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Russia Intelligence N°63 of October 11) N°64 - October 25 2007 Published every two weeks / International Edition CONTENTS KREMLIN c P. 1-5 Politics & Government The war of the kings continues unabated KREMLIN The world of politics in Moscow continues to live these days at the rhythm of the c The war of the kings contin- Cherkesov/Patrushev serialised melodrama, named after the two figureheads who have hurled a ues unabated nearly-public challenge to each other by means of spectacular arrests and reciprocal accusations SECRET SERVICES of corruption and profiteering (Russia Intelligence n°63 of October 11). We are naturally follow- cJust where will Patrushev- ing ever closely this conflict where one of the stakes is the National security council, whose lead- Cherkesov war lead ? ership is vacant at the moment. Viktor Cherkesov has the ambition to take over in order to c Alexandre Grigorev, Nikolay Patrushev’s «horse» support Sergey Ivanov in his presidential aspirations. This is one of the outcomes impossible to accept by the Patrushev/Sechin clan which naturally wants to preserve this highly strategic post. BEHIND THE SCENE This war has made its collateral victims, notably in the press, where each camp possesses its sup- c The return l’inflation porters. The wife of Viktor Cherkesov is a very well-known journalist in Saint Petersburg worries the Kremlin and Moscow, Natalya Chaplina, whom he met in the northern capital in the early 1990s. FOCUS But Cherkesov is also the beneficiary of support in other press organs, and certain journalists find c The unknowns of the themselves by chance, accused of shady deals. One of them had the surprise of noticing that an « Putin plan » off-shore account had been opened in his name and that a «generous benefactor» had credited DIPLOMACY him with several million dollars, another was accused of supposed links to Vladimir Barsukov, c A major Russo-American alias Kumarin, currently enprisoned as the presumed chief of the Tambov gang. In brief, in bargain in view this war inside the «services» which concerns individuals reputedly close to Vladimir Putin, ALERTS all blows are permitted. c François Pérol c Sergey Naryshkin The prudent reservation in which the Russian president has camped is unusual for him in this c Mikhail Margelov type of circumstance. The most pervasive of confusion reigns in his immediate circle as a result of these events. The new Prime minister Viktor Zubkov, has adopted a fairly disconcerting, lectur- ing style of government without sensitivity, with ministers and officials, sometimes in front of tel- P. 6-8 Business & Networks evision cameras. Because of his Saint Petersburg and Poutinian past, Zubkov can count on allies ALERTS in all camps. During his time in the Saint Petersbug municipal government, he helped Cherkesov c PKN Orlen and Patrushev to find appropriate dachas in the region of the northern capital. He is said to be on c Oleg Deripaska friendly terms with Nikolay Patrushev and Sergei Ivanov, but his relations with Cherkesov remain FOCUS good. The fact that the Kremlin has not intervened on one side or another (it has even consolidat- c Yuri Yarov, the new strong ed in a way the position of Cherkesov, as we relate on page 2) is also a sign that concerning the man of the naval sector succession of Vladimir Putin, nothing has been decided. In the aftermath of the intitiatives and BEHIND THE SCENE spectacular declarations of recent weeks, which we described (the consecration of Zubkov as a c Chemezov weaves his web possible successor, Putin’s accord to lead the United Russia list in the December legislative elec- in the Defence ministry tions, suggestion of a possible role as Prime minister for the current president), new scenarios INDUSTRY have circulated. c The strange two-step by Moscow and New Delhi As we analysed in our last mailing (Russia Intelligence n°63 of October 11), the scenario of c “The Russo-Indian accord on Putin as Prime minister is perhaps not the most credible in view of the fact that the balance of the 5th generation fighter has power that exists today clearly favours the president. One thing seems assured according to those indeed been signed” knowledgeable about the Kremlin we have consulted in Moscow in recent days : Vladimir Putin SUBSCRIPTION wants an new term. For this wish to be fulfilled, he must manage the period between the two elec- Print Edition tions, or at least four years if the president elected in March 2008 does not stay in office for its (23 issues, airmailed overseas) entire term. Four years in the current Russian political climate can seem like an eternity. Suddenly €77Ø0 TTC strategists working for the Russian president foresee another solution : Vladimir Putin will be a The Web Pack member of the Duma after the presidential ballot, without a doubt. If he resigns his post immedi- (Print Edition ately after having been elected to remain in the Kremlin, he conserves the possibility of returning + PDF + archives acess) to the Duma, even several months later. Returning to his seat in the Duma after the presidential € 880 TTC vote, he would become the president, a symbolic and popular figure — whose shadow would no The Premium doubt spill over the occupant of Kremlin, especially if that person is Viktor Zubkov. Would the lat- Subscription ter «play the game» and relinquish his post if he were gently requested? That is the question. (Print Edition + PDF + access to all the website contents) In brief, rarely has a succession process been so hectic, uncertain and managed with so much € 1200 TTC approximation. d www.russia-intelligence.fr RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Politics & Government SECRET SERVICES c Just where will Patrushev-Cherkesov war lead ? The open war raging in Moscow between the director of the where General Bulbov’s wife, Galina, is one of the managers, is FSB, Nikolay Patrushev, the boss of the federal anti-narcotics also being investigated by tax authorities. service, Viktor Cherkesov, and their respective allies (Igor Sechin, Vladimir Ustinov and Alexandree Bastyrkin for the first, Yuri The FSB also led others to believe that General Bulbov was the Chayka, Viktor Zolotov and Yevgeny Murov for the second — owner of a number of investments and properties in the Kalin- read Russia Intelligence n°63 of October 11 2007) has witnessed ingrad region, his place of origin. Accusations of corruption, taken some new developments. The lines of fissure between the main up by Oleg Mitvol, the n°2 at the Federal environmental protec- power structures in the country have crystalised, while an exten- tion agency, also recently denounced illegal building in the pro- sion of the battleground into the national Security council is also tected areas of Kurshkaya kosa (read the profile of Oleg Mitvol in evident. Russia Intelligence n°42 of october 27, 2006). The power centre where the division between those who were This lethal conflict between Cherkesov and Patrushev is, ac- for long — in a very simplified way — referred to as “silovikis” in cording to our information, in the process of shifting to the Na- the Western press is without a doubt the prosecutor’s office. On tional security council, whose leadership is vacant since the de- October 15, it was learned that the services under Yuri Chayka parture of Igor Ivanov this summer. The head of the Federal had filed an appeal to obtain the release of General Bulbov, the anti-narcotics service would like to be named as the new head. He right-hand man of Viktor Cherkesov detained since early would have even drawn closer to Sergey Ivanov, the first vice Prime October.Probably unheard of before in Russian judicial history, minister, to lobby in this direction with the president. Apparently the Prosecutor’s office and the lawyers of an accused esablished with only limited chance of success. At the end of his “direct line” a common front, in this case against the Investigating committee with the public, Vladimir Putin, had in fact told the correspondant (SK) of Alexandree Bastyrkin, who was behind the detention. An- for Kommersant, Andrey Kolesnikov, of his exasperation in the other of Viktor Cherkesov’s assistants’, Vladimir Zubrin (ex-deputy face of the public nature of this settling of scores between the serv- prosecutor from 2002-2004), followed the complete public unfold- ices. “I consider it inproper to spread out this kind of problem in ing between the services by giving a press conference on October the media. And if someone acts that way, by expressing complaints 11. Apparently sure of his strength, the FSB director also entered about a conflict between secret services, he should first of all be into the media debate, not to cross swords with his foes, but to beyond reproach himself.” A barely disguised allusion to the lengthy present the results of his services in counter-espionage operations. interview granted by Cherkesov to Kommersant Tuesday October But he did not lose sight of his true objective — the downfall of 9. Nikolay Patrushev on his side is trying to have his protégé, Alexan- Cherkesov and his allies. The director of the FSB scored a hit by dree Grigorev, named as the head of the National security coun- having one of his close associates, General Yuri Nyrkov, named cil (read box). as a deputy to Alexandree Bastyrkin. The clean-up of the FSB In- vestigating committee, which Russia Intelligence underscored in Finally, the leadership conflict within the Russian secret serv- its last edition, was thus confirmed. ices has also had the effect of delaying of consideration of the text on the war on corruption prepared by a working group Faithful to the good old KGB methods – again recently applied headed by Viktor Ivanov (Russia Intelligence n°49 of february during the Gutseriev affair (Russia Intelligence n°60 of Septem- 16, 2007).
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