617 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 70-264 ROBIN, Donald Pier, 1939- E PISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN MARKETING. The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, D.B.A., 1969 Business Administration University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan © Donald Pier Robin 1970 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN MARKETING A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration in The Department of Management and Marketing by Donald Pier Robin B.S., Louisiana State University, 1963 M.B.A., Louisiana State University, 1966 May, 1969 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The writer is indebted to his major professor, Dr. Charles G. Walters, for his hard work and rapid turnover of material on this dissertation. Thanks are also due the two other reading members of this writer's committee, Dr. William J. Stober and Dr. Perry F. Boyer, for their con­ structive comments. The aid of a rapid and dependable rough draft typist saved the author considerable time and anguish. For these services, the author thanks Mrs. Jo Anne Martin. .. The author is especially indebted to Louisiana State University for their Dissertation-Year Fellowship, under which this study was written. The funds and freedom provid­ ed through this fellowship were of immeasurable help. Finally, but most important, the writer wishes to thank his wife for her understanding and forbearance through five straight years of graduate work. Perhaps the dividends about to be reaped shall be some minute repayment for the hardships of those five years. ii TABLE OP CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM.....................1 Statement of the Problem and Hypotheses . 3 Scope and Limitations of the St u d y ............ 4 Definitions of Terminology ................... 6 Methodology ................................ 6 Science and Scientific Explanation ......... 8 Theory ..................................... 9 Normative Science ........................... 11 Positive Science ............................ 12 Research Design................................ 13 Library or Secondary Research............... 13 Primary Research ............................ 14 Report Preview ................................ 23 II. THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OP EPISTEMOLOGY IN MARKETING .................................. 26 Efficiency of Epistemology for Developing Science in Marketing........................27 Effectiveness of Epistemology in Develop­ ing Science .............................. 28 XXX» • ■ CHAPTER PAGE Problems with Development of Science in Marketing............................... 31 Desirability of Science in Marketing. 44 Favorable Aspects of Science in Marketing 44 Encroachment of Human Privacy ............ 47 Marketing's Move Toward Science .......... 49 Summary of Analysis ......................... 53 III. THE TWO SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE................ 55 A Priori Knowledge........................... 57 Function of Experience..................... 57 The Basis for A Priori Knowledge. .... 59 Characteristics of A Priori Knowledge . 62 Role in Theory Development .............. 72 A Posteriori Knowledge ..................... 73 Definition........................... i . 74 The Basis for Empirical Generalizations . 76 Characteristics of A Posteriori Knowledge ............................. 83 Role in Theory Development................. 84 Summary of Analysis ......................... 86 IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE TWO SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 89 The Logical Positivist's Argument on A Priori Knowledge ....................... 90 iv CHAPTER PAGE Tautological Aspects of Arithmetic. 9^ Unreality of Euclid’s Geometry ......... 94 Arguments on Other A Priori Propositions. 96 A Rationalist Rebuttal to the Arguments . 98 Conclusions About the Arguments ......... 100 The Problem With Induction................. 1°1 Skepticism on Uniformity in Nature. 102 The More Basic Problems of Universal Causation ....... ............... 105 Conclusions for the Marketing Scientist . 109 Summary 6f A n a l y s i s ....................... 112 Intermediate Summary of Conclusions .... 114 V. A HISTORICAL SKETCH OP RESPONDENTS .... 119 Relation to Employing Institution ..... 120 Academic Considerations ................. 122 Highest Level of Academic Achievement . 123 Institution Conferring Level of Attain­ ment.................................... 124 Major Area of S t u d y ..................... 126 Personal Data .......... 127 A g e ...................................... 127 v CHAPTER PAGE Years as Full-Time Teacher.............. 128 Interest in Theory and Research ........ 129 Study of Methodology*..................... 131 Formal In-Depth Study of Methodology . 131 Informal Study of Methodology ........... 132 Study of Methodology Compared to Interest and Training.............................. 133 Study in Methodology and Academic Rank. 133 Study in Methodology and Teaching Ex­ perience 134 Study in Methodology and Major Area of . S t u d y .................................. 135 Study in Methodology and Interest in Theory.................................. 137 Summary of Analysis ....................... 138 VI. ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS ............. 142 Method of Analysis ....................... 143 Methodology for Measuring Understanding . 143 Method for Determining the Percent Theo­ retical of Marketing Thought ......... 149 Method for Determining Effect of Selected Personal Characteristics............... 149 vi CHAPTER PAGE Measurement of Understanding............... 150 Analysis of an A Priori Passage ........ 150 Analysis of an A Posteriori Passage . 152 Respondent Recognition of Epistemological Problems................................ 153 Respondent Rating of Approachs for De­ veloping Marketing Theory ............. 156 Approach Used for Solving a Complex P r o b l e m ........................... 158 Degree to Which Marketing is Theoretical. 160 Selected Personal Characteristics of Res­ pondents ................................ 161 Collegiate Major......................... 162 Interest in Theory or Research........... 166 Age Groupings........................... 171 Summary of A n a l y s i s ....................... 175 VII. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ................. 177 Subhypothesis.:l One Better Approach to Mar­ keting Theory Depends on Epistemological Understanding ........................... 177 Value of Epistemology in Developing Mar­ keting Theory ......................... 178 vii CHAPTER PAGE Level of Epistemological Under­ standing................................ 183 Subhypothesis 2: A High Level of Science in Marketing Requires an Accepted Episte­ mology.................................... 185 Subhypothesis 3: Problems with Epistemologi­ cal Uncertainty Adversely Effects Develop­ ment of Science in M a r k e t i n g ........... 188 Acceptance of A Priori Knowledge .... 183 The Problem with induction............... 192 A Better Approach for Developing Market­ ing T h e o r y ........................... 194 Selecting an Epistemology................ 195 Nature of A Priori Knowledge ........... 195 Nature of A Posteriori Knowledge and In­ duction . ......................... 196 Suggestions for Application of Conclusions. BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................... 200 APPENDIX A ...................................... 206 APPENDIX B ...................................... 212 VITA .............................................. 214 viii LIST OP TABLES TABLE PAGE 5.1 Academic Rank of Respondents................ -*-21 5.2 Highest Academic Achievement................ I22 5.3 Institution Conferring Highest Level of Attainment................................... I24 5.4 Major Area of S t u d y ........................... 127 5.5 Age of Respondent..............................128 5.6 Years as Full-Time Teacher..................... I28 5.7 Respondent Interest in Theory and Research. 130 5.8 Formal In-Depth Study of Methodology...........132 5.9 Informal Study of Methodology................. 132 5.10 Study in Methodology and Academic Rank. 134 5.11 Study in Methodology and Yearsaas Full-Time T e a c h e r ..................................... 135 5.12 Study in Methodology and Major Area of Study. 136 5.13 Study in Methodology find Interest in Theory and Research................................. 137 6.1 Analysis of A Priori Passage................... 151 ix TABLE PAGE 6.2 Analysis of A Posteriori Passage.............. 153 6.3 Respondent Recognition of Epistemological Problems...................................... 155 6.4 Respondent Ratings of Approaches for Develop­ ment of Marketing T h e o r y .......... 157 6.5 Approaches Used
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