DOCSLIB.ORG

Philipp Frank: Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, and Social Engagement

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Philipp Frank: Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, and Social Engagement Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 8-17-2015 12:00 AM Philipp Frank: Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, and Social Engagement Amy N. Wuest The University of Western Ontario Supervisor Dr. Kathleen Okruhlik The University of Western Ontario Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy © Amy N. Wuest 2015 Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd Part of the Epistemology Commons, History of Philosophy Commons, Other Philosophy Commons, and the Philosophy of Science Commons Recommended Citation Wuest, Amy N., "Philipp Frank: Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, and Social Engagement" (2015). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 3164. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/3164 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PHILIPP FRANK: PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, PRAGMATISM, AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT (Monograph) by Amy Natalie Wuest Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario, Canada © Amy Wuest 2015 Abstract Philipp Frank––physicist, philosopher, and early member of the Vienna Circle––is often neglected in retrospective accounts of twentieth century philosophy of science, despite renewed interest in the work of the Vienna Circle. In this thesis, I argue that this neglect is unwarranted. Appealing to a variety of philosophical and historical sources, I trace the development of Frank’s philosophical thought and, in so doing highlight the roles played by history, sociology, values, and pragmatism in his philosophy of science. Turning to contemporary literature, I then argue that Frank’s work should be understood as an early instance of what is now called “socially engaged philosophy of science.” This understanding is explored through a careful consideration of his work on education, where previous work on history, sociology, values, and pragmatism is applied to an important, real-world problem. This socially engaged reading of Frank extends beyond pragmatic issues of theory application, because as I show, Frank used sociology to argue for the meaningfulness of metaphysical claims. However, Frank’s account of meaning may seem to be problematic since it heavily relies on Percy Bridgman’s operationalism. So, I outline the problems associated with Bridgman’s account of operationalism and show that Frank’s view does not fall prey to the same criticisms. After these objections are addressed, Frank’s work is contextualized in the broader debate about value-free science, where I argue that Frank did not endorse the value-free ideal. As a result of these findings, we will not only have a clearer picture of Frank’s philosophical contributions, but also a better understanding of how the philosophy of science can better engage important social issues. Keywords Philipp Frank, Logical Empiricism, Vienna Circle, Philosophy of Science, Pragmatism, Science and Values, History of the Philosophy of Science, Socially Engaged Philosophy of Science, Operationalism. ii Acknowledgments I would like to thank Dr. Kathleen Okruhlik for her tireless work and her constant support throughout this project. Her enthusiasm and encouragement were invaluable, especially during the most intensive phases of research. I benefited immensely from her thoughtful feedback and incisive criticisms. By working with Dr. Okruhlik I learned many things, but, most importantly, I learned how to be a scholar. And for that I cannot thank her enough. I could not have asked for a better supervisor. Also, I would like to thank the other members of my thesis committee, Dr. Chris Smeenk and Dr. Gillian Barker, for their valuable comments on my work. Indeed their early feedback proved vital to the development of this project. And, their comments on later drafts resulted in immense improvements to the final draft. Dr. Don Howard, Dr. Steven Bland, and Dr. Eric Desjardins also provided me with many, many helpful comments on this thesis as members of my examination committee. Those comments improved the final draft of this thesis and left me with countless questions to explore in future projects, for which I am very grateful. I would also like to thank Dr. Gerald Holton and Dr. Robert S. Cohen for allowing me to interview them for this project. These discussions formed the foundation of my research and I could not have completed this project without their helpful guidance. Moreover, I would also like to thank them for the incredible kindness that they showed to me during the interviews. Additionally, I would like to thank Dr. Wayne Myrvold for contacting Dr. Cohen on my behalf and for supporting the funding application that allowed me to conduct these interviews. I would also like to thank the Rotman Institute of Philosophy for funding many parts of this research. Next, I would like to thank my dear friends Saad Anis and Ryan Middleton. They commented upon many parts of this thesis, and I was fortunate to have the opportunity to spend countless hours discussing philosophy with each of them. I learned so much from each of them and would not want to imagine going through this process without them. I would also like to thank Jonathan Fardy for his constant support and encouragement, which I relied upon frequently. Also, I would like to thank him for introducing me to a variety of philosophical perspectives that enriched my thought and, hence, this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. Erik Curiel for his support and for the many wonderful conversations that we had, both in the classroom and in the symposium. Lastly, I would like to thank the many friends and colleagues that I do not have space to name here. I benefited from tremendous support, from so many people. Lastly, I would like to thank my family. Ray, Melissa, and Anna have each been wonderful. And, I would like to thank my Mom, Angel Wuest, who taught me so much about compassion, and my Dad, Ray Wuest III, from whom I first learned philosophy. I dedicate this work to them. iii Table of Contents Abstract .............................................................................................................................. ii Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ iii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. iv 1 Chapter One ................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Understanding Logical Empiricism .................................................................. 10 1.3 Philipp Frank and the Crisis of Philosophy ..................................................... 20 1.4 Conventionalism and Causality ......................................................................... 29 1.5 Responses by Einstein and Lenin ...................................................................... 33 1.6 Frank in the Nonpublic and Public Phases of the Vienna Circle ................... 40 1.7 Frank in Vienna and Prague .............................................................................. 48 1.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 54 2 Chapter Two ............................................................................................................... 57 2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 57 2.2 The Left Vienna Circle Thesis ........................................................................... 62 2.3 The Harvard Period in Context ......................................................................... 75 2.4 Frank, Education, and Socially Engaged Philosophy of Science .................... 81 2.5 Future Directions ................................................................................................ 91 2.6 An Account of Values in Science? ................................................................... 101 2.7 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 110 3 Chapter Three .......................................................................................................... 112 3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 112 3.2 Contemporary Scholarship and Resisting the “Neurath Narrative” ........... 114 3.3 Frank and Verification ..................................................................................... 124 iv 3.4 Hilbert and Frank in Contemporary Scholarship ......................................... 132 3.5 Frank’s Use of Hilbert ...................................................................................... 135 3.6 The Development of Frank Conception of Social Factors and the Influence of Scholastic Thought ...........................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Social Sciences—How Scientific Are They?
    31 The Social Sciences—How Scientifi c Are They? Manas Sarma or Madame Curie. That is, he social sciences are a very important and amazing in their own way. fi eld of study. A division of science, social sciences Tembrace a wide variety of topics from anthropology A better example of a social to sociology. The social sciences cover a wide range of science than law may be topics that are crucial for understanding human experience/ economics. economics behavior in groups or as individuals. is, in a word, fi nances. Economics is the study By defi nition, social science is the branch of science that deals of how money changes, the rate at which it changes, and with the human facets of the natural world (the other two how it potentially could change and the rate at which it branches of science are natural science and formal science). would. Even though economics does not deal with science Some social sciences are law, economics, and psychology, to directly, it is defi nitely equally scientifi c. About 50-60% of name a few. The social sciences have existed since the time colleges require calculus to study business or economics. of the ancient Greeks, and have evolved ever since. Over Calculus is also required in some science fi elds, like physics time, social sciences have grown and gained a big following. or chemistry. Since economics and science both require Some colleges, like Yale University, have chosen to focus calculus, economics is still a science. more on the social sciences than other subjects. The social sciences are more based on qualitative data and not as Perhaps the most scientifi c of the social sciences is black-and-white as the other sciences, so even though they psychology.
    [Show full text]
  • Theory and Reality
    an introduction to the philosophy of science ........................................................... SCIENCE AND ITS CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS A SERIES EDITED BY DAVID L. HULL THEORY AND REALITY ........................................................... Peter Godfrey-Smith is associate professor of philosophy and of his­ tory and philosophy of science at Stanford University. He is the author PETER GODFREY-SMITH of Complexity and the Function ofMind in Nature. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 2003 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published 2003 Printed in the United States of America 12 II 100908 45 ISBN: 0-226-30062-5 (cloth) ISBN: 0-226-30063-3 (paper) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Godfrey-Smith, Peter. Theory and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of science I Peter Godfrey-Smith. p. cm. - (Science and its conceptual foundations) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-226-30062-5 (alk. paper) - ISBN 0-226-30063-3 (pbk. : alk. The University of Chicago Press / Chicago and London paper) I. Science-Philosophy. I. Title. II. Series. QI75 .G596 2003 501-dc2I 2002155305 @ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences-Perma­ nence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992. 56 Chapter Three Later (especially in chapter 14) I will return to these problems. But in the next chapter we will look at a philosophy that gets a good part of its motivation from the frustrations discussed in this chapter. Further Reading 4...................................................................................... Once again, Hempel's Aspects ofScientific Explanation (1965) is a key source, con­ Popper: Conjecture and Refutation taining a long (and exhausting) chapter on confirmation.
    [Show full text]
  • Positivism and the 'New Archaeology'
    2 Positivism and the 'new archaeology' 'Recipes for the Good Society used to run, in caricature, something like this - (1) Take about 2,000 hom. sap., dissect each into essence and accidents and discard the accidents. (2) Place essences in a large casserole, add socialising syrup and stew until conflict disappears. (3) Serve with a pinch of salt.' (Hollis 1977, p. 1) 'The wish to establish a natural science of society . probably remains, in the English speaking world at least, the dominant standpoint today . But those who still wait for a Newton are not only waiting for a train that won't arrive, they're in the wrong station altogether.' (Giddens 1976, p. 13) Introduction How should archaeologists come to have knowledge of the past? What does this knowl- edge involve? What constitutes an explanation of what archaeologists find? This chapter considers the answer to these questions accepted by the 'new' archaeology; it considers epistemological issues raised by a study of the past in the archaeological literature post- dating 1960. New archaeology has embraced explicitly and implicitly a positivist model of how to explain the past and we examine the treatment of the social world as an exten- sion of the natural, the reduction of practice lo behaviour, the separation of'reality', the facts, from concepts and theories. We criticize testing, validation and the refutation of theory as a way of connecting theory and the facts, emphasizing all observation as theory-laden. The new archaeology polemically opposed itself to traditional 'normative' archaeology as a social science and we begin the chapter with a consideration of this change and why it took place.
    [Show full text]
  • What Is That Thing Called Philosophy of Technology? - R
    HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY – Vol. IV - What Is That Thing Called Philosophy of Technology? - R. J. Gómez WHAT IS THAT THING CALLED PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY? R. J. Gómez Department of Philosophy. California State University (LA). USA Keywords: Adorno, Aristotle, Bunge, Ellul, Feenberg, Habermas, Heidegger, Horkheimer, Jonas, Latour, Marcuse, Mumford, Naess, Shrader-Frechette, artifact, assessment, determinism, ecosophy, ends, enlightenment, efficiency, epistemology, enframing, ideology, life-form, megamachine, metaphysics, method, naturalistic, fallacy, new, ethics, progress, rationality, rule, science, techno-philosophy Contents 1. Introduction 2. Locating technology with respect to science 2.1. Structure and Content 2.2. Method 2.3. Aim 2.4. Pattern of Change 3. Locating philosophy of technology 4. Early philosophies of technology 4.1. Aristotelianism 4.2. Technological Pessimism 4.3. Technological Optimism 4.4. Heidegger’s Existentialism and the Essence of Technology 4.5. Mumford’s Megamachinism 4.6. Neomarxism 4.6.1. Adorno-Horkheimer 4.6.2. Marcuse 4.6.3. Habermas 5. Recent philosophies of technology 5.1. L. Winner 5.2. A. Feenberg 5.3. EcosophyUNESCO – EOLSS 6. Technology and values 6.1. Shrader-Frechette Claims 6.2. H Jonas 7. Conclusions SAMPLE CHAPTERS Glossary Bibliography Biographical Sketch Summary A philosophy of technology is mainly a critical reflection on technology from the point of view of the main chapters of philosophy, e.g., metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Technology has had a fast development since the middle of the 20th century , especially ©Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS) HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY – Vol. IV - What Is That Thing Called Philosophy of Technology? - R.
    [Show full text]
  • BRONZE AGE FORMAL SCIENCE? with Additional Remarks on the Historiography of Distant Mathematics
    ROSKILDE UNIVERSITETSCENTER ROSKILDE UNIVERSITY Faggruppen for filosofi og Section for philosophy videnskabsteori and science studies BRONZE AGE FORMAL SCIENCE? With additional remarks on the historiography of distant mathematics JENS HØYRUP FILOSOFI OG VIDENSKABSTEORI PÅ ROSKILDE UNIVERSITETSCENTER 3. Række: Preprints og reprints 2003 Nr. 5 In memoriam Robert Merton 1910–2003 Revised contribution to Foundations of the Formal Sciences IV The History of the Concept of the Formal Sciences Bonn, February 14-17, 2003 I. Past understandings of mathematics .......................... 1 Aristotle and others ............................................ 2 Scribal cultures I: Middle Kingdom Egypt ........................... 4 Scribal cultures II: Old Babylonian epoch ............................ 6 Riddle collections – and a hypothesis ............................... 15 II. Understandings of past mathematics ......................... 16 Second (didactical) thoughts ...................................... 18 Bibliography .............................................. 20 The paper was prepared during a stay at the Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte,Berlin. I use the opportunity to express my sincere gratitude for the hospitality I received. Referee: Aksel Haaning My talk falls in two unequally long parts, each turning around a particular permutation of the same three key words:* – The first, longer and main part treats of past understandings of mathematics. – The second, shorter part takes up understandings of past mathematics. In both parts,
    [Show full text]
  • R Epor T Resumes
    R EPOR TRESUMES ED 010 991 SE 000 019 BIOLOGICAL EDUCATION IN AMERICAN SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1890-1960. BY- HURD, PAUL DEHART AMERICAN INST. OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES REPORT NUMBER BSCS BULLI PUB DATE 1 FEB 61 EDRS PRICEMF S0.45 HC$10.76 269P. DESCRIPTORS *BIOLOGY, *SCIENCE EDUCATION, *SECONDARY SCHOOL SCIENCE, CURRICULUM, COURSE CONTENT, EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES, HISTORY, TEACHING METHODS, TEXTBOOKS, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES CURRICULUM STUDY, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHANGES IN AMERICAN SECONDARY SCHOOL BIOLOGICAL EDUCATION CURING THE PERIOD 1890-1960 ARE DESCRIBED. INFORMATION FROM THE REPORTS OF IMPORTANT COMMITTEES SUMMARIZES CHANGES IN BIOLOGICAL EDUCATION CURING EACH DECADE OF THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE STUDY. CHANGES IN COURSE CONTENT, TEACHING METHODOLOGY, AND RATIONALE ARE RELATED TO CORRESPONDING CHANGES IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE, EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY, AND EXISTING KNOWLEDGE OF LEARNING THEORY. TOPICAL AREeeS ANALYZED INCLUDE (1) COURSE OBJECTIVES, (2) CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION CF COURSE CONTENT, (3) TEXTBOOKS, (4) THE LEARNING CF BIOLOGY, AND (5) INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCES. UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS IN BIOLOGICAL EDUCATION AND PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN TEACHING BIOLOGY ARE DISCUSSED. (AG) op- lb" A II1111 It -41111thz- ,...11100t'. BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES CURRICULUM STUDY BULLETIN NO. 1 BIOLOGICAL ir(kryi( EDUCATION IN AMERICAN SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1890-1960 By Paul DeHart Hurd Education Consultant Ilielogical Sciences Curriculum Study On leave, School of Education Stanford University U.S. DEMMER Of RAM, MOON a WEIFAR ma Of MANN 11115 DEMI HAS Ka REPEONCEN UAW AS NaiveIRON Mt PERSON OR 01111111ATION OMANI IT.POINTS Of MEW OR OPINIONS STAND 00 NOT NECESSARY MUER OffKIAL OffKE OfEDUCATION POSITION 01 POUCY. American Institute of liological Sciences 2000 P Street, N.W.
    [Show full text]
  • Outline of Science
    Outline of science The following outline is provided as a topical overview of • Empirical method – science: • Experimental method – The steps involved in order Science – systematic effort of acquiring knowledge— to produce a reliable and logical conclusion include: through observation and experimentation coupled with logic and reasoning to find out what can be proved or 1. Asking a question about a natural phenomenon not proved—and the knowledge thus acquired. The word 2. Making observations of the phenomenon “science” comes from the Latin word “scientia” mean- 3. Forming a hypothesis – proposed explanation ing knowledge. A practitioner of science is called a for a phenomenon. For a hypothesis to be a "scientist". Modern science respects objective logical rea- scientific hypothesis, the scientific method re- soning, and follows a set of core procedures or rules in or- quires that one can test it. Scientists generally der to determine the nature and underlying natural laws of base scientific hypotheses on previous obser- the universe and everything in it. Some scientists do not vations that cannot satisfactorily be explained know of the rules themselves, but follow them through with the available scientific theories. research policies. These procedures are known as the 4. Predicting a logical consequence of the hy- scientific method. pothesis 5. Testing the hypothesis through an experiment – methodical procedure carried out with the 1 Essence of science goal of verifying, falsifying, or establishing the validity of a hypothesis. The 3 types of
    [Show full text]
  • Guide to Proper Names and References in Gödel's “Protokolle
    Guide to proper names and references in Gödel’s “Protokolle” notebook People Abel Othenio Abel (1875-1946) professor of paleontology and paleobiology at the University of Vienna. Founder of the group of professors known as the “Bärenhöhle” that blocked the appointment and promotion of Jews Adele Adele Nimbursky, née Porkert (1899–1981), Gödel’s girlfriend, separated from her first husband; she and Gödel would marry in September 1938 Bachmann Friedrich Bachmann (1909–1982), mathematician, doctoral student of Scholz’s at Münster, where he received his Ph.D. in 1933; from 1935 at University of Marburg, as assistant then Privatdozent Behmann Heinrich Behmann (1891–1970), German mathematician; his reply to Perelman’s criticism of Gödel’s result had appeared in the journal Mind in April 1937. He was dismissed from his position at ​ ​ the University of Halle after the war for his Nazi Party activities Beer Gustav Beer, member of the Vienna Circle and Menger’s Mathematical Colloquium Benjamin Abram Cornelius Benjamin (1897–1968), American philosopher of science on the University of Chicago faculty 1932 to 1945 Bernays Paul Bernays (1888–1977), Swiss mathematician and logician; close collaborator with David Hilbert on the foundations of mathematics and the axiomatization of set theory Brentano Franz Brentano (1838-1917), resigned as priest, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vienna, founder of Gestalt Brunsvick Egon Brunswik (1903–1955), Hungarian-born psychologist, assistant to Karl Bühler in Vienna, active member of Otto Neurath’s “Unity of Science” movement Bühler Karl Bühler (1879–1963), professor of psychology at the University of Vienna. He led an effort to reorganize Vienna’s city schools by incorporating scientific findings from child psychology.
    [Show full text]
  • The State of Inclusive Science Communication: a Landscape Study
    The State of Inclusive Science Communication: A Landscape Study Katherine Canfield and Sunshine Menezes Metcalf Institute, University of Rhode Island Graphics by Christine Liu This report was developed for the University of Rhode Island’s Metcalf Institute with generous support from The Kavli Foundation. Cite as: Canfield, K. & Menezes, S. 2020. The State of Inclusive Science Communication: A Landscape Study. Metcalf Institute, University of Rhode Island. Kingston, RI. 77 pp. Executive Summary Inclusive science communication (ISC) is a new and broad term that encompasses all efforts to engage specific audiences in conversations or activities about science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and medicine (STEMM) topics, including, but not limited to, public engagement, informal science learning, journalism, and formal science education. Unlike other approaches toward science communication, however, ISC research and practice is grounded in inclusion, equity, and intersectionality, making these concerns central to the goals, design, implementation, evaluation, and refinement of science communication efforts. Together, the diverse suite of insights and practices that inform ISC comprise an emerging movement. While there is a growing recognition of the value and urgency of inclusive approaches, there is little documented knowledge about the potential catalysts and barriers for this work. Without documentation, synthesis, and critical reflection, the movement cannot proceed as quickly as is warranted. The University of Rhode Island’s Metcalf
    [Show full text]
  • Kant's Definition of Science in the Architectonic of Pure Reason And
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Institutional Research Information System University of Turin 372DOI 10.1515/kant-2014-0016Gabriele Gava KANT-STUDIEN 2014; 105(3): 372–393 Gabriele Gava Kant’s Definition of Science in the Architectonic of Pure Reason and the Essential Ends of Reason Abstract: The paper analyses the definition of science as an architectonic unity, which Kant gives in the Architectonic of Pure Reason. I will show how this defini- tion is problematic, insofar as it is affected by the various ways in which the rela- tionship of reason to ends is discussed in this chapter of the Critique of Pure Rea- son. Kant sometimes claims that architectonic unity is only obtainable thanks to an actual reference to the essential practical ends of human reason, but he also identifies disciplines that do not make this reference as scientific. In order to find a solution to this apparent contradiction, I will first present Kant’s distinction be- tween a scholastic and a cosmic concept of philosophy. This distinction expresses Kant’s foreshadowing of his later insistence on the priority of practical philos- ophy within a true system of philosophy. Then, I will present a related distinction between technical and architectonic unity and show how Kant seems to use two different conceptions of science, one simply attributing systematic unity to science, the other claiming that science should consider the essential practical ends of human beings. I will propose a solution to this problem by arguing that, if we give a closer look to Kant’s claims, the unity of scientific disciplines can be considered architectonic without taking into consideration the essential practi- cal ends of human reason.
    [Show full text]
  • By Government, Particularly in Administrative Positions, and Exert an Increasing Demand and Suggest Future Action for Trained Pu
    DOCUMENT RESUME ED 025 220 24 HE 000 314 By-Mosher, Frederick C. Professional Education and the Public Service; An Exploratory Study. Final Report. California Univ., Berkeley. Center for Research and Development in Higher Education. Spons Agency-Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C. Bureau of Research Bureau No- BR-5-0248 Pub Date Apr 68 Contract- OEC- 6- 10- 106 Note-170p. EDRS Price MF-$0.75 HC-$8.60 Descriptors- Administrative Personnel, *Government (Administrative Body), Governmental Structure, *Government Emplo_yees, *Higher Education, Professional Education, Professional Occupations,Professional Personnel, Public Administration Education, Public Officials, *Public Policy Professional and technical fields are the fastest growing occupational sectors in the US. More than one-third of all professional and technical workers are employed by government, particularlyinadministrative positions, and exert an increasing influence on public policy. But, with the exception of city managers, many of these employees regard themselves as members of the disciplines in which they weretrained rather than primarily as public administrators. The field of public administrationhas not influenced public policy as much as other fields have, possibly because: it is not a specialized profession; practitioners do not agree on what its core knowledge,skills and orientation should be; and there is little incentive for students to pursue studies in the field since most administrative positions are held by otherspecialists. Althou9h more attention in colleges is now being paid toadministrative and management fields, courses are usually based onorganizational theories of private business models, with little emphasis on the unique problems of government administration.Professional schools suffer from a general bias against teaching the kinds of subjects thatmight be useful in government jobs.
    [Show full text]
  • Einstein and the Development of Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science
    Einstein and the Development of Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science Don Howard University of Notre Dame Introduction What is Albert Einstein’s place in the history of twentieth-century philosophy of science? Were one to consult the histories produced at mid-century from within the Vienna Circle and allied movements (e.g., von Mises 1938, 1939, Kraft 1950, Reichenbach 1951), then one would find, for the most part, two points of emphasis. First, Einstein was rightly remembered as the developer of the special and general theories of relativity, theories which, through their challenge to both scientific and philosophical orthodoxy made vivid the need for a new kind of empiricism (Schlick 1921) whereby one could defend the empirical integrity of the theory of relativity against challenges coming mainly from the defenders of Kant.1 Second, the special and general theories of relativity were wrongly cited as straightforwardly validating central tenets of the logical empiricist program, such as verificationism, and Einstein was wrongly represented as having, himself, explicitly endorsed those same philosophical principles. As we now know, logical empiricism was not the monolithic philosophical movement it was once taken to have been. Those associated with the movement disagreed deeply about fundamental issues concerning the structure and interpretation of scientific theories, as in the protocol sentence debate, and about the overall aims of the movement, as in the debate between the left and right wings of the Vienna Circle over the role of politics in science and philosophy.2 Along with such differences went subtle differences in the assessment of Einstein’s legacy to logical empiricism.
    [Show full text]