Role of Opposition Movements Against Bhutto and Against Zia

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ROLE OF OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS AGAINST BHUTTO AND AGAINST ZIA:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ABID HUSSAIN ABBASI

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY

ISLAMABAD

2017 DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY

ISLAMABAD

APPROVAL OF THESIS FOR SUBMISSION

I hereby recommend the dissertation prepared under my supervision by Abid Hussain Abbasi entitled ROLE OF OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS AGAINST BHUTTO AND AGAINST ZIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY.

Prof. Dr. Razia Sultana Supervisor Author’s Declaration

I Abid Hussain Abbasihereby state that my PhD thesis titled“Role of

Opposition against Bhutto and Zia: A Comparative Study”is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me for taking any degree from this

University (Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad), Or anywhere else in the country/world.

At any time if my statement is found to be incorrect even after my Graduate the university has the right to withdraw my PhD degree.

Name of Student:Abid Hussain Abbasi Certificate of Approval

This is to certify that the research work presented in this thesis, entitledRole of " Opposition against Bhutto and Zia: A Comparative Study”was conducted byMr. Abid Hussain Abbasiunder the supervisionProf. of Dr. Razia Sultana. No part of this thesis has been submitted anywhere else for any other degree. This thesis is submitted to theDepartment of History Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabadin partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Field of History. Department of:History University of:Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

Student Name:Mr. Abid Hussain Abbasi

(Designation & Office Address)

Prof. Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema Dean, Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS) National Defence University (NDU), E-9 Islamabad.

(Designation & Office Address)

Dr. Abdul Rauf Department of Political Science University of Peshawar, Peshawar.

Supervisor Name:Prof. Dr. Razia Sultana

Name of Dean/HOD:Dr. Rabia Umar Ali Plagiarism Undertaking

I solemnly declare that research work presented in the thesis titled“Role of Opposition against Bhutto and Zia: A Comparative Study” is solely my research work with no significant contribution from any other person. Small contribution/help wherever taken has been duly acknowledged and that complete thesis has been written by me.

I understand the zero-tolerance policy of the HEC and UniversityQuaid-i-Azam ( University Islamabad).

towards plagiarism. Therefore I as an Author of the above titled thesis declare that no portion of my thesis has been plagiarized and any material used as reference is properly referred/cited.

I undertake that if I am found guilty of any formal plagiarism in the above titled thesis even after award of PhD degree, the University reserves the rights to withdraw/revoke my PhD degree and that HEC and the University has the right to publish my name on the HEC/University Website on which names of students are placed who submitted plagiarized thesis.

Student /Author Signature:

Name: Abid Hussain Abbasi To Allama Muztar Abbasi

vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First, I thank Almighty Allah, who gave me strength and courage to complete this study successfully. It is a pleasure for me to express my feelings of gratitude for my supervisor Professor Dr. Razia Sultana Sahiba for her scholarly guidance, patience and encouragement. She has always been very kind, friendly, easy to reach and helpful. I will always be grateful to her very kind guidance.

I am also indebted with the able guidance and scholarly attitude of my teachers at Quiad-i-Azam University. Particularly I pay my heartily gratitude to Professor Dr.

Syed Waqar Ali Shah sahib who not only played a major role to get me admission in

PhD but always guided and supported me so generously.

Similarly, there are many friends, colleagues including my teacher and mentor Allama Muzter Abbasi Sahib (Late), Javed Sidiq Sahib, Hafiz Saeed Sahib, Mr.

Jehangir Khan, Mr. Afzal Cheema, Mr. Jalil Asghar Satti, Zahid Zaman Qureshi and Mr.

Kamran Khan for their support and guidance. Mr. Gul Hassan Librarian of PAF College

Lower Topa for his generous support in provision of various books, Mr Hammad Abbasi for his valuable time for proof reading and his help in setting the draft.

I also thank the library staff of Seminar Library of the Department of History,

Central Library of Quiad-i-Azam University, Central Library Allama Iqbal Open

University Islamabad, National Documentation Centre, National Assembly Library,

Municipal Library Rawalpindi, Iqbal Municipal Library Murree, Resource Centre

Murree, personal library of Allama Muztar Abbasi sahib and all those whom I visited for material collection during my research work. I am also grateful to all those friends who provided me the chance to share their informative company.

vii Moreover, I wish to express my love and care for my beloved niece Isra who helped and supported me while preparing my draft ,and my beloved brother Baber for his consistent support and push to complete my work. I also thank my very kind and beloved sisters Asia and Aapi for their love and care during my research work.

In the end I very humbly attribute the weaknesses of the dissertation to myself and the strengths to all those who guided and supported me.

Abid Hussain Abbasi

viii ABBREVIATIONS

AIML All India Muslim League

AKMC Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference

AL Awami League

ANP Awami National Party

APC All Parties Conference

APMSO All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organization

APP Associated Press of Pakistan

APWA All Pakistan Women Association

AZO Al-Zulfikar Organization

BD Basic Democrat

BNP Baluchistan National Party

CAS Chief of air Staff

CBR Central Board of Revenue

CCI Council of Common Interest

CEC Central Executive Committee

CEC Chief Election Commissioner

CENTO Central Treaty Organization

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Criminal Investigation Agency

CJCSC Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

CM Chief Minister

CMLA Chief Martial Law Administrator

CNC Commander-In-Chief

ix Con ML Council Muslim League

CONS Chief of Naval Staff

Conv ML Convention Muslim League

COP Combined Opposition Parties

COAS Chief of Army Staff

CONS Chief Of Naval Staff

CPNE Council of Pakistan Newspapers Editors

CSP Civil Service of Pakistan

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DAC Democratic Action Committee

DG Director General

DMG District Management Group

DPR Defense of Pakistan Rules

DSP Deputy Superintendent of police

DWA Democratic Women Association

EBDO Elective Bodies Disqualification Order

EC Election Commission

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FIA Federal Investigation Agency

FSC Federal Shariyat Court

FSF Federal Security Force

GDA Grand Democratic Alliance

GHQ General Head Quarters

HRCP Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

IB Intelligence Bureau

x IJI Islami Jamhoori Itehad

IJT Islami Jamiyat-i-Tuleba

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence Agency

JCSC Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

JI Jam’at-i-Islami

JUI Jamiyat Ulema-i-Islam

JUI-F Jamiyat Ulema-i-Islam ( Fazalu Rehman)

JUI-H Jamiyat Ulema-i-Islam ( Hazarvi)

JUP Jamiyat Ulema-i-Pakistan

KPK Khyber Pakhtun Khawa

LFO Legal Framework Order

MD Managing Director

MLR Martial Law Regulation

MNA Member National Assembly

MPA Member Provincial Assembly

MRD Movement for the Restoration of Democracy

MUF Mutaheda Ulema Forum

NAP National Awami Party

NAP (B) National Awami Party (Bhashani)

NAP(W) National Awami Party (Wali Khan)

NDA National Democratic Alliance

NDF National Democratic Front

NDP National Democratic Party

NFC National Finance Commission

NPP National Peoples’ Party

xi NPT National Press Trust

NSF National Student Federation

NWFP North Western Frontier Province

OIC Organization of Islamic countries

PBUH Peace Be Upon Him

PCO Provisional Constitutional Order

PDF Pakistan Democratic Fund

PDM Pakistan Democratic Movement

PDP Pakistan Democratic Party

PFUJ Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists

PIA Pakistan International Airlines

PKMAP Pakhtun Khwa Mili Awami Party

PLF Pakistan Lawyers Forum

PM Prime Minister

PML Pakistan Muslim League

PML(N) Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)

PML(P) Pakistan Muslim League (Pagara)

PNA Pakistan National Alliance

PODA Public Office Disqualification Order

POW Prisoners of War

PPO Pakistan Press Ordinance

PPP Pakistan Peoples’ Party

PSF Peoples’ Student Organization

PTV Pakistan Television

PYO Peoples Youth Organization

xii RCO Revival of Constitutional Order (1973)

SAT Sind Awami Tehreek

SAW Swal Allaho waalehey Wasalam

SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organization

TI Tehreek-i-Istaklaal

UAE United Arab Emirates

UNO United Nations Organization

USA United States of America

USM United Students Movement

USSR Union Soviet Socialist Republics

WAF Women Action Forum

xiii GLOSARY

Ammal A journal started by PPP from London

Bradari Clan, tribe, broader family

Jihad Fighting against infidels , striving against wrong

Madrassa Muslims religious educational institutions

Nizam-i-Mustafa The System of the Prophet (SAW)

Shikargah Hunting land

Batai Lease amount of agricultural land

Gherao To besiege (building) for demands

Azaan Call for prayer (in Islam)

Mureeds Followers

Murshid Mentor

Wadera Feudal lord

Deobandi A sect in Islam attributed to Deoband a city in India where a renowned Islamic religious school is located Ramadan The fasting month in Islamic calendar

Minar-i-Pakistan Parliament ( Islamic assembly for consultation)

Quaid-i-Azam Great Leader

Hari Peasant ( in Sind)

Jeeay Bhutto Long live Bhutto

Gundas Goons

Danda Stick, to use for hunting

Wadera Feudal lord

xiv ABSTRACT

The dissertation entitled “Role of Opposition against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and against Ziaul Haq: a comparative study” provides a comprehensive account of the role of two opposition movements; first against Bhutto and the second against Gen. Zia. In Bhutto’s ascendency to power establishment played a mixed role as it had to bring him in power in the wake of military disaster of 1971. But after assuming power he could hardly maneuver between the civil and military leadership to steer the ship of democracy on a sustainable track. Eventually he met a tragic end at the hands of same forces that earlier brought him into power. In the case of Gen. Zia the opposition played a reverse ball game.

The role of opposition movement (PNA) against Bhutto, role of various key players, “behind the curtain” forces against the popularly elected government of Bhutto was quite obvious in bringing down the popularly elected government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. On the contrary, the struggle of opposition movement (MRD) against Zia, role of various segments of Pakistani society in the movement for the restoration of democracy and rule of law led to an extent in restoration of democracy in the country.

In fact, Bhutto came in power as a result of a popular movement of 1968-69 which mounted against the then President Ayub Khan. This movement, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, challenged the status-quo. After assuming power as a popular leader of the country he introduced egalitarian reforms which further antagonized opposition among the forces of status quo.

The study explored that opposition in connivance with other forces overthrew the democratically elected government. Ironically, the then opposition turned a democratic country into dictatorship; an anti-capitalist country turned into a staunch ally of US-led Jihad (war) against USSR in Afghanistan and adopted a pro-US foreign policy.

Bhutto, despite being a feudal himself introduced a number of egalitarian reforms and challenged the interests of the elitist classes including civil-military establishment, industrial elite, feudal class and other elitist groups. These groups with their class interest supported to launch a strong movement against Bhutto and consequently succeeded to overthrow him with the help of military junta.

xv In contrast the movement against Zia was launched by people of Pakistan for the establishment of democracy and rule of law in the country. Almost all opposition political parties and progressive segments of Pakistani society played an important role to render great sacrifices in the movement against Zia. The role of political workers, lawyers, students, women and other segments of society has been instrumental against the dictatorial regime of General Zia. Although the movement could neither bring the dictator down nor succeeded to bring back the process of change started by the 1968-69 movement against the strata of ruling elite, nor it could bring back the process of egalitarian reforms initiated by Bhutto regime.

xvi CONTENTS

Acknowledgment ...... v

Abbreviations...... vii

Glossary ...... xii

Abstract ...... xiii

Introduction...... 1-13

CHAPTER 1

Opposition in Conceptual Framework...... 14-55

CHAPTER 2

Bhutto’s Rise to Power and evolution of Opposition during His Regime...... 56-116

CHAPTER 3

Role of Political Opposition (PNA) against Bhutto...... 117-216

CHAPTER 4

Role of Establishment and other Forces against Bhutto...... 217-282

CHAPTER 5

Role of Opposition (MRD) against Ziaul H aq...... 283-360

CONCLUSION/COMPARISON ...... 361-374

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 377-396

Appendix I...... 397-398

Appendix II...... 399-402

Appendix III...... 403

Appendix IV...... 404

Appendix V...... 405-413

xvii INTRODUCTION

Opposition has an important role in any system of government but in

democracy, opposition is an integral part. Opposition has a constitutional role in a

democratic dispensation to keep checks on government’s policies and functions.

Pakistani nation lived more than half of its life under the direct military rule and

major portion of the remaining years under its shadow.1 The span of democratic rule

is nominal and so is the case with the institution of opposition. After the creation of the country in 1947 the first democratic government elected in an election on the basis

of Universal Adult Franchise ruled the country from 1973 to 1977. The first

parliament elected through Universal Adult Franchise base elections carried out its

constitutional role by making a unanimously passed constitution for the country that is

still in place. The opposition to the Bhutto government played its role but later joined

hands with the opposition forces to democracy itself against the democratically

elected government. Bhutto Era and role of opposition against his government is of

great significance as it has long lasting impacts on the political history of Pakistan.

Military remained directly in power for about thirteen years before Bhutto came in

power, and eleven years after Bhutto’s removal from power. Various opposition

forces played pivotal role against democratic system emerged after about twenty years

of illegitimate undemocratic rules and facilitated another military dictatorial rule for

next eleven years. Military establishment has a strong influence on the policymaking

of the civilian elected governments even in post-Zia era. An effort is being made in the present study to give due attention to the role of opposition against Bhutto, causes

of its emergence and effects and its comparison with role of opposition against Zia i.e.

MRD’s struggle to bring back democracy and rule of constitution in the country.

Despite large number of sacrifices and constant struggle, MRD neither could succeed

1 to achieve its immediate objective to restore democracy nor could repair the damages to the democracy caused by the opposition movement against Bhutto.

1. Statement of the Problem: The purpose of this study is to make a comparative and

interpretive analysis of two opposition movements in the political history of Pakistan;

opposition movement against Bhutto (PNA) and opposition movement (MRD) against

General Zia. Generally, historians studied the role of rulers and ruling governments in the politics of Pakistan but they did not pay due attentions to the role of opposition in the politics, particularly “informal” forces of opposition. Various opposition

movements played a vital role in the politics and put far-reaching impacts on its future

course. The aim of the present study is to fill this gap by making an effort to study the

Role of Opposition Movement against Bhutto and against General Zia. Finding out

similarities and differences between the two struggles, this study also aims to interpret these movements in an historical perspective. Opposition against Bhutto emerged

during his five years in power as a result of his reformist policies challenging the

interests of the set patterns of the elitist groups in the country that were in power before Bhutto. Bhutto played a vital role in the movement against Ayub Khan in

1968-69, which was a class-conscious movement and challenged the “tradition” of

elitist politics for the first time in the history of Pakistan. Bhutto came into power as a

result of the success of this movement. The main causes of various forces of

opposition against Bhutto were his reformist agenda and his challenge to the tradition

of elitist politics (military, feudals, religious clergy, capitalists backed by US).

In 1977 when Bhutto announced election, a nine-party alliance was formed

and after the elections launched a strong movement against Bhutto on the allegations

of “massive” riggings in the elections by ruling PPP. The opposition movement

against Bhutto wanted in its initial phase after the 1977 elections, new and rigging

2 free polls, then implementation ofNizam-i-Mustafa (Islamic Shariaha) but later they

demanded removal of Bhutto regime altogether, the movement against General Zia

remained consistent in its demand for restoration of democracy. This difference in the

nature of demands by the two oppositions reveals one of the fundamental differences between the two movements. The movement against Bhutto drew its mass support

initially from the urban middle class and the orthodox rural population. In addition, a

small number of greater Baluchis and Pashtuns of North West Frontier Province (Now

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Baluchistan were among the first supporters. The

movement got a foothold in the mainland of Punjab and urban Sind gradually, the

rural Sind, however was largely Pro-Bhutto. Opposition against General Zia, on the

contrary, enjoyed dependence on mass support from across the country to an extent

even at the initial stage though its support base largely was in Sind.2

The most crucial difference between two movements was their relationship with the establishment of Pakistan. Bhutto came into power in the wake of 1968

political struggle that was predominantly a class-conscious movement. Despite being

a feudal himself, Bhutto had challenged the interest of the elite feudal class,

industrialists and civil and military establishment. Not surprisingly at all, it were these

classes with vested interests that helped mobilize the anti-Bhutto struggle. In contrast, the opposition struggle against General Zia did not enjoy such a strong support from the economically and politically powerful elite strata of Pakistan. The establishment

considered the anti-Zia struggle a force that had the potential to bring down a dictator without challenging their interests. The establishment neither secretly supported nor

“openly” opposed the MRD.

The American factor played a significant role in helping the opposition parties

get rid of Bhutto. In the backdrop of increasing Russian influence in Pakistan US

3 government considered the Bhutto regime a hurdle in their cold war struggle against

communism. Without a support from the USA, Pakistan Army would most probably

not have ousted Bhutto. At the times of General Zia, Pakistan was a close ally of the

USA in the common cause of ‘Islamic Jihad’ in Afghanistan. The Americans held

almost the same attitude towards the two opposition struggles which were held by

Pakistani elite, economic and bureaucratic classes against General Zia. The movement

against Bhutto paved the way for a martial law which gradually undid many of the

reforms introduced by Bhutto government. The opposition remained silent over the undoing of Bhutto’s socialist reforms, under Genera Zia. Many of the anti-Bhutto

opposition parties were later Zia’s close allies in the US-led Jihad against Russia in

Afghanistan.3

The end of both struggles resulted in strikingly different political lessons. With the overthrow and subsequent execution of Bhutto, a democracy turned into

dictatorship, an anti-US country into a Pro-US ally, actively involved in anti

communist war in Afghanistan. Anti-Bhutto politics brought a culture that still hovers

over Pakistan in many ways. On the other hand, with the death of General Zia, no

fundamental visible change in Pakistan’s foreign policy or internal economy was brought. All governments since the time of Zia have followed almost the same foreign

and internal policies. Close friendship with the USA and privatization of large-scale

economic units of Pakistan practiced by all the governments since General Zia’s death

proves that the removal of Bhutto was not only a change of ruler but also of political

outlook. How and why the opposition against Z. A. Bhutto has had greater

significance than the opposition against General Zia are the main research questions being answered in the present study.

4 II. Hypothesis: The opposition movement against Bhutto has had greater

significance for power politics of Pakistan than the opposition movement against

General Zia.

III. Significance of the study:

This study is significant for several reasons; first, it is the first ever study that

analyzed the role of various forces of opposition against Bhutto and compares and

interprets the role of opposition struggle first against Bhutto and then against General

Zia. The study shows that a struggle against egalitarian government of Bhutto resulted

in a dictatorship (that of General Zia) which lasted a long period that protected the

interests of Pakistani establishment (feudal, industrialists and military elite and

foreign forces: US-led war in Afghanistan). On the contrary, the struggle against

General Zia by the legacy of Bhutto (PPP) and other opposition parties resulted only

in a change in the fa9ade of government. Control of powerful Pakistani establishment

could not weakened by Ms Benazir Bhutto or later Mr. Nawaz Sharif’s rules.

Secondly, the study implies that the results of the two oppositions’ struggles proved the real intentions of the leaders of the two agitation movements. In the instance of

Bhutto, opposition did not want only a change of the ruler but also of the egalitarian

democratic and socialist process initiated by Bhutto. With the downfall of Bhutto, the

same old traditional elitist politics returned that had persisted in this country ever

since its creation, and unfortunately, right wing parties never mourned this return. In the case of General Zia, after the removal of the dictator, a popularly elected prime

minister could not revive the gradual change towards a socialist egalitarian economy

coupled with supremacy of the parliament over the military-led establishment.4

5 Finally, the study is significant in the light of the current state of affairs in

Pakistan where religious tolerance, democratic norms, rule of law and supremacy of the parliament seem to be on the losing side. The major reason for the above failures

is the political culture of Pakistan and this present political culture is rooted in the vested interest of various elements of the establishment.

V1 . Literature Review: This study has drawn from the following sources. First, it

surveyed, analyzed and drawn conclusions from those works that deal with theoretical

aspect of the struggle between establishment and political parties in general. Ian

Talbot’s Pakistan: A Modern History, Lawrence Ziring’s Pakistan in the Twentieth

Century, Stanley Wolpert’s Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, is a valuable source to provide

comprehensive details about Bhutto and General Zia governments. Hamid Khan’s

Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan is a valuable source of Constitutional

development during Bhutto and Zia eras. Anwar Syed’sThe Discourse and Politics of

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan in Crises by Ashok Kapur, Lal Khan’s Pakistan’s Other

Story, Philips A. Jones’ Pakistan People’s Party Rise to Power, M. S. Korejo’

Soldiers of Misfortune: Pakistan Under Ayub, Yahua, Bhutto & Zia provide

important details about Bhutto’s rise to power and his relations with establishment.

The memoirs and autobiographies of the leaders who remained involved in

MRD and PNA movements including Sherbaz Khan Mazari’s A Journey to

Disillusionment, Asghar Khans’s My Political Struggle and We’ve Learnt Nothing from History, Benazir Bhutto’s Daughter o f the East and Daughter o f Destiny, ,

Professor Abdul Ghafoor’s phir martshal la aa gaya and or election na ho saky, Rafi

Raza’s Pakistan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Maulana Kausar Niazi’sZulfikar Ali Bhutto

of Pakistan: Last Days, The Mirage of Power: An Inquiry into Bhutto Years 1971

1977. by Dr. Mubashar Hassan, and memoirs of the military generals such as

6 Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics by General Retired Arif, K. M. General

® Faiz Ali Chishti’s Betrayals of Another Kind: Islam, Democracy, and the Army in

Pakistan. Memoirs of Lt. General Gul Hassan.by General ® Gul Hasan are valuable

primary sources of information about the eras under discussion.

Secondly, the study also got help from those works which address the topic in

question directly. This category include works like- Tariq Ali’s Pakistan: Military

Rule or People’s Power?, Kamal Azfar’s Pakistan: Political and Constitutional

Dilemmas, Aesha Jalal’s The State o f Martial Rule, and Khana Farhang Iran’s Islami

Mumalik Main America Ki Mudakhlitain ( America’s interference in Muslim

Countries), A history of the Pakistan army : wars and insurrections by Brian

Cloughley, East Pakistan the end game -1971 by ‘Abdurrahman Siddiqi, The

Pakistan Army by Stephen P Cohen, The military and politics in Pakistan by Hasan

Askari Rizvi provide a handful of valuable information about the development of

military in Pakistan, its intervention in politics and its role and relations with

politicians. Pakistan ma inqalaab or rad-e-inqalaab ki kahani. Urdu. by Rana

Shaukat Mehmood and tehreek-e-bahali-e Jamhooriyat (MRD). Urdu. by Justice ®

Afzal Haider provide detailed information about the role of political workers and

other segments of society for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan during the

Martial Law regimes.

The third important source includes primary sources such as memoirs, and

interviews of a number of politicians, journalists and lawyers, some of them were

directly involved in the movements under discussion, to understand and develop the

study. State documents/papers including whitepapers, Senate and National

Assembly’s debates have also been used. And last are other published secondary

sources.

7 V. Research Methods and Sources: In the study both quantative and qualitative

methods are used with major reliance on qualitative method. A great part of study is based on books and archival material. But the first-hand knowledge of those who are

related in some way to the two political eras and journalists, lawyers, etc has also been collected and utilized. Interviews with politicians and political analysts have brought to surface several sensitive and crucial issues related to the thrust of this

study. It must be borne in mind that the study does not aim to narrate history like a

story. Rather, it aspires to analyze the roles of the two oppositions.

VI. Organization: This research effort is divided into five main chapters. These are

as under:

Chapter one, briefly reviews the opposition in theoretical and conceptual

framework, background of Pakistan’s political culture till the rise of Bhutto to power

and the dominant role of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. Role of various forces,

other than political opposition, in the rise and policies of Bhutto are discussed in this

chapter. Pakistan came into being under the banner of Muslim League, which led a

large section of the Muslim society supportive of the Two-Nation Theory.

Consequently, the issue of class-conflict dimmed into the background with the issue

of establishing an Islamic society that has become the most popular political theme in

Pakistan. Nevertheless, it did not take long when class movement came to the

foreground that brought Z.A Bhutto into power.

Chapter Two explains the factors that led to the forming of opposition struggle

against Bhutto. Bhutto challenged but never seriously weakened those sections of the

Pakistani ruling elite that had been ruling before him and against whom the 1968

political upheaval was aimed. Instead he angered many of those amongst his political

8 comrades as well as common people who believed him to be an anti-rich messiah that would deliver the common people from their poverty. Thus, on the one hand those

elite classes that thought his government a threat to their interest, formed new ranks to

end his rule. On the other hand, he failed to deliver what he had promised before large

political gatherings: democracy and socialism, leading to a considerable restlessness

among the masses. The movement against Bhutto was a fruit of these two forces.

Chapter Three discusses the role of opposition movement (PNA) against

Bhutto, elections of 1977, their aftermath, allegations of massive rigging, PNA

movement, negotiations, and finally imposition of Martial law by military, despite

reaching an agreement between PPP and PNA, role of various quarters of opposition

in PNA movement against Bhutto. After the announcement of elections in January

1977, nine distinct political parties, with striking differences of ideologies, forged an

alliance against Bhutto. Bhutto’s PPP secured overwhelming majority in the national

assemblies’ elections held on 7th March. PNA alleged that elections were rigged by

ruling party and boycotted the elections of provincial assemblies to be held on 10th

March. PNA started a strong agitation movement against Bhutto in major cities of

country, mainly in Punjab. Initially the movement was against the alleged rigging but

after Bhutto’s offer to re-polls on alleged rigged seats the movement turned into the

demand for the imposition of Nizam-i-Mustafa (Islamic Shariiat Law). Bhutto and

PPP firmly believed that the movement against Bhutto was launched in connivance

and support of some indigenous and foreign forces whose interests were affected by the policies of Bhutto (military-led establishment, big businesses, feudal lords,

religious clergy and global capitalist forces). A number of impartial analysts and

evidences also supported their version to a greater extent. With the intervention of

Saudis and other Muslim countries, a series of negotiation started and long sessions of

9 negotiations held, however when the negotiation succeeded and both the parties

reached an agreement the military under General Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial law in the country by toppling the constitutional government of Bhutto, which lasted for 11 years, the darkest one in the country’s history.

Chapter Four analyzes role of the forces that conspired against Bhutto

regime from “behind the curtain”. Pakistan’s military elite had been ousted, along with big land lords and businessmen, from power when Bhutto came into power.

Restless to grab their lost prestige, the military establishment was conniving against

Bhutto long before the imposition of Martial law by General Zia.5 Bhutto was the first

and so far last ruler that ever seriously challenged the American interest in Pakistan.

With his removal from power, Pakistan’s foreign policy went back to its pre-Bhutto

era, conformity with American interests. It is believed by many among scholars and

analysts that US factor played a vital role in anti-Bhutto movement. This Chapter underscores the role of military-led establishment against Bhutto during his years in

power and in his removal from power. The effects of Bhutto’s removal have also been

glanced in this chapter. Bhutto’s rise to and removal from power symbolized not only

a change of governments but also a change of political culture. Bhutto came into

power as the first prime minister, democratically elected by voters mostly came from the rural peasantry or urban working class. His removal from power brought into

fashion a political culture that has put the class question in the background, since the

first day of General Zia’s rule down to General Musharraf’s regime. Thus, the

movement against Bhutto has brought a greater change than any other opposition

struggle except the 1968-69 political movement against General Ayub Khan.

Chapter Five analyzes the MRD’s (Movement for the Restoration of

Democracy) struggle against General Zia. The opposition parties’ struggle against

10 General Zia aimed to bring a change in the government, not in the economic system

or foreign policy of Pakistan. It did not bring back into fashion the political culture, which was heralded by 1968-69 movement and was rolled back by General Zia

regime. The struggle of PPP-led movement and its impacts have also been highlighted

in this chapter. The largest political component of the movement (the PPP) relied upon the theme of democracy, ignoring the core issue of socialism. Benazir’s attitude towards the country’s economy and foreign policy was by and large similar to that of

General Zia. In short the only political movement that seriously challenged the elite troika of feudal, businessmen and military generals was the 1968-69 class struggle that brought Bhutto into power. The most serious attempt by Pakistan’s elite troika to

get itself re-established was that of the PNA’s movement, (Pakistan National

Alliance). From the point of view of the bringing substantial change in the

foundations of political culture, MRD does not stand in comparison to either of the two movements (1968-69 Movement and PNA movement), despite years-long

struggle and sacrifices of the workers of component parties, specially PPP.

I have allotted three chapters to discuss the role of opposition against Bhutto

and only one chapter to analyze the role of opposition against General Zia for the

following reasons. The creation of PPP, its ascendancy to power, and the opposition the PPP government faced is an anomaly keeping in view the classical pattern of

regime changes in Pakistan. Bhutto came into power as a result of a populist

movement in a sharp contrast to the tradition of elitist politics fueled by intrigues and

conspiracies in dark echelons of power. The movement of 1968-69 and Bhutto’s

ascendancy to power was the result of a predominantly class-conscious movement.

His radical reforms were an anomaly in the history of Pakistan. Before Bhutto the

11 elite comprising of civil and military bureaucrats, feudal lords and the newly born bourgeoisie generally controlled the state power.

Military remained in power directly for thirteen years before Bhutto came into

power.

The opposition PNA against Bhutto was also an anomaly in the history of

Pakistan when rightists and leftists, the pro-American and pro-Russian political

parties all joined hands against Bhutto. Even inNizam-i-Mustafa movement the

parties of leftist leaning joined hands against Bhutto with extreme rightist parties.

Bhutto antagonized all his opponents as all segments of political spheres of Pakistan were affected by his ascendancy in power through a popular movement, unprecedented in Pakistan. His party had influence at the national level; in all

provinces of Pakistan thus antagonized the regional parties as well. On the other hand the opposition against General Zia was a traditional opposition as it was against Ayub

Khan, Musharraf and other dictatorial regimes as opposition struggles against

dictatorships but opposition against Bhutto was against a first ever popularly elected

government on the basis of adult franchise and in result of a class-conscious

movement. In MRD parties of left leaning joined hands against dictatorial regime and those having rightist orientation either joined hands with the regime or remained in a

silence support to regime, as they have been doing classically against any dictator in

past.

1 Masooda Bano, Breakdown in Pakistan: How Aid Is Eroding Institutions for Collective Action. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012),31

12 2 Amir Ali Chandio; Mughis Ahmad; Fouzia Naseem,Struggle for Democracy in Sindh: A Case Study of Movement for Restoration of Democracy (1983), Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences Vol.1, No.1, Jan 2011 .http://berkeleyjournalofsocialsciences.com/Jan%205.pdf. Accessed on: 12th September 2011 3 Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan .(New York : Harper, 2009),158 4 Benazir Bhutto was given government with certain conditions by the military establishment

13 CHAPTER 1

OPPOSITION IN CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Democracy is considered to be the best and ideal system of government to regulate the society and use the best mean to keep the conflicts and collisions generated by ethnic, linguistic and religious differences under manageable limits in the contemporary plural societies. The tolerant and patient behavior is the essence of democracy, particularly in difficult condition of disagreement.

In a democratic dispensation of government divergent views and opinions are respected and freedom of expression is ensured. In democracy majority is given the right to rule and minority performs as opposition to keep checks and balances on the functioning of majority party. In this way opposition is an important part of democracy. It keeps an eye on the interests of the people specially the weak and vulnerable classes of a society. 1

Political parties represent the institutionalized dissent and disagreement on policies formulated and enforced to regularize the society. Alternative opinions, divergent views, plans, political views and suggestions are represented by political parties. Developing consensus is a peaceful mean to resolve the conflicting issues.

A strong democratic system is an objective of an opposition which is an essential part of democratic dispensation. Democracy can be defined as civilian rule through elected representative bodies and civil rights and freedom.2 The main components of this type of regime are a legislative elected through elections, judiciary with separation of powers as laid down by the constitution of the country. Unwavering, sound and effective ruling elite and a responsible opposition to the ruling government are essential ingredients for a democracy. 3

14 A non-politically motivated and adequately capable bureaucracy to implement the decisions of the parliament, a respected judiciary independent of the legislature and executive, an efficient executive civil service and an effective and efficient loyal army without any arrogance of being the sole custodian of the national interests, are the significant component of a democratic system. 4

1.1 What is opposition?

It is very difficult to define term ‘opposition’ because it has been defined variously. It relates to different types of activities. The manifestation of disagreement with a policy or action of or other activities can be seen as opposition. When the policies of government are override the courts confront them. Media criticizes the government policies and the common men record their voice through protest demonstration.5 Different sections of the society defy government when they raise voice against specific policies, which may influence them. A political party generally puts up most organized form of opposition to state’s stance. In all above cases opposing means showing disagreement and resentment against any policy or measure of the government.6

Political theorists have tried to define opposition within different contents but in common view all those segments of a society that raises their voices against the status-quo can be counted as opposition

The acts and expressions those promotes change can be viewed as opposition in sociological contest.7

Leonard Schapiro states opposition as an organized political group or groups which have a purpose to remove the government and bring the government of its own choice.8 It is the right of parties and political movements which seek to

15 replace it by presenting different policies. In a democratic system the role of opposition to challenge the government through parliamentary and electoral means is regarded as mandatory.9 Agitation movement, interest groups and parties can also assume the function of the opposition, outside the parliament. But these forms of opposition cannot play a sound role as the parliamentary opposition does.10 Opposition can be defined as a political party, group or wobbly association of men and women trying to challenge the government and its policies. 11

When the government lost the confidence of the people the opposition keeps itself prepared to form the government, though it is in minority for a temporary period of time. It must have effective policies of its own not merely opposing for the sake of power. 12 Political parties and groups that oppose the functioning government are called the opposition.13 Thus the term opposition has been defined differently in various contexts. In democratic countries opposition manifests itself in the form of political parties or non-political grouping in the form of pressure groups or interest groups which try to achieve their purpose by struggling within the ambit of constitution. In case of Pakistan “Establishment” is another strong opposition to the democratic government when it considers the democratic government is “encroaching” the boundaries of the “national security and national integrity”. In Pakistan the term

“Establishment” is generally referred to those forces who exercise de facto power; it includes the military high command and the intelligence agencies, together with the top leadership of certain political parties, high- level members of the bureaucracy, religious clergy, major landlords and business persons that work in alliance with them. The military high command and intelligence agencies form the core of the Establishment and are its most permanent and influential components. 14 Radical and revolutionary methods are used by opposition in the countries where democracy is not functioning. In democratic countries opposition has a legal and constitutional role to perform but it does not occupy similar status in all democratic countries. In parliamentary democracy like United

16 Kingdom opposition has an institutional status. As the mother of parliamentary democracy UK was the first country to recognize the institutional role of opposition. 15 On the other hand in presidential form of government there is no institutional role of opposition. Rather it is divided in various other organs of the state.16 In Western democracies like UK opposition has a constitutional role but in non-democratic countries it functions in many non-institutionalized and dangerous ways.17

Pakistan has been ruled by non-democratic, dictatorial regimes for about

34 years directly and for some years indirectly “through behind the curtain” measures consequently non-parliamentary forms of opposition emerged.18 There is no constitutional role of opposition in Communist system of government.

Instead it stressed the one-party dictatorship of Proletarian.19 According to

H.Gorden Skilling there are four forms of opposition in non-democratic countries first termed as “integral opposition” that is actually the opposition to the whole existing political system. It may be in the form of violent revolts. The classical example in Pakistan can be quoted of the 1968-69 movement against Ayub Khan.

In communist countries these are anti-communist forms that may have democratic faith and conservative beliefs. The second type is a “factional opposition” that is guided by rival groups within the party to top leaders of the party third kind of opposition is termed as “fundamental opposition”; it may be harsh against certain main policies of the regime but not the Communist system itself.

The fourth type of opposition is defined as “specific opposition”. It does not reject the government or its head but some particular policy.20 The functioning of opposition can be classified as a major difference between democratic and non- democratic dispensation. In democratic countries opposition has a legal and constitutional role whereas in non-democratic and authoritarian systems it is

17 illegal and illegitimate. Opposition plays a vital role in the success of a functioning democracy.21

1.2 Role of the Opposition in Parliamentary Democracy

Opposition plays an important role in democratic setup. In democratic form of government the existence and role of opposition is natural and important when conducted on liberal principles.22 Political scientists have given following justifications which legalize the role of opposition in democracy. Representation of different segments of society in the function of the government can be achieved through pluralism and participatory system. Opposition has an obligatory and historic role in a democratic system since true democracy cannot deliver in the absence of opposition. Sir Ivor Jennings validates this supposition by saying ‘if there is no opposition there is no democracy’.23 No society can be free of conflicts and disagreement, their names and conditions can be varied.24 Opposition plays a role of safeguard in multicultural societies. To check the differences on the basis of culture, languages, ethnicity and religions opposition can be an outlet for release of such grievances. It can also be a hope for the discontented segments of a society.25

Modern society, if it is free, requires to speak its mind that is one of the most important way through which this purpose can be achieved is to have a strong opposition on the political horizon. Without the opposition freedom seems to have no meaning. It is not likely to survive in this situation. Power struggle remains continue in every system of government. Those who are not in government try to come in power by ousting those are in power. There are different methods to carry on this power tussle; through elections as in democracy,

18 through force or revolution or other violent methods. Democracy ensures the right of opposition to carry on this struggle by using the forum of parliament.

One of the greatest achievements of the parliament of the present century is that the role of opposition has been accorded the role and recognition.26

Opposition plays a viable role for the strengthening of the system by averting revolutionary acts and by accommodating and channelizing the other mobilized groups without bringing any harm to system. The opposition thus provides procedures for political stability in developing countries.27 Opposition instead of challenging the system challenged the government. Thus the conflict remains within the boundaries of the system.28 The presence of opposition provides a political competition within the system. Democracy cannot function properly without contention and conflict of opposing forces.29 An opportunity for open expression of dissenting opinions is a necessary precondition for viable political action.30 For the exploration and understanding of advantages and disadvantages, to think sensibly and act wisely dissidents and dissenters views help the citizens of a state. Without mutual forbearance no system can be run effectively.

Thus the existence of the opposition provides a must valuable outlet for opinions of the minority. Opposition is a mandatory ingredient in a democratic system and it has right of disagreement in a gentle fashion. Without an effective opposition, government hesitates to carry on its functions properly thus opposition is a mandatory ingredient of parliamentary democracy. 31

It is rightly said that ‘today’s opposition is tomorrow’s government’ that is why its voice is given due importance since there must be continuity and smooth operation of state policies to serve the interests of domestic investors and foreign countries. The government holds great weight to the opposition views so it is

19 consulted and conceded on important matters. Opposition safeguards the right of common people by seeking the justification of government’s actions.32

In the presence of an effective opposition government cannot identify and interpret the public welfare and state’s related issues single handedly as opposition is the second greatest power after the government to formulate the policies of a state. Opposition safeguards the right of common people to question the government for justification of its various policies as democracy gives the fundamental right of the freedom of speech and expression.33 If effective checks and balances are not ensured by the opposition the ruling government can adopt arbitrary and autocratic authority as it is a common proverb that, “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely”.34 Opposition is a “government in waiting” and provides an alternative option to the electorates in the next elections if the incumbent government is not delivering effectively. It keeps a pressure on the ruling government to strive for better functioning. Sometimes it happens that government changes its position on various important issues on the pressure of an effective opposition. It is a fact that government governs and opposition criticizes.35 Opposition keeps eye on the administrative function of the government, points out corruption of the state institutions and other failure of the government. Another important role of opposition is to influence the government policies through constitutional amendments and influencing the government policies through healthy and objective debates. Thus it is opposition which plays a vital role for the survival of parliamentary control.36

The opposition’s day to day political work is also of great importance because the majority party that forms ruling government has little interest to control the executive, whom they govern. It is left to the opposition to assume the

20 responsibility of control. In majority cases legislations cannot be carried out without the consent of the opposition. Thus opposition is necessary for the viability of a democratic system.37 Opposition can develop consensus with the government party on various important issues pertaining to public welfare.

Opposition can bring effective and considerable changes in government bills. The reasonable and informative debates of the opposition members can affect the policies; its role in the parliamentary committees to scrutinize the spending, activities of the government institutions and to hold the government accountable for its policies and actions can bring substantial positive changes in policies.38

Opposition can mobilize the common people to put pressure on government to modify its policies in best interests of the masses. Opposition adopts new and innovative measures to attract the voters. Opposition is also a defender of traditional social structure of a society. Opposition strives to safeguard the rights of minorities in a society from being exploited by a majority. Opposition must provide a vigilant role against the unjust attitude of the government in violation of the rights of the people and suppression by government. It ought to take notice of all expenditures by bringing to light any sort of wasteful spending by executive institutions. A vital role of opposition is to strive for insurance of furnishing an institutionalized framework for the appropriate aggregation of various social groups in state institutions to channelize their energies and their role in political system. It would ultimately contribute to the legitimacy of the system itself.39

Formation of public opinion on various internal and indigenous issues, which are in the best interest of the nation, is another important function of the opposition.

Opposition must play an effective role to enlighten its people about the state affairs as common people are engaged in their personal matters and are not well-

21 informed about happenings on national level. 40 It is the duty of the opposition to be dedicated for securing the basic rights of common man laid down in the constitution, and keeping checks on the government policies regarding their fundamental rights. Thus the role and function of the opposition can be summarized that if it finds faults in government dispensation it proposes and recommends amendments and solutions, it draws information by asking questions and by raising voice on various important issues and makes up the public opinion.

It keeps checks on the actions of the government and forces the government to take decisions with consensus. As compared to government, opposition can freely acts within the norms of democracy in a constructive and progressing manner. It is generally presumed that merely opposing is the main purpose and the only role of opposition however it is not the sole responsibility of the opposition. It has to act positively and responsibly and not to oppose any issue unless it comes along with an alternative plan or program. Since the opposition is constitutional institution which has certain rights and duties. It is the defender of the constitution and its basic values.41 It is the foremost duty of the opposition to prevent the government to act in unconstitutional or extra-constitutional manner or violating the basic rights of the citizens.42 In a democratic system opposition must take power through constitutional manner and not use of violence or extremist methods and must avoid unconstitutional provocation to army to take over or using other extreme agitation or extra-constitutional methods, quite frequently evident in the politics of Pakistan. 43.Opposition must play its role that government must change through constitutional means and not through any extra-constitutional conspiracy.

Effective role of opposition is subjected to some famous techniques and firm observance of principled stances. The divided opposition provides an opportunity,

22 even to a bad and unpopular government to prolong its tenure. It is difficult to mobilize its members and public against policies of government when opposition is divided and fragmented.44 If the opposition is divided and not functioning properly the incumbent government can win the election by default. The divided opposition cannot impress upon the voters even if its stance is positive and provides the incumbent government to return in the power.45

The opposition by its very nature is able to formulate well-thought out program of action so that it can present itself as a force to be conceded.46

Opposition educates the people that the solution of a problem, many answers to a question and the solution adopted by government is not the only solution. The vested interests of the individuals must be sacrificed on larger national interests.47

Only strong opposition can play a substantially effective role in parliamentary system. The week opposition cannot prevent the government to become autocratic. 48 Leadership in opposition also plays an important role. Without effective leadership opposition role is just ceremonial. The weak opposition and its leadership would lose confidence and acts just a mere body.49 At first stage opposition convinced the voters that the government is not functioning in the best interests of the country and its people then it tries to take the place of the government. No opposition can produce that belief unless its front bench has enough quality, not only to take the attack, but it has got to be taken on comprehensive and adequate grounds.50 Opposition focuses on the issues which can attract wide publicity as its ultimate objective is to attract large masses.

Consistent connections with the common masses prove fruitful for opposition. 51

A hard resistance from the opposition to any act of the government against the basic human rights and cultural values makes the opposition popular among the

23 people during the election times. 52 Opposition must not be defensive it should take the offensive initiatives against the government, which makes opposition popular. The fluctuation in the support of opposition provides an indication to government to assess its policies effectiveness.53

1.3 Development of opposition in Historical Perspective

This section of the study deals with the emergence and growth of the opposition. The studies of general pattern of opposition provide insight and guidance to evaluate its pattern in a post-colonial state of Pakistan. Opposition in the political field emerges because of the following factors. The most significant aspect is the modernization process in society. Economic and political institutions of a state determine its modernization. The process which brings positive changes in all walks of human life, including industrial development, secular approach of the people, urbanization, educational development and media’s role, can be called modernization. 54

Modernization develops the opportunity of consciousness, rationality, organization and action in various social groups.55 Social mobilization and economic progress is linked with modernization. Rise in education, literacy rate and information exposure through urbanization enhanced the expectation and aspiration of the masses. Unequal distribution of resources, uneven development creates unrest and restlessness among people . The uneven economic growth in various regions increases unrest, destabilization and tension among the people. It leads people and groups to conflict with government. Consequently different ethnic, religious and other sectarian groups are provoked to violence who lived peacefully in traditional societies. The sense of economic deprivation causes instability.56 These conflicts raised the level of demands. Emergences of new

24 ideas call in question the legitimacy of the old order and suggest more just distribution of income.57 Secondly, wealth concentrates in few hands as the economic growth get faster while the losses are diffused among many people.

Consequently the number of poor people increases in society. Fast economic growth increase inflation and prices of the commodities go sky rocket. On the other hand wages of workers do not grow proportionally. There appears big and huge gap between the prices and the wages, such economic growth increases the inequality. Both aspects of the modernization give rise to new social and economic groups and they pose new demands and pressure upon the political system.58 In Pakistan almost all governments whether they were military or democratic focused on economic development but this development benefited the capitalists only. This uneven distribution of wealth has given rise to unemployment and under-employment with each passing year number of unemployed people has risen with incredibly fast speed. Growing unemployment hunger and poverty has generated frustration, hopelessness and despondency in the society and this scenario was manifested during the anti-Ayub movement in

Pakistan.59 One of the deepest impression and impact of the modernization is that it changes the nature and structure of the society. Apart from it difference in the quality of life between urban and rural areas has widened. Economic development has generated new social groups and new social order. In due time different groups in the society including students, teachers, intellectuals traders, doctors and engineers as special groups have emerged on the scene. These groups develop feeling of efficiency and dispensation and demand participation in the political system of the country. 60 The urban middle classes emerge in politics and they have become the source of opposition to the prevailing political, economic and

25 social system which is still swayed and driven by the country side. The modern society is pluralistic in nature and is interwoven by different religious, social, ethnic and linguistic groups. Such plural society by the way exists in the traditional society but society’s low level of political participation reduces the chances of integration and unity. But mobilization in such communal groups triggers the element of animosity and antagonism between them. Thus in modern society political system absorbed and assimilated these groups or they joined the opposition ranks. For being educated and experienced the urban middle classes and groups have the ability and potential to be political opposition.61 The main source for organizing the political party and political system is the natural and social needs of the society. Within the new system, these new groups usually find their representation in opposition ranks. It is, therefore, the opposition which gives institutional mechanism for assimilating new groups. Political demands raised by these groups are usually based on class-interests.62 Secondly, the gains of quick development are often concentrated in a few groups. Rapid growth often creates inflation and price hike as compare to wages, prevailing economic development increases inequality and at the same time social mobilization decreases the legitimacy of that inequality. Economic development enhanced the production remained a major concern of various governments in Pakistan but they only benefited the big capitalists. The economic deprivation of common masses played an important role in anti-Ayub movement of 1968-69, which was predominately a class-conscious movement. In this instance the masses took themselves the role of opposition.63 The rural urban economic disparity and imbalances is another striking result of urbanization. 64

26 Economic growth in the city leads to the emergence of new social groups and lead

to the development of new social order. In due course more students, doctors,

lawyers, bankers, judges and teachers have emerged on the scene. These groups

have shown political awareness and demand participation in political activities.65

The modernizing society is often plural in its structure. It includes so many

groups, religious, racial, ethnic and linguistic groups. Such groups either became

parts of political system or assumed a role of political community to modernize

the society and assimilation of social and political groups which is a major

institutional means for developing political parties and political dispensation. Thus

the changes brought by the modernization are addressed by party system.66 Ethnic

conflict has very old history but its intensity in recent years is directly related to

modern state. The state interprets ethnic and national appraisals as a dissent voice

for provincial autonomy. If the state is not responsive to their demands they take

extreme measures and some time they try to create state within the state.67 The

emergence of Bangladesh on the world horizon is the classic example. The

Modern state is an instrument of capitalist expansion has played very important

role in the spread of modernity. It was European colonial states which first

introduced these colonies and later on these colonies attained independence These

states took it upon itself to launch modernization.68 The state is essentially an

institution for managing and mediating class relations to maintain the dominance

of the some over the other.69 The modern state is rigidly centralized, having one

language one culture and one nation.70 K.K. Aziz points ten conditions which

develop a faction and stages in its evolution. They are

• Group feeling

• Love for fellow national

• Animosity to other groups

27 • Territory

• Desire for independent Government.

• Social Ideas

• Culture

• Religion

• History

• Character All these factors form its spiritual basis and the ultimate level of

development portrays the sentiments of nationalism, pride, devotion to national

cause and desire to achieve greatness in future. 71

The state as major source of political power and as the largest employer in

pre-industrial societies stimulates the rise of ethnic and regional movements

because of industrialism. The modern state has already started before the process

industrialization only makes the process of turning societies into homogenous

social and political units.72 Hamza Alvi gives some factors that help emergence of

opposition in the post colonial societies. In case of Pakistan the military-

bureaucratic oligarchy is recruited on the basis of regional, ethnic and social basis

so it has a distinct importance in the post-colonial state. And the groups belonging

to middle classes, having no role in military-led oligarchy try to form opposition.

Moral ideologies and principles are invoked to get the support of common people.

Both ruling elite and the opposition to it, follow this mean to justify their political

and class interests. That is why the politics of these post-colonial states are

dominated by linguistic, ethnic, origin, cast and religion differences. Slogans

against the culturally and ethnically dominant factions in military-led oligarchy

are common tools used by opposition.73

28 Some scholars have pointed out the role of elite in the development and emergence of the opposition. The common masses are mobilized and led by elitist groups for their vested interest to reach the helm of power.74 Muslim political elite used Islamic ideology in order to get into power which arose from economic and social compulsion.75 In some countries ethnic groups become motivated and assume the role of the opposition to government for the reason that in such countries different ethnic groups are mixed up but in some states these ethnic groups live in isolated areas of the country. 76 Many examples can be quoted for this type of opposition but the most significant one is the dismemberment of East

Pakistan. There were a distinct geographical and demographical composition of the people of East Pakistan who were in a clear majority in the state of Pakistan.

When the ruling elite of the state of Pakistan did not meet their demands for rights and provincial autonomy turned into struggle for a separate state.77 There are various stages of the development of opposition. At the primary stage the faction appears in an aggravated manner to the ruling elites. Popular personalities played a role to use the anger of these factions. These factions to be called political parties but they are deprived of fabric of organization and social support which are observed in the constituent party of well-established and mature political posture.

Such political parties dominated the 18th century politics in Europe and America.

These political parties mainly depend on personalities that are prone to decay and change such parties are inherently conservative. The leaders of the parties boast the people due to their struggle for the rights of the people.78 New factions and social groups emerged and become part of the political parties and the breaking of old factionalism gave a turning point in the development of opposition. The pattern of factional politics must change so as to give incentives and motivation

29 for factional leaders to expand their political participation and increase their political activities. So long as multiple groups go on competing, there are very few chances that they would expand their political participation. They try to appeal the people of opposite faction but in this scheme of gaining priority faction tries to make alliances with multiplicity of groups and divisions pave way to work out and plan new strategies. This leads to factional mergence and polarization.

Consequently they are portioned into two strong and stable groupings or the emergence of one powerful group which overpowers other groups. Once the political players in the system are committed to one side the leaders of each side are strongly and forcefully encouraged to opposition leaders to devise and plan such organizational linkages only when these actions are necessary to achieve highly desired goals. These goals are normally the conquest of power and re orientation and restructuring of the society. To diminish the absolute powers of the exploitative rulers the revolutionary and nationalist movements try to destroy the existing system. The genuine social revolutionary movements in oppressed nations put the nationalist character as the central point of their struggle.79

These leaders expand their political thoughts and views to build up support against the present government they also want support so that they are able to produce strong opposition party to organize the participation.80 Mobilization and organization are process as for acquiring or building power. The parties developed on this pattern mostly work in western political system. This transition from faction politics to party politics and ever-growing competition between the parties is directly related to upsurge of political participation. In this form of politics two leaders of the group within existing system take the lead in expanding the system involves least discontinuity in political evolution.81 Constitutional setup, political

30 culture, social and economic system, electoral setup and the state of conflict between opposition and government are the major features in a democratic dispensation. The strength and weakness of the opposition is based to a fair extent on the political party system of that country. In a unilateral part system opposition lies within the party itself and external opposition has a least role to play, as in the

Communist system. Various groups within party raised their dissident, provided level of freedom of expression. These groups may also have rights of expression at parliamentary level. There were some organized factions within Russian

Bolshevik party, Italian Fascist Party and German Nazi Party.82 On the other hand two party systems like the one existing in the Great Britain answerable to a larger public. The constitutional role of opposition is described adequately as the role of government.83 Two or more than two parties which have a reasonable representation in society can alter and modernize the political process, although in dominant party system state is run by one dominant party. There is a fair chance of monopolization of politics by dominant party, so it should relate sensitively with other political functioning groups. 84 With the passage of time, the vote bank of the minor parties’ raises and the dominant parties are bound to adjust its policies and practices and accommodate the members of minor parties in the system. Owing their distinct agendas minor parties confront the dominate party instead of competing one another. The existence of dominant party also affects the role and nature of the opposition. If the domination is prolonged and repressive the opposition is likely to become impotent, uninteresting and colorless. Sometime therefore if opposition is kept away from the power, it assumes the violent and extremist attitude. When the ruling party rules for a long time uncontested then the opposition emerges within the party.85 In Pakistan Muslim League which was the

31 dominant and major party among minor parties till 1954 faced many challenges.

The internal rifts in a party paved way for the formation of another party. Thus the internal opposition leads to the staunch opposition from within. 86 When a single party does not win majority in elections and there is close contest in the elections which lead to multi-party system. Coalition governments are formed with the support of smaller parties.87

In General election 2008 no party in Pakistan gained majority to formulate government. PMLN and Pakistan People Party emerged as two major parties and they formed coalition government in center as well as in the province. But later on

PML N drew itself from the government and Pakistan People Party formed government by forging alliances with ANP, MQM and Pakistan Muslim League

Q. In multiparty government, different parties may move back and forth from the government if the difference in policies emerges. Recently JUI, Fazal Ur Rehman has quitted the coalition government due to differences on policy issues. 88

As Angela Burger points bout:

“in a multiparty system the line of demarcation is not clear and so the institutional form of the opposition is not stable. Since shifting majorities support the government’s distinction between the government and the opposition disappears. As the opposition is composed of various elements, therefore it lacks organization in the functioning, as it is difficult to get assent from its different elements. In a multiparty system the opposition tends to indulge in massive and scathing criticism and promises since it has limited prospects of coming into power and the differences and animosities are acute among them to offer any clear alternatives to the public” 89

Although the parties in coalition support the practical day to day functions and policies of government but when it comes to repugnant to their ideologies they oppose the policies initiated by majority party in the coalition. Governments and political systems based on multi-parties are more vulnerable for military

32 interventions as compared to strong modernized dominate party system. 90 Big strong parties act in more logical and organized manner but small parties are less flexible and independent in decision making than strong parties in two-party system or dominant party system. In such type of system one to one relationships tends to exist between social forces and political parties.91 The multiple party system as a whole is therefore changeable but not stable. Political parties rise and fall over the time with changes in the social structure. Each party in the beginning seems to be indication and herald of change, reforms and progress because they embody the interests of a new emerging social force. Multi-party system has the capacity to assimilate various social groups, both in power and opposition to it.

These bi-polar groups develop a modernized political system. 92

Multi-party system is currently being practiced in New Zealand, Denmark ,

Norway and Sweden some Asian and African countries also experiencing the multi-party system. This system is also working and being followed in

Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Some of these Asian countries are facing very sensitive problem in the form of military intervention and military coup. Their political system has faced disintegration and failed to develop consensus on major issues in politics. In single party system the political leadership often dominates social groups and social forces. On the other hand in a multiparty system the social groups and forces dominate the political parties.93 These parties try to win peoples support by developing appealing manifesto and development plan which can bring real and practical change in life of the masses but political parties and social groups enjoy a reasonable equilibrium in the two party system. Thus there is rationality and logic in two-party system but it is political logic rather than the social one and it is grounded as much in the need for political stability as in the

33 attraction of popular choices and preferences and democratic liberties. 94

Opposition can perform in more vigilant manner if its internal structure and dynamics are reasonably strong. Rifts in the party ranks can adversely affect the role of opposition party. The classic example of high level of internal party unity and integration can be quoted in British two-party parliamentary system. On the other hand with low internal party unity example of USA can be relevant. New

Zealand, Sweden and India are other examples of high level of internal party unity. Pakistan, Italy and France can be categorized as systems with low internal party unity. 95

The government and the opposition compete and struggle against each other in the parliament and in elections thus, the form of government, Parliamentary or

Presidential determine the nature, space and role of the opposition. In United

States of America where Presidential system two parties engage in ferocious tug- of-war to take precedence over the other party the same approach and pattern can be seen in congressional elections. But in the congress party cohesion is fragile and weaker than the United Kingdom where strong parliamentary system is operating and this system has a unique history and passed through many ups and downs but it has managed to survive in multiparty system. Moreover parties may not be strictly competitive even during the election.96 Parliament is an important forum where the relations between opposition and government are significant besides the institution of elections. Sometimes even the floor of the parliament presents a picture of election campaign as much of the time spent in the parliament on long speeches and irrelevant debates for scoring points rather than paying attention on the problems of the people. Parliament also plays a role of publicity of the important decision making to attract the voters from both sides.

34 The conflicts between opposition and treasury benches in House of Commons are an important part of the functions.97 The role of opposition is appreciable as it emphasizes on public opinion in policy making instead of bureaucracy. On the issue of securing number of seats political parties are highly competitive as the seats in parliament are fixed and mean winning of one seat by one opposition party is the loss of the other. On the issues of formation of government, vote of confidence or no confidence, legislations and budgetary matters opposition is highly strict and competitive whereas on the issues of minor importance parties are not as competitive, even some of the legislations are carried out unanimously.98

The forgone discussion sustained the existence and role of the opposition in democratic form of government. There can be no democracy if there is no genuine and effective opposition in the system. Role of opposition is extremely vital to keep the system on the right track and also to keep it going but it should never be forgotten that the opposition certainly has disadvantage and suffers because opposition is not a commanding end. The opposition has to face certain disadvantages they include that the opposition has the opposing duty and role to perform which is to be highly critical of the government policies and got to be responsible at the same time. Because any misconceived movement on the behalf of the opposition may cause huge loss to parliamentary democracy as well as to the country as it happened with Pakistan in 1971. When Awami league led by

Mujibur Rehman demanded separate country for the Bengalis and had successful eventually.99 Traditionally government has resources and machinery at its back call to prove relief and comfort to win the heart and the soul of the people whereas opposition has nothing to offer but only ideas and views to console and appease

35 the growing frustration of the people in the time of trial and tribulation.

Government takes measures to marginalize opposition parties by depriving them of equal access to media and financial resources.100 Another limitation of the opposition is that it has no financial and material resources to offer incentives to the masses. Similarly the party and portion of the power works strengthening the ranks of the government but there are always fraction, cracks and loopholes in the ranks of the opposition and opposition leaders have no desperate remedy to put cure on these pitfalls.101 Governments of developing states use highhanded tactics to undermine the role and influence of opposition. These ruling governments take repressive, underrate and sometime unlawful measures to restrict the opposition to play its role in parliament and even in elections. As compared to government opposition has limited resources which affect its performance especially in the election campaign. On the contrary government has reasonably effective machinery at its back and call to further its policies and designs. The opposition does not have an effective access to information as the government does.

Government can collect any information from its any department. On the contrary opposition’s limited sources of information create hindrances in its legislative business as various bills and other functions to present the shadow planning to government policies requires related information. The major divergence between government and opposition is conflict with principles: conflict with basic principles and conflicts over subsidiary principles.

Opposition and ruling parties in America are at loggers-head as the competing teams do. One holding the office one, the other is seeking to dismantle and dislodge it. It is persistent crosses ongoing and continuous battle between the ins and outs but this struggle never crosses the boundaries of democratic set-up.

36 Government renders opposition almost to its non-existence, and opposition is unable to play any significant role. Then the role of the opposition is diminished in the country.102

The division of political parties in UK is based on ideological and social matters. On the issues of trade, commerce, defense and foreign policy and both

Liberals and Conservative parties represent two opposite groups and thus division between the two parties can be seen in term of the division existing in the British society. Both parties are always in the agreement on the basic rules of the game and both of them allow each other to survive and live with peace. The opposition in United Kingdom has solidity, conviction and confidence that can hardly be attained by the opposition in the U.S.A. No party has crazed for year’s monopoly and totality, which gives the strength to the government.103 In France, Italy

Belgium, Netherlands role of opposition may be more critical for the nature and future of the government. The communist parties opposite to western democracy do not agree with pluralizing of parties, which they replace with a single party governments in communist countries. They do not recognize any role of the opposition as well as right of freedom of expression and protest. The non communist countries do not approve the one party system or authoritarian view of ruling party. The competitiveness of various segments of society regarding the solution of comparatively significant problems and their explicit framework helps emergence of political opposition. Suppression of opposing voices in opposition leads to deadly fight between opposition and ruling party which leads to the repression one of the party. Opposition has a day to day role to play as one of the two key players of parliament in the conventional manner. The role of opposition in two party systems is more crucial, UK is the classical instance.

37 Due to this role opposition enjoy distinction in the existing system. In Great

Britain the present model is classical one and the singularity of this is specifically symbolized by its very name Royal opposition. 104

Although government and opposition remain engaged in lethal battle and try to outclass each other, because both are supposed to play role of different nature. But when government and opposition feel that the system is in danger by the crises from within they forget their differences and grievances and put up stone wall resistance to thwart the nefarious designs of the anti-democratic forces.

Both government and the opposition parties have set up the example of such unification, whenever they sensed any danger to political system of the country.105

Some other factors that effects the nature and strength of opposition is the political culture of the country. Political culture is made up of the existing rival political parties interact with each other and the inherent structures of the parties.

International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines Political culture as

"set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system". It encompasses both the political ideals and operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product of both the history of a political system and the histories of the members. Thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experience”.106

Political behavior of different institutions of a state largely based on the historical continuation and orientation of its people. Thus political culture is distinct in various countries. The opposition is based on orientation towards masses, political system, cooperation and consensus and problem solving.

Orientation towards political system is based on trust, loyalty and collective

38 approach towards solution of the problems.107 To provide objective criticism and presenting practical alternatives to the policies of the government in office is the prime duty of a responsible opposition. If this role of opposition is effectively carried out it provides ruling party an opportunity for setting realistic goals and pursue them relentlessly without creating too much fuss. Due to the role of opposition the ruling government remains responsive to the common men and aware of its own shortcomings in operationalizing its own agenda. 108

Society is a group of people living together having common interests, objectives, social values and reliance upon each other. Such groups of people need political credentials, coordination, command and control and correlation among themselves. A political, economic, cultural and social characteristic of a state is formed by the government. Government is inheritable to the existence of civilized society. Some people exercise the power to perceive, administer and customize the rule of law. 109 The word ‘government’ and its ‘governance’ comes from

Greek word ‘Kyberman’ which means to steer, to exercise continuous authority, to direct and administration of policy, to rule and to control.110 It relates different departments of the society like security, education, health, employment, foreign affairs, tax collection, developmental projects, rule of law etc. Government manages and supervises social interests of the people living in specific territory having common sovereignty, language and culture. Government normally consists of legislators, administrator, and arbitrators. This is also a systematic framework by which state policy is implemented, as well as the mechanism for determining the state policy. Without a strong government, society becomes “Banana

Republic” and anarchic.111 Development and surge of human wisdom changed institutionalization process and institutions organized naive and advance patterns

39 of the government. Government of any manifestation affects every human activity. Objectivity in the consistent development of the governmental pattern was always aimed at devolution of power from few people to more. Initially very few people had quality to govern any country and monarchical governments were formed. In Episcopal112 form of government, one person or very few people had to finalize destiny of the whole society. Description of the government is mainly based upon the attributes where decision making power is held. Clash between

Aristocratic attributes an Kakistocracy (government under the control of a nation's worst or least-qualified citizens) 113 has always been present in the history. In nobility one bloodline governs the state. Aristocracy was also another pattern of the government in which elite citizens rule and they are chosen on the basis of different parameters. The pattern in which wise, innovative and intelligent people of a community rule is called Geniocracy.114 Then came a stage in the history in which physically strong, cunning and powerful persons started ruling the state, it was called Karatocracy.115 When human history took another plunge, people started enacting their governments on the basis of people’s ability, knowledge in a peculiar area and contribution to the society, such model was known as

Mentocracy. 116 People were also awarded with the government on the basis of honour and prestige. In this constitutional theory only property owners may participate in the function of government, such model was called Timocracy.117

When human society stepped in specialization era, Technocracy emerged where technical experts, proficient and talented people like doctors, engineers, professionals, technologists and scientists were given the governing role.

Furthermore one pattern has sub-patterns like Autocracy also formed Despotism, dictatorship, Fascism. Monarchy also passed through different periods absolute

40 monarchy, constitutional monarchy, diarchy, elective monarchy, emirate, federal monarchy etc.118 There came some authoritarian governments where a specific set of people possess the authority of the state in a republic or union. Under this system unelected rulers give some degree of individual freedom. In totalitarian governments highly centralized and coercive authority grabs legislative, executive and judicial system under one person or group of people. Throughout these models role or existence of regular constitutional opposition was out of scene.

Military/Junta is a form of rule when ambitious military officers seized power in the country.119 Pakistan is a notable instance of Junta rule in South Asia as it experienced more than half of the years under the military junta rule from its inception.

When a regime allows multi-party system, it gives voice to opposition.

Democracy is the most popular form of government specifically in the west and some eastern countries that have been influenced by the historical developments of West are remained under western rule. Democracy is an attribute of the government devised by the people using their votes or ballots. Democracy is the result of industrial revolution. 120 Etymologically the word democracy was derived in 1570s, from Middle French democratic (14th century), from Medieval Latin democratic from Greek democratic “Popular government” from ‘demos’ common people rule. 121 Democracy provides an opportunity to the people to choose their representatives to run the government, with responsibility to maintain their rights against probable violation by the incumbent government.122

The essence of democracy is populism and public opinion. This vitality of democracy lies in giving representation to the common people in formation of government. Democracy is a name of structure of political system. Athenian

41 democracy got customized around the fifth century BC in the Greek city-state

(known as polis) of Athens and the affiliated territory of Attica. Athens is the first known democracy. That political structure was ‘direct democracy’ in which people participating in legislation and executive bill. The voting rights were only restricted with the male adults.123 Sometimes poets and other humorous actors also influence the mind of the electorates. 124 The democracy that lasted for long time was the democracy of Pericles, the influential generals who were very popular orators as well, during the golden age of Greece.125. After the death of Pericles,

Athenian democratic government was briefly interrupted two times by oligarchic revolutions towards the end of the Peloponnesian Wars.126 Oligarchy swept away the people’s government. The Macedonians oppressed democratic government in

322 BC. The Athenian government was reformed but its resemblance with the real democracy is debatable.127 In democracies, larger portion of society either make decisions to elect their representatives to decide public matters. Different political parties present different ideas to tackle socio-political and economic problems of the people. One of the democratic attribute is “Demarchy in which the country is ruled by indiscriminately selected persons either from the eligible citizens or different juries. Demarch solves problems of conventional representative democracy which is widely subject to manipulation by interest groups. It also divides society into active and wise citizens verses a large majority of passive uninvolved and uninformed electorate.128 The key distinction between a democracy and other constitutional forms of government is that the right to vote is not restricted with wealth, religion color, caste and any other natural difference.

For this very purpose principle of Universal Adult Franchise is the best instance.

Country is divided into different ‘constituencies’ and ‘electoral colleges’ where

42 governments are formed by a simple one-vote-per-persons head count.129 One other variant of democracy is ‘liberal democracy’ in which representatives operate under the principle of liberalism. It clearly needs free, fair and transparent elections among different parties. Government operates in different branches and departments of democracy for mostly safeguards human rights & civil liberties for all people without any sort of discrimination. There may be different constitutional forms in liberal forms of democracy. Italy, USA, Germany, India,

Ireland, France are the examples of constitutional republics under liberal democracy. 130 In representative democracy, people elect their representatives and then representatives implement, form and enforce public policy. Social democracy rejects the polarization of capitalism and socialism. It fosters the gradual evolution of capitalism into socialism.131 Public services such as food, education, health, employment etc are provided by the government.132 During the ancient monarchies and even in ancient Athenian democracies the role of opposition was neither defined, nor institutionalized. Under monarchies and autocracies, opposition was not even imagined. As a result of which government either kept on fighting rivals or governments were ousted by rival political groups. It caused political suffocation. Popular democracy gave legal and constitutional status to opposition. Rather the elements against the ruling elite were given channel to play role within the system. Hence opposition became inevitable part of democracy.

Even we can say that role of opposition authenticated democracy. ‘If there is no opposition, there is no democracy.133 Post-colonial countries suffered from political instability only due to the absence of opposition. In democracy the opposition has a pivotal role to play and legal powers to exercise. Proper and explicit form of opposition in those countries where there is multi-party scenario.

43 In a parliamentary form of government a party or group of like-minded parties form the government and remains in power as long as it retains the confidence of popularly elected leader known as leader of the opposition. Opposition also enjoys legal and constitutional rights and opposes government where it finds suitable. In case of protestation of opposition public opinion is very much affected. The opposition acts as a watch dog of the system.134 Under monarchical government and Stratocracy (Military Dictatorship) all the legislative, executive and judicial powers fall under one person or group of mighty people, that’s why role of opposition is negligible within that system. Such political scenario creates agitation among the masses and political leaders gather masses against the government. Movement against General Ayub Khan in 1968-69, movement against General Zia (MRD) and movement against General Musharaf are the examples of such opposition movements in Pakistan. 135

The developments of democratic institutions are influenced by the historical, demographic, socio-economic, cultural and traditional factors of the society. Societies which exercised dictatorships, lack democratic attitude.

Democracy is highly and inevitably influenced by the economic interests of the common people. People, who become economically free, can play their role freely in devising democratic system.

1.4 Development of Early Opposition in Pakistan

When new state of Pakistan was formed in 1947 the institutional development was unbalanced. Political parties were so weak and vulnerable against the strong and well organized civil-military bureaucratic oligarchy. Due to the weak political system military-led oligarchy filled the vacuum. 136

44 Perceived and real security threats from India raised the necessity and development of military bureaucracy and thus major part of resources was decided to be invested on security.137 Domination of civil-military bureaucracy needs weak political parties, stronger the political parties weaker would be the establishment. In the early days, the main opposition political party in the constituent Assembly was the Pakistan National Congress.138 PNC was made on communed secular lines instead of religious discrimination like Muslim League.

There was no considerable room for the opposition to grow and play role inside the constituent Assembly due to the dominant role of Muslim League as the founder party of the country, so opposition entered in provincial assemblies through provincial elections and developed their provincial leanings in the respective provinces. Opposition got representation in 1954 after the dissolution of first constituent assembly and formation of new assembly from the provinces.139 As no party got majority to form government, PML formed government with the United Front on 11th August 1955. In 1956, first Constitution was formed and the role of opposition was recognized. The second largest party was designated as opposition by recognizing the formal role of opposition.

Constitution also envisages that the leader of the opposition would be granted certain allowances and privileges from the national exchequer.140 Then opposition leader Hussain Shaheed Shurawardy ousted Muslim League’s government by forming coalition with Republican Party.141 Then changing of governments so frequently led to the imposition of Martial Law in the country in 1958.142 Ayub

Khan remained in power as a military dictator for about ten years (1958-1969).

There was no considerable room for opposition to carry out its constitutional role during Ayub’s rule. Ayub raised slogan of modernization. From 1958 to 1962,

45 Ayub Khan governed the country as the Martial law administrator and then from

1962 to 1965 as President after withdrawal of martial law in 1962. In his first phase different ‘ulema’ turned against him due to is modernization agenda.143 In the second phase of controlled democracy he reversed his agenda of modernization. Ulema became his opposition during the first phase. 144 The powerful and dominant players of the state during Ayub era were the military, civil bureaucracy and Ayub Khan himself backed by Americans. 145 Opposition was the subordinate player which had marginalized functions till March 1969.

After March 1969 opposition became stronger in internal political affairs in

Pakistan. But the real opposition was to the exploitative system, outside the assemblies. These key factors changed Ayub’s relations with other stakeholders.

Ayub-Bhutto conflict, Ayub-US government, and Ayub - Yahya rivalries changed the fortune of Ayub Khan from success to failure after March 1969.146 Z.A Bhutto radicalized the masses after 1966 in the Western wing of the country which led to the Ayub Khan’s fall from power.147 In 1962 Ayub’s constitution, there was no place for political parties in Pakistan’s political life. This suppression also ignited the masses against Ayub. One of other reasons behind the military’s move against

Ayub was that since 1958, Pakistani Army was enjoying 60% budget out of annual national Budget.148 The allocation of jute exports earnings from center

(West Pakistan) to East Pakistan seriously affected Army’s budget.149 These factors led to a massive movement against Ayub. In March 1971 Pakistan Army decided to disperse Mujib and Awami league through power. It changed the socio political conflict into inter-state military conflict. Pakistan Army accused India of instigating and arming guerillas in East Pakistan. This led to Pak-India war in

December 1971.150 Since 1966 Bhutto and other political forces emphasized the

46 assurance of provincial autonomy and general election on Universal Adult

Franchise Basis. In 1969-70 Yahya khan after taking over the country, accepted the need of general election and abortion One Unit Scheme.151 Bhutto’s Pakistan

People’s Party used the slogan of Islamic socialism, democracy and interfaith harmony and swept polls in Western wing of the country, especially Punjab and

Sind. Whereas Awami League secured simple majority in National Assembly butt all seats from Eastern Wing. During March-December 1971 there was three-way struggle between Army, PPP and Awami league. Bhutto and Junta under Yahya also made coalition in certain constitutional matters. 152 Even in the past Bhutto was part of establishment but the movement of 1968-69, predominantly a class movement, gave birth to a new political scenario in the country and PPP under

Bhutto led the movement in the Western Wing of the country.153

During the Bhutto era starting from December 1971 to July 1977, Bhutto challenged the status-quo and the foundations of democratic and constitutional political system were laid down. After the breakup of Pakistan and defeat of

Pakistan Army, Pakistan went into identity, and psychological crisis. Bhutto supported Army against Mujib and Banglis. It contributed into Bhutto’s elevation to the power.154 Bhutto’s secularism aggravated many Islamic parties. Jamat-e-

Islami started mobilizing radical Muslims against Bhutto’s secular policies towards religion.155 Bhutto’s nationalization Policy challenged the monopoly of capitalists, industrialists and his agrarian reforms challenged the feudal lords. All these groups turned against Bhutto and never lost a single chance to harm

Bhutto’s government. Invincible hands started playing role from the very beginning. Bhutto adopted nationalization policy because in the Ayub regime wealth and economic resources were concentrated in few hands. Just after two

47 month of being in office in January 1972 the government nationalized 32 industries from the private sectors. In 1973, 26 vegetable ghee units were nationalized. Banks were also nationalized in 1974. Then in 1976 small scale production units were also nationalized.156 All those who were affected by that policy used all their resources to oust Bhutto’s government. Bhutto was the first leader who took practical steps to revise the socio-economic contract and evolved the country from free market to mixed economy.157 Moreover, bureaucracy did not want national institutions to be nationalized. So it vexed Bhutto’s reforms because interests of civil and military bureaucracy were linked with land-lords and capitalist class. Nationalization policy always plunders the interest of monopolies, oligarchies and trans-national institutions. Invincible hands patronized the opposition to destabilize Bhutto. Apart from some other causes, Bhutto was firm to transform capitalism into socialism through transition. 158 As a political leader always compromises, so did Bhutto to embody all factions of the society. Bhutto’s regionalism, his collaboration with anti-American leaders of Middle East especially made USA conspire against Bhutto.159 Foreign elements also played vital role to strengthen opposition’s unjust and inappropriate movement. Bhutto was surrounded by many opportunists who had no competence to give useful to him. Bhutto’s autocratic style also poured oil on the fire. Bhutto’s decision to use force against his political rivals, enlarged the gulf between his regime and opposition parties. Instead of relying totally on political solutions, Mr. Bhutto himself let military to meddle in his affairs.160 Bhutto threatened his opposition parties of using force and calling army to maintain law and order. On the one hand, he wanted to bring military under civil rule for that very purpose he took many steps and role of army was also institutionalized and constitutionalized.

48 Bhutto brought many changes in military top leadership boldly. It is stated with firm conviction that Bhutto made efforts to bring army under civil rule and he succeeded to a great extent. But when he started to involve army in political affairs, he got into troubles.161 Just after General Zia imposed Martial law, he denationalized all the industries. It shows that military, capitalist class, religious clerics and bureaucracy joined hands against Bhutto as the later challenged their class interests by introducing radical reformist program. The role of opposition against Bhutto, in a way, was unconstitutional. After General Zia abrogated the law, all factions of opposition got share in his cabinet, which clearly shows that opposition against Bhutto was not striving for democracy, rule of law and stability but to get the industries released, removal of their arch rival who severely affected the interests of the elitist partners ruling the country before him. General Zia inculcated religious radicalism in army to pave the course of coalition between

Army and religious extremism.162 Actually this plot was mapped by USA to fight against USSR. Turmoil by the religious parties against Bhutto resulted into active role of Pakistan Army and jihadist against USSR. Bangladesh was departed from

Pakistan for the above mentioned purpose too. Had Bangladesh been the part of

Pakistan, USA and Pakistan Army would not have been used in Afghan War.163

Bhutto mentioned in his speech to national Assembly that the turmoil was being used by USA against him.164

On the other hand, after seizure of power by army under General Zia once again, the political forces joined hands for the restoration of democracy and rule of law. For this purpose, Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) was formed in 1981 with PPP of Bhutto as major party along with other parties, mostly of left leaning.165 During the tyrannical rule of General Zia the role of opposition

49 was diminished through draconian measures against opposition. Despite highhandedness of the military regime of General Zia, opposition MRD rendered great sacrifices for the restoration of democracy. A large number of political workers were hanged, kept behind the bars, made victim of public flogging by the military regime, even women were arrested and baton charged for their role in demonstrations for the restoration of democracy. Rule of law and human rights were brutally violated at massive scale. Almost all the major leaders of MRD including Benazir Bhutto were kept in jails for years. MRD boycotted the presidential referendum and non-party based elections held by the military regime in 1984 and 1985 respectively. Even after the inception of a so-called parliament the opposition MRD continued its struggle. Details of opposition struggle against

General Zia will be mentioned in Chapter 5.

Bhutto’s ascendency in power, his policies which lead to emergence of a severe opposition against him will be discussed in the next chapter.

50 NOTES & REFERENCES

1 Shaukat Masud Zafar.Rising Inequality in Pakistan, The Pakistan Spectator, Islamabad. November ,6, 2010. Accessed At: http://www.pkhope.com/rising-inequality-in-pakistan/ 2 S N Eisenstadt, Readings in social evolution and development. (New York, Pergamon Press, 1970), 295 3 Fred R Von der Mehden, Politics of the developing nations. (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs Prentice- Hall, 1964), 1. 4 Ibid., 24. 5 Angela Sutherland Burger,Opposition in a dominant-party system; a study of the Jan Sangh, the Praja Socialist Party, and the Socialist Party in Uttar Pradesh, India.(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 15. 6 Kari Palonen, The Struggle with Time. 2nd edition: A Conceptual History of 'politics' as an activity. (London: Transaction Publisher, 2006), 143. 7 David Crystal. The Cambridge Encyclopedia New York 1990. pp882 8 Leonard Schapiro,Political opposition in one-party States.(New York: Wiley Publishers, 1972), 15. 9 E K Brown; Sarah Ogilvie,Concise encyclopedia of languages of the world .(Boston : Elsevier, 2009), 453. 10 Gilbert Champion British government since 1918. ( London : 1950),.9 11 Norman Wilding; Phillip Laundy,An encyclopedia of Parliament : With a foreword by the viscount Halvern, (London, 1958), 498. 12 Robert Dahl, Political Opposition in Western Democracies, (London: New Heaven Publishers: 1966), 16. 13 Ibid., 17. 14 UNO’s Report on Benazir Bhutto’s Assassination. 50. Accessed at: https://www.google.com.pk/UNO Report on Benazir Bhutto Assassination 15 Michal Kubat, Political Opposition in Theory. (London: Peter Lang, 2010), 29. 16 Ibid., 25. 17 Janina Frentzel-Zagorska, From a one-party state to democracy : transition in Eastern Europe .(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993), 117 18 Sarina Singh, Pakistan & the Karakoram Highway.(London : Lonely Planet, 2008), 34 .19 Lal Khan. Pakistan’s Other Story. ( Lahore: The Struggle Publications, 2008), 128. 20 H Gorden Skilling, Crisis and Change in Czechoslovakia. Accessed at: http://ijx.sagepub.com/content/23/3/456.extract 21 Ivor Jennings,Cabinet government. ( London: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 15. 22 Ibid., 19. 23 Ruth Wilson Gilmore,Golden gulag : prisons, surplus, crisis, and opposition in globalizing California. (Berkeley : University of California Press, 2007),30. 24 Larry Jay Diamond; Marc F Plattner, The global resurgence of democracy. (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press,1996),40. 25 Adam Przeworsk, Democracy in a Russian Mirror. ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 176 26 R. Jayaprakash, Role of Opposition in the Legislature: A Study on the Role of the Opposition in the Kerala Legislative Assembly.(Kerala: Institute for the Study of Public Policy and Management, 1990), 9 27 Richard Hofstadter, The idea of a party system; the rise of legitimate opposition in the United States, 1780-1840.( Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969), 265 28 Ibid., 48. 29 Gurmukh Pam Madan,India of Tomorrow: problems of social reconstruction .(Bombay : Allied Publishers, 19750, 163 30 Ludger Helms, Parliamentary Opposition in Old and New Democracies, (London: Oxford University Press, 2013), 248. 31 Jennings cabinet, government, 435. 32Kevin Tan,The Singapore Legal System/Singapore : Singapore University Press, 1999),87

51 33 George Klosko, Democratic Procedures and Liberal Consensus .(New York : Oxford University Press, 2000), 43 34 Martin H. Manser, The Facts on File Dictionary of Proverbs .(New York : Facts on File, 2002.),225 35 Jennings cabinet, government, 439. 36 Gustaaf Houtman,Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics, (Hanoi: Chang li Publishers, 1999), 441. 37 W N Coxall, Pressure Groups in British Politics.(New York : Longman, 2001), 165 38 Bryan M Evans; Charles W Smith,Transforming provincial politics : the political economy of Canada’s provinces and territories in the neoliberal era. (Toronto : University of Toronto Press,2015), 268 39 Juan J Linz; Alfred C Stepan,The Breakdown of democratic regimes. (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press,1978),123 . 40 Harold Joseph Laski, Parliamentary government in England; a commentary, (New York, Viking Press, 1938), 165. 41 Peter J. Cullen, Klaus H. Goetz,Constitutional Policy in Unified Germany.(London: Frank Cass, 1995),121 42 Takeshi Ishida, Ellis S. Krauss, Democracy in Japan.( Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989),156 43 Opposition welcomed the first Martial Law imposed by president Skandar Mirza in connivance with General Ayub Khan the then Army Chief, when Gen Zia ul Haq imposed Martial Law after a rigorous movement by Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), almost all opposition parties were included in the military dictatorial regime of Zia Ul Haq, in 1999 when General Pervez Musharaf imposed Martial Law a larger segment of Pakistan Muslim League-N, the part which was ousted from the government by Musharaf, joined his ruling coalition by naming itself as Pakistan Muslim League -Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q). during the decades of 80s and 90s military played its role in connivance with the opposition to deposed the successive governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, though did not come in power directly. 44 Carol Diane St Louis,Negotiating change: approaches to and the distributional implications of social welfare and economic reform. ( PhD Dissertation submitted to Stanford University. Department of Political Science, 2011), 265 45 Laski, Parliamentary government, 167. 46 Ibid., 175. 47 Hayat Singh Fartyal, Role of the opposition in the Indian Parliament, (Allahabad : Chaitanya Press, 1971), 13. 48 Ibid., 43. 49 Ibid., 48. 50 Laski Parliamentary government, 164 51 Ibid., 167. 52 Lesley Jeffries, Oppositionin discourse: the construction of oppositional meaning. (New York : Continuum,2010),169. 53 Ibid., 170. 54 A S Narang, Ethnic identities andfederalism.(Shimla : Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1995), 22 55 David ApterSome reflection on the role of political opposition in New Nations Berkeley : Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1962), 144. 56 Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Luis Serven,The economics of saving and growth : theory, evidence, and implications for policy.(New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999), 154 57 Fartyal, Role of the opposition in the Indian Parliament, 25. 58 Ibid., 29. 59 Lal Khan, Pakistan’s Other Story, 153 60 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; T M Knox; J Sibree, The philosophy of right; The philosophy of history. (Chicago :Encyclopedia Britannica,1955),35. 61 Luigi Tomba, East Asian capitalism : conflicts, growth and crisis. (Milano : Feltrinelli, 2002),131 62 Zehra F. Arat, Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries.(Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991),59 63 Michal Kubat, Political opposition in theory and Central European practice. (New York : Peter Lang, 2010), 56 64 Michael Tuner, British Politics in an Age of Reform, Accessed from https://books.google.com.pk/books?isbn=071905186X on December 17, 2014, 57. 65 Ibid., 59.

52 66 Ibid., 65. 67 David E. Smith, Across the Aisle: Opposition in Canadian Politics, (L:ondon: Oxford University Press, 2013), 75. 68 Ibid., 81. 69 Arne Kommisrud, Historical Sociology and Eastern European Development, Accessed on https://books.google.com.pk/books?isbn=0739136348 on December 17, 2014, 89. 70 Ibid., 90. 71 Khursheed Kamal Aziz, The making of Pakistan: a study in nationalism, (London, Chatto & Windus, 1967), 12. 72 Hamza Alavi, The State in Post-colonial Societies : Pakistan and Bangladesh. ( Lahore: Sang-i- Meel, 1973), 165. 73 Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies-Pakistan and Bangladesh" in New Left Review, 74 (July-August 1972), 59-81. 74 Roger Southall, Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, (London ; Portland, OR : Frank Cass, 2001), 171. 75 Creation of Pakistan by Muslim League, dominated by elitist Muslims, can be quoted as an example of using Islamic Ideology as a tool to attract the masses. 76 Ibid., 175. 77 Diwan Ghufran Ahmad Khan, Disintegration of Pakistan.( Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1986), 49 78 Abigail Bess Baken, Critical Political Studies, Accessed from https://books.google.com.pk/books?isbn=0773522522 on December 17, 2014, 164. 79 Michael Lowy, Michael Lowy, Fatherland Or Mother Earth?: Essays on the National Question.( London: Pluto Press with the International Institute for Research and Education, 1998) 59 80 Kurt Steiner,Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan, (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1980),179. 81 Ibid .,180. 82 Paul R Brass,Language, religion and politics in North India. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).165. 83 Ibid., 87. 84 Ibid., 88. 85 Stephen Johnson, Opposition Politics in Japan: Strategies Under a One-Party Dominant Regime , (New York: Rutledge, 2013), 167. 86 Ibid., 170. 87 Nicholas John Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, Accessed from https://books.google.com.pk/books?isbn=1412817145 on December 17, 2014. 88 The Express Tribune Islamabad, December 15, 2010 89 Angela Sutherland Burger,Opposition in a dominant-party system; a study of the Jan Sangh, the Praja Socialist Party, and the Socialist Party in Uttar Pradesh, India.( Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969),19. 90 Ibid., 20 91 Clemens Spiess, Democracy and Party System in Developing Countries, (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 20. 92 Ibid., 21. 93 Brian Smith,Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development.(Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1996),117 94 Ibid. 95 Marvin D. Lugo,Waves of Opposition, Accessed from https://books.google.com.pk/books?isbn=0252073614 34 on December 17, 2014. 96 Ibid., 39. 97 Kenneth F. Greene, Why Dominant Parties Lose, Accessed from https://books.google.com.pk/books?isbn=1139466860 on December 17, 2014. 98 Bjorn Erik Rasch; George Tsebelis, The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting.(New York : Routledge, 2011),122 99 A. B. S. Jafri, The political parties ofPakistan.(Karachi: Royal Book Co., 2002 ), 116 100 Gero Erdmann, Marianne Kneuer,Regression of Democracy? (Wiesbaden : VS Verlag, 2011), 234 101 Ko Maeda, Institutions, Opposition Behavior, and the Fates of Governments in Parliamentary Democracies. (PhD Thesis submitted to Michigan State University. Department of Political Science, 2005), 57 102. Fartyal, Role of the opposition in the Indian Parliament, 24.

53 103 Ibid., 25. 104 Mark Kesselman, Introduction to Politics of the Developing World, Accessed from https://books.google.com.pk/books?isbn=0495833452 on December 17, 2014, pp35 105 Ibid., 38. 106 Political Culture. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Accessed at: https ://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Political_culture 107 Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power, (London Oxford University Press, 2001), 43. 108 Jan-Erik Lane, Comparing Party System Change, Accessed at: https://books.google.com.pk/books?isbn=1134708513 on December 17, 2014. 109 Ibid. 110 Jonas Clark, Advanced Apostolic Studies: Transitioning Every Believer Into Apostolic Ministry. ( Florida: Spirit of Life Publishers, 2002), 38 111 David Robertson,A dictionary of modern politics .(London Europa Publications 2002), 23. 112 A religiously influenced government under the Church of North America. Samuel Wilberforce,A history of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America.(London: Burns Publisher, 1844). 13. 113 wiktionary. Accessed at: https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/kakistocracy 114 Rael; Marcus Wenner; Eva Ponty,Geniocracy: government of the people, for the people, by the geniuses. (London: Nova publishers,2008), 7. 115 Badal W Ph D Kariye, Political sociology of security, politics, economics & diplomacy : quicker academic path. (London : Authorhouse, 2010), 100. 116 Fredrick B. Pike, The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature.(Austin : University of Texas Press, 1992), 107.; also se: American Heritage Dictionary of English Language (4th Edition) 117 Badal, Political sociology of security, 104 118 Ibid. 119 Badal, Political sociology of security, 101. 120 http://www.ushistory.org/us/22a.asp 121 Word Origin and History for pro-democracy. Accessed at: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pro-democracy 122 Wenche Barth Eide; Uwe Kracht, Food and human rights in development.(Antwerp : Intersentia, 2005),181 123 John Thorley, Athenian democracy. (New York : Routledge, 1996), 31. 124Henderson J. (1993) Comic Hero Versus Political Elite p307 ]. 125 https ://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Pericles 126 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peloponnesian_War 127 Clarke , PB. and Foweraker, Encyclopedia of democratic thought Roulledge, 2003, p 196 128 John Burnheim, Is democracy possible? : the alternative to electoral politics. ( Berkeley ; Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1985), 156-157. 129 Abel. M., Remade in India : political modernization in the Indian context.(Hyderabad: ICFAI University Press, 2006),117 130Lewellen, Tedc. Political Anthropology: An Introduction Third Edition, ( Washington: Praeger publishers, 3rd edition,2003) , 77. 131 Bhutto’s example...... 132 Jeffery Kopstein ,Mark Lichbach, Comparative politics interests,: identities, and institutes in a changing global order , (edited), 2nd ed, (London: Cambridge University Press, 2005,) , .4. 133 Roger Southall, Opposition and Democracy in South Africa.( London: Frank Cass, 2001), 20 134 Sunder Ram,Role of opposition Parties in Indian Politics, (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications,1992), 21. 135 Nadeem F. Paracha,Uprisings and Downfalls: Attempts at ousting Pakistani governments. http://www.dawn.com/news/1141343 136 Ghita Lonescu and Madariaga Isabelde, Opposition: Past & Present of a Political Institution. ( London : C.A Walts, 1968) , 34. 137 Kaushik Roy, Military Manpower, Armies and Warfare in South Asia. ( London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013.), 123 138 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan_National_Congress 139 Subrata Kumar Mitra; Mike Enskat; Clemens Spies, Political parties in South Asia. (Westport, CT : Praeger, 2004), 140. 140 1956 constitution) Article 9. Accessed at: http://notesonpakistan.blogspot.com/2009/05/constitution- of-1956.html

54 141 Asian Thought and Society, Volume 4, Issues 10-12. ( New Delhi: East-West Pub., 1979), 280 142M.Rafique Afzal , Pakistan: History and Politics 1947-1971. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1991). 229, 239. 143 Dr. Shaukat Ali, Pakistan: A Religio-Political Study. (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research,1997), 84. 144Sarfraz Husain Ansari,Forced Modernization and Public Policy: A Case Study of Ayub Khan Era (1958-69).Accessed at: http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/Forced_Modernization.pdf 145 Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan era; politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969.(Syracuse, N.Y.] Syracuse University Press, 1971), 63. 146,Ashok Kapur, Pakistan in Crisis. (New York: Routledge, 1991), 57, 58, 147 Ibid., 59 148 South Asia Defence and Strategic Year Book .Journal, magazine.(New Delhi : Panchsheel, 2007 2009). Accessed at: https://books.google.com.pk/books1958 Pakistani Army 60% budgetoutof annual national Budget 149 Kapur,Pakistan in crisis, 88. 150 Ibid. 151 Christophe Jaffrelot,A history of Pakistan and its origins.(London : Anthem Press, 2002),73. 152 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's drift into extremism : Allah, the army, and America's war on terror.(London : M.E. Sharpe, 2005),59. 153 Barry O Jones, Dictionary of world biography, (Melbourne: Information Australia, 1994),84. 154 James Wynbrandt, A brief history of Pakistan.(New York : Facts On File, 2008), 212. 155 Michael T Kindt; Jerrold M Post; Barry R Schneide, The world's most threatening terrorist networks and criminal gangs. (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 52. 156 The Economy of Pakistan Economics Essay. Accessed at: http://www.ukessays.com/essays/economics/the-economy-of-pakistan-economics-essay.php 157 Yasmeen Niaz Mohiuddin, Pakistan : a global studies handbook.(Santa Barbara, California : ABC- CLIO, 2007), 103. 158 Khalid B Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan : the nature and direction of change. (New York : Praeger, 1980), 87. 159 S Nihal Singh, The yogi and the bear : story of Indo-Soviet relations.(New York : Mansell Pub., 1986), 132. 160 Kapur, Pakistan in Crises, 95. 161 Ibid., 105. 162Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan : America Tortured Relationship with Islamabad, (London:Cambridge University Press), 78-79. 163 James Heitzman; Robert L Worden; Richard F Nyrop, Bangladesh : a country study.(Washington, D.C. : Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1989), 196. 164 Manzooruddin Ahmed, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, and Society.(Durham, N.C. :Carolina Academic Press, 1980), 106 165Peter R Blood, Pakistan : a country study. (Washington, D.C. : Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,1995),220.

55 CHAPTER 2

BHUTTO ‘S RISE TO POWER AND OPPOSITION AGAINST HIS REGIME

This chapter explains Bhutto’s rise to power, his relations with military

establishment, role of military to help Bhutto to come in power, various quarters of

his opposition, his egalitarian reforms and role of opposition because of those reforms

and policies. These policies were assumed to affect the interests of the major

components of the ruling establishment (Military, feudal lords, business tycoons,

religious clergy and their allies). The challenges of intra-party opposition, splits

among liberals due to his vindictive nature and the role of other forces against his

rule will be elaborated in this chapter. This Chapter will also explicit the factors that

led to the formation of opposition’s struggle against Bhutto. Political instability of

Pakistan can be explained in the person of Bhutto, his background, tenure in power,

style of governance, personal motives, style of handling various matters, reforms and

his way to deal with various quarters of opposition. After studying the Bhutto’s Era in

detail, the role of opposition against him can be well explained.1 Pakistan’s political

instability is explained in terms Bhutto’s background, his views about power,

performance, and concerns of his personal destiny.

Bhutto challenged but never seriously weakened those sections of the

Pakistani ruling elite that had been ruling before him and against whom the 1968

political upheaval was aimed. Instead he antagonized many of those amongst his

comrades as well as common people who believed him to be an anti-rich messiah who would deliver to the common people and would rescue them from poverty. Thus, on the one hand those elite classes that thought his government a threat to their interest,

formed new rank to end his rule. On the other hand, he failed to deliver what he had

promised before large political gatherings in the name of democracy and socialism

56 that led to a considerable restlessness among the masses. 2 To understand the

emergence of a sever opposition against him a glance on his personal life, his

emergence as national leader and his policies and style of governance during his five years in rule is essentially required.

2.1 Education, entrance into politics and Rise to Power

Bhutto was the only leader to sustain popular claim to be a national leader

after Quid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, as Bhutto came to be referred as Quid-i-Awam (leader of the people). Bhutto was the only charismatic

leader after Jinnah, on national level, in the Western Wing of the country.3 During his

stay at Berkeley , University of California Bhutto not only received strong footings in

international law and secured perfect position in studies but he was also the first Asian

elected to the student union council and engaged himself in a number of political and

social activities. He developed his taste for political activities and took part in the

1950’s senate campaign of Congress’s woman candidate Helan Gahasan Donglas.

Bhutto also organized an association of Pakistani students and wrote many pamphlets

supporting the new state of Pakistan, cause of Palestine and Vietnamese against the

French. He also developed his interest in socialism apparently under his mother’s

influence as she was from an ordinary family of Bombay with least privileged background.4 After returning from USA Bhutto used to participate in the movement

launched against One Unit Scheme. Getting impressed by Bhutto’s speeches during

his agitation movement H.S Surhrwardi asked Bhutto to become member of the

Awami league which Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, the father of Bhutto, refused. Bhutto

entered in to politics through elitist political (ruling establishment) against whom,

later on, he became the champion of popular democracy and socialism.5 On 27th

October, 1958 Bhutto became the minister of commerce and industries, hardly at the

57 age of 30, in the Cabinet, on the same day when Army Chief Ayub Khan took over the helm of affairs of the country from Skandar Mirza. In August 1963 Ayub Khan

awarded Bhutto the “Hilal-e-Pakistan” the highest civil award. Bhutto also paid rich tributes to Ayub Khan at various public places. In January 1963 when Muhammad Ali

Bogra the foreign minister and former prime minister expired Bhutto became the

foreign minister. During the Bogra,s sickness Bhutto informally taken over the

responsibility of looking after affairs of foreign ministry in November 1962. As

foreign minister Bhutto tried to give a new perspective to Pakistan’s foreign policy

and reformulated its priorities and alternatives.6 Bhutto after assuming the office of

foreign minister on the sudden death of Muhammad Ali Bogra in 1963, 7 tried to

reshape the Pakistan’s foreign policy from pre-dominantly pro- western to a degree of

neutrality, and developed close ties with China which annoyed Washington. Bhutto

negotiated a boarder agreement with China, Air lines operation between the two

countries and mutual trade. China also agreed to establish large industrial complex for the manufacturing of military hardware near the city of Wah. Despite the fact that

Bhutto in his book “Myth of Independence” clearly mentioned that smaller countries

could not exhorted with USA on the basis of equality but interests.8 Bhutto took up

Kashmir issue by launching public campaign against Ayub khan for what he termed

as “sell out at Tashkent to India”. Bhutto’s tactics were to keep on talking about

revealing the betrayal of Kashmiris by Ayub on signing the Tashkent Agreement. But

never to spell them out, just used as popular slogan and rhetoric to muster the support

of the people in Punjab who were predominantly having anti-India feelings.9 Unrest was evident among the youth, students, workers, lawyers, intellectuals against ten years long dictatorial regime of Ayub Khan. The unrest was mounted to its peak after the announcement by Fatima Jinnah, sister of Muhammad Ali Jinnah the founder of

58 Pakistan contest presidential election of 1965. Almost all opposition parties supported

Fatima Jinnah but the results clearly declared Ayub Khan as ‘victorious”.10 But the war between India and Pakistan in September 1965 suppressed the mounting feelings

for the time being. However, after the war ended and Tashkent Declaration was

signed Bhutto’s “populist rhetoric” on Tashkent Declaration added fuel to the

mounting feelings among the people of Pakistan, especially in the Province of

Punjab.11 He would employ this technique of attacking the opponents but never to

elaborate his charges. He would attack his opponents without giving their names but just adding by gestures his opponents’ main mark of distinction (obesity, habits, wealth. body structure etc).Though Bhutto spoke indifferent Urdu thelingua franca

of the people of the country, yet he spoke in their pronunciations. So the common

man enjoyed his serious as well as the humorous parts of his speech. A.H Kardar .a

close associate and a party elected MPA from Lahore narrated the vindictive nature of

Bhutto.12 Bhutto remained in Ayub’s cabinet for eight years (1958-1966), with other

ministries, as minister of foreign affairs .His support to the Ayub khan candidature in the 1965 elections against Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali

Jinnah founder of Pakistan, was unqualified and so was his condemnation of the

opposition. He was General Secretary of the ruling Convention Muslim League. But

in 1966 he had developed sharp differences with Ayub Khan apparently on Kashmir

question and peace terms with India.13 He was offered an ambassadorial post in

France or any other place of his choice which he refused and decided to enter into the

politics in opposition to Ayub Khan.14 Bhutto opposed Ayub Khan on Tashkand

declaration that “what he achieved in battle field has been lost on the negotiation table”. This popular rhetoric attracted the masses in Punjab towards Bhutto. Later,

during the Yahya Regime as the foreign minister and de-fecto deputy prime minister,

59 Bhutto in the Security Council of United Nations hotly pleaded the case of Pakistan

and wowed to fight war with India for one thousand years.15 In Punjab the anti-India

slogans earned an enormous fame and charisma for Bhutto. Punjab always praised the

anti-India stance.16 It is believed that Ayub could not resist the mounting pressure

from U.S to get rid of Bhutto as U.S could not tolerate the fostering amicable relations with communist world, initiated by Bhutto during his tenure as foreign minister.

Secondly Ayub wanted support from US to get away the failure of 1965 war with

India.17On the other hand Bhutto realized that General Ayub would be soon out of

power. USA felt no more credibility in Ayub and secondly the conflict with India

created problems for him within the country. Bhutto wanted to leave Ayub’s

government without damaging his political standing but was waiting for an

appropriate time. But Ayub, however, did not wait and on 18th June 1966 relieved

Bhutto from the cabinet.18 Ayub needed Bhutto as he was impressed by his academic brilliance and political ambitions. Soon Bhutto became the chief exponent of the

policies of the military dictator. Without patronage of Ayub Khan Bhutto perhaps

could have not attained prominence on the national political scene of Pakistan.

Thus both in a way were interdependent on each other.

Bhutto’s redefinition of foreign policy and his tilt towards Communist world

from utter reliance on America posed some problems for Ayub Khan as his

ascendency in power was totally dependent on US economic and military support. 19

Bhutto advocated the normalization of relations with USSR and china and did

not believe that Pakistan’s membership of the defense pacts (SEAT and CENTO) was

incompatible with such an approach. He was the exponent of Pakistani’s claim on the

disputed territory of Kashmir. Bhutto had been Ayub’s foreign minister and

contributed in fatal misjudgment of the war of 1965 along with some generals of

60 Pakistan army to convince Ayub to start war.20 After parting ways with Ayub Regime,

Bhutto launched a rigorous movement against the Ayub regime, after staying some weeks calm. Bhutto after leaving Ayub’s cabinet on June 18, 1966 launched a

rigorous movement against Ayub Khan’s regime as the major critic of Ayub’s

policies.21 Bhutto led the students who were protesting against University Ordinance

and for other demands. Bhutto led the political uprising. Bhutto was arrested on 13th

November 1968 on the charge of inciting students for violence. Riots broke out in

many cities of West Pakistan following his arrest.22

On 24th February 1968 speaking to the inter college students body at

Rawalpindi Bhutto indicated his opposition to the regime.23In the beginning of the

movement Bhutto was more critical of the foreign issues and less critical of Ayub’s

regime. In a press conference in Karachi on 17th October 1967 Bhutto showed his

intentions to give a socialist manifesto of his proposed party and withdrawal from

SEATO and CENTO and developed relations with Afro-Asians, especially with other

Muslim countries.24 When Bhutto was on the stormy tour of Lahore, the capital of

most popular province of Pakistan and Faisalabad, the Manchester of Pakistan, and

other big cities, the other opposition leaders suspected Bhutto as the ally of the regime

as he was given the response as the only opposition leader by the regime. Bhutto

started to setup opposition to regime from verbal criticism to a confrontation in

streets. During the charged atmosphere of Arab-Israel war Bhutto agreed to speak on the implications of war in a public meeting at Nasir Bagh Lahore, arranged by the

militant National Student Federation (NSF). The administration flooded the grounds

and introduced live wires and sentgundas (goons) to disrupt the meeting.25 Despite various attempts by the regime Bhutto’s popularity was at rapid rise. The immensely

growing popularity of Bhutto and PPP in the urban middle class alarmed the JI, which

61 was considered the strong support base of JI. The JI sponsored press launched a

propaganda movement against Bhutto by dubbing him Communist. Bhutto’s close

associate and the editor of weekly “Shahab” Maulana Kauser Niazi launched a

counter attack on the opponent of Bhutto apparently on Bhutto’s advice. This section

of Urdu presses conservatively wrote that the son of “Hindu woman” 26could not be trusted such a high office in Pakistan. On the other hand pro-Bhutto stated that the

hero worship of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah made Bhutto a better Pakistani

even during his childhood, than Maulana Maudoodi who had opposed Jinnah in his

movement for the creation of Pakistan. This opposition primarily based on left-right

ideological tilts continued even after the hanging of Bhutto by a military dictator.27

A strong Movement launched by students, workers, lawyers, trade unions and

supported by left wing scholars and union leaders against Ayub Khan provided an

opportunity for Bhutto to rise on the political scene of the country by leading that

movement. On 25th March 1969 Ayub Khan handed over power to another military

dictator General Yahya Khan though he was bound to hand over power to the speaker

National Assembly but, as the Speaker was from East Pakistan, he handed over power to his own Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces by violating his own

constitution.28 General Yahya Khan left behind a dismembered country, a nation in the state of utter disappointment and army facing a severe stigma of humiliated

defeat.29

Pakistan came into existence as a result of a democratic movement but out of

eleven head of states of Pakistan, six were either military dictators or bureaucrats.

They remained in power for more than 35 years and dismissed eight out of the fifteen

prime ministers and dissolved seven out of the ten national assemblies, banned five

out of seven political parties.30 Since 1947 after the creation of the country twenty-

62 nine out of thirty-eight elected provisional assemblies were prematurely dissolved.

Forty-four out of seventy-seven chief ministers were dismissed by the either federal

government or by the head of state. It took twenty three years for Pakistan to held first

general election on the basis of adult franchise of national level and surprisingly these

elections were conducted by a military dictator General Yahya Khan in 1970.31

Another thirteen chief ministers could not manage to sustain majority in the

assemblies and consequently resigned. Landed aristocracy and feudal lords dominated the national political scene of the country for most of the years of its history. Military

dictators were giving special places to feudal lords in their military regimes for being there natural allies as on the basis of the commonality of interest.32 Military dictators

in search of legitimacy joined hands with landed gentry and religious establishment of the country. Most of the political parties were dominated or filled with a number of big landlords who actively protected their land interests not at the party level but in the cabinets and parliament as well.33 Due to weak democratic political institution in the fifties and sixties civil-military bureaucracy got the edge and the balance of power

swung towards them. In result of interplay of international, regional, global and

domestic factors Civil-Military-Feudal Oligarchy forged relations with USA which

further weakened the already weak position of politicians and political

institutions.34Ayub Khan weakened the political institution by introducing EBDO

(Elective Bodies Disqualification Orders) to sideline the national politicians from

scene).35 Under EBDO about sixty thousand politicians of various level, local and

national from both wings of the country were disqualified to hold any public office.

Cases were registered against a number of reputed politicians who actively

participated in Pakistan Movement as political vendetta.36 Successive Martial laws weakened the process of democratization of the country, caused constitutional crises,

63 badly weakened the political institutions and affected the progress and development

of the state. Question related to defense budget, promotion, retirements, disciplinary

actions and other issues promotes civilian supremacy when brought to the parliament

even the strong, comparatively may be, civilian regime of Bhutto the defense budget

could not be brought to the parliamentary debate.37 So Bhutto emerged on national

scene in such unfavorable circumstances for democracy.

2.2 The Founding of the PPP in Historical Background: A Challenge to

Status-quo

Bhutto after parting ways with Ayub Khan considered many options to start

his political career afresh. He negotiated with Wali Khan to get the office of general

secretary which Wali Khan declined to offer. Then he tried to join Daultana’s

Council Muslim League. Daultana being an experienced and traditional politician

greeted Bhutto and promised that he would think over it. But after the departure of

Bhutto he told his associates that this “young man” could not win even his own

constituency. Later on when Bhutto during his campaign against Ayub Khan, reached

Rawalpindi railway station a chanted crowed of thousands of people welcomed him,

Daultana was traveling by the same train and hardly managed to get out of the railway

station, a photographer captured the scene that on one side Daultana was going all

alone from the right side of the train and on the left side of the train Bhutto was waving hands to the crowd of multi thousand charged people. The photographer

published that picture in daily Morning News Rawalpindi next morning with a

caption,” fate of two leaders”.38 Though Bhutto got a new political birth as the torch bearer of the class-conscious movement against Ayub Khan during the turbulent years

of 1968-1969 but in the election year he emerged as a serious contender for the office

of the Prime Minister. There were two main reasons for Bhutto’s dramatic popularity

64 in west Pakistan first his charismatic appeal to the people specially the younger

generation and students, secondly there was a vacuum in the opposition ranks as the

leaders like H.S Saharwardi, I.I Chundrigar, Maulvi Fazalul Haq were dead and rest

of leaders had provisional and regional postures, and many leaders were EBDOed by

Ayub Khan, Bhutto filled the vacuum.39 Bhutto was the first Sindhi politician to become head of the state and head of the government of Pakistan. Before Bhutto

Muhammad Ayub Khorro was the only Sindhi who remained the defense minister in the cabinet of Feroz Khan Noon.40 The conservative section of Pakistani press, on the behest of the allies of ruling elite (Establishment) especially monthly Urdu Digest, the weekly Zindagi and Chittaan speculated very negative stories about Bhutto. These

newspapers backed by Maulana Madoodi’s Jamaat-i-Islami that had opposed the idea

of Pakistan and succeeded to carve its considerable support in urban middle class of

Pakistan.41 These sections of Urdu press published about the alleged Hindu humble background of Bhutto’s mother and speculated that the marriage of Sir Shahnawaz

Bhutto and Khursheed Bhai was not a regularnikah. 42 Bhutto eventually decided to

form his own political party. When returned from his summer trip to Europe Bhutto thought that it was an appropriate time for the formation of a new political party.

Along with J.A Raheem, a career bureaucrat and a left-wing scholar, Bhutto

announced the decision for the formation of new political party at the Hyderabad

residence of Mir Rasool Bux Talpoor in September 1967.43 Ironically PPP got birth

from a movement launched by workers, students, peasantry, lawyers and other middle

class intelligentsia against the feudal-bureaucratic-military Oligarchy (Establishment) which ruled the country for most of the years after its independence. But PPP was also

dominated by big feudal lords, specially the elections of 1977 a huge number of PPP

candidates were big land lords against whose Bhutto and his comrades were raising

65 slogans of revolution during the movement against Ayub Khan after the formation of

PPP.44 At the time of forming PPP Bhutto announced that his party would be a

national progressive organization having its roots deep into the masses equally in East

and West Pakistan.45 Bhutto chose Lahore for the founding convention of PPP not

only for the reason that it contained the largest groups of pro-Bhutto elements but also

appropriate for its profound historical and symbolic importance. Lahore hosted the

AIML session which passed the “Pakistan Resolution”. All India Muslim League

AIML convention of the 1940 gave Lahore the historic distinction of being the city

from where the Pakistan movement was started, that feature was more important than

its cultural and political importance in “one unit west Pakistan’s” capital.46 It became urgent for Bhutto as on one hand he was busy in the organizational activities of the

newly formed party; on the other hand formation of Pakistan Democratic Movement

(PDM) on 1st May 1967 also alarmed Bhutto as he did not want to allow the pre

existing parties to gain sole possession of the anti-Ayub opposition.47 The PDM

comprised most of the parties in the old Combine Opposition Parties (COP) with

important exception of NAP. 48 Bhutto was willing to cooperate with PDM on the

issue of restoration of complete democracy, grant of fundamental human rights and

adult suffrage.49 Pakistan Peoples’ Party was founded at the residence of Dr.

Mubashar Hassan at Model Town Lahore in a two days convention held on 30th

November and 1st December 1967 with a socialist manifesto.50 The founding

documents were prepared by Bhutto and J.A Rahim they were very radical and called

for socialist change in the aims and objectives of the new party.51 The founding

document of PPP said:

“The ultimate objective of the party is the attainment of a classless society which is only possible through socialism in our time”.52

66 Bhutto made a very passionate and vigorous speech. In the speech he said, we

have to tackle basic anomalies, change this system and put an end to exploitation, this

can only be done by socialism that is why our party stands for socialism. After

founding convention Bhutto went into full political action across the country sensing too well that the people were yearning for radical change. To galvanize those burning

aspirations he went all over the country presenting himself as their revolutionary

socialist leader who would lead the transformation of society through revolutionary

changes. In one of his speeches Bhutto Said:

“My dear Friends It is said that I am wealthy man and feudal lord. It is said that I have no right to struggle for socialism without distributing my wealth among the people socialism can be introduced only when all means of production are brought under state control but even so I hereby announce that if my wealth can be of any good I will not hesitate to give it away.”53

The Men and Women who gathered to found PPP were having diverse social

identities, though mostly progressive, different backgrounds, previous political and

ideological affiliations, and general characteristics, students and staunch anti

feudalism. These people were considering Bhutto an anti-status-quo, a true democrat

and progressive leader who would bring a socialist revolution with the help of a well

organized political organization.

The PPP had emerged as a broad based opposition movement held together by

a single dominating figure, who had defeated its predecessors. PPP claimed to be a

revolutionary party but in the subsequent event, PPP failed to break with past patterns

of Political organization in Pakistan. The result was growing factionalism, dependent

on Bhutto’s personal support for authority and an increasing rift between the rightist

and leftist group who attached more importance to organization. 54

67 There were also disillusionments by the entry of rural notables of the landed

gentry into the party. The situation might have been different if the party had been

moved strongly institutionalized before it came into power.55 The comprehensive

reorganization which took place in December 1976 still emphasized personal loyalist

over effective institutionalization. Bhutto himself selected higher office holders, his

secretariat and those at the district level and below unfortunately decision making

power was totally centralized and Bhutto had personalized the PPP much as India

Gandhi stood for the Congress in India. He used to say that:

“I am the PPP and they all are my creatures”. 56

At this juncture PPP’s real decline and downfall started. Z.A Bhutto was

surrounded and encircled by sycophants and opportunists. These sycophants replaced the creative thoughtful leaders as the key to influence in the echelons of the party.

Even person like J.A Rahim who had drafted the PPP’s foundation document found

himself out in the cold in July 1974 after he had the temperament to publically

disagree with Bhutto’s handling of affairs.57 In third world countries like Pakistan

democracy was passing through transition phase. It had been the dilemma of these

countries that here personalities not institutions rule the people and they made

decisions regarding the fate and future of the state so was the case with PPP.58

Factional divisions went hand in hand with the PPP’s increasingly clientest politics.

This was illustrated most clearly by the clash in the Punjab between Sheikh Rashid

and Ghulam Mustaf Khar.59 Ghulam Mustafa Khar, a landlord from Muzzafar Gharah used the well-established techniques of harassment not only on personal rivals but on

ideological opponent such as Mahmud Ali Kasuri, who protested against the party’s

growing authoritarianism at both national and province level. 60 The rising tide of violence as seen in the assassination and attacks on opposition and PPP figures alike

68 those who died by the bullets included Maulvi Shahmsuddin, Khawaja Rafique and

Abdus Samad Wali Khan and Asghar Khan who escaped death on a number of

occasions. Ian Talbot argued that corresponding to Rashid and Khar in Punjab were

Jam Sadiq and Rasual BakshTalpur in Sind and in the frontier province Humayun

Saifullah and Habibullah Khan in Bannu. Such personal rivalries and animosities

among the big lords.61 Talking about violence in the party, Bhutto noted in a memo of

16 August 1973, ‘pistols to the right of us and to the left us, pistols all around us’.62

This seems to be the motto of the party from the above discussion it can be concluded that party deterioration and downfall began soon after its foundation. Party was not

given due time and right policies to establish itself on strong footing. Things began to

slip from willful, obdurate but determined Z.A Bhutto.63 These drifts in PPP caused weaknesses in the party and displayed weakness of the regime.

2.3 PPP’s Political Journey

Bhutto joined the military government of Yahya Khan shortly before the

army’s surrender in Dacca as the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (Noor ul Amin was made Prime Minister the lone member who was elected from East

Pakistan with Raja Teri Dev Roy). In that capacity Bhutto visited New York to

negotiate a peaceful solution to the crises in Eastern wing of the country. He had

stormed out of the meeting of the Security Council after tearing the polish resolution

and wowed a thousand year war with India and left the chamber of the Security

Council. This extraordinary scene viewed by millions of Pakistanis on television and

developed a remarkable image of Bhutto as a patriot. This performance won Bhutto the support of even those who not voted his party in the elections of 1970. It also won the admiration of the young officers in army who had felt humiliation by the conduct

of the generals. On his return to Rawalpindi three officers staged a silent coup against

69 Yahya khan. Yahya was forced to resign and Bhutto sworn in as the president and the

CMLA of what was left of Pakistan.64 PPP emerged as the force of high degree of all

Pakistan level unmatched many other political parties of the country. Bhutto had been

Ayub’s foreign minister and contributed in fatal misjudgment of the war of 1965

along with some generals of Pakistan army. Bhutto after leaving Ayub cabinet on

June 16, 1966 and launched a rigorous movement against Ayub Khan’s regime as the

major critic of Ayub’s policies. To state major steps needed to improve Pakistan’s

political and social conditions which had deteriorated significantly a group of Lahore based intellectual and liberals drafted “ A declaration of the unity of the people “.

Bhutto joined this group of intellectuals and after deliberations of one year to contact with professionals, students, lawyers and left wing intellectuals from various parts of the country and even abroad, they founded the PPP in Lahore at the residence of Dr.

Mubashir Hassan a left wing scholar and the university professor ,on 30th November-

1st December 1967.65 Bhutto’s stormy nature, his personality and his early reliance on

left ideologies soon managed to unite the army and other forces against him whose

interests were at least apparently in danger by the stormy rise of Bhutto.66 The ruling

establishment, the elite of Pakistan, big landlords and industrialists, religious and

ethnic groups and national and international players even leaders of labor unions and

leftist parties were all stoutly against him. Bhutto and his associates believed that the

most formidable of their ill-wishes were to be found on the senior rank of the civil and

military bureaucracy.67 Bhutto was the only politician of stature in the remaining

Pakistan. After the dismemberment of East Pakistan the disgraced army turned towards Bhutto and he was made the president and the first civilian Martial Law

administrator. At that time Bhutto was the only leader of the country who could

rescue the rest of Pakistan and being the leader of majority party in the National

70 Assembly of West Pakistan it was considered his legitimate right to form government.

But just in seven years he was not only removed from the power but later on hanged by the army, refusing the appeals from the heads of the states of a number of

countries, especially Muslim countries. Bhutto was born in a family which was

integral part of the establishment of the country. He being the son of a notable wadara

(land lord) of the Sindh, knew the establishment better than his contemporary

politician and his successors.68 Bhutto failed to introduce fair and transparent

democratic system rather one can say he introduced preferential politics in the

country. Sindis were disproportionately underrepresented in the main institutions of the Pakistani state and among its business elite. Politicization of mohajars’ identity was even more detrimental as the community formed a core part of the ruling national

elite. Tensions were increased between Sindhis and Mohajars which were heightened by the promotion and use of Sindhi language and by the nationalization of large

industrial houses owned by Mohajars. 69 The situation was further aggravated by the

national government’s introduction in 1973 of a new quota system for federal

employment. Mohajars held one-third of the gazetted posts in the civilian bureaucracy

although much lesser than their share of the total population by the early 1970. The

resentment caused by this discrimination in favour of rural Sindis was intensified by the extension of the application of the quota to educational institutions and by the

domicile issues.70 Party meeting held in Karachi on 28th February, 1971 was

summoned for the endorsement of Bhutto’s decision that no MNA elect of PPP would

attend the Assembly session summoned on 3rd March 1971 by Yahya Khan. Mr.

Khaliq Khan the only MNA elected from KPK stressed the need to have direct contact with the laborers and peasants in East Pakistan. He directly addressed Bhutto that for

all his actions he would be responsible to the party and party would never allow him

71 to become another Ayub khan or a dictator. In response Bhutto scolded him with the

remarks that:

“three young men” standing they should know I am also young”. While directly addressing to Khaliq Khan Bhutto said “Khaliq why should I become an Ayub Khan or a dictator, I am a people’s representative, further added in almost threatening manner and if I ever decided to become an Ayub Khan or a dictator neither you nor anyone else would be able to stop me”71

Mukhtar Rana, Ahmed Raza Kazmi, Khaliq and A.H Kardar were the first young lot to oppose Bhutto in party at very early stage on the eve of its decision not to

attend Assembly session at Dhaka. On 28th February 1971 Bhutto while responding to

a charged crowd gathered at Iqbal Park Lahore said that “any member from his party

or any other party from west wing of the country would dare to go to Dacca their legs would be broken”.72 Bhutto used the unchecked powers of Martial Law against those who were hostile or against him in the past. Chairman National Press Trust (NPT) was removed under Martial Law order 28, Z.A Sulehri was also removed from the

post of senior editor of The Pakistan Times a leading English daily under NPT.

Managing Director of Pakistan progressive papers limited, Chairman West Pakistan

of national shipping cooperation were removed from their offices as they had friendly

relations with Yahya Khan. Such removals under Martial Law could not be brought before any court of law. Habibullah and S.V Durani Governor State Bank were not

only removed from office but faced arrest publicly. 73 On 2nd March 1972 Bhutto

called General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim on lunch in President House and

after lunch Bhutto asked Gul Hassan that, sometime in life we have to take some sour

decisions even against friends and he felt sorry but he had to ask Gul Hassan to

resign.74 Gul Hassan reluctantly signed on the draft of resignation that was already

drafted. Air Martial Rahim asked in a light mood “me too”, Khar replied “yes you too”.75 They were taken to Lahore in the company of Khar and Mumtaz Bhutto

72 accompanied by a police escort. They were virtually kept as prisoners in Governor

House Lahore. After a few days they were given ambassadorial assignment to the western countries (Spain and Germany). But after enjoying ambassadorial positions in western countries for a number of years when Bhutto was caught by circumstances

and opposition launched vigorous movement against him the two retired generals

resigned from there ambassadorial assignment and joined opposition movement

against Bhutto in 1977.76 Bhutto used fully the powers of Chief Martial Law

Administrator which conferred on him to impose emergency which lasted for most of

his years in power and used for implementation of policies.77 In July 1967 the military

government sought to discredit Bhutto by publishing documents that he considered

himself a citizen of India up till 195 8 . 78 The fact was that, like many other Pakistanis,

Bhutto claimed for his ancestral land in India. This issue was used against Bhutto throughout his years in power and especially during PNA movement against him.79

2.4 Bhutto and the Establishment as Opposition.

2.5 Transfer of Power

Establishment is defined as an informal system that joins together the senior

ranks of the military, civil bureaucracy, key members of judiciary, big feudal lords, business lords, key officers of intelligence agencies and other elites. “Establishment”

is like the classic oligarchy of the Greek era.80 The “Establishment” is generally used

in Pakistan to refer to those who exercise de facto power; it includes the military high

command and the intelligence agencies, together with the top leadership of certain

political parties, high- level members of the bureaucracy and business persons that work in alliance with them. The military high command and intelligence agencies

form the core of the Establishment and are its most permanent and influential

components81. During his stay in the Ayub cabinet as foreign minister Bhutto was the

73 young ruthless, ambitious and chartered member of the Establishment82. But later on

he challenged the interests of the Establishment based on the system of status quo

during the movement of 1968-69 and antagonized the ‘extremist” elements in the

Establishment. 83

During the campaign of elections of 1970, Military establishment when

realized that Bhutto and Mujib might secure more seats than their hopes then they

distributed funds through Director Intelligence Bureau, Mr. Rizwi to influence the

election results. Rizwi had good friendly relations with Maulana Abdul Hameed

Bashami who was used in East Pakistan against Mujeeb. In West Pakistan General

Umer collected money from the industrialists and was given to Abdul Qayum Khan

against Bhutto. 84 Bhutto, after coming into power, conducted inquiry against Rizwi

and General Umer and it was proved that they embezzled the funds. Later on Rizwi

returned Rs. 3 lack. 85 Maulana Bashami allegedly had betrayed the movement against

Ayub Khan as he supported Ayub Khan in the election of 1965, when all the

opposition supported Fatima Jinnah. Bashami considered Ayub Khan anti-imperialist

and pro-China, on the behest of establishment. Thus, only Bhutto in the West wing of the country and Mujibur Rehman in the Eastern wing of the country retained an unsustainable image in the public. Even after the dismemberment of East Pakistan the

saddest event in the history the ruling generals ( junta) wanted to keep on occupying

power. On 17th December just one day after the military defeat in East Pakistan

General Gul Hassan and Air Martial Raheem (CAS) visited the president house where

Yahya was planning to address the nation on radio. Both the officers told Yahya Khan

in the presence of General Hamid that situation had become so worse and he (Yahya)

had to quit the power which Yahya declined. When the pressure was mounted by his

officers Yahya showed intention to go to army as commander-in-chief which was too

74 strongly opposed by the officers. Then Yahya suggested that General Gul Hassan to become the President and General Hamid C-N-C as he wanted to carry on the control

of armed forces, the ruling power of the country.86 General Gul Hassan could not

refuse this proposal but General Hamid said that he would decide to accept the C-N-C

post after a meeting with officers of GHQ. The Hamoodur Rahman commission

recommended to initiate trial against General Gul Hassan but Bhutto appointed him as

Army Chief. Bhutto did not initiated cases against all those generals who were

responsible for the defeat and consequent dismemberment of East Pakistan. Bhutto

only pursued to retire General Yahya Khan, General Hameed, General S.G.M

Perzada, General Umer, General Khudadad, General Kiyani and General Mitha, which showed Bhutto’s reluctance to take action against those who are responsible for

dismemberment of East Pakistan or shows his connivance with them in the

dismemberment.87 On one hand Pakistan was demanding from Bangladesh not to

initiate trial of Pakistani generals so to keep the morale of defeated army high but at the other it was difficult for Bhutto to initiate trial of generals. During the Simla

negotiation the Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi advised Bhutto that he let initiate war crime against some of generals of army which Bhutto refused. Bhutto did never

published Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report according to his detractors

(opponents), Bhutto did not initiate trial of generals as if he had initiated trial his own

involvement and connivance with military generals in the East Pakistan debacle would have been disclosed.88 Whether it was Bhutto’s decision not to published

report, initiate trial against generals or was the pressure from the military

establishment, but just after 5 years he paid the price in the shape of his deposition

from the government and consequently his hanging by a military General on April 4,

1979. 89 Yahya Khan wanted to keep the Presidency with Bhutto as prime minister

75 when Bhutto refused Yahya suggested to keep the C.N.C and CMLA which was also

refused by Bhutto.90

Even after the insulting military defeat in East Pakistan various groups in the

establishment were maneuvering to retain power in the hands of military and the

popularly elected leaders of the masses were the last and the least option to hand over

power. They were trying to mount pressure on the popularly elected leader to

negotiate better terms with them. According to Brigadier ® A.R Sidique the head of

Inter Services Public Relations, that when he reached General Gul Hasssan’s

residence the CAS Air Martial Rahim and Shakir Ullah Durani the managing director

of PIA who had personal relations with them, were sitting. They were there to decide

about their new “boss”. Air Martial Raheem wanted to hand over power to Aasghar

Khan but General Gul Hassan was in favor of Bhutto, though he passed derogatory

remarks about the elected leader of the people. By stressing upon his proposal Gul

Hassan said that “how can power handed over to a person who lost his electoral seat

from a corporal”? 91 On 19 December Gul told Brig Sidique that at Kharyan

Cantonment army men of both armed division were protesting against the Divisional

Commander with weapons in their hands. The circumstances in the armed forces had become so worse that might be his last day at the office.92 On 20 December General

Hamid was to give briefing to the officers of Lt-Colonel and above about all the

issues and events took place at East Pakistan but he faced severely harsh questions

and remarks by junior officers. The young officers shouted against their senior

leadership and obnoxious slogan was raised to declare them responsible for the defeat

in East Pakistan General Hamid remained silent to listen to those slogans. Vocal

revolt took place by young officers in GHQ Rawalpindi on 19th December where

senior officers of ‘junta’ wanted to brief them about East Pakistan issue.93 Adjutant

76 general, Major General Khudadad ‘Quarter Master Major General Usman Mitha ,

Master General of ordinance Lt-General Khawaja Wasiud Din sitting in front row,

General Gul Hassan reached in hall at 12 a.m. General Hamid while giving the details was depressed and the young officers were sharing remarks of anonymity with one

other. It was quite evident that the generals were cut off from army. When General

Hamid tried to explain that all the efforts were made to have political solution, the hall

echoed with slogans of “shame, shame” The generals wanted to assess the mood of young officers to keep Yahya as Commander in Chief or otherwise to take over power by themselves but the mounting pressure from young officers was astonishing for them. 94 Violent demonstrations started on 18th December against military regime in the Western wing against the East Pakistan defeat and consequent debacle. 95 Bhutto

could never be in the good books of the ruling establishment of status quo as had

played the role of “troche bearer” of the revolutionary movement the first ever class

conscious movement in Pakistan which challenged the set production relations in

Pakistan, and the politics of “status quo”. Though Bhutto did not lead that movement to its logical end and compromised with ruling establishment and their foreign backers for attaining government, but the grudges against him never gone away. The

ruling establishment though under the pressing circumstances left with no choice but to hand over power to Bhutto as the Chairman of victorious PPP from western wing

of the country but they always kept the dislike and considered Bhutto as a serious threat to their vested interest.

2.6 Bhutto: A Product of 68-69 Movement

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came into power in the wake of 1968 political struggle that was

predominantly class conscious movement. Despite being a feudal himself, Bhutto had

challenged the interest of the elite, feudal class, industrialists and civil and military

77 establishment. These classes played a vital role as his opposition and succeeded to

oust him from power along with the failures of Bhutto and PPP. Ignoring the issue whether or not the PPP and its founding chairman Bhutto were sincere and capable of ushering in a social change in the production relations of Pakistan, it can be

doubtlessly contended that 1968-69 political upheaval and its class character threatened the conservative status quo of Pakistan’s powerful ruling elite that had been ruling the country since its inception. In the midst of these stormy and

revolutionary years, that saw the eruption of class consciousness across the country, the PPP and its leaders, especially its founding chairman, appeared on the political

scene as the flag-bearers of a socialist change. Masses were quick to throng to streets

in support of the newly born party, turning it overnight into West Pakistan’s largest

popular political force. However the marriage between the PPP and the downtrodden

never gave birth to a socialist state, for the first PPP government could go no more beyond bringing some reformist changes, like the introduction of land reforms and

nationalization of big commercial and industrial enterprises, which went in the control

of bureaucracy, having no experience and interest to run them effectively.

Unfortunately, for the common men both the feudal lords and capitalists of Pakistan

escaped the fate which the Russian and the Chinese elite had met after the socialist

revolutions of 1917 and 1949 respectively. Despite the failure of Bhutto to bring a

socialist revolution and to become a Lenin or Mao, both the ruling elite and

downtrodden masses considered him a leader that stood for socialism and symbolized the interests of the poor. Consequently he was considered both the devil and a

messiah: devil by the oppressors’ class and messiah by the oppressed classes.96 When

Bhutto took the helm of affairs of the state of Pakistan on 20th December 1971 defeat

and despair surrounded him, six thousand square miles of the land was occupied by

78 India , more than 93000 prisoners both army men and civilian were in Indian jails, the economy was badly ruptured ,Bhutto gave a hope to the nation.97 Bhutto decided to strengthen the defense of the country. He knew the difficulties to achieve rapid

achieving self-reliance. He decided to launch a major program of defense production with assistance of China and France. Like the establishment of federal security force

and the nuclear policy this defense production infrastructure was also based on the

intentions to cut off the military establishment connections with foreign military

suppliers specially the US.98

Bhutto was politically born into the Pakistani establishment and knew it well,

much better than any of his successors.99 It was next to impossible for the ruling elite

(establishment of Pakistan) to regain the glory of armed forces and to build their

image in the public which was badly shattered in the East Pakistan debacle.100 No

leader other than Bhutto could achieve this “Herculean” task who was charismatic and

most popular leader in the western wing of the country. It was already discussed and

realized in Washington and Florida before Bhutto’s arrival to Pakistan at noon of 20

December 1971.101 The armed forces were having intentions to prove Bhutto the

“villain” of the dismemberment of East Pakistan.102 In the elections of 1970 one

segment of the establishment supported Qayum League but when Qayum khan could

not succeed, they turned to Bhutto and a relation was developed between Bhutto and that powerful segment of establishment.103 While returning to Pakistan Bhutto shared with his party friends and close associates that he had explained that he was not anti-

US and his pro-China policy benefited the US as Pakistan, being close friend of China was used by Nixon administration as a bridge between US and China. He praised the

Nixon’s China policy. He tried to clear his war mongering image and assured that he wanted a peaceful Subcontinent which military regime failed to achieve.104 Before

79 returning to Pakistan Bhutto had extensive meetings with US administration including

President Nixon and others. He hosted a lunch for George Bush and other permanent

representatives at the UNO.105 According to Lal khan Bhutto was used by Washington

and Rawalpindi to pacify the situation in which the whole nation felt humiliated and

had the feeling of contempt for the armed forces. The “revolution” was lost as Bhutto

connived with the Americans and ruling elite in Pakistan to get power.106 Air Martial

Rahim and General Gul Hassan persuaded Yahya Khan to hand over power to Bhutto

after the sad dismemberment of eastern wing of the country. One of the generals of

Yahya janta was vehemently against Bhutto and reportedly said that if other generals

could not coup he would undertake the coup to sort out the PPP. Similarly some brigadiers also threatened to march on GHQ Rawalpindi. This psychological mistrust

prevailed even after he assumed power.107 A military court of inquiry found that six

senior officers were involved in a conspiracy to launch a coup two days before Bhutto

assumed power. On 9 August 1972 those officers were retired prematurely from

service.108 So ironically no considerable disciplinary action was taken against those

conspiring officers. Even after the dismemberment of half of the country the generals

(junta) were not ready to hand over power to Bhutto, despite the fact, that Bhutto did

not have relations with the establishment based on animosity and he might have

played his role to keep Mujib out of power in connivance with the military

establishment.109

PPP had always remained victim of the hatred of establishment.110 The

military junta gave an impression that Bhutto was simply and merely military

nominee but it would not be justice to him as he was the leader of the majority party

in the Western wing of Pakistan, the rest of Pakistan.111 Military operation in East

Pakistan brought PPP and military together based on mutual non-hostility. Bhutto

80 apparently accepted the army’s “legitimate” structural role in the state to make him

acceptable for the state through a mini-coup in the presidency on 20th December

1971.112 After coming into power, Bhutto sought to curb the power of military and bureaucracy Thus, two unelected institutions of Pakistani state inherited the powers of the pre-independence era. Bhutto thought an opportunity in the disarray after the

defeat in Bengal but failed to curb the powers of these institutions, ironically, rather than securing autonomy he became reliant on military and civil service.113 After

assuming power by Bhutto, Khar was appointed as Governor of Punjab, Mumtaz

Bhutto, the cousin of Bhutto as Sindh Governor, Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao as

Governor KPK where PPP was in minority and virtually non-existent in Baluchistan, where after a delay of few days, Sardar Ghaus Bux Bazinjo was appointed as

Governor, without consultation with NAP-JUI coalition in majority in those two

provinces.114A small cabinet was sworn in at 2:00 AM in the morning to impress the

ministers that hard work must be the order of the day. J.A Raheem as senior Minster,

Sheikh Rashid, Mubashir Hassan, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Miraj Khalid, Hanif Ramy,

Justice Faizulla Kundi, Hafeez Pirzada and Raja Tri Dev Roy the one of the two non-

Awami League members elected from East Pakistan. After the election of 1970, Noor ul Amin was made Vice President earlier the post was not existent under Martial Law

having no practical function but to give symbolic representation to the dismembered

East Pakistan.115

Bhutto’s vindictive nature even not spared his own comrades. Ahmed Raza

Qasuri was beaten and his arms fractured. But when he criticized Bhutto in the

National Assembly he was beaten and bullet hit his leg.116 Many cases were registered

against a leading trade unionist, including a murder case against a factory owner in

81 Faisalabad and Mukhtar Rana a PPP office bearer and MNA spent more than three years in jail.117

NAP was claiming to be a socialist party and exponent of provisional

autonomy, but in elections of 1970 Wali Khan the NAP leader succeeded to acquire the support of almost all the land lords of Baluchistan and (KPK).118 Over a lunch on

26th November 1971 when Yahya Khan showed his intentions to ban NAP, Bhutto

readily approved and said that Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Wali Khan and other members of

NAP were anti-Pakistan. However, after coming in power Bhutto lifted ban from

NAP.119

Bhutto knew that without acquiring the support of NAP-JUI alliance a

constitution could not be enforced in KPK and Baluchistan. On the other hand some

of the leaders of PPP in KPK and Qayum Muslim league were of the view that such

importance should have not been given to NAP-JUI alliance. They also viewed that

PPP and Qayum League with the support of independents could form government in

KPK.120 Bhutto kept on playing with both the parties against one another, NAP and

Qayum Khan that had laid roots of political animosity. Bhutto used his negation tactics with Qayum League to bring NAP on the tables of negotiation. On the issue of

constitution, on the other hand his talks with NAP were underway in to put pressure

on Qayum Khan to settle an alliance with him on his own terms.121 Opposition parties

observed “Black Friday” on March 23 1973 and gave a call for the boycott of the

National Assembly and demanded the introduction of genuine parliamentary

democratic system in the country and protested against authoritarian tactics which the

opposition called the modification of the agreed draft of All Parties Constitutional

Conference.122Under the pressure from reactionary orthodox religious elements the

1973 constitution was given a predominant Islamic outlook. 123 Leader of the NAP as

82 opposition leader Wali Khan accused Bhutto for being “counter revolutionary” and

castigated him as “Adolph Bhutto” for using “fascist” ways to deal with opposition.124

Bhutto decided to shelve the findings of Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report at the request of army.125Before joining opposition camp Asghar Khan toyed the idea to join Bhutto’s PPP. He was a severe critic of the “authoritarian” policies of Bhutto, who later offered him to join his PPP, they had two long meetings in this regard, but

during the campaign of election of 1970 Asghar Khan, though contested but made

speeches against PPP candidates and raised “Bhutto”,s ambition and dangers of his

coming in power.126 When Bhutto came in power Asghar Khan in a press conference

at Lahore on 1st December on the eve of new year offered his cooperation to the

Bhutto’s government if Bhutto did three things, firstly he should allow the freedom

of speech and press, secondly if he implemented the economic agenda he promised

during the election campaign of 1970, thirdly Bhutto should not try to improve good

relation with Bangladesh127 Asghar Khan also warned government in the same press

conference that the Bhutto government attempted to suppress the dissenting voice and

make a fool of people. His party would oppose the government as severe as they

could. According to Asghar Khan Bhutto had offered him to join him and if they set

off from Karachi and while reaching to Rawalpindi railway station Yahya Khan would receive them and hand over power to them, and then they (Bhutto and Asghar

Khan) would rule the country for twenty years. When Asghar Khan asked Bhutto what would be the agenda and program of the “rule”, he replied that agenda was to

rule and “people are stupid and I know to make them fool,danda (stick) would be in

my hand and no one could remove us from power”128 Former President Yahya Khan

and Chief of Army General Abdul Hamid Khan were kept under house arrest on 8

January 1972.129 On the accusation of “Bonapartism” Bhutto removed General Gul

83 Hassan and Air Martial Raheem Khan on 3rd March 1972 just after three and a half

months of assuming the power and these two officers played the role to hand over

power to Bhutto. 130 General Gul Hassan and Air Martial Raheem were invited on a

lunch at President House and were asked to resign in an unusual manner. They were

kept busy talking with Punjab Governor Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Mumtaz Bhutto the cousin of President Bhutto and the Federal Minister, meanwhile the telephonic

contact was established with General Tikka Khan who had led Army Action in East

Pakistan. Tikka Khan was made Army Chief and Air vice Martial Zafar Chaudry was

contacted and was asked to assume the office of Air Chief.131 Bhutto, against the

democratic norms followed by his predecessors, military dictators, appointed a

committee under his own chairmanship to draft permanent constitution for the

country.132 Law Minster Mehmood Ali Qasauri resigned from the portfolio amidst

differences on the issues of the outlook of constitution. Qasuri wanted that the

constitution would be based on West Minister democratic model, an ‘unqualified’

parliamentary system whereas Bhutto wanted a modified version of parliamentary

system with extraordinary power to the Chief Executive. Kasauri resigned on 6

October 1972, consequently he quitted constitution draft committee and the National

Assembly seat. 133 In February 1973 Kasauri was expelled from the party and he joined Tehrik-Istaklal of Asghar Khan, a vocal opposition party. On I3th October,

Miraj Muhammad Khan a young revolutionary and trade unionist from Karachi and

minister of state for political affairs resigned from his ministerial portfolio, on

difference with Bhutto’s policies and high handedness with labors and other political

affairs.134 Bhutto was believer of the concept of absolute power, when he was General

Secretary of Convention Muslim League he suggested Ayub Khan that the district

commissioner should be given powers of police chief and president of the ruling

84 party’s district chapter. He was determined to use his position as vehicle to device the

absolute power. Bhutto depended more on traditional tools of executing power i.e. bureaucracy about the nature of whom he learnt a great deal during his eight years in

power. Whoever dared to oppose him during his prime years of power had faced

nothing but contempt and humiliation.135 Bhutto used authoritarian power under

Martial Law regulations which not only snub his political opposition, descendent of

his own PPP but even the journalists who criticized his policies and persuaded him to

fulfill his promises made during the chanted election campaigning.136 Tripartite

Accord soon became the point of contention between government and opposition.

NAP-JUI demanded its power share in centre and the interpretation of two points of the Accord mounted the differences between them i.e. period of the continuity of

Martial Law and the vote of confidence of Bhutto.137

Bhutto created a political cell within the ISI by an executive order and brought

it directly under the Prime Minister. Bhutto used ISI as he used FSF, his most

personal force, for the surveillance of his political opposition to make them refrain

from challenging the authority of his government.138 ISI’s main task was to cover

external intelligence but it overlapped as it participated more in the political

maneuvering within the country though it operated under the head of government but

established a close liaison with Army chief. In 1975 Bhutto established a political wing within ISI, merely for surveillance and intelligence of his political opponents

later on his political cell in the ISI gain gigantic power.139 Primarily these intelligence

agencies were established to protect the interest of the state from foreign aggression

and internal threats against interest of the country. But political interference promoted

its role for the vested interest of the head of the government of the day, which also

provided the opportunity to the officials and personnel to promote their personal

85 interest as well.140Bhutto sought to curb the power of military and bureaucracy, the two unelected institutions of Pakistani state inherited the powers of the pre

independent era. Bhutto thought an opportunity in the disarray of the defeat in

Bangladesh but failed to curb the powers of these institutions, ironically, rather than

securing autonomy he became reliant on military and civil service.141 Their disarray

and disappointing role in the wake of succession of Dhaka provided him with an unparalleled opportunity to break with the past. But in the events, hopes for radical

change to the traditional civil-military relations he could not brought a substantial

change. Bhutto became easily reliant on both the army and the civil service. Hasan

Many steps which Bhutto took in order to establish control over the army whose myth

of invincibility was shattered in the swamp of East Pakistan. Bhutto relieved from

service several top officers like General Gul Hassan C-N-C of Army and Air Marshal

Rehim Khan Chief of Air Staff along with 34 other army officers in total on the plea

of “Bonapartism”.142 Twenty nine senior officers of the military were removed from their offices within first four month of Bhutto’s assumption of power including Chief

of the army staff General Gul Hussan khan who was replaced by General Tikka Khan

and seemingly General Zia was to succeed him on his retirement in 1976. A

commission, chaired by Humoodur Rehman Chief Justice of Pakistan, was set up to

move into the military catastrophe in East Pakistan. Its findings were never made

public. 143In addition Bhutto took a number of measures to decrease military’s long term influence. They include the restructuring of the military high command in order to divide power and the reduction of the tenure of chief of Army Staff to three years.

The most controversial reform was the creation of the federal security force under the

control of federal government, and its duty was to assist police in maintaining law and

order. This was highly professional and well equipped task force. Opponents of

86 Bhutto criticized it as an oppressive private army and its existence along with

People’s guard reminded serving army officers of Bhutto’s earlier call for the

replacement of a conventional force by people’s Army144. Such anxieties alarmed

army high command when on returning from an overseas visit Bhutto inspected a

guard of honour of the people guards rather than an Army contingent. Military

resentment and displeasure was expressed in the refusal to train FSF recruits.

Significantly one of the first actions of Zia regime was to disband this force. A

number of clauses in 1973 Constitution were specifically designed to discourage

future military intervention. Its third clause serving military men were to take the oath that they would not take part in political activities of any kind. Article 6 defined high treason as any attempt to abrogate or subvert the constitution by the use of force.

These clauses strengthened the legal cover provided by the 1972 Supreme Court verdict in Asma Jilani case which ruled that Yahya Khan’s assumption of power in

1969 was illegal and unconstitutional.145 Despite the favourable background Bhutto

always remained uneasy in his relations with army generals. He was even ready to take the wrath of left wing supporters when he exempted army officers holding land

from the March 1972 land reforms and made serious efforts to bring back the

prisoners of war of 1971 in July 1972 under Simla Agreement to please the military

establishment. A people’s army could not provide security in the regional context

after the Afghan issue was raised by government of Sadar Mohammad Daud

following the overthrow of king Zahir Shah on 17th July 1973 and nuclear explosion by India in 1974. There was also need of replacement of military equipments after

1971 war with India. Pakistan defense expenditure rose by over 200 percent during

Bhutto era even more important reliance on army increased for internal security as well. This enabled men in uniform to renew their taste for power and drew their

87 attentions back into politics. The army was called to action on 19th July 1972 to

restore law and order in Sindh following the language riots in Sindh.146Army

remained involve in Baluchistan from 1973-77. Large scale deployment of troops in

Baluchistan to deal with tribes, separatists, autonomists was disapproved by the other

political parties, specially the opposition parties NAP-JUI, who were directly affected by the army action in Baluchistan. The use of force carried echoes of Yahya’s ill-

conceived military action in East Pakistan. The tension between the Federal

government and the NAP JUI administration in Quetta were kept in check until the

July 1972 passage of Simla Accord after that escalation heightened in the province.

Different tribes like Marri, the Baluchistan national Liberation Front established bases

in Kandhar and Baghdad as well as in Baluchistan. At the height of struggle the

Pakistan air force received assistance from the Shah of Iran who had his own Bloch

problem.147 Conflict between army and separatists claimed several lives and gravely undermined the popularity of Bhutto’s regime. Bhutto acknowledged the army

overrode his plans for withdrawal because the generals wanted to spread their tentacles throughout Baluchistan. This involvement of Pakistan armed forces provided them with chance to re-establish and re-organized them to play effective role in

politics of Pakistan.148 Civil establishment had drawn adverse comments in

government reports from 1950 onwards but they were highly organized and well

established. These reports called him “Sultan of Pakistan”. Radical opinion hoped that

Bhutto would make good earlier gestures toward reform especially in the light of

animosity towards bureaucracy during 1968-9 campaign against Ayub Khan. Two of the ringing slogans of the time were “Death of the Serving Kings” and End

corruption149. On assuming power Bhutto dismissed leading civil servants associated with military era which he dubbed as one of nokarshahi (Bureaucracy) rule by the

88 civil servants and jailed Ayub Khan’s right hand Alftaf Gohar. The purge of civil

servants on grounds of corruption and inefficiency was by no means unique but had been feature of the early days of all martial law administrators.150 Bhutto’s reform of the bureaucracy, despite the abolition of CSP and the introduction of a unified grade

structure key positions in the central secretariat continued to be headed by the

members of the former elite cadre and the functions of civil servants were never usurped by the PPP bureaucracy. Bhutto’s personal control over the administration was nevertheless secured through the creation of special posts and the establishment

of a “lateral entry scheme” administered not by Federal Service Commission but by a

political establishment division. Critics claimed that this raised an army of stooges who were sycophants appointees relatives and hangers-on of federal ministers. In the

later period of his regime Bhutto came increasingly to rely on the bureaucracies just

as he did on army. This was unintended consequence of his institutional and socio

economic reforms for all his attempts to break with the past Bhutto’s was ultimately

as dependent on bureaucracy for the maintenance of his rule as had been any of his

predecessors. 151

2.9 Bhutto’s Political Opposition

Muslim league (Qayum) and Jamat-i-Islami were identified as the client

parties during the election campaign of 1970 and discredited in the polls. NAP was

proponent of “Provisional autonomy” whereas PPP claimed to be leftist party. On 20th

December 1971 after the sad dismemberment of eastern wing of the country Bhutto

emerged as the leader of PPP the majority party and became president and chief

martial law administrator. After passing the 1973 Constitution Bhutto got elected as the prime minister from the National Assembly. Bhutto appointed his close associate

Hayat Muhammad Khan Sharpao as the Governor of KPK but to get the support of

89 NAP and Wali Khan and JUI of the Mufti Mehmood Bhutto agreed to replace the

Governor with their consent. On one hand Bhutto was negotiating with NAP and JUI

on the other hand he struck an alliance with the old and most conservative leader of

KPK, Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, political rival of Wali Khan and NAP.152 Wali Khan termed the victory of Awami League and PPP in the elections of 1970 the success of

progressive forces and expected from them to adjust their differences and would give the nation the much needed constitution. 153 Soon after taking over as President and

CMLA Bhutto met Wali Khan. Bhutto accepted the majority of NAP-JUI in KPK and

Baluchistan. Bhutto showed his interest to normalize his relations with India, which

shocked Wali Khan that in recent past Bhutto wowed to fight a thousand years war with India. Bhutto offered Wali Khan to lead the delegation to hold peace talks with

India, Wali Khan declined by saying that India won the war and we would have to

accept the conditions of India and did not agree to the responsibility of the blunders

committed by others. Just two days later Bhutto lifted ban on NAP as was promised

in the meeting.154 Wali khan welcomed the decision and showed his willingness to

extend his cooperation for the cause of real democracy in the country however he

regretted that a democratically elected party is ruining the country under Martial Law,

in the of the emancipation of the people and the prosperous and progressive

Pakistan.155 On one hand Bhutto accepted the majority of the NAP-JUI (H) but on the

other without taking into confidence popularly elected majority party leaders

appointed his close friend and associate in the PPP Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao

as the Governor of KPK. When Wali khan showed his concerns Bhutto expressed

regret and promised to take Wali Khan into confidence in such importance decisions

in future. Bhutto invited the NAP Bloch leaders Sardar Khair Bux Marry and Sardar

Ata Ullah Khan Mangal for the negotiations to appoint Baluchistan’s governor

90 .Bhutto got concerned when the Bloch leader reached Peshawar to discuss issue with

Wali Khan instead of meeting with Bhutto. Bhutto appointed Ghaus Bux Bizinjo as the Governor of Baluchistan, the Chief of Sarwan. The Bloch leaders showed their

discontent and arranged public demonstrations against this decision.756

2.10 United Democratic Front On 13 March 1972, an alliance of six major opposition parties and

independent members was formed with Pir Pagarra became its President. The

objective of the alliance was to unite opposition against “arbitrary” nature of the

actions of the ruling PPP. Its first meeting was held at Peshawar on 23 April, 1973.157 though the front (UDF) could not achieve substantial response from the people but

succeeded to an extent to awaken the people about the importance of the opposition to the ruling regime.158 The UDF was established at Rawalpindi in which all the

opposition political parties had participated except TI.159 The main aim of the alliance was to make a united struggle for the restoration of democracy, release of political

prisoners, to check on dictatorial acts of the government and the implementation of

Islamic and parliamentary constitution.160 The UDF again met on 1st March 1973, to

discuss how it should work in the future. In this regard on 2nd March, 1973, at

Islamabad, UDF presented its main points as following;

1. The UDF would show the path of brotherhood, love and unity.

2. The safety of geographic boarders would be the prime aim of the Front.

3. It would struggle to make the implementation of an Islamic Democratic

Federal Parliamentary constitution possible in this country.161

4. It would make all attempts of the arbitrary rule impossible.

5. It would struggle to provide basic necessities of life to the people.162

6. It is in favor of provincial autonomy and the center would not be allowed to

interfere in the matter of the provinces.

91 8. It would combat every movement which would try to disintegrate Pakistan.

9. It would work for the freedom of press.

10. It would work for setting the enquiry for discovering the truth about the

discovery of arms from the Iraqi Embassy. This enquiry must be prosecuted

by the high judicial commission and the results of the research should be

published. It further demanded that the people who were involved in this

conspiracy should be punished.163

11. It would work for the rights of all those students, scholars and journalists who

are working for the stability and progress of Pakistan.

12. It would work for the release of civilian and military prisoners of the 1971

war.164

13. It would not allow any party or government to violate the democratic political

traditions.

14. It would combat all the internal and external conspiracies.

15. It would struggle for the end of the emergency.165

The opposition felt strengthened on the platform of UDF and was ready to

face the despotic rule of the PPP. In the UDF the secular leader of the KPK Wali

Khan had joined the Sindh Hur leader Pir Pagaro and Islamic fundamentalist Mufti

Mehmood of the JUI.166 The UDF was a combination of all opposition parties having

different political agendas and ideologies but had common anti-Bhutto agenda. Pir

Pagaro was elevated as the President of the UDF and he suggested to boycott the

National Assembly till Bhutto promised a constitution to the nation.167 Professor

Ghafoor Ahmad was elected as General Secretary of the UDF and Mufti Mahmood

and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan were elected as Vice-Presidents. UDF formed a

committee of five members who had submitted the alterations in the constitutional

92 draft proposed by President Bhutto. Later on talks were held between Bhutto and the

members of the UDF to sort out the problems on the issue of the constitution.168 Soon

after entering into the UDF the Council Muslim League (CML) divided into two

factions. Some politicians had criticized their respective leaders for entering into the

alliance which was headed by the NAP. They were critical of the role of Wali Khan

and his fellow party men in the Pakistan movement. They questioned the patriotism of the NAP vis-a-vis for Pakistan and requested other political parties not to enter into

any alliance with the NAP.169 On 17th February 1973 the Constitutional Bill was

finally presented in the National Assembly by Hafeez Pirzada, Minister of Law and

Parliamentary Affairs. He requested the opposition for co-operation and cleared that

matters like provincial autonomy and division of power between center and provincial

governments were open for debate.170 In the beginning the UDF demanded hundreds

of changes in the Constitutional Bill. But later the UDF reduced their demands to

eleven major points, which are presented above in the form of 15 points. 171 UDF

completely refused to compromise on its proposed eleven demands in any case. The wrong political strategies of Bhutto helped the Opposition to form this alliance.

Demonstrations against the PPP started in the whole country as this Front was the

amalgamation of national opposition parties. The purpose of these demonstrations was to pressurize the government on constitutional issue.172 On 23 March 1973 at

Liaqat Bagh, Rawalpindi, the public meeting of the UDF was organized. It was

attacked by law enforcing agencies and PPP supporters. 173 This made the political

situation tense. The UDF warned the PPP that they would boycott the National

Assembly. Such news was not taken as a good one by Bhutto because without their

participation the constitution could not be adopted.174 Bhutto had completely understood the importance of the UDF. To tackle the situation in a proper way, he met

93 with many opposition leaders on 2 April, 1973. But Wali Khan and Pir Pagaro were

excluded from this meeting.175 Basically Bhutto had met the leaders of his choice and

it was an attempt to divide the political opponents of him. In this meeting, Bhutto had

accepted some demands of the leaders in the constitution which he had rejected earlier

for the last six months. He had also made a conciliatory attempt towards the religious

parties like JUI, JUP, JI, though his main purpose was the isolation of Wali Khan. He

agreed to the demands of the religious parties that Prime Minister and President must be a Muslim and he also promised that special facilities would be guaranteed throughout the country for the study of Arabic and the Publication of the correct and

exact version of Holy Quran.176 From 9 April 1973, the third meeting on the

Constitution Bill started in the absence of the opposition. The law minister once again

requested the opposition to co-operate with the party in majority. This appeal proved

affective as the opposition decided to participate in the discussion for the constitution.

This meeting was the turning point as Bhutto accepted all the eleven points of the

UDF on the condition that opposition would return to the Assembly. Bhutto's efforts were successful and in the end he presented the nation a gift of the consensus

document in the shape of constitution of 1973 with no vote against it.177 Bhutto had taken all these steps not only because he wanted to compensate the opposition or to

give permanent constitution to the country but also to give some more life to his tenure.178 In the first week of August 1973, the National convention of the UDF was

called in Lahore. The UDF was not satisfied with the behavior and the attitude of the

PPP. The UDF declared that it would launch a nationwide movement if the basic

rights and civil liberties of the citizens were not restored in the country by 24 August

1973.179 It requested for lifting of section 144 to restore freedom of expression after the enforcement of the permanent constitution. The UDF had declared 14 August, a

94 deadline to the state for conceding its seven new demands. These demands included,

lifting of emergency, the release of political prisoners (including students and labour

leaders), freedom of the press, withdrawal of cases against students and labour

leaders, repeal of the Press Ordinance and decline in the prices of essential

commodities.180 The disobedience movement which was the byproduct of the ruling

party’s behavior, started. However, this movement proved to be a total failure. There were two main reasons behind this failure. Firstly, there was the difficulty to

coordinate the movement because of the heavy floods and secondly, it seemed insane that one political group was demanding democracy in a country that was apparently

functioning within the democratic frame work. 181

2.11 Bhutto's Political Reforms

To appreciate the reforms instituted during Bhutto's time, no major factors

must be borne in mind besides the populist nature of his regime and the global tendency towards increased nationalization of economic activity. The social impact of

industrialization was limited and a large proportion of the population was only

peripherally touched by its growth. Political parties during the period were dominated by landed gentry and industrial elites. PPP emerged as party of diverse classes.

Industrial workers, peasants, shopkeepers, small industrialists, the intelligentsia, the

middle classes and even enlightened or opportunistic sections of the propertied

classes, all were found in its ranks. Its membership reached to great number within

months. The movement of 1968-69 against Ayub Khan led by PPP was able to attract the urban middle classes, professionals, students and the politically deprived sections

of the landed classes. Thus, very rapidly, the People's Party grew in size, carrying within its ranks a multiplicity of rural and urban classes. The nationalistic posture, which enabled Mr. Bhutto restore dignity and pride to a nation which had suffered

95 humiliation in the 1971 war. 182 The overwhelming success of the PPP in the

elections in West Pakistan gave Mr. Bhutto the political strength to push through

policies, which a weak government could have not done.

2.12 Constitutional Reforms

After the end of Ayub regime, Pakistan had its first elections on one-person-

one-vote basis in December 1970. The PPP emerged as the majority party in West

Pakistan. Bhutto formed the government in Pakistan on 20th December 1971. Ayub

Khan's constitution of 1962 had already ceased to exist after the imposition of martial

law by General Yahya. In April 1973 the Bhutto government promulgated a new

constitution; it relied heavily on the principles of the constitution drawn up in 1956.183

2.13 Tripartite Constitutional Agreement

On 6th March 1972 a tripartite agreement by President Bhutto and the

opposition parties of NAP and JUI, G.M Syed actively assisted this agreement to the

agreement. By virtue of this agreement, Arbab Sikander Khan Khalil was made

governor of KPK and Ghaus Bux Bazinjo was to be the governor of Baluchistan.

Opposition parties NAP-JUI would form the governments in KPK and Baluchistan.184

.G. M. Syed played an active role to assist the PPP and NAP-JUI to reached Tripartite

Accord.185 Tripartite Agreement was signed by PPP chairman Bhutto, NAP leader

Wali Khan and JUI leader Mufti Mehmood under this agreement it was decided that

Martial Law would be lifted by 11th August 1972, constitutional issues and the

appointment of the governors of the provinces of KPK and Baluchistan were also

decided in this agreement. But the politicians could not maintain the spirit of this

agreement.186 The silent features of the Tripartite Agreement were as following:

1. National Assembly session would meet on 14 April 1972 for a period not more than three days.

96 2. The government would be run on the basis of interim constitution and committee of National Assembly would draft a permanent constitution for the country 3. Martial Law would be lifted from 14 August 1972 4. The limited purpose session of the National Assembly to be held on April 14, would have three items on the agenda: a). to vote on a motion of confidence in President Bhutto’s government, b). to vote on a proposal that the interim constitution be passed on the basis of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Indian Independence Act, 1947, “with constitutional amendments”, and c). to vote on a proposal that martial law would continue till August 14. 5. Those elected as members of more than one Assembly would be permitted to retain their seats in both the houses till the constitution was finally adopted. 6. The President, the Vice-President, governors, ministers and advisers, both at the centre and in the provinces, would remain members of the Assemblies to which they were elected. 7. Until the National Assembly framed the permanent constitution, the Central government would continue to have the right to appoint governors in the provinces. As a compromise, however, the centre would appoint governors in consultation with the majority party in the two provinces of KPK and Baluchistan. 8. The governments at the centre and provinces would be formed on the basis of parliamentary majorities. The three parties settled for PPP rule at the Centre, in Punjab and Sindh, and NAP-JUI rule in the KPK and Baluchistan. 9. These provincial Assemblies would be convened on April 21, a week after the meeting of the National Assembly. 10. The constitution drafting committee would present its report on August 1, and the National Assembly would reconvene on August 14, the day on which martial law would be lifted.187

Bhutto agreed to lift Martial Law by 14th August 1972, the same day when the

National Assembly session was summoned to consider the draft of permanent

97 constitution for country. Till approval of new constitution the government of the

country would be run under the interim constitution.188

Interim constitution based on Government of India Act 1935 and Indian

Independence Act 1947 came in force on 21st April 1972. This constitution passed

112 documents, comprising seven schedules and 290 clauses. Though for a

constitutional amendment two-third majority in the National Assembly was required but it was not difficult for Bhutto to bring amendments to the constitution owing to the majority of PPP in the National Assembly. Out of the total six amendments in

constitution made in 1970, four were to give more powers to executive; Bhutto became chief executive (PM) after passing 1973 constitution.189 Bhutto himself

admitted that the three constitutional amendments were brought in order to check the

attitude of opposition whereas he termed the attitude of opposition as non-

democratic.190 Bhutto lifted the martial law from the country after four month of

assumption of his office. He introduced interim constitution in the country. This

constitution was based on 290 clauses and seven schedules and approved by those

representatives who were elected in 1970 elections. The interim constitution provided

for a centralized government with a presidential system at the center and a

parliamentary system in the provinces.191 According to the 1973 Constitution,

Pakistan was to become a parliamentary democracy. The National Assembly

members 'would be elected through adult franchise for a period of five years. The

leader of the political party with a majority in the Assembly would be asked to form a

government by the president who, constitutionally, was a figurehead. The Prime

Minister would select his cabinet. A vote of no-confidence in the government by a

majority in the National Assembly would result dissolving the government and calling

for fresh elections.192 The significant innovation introduced by the 1973 constitution

98 was the establishment of a Senate or Upper House. The Senate would consist of an

equal number of members from each province, irrespective of its population strength.

These would be persons nominated by the members of each provincial assembly. Any bill passed by the National Assembly had to be approved by a majority in the Senate before it could become the law of the land. Similarly any bill passed by the Senate

had to be approved by the National Assembly before being adopted as a law. The

Senate offered two advantages: firstly it could work as a think-tank consisting of

people who were specialists, professionals, scientists, academics etc. In other words, those having no electoral base could enter the supreme decision-making body of the

system.193 Secondly, and extremely important, the minority provinces had an equal

status in the Senate which, therefore could safeguard their interests..194 At the

provincial level, there were four assemblies, one for each province. The members of these were elected on the basis of adult franchise in each province. The leader of the

majority party in the house would forms the provincial government. This ensured a

high degree of political autonomy for each province. The National Assembly could

not make any changes in the political leadership of provinces without amending the

constitution itself by at least a three-fourth majority.195 The Bhutto government's

constitutional arrangement suffered from a number of weaknesses. PPP enjoyed and

overwhelming majority in the National Assembly and due to the organizational

structure of the party powers were rested in the hands of Bhutto. Bhutto was not

dependent on parliamentarians of his party as he enjoyed a direct relationship with the

masses without the mediation of the party’s elected members. So it was easy for the

party high command to amend the constitution and Bhutto made a number of

amendments in the constitution.

99 2.14 Economic and Social Reforms of Bhutto

Bhutto sought to consolidate and strengthen PPP among people of Pakistan

including rural and urban areas of the country. PPP supported the poor by policies of

land and labour reform and by the nationalization of industries, financial institution

and schools. Such reforms were condemned as half-hearted by leftist groups

associated and grouped with PPP who were already dissatisfied by the opportunist

entry of landlords into its ranks and by Bhutto’s personalization of power. At the

same time the reforms created powerful enemies among the propertied classes. The

policies of' the Bhutto period are discussed under the following headings:

1. Agrarian/Land Reforms

2. Labour Reforms

3. Educational Reforms

4. Industrial Policies

We shall now discuss each separately.

2.15 Agrarian Reforms/Land Reforms

PPP mustered a great support of the silent majority of the rural poor people,

small peasants and tenants in the election of 1970. PPP promised to introduce land

reforms on the lines of Socialism in all sectors especially in agriculture sector. PPP

introduced two major reforms; a new ceiling on landownership, and security of tenancy. During the Ayub Era the ceiling on land ownership was five hundred acres in

irrigated and one thousands non-irrigated land. Bhutto reduced the ceiling to two

hundred and fifty acres irrigated and five hundreds non-irrigated land. The excess

land, attained from land reforms, would obviously be allocated to small peasants to

raise their income levels.196

100 After assuming power Bhutto introduced various reforms. A Martial Law

Regulation, (MLR) 115 of 1972 was promulgated on the 11 March 1973. The most

important one related to agrarian reforms.197 Under this order agriculture land ceiling

on individual holding was reduced from 1000 acres of non-irrigated and 500 irrigated

land to 300 and 150 acres respectively. Bhutto pressed quickly with his reforms

program, disregarding warnings from various quarters, including Chinese premier

Zhou En Lai. 198 In January 1977, just before the general election, Bhutto announced the second phase of land reforms. The ceiling for irrigated land was fixed 100 acres

and for non-irrigated 200 acres.199 In November 1975 small land owners, owning land up to 12 acres irrigated and 25 acres non-irrigated were exempted from all kinds of

land revenue and taxes. 7.27 million farmers were benefited through this scheme.200

These land reforms were a severe blow to the landed aristocracy, especially in

Punjab where full emphasis was given to these reforms.201 Concessions related to

orchard forms, shikargahs (hunting land, games) and stud farms were withdrawn.202

Similarly big lands allotted to government servants/bureaucrats by previous

governments were also reformed accordingly. People were not allowed to have land

more than a certain limits for studs and cattle farms as they managed to retain their big lands during Ayub’s land reform. These reforms were well propagated by

government and party machinery but despite the fact the landed class created many

obstacles for the government to get the maximum positive outcome of the reforms as

intra-family transfer and allowances for tractor and tube well owners could increase their individual ceilings. Even in some areas the landless were shown owners of the

land only in papers, in a fictitious manner. The land acquired from these reforms were

allotted to landless tenants free of cost, and if any tenants was liable of any tax or

revenue dues in connection with the reforms introduced by previous governments,

101 were exempted.203 Bhutto also announced that the lands allotted to military officers in boarder areas and instead these officers attained land in interior areas would be

confiscated. More than 100 acres land from the civil officer would be confiscated and

distributed among landless tenants. Lands recovered as a result of reforms would be

constituted in Guzaara units, and would be distributed accordingly. 204 State land

recovered from feudal lords would not be auctioned but would be given on easy

installment to poor landless tenants. Tax would be paid by land owners and not by tenants. If a land owner intended to sale the land tenants would be given preference.

Agriculture produce(batai) would be distributed on 50, 50 basis. The reforms of 1972

resumed 1.3 million acres and 0.9 millions of which was distributed among 76000

landless tenants in 1977, under the second phase of reforms 1.8 million acres were

resumed and distributed.205

These reforms brought a socio-economic change in the rural society of Punjab

and Sind, as the poor tenants got their land and got free from the clutches of the feudal

lords, at least to an extent. These reforms also affected the agricultural produce.206

But these radical reforms introduced by Bhutto government were partially effective.

As the landlords in connivance with state bureaucracy and got away with large

portions of their estates by forging the books and other corrupt methods.207 As a result

of these reforms big land lords and some of the high ups in the government, were

included among those who had to give their lands. A sum of 4.9 million acres of land was received by government in result of these reforms. 208 These reforms endangered

Pakistan’s “feudal lords,” often inherited land owners, who succeeded to avoid the

reforms putting land holdings in the name of distant relatives, servants and friends.

Thus, Bhutto alienated a powerful political force without attaining the benefits of the

land reforms.209 Though in the words of a leading authority on the land question: ‘the

102 1972 land reforms did not make even a dent in the concentration of land in the Indus

Basin’210.The situation of status-quo did not change much of the British Colonial Era,

as landlords, either personally or through their middlemen, continued to exercise

arbitrary jurisdiction over the daily affairs of the peasants. As a result of ignorance,

lack of means or intimations by police officers was denied access to the legal channels

of the law enforcement and judicial system against century-old hold of the landlords

on the lands.211 Bhutto challenged but not completely destroyed the exploitations of the feudal culture in this country that was why he needed to introduce more reforms

prior to the elections of 1977 and promised even more after the elections. In

admission of the failure of earlier measures Bhutto announced more stringent land

reforms on the eve of the 1977 elections.212 Provincial governments issued ordinance to allot 5-marlas plots to non-proprietors in rural areas for the housing purposes. Such

5-marlas plots were allotted in various areas of the country to non-proprietors. About

seven lack plots were allotted to the artisans, labourers and other low-paid workers

free of cost, unprecedented in the history of Pakistan.213 It is important to note that the

reforms, rather than signaling a shift in the balance of power in the favor of poor tenants, which was the primary objective of the peoples’ government, encouraged

Punjabi landlords to enter the PPP’s ranks in order to safeguard their positions and they managed to accommodate themselves in successive regimes, even after Bhutto.

Bhutto liberally awarded PPP election tickets to these landlords in 19977.214 When

Bhutto’s decline was started and eventually his government was overthrown by

General Zia these big land lords joined the hands of dictator against Bhutto for their

class interests.215

103 2.16 Labour Reforms

Bhutto announced a far reaching and comprehensive package of labour reforms on

10th February, 1972. Hanif Ramy minister Labour and Manpower and a left-wing

intellectual was the man behind the preparation of these reforms. Work councils and

labour courts were to be set up under these reforms and their powers were increased.

Compulsory system of elected, shop stewards, safeguard against arbitrary termination

from service and labour courts to address labour disputes, profit-sharing measures for workers, cheap housing and free education to the children of workers, at least one

child of every workers, rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining, and

assurance of greater security of service was ensured. Insurance against injuries and

old-age pension schemes were also introduced. 216 Though these reforms gave powers to the workers and many strikes and agitations and protest were launched against the

government as the workers were expecting lot more from the elected peoples’

government as promised by PPP during its election campaign. 217

The main features of this policy were:

1. Workers participation in management at the factory level. 2. The right of Collective Bargaining Agent to appoint auditors for auditing the accounts of the company. 3. Increase in the rate of workers shares in companies profit from 2% to 4% and later to 5% 4. Procedure for the redress of individual grievances. 5. Empowering the Labour Courts to go into all the facts of the case while adjudicating and determining an individual grievance including a grievance arising out of dismissal. 6. Introduction of pension scheme for the workers. 7. Settlement of disputes at the works council level. 8. Curtailment of the period of strike/lock-out notice from 21 to 14 days. 9. Statement of reason for termination of services for any reason whatsoever. 10. Statutory bonus up to one month’s pay in the event of profit. 11. Application of certain laws to contractor’s workers. 12. Nomination of workers representative on the governing body of workers welfare fund.

104 13. Payment of entire contribution to pension and social security institution by the employer. 14. Group insurance scheme for workers. 15. Making safety measures more effective. 16. Introduction of group incentive scheme. 17. Amendment of the definition of industrial dispute taking out the enforcement of a right guaranteed by law, award or settlement to a worker from the ambit of the definition of industrial dispute. 18. Enhancement in the scope of unfair labour practices and its punishment. 19. Establishment of NIRC and determination of its role. 20. Establishment of wage commission for Banks.218

These labour reforms did not apply on daily-wages workers and not fixed the

minimum wages which alienated left-wing active workers of party. A bloody clash between striking industrial workers and law enforcement agencies, called by

government to quell the strike in Karachi offended the left-wing activists of party and

consequently Miraj Muhammad Khan a young Krachiite ideologue parted ways with

Bhutto.219 These strikes adversely affected the performance of newly nationalized

industrial units in various parts of country. Workers participation mandatory under the

reforms caused some problems. The government found itself caught between two

constituencies of support and was unable to please and appease none of the two.

Many small scale enterprises were located in Punjab in such towns as Gujrat,

Wazirabad and Kamoke become part of the collapse of the PPP stronghold in the

Punjab in 1977 election is attributable to the alienation of the small entrepreneurs. The

erosion of business confidence hit investment which declined across the country.

Industrial sector leading to rising unemployment for workers whose lives were

already made miserable and deplorable by the rising prices of the load stuffs.

Ironically improved conditions which some section of the working class experienced

owned for more to the governments encouragement of the export of the labour to Gulf than to its wanted reform program. 220 Despite the efforts of the government these

105 labour reforms could not yield the desired results to satisfy the labour community in

large.

2.17 Educational Reforms On 15th March 1972, the new education reforms were announced by Bhutto

government. Under these reforms universal and free education up to matriculate

classes was ensured all over the country. After nationalizing all educational

institutions, except the missionary schools, the students would have the opportunity to

get education irrespective of their financial and social status. More than four hundred

schools and a large number of colleges were nationalized only in Sind and Punjab

provinces.221 221

The aims of nationalization were envisaged by government that to end the

exploitation of poor masses, to develop a uniform education system and to end the

exploitation of teachers and other staff members. Special institutions were announced to setup for the gifted and talented students, both male and female, irrespective of their financial background and their expenditures were to be met by government. 1st

October 1972 was declared as National Literacy Day to create awareness among the

masses in various parts of the country.222 Teachers training and induction of female teachers in primary section would be ensured. A reasonable amount would be

allocated for students to get higher education. National Book Foundation would be

founded to develop curriculum and reference books.223

A number of measures were announced to uplift higher education in the

country. Several institutions were announced to be raised to the status of universities.

A new university for Baluchistan in Quetta would be built which would include a

medical college, engineering college in Karachi, engineering and agriculture college

in Peshawar and a university and a secondary board were also the part of education

policy of 1972.224 A body called University Grants Commission (UGC) was to be

106 formed to regulate and coordinate the functions of universities of the country. UGC was to act as a buffer between government and universities administration. University

Ordinance of Ayub Era was promised to be revised and remove the objectionable

clauses. To promote scientific and technological knowledge in the country Centers of

Excellence were to be developed in the universities under UGC. 225

The rationalization of the education system and an ambitious mass literacy

program were the more important features of the intended social improvement during

Bhutto period. . The employment of better trained teachers and the provision of technical and scientific apparatus were promised. Such large-scale nationalization

caused panic among the owners of these institutions as no compensation was paid to them.226

2.18 Industrial Policies

In January 1972 the Bhutto government introduced the nationalization of over thirty large firms in the basic industries. These measures which kept the promise of

PPP manifesto was intended to eliminate once for all poverty and discrimination in

Pakistan. Two months later nationalization was extended to the financial sector with the take-over of the life insurance companies.227 The following November the

government setup a state life insurance corporation of Pakistan.228 The next burst of

nationalization took place and it involved ghee industry, quite contrary to previous

measure this affected the small industry owner who had supported the PPP in 1970

elections. Significantly small traders and merchants were at the forefront of the 1977

anti-Bhutto movement

Chief economist in the planning commission during Ayub regime Dr.

Mehboobul Haq caught the attention of people when he revealed that 66% of nation’s

industrial wealth, 70% of insurance assets and 80% of bank assets were owned by

107 twenty-two families. General Habibullah Khan a noted army officer, whose daughter was married to Ayub Khan’s son was arrested and shown on television hand cuffed

and put into the prison by Bhutto government.. According to Mehboobul Haq

disclosure, he was amongst the 22 richest families of Ayub Khan’s era.229 Just within two weeks of assuming power by PPP about two dozen large firms were nationalized by the government, reportedly these large firms were in control of 60% of nation’s wealth. Bank and insurance campaigns were also nationalized.230 Where the Bhutto

government left its greatest mark was in the industrial sector. Maulana Kauser Niazi

and Miraj Muhammad were appointed as advisors and Rafi Raza as the special

assistant to the president. On 1st January, 1972 just twelve days after assuming power

Bhutto government issued the economic reforms ordinance.231 Under this ordinance

heavy industry was nationalized including heavy engineering, iron and steel,

automobile, oil refineries, gas and electricity, cement petro-chemicals and basic

chemicals. This large scale nationalization was a serious blow to the ‘twenty-two’

families who dominated the economic scene and were influential since Ayub Khan

Era and later became arch enemies of Bhutto and lavishly participated in anti-Bhutto

campaign to set their score with the later. 232

Bhutto government confiscated about five hundred passports of thirty two big businessmen and land holders family and asked them to bring back their wealth

deposited in the foreign banks. This act frightened the wealthy families and forced them to go to anti-Bhutto camps.233 'The main thrust of his policies was the

nationalization program, Large chunks of the large-scale industry, rice threshing, vegetable oil production, and the sugar industry were all fully nationalized. Large

companies in some of the other industries including tractors manufacturing, fertilizers,

steel, were also taken over.

108 According to Philip A. Jones there were multiple reasons. Due to large

scale industrialization during Ayub era distributional inequalities emerged in urban

sector. Large scale industrial wealth was concentrated in few hands. White-color and

industrial workers were not sharing wealth in industrial development. Secondly due to

concentration of population in big urban centers in result of industrialization mass

mobilization and effective opposition emerged in these urban areas.234 So to keep the

rural population away from the urban middle class protests Bhutto government

needed to appease the peasants in their own areas. 235 The urban population, therefore,

often provided 'leadership’ to mass movements. An important part of the active

popular support for the PPP had come from the urban workers and middle classes.

The nationalization program of Bhutto's government had many implications. there was a great deal of pressure on the PPP to introduce radical industrial reforms.

“Managing Agency System” a legacy of nineteenth century British India and was in

practice to abuse the position of directors and to concentrate the wealth. The abolition

of this system was a serious blow to the Finpols. Thus they turned against Bhutto and

resisted his policies. 236 On one hand the resistance of Finpols the private investment

dropped drastically on the other, due to, bureaucratization of industry and the

government policies to increase the public investment the fruits of nationalization

could not be attained considerably. Table 1 shows the ratio of public and private

investment during Bhutto years.

109 Table 1 Private and Public Sector Industrial Investment ______(million of rupees)______Year Private Public Total Public investme nt as % of total 1971-72 1235 99 1334 7 1972-73 1018 111 1130 10 1973-74 1023 391 1440 28 1974-75 1437 1065 2502 43 1975-76 1818 3182 5000 64 1976-77 1795 4315 6110 71 Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 1976-77. (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, 1977), 43

To control the supply of money on one hand and to regulate the

allocation of resources on the other hand Bhutto government nationalized the private banks. 237 The “bureaucratization” of industry and the recession of global markets

resulted the close down of many industrial units and the work-force problems

emerged 238 Business and industrial groups discomforted by nationalization and

reforms of Bhutto and when movement started against him they lavishly supported the

movement239. The opposition parties of smaller provinces especially KPK and

Baluchistan perceived him as the dominance of the centralist forces led by Punjab and

considered his reformist policies as interventions and resisted them. The religious

rightists particularly JI perceived Bhutto’s socialist policy as anti-religion and called

him a kafir (nonbeliever). 240 Those business and commercial families (Finpols),241 who developed close relations with the then political leadership and provided

financial infrastructure in the formative years of Pakistan. During Ayub era these

families progressed and developed industrial houses. Thus Finpols were assigned a

pivotal role in the country’s economy by the then rulers. On the basis of heavy wealth

and financial power they were referred to as “22 families.242 These Finpols were felt threatened when Bhutto came in power. When in January 1972 Bhutto announced a

110 drastic reformist agenda they became more skeptical and lent their discreet support in the opposition camp.243

Bhutto like any reformist tried to satisfy both the radicals and conservatives

classes predominantly represented in his party. 244 The reformist measures of Bhutto

cold not bring revolutionary changes to fully satisfy the poor and downtrodden, the

major constituency of Bhutto and had considered him a “messiah’ for them. Thus, on the other hand, by introducing large-scale reforms Bhutto antagonized the urban bourgeoisies, the rural gentry and religious right by introducing modernizing the

society, and other components of ruling establishment. His tilt towards Muslim world,

Third World also antagonized the “big foreign powers”.245 So when the ruling classes

sponsored the movement against Bhutto in 1977 under the banner of PNA the

common masses were mobilized effectively against the dissolution of his government

and his consequent execution in a maneuvered murder case.

The role of PNA will be discussed in details in next chapter.

111 NOTES & REFERENCES

1 A. G. Heeger. Politics in the Post Military State: Some Reflections o f Pakistani Experience. World Politics, 2 ( January, 1977), 242-256. 2 Haig Patapan, John Wanna, and Patrick Moray Weller, Westminster Legacies: Democracy and Responsible Government in Asia and the Pacific. (Sydney, NSW: UNSW Press, 2005), 54. 3 R. Majumdar, Pakistan: Jinnah to the Present Day. (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1998), 431 4 Philip E.Jones, The Pakistan People's Party: Rise to Power. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003),67. 5 Ibid., 68. 6 Mujumdar,Pakistan , 437. 7In his civilian government Muhammad Ali Bogra as the prime minister formed his second cabinet and included Ayub Khan, the army chief, as the defense minister, interestingly when Ayub Khan imposed martial law he chose Muhammad Ali Bogra his former boss as foreign minister in his dictatorial regime.7 8 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,The Myth of independence. ( London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 15. 9Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment. ( Karachi:Oxford University Press, 1999), 137. 10 Faisal Devji,Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea. ( London: C. Hurst Publishers, 2013), 217. 11A.H Kardar, Pakistan’s Soldiers o f Fortune. 144. 12 Ibid. 13 J. Hennery Korson, Contemporary Problems of Pakistan. ( Colorado: West view Press, 1993), 58. 14Hassan Askari Rizvi,Military, State and Society in Pakistan. (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000), 166. 15 Krishna Chandra Sagar, The War of the Twins. ( New Delhi: Northern Books, 1997), 86. 16Ahemad Raza Khan Kasuri Private Interview Islamabad Dated: February 8, 2012 17Salman Taseer, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: A political Biography. (London: Ithaca Press, 1979) ,72. 18Mujamdar. Pakistan, 439. 19Ibid., 438. 20Ashok Kapur,Pakistan in Crises. ( London: Routledge Publishers, 1991), 111. 21 Mujamdar,Pakistan , 431. 22Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History o f Pakistan.. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 355. 23Morning News Dhaka, Nawa-i-Waqt Lahore, 25 February 1967. 24 Khan. Constitutional and Political History o f Pakistan, 437. 25Jones, People’s Party, 113. 26 Bhutto’s mother was a Hindu Rajput who had converted to Islam before getting married with Shahnawaz Bhutto. 27 Shahid Javed Burky, State and Society in Pakistan.1971-77. (London: The Macmillan Press, 199), 88. 28. Lal Khan, Pakistan's Other Story: The 1968-69 Revolution. (Lahore: The Struggle Publications, 2008), 244. 29Ronald James May, VibertoSelochan, The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific .Edited ( New South Wales: Crawford Publishing House, 1998), 19. 30Hafeez Malik. Pakistan: Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 84. 31Ibid., 90. 32 Military dictators joined hands with landed gentry and bureaucracy having their roots of ruling experience deep into the British Imperialist rule in this territory, eventually they formed a powerful strata known as “Establishment”. 33 Malik, Pakistan, 91. 34 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 54. 35 Qayum Nizami, Jarnail aur Siyasatda awam ki adalat men. Urdu. ( Generals and Politicians in Public Court). (Lahore: Jahangir Books, 2009) ,83. 36Ibid., 84. 37Malik, Pakistan, 118. 38JavedSidiq Resident Editor Daily Nawa-i-Waqt Private Interview Islamabad on 24 February 2014 39 Rizvi.Military, State and Society in Pakistan, 167. 40Burky, State and Society in Pakistan, 88. 41Haroon k. Ullah, Vying for Allah's Vote : Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence and Extremism in Pakistan. ( New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 84. 42 Bhutto’s mother Khursheed Bhai was from a humble family background of Bombay and could not have the status of a “first wife” in the house of Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto, as she was also the second wife. 43Jones, People’s Party, 113. 44 Khan. Pakistan’s Other Story, 331.

112 45The Pakistan Times Lahore. 17 September, 1967 46Jones, People’s Party, 114. 47 Pakistan Chronology, 1947-1997: With Prologue and Afterword. (Islamabad: Govt. of Pakistan, Directorate General of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Media Development, 1998), 253. 48 PDM comprised the national democratic Front of East Pakistan, council Muslim League, and the Nizam-e-Islam party. 49 The Pakistan Times Lahore, 6 November, 1967 50Abdul Ghafoor Bhurgri, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Falcon of Pakistan. (Karachi: SZABIST, 2000), 254. 51 The founding documents of PPP reads that; Islam hamara deenhy (Islam is our religion), Socialism hmari maeeshiyat hy. (Socialism is our economy), Jamhooriyat hmari syasathy. (democracy is our polity), takat ka sarchishma awam hen. (Powers lie in the hands of common people). ( PPP’s founding documents). 52 Lal Khan, Pakistan’s Other Society, 53 Ted. G.A. Pakistan under challenge (Oxford University press London, 1975),27. 54Lal Khan. Pakistan’s Other Story, 208 55 Ted. G.A. Pakistan under challenge, 32. 56Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Volume 28, Issue 2. ( Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research,2007),36. 57 Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. ( California: Stanford University Press, 2012), 99 . 58IanTalbot, The Destruction of democracy.(London: Oxford University press, 1984),81. 59Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the twentieth century. A political History,( London: Oxford University press., 2007),373. 60 Hamid Khan. Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 543. 61 Talbot. Democracy, 82. 62 Ramachandra Guha, Makers of Modern Asia. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 292, 63 Ibid 83. 64Shahid Javed Burky .Pakistan: Continuing Search fo r Nationhood.. (Lahore: Book Corporation, 1986). 145 65 Cohen, The Idea o f Pakistan. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 135 66 Ibid. 67Mubashir Hasan, The Mirage o f Power: An Inquiry into the Bhutto Years, 1971-1977. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 29-30. 68 Cohen, The Idea o f Pakistan, 138. 69 Ibid., 84. 70 Ian Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005),83. 71 A. H. Kardar, Pakistan's Soldiers o f Fortune. (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1988), 146. 72Ibid. 73 Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, 1967-1977. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 150-51. 74 Ravi Kalia, Pakistan: From the Rhetoric of Democracy to the Rise of Militancy. ( New York : Routledge, 201), 142 75Ghulam Mustafa Khar’s interview with IftikharAhemad Geo TV, dated March 18, 2013 76. Mohammad Asghar Khan, We've Learnt Nothing from History: Pakistan, Politics and Military Power.( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 03. 77Ibid. 78 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 436. 79Ibid., 433. 80 Cohen, The Idea o f Pakistan, 68. 81 United Nations’ Report on Benazir Assassination Case Published in daily Dawn September, 3, 2009, page 14 82 Ibid., 73. 83 Khan, Pakistan’s Other Story, 246. 84 M. S.Korejo, Soldiers o f Misfortune: Pakistan Under Ayub, Yahua, Bhutto & Zia. (Lahore: Ferozsons, 2004),63. 85 Rao Abdul Raseed, Jo main ny dekha( Urdu). ( That I saw). ( Lahore: Atish Fashaan Publications, 1985), 63 86Nizami, Jarnail aur Siyasatda awam ki adalat men,111. 87Ibid., 113. 88Ibid., 114. 89Ibid., 114. 90 Raza, Bhutto and Pakistan, 136. 91 A.R. Siddiqi, East Pakistan: The End Game. Oxford University Press. ( Karachi, 2004), 121. 92 Nizami, Nizami, Jarnail aur Siyasatda awam ki adalat men, 113. 93 Khan, Pakistan’s Other Story , 270. 94Nizami, Jarnail aur Siyasatda awam ki adalat men, 118. 95Ibid., 118.

113 96 Khan. Pakistan’s Other Story, 273,74. 97 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 438. 98 Cohen, The Idea o f Pakistan, 140. 99Ibid., 138. 100Muhammad Anwar, Ebad Baig, Pakistan: Time for Change. (Bloomington. UK: AuthorHouse, 2013), 42. 101 Khan Pakistan’s Other Story, 273. 102 Mujamdar. Pakistan, 440. 103Maj ® Aamir’s letter to IrfanSidiqui, published in daily Jang Rawalpindi, dated 26 April, 2012 104 Raza. Bhutto and Pakistan, 136. 105Ibid., 135. 106 Khan Pakistan’s Other Story, 145. 107 Raza., Bhutto and Pakistan, 134. 108 Ibid., 135. 109Nizami. Jarnail aur Siyasatda awam ki adalat men, 120. 110Nazir Naji. Shakist Ki Awaaz. Daily Jang Rawalpindi, 22 April, 2012 111 Khan. Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 431. 112 Muhammad Wasim, Politics and State in Pakistan. (Islamabad : National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research. 1994), 254. 113 Talbot, Pakistan, 222. 114 Raza, Bhutto andPakistan,144. 115 Ibid. 116 Private Interview with Ahemad Raza Khan Qasuri. Islamabad on February 17, 2013 117Kardar, Soldiers o f Fortune. 147. 118 Dilip Mukharjee,Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; Questfor Power. (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972), 101. 119 Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics.( Cambridge: President and Fellows of Harvard college, 2014), 188. 120 Raza, Bhutto and Pakistan, 152. 121 Ibid., 153. 122 Mujamdar,Pakistan, 450. 123 Ibid. 124 Sayyid Afzal Haidar, Bhutto Trial. (Islamabad: National Commission on History and Culture, 1996), 121. 125Kaussar Niyazi, ZulfiKar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan, Last Days. (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1992),18. 126 Burky Pakistan, 60. 127 Dawn (Lahore) 2 December, 1971 128 Private Interview with Asghar Khan Islamabad, 14 April 2013 129 Mujamdar,Pakistan, 448. 130 Khan. We’ve Learnt nothing from History, 62. 131 Ibid., 63. 132 Mujamdar,Pakistan, 449. 133 Dawn (Karach), 7 October. 1972 134 Mujamdar,Pakistan , 449. 135 Khan, We’ve Learnt Nothing from History, 57 136Ibid., 58. 137Anwar Hussain Syed, The Discourse and Politics o f Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992),181. 138 Lawrence Ziring Pakistan at the Crosscurrent o f History. (Karachi: Vanguards Book, 2004), .279. 139 Hafeez Malik, Pakistan: Founder’s Aspirations and Today’s Realities. ( New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 105. 140Ibid., 106. 141 Talbot, Pakistan, 222. 142 Muhammad Siddique Qureshi,Political Culture in Pakistan. ( Wordmate Publishers, Islamabad, 2002), 352. 143 Hassan Askri Rizvi.Military and Politics in Pakistan. ( Sang-i-Meel Publications, Lahore, 2000), 180 144 Ibid,184. 145Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century. : A political History, (London Oxford University press, 2007), 273. 146Rizvi,Military and Politics in Pakistan, 189. 147Qureshi, Political Culture, 354. 148 Military and Politics in Pakistan, 190. 149 Ian Talbot. The Destruction of Democracy.( London: Oxford University Press, 1984), 84. 150 Ibid,85. 151Charls Canady. Contemporary Problems ofPakistan.( London: Brill Publications. 1974), 74. 152 Salmaan Taseer, Bhutto A Political Biography. (London: Ithaca Press, 1979),188. 153Dawn Karachi 10 December, 1971, Morning News 18 January, 1971.

114 154 Raza, Bhutto, 152 155The Pakistan Times Rawalpindi, 6 January 1971 156 Jones, Pakistan Peoples ’ Party, 113. 157 Muhammad Sidique Qureshi,Political Culture in Pakistan.(Islamabad: Dost Publications, 2002), 126. 158Ibid., 127. 159Asaf Hussain,Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case o f Pakistan. (Folkston, England: Dawson, 1979),212. 160SafdarMahmood, Pakistan: Political Roots And Development 1947-1999 (London: OUP, 2003), 150. 161Tajamul Hussain Anjum,Pakistan: Tarikh-o-Sayasey Jal'sey (Urdu) (Lahore: Nazir Ahmad Publishers, 1993), 407.. 162Hussain, Elite Politics, 212. 163Hussain.Tarikh-o-Sayasey Jasley, 407. 164Hussain, Elite Politics, 213 165Hussain, Tarikh-o-SayaseyJ alsey, 408. 166Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan (Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1978), 40. 167Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto, 212. 168Hussain, Tarikh-o-SayaseyJalsey, 408. 169SaleemYunis, Sayasi Aiathad aur Pakistani Sayasat Per Oun K Asrat (Urdu) (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993),100. 170Rushbrook William, Pakistan Under Challenges (London: Stacey International, 1975), 144. 171Rushbrook, Pakistan Under Challenges, 144. In some books the number of reduce demands are 11 and in some it is 12. 172Muneer Ahmad, Pakistan Kay Sayasi Ithad (Urdu) (Lahore: Frontier Post Publishers, 1993), 74. 173 Harbans Singh Bhatia, Portrait of a Political Murder. (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1979),52. 174 Ibid. 175Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto, 212. 176Ibid., 213. 177 Rush Brook, Challenges, 145. 178 Ibid. 179Waseem, Politics and the State, 335. 180 Kumar,Pakistan, 149. 181Saeed Shafqat, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto. (Boulder, Colombia: Westview Press, 1997),104. 182 Ibid., 294. 183 Z. K. Maluka,. They Myth o f Constitutional Bastion,( Oxford University Press, London, 1995), 54 184 Haider. Bhutto Trial, 80. 185Ibid. 186Ibid., 121. 187 http://www.dawn.com/news/741596/a-leaf-from-history-the-tripartite-agreement. Accssed on 20 November 2013 188 Mujamdar,Pakistan, 449. 189 Ibid., 451. 190 Ibid. 191Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: Enigma of PoliticalDevelopment.(Boulder West View Press, London, 1980), 89. 192 Ibid.,56. 193 Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Senate of Pakistan. Accessed at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_of_Pakistan#Purpose_and_role 194 Ziring, Pakistan, 57. 195Bhatti, Pakistan Affairs, 574. 196Bhatti, Pakistan Affairs.655. 197 Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, Martial Law Regulation No. 115, published inGazette o f Pakistan, Extraordinary, of 11 March 1972. 198 Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 148. 199 Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan. (New York: Praeger, 1980), 91 200Ibid., 92 201 Syed AfzalHaider, Bhutto Trial (Islamabad: National Commission on History and Culture, 1995), 80. 202A.H. Kardar, Pakistan’s Soldiers o f Fortune (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1988). 170. 203 Muhammad Ali Chiragh,Pakistan: Tareekh, Jamhooriat, Siyasat, Aeen 1947-1990. (Urdu, Lahore: Sang-i- Meel Publication, 2004). 280. 204 A small appropriate unit for each landless family allocated by the government. 205 Rafi UdeenShahab, Pakistan Ke Pachass Saal. ( Urdu, Lahore: Maqbool Academy, 2003) ,247. 206 Ibid., 248. 207Lal Khan, Pakistan’s Other Story: The 1968-69 Revolution. (Lahore: The Struggle Publications 2008), 297.

115 208 Shahab, Pakistan Ke Pachass Saal., 247. 209 Stephen Philip Cohen,The Idea o f Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005), 142-43. 210Subrata Kumar Mitra. The Post-Colonial Sate in Asia: Dialectics o f Politics and Culture. (Edited. New York: Harvester Wheat sheaf, 1990), 27. 211Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid. Pakistan: The Unstable State.(Edited. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1983), 32. 212 Talbot. Pakistan: A modern History, 231 213 Sayeed, Pakistan, 92 214 Ian Talbot. Pakistan: A modern History. (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1999), 231. 215 Ravi Shekhar Narain Singh, The Military Factor in Pakistan. (New Delhi :Newbury , 2008),168 216 Sayeed, Pakistan, 100 217 S. Akbar Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan's Economy. ( Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2005 ), 49 218 Labour Policy 1972, LABOUR NEWS. Accessed at: http://www.labournews.net/lnv2/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=4 &Itemid=37 219 Laurent Gayer, Karachi: Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City .(New York : Oxford University Press, 2014) 58 220 Ibid., 557. 221 Hamid Yausuf Pakistan:, in Search o f Democracy 1947-1977 (Lahore Aroasia Publishers, 1980) , 80. 222 J Henry Korson, Contemporary problems of Pakistan. ( Lahore : Pak Book Corp., 1993), 133 223 Ibid 224 Ibid.,134 225 Ibid., 127 226 Mahboob Hussain and Yawar Haroon, Nationalization of Education in Pakistan: Z. A. Bhutto’s Policy and Implementation. Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 21, Issue - 1, 2014. Accessed at: http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/Mehboob_V21_Issue1_2014.pdf 227 Dr. Mubashar Hassan. Private Interview, Model Town Lahore, February, 22, 2012 228 Daily Dawn Lahore, July, 15, 1977 229 Khan, We’ve Learnt nothing from History, 63. 230Ibid., 64. 231J. Henry Korson, Contemporary Problems of Pakistan. (Lahore : Pak Book Corp., 1993), 85 232 Raza, Bhutto and Pakistan, 147. 233 Shahab, Pakistan key Pachaas Saal, 245. 234 Philip. E. Jones. Pakistan Peoples’ Party: Rise to Power (Oxford University Press, London, 2003) , 294. 235 Ibid., 295. 236 Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in a Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan. ( Fokestone Kent: Dawson, 1979), 106 237 Ibid., 572. 238 Ibid., 573. 239 Sayeed, Pakistan, 99 240 Saeed Shafqaat, Reforms of Bhutto, 39 241 Saeed Shafqaat termed thebussiness and commercial families having their connections with the ruling elites as “Finpols”. See: Saeed Shafqaat,Reforms of Bhutto, 39 242 Saeed Shafqaat, Reforms of Bhutto, 44 243 Dalip Mukharjee, Bhutto: quest for power, 178 244 Saeed Shafqaat, Reforms of Bhutto. Journal of south Asia and Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. XI. 3, 1988.Accessed at: http://www.saeedshafqat.com/articles/2011/journal-of-south-asia.pdf. p37 245 Role of other forces against Bhutto, both national and international, will be discussed in details in following chapters i.e. Ch. 3 and Ch.4

116 CHAPTER 3

ROLE OF OPPOSITION AGAINST BHUTTO (PNA) IN 1977

This chapter will deal with role of opposition in 1977 against Bhutto, election

1977 its aftermath, PNA’s rigorous movement against alleged rigging in elections,

negotiations with Bhutto regime , imposition of Martial Law by military under

General Ziaul Haq despite an agreement signed between PNA and government would be discussed in this chapter.

In Pakistan, ruling party considers its “right” to use the governmental

machinery for its election campaign. Bhutto was well aware of the electoral history of

Pakistan as he was one of the key ministers of the ruling party when Ayub Khan held

elections in 1964, and all governmental machinery was used in favour of Ayub Khan to get him re-elected as President of Pakistan against Fatima Jinnah. Bhutto himself

contested the 1970 parliamentary elections and his PPP returned as the largest party in the Western wing of the country. The rulers consider their justified right to use the

state machinery for their elections and they expect not to be questioned for this

action.1 During the Ayub era civil bureaucracy, commissioners and other government

officials were used to get Ayub Khan elected in a controversial election against

Fatima Jinnah. Permits, jobs and other benefits were used to buy the loyalties of

councilors.2 The elections of 1970 were different in a way that the intelligence

agencies gave their reports that religious and right-wing parties would secure more

seats but no single party returned as much successful as to form a stable government.

So Yahya Khan felt easier to maneuver a deal with the parties with scattered mandate to retain power in his hands. Secondly, Yahya Khan was more interested in personal

enjoyments than a substantial political maneuvering. Though some of the elements in the Yahya Khan’s government, with the finance of their associates in the trading and

117 business community supported their favorite candidates in rightist parties but the

election results stunned political pundits and government itself. In Western wing of the country Bhutto’s PPP secured majority and in East Pakistan Mujib-Ur-Rehman’s

Awami League secured an overwhelming majority and became able to form a

government comfortably. For the first time adult franchise based elections were held

in the country and common voters voted against the traditional forces of status-quo

and voted for the parties with revolutionary manifestoes. 3 After staying more than

five years in power Bhutto thought it appropriate to get the fresh mandate as

according to his analysis the opposition was fragmented and would not pose any

substantial threat to his electoral victory. He decided to hold general election in March

1977.4

3.1 Initial Efforts to form an Opposition Alliance

Until the May 1976 many efforts were made to reactivate the United

Democratic Front (UDF) the alliance which was formed as an opposition alliance

against Bhutto government in 1973. But the member parties could not agree upon any

formula. The opposition parties were concerned about the preparation of election and

an unannounced election campaign and many policies and reforms implemented by the ruling PPP to attract the electorates. Air Martial ® Asghar Khan and Maulana

Shah Ahemad Norrani seemed not much interested in widening of the scope of UDF to include more parties in it. The fragmented opposition was a source of

encouragement for PPP.5 Opposition parties were making efforts to succeed to form a

grand alliance to contest election against Bhutto. For them it was the only mean to

give a reasonably tough contest to an overly confident opponent. To give a

psychological set back to his opponents Bhutto invited king of Saudi Arabia, Khalid

Bin Abdul Aziz who not only announced a heavy amount of Rs 300 million US

118 dollars to Pakistan but also laid down the foundation stone of a grand mosque at

Islamabad to be built by Saudis. Bhutto wanted to give an impression that he had a

support of Saudi Islamic government, which was considered the custodian of the holy

places of Muslims. Opposition leaders engaged in efforts to forge an alliance against

Bhutto. They even refused to attend the reception hosted by Bhutto in honour of the

Saudi monarch. Perhaps they did not want to give Bhutto a chance to glorify the

function with the presence of opposition and try to take political advantage. Then PPP

started thinking of the activities of the opposition. 6

3.2 Bhutto’s new set of Reforms

On 6th January just one day before the announcement of the election Bhutto

introduced the second phase of his land reforms to attract the support of the peasantry.

The ceiling on landholdings was reduced to 100 acres irrigated and 200 acres on non

irrigated land. Revenue on smaller peasants was abolished and income tax imposed on the earnings of landlords from land. These reforms were passed by parliament two

days later.7 Bhutto and his associates were making every effort to win another victory

in the elections and continue for next five years.

Bhutto was desirous to have a two-third majority in the legislature to make

any amendment in the constitution, especially to introduce Presidential form of

government and to become a powerful President.8

3.3 Formation of Opposition Alliance

On one hand the ruling PPP government continued its efforts for the

preparation of the election on the other opposition parties were making efforts to

forge an alliance to provide an alternative platform to the people of Pakistan against

Bhutto. On 30th October, 1976 a meeting of opposition parties was held and they

discussed the need of an opposition alliance. The deliberations of the meeting

119 produced some successes. The participants of the meeting put forward their demands to the government regarding the upcoming elections. The opposition parties in this

meeting developed a consensus on a ten point charter of demands to the government.

It demanded from the government lifting of emergency and Section 144, freedom of

press, withdrawal of cases against opposition leaders and workers on political bases,

political prisoners be released and cases be trialed in normal courts instead of special tribunals and media and other government machinery be not used for the defamation

of the opposition leaders, and suggested some measures for the transparent holding of

election.9 Bhutto’s political comrades and his trustworthy bureaucracy either did not

dare or deliberately kept him unaware about the real picture of the opposition camps

and kept on singing the musical lyrics that his achievements would bring him in

power in an comfortable manner. Otherwise leader of Bhutto’s postures could not be

so ignorant about the dire situation against him in his opposition quarters. Bhutto blindly trusted the reports of deputy commissioners and other bureaucratic offices,

intelligence agencies and other sycophants that his candidates would be winning

comfortably. He took weak decisions. 10 Bhutto wanted to catch opposition unprepared and win the comfortable majority in the Assembly.11 On 21 November,

1976 the last joint session of the parliament of the Bhutto’s tenure was held. In this

session Bhutto kept on lashing on opposition, ridiculed the opposition leaders instead

of evaluating the policies and achievements of his government. While keeping in

consideration, though belated, Bhutto held meetings with party workers in various big

cities about the political situation, though these meetings proved not more than

symbolic ones. Though with many complaints, PPP jiyalas opposed the timing of the

elections.12 Bhutto did not want to give sufficient time to opposition to launch an

affective election campaign against him. Bhutto made Rafi Raza a Karachiite lawyer

120 of a business family and a former minister head of election campaign and on1st

January, 1977. He gave a responsibility to Kausar Nazi to start public speeches in big

cities to gage the pulse of the common people about the performance of his

government.13 In the evening session of National Assembly on 7th January Bhutto

announced that general elections would be held on 7th March for National Assembly

and on 10th March for provincial assemblies and the existing assemblies would be

dissolved on 10th January by completing their terms. When Bhutto made this

announcement opposition was not present in the assembly as they boycotted the

session against the presenting of an ordinance by the government in the morning

session of the assembly. Not only opposition but the nation also surprised by this

sudden announcement. Though PPP was preparing for elections for more than a year but it was expected that Bhutto would go for election in 1978. Bhutto remained tense

during 1975 when Shah Faisal of Saudi Arabia was assassinated. He was also

perturbed due to intra party intrigues. He imposed Governor Rule in KPK in

February, 1975. This act was considered autocratic by opposition ranks. He decided to

go for fresh mandate due to various intrigues of his own party comrades even in 1976 to get strengthened to deal with right-left intrigues.14 Before the announcement of the

elections by Bhutto the session of the assembly gave three years extension to the

service of Chief Election Commissioner Justice Sajjad Ahemad Jan against the rules.

Rules gave prerogative to National Assembly to extend the services of CEC only for

one year. Opposition protested this extra-constitutional step of the outgoing assembly

on the behest of Bhutto government.15 On 8th January Bhutto wrote a letter to his

party’s outgoing members of assemblies thanking them and telling them his

achievement on basis of which he was going to seek fresh mandate from his

121 countrymen. He told them that a process of change started by the people of Pakistan would continue if they gave a fresh mandate to his party for next five years.16

As the election date was announced the business community took it as a sigh

of satisfaction whose interests were affected adversely by the policies of Bhutto

regime. On the other hand opposition parties speed up their efforts to forge an alliance

against Bhutto as they were working on it for about a year. They were keenly

apprehended about the holding of free and transparent election by Bhutto regime.17 As

Bhutto officially announced the election date the opposition parties geared up their

efforts to launch an alliance as there was not much time left for the submission of

nomination papers and electioneering. On the other hand Bhutto’s party leaders were

amused by viewing the fragmented opposition. Parties of UDF were interested to

contest elections from all constituencies dividing the votes of opposition. No one even

could think at that time that an alliance would be made in just few days and that would create an atmosphere which would not only irked Bhutto but launched a

rigorous movement to oust Bhutto from power and consequently created the

conditions that army toppled Bhutto regime and hanged him eventually.18 On 10th

January, 1977, the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan,

announced the elections details .The seats over which contests were to be held were:

Punjab 115 NA, 240 PA; Sind 43 NA, 100 PA; KPK (NWFP ) 26 NA, 80 PA;

Baluchistan 7 NA, 40 PA, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) 8 NA, Federal

Capital 1 NA. In all, 200 seats in the National Assembly and 460 seats in provincial

Assemblies.19 Keeping in view the rifts among the opposition parties and in the

absence of a joint alliance of opposition which would cause division of opposition votes, PPP leaders were assuming an easy two-third majority in the election. The

leaders who did not join UDF were considering their possibilities for a better

122 performance in the elections. The former Air Chief and a staunch foe of Bhutto since

1970 Asghar Khan thought for himself that he was more popular and could prove

himself a better alternative leader than Bhutto. Asghar Khan was not willing to join

UDF as he thought that he was more popular leader than any other in opposition. But

“behind the curtain” efforts were continued to unite the opposition on one platform

and finally on the assurance of some “hidden forces” Asghar Khan become ready to join hands with opposition in a wider alliance.20 In another session held on 12th

January the leaders of former UDF discussed their reaming matters. After the meeting

a press conference was held in which Asghar Khan announced the formation of PNA

and announced that PNA took a number of decisions including the selection of

‘plough” as the election symbol of the alliance. He told newsmen that a committee

including Rafiq Ahmad Bajawa, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Nawabzada Nasrullah

Khan and Malik Nazir Ahmad was formed to decide offices and other details of the

alliance. On Jan 16, Mufti Mahmood of JUI was elected its President, Nawabzada

Nasrullah Khan as Vice President and Rafiq Bajawa of the JUP as Secretary General.

Secretary generalship for Bajwa was demanded by Asghar Khan.21

The speed with which the PNA came into form setting aside all the differences

not only stunned Bhutto but annoyed him with his secret agencies which had

presented a different picture to him. The secret agencies, on which Bhutto was relying

more than his political associates, were given task to create suspicions among

opposition parties and keep them part a pole. But his agencies could not succeed and

PNA came into existence.22 Opposition parties had sharp differences of various kinds but they all were against Bhutto to an extent of animosity as they were made victims

of high handedness by the hand of Bhutto during his years in power. The election of

March 1977 provided them with an opportunity to settle their scores and they did not

123 miss this opportunity and forgot their differences and got united against Bhutto.

“Bhutto” was the only cause to forge an alliance. He was the common bias of all the

component parties of opposition.23 During his five and a half years in power Bhutto

arrested two chief ministers, two governors belonged to opposition and forty four

member of National and provincial assemblies mostly from opposition which created

a severe grudge in the minds of the opposition leaders against Bhutto. 24 According to

a Marxist analysts the component parties of PNA did not have only ideological or

political interests but also had economic interests. Various parties included in PNA were representing various economic groups in the country, especially in the urban

centers and for this very reason getting the support and backing of these interests

groups in terms of both finances and manpower in the protest rallies, against Bhutto, when they alleged the rigging by PPP in the March 1977 elections. Muslim League

represented small and medium capitalists, JI represented middle-sized businessmen

and traders, JUP and Tehreek-i-Istaklal represented big trading capitalists and

monopoly capitalists. Tehreek-i-Istaklal had also close ties with civil-military bureaucracy, NAP with its support among middle classes which were against the

feudal lords of Sind and Punjab, petty bourgeoisie, kulaks and land owners in

Baluchistan and KPK.25

3.4 Unopposed Election of Bhutto and Others

The leaders of PPP were not very much concerned about the formation of the

PNA as they were assured by secret agencies and the bureaucrats like Rao

Rasheed,Masood Mehmood, Yousaf Butch and others, on whom Bhutto relied the

most, that the member parties of PNA would be fighting on various issues before the

polls took place. But it proved ironically wrong once again. It was quite evident that

due to harsh treatment to the opposition during the five years in power by PPP the

124 only course left for them was to get united against Bhutto. Otherwise he would continue his rule unchecked. 26 EC set 17 January date for the allocation of election symbols to the political parties. Despite the objection of Hafeez Pirzada of PPP, EC allotted the plough symbol to PNA by rejecting his plea that PNA was not a party but an alliance of nine parties so was not liable to get one joint election symbol.27

President issued an ordinance to amend the electoral rules on the advice of Prime

Minister Bhutto as suggested by Election Commission to allot common election symbol to an alliance of political parties. This new rule facilitated PNA to contest election on a common symbol of ‘plough” and managed to develop an impression of joint opposition platform against Bhutto’s PPP to attract the voters.28 19th January was the last date for the filling of nomination papers for National Assembly and 22

January for the provincial assemblies. A large number of new entrants throng to PPP for securing tickets which caused difficulties for Bhutto to award party tickets to old loyal party men. Election Commission set 19th January as the last date for the filling of nomination papers and till that date no candidate had filled nomination papers from the Larrkana constituency against Bhutto. On next day Bhutto was declared elected unopposed. Opposition charged the administration with many allegations.

While addressing to the press, Mufti Mehmood President of PNA alleged that

Maulana Jan Muhammad Abbasi the opposition candidate against Bhutto from

Larrkana constituency was kidnapped by police. He was kept in confinement till the last date of submission of papers passed. The main purpose of his kidnapping was to pave the way for Bhutto to get himself elected unopposed.29 The decision to get

Bhutto elected unopposed was undertaken by the election team of PM house to get a psychological boost on opposition before polling. Bureaucracy perhaps thought that no nomination paper filed against Bhutto would raise his image among public or

125 they were playing in the hands of invincible forces to get Bhutto politically trapped.

The sycophants of Bhutto tried to project him as the leader of the Mao’s postures; the revolutionary leader of China, and his unopposed election would boost his image.30 Khalid Kharl was the deputy commissioner of Larrkana and Mohammad

Khan Junejo was the home secretary Sind. They prepared the plane well before the polls to prevent the filling of nomination papers against Bhutto to get their “leader” elected unopposed. Bhutto might have not known this plan but the way the bureaucrats executed it, Bhutto should have taken some disciplinary action if he was kept unaware of the whole plan.31 Maulanan Jan Muhammad Abbasi of the opposition was kept in house arrest near Larrkana till the time of submitting nomination papers passed. The Jama’at leadership sent immediate complaints to the

Election Commission but in vain. On 19th January EC announced that Bhutto was elected unopposed for the reason that no candidate could file nomination papers against him. Bhutto’s nomination papers were submitted by Munawar Abbasi a local

PPP leader of Larrkana. After hearing the news of Bhutto’s unopposed elections

PPP workers started jubilation being totally unaware of the sad consequences cause by such deeds of PPP.32 Besides Bhutto, 19 other PPP leaders including Mumtaz

Bhutto , Ghulam Mujataba Jatoi, Makhdoom Talibul Mula, Syed Bashir Ahmad

Shah, Haji Najmuddin Khan Leghari, Malik Sikandar Khan, Liaqat Jatoi 33 Atta

Mohammad Mari, a landlord and a follower of Pir Pagaro were also elected unopposed. Among them one was Bhutto’s cousin, one was CM Sind Mustafa

Jatoi’s brother and others were also from the landed gentry.34 The sizeable new comers made Bhutto over-confident about his perceived easy victory in the election as they were considered all time electable irrespective of the party they contested the election from.35 Unopposed election of Bhutto, his chief ministers and others did not

126 bring any good name to PPP and the process of election itself, instead it created

suspicions about the election process. On 20th January, 1977 almost all newspapers

published a picture of Z. A. Bhutto on the front page with a caption of “great

leader”. The unopposed election of 22 candidates including Bhutto himself created

suspicions about the transparency of the elections. The incident of Larrkana, in

which Jan Muhammad Abbasi the opposition candidate against Bhutto was confined

in a government guest house and released after the nomination papers filing time

further worsened the suspicions.36 The PNA called the large scale unopposed

elections of PPP candidates poll rigging. Its claim carried some weight without

doubt when three days later, the sitting chief ministers of all the four provinces got

elected unopposed. On the evening of 22nd January, the last day for filing the

nomination papers for provincial assemblies, Sind Chief Minister Ghulam Mustafa

Jatoi, Punjab CM Sadiq Hussain Qureshi, KPK Chief Minister Nasrullah Khattak

and Balochistan Chief Minister Mohammad Khan Barozai were declared elected

unopposed, besides 26 other candidates of Sind Assembly and 22 of Baluchistan

Assembly, although opposition boycotted the elections in Baluchistan.37

PNA took the issue of large scale unopposed election of PPP candidates by taking the plea that the rejection of papers of PNA candidates were on weak and unreasonable grounds. But the EC rejected the plea leaving the impression that it was tilted towards government nominees.EC accepted the plea and announced on 24

January that all complaints should be submitted by 30th January before notifying

officially the uncontested candidates. But in case of Bhutto it did not accept the

appeal of Jan Muhamad Abbasi from Larrkana constituency but from Nawab Shah it

did accept. It gave an impression of partiality of EC.38 On 11th February Election

127 Commission decided in favour of Bhutto’s unopposed elections. But the damage was

already done to the credibility of the election.39

3.5 Beginning of election campaign Maulana Kausar Niazi was in-charge of holding public meetings in big cities

for PPP election campaign, Kausar Niazi suggested in a plan to Bhutto that public

meeting should be started from 4th February but Bhutto wanted earlier as he did not want to be dependent totally on bureaucracy. He wanted to give his election campaign

a momentum like was done in his campaign of 1970 election. However, Bhutto could

not gage the pulse of the masses which had changed drastically due to his own role to boost up their expectations. The slogans he had given in previous elections and his

party men’s repeated mention of his reforms during his five years rule was a bit faded.

Secondly no government in poor and developing countries of the Third World could

remain popular among common people due to mighty problems and limited resources,

corruption, foreign interferences, pressures from undemocratic forces. But Bhutto

once again decided to use roti, kaprra and makan (food, clothing and shelter) as his

party’s election slogan. On the other hand opposition, dominated by right wing

religious parties raised a new slogan Nizam-i-Mustafa (the system of the Prophet

SAW) to attract the predominately Muslim masses against a “Socialist” Bhutto. The

slogan of Islam had always been used for political maneuvering and benefits to attract the illiterate and semi-illiterate masses of the country. The opposition made the

election campaign literally a “war of Islam and K ufar” (Paganism, non-believing).40

JI had always been using this catchphrase of Islamic system to attract the support of

the voters. JI was the major party behind the formation of UDF in 1973 and it was due

to its efforts a 12 poinst charter of demands was presented to government to

implement Islamic system in the country. The same slogan of Islamic system with

new name of Nizam-i-Mustafa was used as election slogan by PNA against the

128 modern democratic system which they called a Western one to attract the support of

masses.41 Ironically the parties of so called socialist leaning like Wali Khan’s NDP 42

and Asghar Khan’s Tereek-i-Istaklal were also part of the alliance and lauding the

slogans of the Nizam-i-Mustafa, which they knew very well that was merely an

election slogan. As the slogan of Nizam-i- Mustafa was catching the attention of the

masses and getting popularity Bhutto, to counter this slogan and to attract the

religious right segment of the society, announced that from 1st July 1977 the weekly

holiday would be Friday instead of Sunday. Maulana Shah Ahemad Noorani

responded that first Friday of July would be on 7th July but Bhutto would not be in

power till then, this created a suspicion about the exact date of the ouster of Bhutto which later proved true.43 PNA started its election campaign from Nashter Park

Karachi on 23rd January. On the same day PPP started its campaign from Rawalpindi by holding a big public meeting at Liaqat Bagh. Bhutto lashed out on PNA in his

speech at Rawalpindi. He said that every component party of PNA had its own

ideology and if they managed to get power it would not lost for more than three

months due to severe differences of ideologies. 44 As election campaign reached to its

full swing, both PPP and PNA started making every effort to muster the support of

maximum number of electorate. In a participatory democracy role of Election

Commission is imperative. Despite the immaculate reputation of CEC Justice Sajjad the EC needed to be overly cautious when such a one-on-one contest of opposition

and ruling party was being held. PNA launched a number of complaints against

election irregularities specially their failure to file nomination papers from Larrkana

constituency against Bhutto. EC was duty-bound to settle such issues to facilitate the

candidates to file their nomination papers to the best possible satisfaction of all

contesting candidates. It was more important especially on such a high profile

129 constituency where the Prime Minister of the country was contesting elections and the whole world was focusing on this constituency. But EC could not succeed to sort out

an acceptable solution.45 The date for submitting complaints regarding election

irregularities during the nomination filling process was fixed on 30th January and a

number of such complaints were filled on that fixed date. On 11th February EC

announced its final decision and declared Bhutto elected unopposed by dismissing

PNA’s plea.46 On one hand ruling PPP was repeatedly claiming that the process of

election would be totally transparent and fair on the other the opposition PNA

continued to bewail government’s irregularities. Not many leaders of PPP could judge the growing popularity of PNA. Heavy numbers of people were attracted to the public

meetings of PNA. For some it was more the reaction of common masses against some

of the policies of Bhutto regime during the last five years in power than the popularity

of opposition.

3.6 Deviation from 1970 pattern

The close associates of Bhutto in the cabinet were a state of utter satisfaction

and showing their jubilation on the large scale entrance of feudal lords and tribal

chiefs in the PPP. These were the same feudal chiefs against whom Bhutto raised

heavy revolutionary slogans during anti-Ayub movement and Bhutto always tried to

get the credit to defeat them in the elections of 1970, and called his revolution against the privileged classes of Pakistani society. He called his victory in the election of

1970 as the revolution of poor masses and under privileged classes against the ruling

elite. Bhutto and his associates in the party deviated from their previous policy and

party manifesto and preferred to allot tickets to the “electables” instead of party

ideologues.47 Bhutto alienated himself from the leftist ideologues in the party and

started depending on bureaucracy, intelligence agencies and aligned himself with

130 feudal lords during last years in power. Bhutto enhanced his dependency on which he

had launched a movement to bring “socialism” during the years 1968-89 and election

campaign of 1970. Rafi Raza was made in-charge of election campaign during 1977

elections.48 Out of 25-member cabinet during last phase of his rule 11 were big feudal

lords, a drastic difference from his previous cabinets when feudal lords, businessmen,

industrialists and big civil and military bureaucrats were not included in the cabinet as

proclaimed PPP to be the party of poor masses. Leftist ideologues like J. A Raheem,

Mubashar Hassan and Khursheed Hassan Meer were ousted from cabinet and those

ministries were filled by feudal lords. Sheikh Rasheed was the only notable leftist in the cabinet having no powerful voice to project leftist ideology in the cabinet for being the lone voice. Big civil and military bureaucrats were also included in the

cabinet and other decision-making forums. This showed clearly that how Bhutto

deviated from his party’s leftist leaning.49 As the electioneering picked up momentum the confinements imposed by Bhutto regime were toppled. On 24th January PPP

issued its manifesto with a number of promises but it was not very much different

from its previous one, in contrast to PNA which had heavy criticism of the “wrong”

doings of Bhutto regime and new promise ofNizam-i-Mustafa. Due to his lauded

claims to bring a socialist revolution in Pakistan, his nationalization and other policies tilted towards socialism triggered propaganda against him. This massive campaign

launched against him was sponsored by those opposing groups and classes whose

interests were at stake by his left-oriented policies. Bhutto was extensively criticized

and dobbed as socialist, communist which was considered tantamount to infidel.

Religious emotions of the people were used as tool against Bhutto to encounter those

religious-oriented propagandas. Bhutto also tried to use various actions as counter

propaganda, though some of such actions had multiple faces and significance. Bhutto

131 had supported several extremists groups against the Afghan government. These

groups later on played a pivotal role in “the holy” war against Soviet Union. These

actions of Bhutto eroded his popularity in leftist circles.50 On 24th January Bhutto

formally introduced the manifesto of PPP while addressing to media in Rawalpindi.

Bhutto claimed his manifesto an amalgamation of “idealism and realism”. He

promised an increase of fifty percent in the national production and uplift of the living

standard of common man. He reiterated the slogan of PPP, “Islam is our faith,

Democracy is our Polity, Socialism is our economy and all powers lie with people”

and wowed to strengthen the already achieved economic objectives.51 Tehreek-i-

Istaklal Chief Asghar Khan emerged as the most popular leader of the PNA during the

election rallies especially in the city of Karachi. He gained popularity in many

quarters of Pakistani masses after the dismemberment of East Pakistan but he was not

clear about his future political course of action. For some he was confused about his

political ideology that was why he could not translate his popularity into concrete

political support in term of ballot. Sometimes, he sounded a champion of the cause of

downtrodden classes of society on socialist pattern but could not sustain this image of

him. During the PNA movement he emerged as “the leader” as he was lucky enough that no other leader of the alliance had such wider acceptability and popularity in all

segments of masses. Khan Abdul Wali Khan the talented son of Pashtun nationalist

leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan commonly known as Bacha Khan was a leader of very high posture and popularity but only among the nationalist elements of the

smaller provinces. The ruling establishment dominated by Punjabis had consistently been dubbing them as anti-Pakistan, anti-Islam by criticizing them about their role in

Pakistan Movement making them unpopular among Punjabi masses. Other leaders of

PNA were either of local stature or having their following only in their respective

132 sects of Islam. None of them had following in all segments of society, from right to

left, from religious to seculars, corporate and business classes altogether. 52 Asghar

Khan was perhaps the only leader having an extent of following in almost all classes

and “acceptable” for ruling establishment and even foreign forces.53 When Asghar

Khan was welcomed by large crowds at various public meeting he caught by

misunderstanding that he was the only leader to be Bhutto’s alternative rather more

successful than any other leader of the country.54 PNA awarded tickets to its

candidates for 168 seats out of total 200 seats whereas PPP filed candidates on 191

seats. Qayum League nominated 37 candidates and 324 independent candidates were

also in run for 200 seats of National Assembly. PNA boycotted in the election in

province of Baluchistan on the pretext of bad law and order situation. Thus, PPP was

in a comfortable position to win all seven seats of National Assembly in the

province.55 Both PNA and PPP started holding big public meeting in various cities.

Asghar Khan addressed big public meeting at Karachi.56 Bhutto managed to send a

message to his party workers and opposition of his popularity by addressing a huge

public meeting at Lahore. Contrary to PNA leadership Bhutto was sole source of

attraction in his party’s public meetings. Sometimes, he addressed more than one

public meeting, even four and five meetings a day to attract the voters specially

peasants, workers and lower middle classes. But at the end he seemed tired and had

rest to watch the happenings from outside. On 4th March he opted to rest and decided to counter the reports of his associates in party.57 Though small scale scuffles were

reported between the workers of both the parties which was an expected phenomenon but PNA observed a strike on 28th February and complained about the disturbances

created by ruling party in their public meetings and demanded an supra body to

monitor the fairness of election. 58

133 3.7 Electioneering 5th March was the last day for the election campaign and Bhutto chose Lahore to address his last public meeting as his main focus was on Punjab which he knew would play a decisive role in the election results. In the allegations and counter

allegations he made new promises to attract the support of the electorate and managed to create an impression of future hopes for common masses.59 On the evening of 5th

March Bhutto held a meeting with the Chief Secretary Punjab, Dr. Mubashar Hassan,

Director Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Ghulam Jeelani and other officials of

Intelligence Bureau to discuss various aspects of the elections especially number of

seats expectedly to be won by PPP. IB reports revealed to Bhutto that PPP would win

55 seats comfortably from total 116 seats of National Assembly from Punjab, on 16

seats tough contest was expected but PPP was in better position so according to the

reports submitted by the bureaucracy, PPP would be winning about 70 seats of

National Assembly only from the province of Punjab.60 Bhutto deputed these

officials to handle the election activities and asked them to report him directly to keep

him informed instantly. Political associates of Bhutto, specially the left wing scholars were annoyed as they felt that Bhutto gave more time and consideration to the reports

of bureaucrats and other unelected people than the party hierarchy.61 Political

activities were ended as people were observing Eid-Milad-ul-Nabi on the same day.

Both sides were optimistic of the results in their favour but the impartial analysts were

predicting an easy victory of PPP but with a close margin and no one was giving two- third majority to PPP, as desired by Bhutto and PPP.62 On the other hand PNA leaders were also claiming to be optimistic about the results, but Asghar Khan was repeatedly

claiming that PNA had won the elections and only formal act of voting was left and

said that any results other than the victory of PNA would not be accepted by PNA.

This showed how charged the PNA leader was and what were the designs of some of

134 the PNA leaders. Asghar Khan said with emphasis on many occasions that any result

other than PNA’s victory would mean “rigging” and PNA would not accept those

results, whereas majority of neutral analysts were predicting PPP’s victory.63 EC

assured once again that elections would be free and fair. On 5th March government

announced to impose Section 144 of the emergency act to maintain law and order on

election day and armed forces would also be called for the assistance of civil

administration on 7th March, the polling day.64 About 30 million registered voters were to cast their votes to elect 181 members of the National Assembly as 19 out of total were already elected unopposed.65 PPP established a control room at the Prime

Minister House to monitor the polling process and to inform Bhutto about the

happenings spontaneously. PTV and radio Pakistan were instance source of quick

information but was not reliable for the opposition. PTV and Radio Pakistan started

announcing results as early as six in the evening. The first result announced the seat won by PNA but just after that the PPP victories started. PPP was winning

overwhelmingly which made Bhutto doubtful about the process as he was expecting a victory but not that much overwhelming.66 Rather got perturbed on the massive victory of PPP candidates and complete routing of PNA. When the heavyweights of

PNA lost their seats, especially Chaudri Zahoor Elahi lost from both the constituency

Bhutto got surprised and in an utter restlessness called his special assistant Rafi Raza

and inquired, “Do you think I rigged those results?”He replied that total diminishing

of PNA was surprising. Bhutto called commissioners of almost every division and

asked them in a harsh manner that did he not ask them to be impartial, which showed that the extent of happenings was even beyond the knowledge of the Prime Minister.

Bhutto also called Director IB and DG ISI and inquired from them as well. But one thing was clear that the magnitude of PPP’s victory was beyond everybody’s

135 expectations.67 In the early hours of the morning Bhutto telephoned his special

assistant Rao Rasheed and inquired that how that all happened and inquired about

rigging. Whatever Bhutto asked for rigging or his ‘loyalists’ showed more loyalty than the king was uncertain. The atmosphere turned tense. Many heavy weight of

PNA lost their seats. 68

3.8 Results of the Elections

The final results of the 1977 elections badly ruined the expectations of PNA

and the leaders rejected the results immediately and wowed to start a protest

movement and declared the elections a fraud and charged the government with

massive rigging. Out of total 31million registered voters about 16.8 million cast their votes. PPP managed to secure a slightly more than 10 million votes whereas PNA

secured about 6 million votes. Thus, PPP secured 60 percent of the total casted votes

and secured 155 National Assembly seats. PNA bagged only 36 National Assembly

seats in a house of total 216 seats by securing 35 percent of the total cast votes.

Qayum League secured only one seat and eight went to independent candidates. 69 In

previous assembly PPP had 109 seats, defunct NAP 20, independent 20, Muslim

League (Q) 08, JUI 06, JUP 02, JI 3 and one member Raja Teri Dev Roy was elected

from East Pakistan. As a result of the election of 7th March, 1977, PPP secured 155

seats and PNA could manage only 36 seats of National Assembly; Muslim Leagues

(Q) could win even one seat, although there were 08 seats of ML (Q) in the previous

assembly. In previous Assembly there were 20 independent members but in the

elections of 7th March only 08 independent members could won in all from FATA. In

Punjab out of total 115 seats PPP secured 107 and PNA could manage only 8 seats. In

KPK PNA secured 15 and PPP could managed only 07. In Sind PPP secured 32 and

PNA 11, most of seats won by PNA in Sind province were from urban centre like

136 Karachi and Hyderabad. PNA boycotted the election in the province of Baluchistan as

a protest against the ongoing military action in the province so all seven seats were won by PPP. PPP secured 10 million votes about 59% of the total casted votes and

PNA secured about 06 million which was about 36% of the total polled votes. 70 PTV

and Radio Pakistan were covering the election results throughout the night and even

next day but majority of the people preferred to listen BBC Urdu Service as the

credibility of the Pakistani official media was very low since Ayub Era when he used

official media for the false projection of the ruler and Bhutto also followed the same way and did not change its role and character as a credible source of information.71

Unexpected results caused concerns in Bhutto’s mind and he inquired from his close

aide Rafi Raza that “do you think that I rigged those results?”At mid night of the

election Bhutto called commissioners of many divisions in Punjab and inquired that what was happening there and in the end in a confirming mode asked them “did I not tell you to be impartial and fair”. Bhutto also called Director IB and DG ISI on Phone to inquire about the happening which showed his concerns about the results which

revealed overwhelming majority for PPP, especially in the province of Punjab.72

While addressing a crowded press conference at Rawalpindi on 8th March

Asghar Khan wowed to boycott the provincial assemblies election scheduled on 10th

March owing to the rigging, irregularities and killing of opposition workers by

government and PPP supporters. He told the press that according to reports coming

from across the country about 50 people were killed and hundreds were injured. In the

same evening PNA central council met at Lahore rejected the election results and

decided that newly elected member of National Assembly on PNA ticket would not take oath and a complete countrywide strike would be launched from 11th March.73

137 Other leaders reported that death toll in election related skirmishes reached to 300 and

many injured. Major tensions were occurred in cities like Karachi Hyderabad and

Lahore. In Karachi PNA won 9 out 11 total National Assembly seats. Government

deployed troops of law enforcement agencies to meet the further unpleasant

incidents.74 The election was won by PPP, but some elements in PPP stole the already won elections which were widely suspected of being rigged. Opposition demanded for

fresh election but General Zia ul Haq imposed Martial law despite the fact that an

agreement was reached between PNA and Bhutto for new elections. 75 Initially PNA

demanded in protest rallies a thorough and impartial inquiry in election rigging and

other highhandedness of government agencies against opposition, new elections on

some seats and to de-seat some MNAs elected through rigging and use of unfair

means.76 On 9th March Bhutto rejected the rigging allegations of PNA and declared that results of the polls were according to his party’s expectations and even impartial

analysts had also predicted the same. Some of his party associates persuaded him to

postpone the provincial assemblies’ election until an agreement reached with the

opposition PNA. But he decided to hold the provincial assemblies elections as

scheduled. In his press conference Bhutto assured the voters that law and order would be maintained on polling day and appealed them to cast their votes in maximum

number. 77 He rejected the advice of his associates by saying that postponing the

provincial assemblies was equal to accept the wrongdoings on the 7th March

election.78

3.9 Allegations of rigging and Agitations Started

A tense situation started to be created as opposition boycotted the provincial

elections assemblies and Bhutto regime insisted to hold elections on the scheduled

date of 10th March. Despite Bhutto’s appeals and assurances of maintaining law and

138 order the turnout was low as compared to 7th March. PPP candidates became victorious in overwhelming numbers and in some constituencies without contest, a

few independent won as well. PNA rejected the results and called them a “fraud” and

announced countrywide agitation movement on 11th March. On 11th March a

countrywide strike was observed, violent acts took place at various cities between

police and PNA workers. PNA workers openly violated the section 144 of emergency

rule and police arrested a hundreds of PNA workers. According to PNA more than a

dozen workers were killed and many more injured.79 On 11th March PNA council

encouraged by a successful strike in various cities of the country put forward more

harsh demands to government otherwise protest demonstrations wowed to be started

across the country. The demands included annulling the results of elections and

holding of new election under judiciary and armed forces, removal of Chief Election

Commissioner and above all resignation of Prime Minister Bhutto. On next day 12th

March Mufti Mehmood President PNA presented these demands to the government in

a press conference at Lahore.80 Keeping in view the aggravating situation Bhutto

addressed the nation on radio and TV for more than an hour and showed his willingness to hold talks with PNA leadership regarding election-related issues. But at the same time he said that 7th March election result was a “settled issue”. 81 On next

day 13th March Bhutto wrote letter to Mufti Mehmood to confirm the offer for talks.

PNA leadership discussed Bhutto’s letter in the Peshawar meeting of the

leaders and on 14th March replied on the same day and demanded clear terms of the

meeting otherwise they did not trust Bhutto. The letter read:

“My Dear Bhutto Sahib, I am writing to you in reply to your letter dated March 13, 1977, which I received today, i.e. March 14, 1977 at 2am. Your recent address on PTV and Radio was discussed in the meeting of the heads of the constituent parties of the PNA. Keeping in mind the largest interest of the nation, it was decided not to enter in a

139 dialogue, the terms of which are not clear. If you have any fresh proposal, we will be happy to discuss it in our next meeting. Yours sincerely, Mufti Mahmood.”82

On the very next day on March 15 Bhutto replied the letter showing his wish to settle the political issue through dialogue. His letter of 15th March said:

“My dear Mufti Sahib, I have received your letter of March 14. The terms of the dialogue to which I have invited you as the Leader of the Opposition are already abundantly clear. It is axiomatic that I cannot contemplate or entertain any proposal which is outside the ambit of the Constitution. Once this is understood on both sides, our dialogue will be characterized by a sincerity of approach and you may rest assured that it will comprehend any grievances that you may have and the legal remedies, strictly within the scope of the Constitution, available for their redress. I trust you appreciate that the Constitution means stability for Pakistan and bypassing it is fraught with perilous implications for the country. Yours sincerely, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.”83

By writing this letter Bhutto might have hoped the things leading to a positive

direction but it did not happened. On 14th March ISI presented a comprehensive report to government that 33 seats were rigged by government’s candidates. The names of the constituencies and names of the losing candidates were also mentioned in the

report which suggested government to re-poll on the said constituencies. But

government did not pay much heed to the report at that time.84

140 3.10 Workers Scuffles

PPP’s stalwarts proved wrong in their estimation about the dismemberment of

PNA on the issues of share in tickets and at least after the elections. PNA started a

protest demonstration across the country in a coordinated manner when Bhutto failed to bring them on the negotiation table. Soon the protest converted into violence,

especially in the city of Karachi, where majority was supporters of rightist and centrist

and religio-political parties. PNA won nine out of eleven total National Assembly

seats from the city. Due to violent acts the miscreants took advantage of the situation

and looting and arson became a routine and the common peaceful citizens were forced to take refuge in comparatively safer areas. Police and law enforcement agencies

failed to control the fights between PNA and PPP workers on regular basis and started

large scale arrests of PNA workers.85 PNA wanted to send a message to government that now the will of the people would be decided on the roads. Severe violent acts in the name of protest began such as burning the shops and looting sprung in the city.

When the ever-increasing acts of violence went out of control of police, government

called FSF and army contingents. Curfew was imposed in various areas of the city

including Nazimabad, New Karachi, Liaqatabad, Pathan Colony, Orangi Town and

others. The protesters burnt the house of Habib-u-Rehman a local PPP activist in which fourteen residents of the house were burnt alive. This provoked further violence even in PPP ranks and alarmed the possibility of secret hands to further

sabotage the already deteriorating peaceful situation in the city.86 Similar, situation of violence erupted in the city of Hyderabad after acts of violence it was also put under

curfew. Then the protest demonstrations were becoming more organized and seriously threatening the peace of the country. Keeping in view the alarming situation Bhutto

started using all possible channels to bring opposition on dialogue table. In reply to

141 the 15th March letter PNA stated the post-election situation in the country and said that the people of Pakistan were agitating in various parts of the country and

government on one hand were using highhandedness against protesters and on the

other invitations for dialogue was extended by Bhutto. PNA stressed on its resolve of

12th March that the National Assembly elections should be held afresh, fair and free by the administration and agencies on which people and PNA trusted. Without clear

cut assurances such vague invitations would produce no positive results. PNA stressed the needs of acting upon constitution in letter and spirit.87 On 16th March secretary

general of PNA Mr. Rafique Bajwa met PM Bhutto to create a conciliatory

atmosphere conducive for talks. Though his meeting with PM was in his personal

capacity but PNA, especially JI declared his meeting a betrayal to the cause of PNA.

On the other hand government tried to portray this meeting as a crack in the PNA. In

fact JI wanted to have this post for itself and took full advantage of the secret meeting

of Bajwa with Bhutto and managed to get this post for its secretary general Professor

Ghafoor Ahmad as the new secretary general of PNA in place of Bajwa. 88 On 19th

March Bhutto responded to the allegation and tried to justify his stance regarding the

meeting. While responding to the allegation of pre-planned rigging, Bhutto said that by saying so the alliance was undermining the process in which it had taken part and

captured a sizeable number of seats and on that basis “... I invited you to talks in

order to arrive at an amicable settlement”. However, he rejected the allegations of violence. Bhutto warned that:

“I cannot allow license to any force to create chaos and disorder in the country. However, let me assure you that those who choose to follow or return to the constitutional legal path will have full opportunity to play the respective and constructive role.” He concluded with the assertion that :

“. acts of destruction will not attain what amicable discussion can achieve. I, therefore, look forward to your positive response to my invitation.

142 Yours sincerely, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.”89

3.11 Efforts for better Dealing

On one hand letters were exchanged to reach an amicable solution of the

problem on the other protest demonstration continued and the arrest of the PNA main

leadership further aggravated the protest situation. On 18th March PNA leaders

including Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, Asghar Khan, Professor Ghafoor Ahmed,

Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri, Mian Khurshid Mehmood

Kasuri, Mian Zahid Sarfraz, Begum Nasim Wali Khan, Muhammad Shaukat and

others were arrested and sent to prisons in various jails. These arrests provoked the

PNA workers and intensity of agitation was at rise.90 Despite the arrests of PNA

leaders Bhutto continued his efforts to settle the issue through negotiation and tried to

convince the opposition to settle for 36 seats in the National Assembly but opposition

refused and stressed that elections were a shambles and only a fresh, free and fair

election under a credible and neutral authority could be the solution of the problem.91

On 19th March Bhutto wrote another letter to Mufti Mehmood and stressed on the

need of holding negotiations without conceding anything prior to the start of

negotiations. Bhutto expressed in his letter that he was not writing as the Chairman

PPP but as the chief executive of the country to resolve the problems of the country.

But Mufti Mehmood in a one paragraph reply to Bhutto’s letter said that as the major

leaders of PNA were in jail so he alone could not decide anything. His letter said:

“Dear Mr Bhutto, I acknowledge receipt of your letter of March 19. I am afraid I cannot give you any reply unless I consult the PNA leaders. Since most of the leaders of the PNA, including Professor Ghafoor, General Secretary of the PNA, are in jail, their immediate release is essential so that I may convene a meeting of the PNA heads tomorrow evening for considering the text of your letter of March 19. Yours sincerely. Maulana Mufti Mahmood, President Pakistan National Alliance.”92

143 To facilitate dialogue government released four leaders including

Asghar Khan, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani and Professor

Ghafoor Ahmed but PNA demanded the release of all leaders and did not break the

agitation and called a countrywide strike on 21st March. On 22nd March Bhutto

convened National Assembly session, adding fuel to fire and created more tensions.

To satisfy the opposition Bhutto issued an ordinance to empower CEC to null and wide the results of a constituency where he found any irregularity was done. By

convening National Assembly session Bhutto wanted to justify his position that

elections were fair and just despite the fact that before the official announcement of the election result assembly session could have not been called.93 On 22nd March PNA

held its meeting at Lahore and discussed the release of its leaders, though all were not

released, and approved a letter to be written to Bhutto. The letter said:

“The stand of the PNA is clear. If you accept our demands made on March 12 namely: your resignation from the office of Prime Minister, constitution of a new Election Commission enjoying the confidence of the people and holding of fresh elections with the assistance of the Judiciary and the Armed Forces of Pakistan, we are prepared to discuss with you how these can be implemented within the four corners of the Constitution wherever and whenever you like. I am confident that no amendment of the Constitution would be required for the fulfillment of our demands.”94

In this letter PNA mentioned about the role of Army along with judiciary in the process of election. PNA also appealed to President Fazal Ellahi Chaudri to fulfill

his constitutional obligation to declare annulled the results of “unfair” elections.95 On

26th March National Assembly session held but only PPP members elect participated

in the session Bhutto got elected as the Prime Minister afresh for next five years.96

144 3.12 Government Machinery Paralyzed

In the beginning opposition alleged the rigging in 21 constituencies but later

on demanded to declare all the result false and to hold new elections and not under

Bhutto but an impartial machinery.97 On 21st March Bhutto wrote to CEC Justice

Sajjad Ahmad Jan to expedite the process of scrutiny of the results of those

constituencies where allegations of rigging were raised. To show his sincerity with

free electoral process Bhutto asked CEC to bring to the course of law as soon as

possible if anyone violated the law and rigged the elections. EC took a long time and

lengthy procedure to establish election tribunals and announced the results of even those constituencies where opposition alleged severe charges of rigging on the very

day when Bhutto issued his directive. So it made the directive of Bhutto to CEC unclear that whether it was just an effort to cool down the situation or he sincerely wanted law to take its course.98

On 25 March, Mufti Mehmood sent a copy of letter which he wrote to Bhutto

on 24th March to President Fazal Elahi Chaudri and asserted the rigging charges

against government and appealed to President to fulfill his constitutional duty. The

letter further said:

“... the only constitutional course in such critical circumstances is for the head of state, who is the ultimate constitutional authority that has the inherent power to act in such an emergency, to order fresh elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies under an administration and through a machinery that ensures that these elections are ‘conducted honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with law and that corrupt practices are guarded against’, as prescribed in the Constitution. Mr Bhutto and his cabinet have demonstrated by the abuse of their official power that they cannot be trusted any longer with the executive authority of the state. The present Election Commission has also shown itself to be incapable of discharging the responsibility given to it under the Constitution.”99 It was quite suspicious that the copy of the letter reached to the newspapers

office even before reaching to the President.100 Bhutto became more intolerant and

145 adamant and on 25th March, just one day before the first session of Assembly arrested

all major leaders of PNA including Mufti Mahmood, Mian Tufail Ahmad, Malik

Mohammad Qasim, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, Prof

Shah Faridul Haq, Syed Munawar Hassan, Haji Hanif Tayab, Begum Nasim Wali

Khan, Mir Rasool Bakhsh Talpur, Mian Mohammad Shaukat and some second liner

leaders.101 PNA called a countrywide strike on 26th March on the eve of the holding of

first session of Assembly. All 153 members elect of PPP and eight from FATA took

oath Mian Meraj Khalid a PPP left wing ideologue was elected speaker of the

Assembly. While addressing to Assembly Bhutto declared March 7 elections an

historic event and offered PNA to start negotiations in best interests of the nation but

he did not change his earlier stance about the March 7 election called them free and

fair. 102 The holding of session by the government without the participation of

opposition further aggravated the already tense situation in the cities. Owing to the tense situation citizens wanted quick solution of the problem even the elected

members of National Assembly of PPP remained stuck in their respective

constituencies to avoid encounter of charged protesters. On 28th March National

Assembly met again to elect the Leader of the House. Opposition did not participate

in the session. Only 168 members of the treasury benches participated in the session.

After getting elected afresh Bhutto in his speech to National Assembly invited

opposition to start dialogue and quit the politics of destruction. He also announced to

lift emergency, release of political prisoners detained during the agitation and decision

of all election related petitions within three months and to bring all laws in conformity with Islamic teachings, again attempt to ease the grave tense situation caused by the

opposition movement.103 A state of restlessness prevailed in the country even on

governmental machinery. On 1st April Bhutto once again invited opposition to hold

146 negotiation and assured to lift emergency and release all those arrested for violating of

Section 144. But opposition did not take Bhutto’s offers seriously and charged him for being untrustworthy. Elections for provincial assemblies were held without the

participation of opposition as they boycotted the elections. The situation turned worse when Bhutto convened the opening sessions of four provincial assemblies. The

opposition considered these act of Bhutto as he was not paying any heed to the

demands and agitation of the opposition and deliberately trying to irritate the

opposition to convene the sessions of provincial assemblies in a normal manner. On

30th March the inaugural session of Sind assembly was held in a tense atmosphere. All

99 members of assembly participated in the session all from the treasury benches not

a single member of opposition. Members elected Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi as the chief

minister. In the same evening 21 members of federal cabinet sworn-in at Islamabad in

a chanted gathering of PPP not paying heed to the tense political situation in the

country.104 On 3rd April session of Baluchistan Assembly and 6th April KPK

Assembly were held in a peaceful atmosphere but when on 9th April session of

Punjab Assembly was scheduled to be held a number of protest rallies held all over the country. FSF and army were called to support police and all major roads leading towards Punjab Assembly were blocked completely to prevent the rallies to reach the

assembly building. Scuffles between supporters of PNA and PPP were took place at various places. Security forces opened fire on protesters at various places including the premises of Punjab Assembly. According to governmental sources seven people were killed and 78 injured whereas PNA sources claimed that 37 were killed and

more than hundred were killed in firing of the state agencies.105 The situation became

severely worse especially in Punjab. While addressing to a press conference in

Karachi Bhutto categorically refused to accept PNA’s demands and said:

147 “It would amount to conceding their (the PNA’s) false charge that I am a manipulator and rigger of elections. I do not want to go down in history as a rigger of elections which I am not. If I had rigged elections, I would have said that I have committed a great crime, and let history give its verdict. What the hell is the office of the Prime Minister? I am more concerned about my place in history.”106

Bhutto held a meeting of his party stalwart at Governor House Lahore on the

same evening when Punjab Assembly’s inaugural session held and sad incident of

killing gloomed the environment. Chief Minister Punjab, newly nominated ministers

and other participated in the meeting. Since the PNA agitation adopted a popular

slogan of implementation of Nizam-i-Mustafa (the system of the Prophet SAW).

Bhutto was perturbed on the new developments, killing of protesters and newly

adopted slogan of Nizam-i-Mustafa, and discussed the issues and tried to draw the

future course of action. Some of the party leaders including Maulana Kausar Niazi

persuaded Bhutto to announce some measures to bring the system in conformity with

Islam. But Bhutto did not want to become another Ayub Khan to compromise his own

enacted system and for which he was voted in by poor masses of Pakistan. He smelled

some conspiracy in the stance of PNA and felt that if he conceded the demands of

PNA they would be increasing its demands with passing movement and especially when they would feel that they could force Bhutto to concede to their demands. He

said there would be no difference of PPP and JI’s point on the outlook of the state, if

he takes such measures. He said that he would prefer to quit than to accept what

people like Maulana Maudoodi wanted to implement in the country. He said that these

religious rightist people could not be appeased and their demands would be increasing

if he accepted them. If he gave them impression that he bowed before their demands they would get psychological edge and forced him to bow further.107 In that meeting

Bhutto asserted that he would remain stick with his standpoint and would not bow to

accept the demands of opposition. But he could not sustain his position and the

148 latterly happened events forced him to concede the demands but perhaps too late to

produce any positive result for him. On the other hand the opposition movement took

new swing and they asked the people not to pay any kind of taxes to

“unconstitutional” government. 108

3.13 The State Shaken

Bhutto along with other senior members of party including Sind Chief

Minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Hamid Raza Gilani, Shaikh Rashid Ahmad and

Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Maulana Kausar Niazi, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto and others

prolonged stay at Lahore to monitor the situation closely after the sad incident of

killings on the occasion of the inaugural session of Punjab Assembly. The incident

perturbed Bhutto and he smelled a conspiracy behind the large scale killings of

opposition workers as he believed that administration violated its jurisdiction. His

close associates in party used to discuss the issue in details from various aspects,

during their stay at Lahore. In a meeting during the absence of Bhutto Rafi Raza the

in-charge of election campaign and Mumtaz Bhutto, Bhutto’s cousin .discussed about the quitting of office of Prime Minister by Bhutto to defuse the increasing tense

situation but Mumtaz rejected the idea. The party stalwarts were convinced that

situation was leading towards an irreversible end.109

On the other hand the situation was turning from bad to worse as disorders

prevailed in the streets of big cities of the country. Government agencies continued

arresting the protesters everywhere. On 11th April a complete strike was observed all

over the country and PNA appealed to people not to pay taxes to “unconstitutional”

government. Government called this appeal unconstitutional.110 PPP leaders were in a

state of uncertainty and started thinking in a disagreement regarding the handling of

grave issues by the party hierarchy and the government. On 13th April general

149 secretary of PPP Dr. Mubashar Hasaan a leftwing scholar and a close associate of

Bhutto resigned from party on disagreement on the ways of handling the issues by the

government. Bhutto did not accept the resignation and called him for a meeting for a

rapprochement.111 On 13th April Bhutto sent an editor of a newspaper, a left-wing

scholar Mazhar Ali and his wife to meet Sherbaz Khan Mazari in Sukhar jail. He

offered Mazari to form government in Baluchistan and KPK and asked him to

dissociate himself from right-wing religious parties, which Mazari declined.112 On

14th April, Dr. Mubashar met Bhutto and in a blunt manner asked to clean the party of the bureaucrats around him and feudal lords who entered the party just before the

elections and got the seats in the assemblies. He also demanded to disband the FSF, which had become a notorious force to punish the opponents of the regime and to get

away the corrupt elements related to ministers and their cronies gathered around for their corrupt designs. Then it was perhaps too late for Bhutto to accede to those

demands as he was caught by the circumstances.113 Abdul Hafeez Kardar,

Mohammad Ashraf Choudhry, Sardar Shaukat Hayat a later entrant in party, along with eleven other newly elected members of provincial assemblies of Sind and Punjab

resigned and quitted party and suggested Bhutto to accede to the demands of PNA.

General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal ®Rahim Khan who were ousted from their

military positions by Bhutto in a dramatic manner in early years of his power and sent them to Spain and Greece as Ambassador also resigned from their Ambassador ial

positions alleged Bhutto of rigging the elections and joined PNA’s protest.114 Bhutto

remained a bit calm during his stay in Lahore thinking upon means and ways to solve the problem he was caught in. He also thought about to call military to resolve the

issue. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada was assigned to monitor the situation of the Generals and

he assured Bhutto that there was not a bit of chances of any military intervention and

150 Generals were loyal to Bhutto which proved horribly wrong later.115 During his stay

in Lahore Bhutto and his associates considered the lifting of the state of emergency

and Section 144. The opinion of Attorney General Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar was sought who opposed this idea. On the other hand agitation of opposition continued and this time adopted a new strategy that groups of protests startedazaans from mosques

(calling for prayer) to attract the attention of common people. It was considered a

symbol of calling for rescue from natural calamities by Muslims by calling azaans. 116

3.14 Yahya Bakhtiar formula, Maulana Moudoodi’s Role

On 14th April, .in such tense situation and deadlock Yahya Bkhtiyar, the

Atorny General of Pakistan presented a solution of the problem which later came to

be known as Yahya Bakhtiyar Formula. He proposed to hold first fresh elections for

Provincial Assemblies and PNA if returned successful in those elections then National

Assembly should also be dissolved and fresh elections be held. Initially Bhutto denied

it by saying that Bakhtiar presented it in his personal capacity but later Bhutto

accepted it to be in best interest and to get the nation out of the impasse he was ready

to act upon this formula. PNA also gave some consideration to this formula but finally

rejected it by saying that no less than their demands would be acceptable.117 On 15th

April Bhutto met JI’s founder Maulana Maudoodi at his residence in Lahore knowing

that the demand for the imposition of Nizam-i-Mustafa was initiated by Maudoodi.

When Bhuuto reached Maudoodi’s residence a chanted group of IJT raised slogans

against meeting, Maulan told them that it was against courtesy not to welcome a guest

who reached one’s house. Bhutto said that he visited Maulana to importune advices

and guidance from Maulana Maudoodi. Maulana Maudoodi suggested Bhutto that he

should quit the office and provincial governments should take over the country and

hold elections of National Assembly at appropriate time. Meeting lasted for about

151 seventy five minutes but ended without producing any positive result acceptable for both the parties.118 Bhutto tried to defuse the tense situation by introducing some

measures to Islamize the system. Bhutto’s Intelligence Agencies and his political

associates could not dare to present real situation before him that the charged people would not be accepting anything less than Bhutto’s stepping down and holding fresh

elections under impartial machinery as opposition was convinced so enthusiastically that it was the only solution of their problems. In private meetings Bhutto’s team

members criticizing his policies specially his wish to handle the protest movement by

force. Even his talented cousin Mumtaz Bhutto in private meetings used to say that the way Bhutto was handling the issue would lead to the imposition of a Martial

Law.119 On 18th April, two days after meeting Maudoodi, Bhutto announced banning

of the sale of liquor, night clubs and all kinds of gambling in response to the demands

of the opposition forNizam-i-Mustafa. 120He also announced the restructuring of the

Council of Islamic Ideology and offered Mufti Mehmood to become its head. The

PNA out rightly rejected the measures and said that fresh elections under impartial

machinery was the only solution of the problem.121

3.15 Imposition of Partial Martial Law

When Bhutto was caught by the aggravated situation he started thinking of using many options to get out of the tense situation including using force to deal with the agitators. Bhutto held a number of meetings in the last weeks of April with his

party high command and military Chief Ziaul Haq and other military Generals to

discuss the ways and means to deal with the increasing protest demonstrations by

PNA. Bhutto was repeating his intension to resolve the political issue through

political means and not to use force but later events proved that use of force was a

major option before him to restrain the agitation. On 20th April, while addressing the

152 nation on national broadcast Bhutto insisted that uncertainty and chaos was created to

destabilize the country under a heavy conspiracy by some foreign forces and appealed the people to desist the means of destruction. He said that every problem had a

peaceful solution instead of violence.122 On 21 April, Rao Rasheed special assistant to

Prime Minister Bhutto wrote a secret note to him that PNA planned to extend their violent agitation in every corner of the country to paralyze the whole administration

of the government. He further wrote that situation would severely tense and out of the

control of the police force. Bhutto was alarmed by the note. PNA had called a

countrywide strike on 22nd April. Bhutto called an urgent meeting attended by law

minister Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, foreign minister Aziz Ahmad, Chief of General Staff

General Abdullah Malik, Maulana Kausar Niazi and Sind Chief minister Ghulam

Mustafa Jatoi and others to discuss the new and forceful wave of agitation in the

country. As the situation turned worse especially in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore

Bhutto intended to impose Martial Law in those three big cities. The idea was

countered by General Malik a trusted one by Bhutto in army. Some cabinet members were also against the idea to bring army into civil affairs but did not dare to speak before Bhutto. Pirzada drew the attention that without amending the constitution

Martial Law could not be imposed as there was no such clause allowing to do so.

COAS Zia closely watched the situation without giving even a sign that Baluchistan was already under military action and to give more powers to military would mean a

d’efecto rule of military in the areas. However he tried to convince Bhutto that he was the most loyal person of Bhutto in military. On 21st April, government imposed

Martial Law in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore.123

153 3.16 Saudi Interests for negotiations

Ostensibly Bhutto had not shown any intention to get external support. He met

Saudi Ambassador Riaz-ul-Khateeb along with foreign minister Aziz Ahmad. Saudis were expected to play a role to defuse the tension. Riaz-ul-Khateeb flew back to

Saudi Arab to receive further instructions from King Khalid. It was highly hoped that

Saudi King would play a role and convince the PNA leaders to reach an agreement with Bhutto after getting engaged in meaningful dialogues.

On 22nd April, on the appeal of PNA a nationwide strike was observed and violent agitation paralyzed the business in big cities of the country. Martial Law

proclaimed in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore, which was termed by the government

as ‘limited Martial Law”. Many problematic areas of the big cities were kept under

curfew. Army was called in many other cities to assist the civil administration

including Faisalabad, Bhawalnagar, Sialkot and others. Several dangerous bloody

clashes occurred at various places in big cities between protesters and law

enforcement agencies. Newspapers were put under censorship and were not allowed

photographs of protests and any material to escalate riots in the country.124

On 24th April situation was further turned tense when government arrested

Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan an eminent politician and leader of PNA.125

3.17 PNA (Asghar Khan) Call to Amy

When the country was caught by severe wave of agitation Bhutto felt himself with no other reasonable option but to start dialogue with opposition (PNA) and to

consider their demands to overcome the problem. At many places protesters violated the restrictions of curfew and scuffles between government agencies and PNA workers generated worries on both sides. Bhutto spoke to Mufti Mehmood for holding

meaningful dialogue with PNA and accommodating reasonable demands of PNA

154 even holding fresh elections if convinced by PNA. On 25 th April PNA leaders jailed at various cities were brought to gather at a police rest house at Sehhala near Rawalpindi to start dialogue by declaring that rest house a sub-jail. 126On the same day, 25th April

Asghar Khan wrote a controversial letter 127to the senior officers of armed forces

advised them not to abide by any illegal order of the seniors especially of a

government which had lost its sanctity by “stealing” the wish of the people through

acts of rigging.128 This was for the first time in the history of the country that such a

letter was written to armed forces instigating them not to obey the orders of the

government.

3.18 Efforts for Resumption of Negotiations

Asghar Khan’s letter to the armed forces was not taken seriously by the

officers in armed forces, at least apparently. But a debate was generated and political brains considered it instigation to the armed forces not to obey the orders of senior

creating a further mess in the country. 129 Defense ministry issued a statement

mentioning the constitutional role of armed forces saying that it was the constitutional

duty of the armed forces as national institution to support the civilian government,

institutions whenever called to do so. 130 Imposition of Martial law in three big cities was criticized by various sections of society and PNA called it an attempt by Bhutto to use military means to solve a political issue, caused an embarrassment for both

Bhutto and army.131 On 27th April services chiefs of the armed forces issued a joint

statement to reassure their loyalties to the civilian constitutional government. Joint

statement of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Mohammad

Sharif, Chief of the Army Staff General Ziaul Haq, Chief of Naval Staff Admiral

Mohammad Sharif and Chief of Air Force Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan said:

“We wish to make it absolutely clear that Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force are totally united to discharge their constitutional obligations

155 and to fulfil the pledge their officers and men have taken to defend the country’s independence even at the peril of their lives”.132

Government brought Asghar Khan from Sahiwal jail to Sihala police rest

house where other PNA leaders including Mufti Mahmood, Professor Ghafoor

Ahmad, Sardar Sherbaz Mazari, Begum Nasim Wali Khan, Nawbzadah Nasrullah

Khan, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani and Maulana Jan Mohammad Abbasi were

confined. Bhutto convinced Pir Pagaro a leader of PNA, who was not confined and was residing in Rawalpindi, to meet the confined PNA leaders to know their minds

about their future plans regarding the movement.133 On 28th April, Bhutto addressed the National Assembly in an impassioned, charged and dramatic manner for about 90

minutes where no opposition members were present and only PPP members attended the session. Bhutto lauded categorically the interference by foreign forces against him

and directly accused US supporting agitation to remove him from power. He called

US an “elephant” and said that elephant had a sharp memory and gave a self

described narration of the events for which US was annoyed with him. He told the

Assembly that US was annoyed with his policy regarding Vietnam and the Muslim

World. 134 Bhutto expressed in detailed that how US disapproved his policies. He

claimed that his policy towards Vietnam and Middle East antagonized US. He further

claimed that he supported Middle East and Arabs in a practical manner.

“We were told that India was superior to Pakistan which we refused to accept,” he pointed out. He recalled that even convening of the Islamic Summit was

opposed and he was asked to postpone it for a month. When it was done, another

postponement was sought. But when the demand came for a third time, a letter was written to the Saudi monarch Shah Faisal, who agreed with not paying any heed. He

said,

“.. .political bloodhounds of the US opposed Pakistan in attaining nuclear power.”

156 He attributed the PNA’a agitation movement to an international “conspiracy”

and claimed that the demand for implementation ofNizam-i-Mustafa was an imported

agenda. He attributed major p[art of his speech to PNA and called it an “international

conspiracy” and the tactic were ‘imported”.

He claimed that demand of Nifaz-i-Shariat had been exposed; the insanity was being spread in the name of Nizam-i-Mustafa and its pioneer Maulana Maudoodi was

saying that it was not the real issue. 135

He further said,

“we will enforce Islamic system. The use of alcohol and nightclubs has been banned. The PNA should join the Islamic Ideology Council and we will call other scholars. It has been mentioned in the constitution that all laws would be brought in accordance with Islamic injunctions within seven years but if that was the issue of the PNA we would accomplish it within six months.”136

It was a unique event of its kind that a Prime Minister of a Muslim country

directly accused the US involvement in a conspiracy against him which shocked the

country and even in various parts of globe. US responded in a prompt manner and US

Secretary of state Cyrus Vance Wrote a letter to Bhutto to negotiate his grievances in

an objective manner with US authorities on ministerial level instead of accusing US in the Assembly. He offered Bhutto for a direct talk at Paris where Secretary of State

. . i ' i n was on a visit.137

Bhutto sent his foreign minister Aziz Ahemad Khan to Paris along with some

documents as proofs for his claims.US Secretary of State rejected all allegations and

advised Pakistani authorities to forget past and engage in bilateral diplomatic

relations.138 During his stay in a hotel in Paris documents from Aziz Ahemad’s room were stolen to wash out the alleged proofs.139

157 3.19 Arab intervention for Dialogue

In the last week of April the ongoing protests and tense situation in Pakistan

concerned the Arab countries which considered Pakistan a friendly country. Foreign

minister of Libya Ali Al Taraqi, foreign minister of UAE Khalifa Al Suwaidi, Saudi

Arabian Ambassador Sheikh Riaz-ul-Khateeb contacted the Pakistani government

and offered their assistance to solve the problem. Riaz-ul-Kateeb met Bhutto and

discussed the issue in details. Bhutto told him that situation was improving and paid

his homage to King Khalid of Saudi Arabia for his interest in the issue.140 Riaz-ul-

Khateeb went to Saudi Arabia to seek the permission and guidance of the Saudi King

Khalid and on his returnee met Bhutto and on 17th April met the PNA leadership at

Sihala Rest House and conveyed the feelings and worries of the king to the leaders

and urged them to solve the issue as soon as possible. He also offered his services for

mediation between government and opposition (PNA). PNA leaders thanked the

Saudi efforts but talks could not start as no plane was prepared.141 Libyan and UAE

also contacted PNA leaders and assured guarantees to them for the implementations

of any agreement if reached between government and opposition. The whole country was caught by a wave of protest demonstration and a state of lawlessness prevailed which not only caused loss of precious lives but a heavy loss to the already fragile

economy of the country. PNA was not ready to start the negotiation unless their

demands were met. On the other hand government was stuck with its stand point that

the opposition demands were “rigid” and were not acceptable, specially the stepping

down of the Bhutto from the office of the prime minister.142 Pir Pgara had given a

call to besiege Bhutto on 30th April and announced a large protest procession in

Rawalpindi but on the same day Bhutto met Pir Pagara in Rawalpindi as an effort to break the stand-still situation. This meeting lasted for about fifty minutes. This move

158 by Bhutto was regarded positive by many and created a hope to break the deadlock.

Bhutto offered Pir Pagara for holding talks on PNA’s agenda and also offered to hire

lawyers of their choice for PNA’s detained leaders. 143 On 30th April Bhutto suddenly

appeared in the busy bazaar of Rawalpindi in an open jeep and while waving the letter

of US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, which he wrote to Bhutto in response to his

allegations for American involvement in the conspiracy against him, addressed a large

public gathering there in a charged manner. He alleged US government to be involved

in conspiracy against him.144

PNA leaders met on the arrival of Pir Pagaro to Sihala and prepared a 32-

points charter of demands for negotiations to present to Bhutto at the opening of the talks, these demands were rather pre-requisite for dialogues, as PNA rejected the offer

of Bhutto to start talks first with a four-member ministerial committee.145 Saudi

Ambassador met both the parties twice to devise means for opening dialogue. On 2nd

May Bhutto visited Mufti Mehmood at CMH Rawalpindi where he was taken for treatment after getting ill and exchanged talks on the means of solution of the

problem. Bhutto proposed a talk between PNA team and ministerial team of

government at initial stage which Mufti Mehmood rejected. On the other hand Saudi

Ambassador continued emphasizing the PNA leaders specially Mufti Mehmood to

start talks.146

Saudi Ambassador and Libyan Foreign Minister continued their efforts for a

settlement of the problem and met Bhutto and PNA leader Mufti Mehmood on 2nd

May but both the parties remained stuck with their stand points so those meeting

could not produce any evident result. The situation became tenser in the country and

Bhutto met Mufti Mehmood at Prime Minister House on 3rd May. This secret meeting took place on the behast of Bhutto. Bhutto tried to assure Mufti Mehmood that he was

159 serious to resolve the tense situation and resumption of talks. He further assured that

if an agreement was signed he would implement that agreement in true letter and

spirit in an honest manner and the leaders of some friendly Arab countries were ready to provide guarantees for the implementation of the proposed agreement.147 Mufti

Mahmood remained stuck with earlier demands of PNA, the resignation of Bhutto and

holding of new elections under an impartial election commission and with an

overlook of judiciary. Mufti Mehmood briefed the leaders of PNA about his meeting with Bhutto. PNA engaged a number of lawyers and experts to prepare a draft of

demands to present to Bhutto. A fifteen page document comprising of the demands of

PNA was prepared. An additional document to guide the PNA’s own negotiating team was prepared. Team of 11 eminent lawyers of the country including Mahmood Ali

Kasuri, S. M. Zafar, Khalid Ishaq, Zahoorul Haq and others was also engaged to

prepare the charter of demands and asked to remain in connection with negotiating team for any guidance required during the negotiations. Tense situation was

continuously prevailing in the country and government agencies were arresting those

creating disturbances in various cities of Punjab and Sind. The whole nation was

severely in a tense state of mind and anxiously waiting for any solution of the

problem but their leaders were striving for political gains and setting scores against their political rivals.148

3.20. Proposed Charters of Agreement

The charter of demand comprised of a long list of demands including the most

rigid demand of resignation of Bhutto. The other demands were holding of fresh

elections under a neutral administration, the formation of a supra body named as

Council of Implementation, withdrawal of all recently done constitutional

160 amendments and release of all political workers confined in various jails. The charter

of demands was presented to Bhutto on 3rd May which was comprised of 21 clauses

and some additional schedules. A “hard” document for the government to accept but

realizing the fragile position of Bhutto and his bowing to the earlier demands

reflecting his weak position. PNA presented ruthless demands but called it a “simple”

document. It was mentioned in document that the election of March 1977 were a

“fraud” with the nation as they were rigged massively in favour of ruling party

however in the best interest of the nation and assurances from the leaders of brethren

countries Saudi Arabia, UAE, Libya, and Kuwait and on the guaranteed condition of

holding free and fair fresh elections without using any force by the ruling party, PNA

agreed upon the charter. According to the demands included in the charter

government was bound to dissolve National Assembly and all Provincial Assemblies by 7th of July and fresh election for the National Assembly would be held on 7th

October whereas for Provincial Assemblies on 10th October. A Supreme

Implementation Council envisaged with ultra-powers would be formed. It would

enjoy the powers of President and federal government till the formation of new

governments. This council which would come into existence after the signing of the

agreement comprise of ten members five each from both PPP and PNA. Council would take unanimous decisions and in case of any disagreement the matter would be

sent to Supreme Court of Pakistan and it would take the final decision. All

governments would be bound to implement the decisions of the Council and all

institutions including army would be bound to act upon the decisions. The Council would have a constitutional cover from the Parliament. A number of amendments were included in the draft of agreement regarding the electoral laws and rules. Official

media would be bound to give equal coverage during electioneering to PNA and the

161 ruling PPP. It also said that army would be withdrawn from Baluchistan within fifteen

days of the signing of the agreement, return of internally displaced Bloch families left their homes after the start of army action earlier in 1973, an adequate compensation

for them and holding of fresh elections for Azad Kashmir Assembly on 15th October,

149 withdrawal of constitutional amendments which affected the basic human rights

and limited the powers of the courts of law, lifting of state of emergency, withdrawal

of Defense of Pakistan Rules, and further imposition of any emergency state be

conditional to the approval of Supreme Implementation Council, withdrawal of all

special tribunals and release of all prisoners convicted by these tribunals, those killed

and injured during the movement and properties damaged be compensated by the

government, those left the country be allowed to return back peacefully. The draft of the agreement presented by PNA had also included that cases registered on political basis after 1st January 1972, just after taking over power by Bhutto, be removed and

detainees be released. 150 All kinds of curbs on media any pressure of government on

media be removed. The draft of agreement presented by PNA gave immense powers to Supreme Implementation Council and it would be the sole body to govern the

country till the inception of the new government after the proposed elections. If this

council found any problem to implement the agreement it would send a draft to the

President who would be bound to issue an ordinance within 24 hours, and if President would not issue the ordinance the draft sent by the Council would automatically become part of the constitution. After the signing of the agreement till the formation

of new government the authority of the Prime Minister would be so limited that he would not take any policy decision regarding the key issues and related to the assets

and if such a policy was necessary the Prime Minister would be bound to take prior

permission from the Council.151 Along with 32 main clauses a heavy number of sub

162 clauses were included in the draft of agreement presented to Bhutto by PNA. Thus,

Bhutto regime would be a soulless body if the PNA draft was implemented as a whole. PNA tried to corner Bhutto completely from key decision making. The Saudis

sent massage to PNA leadership not to be so rigid while presenting their demands.152

The story which was started as a protest against alleged rigging on a limited number

of seats reached to a mightiest level of never ending demands. The opposition

managed to keep on bowing Bhutto to their ever-increasing demands that never ended

and finally not only overthrew Bhutto regime but also hanged him.153

3.21. Correspondence Resumed

Bhutto and his team got stunned when they received the long list of PNA’s

demands included in their draft. Bhutto did not show any prompt rude reaction and

said that the long list of demands further complicating the already tense situation and

PNA should have come with concrete and specified demands which could be fulfilled.

Many believed, especially in PPP camps and even a fair number of impartial analysts

that some of the leaders of PNA were playing in the hands of some “behind the

curtain” forces and playing to sink Bhutto to its knee in the deep ditch which was dug

for him. Everything was pre-planned and everybody was playing his role. Bhutto was

falling gradually into the “planned” desired end of those “behind the curtain” forces.

Bhutto alleged the Americans for sponsor the conspiracy against him and also tried to justify his claim by counting the reasons for which the US was annoyed with him.154

But there were also indigenous “forces” to dislodge him from power.155 At that time

it was a general perception that Asghar Khan had written the draft of agreement and

such clauses which were quite evidently not implementable and unacceptable for PPP

as it meant the ouster of Bhutto in a disgraceful manner. If it was proved that PPP or

Bhutto had rigged the elections on some seats of National Assembly, initially

163 demanded by PNA that the elections of 22 seats would be declared null and wide ,156

and though many impartial surveys and analysts were predicting a comfortable victory of PPP then presenting a long list of demands almost toppling the whole

existing system, demanding implementation of Nizam-i-Mustafa, holding of new

elections in such a polarized society where the opponents were enemies of each

other’s lives could not be justified. The PNA expanded its demands for holding

elections under their proposed Council even in Azad Kashmir. PNA’s charter of

demands demanding the revolutionary measures in every sphere of life from human

rights to electoral reforms, from judicial system reforms to the release of prisoners

had nothing to do with the alleged rigging of elections on some seats by a party of which victory was quite evident. There was no doubt that Bhutto used

highhandedness and literally abused the power against his opposition. But taking

revenge from the whole system and putting it under threat and consciously or to an, unconsciously fulfilled the agenda of those forces who had become enemies of Bhutto

as the later challenged their rested interests.157 Asghar Khan was being projected to be the substitute of Bhutto the way he was given wide coverage in anti-Bhutto

newspapers. He himself tried to project himself as the next Prime Minister of the

country. He used a language of severe animosity against Bhutto and turned the

political rivalry into personal enmity and wowed to hang Bhutto on the Kohala Bridge

at the border between Pakistani Punjab and Azad Kashmir on river Jehlem.158 When

at last stage of the negotiations an agreement was about to be signed Asghar Khan

harshly toppled the agreement twice. Such evidence created suspicions about his role

against Bhutto even if one ignores the rumors spread about his connections with the

ambitious Generals of army and even some alleged his relations with American CIA.

If Bhutto managed to further bowed before even the “unjust” demands of PNA and

164 signed the agreement he could not have saved his government as the aim was not

reaching an agreement but the ouster of Bhutto from power. If on the proposed date

7th July, the agreement was to be implemented, Bhutto could not accept that

agreement as it demanded his resignation on that date, though it was a perception without any solid proofs but the other evident and ever increasing demands of PNA were qualifying this perception not to be a mere perception. When the negotiations were finalized and an agreement was reached between PPP and PNA and just an

approval of PNA General Counsel was to be carried out Asghar Khan along with

other hardliners in PNA made every effort to sabotage the negotiations. Asghar Khan

even threatened to launch a protest movement against the PNA negotiating team if they signed the agreement and assured on army’s behalf of holding elections within

90 days after imposing Martia Law.159

Protests demonstrations continued in the country further deteriorating the

already tense situation. On 6th May a big procession was taken out in Lahore in

defiance of curfew. Police opened fire and at least two people died and many other

injured. Police sealed the office of PNA at Lahore and raided on the houses of local

active PNA leaders and arrested many of them.160 On 6th May Riazul Khateeb the

Saudi Ambassador met the PNA leaders at Sihala and conveyed them the massage of

Saudi King Khalid urging them to act gently and solve the problem through

negotiation and not violence. Pir Pagara presented a draft document to Saudi

Ambassador about the background of the issue, problem and its solution proposed by

PNA and told that PNA was not ready to hold talks with the ministers of Bhutto but

Bhutto only. But as they respected the Saudi brethrens’ they wish to hold talks. Saudi

Ambassador conveyed the displeasure of Bhutto about the huge list of demands by

PNA and called it an attempt of complicating the already tense situation.161 On 8th

165 May, Bhutto sent a letter in response to the draft of demands by PNA and showed his

displeasure about the length and the improbability of the demands of PNA. The acting

President of PNA said that the draft of the demands was not interpreted in its spirit

and it was comprised of only five basic demands and rest of the clauses were the

explanations of the basic five demands.162 Bhutto was optimistic that PNA would

concede his terms of agreement which showed that despite tall claims he was ignorant

of the real situation or was overly confident to succeed to handle the situation on his terms. On 10th May, National Assembly passed a law banning the sale of liquor and

other un-Islamic practices which were announced to be banned and Friday was to be the official weekly holiday by Bhutto as an attempt to defuse the mounted pressure by

PNA for the implementation of Nizam-i-Mustafa.163 While addressing to public

procession at Gujranwala Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani in an enthusiastic manner

said that Bhutto would not be in power when first Friday holiday came, as this first

holiday would be 7th July. This prediction proved correct as Bhutto was ousted by

army on 5th July, how Noorani was aware created suspicious about his connection

with army Generals.164 On his return to Islamabad from Karahi on 11th May, Bhutto

met his party’s senior members to take them into confidence about the negotiations

with the opposition PNA. In the evening of 11th May, Bhutto took a bold step, tried to

break the ice and along with his ministers Maulana Kausar Niazi, Abdul Hafeez

Pirzada and Mir Afzal Khan visited the Sihala Rest house to meet the PNA leaders.

Mufti Mehmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan andf Sardar Abdul Qayum received

Bhutto and his team there. Bhutto requested Sardar Qayum Khan to assemble the

leaders of PNA at Sihala to start the negotiations at one place leaders of both sides

agreed that the ongoing tense situation was against the interest of the country and

should be resolved as soon as possible. A positive beginning but could not produce a

166 positive result at the end. When Bhutto left from Sihala the PNA leaders decided that

everything should be on record and fot that reason a letter should be written to Bhutto to start the dialogue. So on 12th May, Mufti Mehmood wrote a letter to Bhutto stating the situation in the country and terms for the start of talks, which said:

“You will recall that during your visit to Sihala on May 11, I had told you that I would, after consultations with my colleagues, inform you whether further discussions between us could help to resolve the present political deadlock. I have accordingly informed my colleagues at Sihala camp prison of your point of view as communicated to me. This is summarized below: a) the recent internal and external situation is not conducive to the holding of fresh elections in the country, b) Notwithstanding your views on the undesirability of holding elections for the national Assembly, you nevertheless favour the continuance of a political dialogue. Your views have been given the fullest consideration by my colleagues in our meeting today and we are unanimously of the view that your understanding of the political problem and its remedy is so different from that of the nation that no purpose would be served by the continuance of such fruitless meetings. In view of this, I am sorry to inform you that I will be unable to receive you or engage in any further discussions until our three basic demands, which have already been communicated to you, are accepted.” Yours truly Mufti Mehmood.165

Though the letter did not mention but despite various attempts by brethren

Muslim countries and efforts made by Bhutto, PNA stuck with their most rigid

demands, resignation of Prime Minister, fresh elections under judiciary and army.166

Bhutto was satisfied with his initiative to start negotiations but PNA’s response

perturbed him as they were stuck with the rigid demands of day one. This response

perhaps made Bhutto to think on some alternative course of action as well. While

addressing to National Assembly on 13th May, Bhutto announced to hold a

referendum to get the will of the people for his stay in office or his ouster and would

accept the will of the people. He claimed that in such polarized situation new

elections would be deteriorating for the stability of the country, he said that he was

ready to appear in any test but would not violate the constitutional process by

167 sacrificing the National Assembly. He also severely criticized Asghar Khan for writing a letter to the armed forces and termed it as an act of high treason but did not

state that what legal action would be taken against Asghar Khan as his letter was widely discussed in various quarters of society.167

On 13th May, Bhutto held a high-profile meeting to discuss the tense law and

order situation in the country General Iqbal, General Arbab Jahanzeb and Chief of

Army Staff General Ziaul Haq Law Minister Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Maulana Kausar

Niazi and other cabinet ministers and officials attended the meeting. Hafeez Pirzada

presented the proposal of referendum before the participants of the meeting that if the

result of the referendum would be positive in favour of Bhutto it would give him

(Bhutto) a right to amend even the constitution along with to continue as Prime

Minister for next five years. When Bhutto showed his intension, though vague, to

include army into political decision making Ziaul Haq seemed excited , he also agreed with idea of referendum.168 Opposition leaders showed an indifferent reaction on the

speech of Bhutto in National Assembly in which he accused them so severely. They

spontaneously rejected the proposal of referendum just one day after its

announcement by Bhutto on Assembly floor. Indifferent attitude of both sides once

again created a deadlock in the negotiations. On very next day before dawn PNA

leaders were detained in Sihala Rest House who were brought there a few days earlier to facilitate the negotiation process. They were then shifted to various jails. Professor

Ghafoor Ahmad was sent to Dadu jail, Asghar Khan to Sahiwal, Mian Tufail

Mohammad to Bahawalpur, Nawbzada Nasrullah to Mianwali, Maulana Jan

Mohammad Abbasi to Kot Lakhpat, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani to Garhi Khairo

and Begum Nasim Wali to Haripur Hazara. Only Mufti Mehmood was kept in Sihala

Rest House.169 Initially Bhutto was reluctant to arrest Pir Pagara keeping in view the

168 possible reaction of his mureeds (flowers), and tried to utilize his position to start talks with opposition leaders of PNA of which Pir Pagara was senior vice President

and acting President when Mufti Mehmood the President of PNA was detained by

government. But on 15th May, he was also house arrested at Rawalpindi in his

residence which prompted hismureeds to show a severe reaction in Sind.170

Despite continued tense situation in the country government carried out s routine business in a normal fashion. On 16th May Hafeez Pirzada the law minister presented

a bill for amendment in the constitution to hold the announced referendum as there was no provision of such referendum in the constitution. After passing from the

National Assembly President Fazal Ellahi Chaudri rectified it to make it an Act. This

Seventh Amendment in the constitution said:

“If at any time the Prime Minister considers it necessary to obtain a vote of confidence of the people of Pakistan through a referendum, he may advise the President to cause matter to be referred to a referendum in accordance with law made by Parliament. The President shall call upon the Referendum Commission to conduct a referendum amongst the persons whose names appear on the electoral rolls for the immediately preceding general elections to the National Assembly as revised up-to-date. Any dispute arising in connection with the counting of votes in the referendum shall be finally determined by the Referendum Commission or a member thereof authorized by it and, saves as aforesaid, no dispute arising in connection with a referendum or the result thereof shall be raised or permitted to be raised before any court or other authority whatsoever. If, on the final count of the votes cast at the referendum, the Prime Minister fails to secure majority of the total votes cast in the matter of the confidence of the people of Pakistan, he shall be deemed to have tendered his resignation.”171

On 13 th May, Russian ambassador Sarwar Aszmov met Bhutto, persuaded Bhutto not

to step down, as, according to him, the opposition agitation had no popular support,

and launched by some “hardcore” elements of opposition with support of hidden

forces. Asimov was considered a friend of Pakistan. He also succeeded to peruse

Bhutto not to send his delegation in ministerial conference of CENTO. Azimove tried

to encourage Bhutto who was resented our the US interference, and Byroade’s

169 assessment of the election in which he had assessed that Bhutto’s PPP would secure only forty percent of seats as compared to sixty percent of PNA. 172

Negotiations were suspended there was no likelihood evidently of the resumption of the dialogue with opposition. On 17th May the rumors spread that government decided to detain Maulana Maudoodi the JI head which caused resentment among opposition camp and opposition showed severe reaction that arrest of Maulana would be dangerous. Government kept PNA leaders at various distant confinements having no contact with one another so there were no expectations of any progress in negotiations. But on the other hand the leaders of brethren countries like

Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Libya and others were apprehended about the deadlock in the negotiations and tried to pursue both the parties to start talks.173

3.22. Generals Involved

Bhutto misunderstood by believing that army was with him in every case as

Ziaul Haq the Army Chief was assuring Bhutto his loyalty time and again and

Bhutto discussed every development and even his mind about the events taking

place with Zia which made Zia aware of every strength and weakness of Bhutto.

Perhaps Bhutto left with least options but to fall back on army under Ziaul Haq.174

The senior army commanders were also watching the situation and obviously like

other Pakistani they were also disturbed about the happenings of last few weeks,

especially when three major cities were under Martial Law, the opposition

leadership was kept behind the bars, protest demonstration and highhandedness of

the government to curb those protest created serious apprehensions among army

commanders. The army was also engaged in an operation in Baluchistan province

since 1973.175 Bhutto called Zia frequently in the official meeting and drew the

attention of the army commanders towards political issues and exposed the civilian

170 governments’ weaknesses and intensions to the army commanders which later proved fatal not only for him but for the country as well. Zia was cunning enough to convinced Bhutto psychologically through his gestures that he was extremely loyal to the later. But after leaving Prime Minister House he used to go straight to the

GHQ to take his commanders into confidence and informed them about the happenings in the Prime Minister house regarding the political developments in the country. Bhutto had a faith in the loyalty of Ziaul Haq when he promoted him to the top slot of the army by superseding eight senior Generals but in one such meeting when Zia told Bhutto that the later should take into confidence the other commanders to minimize any chance of army coup Bhutto felt that Zia was cunningly threatening him of a coup.176 On 16th May an important meeting took place between Bhutto and Zia. Corp commanders, director military intelligence attended the meeting among other senior Generals and they blatantly spoke about the political situation and the role of army in the crises and showed their dissatisfaction over the criticism on army for its role in maintaining law and order in the crises. General Jahanzeb corps commander Sind told the situation in his province and stressed the need of holding talks and reaching agreement by political forces instead of using force to curb the political problem. He talked that people showed their hatred for the government. By dismissing proposed referendum he said that if the general elections were “rigged’ then the same would be done in referendum. It showed his disagreement with the governmental version of the political crises. He said when the armed forces were being pushed into political crises the men refused the orders of the seniors a rare instance in the tradition of the armed forces. Going far from his jurisdiction General Jahanzed proposed that army should intervene to force the politicians to reach an agreement to get the country out

171 from a deadlock caused by them. In other words he was proposing his colleagues

and seniors to deviate from the constitutional framework but it was not so regarded

in the army a sin. General Iqbal the corps commander Lahore presented the similar

views about the situation and revealed that he had asked his men not to open fire on

our “own” people during the maintenance of law and order. Corps commander

Peshawar General Sarwar Khan was of the firm view that new elections were the

only solution of the problem. General Faiz Ali Chishti, the murshid (mentor) of

Ziaul Haq was sure that Bhutto would adopt Presidential system if succeeded to

continue in power which would be more problematic for the ongoing tense situation.

He showed his firm belief that people of Pakistan wanted army to come forward and

solve the political crises by holding fresh elections. Other corps commanders shared

similar views which perhaps pleased General Zia whose wish might have prevailed

as the commanders resentment was leading towards a justification for a takeover by

him. It also showed the military’s version of the problem and its solution.177 General

® Faiz Ali Chishti later substantiated the record of the meeting gathered by

journalist Azhar Suhail.178

3.24 Sardar Qayyum on a Task for Negotiation

Bhutto realized to be left with no solid option except negotiation when the

referendum proposal was blatantly rejected by the opposition PNA and army as well, though in their internal meeting Bhutto knew that. He knew that after failing all

option he would have to surrender power and perhaps would be difficult for him to

get elected afresh in such circumstances when the society was polarized and other

quarters besides opposition were also not favourable though he still believed the

loyalty of Zia but after listening the views of senior army generals he took an

impression that military takeover was an option for generals. Despite a pressing desire

172 of talks between political rivals by various quarters of Pakistani society, Bhutto’s

efforts and brethren Muslim countries perusal for negotiations could not produce any

positive result, either for the reason that Bhutto’s approach was not applicable or the

ever-increasing demands of PNA were not acceptable for the government. The

deadlock between opposition PNA and Bhutto irked the friendly brethren Muslim

countries as well like millions of Pakistanis. Saudi Ambassador Riaz Ul Khateeb and

Kuwait’s special representative Rashid Sultan seemed a bit distressed but continued their efforts to convince both the parties that only solution of the problem was the

negation followed by an agreement. Shah of Iran Raza Shah also sent his foreign

minister Hashang Ansari, who met Bhutto on 17th with a special massage to Bhutto

emphasizing Bhutto to get an agreement with opposition PNA as soon as possible,

smelling the changing scenario.179 When Bhutto left with almost no other option to

resume talks as the opposition was not willing to resume talks without fulfilling their

rigid demands of resignation of Bhutto and fresh elections. Bhutto sought the

assistance of one of his grave political opponents Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan former

President of Azad Kashmir and head of Muslim Conference a component party of

PNA for the resuming of talks with PNA. Sardar Qayum was a politician having close

connections with army Generals owing to his position in Azad Kashmir where army

had its stakes keeping in view its animosity with India. Among other leaders of PNA

Sardar Qayum was also detained. Bhutto decided to utilize the worth of the Kashmiri

leader as he felt that Sardar Qayum would be able to convince the PNA leaders to

start negotiations. On 18th May, Sardar Qayum was freed from detention and entrusted the task to bring the PNA leaders on negotiation table which he accepted. Sardar

Qayum flew to Karachi in special aero plan provided by the government to carry out

his mission on faster pace. After meeting leaders detained in Karachi and Gharri

173 Khairo jails he flew to Dadu to meet Professor Ghafoor detained in Dadu district jail

and met Chaudri Zahoor Elahi in the same evening in Karachi jail then flew to Okara to meet Asghar Khan and then in Lahore with Maulana Maudoodi and reached

Rawalpindi next morning to meet Mufti Mehmood in Sihala and gave him reports of

meetings with other PNA leaders and conveyed him the intension of Bhutto to resume talks.180

PNA leaders agreed to resume negotiations on the condition of ignoring the

referendum idea by Bhutto in result of the Sardar Qayum’s tumultuous tour to peruse them. PNA leaders agreed to start negotiation to get the nation out of that impasse

created by political deadlock for about two months. Asghar Khan was the only leader

in PNA who did not want to resume the negotiations perhaps he had still some

optimism that army would take some action to overthrow Bhutto as a result of his

letter written to armed forces or having some signals from some quarters not to

resume talks. On 21st May, Sardar Qayum flew to Hyderabad to meet the Pashtun

leader Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Baluch leader Ghaus Bakhsh Bazinjo confined there from 1975. In the same evening he held talks again with Chaudri Zahoor Elahi

in Karachi jail. On 22nd May, he returned to Rawalpindi and before giving his final

report to Bhutto met with Mufti Mehmood in Sihala Rest House. On 22nd May, Sardar

Qayum went to Hyderabad where he met Wali Khan, Ghous Bakhsh Bazinjo, and

others. He flew to Karachi to meet Chaudri Zahoor Ellahi and then returned back to

Rawalpindi the same night. He gave the report of his talks with leaders to Mufti

Mehmood and also informed Saudi Ambassador about his mission. On next day he

met Bhutto along with Saudi Ambassador. On the same day the special envoy of

Yasir Arafat of Palestine met Bhutto and conveyed a massage of Mr. Arafat to

Bhutto.181

174 On the other hand the representatives of the brethren Muslim countries continued

their efforts and on 25th May, it was announced by Sardar Qayum in a press

conference that negotiations would restart. Mufti Mehmood, Professor Ghafoor and

Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan would be negotiating team of PNA and Pir Pagara

would act as an overseer of the negotiations.182

Bhutto felt his success that PNA agreed to resume talks and considered it that

by opening talks PNA had accepted him as the constitutional prime minister. He

wanted that the request of talks would come from PNA in writing to get a

psychological edge. The Saudi Ambassador Riaz ul Khateeb visited Sihala to PNA

leader on 27th May, fulfilled the Bhutto’s desire to bring a letter from Mufti

Mehmood for the resumption of talks. The earlier demands were included in this

letter for the resumption of talks including lifting of Martial Law and emergency,

withdrawal of cases registered during the movements against the workers and their

release, compensation of financial losses, and stopping of negative campaign against

the PNA leaders on official media and other forums.183

3.25 Assumption of Direct Talks

The arrests of PNA workers continued by the government agencies which

perturbed PNA leaders and Mufti Mehmood issued a press statement criticizing the

government for arrests. Pir Pagara also lashed out on the government and said that

Bhutto was not sincere to solve the problem through negotiations.184 On 30th May,

information minister Maulana Kausar Niazi told media that the talks would resume on

3rd June, and no preconditions were set by any of the party. It was a move to remove the uncertainty regarding the resumption of the talks.185 On 31st May, Bhutto held a

meeting with the services chiefs of armed forces perhaps to take them in confidence

prior to negotiation but this move was showing his weak position to the army

175 Generals. Meeting was attended by Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General

M. Sharif, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen Ziaul Haq, Chief of Naval Staff (CONS)

Admiral Mohammad Sharif, and Chief of Air Staff (CAS) Air Marshal Zulfikar Ali

Khan, Hafeez Pirzada and Maulana Kausar Niazi.186

Bhutto held such high profile meeting with the senior lot of the armed forces

at the stage when negotiations were announced to be started. This act caused

suspicions that Bhutto intended to adopt some other course than negotiations. He tried to take into confidence his militry subordinates about all possible solutions of the

ongoing problems including holding a referendum. Zia refused the option by taking the plea that men army would not be satisfied and even the opposition would not

accept the referendum. From government side Maulana Kausar Niazi presented five

possible solutions of the problem including Bhutto’s resignation and handing over

power to PNA, army take over and holding fresh elections by army at an appropriate time. Bhutto thundered upon the option of taking over power by army by saying that

if the army takeover was an option than he should quit and go to Larrkana, his

ancestral town. Zia instantly responded and stood up in an unusual manner and while

placing his hand on left side of the chest with bowed head said that:

“No sir we have no such intention, we are the right arm of the government, we are loyal and we will remain loyal”187

It is beyond understanding that discussion about army takeover by a key

minister in the presence of army Generals was a deliberate move of Bhutto to check the pulse of the Generals about their intensions of taking over power by staging a

coup in near future. Or it was merely a disastrous overconfidence of Bhutto which

disclosed his position and intensions of future course of actions which tempted the

Generals to take power or they comprehended Bhutto’s reliance totally on army which

revealed his weak position to Generals. On 1st June Saudi Ambassador Riaz ul

176 Khateeb met Bhutto and conveyed the message of Saudi King to him that the

negations must be fruitful and should try to watch and curb any act to derail the

negotiations. Saudi Ambassador told Bhutto that opposition PNA wanted an

assurance that he (Bhutto) would not maneuver the negations for his political gains

and the details of talks should be secret and would not be made public unless an

agreement was reached. Bhutto asked the Ambassador to give every assurance on his behalf.188 On 2nd June, Lahore High Court declared the imposition of Martial Law in

Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore unconstitutional. The Court maintained that there was

no provision in the constitution to impose Martial Law. Court also declared null and void the amendment in the Article 245 of the constitution.189 Bhutto had intension to

challenge the Court’s verdict in Supreme Court but lifted Martial Law on 7th June,

after starting negotiations with opposition. All leaders of PNA were released and PNA

stopped all its protest demonstrations to start negotiations with government. The

impasse lasted for three months and both parties started negotiations formally on 3rd

June 1977. Three-hours long first meeting was held in Prime Minister House in which both the parties agreed to revise their demands. Bhutto, in his opening speech assured

every possible cooperation to make the talks a success and a similar kind of response was showed by PNA leaders. PNA leaders showed their agreement to take back their

demand of Bhutto’s resignation from the office of Prime Minister. It was a big shift in their demands. At the start of the meeting the participants were informed that detained

PNA leaders were being released and many had already been released, government would not arrest any PNA leader or worker anymore and would stop any campaign

against PNA to defame its leadership.190 Defusing all speculations the first meeting was ended with positive note that both parties were very much interested to continue talks with seriousness and in a responsible manner to reach a workable solution of the

177 problem. A two- member committee was formed to make the agenda points for the

next meeting and to short list the demands. The committee was comprised of Abdul

Hafeez Pirzada from government and Professor Ghafoor Ahmad from opposition

PNA. 191Next meeting was to be held on 6th June. On 4th June both parties terminated

protest demonstrations across the country. 192 The two possible options for solution

included the holding of fresh polling in the constituencies highlighted by the PNA that there was rigging in those constituencies. Earlier PNA had demanded declaring the

elections of 22 constituencies null and wide and insisted to hold fresh elections.193

The second option was presented by opposition to hold fresh elections on all

constituencies. Protest demonstrations were stopped by 4th June as Bhutto showed a

slight intension to hold fresh elections. But there the point of contention was that the

new polls would be held within three months as proposed by PNA or in 1978 as

demanded by government. Government released most of the prominent leaders of

PNA detained at various jails and brought them to Sehala for resumption of talks 194

On 6th June meeting resumed, Bhutto accepted that there were reports of using unfair

means in some constituencies but it did not mean that the whole process was unfair

and then the core issue was that how to redress the wrong doings. If the elections were

held then nomination papers of the candidates would be filed afresh and

electioneering would be given time. If the elections were held on the limited

constituencies where rigging was alleged then no need to file papers and no

electioneering was to be carried out.195 After consultations with his colleagues PNA

leader Mufti Mehmood revealed the decision that PNA would agree any of the option

depended on the appropriate assurances by the government that the process of election would be impartial. At the end of the 6th June’s round of negotiation Professor

Ghafoor also told media that talks were leading to positive directions and PNA was

178 utterly satisfied.196 The agreement of the PNA on both the options with certain

guarantees was a big breakthrough but later on the rigid disagreement by them despite the fact that Bhutto went to bow far more than those options but PNA did not accept

raised serious of suspicions about the working of some “secrete” hands working to

sabotage the agreement. On 7th June, Martial Law was lifted from Karachi, Lahore

and Hyderabad.197 The agreement of 6th June talks did not last long as government

despite being agreed upon both the options i.e. holding fresh elections or holding polls

on disputed constituencies gave impression to Gold polls in 1978 which opposition

did not agree. So the disagreement was on dates not on the issue itself. Sardar Sherbaz

Mazari and Begum Nasim Wali were also of the same view as of Asghar Khan.

Actually these leaders had developed even personal animosity with Bhutto, the later took many steps of vindictive nature against the NAP leadership. These leaders

developed connections with the Generals.198

The role of Asghar Khan Leader of Tehreek-i-Istaklal a member party of PNA

remained suspicious throughout the negotiation process. Many people doubted that he

had connections with some “hidden” forces which had assured him become the Prime

Minister of Pakistan once Bhutto was ousted from power. He had written a letter to the armed forces to intervene.199 On 4th June, Asghar Khan addressed a press

conference in Islamabad after his release and denied any difference among PNA

leadership especially regarding his party.200 On 5th June while addressing to a press

conference Professor Ghafoor Ahmad secretary general of PNA said that they wanted to reach an agreement as soon as possible and for this very reason they wanted to have

consultative meetings with Asghar Khan and JUP chief Mulana Shah Ahmad

Noorani, who also provided support to Asghar Khan’s point of views.201 It was

evident that Asghar Khan was against the negotiations to further proceed as he was

179 convinced that armed forces would impose Martial law as a result of his letter to

armed forces thus in his views negotiations would be a useless exercise. Sardar Sher

Baz Mazari and Begum Nasim Wali Khan were also of the same views. These leaders

developed close contacts with Generals and were expecting a Martial Law to be

imposed by army Generals and hold elections in 90 days.202 Such conflicting views

prevailed in the opposition camps and these leaders continued this position till the end

of the regime. On 5th June, PNA leaders decided to stay in Islamabad for

consultations regarding negotiations. On 6th June, the next round of meeting held in a

pleasant environment and for the first time Bhutto showed his intention of willingness to declare the election of March, 1977 null and void. The issue of holding either re

polling or re-election was left to the leaders of PNA to decide.203 On 7th June, PNA

negotiating team came with clear view of holding fresh elections and the idea of re

polling on disputed constituencies was dropped. The sub-committee including

Professor Ghafoor Ahemad and Hafeez Pirzada were given the assignment for the

finalization of the details including the constitutional amendments for legalizing the

clauses included in the agreement.204 In the same evening in the meeting of PNA

leaders held in Islamabad an 11-member legal committee including Khalid Ishaq,

Barrister Anwar, Mian Mahmood Ali Kasuri, S.M. Zafar, Amir Raza, Nasim Farooqi,

Zahoorul Haq, Chaudhry Mohammad Ismail, Abdul Ghafoor Baig, Rana Abdur

Rahim and Ahad Yousuf, was formed to prepare a report comprising of the legal

aspects of the holding of fresh elections. On 8th June the legal team handed over its

report to the sub-committee which meant to draft details for the new elections.205

Hafeez Pirzada the government member of the two-member sub-committee envisaged the many points beyond the mandate entrusted to legal committee as he saw those

points political and administrative than legal. The legal team was given task to

180 prepare legal aspects of the election not administrative and political. The report

presented by the legal committee constituted by PNA for seeking its expert opinion

included the dates of holding elections, powers to be entrusted to election machinery,

election commission, and dates for dissolving federal and provincial government,

formation of caretaker governments and other things which according to Pirzada were beyond the task entrusted to them.206 The new situation created almost an impasse, the

sub-committee, on the recommendation of Pirzada decided to send back the report of the legal team to PNA leadership to consider it again. On 8th June, PNA President

Mufti Mehmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani met

Saudi Ambassador Riaz ul Khateeb and told him that PNA would not accept even

new elections without a solemn guarantee. This created another hurdle in the

proceeding of the negotiations. Saudi Ambassador Sheikh Riaz ul khateeb telephoned

King Khalid and informed him about the latest developments regarding the

negotiations.207 On one hand PNA’s formed legal committee went beyond the

mandate entrusted to it and on the other Pirzada showed prompt reaction without

consulting Bhutto which created deadlock in the talks and the whole proceedings were

at stake. Otherwise it was expected that an agreement would be signed within day or two taking the nation out of the panic situation. On 9th June, both the sides showed

rigidity to remain stuck with their stand points. Pirzada objected the new demands and

Ghafoor demanded guarantee for the fair process of new elections. It was alleged by

many in opposition quarters that Bhutto deliberately wanted delay in the negotiation to gain time and Pirzada was showing objections on his leader’s behest.208 Ghulam

Mustafa Khar the former Governor Punjab and a close associate of Bhutto who was

known for his highhandedness against opponent had left PPP and joined opposition

camp but rejoined PPP on 10th June, and expressed his harsh views about opposition

181 and warned that he could use violent ways against violent acts of PNA. This was

perceived as a warning by government to opposition.209 Mufti Mehmood warned

government that if the disagreement would not be resolved in next meeting PNA would not continue the talks. It was perhaps a reaction of Khar’s induction in PPP and

his harsh statements.210 On 9th June, no considerable proceeding could be held despite

a meeting of about two hours. In the same evening PNA leaders met and agreed to

continue with their demands of seeking guarantee for the whole process, without any

shift, what they called “genuine”.211 On 10th June, Bhutto also attended the round of the meeting. Though the meeting started in a positive exchange of views but soon it

grimed the situation when Bhutto did not show flexibility on the six-points of

opposition including new election commission, election dates, guarantees of fair polls,

lifting emergency, caretaker governments and release of detainees. Members of both

sides remained stuck to their stand points. Impasse continued that Mufti Mehmood

and Professor Ghafoor decided to walkout after a two-hours long meeting but were

requested by government team to stay for vetting of press statement of the meeting.

Though no formal statement was issued but news spread about the impasse that was

created in the talks.212 Like Pakistani citizens the representatives of brethren Muslim

countries were also seriously concerned about the deadlock in the talks and wished to break the deadlock. On 12th June the Saudi Ambassador Riaz ul Khateeb met both

PNA leaders and Bhutto to find a workable solution of the problem when the next

round of the negotiation was to be started.213 In the meeting of 12th June. The PPP team presented a flexible and reasonable 24-points draft of the proposals including the holding of National Assembly elections on 7th October, the release of detainees

except those involved in serious crimes and their cases would be discussed in a

committee for appropriate actions, compensation for losses, ending of Defense of

182 Pakistan Rules and special tribunals, stopping of army action in Baluchistan for four

months after signing the agreement, evolving a code of conduct for polling, formation

of Implementation Council demanded by PNA including four members from both

sides and in case of any disagreement the issue be referred to Chief Justice for the

nomination of three judges to act as arbitrators. The PNA did not accept these

apparently reasonable proposals but pledge to consider them in the meeting of PNA

leaders and come with some reasonable response. 214 On 13 th June, both sides tried not to be blamed for impasse. The discussion remained on the dates of holding new

elections. PPP wanted to hold them in November or December against its earlier

proposal of holding on 7th October and PNA demanded elections in August. The issue

of date could be settled through talks but Sherbaz Mazari, Asghar Khan and Begum

Nasim Wali, the hardliners in PNA presented more rigid demands. They demanded

from government to dissolve the Hyderabad Tribunal and release NAP leader Khan

Abdul Wali Khan and 54 other detained leaders of NAP. These leaders were being tried for London Plan since 1973. They also demanded immediate ending of army

actions in Baluchistan. These demands had some concerns with army as the treason

cases against NAP leaders had some connections with insurgency in Baluchistan and without consultations with army Generals government was not willing or in position to take some decision.215 On the other hand Gen Zia and most of the corps

commanders were not even ready to listen to the demands of withdrawal of army from

Baluchistan and dissolution of Hyderabad Tribunal. This was an immense pressure on

Bhutto.216 Bhutto showed a wish to meet Nasim Wali and Sherbaz Mazari perhaps to take them into confidence about the situation and his position regarding the issue. But both of them refused to meet him showing rigidity.217 Thus, the state of deadlock

continued.

183 3.26 Generals’ Views

On 14th June, the eighth round of negotiation held and PNA rejected the

PPP’s proposal especially of the formation of a coalition government of both the

parties. Mufti Mehmood emphasized to develop a consensus on the date of holding

fresh elections and for them consensus meant to hold elections on 14th August the date

proposed by PNA218. Mufti Mehmood demanded a clear-cut decision on the all

problematic matters otherwise his team would not engage in negotiations anymore.

Before the start of the next round of meeting Bhutto thought to assess the minds of

army Generals about the ongoing crises. Perhaps he wanted to get the fresh assurances

of support from the army commanders to deal with the opposition in a confidant

manner and to stay in power. On 14th June, Bhutto held a meeting with army chief

General Zia and corps commander at Prime Minister House. The meeting was also

attended by Kausar Niazi and Hafeez Pirzada in such pressing situation by protests

and ever-increasing demands of opposition PNA Bhutto wanted to exhibit the army’s

support before opposition and common people, as his position was being eroded and

left with limited options due to rigidity prevailing in opposition camp.219

Bhutto expressed the ongoing situation before the participants of the meeting

and then sought the opinions of the commanders. While addressing to the meeting and trying to justify his thoughts and actions he said:

“The country is passing through the crossroad. I am fully aware of my power; you must remember that I can order the army. On referendum I consulted you because I do not want to impose a solution which you do not consider to be proper. I desire national consensus and you also happen to be a part of the nation. I don’t suffer from any complex. I do not feel shy in talking to army Generals because I know you for the last 10 years. I don’t feel embarrassed in consulting you. When I talked to you about the referendum you might have felt that I would emerge all the more powerful. You wanted a political solution, I agreed. You were in favour of negotiations. I, therefore, told Mufti in the very first session that I am not talking to a foreign delegation, that you people are our elders and brothers. I am not an extremist, I am a liberal. As

184 such it did not take me time to accept what they said. I accepted all their demands, no matter how heavy a price I may have to pay for that. Producing results is beyond my power.

“Some contradictions are bound to emerge as a result of the forthcoming elections which will create instability. But it is certain that after the elections no one will like the army’s interference as they would be having a fresh mandate. Moreover, they will not quarrel among themselves. That would be bad for the country but the army wouldn’t be able to do anything about it. The only way out is that the army should take over now. But this is not a bed of roses. When I met Yahya Khan after he took over, I made it clear to him that he was in a precarious position. He said: ‘What is politics? Common sense. And the bureaucracy says that I have political foresight, that I am imbued with common sense, and can run the government.’ But that was 1969; now it is 1977. Even at that time I had said that the second martial law was always weaker than the first one ... and the third would be still weaker. Weak in the sense that firstly you won’t be able to shoot anyone, and if you do, then remember that is the worst kind of weakness. Today, there is an awakening all over the world.

It will also be said that the Punjabi army is running the government. The other provinces will feel alienated. There would be pressure on you about the ceasefire line in Kashmir. You will face problems on the issue of the reprocessing plant. Only a political government can deal with such matters, not the army. The major powers will also question the high proportion of the defense forces to the population. But I do not mean to say that I alone am the solution to all problems. No, I am trying to find an honourable solution by talking to the opposition and I am positive that I will succeed.”220

After Bhutto’s initial remarks General Zia expressed the support of army for the civilian government but gave a covered message to Bhutto as well. He said

“Sir, you are the one who has done the most for the army. The army is in no way a third party [to the conflict between the government and the PNA]; we have no such intention. You’ve seen that we have earned a bad name in the opposition camp. That goes to our credit. It proves that we are with the government.” 221

Bhutto had heard such assurances from Zia for a number of times

Corps commander Lahore General Iqbal said the army was praying for the success of talks and perhaps he gave the army commanders mind about the events he further said: “The agitation has stopped for the time being, but if the negotiations fail it will start again. There’ll be bomb blasts and firing. The

185 Democratic Youth Force is getting instructions from Asghar Khan. It will be impossible to deploy the army in Lahore again as the people won’t accept that. There is a risk of external threats as well; the Indian army can cross our borders while our units are busy in the cities. There’ll be cracks in the army if we ask it to shoot [at civilians]. It may also lead to mutual tension. The opposition has been working in this direction for a long time. Retired military officers are taking part in the agitation as well as relatives of the soldiers. The election campaign has also had its effect on the junior ranks. There is no [concept of] ‘fire in the air’ in the army, and yet it was resorted to despite orders. As such we wish with all our heart that the negotiations should succeed”,222

After a self-explanatory expression of the situation by General Iqbal , corps

commander Karachi General Jahanzeb Arbab expressed his views about the situation.

He said that senior army officers had no problem as they wanted political settlement

of the issue but the juniors in the army would accept the orders of the seniors but

perhaps unwillingly. He also opposed the release of detainees of Hyderabad Tribunals

as according to him they were “anti-Pakistan. He also pressed for the success of the talks. Corps Commander Peshawar also expressed similar views and opposed the

prolonged involvement of the army in the political matters and if the protest

demonstrations would start again then it would be beyond the control of the army.223

Bhutto listened to the views of his commanders in army and tried to read their minds

and assured them to reach a political agreement with opposition. He interpreted the views of army Generals as an “unconditional” support for him.224

3.27 Resumption of Talks

In the evening of 14th June, the next round of talks with PNA started. PPP team once again presented the option of a coalition government till the

commencement of new election but PNA team rejected altogether. Both the parties were agreed upon holding new elections but the disagreement on the date of the

elections and the jurisdictions of the Implementation Council. The PNA President

Mufti Mehmood wanted elections before 14th August by all means.225 0n 15th June

186 when talks completed nation was given with the good news that both the parties had

agreed upon all the disputed issues and after consultation of a four-member legal team

a formal agreement would be signed by the leaders of both sides. While talking to

press at Prime Minister House Professor Ghafoor and Hafeez Pirzada explained the

salient features of the agreed accord which included the holding of fresh elections in the month of October, the final date would be decided in consultation with opposition,

abolition of all special tribunals including Hyderabad, lifting of special laws including

emergency, army withdrawal from Baluchistan, assurance of press freedom and

release of all detainees detained during the movement.226 Those involved in

negotiations felt relived after a long and hectic series of talks. But Asghar Khan called

the negotiations “worthless” exercise as perhaps the success of negotiations was

against his perceived result and as assured to him by some “hidden forces” Asghar

Khan, Begum Nasim Wali Khan, Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari and Maulana Shah

Ahmad Noorani did not desire the negotiations to be successful and an agreement to be signed with government. They were in favour of ousting Bhutto by army, take over

government and hold elections.227 When the news of agreement on all disputed

matters was given to nation on the late night of 15th June Asghar Khan, Nasim Wali

Khan and Sherbaz Mazari visited Mufti Mehmood and persuaded him not to sign an

agreement with Bhutto and let the army to impose Martial Law and army would

guarantee to hold election in 90 days. The PNA negotiating team deliberately kept

aside those leaders who were not in favour to reach an agreement with Bhutto.228

Saudi Ambassador showed his pleasure on the news of an agreement and appreciated the gestures of both opposition and government and reposing their confidence in King

of Saudi Arabia.229 Bhutto decided to go to Larrkana for a rest for a few days as he

expressed his tiredness for a prolonged series of talks. It was beyond understanding

187 that Bhutto instead of finalizing the accord and ending the impasse lasted for about three months in the country and put his government on stake, decided to go to rest at

Larrkana. The PNA team advised Bhutto to finalize the accord first but he declined.230

The meeting of sub-committee held on 16th June to finalize the details of the

agreement. The meeting held in a positive manner. The issues pertaining to the code

of conduct for press during the electioneering, amendments in Army Act, release of

detained journalists, dissolution of all five governments, constituting caretaker

governments, lifting of emergency laws and some other issues were discussed in the

meeting. But Pirzada was unable to take the decisions without the consent of Bhutto

so issues remained unsolved. On 23rd June, Bhutto addressed the National Assembly

and took the Assembly members into confidence about the holding of fresh elections

as agreed upon with opposition. He said that the holding of new elections was a

“painful” process but he accepted to undergo new elections to get the nation out of

impasse which put the whole nation in trouble.231 Earlier Bhutto had told the PNA

negotiating team that he wanted to have rest for few days when an agreement was

reached between both the parties. As he said was tired of the hectic process of

negotiations. But instead of having rest at Larrkana he announced to visit the five

Islamic countries including Saudi Arabia, Libya, UAE, Kuwait and Iran. Either he wanted to thank the leaders of brethren Islamic countries for their support and

cooperation for the success of the talks or he wanted to take them into confidence

about the apprehensions of some foreign interference working against him. It was

quite un-understandable that instead of signing an agreement with the opposition, which he managed to reach after a painful exercise of about three months he decided to keep it incomplete and flew to Islamic countries. This visit of Bhutto on the critical

stage of the negotiations caused a severe restlessness among the people of Pakistan

188 especially the PNA.232 Bhutto caused a serious blow to the negotiations, which almost

reached to an agreed end, by flying to Muslim countries on 17th June. While talking to

King Khalid of Saudi Arabia Bhutto told him about the alleged interferes of both

super powers USA and USSR in Pakistan’s political affairs. After getting the

confidence of Saudi monarch he left for Libya, Kuwait, UAE and Iran to get the

confidence the leaders of these brethren Muslim countries. 233

On 17th June meeting of sub-committee held but Pirzada expressed his

inability to guarantee the constitutional covering to the agreement, and the formation

of Implementation Council without the consent of Bhutto. On this the opposition

member of the sub-committee Professor Ghafoor decided to postpone the talks on these issues till the arrival of Bhutto. Bhutto kept on negotiating on other issues to

avoid a deadlock.234 On 20th June, another round of negotiation held but could not

reach to a conclusion. PNA held its meeting in the same evening and stressed the

needs of resuming talks just after the arrival of Bhutto to reach a final agreement. In this meeting Professor Ghafoor told the participants of the meeting about the

indifferent attitude of Pirzada especially his recent statement issued in Lahore in which he accused the PNA for not reaching an agreement and damaging the process.

The PNA wanted constitutional guarantee of the agreement and even accused that

Bhutto would go back on his words if the agreement reached between both parties were not given a constitutional cover. Keeping in view the inability of Pirzada to

reach an agreement without consulting team found it essential to resume talks with

Bhutto directly on his arrival and not with Pirzada. 235 On the issue of holding election

in Azad Kashmir a difference raised to an extent that Sardar Qayum, after meeting

Pirzada accused that the later was sabotaging the negotiations.236 Bhutto left the

country at a very crucial time when the agreement was almost final to sign and only a

189 few things were left to finalize, without authorizing his team to settle the left over

issues. What was in his mind never got public, whether he wanted to gain time or

anything else was in his mind making him reluctant to sign the agreement in its

earliest or he wanted to undermine PNA psychologically or he did not want any

agreement with opposition at all.237 During his visit leaders of Muslim countries

pressed Bhutto not to fail the negotiations at any cast and should reach an agreement

as soon as possible, as he himself was lauding the foreign hands to conspire against

him. Delaying the signing of a pact with opposition would mean to provide an

opportunity to that “hidden” hand to work.238 On 20th June, last session of sub

committee held. While talking to Kuwait Television on the same day Bhutto

expressed his wish for the success of the negotiation and revealed that an agreement

had already been reached with opposition for fresh elections. From Kuwait he reached

Iran where he held talks with Shah of Iran on 21st June. Shah of Iran advised him to

complete the process of talks with opposition be expedited. On 21st June, Bhutto flew to Kabul from Tehran and held talks with Afghan ruler Sardar Daud. Bhutto called

Hafeez Pirzada and Mufti Mehmood from Kabul and got information about

negotiations. He assured Mufti Mehmood about a positive result of the

negotiation.239On his arrival from the five-day tour of Muslim countries on 23rd June

he held a session of talks with PNA. Mufti Mehmood, Professor Ghafoor and

Nawabzada Nasrullah represented the opposition PNA in the meeting. PNA team

presented a draft of the agreement and pressed upon the immediate formation of the

proposed Supreme Implementation Council. PNA team also demanded the

constitutional cover of the agreement and announcement of the date of dissolution of

assemblies for holding fresh elections. A situation of mistrust prevailed among each

other due to a long history of confrontations and use of tactics against each other.240

190 Bhutto expressed astonishment on the draft presented to him by PNA team as he

found it a complete new draft and requested Mufti Mehmood to give him a day to

study the new draft.241 Next round of the meeting was to be held on 25th June. In the

morning of 25th June, Bhutto held a meeting with Army Chief Zia, corps commanders

and his political associates Pirzada, Kausar Niazi and his Security Advisor General

Rtd Tikka Khan and put forward the new draft of PNA before the participants. What

Bhutto wanted to achieve to discuss every bit with the army commanders was

mysterious. Perhaps he wanted to impress the opposition by securing support of

Generals. But he had to pay a heavy price later on for such assurances which proved

merely assurances and army imposed Martial Law on 5th July setting aside all claimed

assurances.242In the meeting some of the commanders gave indifferent views about the situation. Bhutto placed the draft of the accord of PNA before Generals and asked their comments. Some Generals showed objections on some of the clauses of the

draft. When Bhutto showed his intentions to repeal the Hyderabad Tribunal, release the detainees there and stop army action in Baluchistan Ziaul Haq stood up and in an unusual manner opposed the proposal and requested Bhutto that he wanted to speak to

opposition leaders on these issue. Bhutto agreed and assured him to give him a chance

to express the army’s concerns about Baluchistan and Hyderabad Tribunal issues to

PNA leaders. 243After meeting Generals Bhutto met the PNA leaders in the evening of

25th June, in the scheduled meeting. The draft of agreement presented by PNA was

discussed in detail. Bhutto presented another draft prepared by PPP and told the PNA

leaders that army Generals had severe differences on some clauses of the draft of

demands presented by PNA, especially withdrawal of troops from Baluchistan and

dissolving of Hyderabad Conspiracy Case. Generals wanted to give briefing to PNA

leaders by themselves about their apprehensions. This showed the intensity of the

191 involvement of the Generals in the matter and Bhutto’s undue dependency on the

Generals making them involved in the political matters.244 On the same day Ghulam

Mustafa Khar held a press conference at Rawalpindi Press Club and threatened PNA

of dire consequences if they did not leave the path of “extremism”. Khar had left party

in 1976 but rejoined when crises of opposition agitation were at its peak. He was

made special advisor to Prime Minister. His threats sent a negative message to

opposition which was engaged in negotiations with government.245 On 26th June a

meeting of central committee of PNA held to discuss both the drafts, presented by

PNA and PPP respectively. It was decided that with the consultation of the legal team

of PNA a new draft of the proposed agreement would be presented to Bhutto. Asghar

Khan opposed the idea in possible harsh manner and asked the negotiating team to

stress the government to accept the draft presented by PNA. Professor Ghafoor was a bit uncouth by saying that PNA would hand over its draft to PPP whether they accept

it or reject it and PNA would not wait for any more to give an opportunity to

government to use time gaining tactics. This ultimatum of Professor Ghafoor

aggravated the situation and showed that the extremist views prevailed in PNA.246

On 27th June, the amended draft of the agreement was handed over to Pirzada with an

ultimatum “accept it or reject it”, in a tense atmosphere. Pirzada refused to meet by

saying that negotiations could not be held in such threatening environment.247 On 28th

June, PNA council met in Islamabad and entrusted authority to Mufti Mehmood to

sign an agreement with Bhutto but not any amendment in the draft of PNA. If Bhutto

did not agree then the next meeting of PNA would decide the future course of action.

In the meeting, there was a visible difference of opinion for some the start of agitation was the only solution but some still wanted to resume dialogue.248 On 28th June,

Bhutto, while addressing to a press conference in his chamber at National Assembly,

192 criticized the PNA but in a comparatively moderate manner. He talked in length about the ongoing process of talks and the events took place in the last two months. He told

newsmen that PNA was demanding more powers for supreme implementation

Council even more than the government exercised. He said that government was willing to hold free and fair elections as demanded by PNA but the agreement would be within the constitutional framework. He warned that if the impasse continued the

situation would be out of control of the politicians. He said that he did not care then

even the angels would come or the “Rasputin” ruled the country, he was willing to go back to Larrkana his home town. He warned in threatening manner that he would pull the skin of the capitalists and exploiters of the poor masses that their generations would remember. This harsh expression of thought by Bhutto soured the atmosphere.

249The Saudi envoy Riaz ul Khateeb got severely disturbed on the worsening of the

situation and met Bhutto and convinced him to be reasonably calm to understand the

situation. It was result of his perusal that in the evening of 29th June Bhutto called

Mufti Mehmood and asked him to send Professor Ghafoor to Pirzada, along with

PNA’s amended draft of the agreement for further deliberations. This call eased the

situation to an extent as both Mufti Mehmood and Bhutto decided to meet next day.

On 29th June, the PNA draft of the agreement was handed over to Hafeez Pirzada.250

While addressing to a public meeting at Taxila near Rawalpindi Asghar Khan the

leading hardliner in PNA demanded the resignation of Bhutto and said in an

enthusiastic manner that the opposition would never accept anything less than

Bhutto’s resignation. This speech of Asghar Khan sent a negative message in

government camp.251 In the evening of 29th June, Mufti Mehmood met Bhutto alone

on his invitation. This meeting of the top leaders of both sides led to a meeting of sub

193 committee on 30th June and discussed all points agreed upon that after this meeting

only a formal meeting would be held to sign the agreement.252

3.28 Generals’ Briefing to Opposition Leaders

On July 1s4, the round of negotiation between PNA and government’s teams

held at Prime Minister House. Mufti Mehmood was told by Bhutto that army Generals would give you a briefing about the matters of their concerns regarding the issues

discussed by the negotiating teams. On this Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan said in

protest that army must not be called in political issues and if army Generals had some

concerns they should communicate through government as they were a subordinate

institution of the government. After perusal of Bhutto and exchange of heated remarks

PNA team agreed to attend the briefing. The Chief of Army Staff Gen Zia, Chairman

of Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Mohammad Sharif, Chief of Naval Force Admiral

Mohammad Sharif and Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Zulfikar Ali Khan came to the room where both the teams were sitting. Ziaul Haq carried a heavy file of about

100 pages to brief the opposition. The briefing lasted for more than two hours. When

General Zia started talking about political situation Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan

lashed out on him by saying:

“Stop talking about politics. We don’t have to hear a political sermon from you. We know politics very well and if you have finished with explaining the military’s point of view then it is enough.” 253

Zia’s body language clearly reflected his feelings on Nasrulah’s harsh

expressions .Bhutto tried to calm the situation.254 Zia was of the view that while

reaching any decision about Baluchistan the “national interests” should be kept in

consideration. He also differed with the idea to put army under the jurisdiction of

Supreme Implementation Council.255 On 1st July, two rounds of talks were held. First

round from 10 am in the morning to 1pm in the afternoon till the break for the Friday

194 prayer and second round held in the evening. Both sides agreed to reach a final

agreement on the same day. Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan wondered about the briefing

of the Generals as nothing new was presented to the participants of the meeting by

Generals about Baluchistan and what the Generals wanted to convey to the political

leaders. Perhaps the Generals wanted to read the situation and the body language of the leaders about the agreement. 256

In the meeting at evening which lasted for about ten hours prolonged discussions took place and Bhutto accepted almost every demand of PNA to their best satisfaction. The final agreement was reached on the points including constituting and the authorities of the Supreme Council, dissolution of assemblies, date for the National Assembly election was finalized as 6th October and 8th October for provincial assemblies, lifting of emergency rules and release of those arrested under emergency rules, dissolution of assemblies on 15th July, despite apprehensions of the army top brass Bhutto agreed to form the proposed Council with the extensive powers of both President and government and governors and provincial government to assure free and fair elections.

It was decided in the agreement that no regulation, order, ordinance could be issued without the prior endorsement of the Implementation Council. Council would also have the authority to take action against any official of the government if a complaint was lodged against him to act against the holding of free and fair elections. The Prime

Minister would be bound to execute the decisions of the council and President would do the same in case of Azad Kashmir issues. Army would be withdrawn from

Baluchistan within 45 days of the signing of the agreement and possible efforts would be made to create conducive atmosphere for holding elections in the province and measures would be taken to rehabilitate the displaced persons in the province. All emergency rules including Defense of Pakistan Rules would be withdrawn

195 immediately after signing of the agreement, special tribunals would be closed down and all detainees would be released. The cases of the detainees who could not be released under the clauses of the agreement would be sent to the Implementation

Council by the committee constituted to review their cases, and if their cases would not be covered under the agreement their cases would be sent to normal courts.257 There were about two thousands political prisoners during Bhutto’s years in power and about twenty thousands were arrested during the PNA movement against government after the elections of March 1977.258 A monotonous situation was created during the final round of talks on the issue of Army Act. The PPP government had given legal cover to the actions of army by amending the Army Act of 1952. Both parties agreed to remove the amended clauses of the Act and all convicted and detained by military courts under those clauses would be acquitted. All those convicted for election-related issues would be released immediately after the signing of the agreement. Interestingly the political leaders and workers convicted after 1st January, 1972, just after Bhutto took over power, were released immediately and their cases were taken back. It showed the extent of the demands and bowing of Bhutto to those demands under pressure. The movement which was started against the alleged rigging on 22 seats reached to such a level that Bhutto was forced to accept or reverse a number of decisions he had taken during his five years in power.259 All restrictions including discriminatory use of newsprint quota and official advertisements were withdrawn. Balance coverage for opposition and government were ensured on official newspapers and electronic media.

It was agreed that Chairman Election Commission and its four members would be selected in consultation and consent of PNA. The Election Commission was given financial and administrative autonomy. The Election Commission was also entrusted with the powers of a high court to arrest, release or to suspend the arrests to hold free

196 and fair elections. A mechanism was also agreed regarding the announcement of the results and only Election Commission was to announce results on official media. All arms licenses issued after 1st January, 1977 stood canceled and arms had to be submitted to nearby police stations. The agreement also curtailed the powers and authority of the Prime Minister to an enormous extent. He could not take any decision related to the revenue or state property without the prior approval of the Supreme

Implementation Council. No political party could be banned till the holding of new elections. It was decided that the Supreme Council was to be comprising of ten members, five each from both parties. The issue of the chairmanship of the council was severely debated, as both the parties wanted to retain its chairmanship. But eventually it was decided that Prime Minister would be the head of the council and its decisions should be unanimous. In case of any disagreement the matter would be sent to

Supreme Court which had to decide the matter within 72 hours. The Council had to make its rules and procedures by itself and to meet once in every week.260 Bhutto bowed to an enormous extent as the demands of the opposition were ever increasing with every passing day. When Bhutto turned ready to accept one set of demands new demands were put forward which showed that something somewhere was there in the minds of some of the leaders of PNA which created suspicions raised by Bhutto as in his view strings of some of the leaders were pulled from some “behind the curtain” forces. 261 On 2nd , July the sub-committee met just to discuss the ways and means to give constitutional cover to the final agreement as the rest of the issues were already agreed upon by the leaders in the long meeting of 1st , July. PNA’s central council met on the same day attended by the leaders of all member parties. Mufti Mehmood and

Professor Ghafoor told the PNA leaders that Bhutto had accepted all the major demands and suggested some minor changes which the PNA negotiating team agreed.

197 The “hawks” in PNA expressed their severe agony and insisted that the PNA draft was a final document and only needed Bhutto’s signature. Begum Nasim Wali said in an angry way that the negotiating team had no jurisdiction to amend the draft they were sent only to explain the draft and get the signature of Bhutto. Asghar Khan went further in an exasperated manner and told Mufti Mehmood that the meeting with

Bhutto should not heve been attended by them. He said that he could give a guarantee that army would hold elections within 90 days after imposing Martial Law in the country and asked them to get aside and to let him handle the matter by himself. His infuriation showed that how much perturbed he was on the news of an agreement on the basic matters by both sides as he felt the failing of his ‘plan’. Mufti Mehmood tried to convince Asghar Khan and Nasim Wali that if the army imposed Martial Law it would not be the removal of Bhutto only but nothing would be in the hands of PNA as well. Later history proved him right. Asghar Khan left the venue in an anguish, perhaps he wanted to act upon his plan in some other ways. The scene could be visualized clearly. Majority was happy on reaching an agreement with Bhutto and forced him to bow before their most of the demands. But the hardliners especially

Asghar Khan was against the signing of an agreement as he was sure that army would take action and he would be the next “Prime Minister”.262 Despite these indifferent circumstances the draft which was agreed by both the negotiating teams was handed over to the legal team of PNA and asked them to return it on 3rd July, the next day.

Mufti Mehmood anf Professor Ghafoor, the “ducks” and somber elements in PNA were disappointed by the rigid attitude of their colleagues in PNA. A similar kind of disappointment prevailed in PPP camp as after bowing to every possible extent to the

PNA demands, even those demands which had nothing to do with the March 1977 elections without favourable result for the country could be produced. Sardar Abdul

198 Qayum Khan met Maulana Kausar Niazi and revealed to him that some of the

“hardliners” in PNA had connections with army and they wanted Martial Law in the country and Bhutto should immediately sign the accord to avoid any such unpleasant situation. He also suggested to Maulana Niazi that Bhutto should meet Mufti

Mehmood and him (Sardar Qayum) to finalize the agreement. Army used PNA against

Bhutto. Maulana Niazi told Bhutto but he refused to meet them and took their apprehensions non-seriously. 263 Federal cabinet also met on 3rd July and army

Generals also attended the cabinet meeting. In the morning of 3rd July PNA’ central council met in Islamabad heads of all member parties participated in the meeting.

Legal experts Khalid Ishaq and Mian Mehmood Ali Kasure also attended the meeting to share the legal opinion. After getting the legal opinion PNA leaders decided to meet again in the evening of the same day. The leaders of component parties attended the evening meeting. Asghar Khan by taking hard line stressed for making a new draft of agreement by legal team. His demands were not supported by the leaders of other parties. Only Asharf Khan of Khaksar Tehreek gave a silent support to his demand.

Sardar Qaym Khan and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan strongly disagreed with the demands of Asghar Khan. Sardar Qayum was of the opinion that PNA negotiating team should finalize the main points afresh highlighted by some leaders, and forwarded to government team for their response if their suggestions were not repugnant to the PNA then the agreement should be signed. Mian Tufail of JI also categorically opposed the preparation of new draft at that stage. He said that Bhutto had become weaker and more than 90 percent of the demands of PNA had already been accepted and 90 percent of the draft was agreed upon. He suggested that legal team should accompany the negotiating team and the agreement should be finalized at its earliest. Baluchistan and Hyderabad issues were also debated extensively but these

199 issues were not the core ones. Opposition was divided visibly into two groups. The hardliners headed by Asghar Khan even challenged the authority of negotiating team and said that when a draft of accord was prepared with consensus then it was not the authority of the team to amend the draft. When the negotiating team of PNA comprising of Mufti Mehmood, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad and Nawabzada Nasarullah

Khan announced that they had reached an agreement with Bhutto the hardliners including Asghar Khan, Begum Wali, Noorani and Sherbaz Mazari refused to aacept the agreement and even challenged the position of PNA negotiating team on the behest of their “hidden” masters.264 It was quite evident that Asghar Khar did not want the talks to be successful at any cast so he was getting involved in useless petty issues.265

After heated discussions it was resolved that PNA legal team should convey the new points to Bhutto. New points included the Implementation Council should be given constitutional cover, governors should be appointed with the consent of opposition and governors should not be given any administrative and legislative authority. The federal government should also be party in the agreement along with PPP and PNA, FSF should be given under the command of army, army courts’ would be run as civilian courts, members of Election Commission should be appointed in consent with PNA, all constitutional amendments should be approved by PNA.266 Mufti Mehmood, Professor

Ghafoor and Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan went to Prime Minister with the additional demands of some of the leaders of PNA and told that the draft which was agreed by both the negotiating teams was not accepted by some hardliners in PNA. Mufti

Mehmood told Bhutto that some of the leaders in PNA had links with army Generals and they wanted the imposition of Martial law in the country. He was talking about

Asghar Khan, Nasim Wali Khan and Pir Pagara. Bhutto consulted his negotiating team in the side room. Kausar Niazi facvoured the idea to accept the draft but Hafeez

200 Pirzada opposed by saying that talk of Martial Law by PNA was merely a tactics to force government to accept the demands. He added that military was with the government and it was the right time to put pressure on PNA for a favourable deal.

Bhutto sought time from Mufti Mehmood for his response.267 Nawabzada Nasrullah requested Bhutto to accept the new points and should support them so that an agreement could reach to avoid any unpleasant end. Mufti Mehmood asked Bhutto that he should accept only the clause of giving constitutional cover to the Implementation

Council. When the issues of army action in Baluchistan and Hyderabad Tribunal came under discussion Bhutto said that he had told to PNA team already that Generals did not want to accede to these issues and even then he would discuss with his political associates and inform PNA. Bhutto’s attitude was visibly serious and his body language reflected some serious concerns.268 On 4th July, in the evening a meeting of cabinet held at Prime Minister House. Cabinet ministers, provincial chief ministers and

COAS General Zia also attended the meeting. Bhutto showed his categorical intensions to sign the agreement with PNA on next day. Hafeez Pirzada expressed some reservations regarding some earlier intensions but Bhutto gave him a harsh response and wowed to sign the agreement on 5th July.269 Hafeez Pirzada expressed his apprehensions that once an agreement was signed the PNA could come with more demands. Bhutto responded that people were tired and would not start agitation again and during this period government would be in a position to deal with them effectively.

This level of considerations were shared in the presence of the army general who later proved himself power greedy. Bhutto was apprehended of the inner stability and international standing of the country if the impasse continued.270

Bhutto and Zia visited the US Embassy to participate the US National Day;

Bhutto also talked with Russian Ambassador there for several minutes.271

201 Bhutto received a massage in the morning of 4th July that he must sign the

agreement otherwise the military would overthrow him by imposing Martial Law.272

Soon after the meeting Bhutto called back his political associates and officials

as he planned to address a press conference at Prime Minister House which proved his

last press talks as Prime minister. Bhutto told journalists that he decided to sign the

agreement with PNA. Though the PNA had brought ten new points to be added in the

already agreed upon draft of the agreement but he decided to sign an agreement with them to get the nation out of the impasse which continued for last couple of

months.273 Bhutto was addressing the press conference at the same time General Zia was holding a meeting at GHQ with his military commanders, principal staff officers

and some selected directors at the late hours of the night to finalize the plot to oust

Bhutto from power as according to them government had failed to maintain peace and

order in the country.274 Some of his commanders including General Jamal Syed Mian

advised Zia to call his action a Martial Law if he practically staging a coup but Zia

said that he did not want to be accused to abrogate the constitution. So he suspended the constitution,275 Chief Justice Yaqoob Ali Khan was called for consultations who

suggested to Generals that instead of abrogating constitution it should be suspended

for the time being. General Faiz Ali Chishti corps commander Rawalpindi was given the task to implement the order which was accomplished by 2.30 am in late hours of the night “successfully.276 When Mumtaz Bhutto left the Prime Minister House late

after the press conference he observed military movement outside the house he

informed Bhutto. Bhutto immediately called his military secretary General Imtiaz and then General Zia but was told that they were busy in GHQ. When Bhutto got through

General Zia he confirmed the coup d’etat and said:

“Sir what you have heard is true. I am sorry sir but there was no way out of the crises”. 277

202 He informed Bhutto on his inquiry that He (Bhutto) would be in protective custody at Murree from next morning.278 The next morning Bhutto was sent to Murree and kept there in protective custody. The PNA leaders left after a dinner hosted in their honour by Seth Sarfraz Abbasi of Aliyot at Shamsabad to Sardar Qayum’s residence from where they too were taken in to custody and driven to Murree early in the morning.279 When the army personals went to Asghar Khan, the fondest of imposition of Martial Law, he could not understand whether Bhutto had imposed

Martial Law or army itself. The common Pakistanis heard of the imposition of

Martial Law by army in the morning when Radio Pakistan broadcasted the news on

5th July. The evidences showed that preparation for imposing Martial Law were continued for a considerable period of time.280 It was a scrupulously designed plan, which was neither prepared suddenly nor an unexpected move but was prepared some time in previous months by the close Generals of Zia and waited for

“appropriate” time to execute. This imposition of Martial Law was given name

“Operation Fairplay” and General Chishti corps commander Rawalpindi who

General Zia used to call murshid (mentor) was entrusted to execute. 281 By including

Article-6 in the constitution Bhutto had thought no general would dare to abrogate the constitution. As under this Article-6 the abrogation of constitution, abating or aiding would be charged as high treason and the punishment would be death penalty.

But Bhutto perhaps in his blind trust in Zia could not understand the latter’s caution in the meeting on 20th June that if the protest demonstrations continued and so the army action it would defame the army’s image and a split in the ranks and files.282

Bhutto regime did not feel the indications of army Generals’ connections with some of the PNA leaders specially Asghar Khan who was extending assurances on behalf of army that army after takeover would hold elections within 90 days. There were

203 unrelenting buzze that some of the secrete agencies were involved in creating problems of law and order. Besides, Army did not accept an inferior position in a setup of civilian supremacy.283 Bhutto badly eroded the credibility of the political leadership by calling frequently the military Generals in the meeting not only exposed his own weaknesses but discredited the political class as a whole. Instead of using political means to overcome a political issue he felt it comfortable to depend on the military Generals for the solution of a political problem. He was bitterly deceived by the lip service of Zia who was assuring his support to him and physically bowing before him. But when found his weaknesses wasted no opportunity to overthrow him mercilessly. This is called “power politics”. A constant hidden hand working against Bhutto could never be over ruled but a statesman of Bhutto’s posture could not understand the plat being prepared against him since his inception in power.284 Army threw him out of power and it is generally believed in Pakistan that governments could not be sustained without the support of

Capitalist US, specially the military, so Bhutto was deposed by army with the support of USA.285 The urban protest demonstrations paved way to military interventions in Pakistan on the pretext to restore “law and order”, despite the very fact that establishing peace and stability in the country was the constitutional duty of the military but not by taking over government being a subordinate constitutional institution of the state.286 After the meeting of 3rd July General Khalid Mehmood

Arif met Bhutto along with Rafi Raza and director IB and told him about the apprehension of a Martial Law but Bhutto did not take it seriously.287 As General

K.M Arif said:

“At this stage, while emphasizing the need for an early political settlement with the PNA leaders, the corps commanders said that in the event of government’s failure to resolve the present crisis, they may prefer to be obliged to exercise a military option.”288

204 General Arif also recalled that after the 3rd July meeting, he had called on Bhutto along with Rafi Raza, director of intelligence, and had apprised him of their fears of an impending military takeover. 289Bhutto paid no heed to the warnings. Zia imposed Martial Law with the consent of US by overthrowing Bhutto in the night of

4th July 1977, as no military coup could be organized without the approval of US, especially when the political giant like Bhutto was to be overthrow. 290 After imposition of Martial Law, Zia put a Military Council in place to run the administration of the country. He himself became Chief Martial Administrator supported by naval and air chiefs and Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee.

General Jehanzeb Arbab in Sind, General Iqbal Khan in Punjab, General Abdullah

Saeed in Baluchistan, and General Sawar Khan in KPK

Bhutto’s installed governors of the provinces were replaced by the chief justices of the provinces as governor. In Sind, the Chief Justice of the Sind High Court, Justice

Abdul Qadir Shaikh, replaced Mohammad Dilawar Kanji as the provincial governor.

Similarly, in Punjab, Justice Aslam Riaz replaced Mohammad Abbas Abbasi.

Justice Abdul Hakim replaced Naseerullah Babar as governor of the NWFP, while in

Baluchistan; Mir Ahmad Yar Khan was replaced by Justice Amir Khuda Bakhsh

Marri.291 Bhutto his close associates and PNA leaders were shifted to Murree and detained there at separate places. Bhutto was kept in Government House and PNA leaders in Punjab House in separate residential rooms. On 13th July Air Marshal

Noor Khan, met Bhutto and PNA leaders detained in Murree. Till that time there was no policy indications of military junta. The next day Hyderabad Tribunal was abolished and all leaders confined there were released. On the same day detained leaders were allowed to contact their families or friends on telephone. Asaghar Khan

205 turned severely angry when he came to know about the accord between PPP and

PNA on 3rd July. When PNA leaders Nawabzada Nasrullah and Professor Ghafoor

Ahemad were about to start the press conference to announce about the reaching an

accord with PPP, Asghar Khan along with Mehmood Kasuri reach there and showed

his harsh attitude to his fellow PNA leaders that they were made fool by Bhutto

once again. And almost shouting said that there was no accord. “I don’t accept it”

and advised his friends that they should also not accept that. He physically forced

them and replaced their place and told the newsmen that there was no accord

between PPP unless ten new points of PNA were not accepted by Bhutto. 292 Begum

Nasim Wali and Sherbaz Mazari also shared the same view and seemed wanted to

disrupt the talks. 293

An agreement was reached between PPP and PNA and was to be formally

signed on 5th July but thejunta under General Ziaul Haq imposed third Martial Law in the country in the midnight of 4th and 5th July. PNA had presented total 32 points and

Bhutto accepted 31 and 1 point was withdrawn by PNA so there was no justification

for imposition of Martial Law at least for the reasons given by Generals.294 After the

removal of Bhutto by army the PNA lost its focus of orientation as their only

objective was to remove Bhutto from political scene and they succeeded to achieve the dream. The lauded slogan of enforcement of Nizam-i-Mustafa proved a

smokescreen. The components of PNA joined hands with the interim military-led

government and strengthened the hands of military regime at the very outset when it

required the support of civilians, except Asghar Khan who was disappointed as his

dream to lead the government could not come true. Just after the taking over by

military the PNA started fragmenting as Shah Ahmad Noorani and Asghar Khan were the first to leave PNA, which proved the alliance of PNA to be strange bed fellows.295

206 It is ironic that the PNA alliance which played the most lasting influential role in the

history of Pakistan that the first democratically elected government on the basis of

adult franchise was removed and country was thrown into the hands of the forces which was ruling the country since its inception was dismantled just after the

imposition of Martial Law and could not play any role in the country’s politics as

alliance afterward as their only objective was to remove Bhutto. After the coup and

overthrow of Bhutto some major components of PNA developed serious differences with the ruling junta on the issues of Islamization, foreign policy and elections

schedules which led to their ouster from the ruling coalition.296 The military

establishment craftily hijacked the movement and imposed Martial Law when an

agreement was finalized between both the parties.297 While addressing to nation after

imposing Martial Law in the country General Ziaul Haq claimed his belief in

democracy by saying:

“I genuinely feel that the survival of this country lies in democracy and democracy alone.”298

But ironically he kept imposed the longest Martial law in the country’s turbulent history, worse notorious for the extra judicial killings, severe torture to

political workers, religious exploitation, women rights violations, and above all

ruining of democracy and democratic norms and massive violations of human rights

in the country for eleven years. 299 While addressing to nation in his first broadcast

General Zia announced that his government would hold elections within 90 days but

afterward on the pleas of PNA leaders decided to postpone the elections on the pretext

that before holding elections it was necessary to clean up the “mess” created by

Bhutto regime so that “positive” results could be achieved. But the real danger for the

rulingjunta was the heavy crowds attracted by the former Prime Minister Bhutto’s

207 receptions at various places he visited. There was a fear complex in their minds that if

Bhutto was allowed to manage to come back it would be a serious harm to their

persons lives. On 9th August, 1977 Bhutto, in a telephonic conversation from the

residence of the former Chief Minister Punjab Nawab Sadiq Hussain Qureshi threatened General Zia that once he would come in power again he would hang all those Generals and their collaborators for violating the constitution of the country.300

On 28th July, Bhutto was released and on 3rd September re-arrested from his residence

of 70-Cliffden Karachi on the charges of murder of Nawab Muhamad Ahemad khan the father of Ahmad Raza Qasuri a former MNA of PPP. On 13 September, he was

again released on the orders of Justice K.M. A. Samadani of Lahore High Court

declaring that the case had no legal grounds. But within three days after the bail on

16th September his bail was cancelled and he was arrested by army commandoes in a

dramatic manner. The courts once again proved that by-and-large they sided with

powerful rulers.301 This time he was arrested under a Martial Law order so that his bail would not be an easy task. Justice Samadani who granted bail to Bhutto was transferred to Sind High Court. Chief Justice of Pakistan Justice Yaqoob Ali Khan was sent on forced retirement as he accepted Nusrat Bhutto’s petition just three days before his retirement. In her petition Nusrat Bhutto challenged the constitutionality of

Bhutto’s confinement. Justice Yaqoob was known for his reputation of a clean and brave man. In his place Justice Anwar ul Haq was appointed as the new Chief Justice

of the country who had no strong legal background but personal friendship with

General Zia.302 By then the military dictator established his firm control over the

reaming pillars of the state, the executive and judiciary. Masood Mehmood the former

head of FSF became an approver against Bhutto. Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain was made the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court who had personal animosity with Bhutto as

208 Bhutto did not promoted him on two occasions and the Justice kept the grudge in his

heart. He not only had the biases against Bhutto but he freely expressed them while

hearing the case and eventually sentenced him a death punishment.303 Bhutto was

denied the right of being heard in civil and session courts as his case was started

directly in Lahore High Court. Bhutto was executed in a case that was called by a

large number of impartial legal analysts as the “judicial murder”.304 An appeal was

filed in the Supreme Court but the court upheld the Lahore High Court decision with a

ratio of three verses four judges. Three judges declared Bhutto innocent and four

convicted him.305 The review petition was also dismissed and despite appeals from

across the globe Ziaul Haq ignored them, despite his promises to many heads of

Muslim states including Sheikh of UAE to pardon Bhutto.306 Bhutto, the first elected

Prime Minister of Pakistan through direct elections, a man who was the founder of

mass mobilization in the country was hanged on 4th April 1979.

Thus, the role of opposition PNA movement against Bhutto proved retrogressive as a

military autocratic government replaced a democratic regime, egalitarian reforms were reversed by the Martial Law regime, and an anti-Capitalist country became once

again a pro-Capitalist, pro-American ally in the war against Soviet Russia and once

again tightened in the pro-Capitalist agreements. 307

Role of military-led establishment and other behind-the-scene forces as an opposition to Bhutto would be discussed in next chapter.

209 NOTES & REFERENCES

1 PakistanHuman Rights Watch: "With Friends Like These... ” September 2006. Volume 18, No.12 (c)., 49. 2 B.G.Verghese. First Draft: witness To the Making of New India.( NewDehli:Typset PalmSpring by Sorya, 2010), 77. 3 Political Parties in South Asia. Edt. Subrata K. Mitra, Mike Enskat and Clemens Spieb. (Washington: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 161. 4 Peter R. Blood, Pakistan: A Country Study. edited.( Washington: Diane Publishing House, 1995), 207. 5 Ashoke Kapur.Pakistan in Crises. ( London: Routledge Publishers, 1991), 126. 6 Devin T. Hagerty, South Asia in World Politics. ( Lanham USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2005), 62. 7 M. K. Akbar, Pakistan: From Jinnah to Sharif. (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1997), 67. . 8 Hassan Abbas. Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, The Army and America’s War on Terror.( New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 85. 9 Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment. ( Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1999), 411. 10 Sanjay Dutt , Inside Pakistan: 52 Years Outlook ( New Delhi: Efficient Publishers, 2003, 378. 11 Pakistan: A Country Study. Edt. Peter R. Blood. (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995 ), 207. 12 Pakistan Horizon. Volume 30. ( Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1977), 94. 13 Naumana Kiran,A Study o f the Composition o f Federal Cabinets in Pakistan: 1947-1977. ( Lahore: Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 21, Issue-1, 2014), 150. 14 Rana Shoukat, Pakistan ma Inqalaab or Rady Inqalaab ki Kahani (Story of Revolution and Anti-Revolution in Pakistan), Urdu. ( Lahore: Fiction House, 2005), 238. 15 Dawn (Karachi) 8 January, 1977 16 http://www.dawn.com/news/1030848/a-leaf-from-history-the-much-awaited-poll-date 17 James Wynbrandt, A brief History o f Pakistan. (New York: InfoBase Publishing, 2005), 212. 18 Satish Kumar, The New Pakistan. ( Vikas Publishing House, 1978), 338. 19 http://www.cssforum.com.pk/css-compulsory-subjects/pakistan-affairs/6018-post-pakistan issues-2.html 20 Mehmood, Inqalab, 237. ( Asghar Khan denied any signal from any force to join, private interview Dated: December 12, 2011) 21 Mohammed Ayoob, The Politics o f Islamic Reassertion. ( New York: Rutledge Publishers, 1981), 234 . 22 James Wynbrandt, A brief History o f Pakistan. (New York: InfoBase Publishing, 2005), 212. 23 Tahir Amin. Coup D ’etat in Pakistan. Pakistan Journal of History and Culture. Vol. XXV111,No 2 (2007), 40. 24 Ali Abbas Hasanie. Democracy in Pakistan: Crises, Conflicts and Hope for a Change. (Karachi: Author House, 2013), 3. 25 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change.( Rawalpindi: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 165. ( quoted “Lahore Study Group”) 26 Raza, Bhutto, 321. 27 Dawn (Karachi), 18 January 1977 28 Verinder Grover and Ranjana Arora,Pakistan, Fifty Years o f Independence: A Chronology of Events, 1947 1997. (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1997), 27. 29 Dawn (Karachi), Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore) 21 January 1977 30 Anthony Hyman, Muhammed Ghayur, Naresh Kaushik, Pakistan: Zia and After. ( New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1989), 26. 31 Hamida Khuhro. Muhammed Ayub Khuhro: a life o f courage in Politics. (Karachi: Ferozsons Publishers, 1998), 502. 32 Muhammad Raja. Journey through Illusions. (New York: Xlibiris Corporation, 2010)., 09 33 Liaqat Jatoi was a landlord of Dadu district who joined Ziaul Haq after the 1977 coup 34 Niazi, Bhutto, 71. 35 Anees Jillani. Advance Towards Democracy: the Pakistani Experience. (Lahore: Progressive Publications, 1991), 53. 36 Khalid Mahmud Arif. Working with Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics 1977-1988. ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 63. 37 Kumar, New Pakistan, 339. 38 Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan. 1967-1977. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 328 39 Ibid., 328. 40 Kumar,New Pakistan,339. 41 Yasmin Niaz Mohiuddin, Pakistan: A global Studies Handbook. ( California: ABC-CLIO Publishers, 2007), 190. 42 Wali Khan NAP was banned by Supreme Court and Sherbaz Khan Mazari with other members of defunct NAP reenacted the NDP when Wali Khan was in jail. 43 Hafiz Taqi Ud Deen, Pakistan ki siyassi jama ’aten or tehreeken. (Lahore: Fiction House, 1995 ), 471.

210 44 Muhamad Ali Chiragh, Pakistan: Tareekh, Jamhooriyat, Siyasat, Aaeen. (Pakistan: History, Democracy, Politics, Constitution), Urdu. ( Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2004), 381. 45 Verinder Grover, Ranjana Arora,Political System in Pakistan. ( New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), 446. 46 Dawn (Karachi), 12 February, 1977 47 Kumar, New Pakistan, 339. 48 Naumana Kiran,A Study o f the Composition o f Federal Cabinets in Pakistan: 1947-1977. (Lahore: Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 21, Issue-1, 2014), 150. 49 Naumana Kiran,A Study o f the Composition o f Federal Cabinets in Pakistan: 1947-1977. (Lahore: Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 21, Issue-1, 2014), 152. 50 Ziring, Pakistan, 289. 51 R. Majumdar. Pakistan: Jinnah to the Present Day. Edit. Vol. 2. (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1998), 484 . 52 S. Akhter Ali, Pakistan Economist, volume 18, Issues 1-26. ( Karachi: 1978) 53 Javed Sidiq Resident Editor daily Nawa-i-Waqt Islamabad. Private Interview dated: February 4, 2015. 54 Asian Survey, Volume 18. ( California: University of California Press, 1978), 124. 55 Manzoorudin Ahemed, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy and Society, ( Carolina: Academics Press, 1980, 74. 56 Asghar Khan. We’ve Learnt Nothing from History. Pakistan: Politics and Military Power. Oxford University Press, 2005. 117. 57 Nafisa Hoodbhoy, Aboard the Democracy Train: Pakistan’s Last Decades o f Democracy, ( London: Anthem Press, 2011), 19. 58 Manzoorudin Ahemed, Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy and Society, ( Carolina: Academics Press, 1980,), 81. 59 The Pakistan Times ( Lahore), 6 March 197. 60 Hamid Khan. Constitutional and Political History o f Pakistan. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 555. 61 Surendra Nath Kaushik, Pakistan Under Bhutto’s Leadership. ( New Delhi: Upal Publishing House, 1985), 13. 62 Khan. A Constitutional and Political History o f Pakistan, 555. 63 Ibid., 560. 64 Dawn Karachi March 8, 1977 65 Asian Survey -Volume 17. ( California: University of California Press, 1977), 612. 66 Raza. Bhutto,332. 67 Ibid. 68 Rao Rasheed, jo mein ny dekha (That I Saw).Urdu. ( Lahore: Atishfashan Publishers, 1985), 224. 69 M.G. Weinbaum. The March 1977 Elections Where Everyone Lost. Asian Survey Vol. 17, No. 7 (Jul., 1977), 599. 70 Shahid Javed Burki. Pakistan: The Continuing Search For Nationhood. (San Francisco: West View Press, 1986). 65. 71 Aqil Shah. The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan. ( Harvard University USA, 2014), 76. 72 Raza, Bhutto, 332. 73 Asghar Khan. My Political Struggle. ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 75. 74 Syed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama’at-i-Islami of Pakistan,. ( London: L.B Tauris and Company, 1994),184. 75 Cohen, Pakistan,136. 76 Iftikhar H. Malik. The History o f Pakistan. (London: Greenwood Press, 2008), 168. 77 Dawn ( Karachi) 10 March 1977 78 Raza, Bhutto, 336. 79 Intercontinental Press, Volume 15, (New York: Intercontinental Press, 1977), 317. 80 Khan. My Political Struggle. 76. 81 Dawn, Karachi. 13 March 1977 82Ibid., 06. 83Ibid., 07. 84Trimizi, Profiles of Intelligence, 29. 85 Aqil Shah. The Army and Democracy :Military Politics in Pakistan. ( Harvard University USA, 2014). 141. 86 Niyazi, Bhutto. 62. 87 PNA’s Letter to Bhutto, in response to his letter of 15th March 88 Irfan-ur-Rehman Raja,Contemporary World Affairs. ( Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1977), 223. 89 Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment. ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 449. 90 News Review on South Asia and India Ocean. ( New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and analysis, 1977, South Asia), 245. 91 92 Majumdar,Pakistan, 486. 93 Strategic Analysis - Volume 8 ( New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 1984), 516 94 Ghafoor Ahemad, Martial Law, Urdu., 98. 95 Pacific Community, Volume 8. (Tokyo: Jiji Press, 1978), 686.

211 96 Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, Volume 35. ( Islamabad: Research Society of Pakistan, 1998), 5 97 Nazir Naji. Daily Dunya Islamabad. 6th June, 2014 98 Wolpert,Bhutto , 285. 99 Ghafoor, Martial law, 230. 100 Jang (Lahore), March 1977 101 Surendra Nath Kaushik,Pakistan under Bhutto’s Leadership. ( New Delhi: Upal Publishing House , 1995), 274. 102 Dawn (Karachi) 27 March 1977 103 The Rise and Fall of Z. A Bhutto: The Election 1977 and its After Math. http://www.applet- magic.com/bhutto .htm 104 Pakistan Affairs, volume 30-32. ( Washington: Information Division, Embassy of Pakistan, 1977) 105 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working with Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics 1977-1988. ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 67. 106 Dawn Karachi, Nawa-i-Waqt Lahore April 10, 1977 107 Raza , Bhutto , 286. 108 Surendra Nath,Pakistan under Bhutto, 275. 109 Raza , Bhutto , 346. 110 Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto, 287 . 111 Political Chronology o f Central, South and East Asia. (Europa Publications, 2003). 219. 112 Raza, Bhutto, 353. 113 Verinder Grover, Ranjana Arora,Pakistan, Fifty Years of Independence: Fifty years of Pakistan's independence: a chronology of events, 1947-97. (New Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1997), 249 114 Arif, Working with Zia, 72. 115 Raza, Bhutto and Pakistan, 72. 116 Trimzi, Profiles o f Intelligence, 98. 117 Hamid Yousaf, Pakistan : In Search o f Democracy ( London: Afrasia Publications, 1980), 161. 118 Akhtar Rashid, Election ’77 and Aftermath: A political Appraisal. ( Lahore: P.R.A.A.S Publications, 1981), 30. 119Raza Bhutto and Pakistan, 299. 120 Anthony Hyman, Muhammad Ghayur and Naresh Kaushik, Pakistan: Zia and After.. ( New Delhi: Abhinav Publishers, 1989), 28. 121 Seyyed Vali Reza Nazr, The Vanguard o f Islamic Revolution, 186. 122 Verinder Grover, Ranjana Arora, Pakistan, Fifty Years o f Independence: Independence and beyond: the fifty years, 1947-97. ( New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1997), 238. 123 Eamon Murphy, The Making o f Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots ofExtremism .(New York: Rutledge Publishers, 2013), 79. 124 R. Majumdar. Pakistan: Jinnah to the Present Day. Edit. Vol. 2. (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1998), 487. 125 Dawn Karachi. 25th April, 1977 126 Dawn Karachi. 26th April, 1977, Nawa-i-Waqt Lahore 127 For complete text of the letter see Appendix I 128 M.G. Chitkara. Mohajir’sPakistan. (New Delhi: APH Publishers, 1996),83. 129 Trimizi. Profiles o f Intelligence, 87. 130 Dawn Karachi, Nawa-i-Waqt Rawalpindi, 27th April 1977 131 Eamon Murphy, The Making o f Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots ofExtremism .(New York: Routledge Publishers, 2013), 79. 132 Khalid Mehmood Arif. Working with Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics 1977-1988. ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 74. 133 Sayyid A. S. Pirzada. The Politics o f Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan 1971-1977. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 175. 134 Latif Ahemad Sherwani. Pakistan, China and America. (Karachi: Council of Pakistan Studies, 1980), 205 135 Wolpert, Bhutto, 288. 136 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 88. 137Tahir Amin, 1977 Coup D ’etat in Pakistan, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol. XXVIII, No.2 (2007), 48. 138 Rashmi Jain. US-PakRelations, 1947-1983. (New York: Radiant Publishers, 1983), 67 139 Niazi, Bhutto. 93. 140 Syed Shabbir Hussain. Ayub, Bhutto and Zia: How they Fell Victim o f their own Plans. (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000), 206. 141 Rafiullah Shehab. Fifty Years o f Pakistan. (Lahore: Kazi Publications. 1990), 290. 142 Stanly Wolpert Needed, Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy, 136. 143 Pakistan Horizon, Volume 30. (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affair, 1977), 97.

212 144 Haider K. Nizamani. The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics o f Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 2000), 90. 145 M. Asghar Khan, . My Political Struggle. ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 90. 146 Niazi, Bhutto, 151. 147 Ibid., 111. 148 Ibid., 178. 149 Ibid., 151. 150 This clause was included in the draft to give relief to Wali Khan and other detainees who had been detained in tribunals and his party was banned since 1975 when Supreme Court banned the party. 151 M. K. Akbar, Pakistan from Jinnah to Sharif. ( New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1997), 77-78. 152 Ibid., 78. 153 Nazir Naji. Dunya Newspaper dated: March 5, 2014 154 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.I f I am Assassinated.( New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1982), 172, 173. 155 Ibid. 156 Nazir Naji, Dunya Newspaper dated: March 5, 2014 157 Robert W. Stem, Democracy and Dictatorship in South Asia: Dominant Classes and Political Outcomes in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. ( Washington: Prager Publishers, 2001), 138. 158 Tajammal Hussain Malik, The Story o f My Struggle. (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1991), 225. 159 Niazi, Bhutto, 217. 160 Pakistan Horizon, Volume 30. ( Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1977), 97. 161 Ibid. 162 Dawn, 9th May 1977 163 Dawn. Other newspapers of 11th May 1977 164 Hafiz Taqi Udeen, Pakistan ki siyassi jamma’aten or tehreeken ( Political Parties and Movements of Pakistan). Urdu. ( Lahore: Fiction House, 1995), 470. 165 Ahemad, Phir Martial law Aa Gaya, 89. 166 Mian Dilawar Mehmood, The Judiciary and Politics in Pakistan: A Study. ( Lahore: Idara Mutalia-e-Tareekh, 1992), 41. 167 Verinder Grover, Ranjana Arora, Pakistan, Fifty Years of Independence: Fifty years of Pakistan's independence: a chronology o f events, 1947-97. ( New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1997), 253. 168 Niazi Bhutto,157. 169Asghar Khan, We’ve Learnt nothing from history, Pakistan: Politics and Military Power. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005 ), 136. 170 Pakistan Horizon, Volume 30. ( Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1977), 99. 171 Khan, Constitutional and Political History o f Pakistan, 565, 566. 172 Wolpert, Bhutto, 293. 173 Pakistan Affairs, Volumes 29-31.(Islamabad: Information Division, Embassy of Pakistan, 1976), 208 174 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. (New York: M.E Sharp, Inc,2005 ), 85. 175 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1970s_operation_in_Balochistan 176 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Working with Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics, 1977,1988. ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 177 Syed Shabbir Hussain. Ayub, Bhutto, and Zia: how they fell victim to their own plans. (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 2000). 214. 178 Javed Sidique, Resident EditorDaily Nawa-i-Waqt Islamabad. Personal Interview Dated: 17 February, 2013 179 Niazi, Bhutto, 158-59. 180 Ibid, 159. 181 Ibid, 160. 182 Nawa-i-Waqt ( Lahore), 26 May 1977 183 Muhammad Saleem,Intakhabaat 1977.( Elections 1977). ( Urdu). ( Karachi: Rasheed Sons Publishers, 1977), 223. 184 Dawn ( Karachi) 30t May. 1977 185 Nawa-i-Waqt ( Rawalpindi), 31 May 1977 186 Niazi, Bhutto, 161. 187 Ibid, 164-65. 188 Ibid, 170. 189 Syed Afzal Haider, Bhutto Trial. ( Islamabad: National commission on history and Culture, 1995), 146 190 Ibid, 147. 191 Kausar Niazi,Bhutto, 173. 192 Though the protest demonstrations were launched by PNA in various cities of the country against the alleged rigging in the elections but to counter those agitation rallies PPP had also started rallies in some cities of the country. 193 Wynbrandt, Pakistan, 212. 194 Haider, Bhutto Trial, 147.

213 195 Niazi, Bhutto, 175-76. 196 Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, Rawalpindi, June, 7, 1977 197 Haider, Bhutto Trial, 148. 198 Ibid, 149. Quoted his personal interviews with Mufti Mehmood and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan. 199 M. G. Chitkara,Mahajir’sPakistan. ( New Delhi: APH Publishers, 1996), 83. 200 Nawa-i-Waqt ( Rawalpindi), 5 June 1977 201 Ibid, 6 June 1977 202 Syed Mujawar Shah, Religion and Politics in Pakistan: 1972-88. ( Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 1996), 225. 203 Niazi, Bhutto, 175. 204 Ibid176. 205 Ibid, 178. 206 Ibid, 179. 207 Ibid. 208 Ibid. 209 Khalid Mahmud Arif. Working With Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-1988. ( Karachi: Oxford University Press,1995), 114. 210 Allahbukhsh Karimbukhsh Brohi , Mr. A. K. Brohi, Counsel for Federation, Statement in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Rawalpindi, October 10, 1977. (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1977), 34. 211 Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto, 296. 212 Ibid. 213 Niazi, Bhutto,180. 214 Ibid., 181-82. 215 Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics. ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014 ), 214. 216 Niazi, Bhutto, 188-189. 217 Raza, Bhutto, 353. 218 Asghar Khan. My Political Struggle. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008),103. 219 Khan, Constitutional and Political History o f Pakistan, 567. 220 Niazi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan: Last Days, 193-94. 221Niazi, Bhutto, 189 222Ibid 223 Syed Shabbir Hussain, Ayub, Bhutto and Zia: How they fell Victim to their own Plans. ( Lahore: Sang-e-Meel publications, 2001), 213, 214. 224 Ibid. 225 Dawn ( Karachi), Nawa-i-Waqt ( Lahore), 16 June 1977. 226 Muhamad Najam Akbar, My Life: Living through Pakistan’s Traumas. (Lahore: Lalhu Publishers, 2010), 243. 227 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History o f Pakistan, 567. 228 Ahemad. Phir Martial Law Aa Gaya Urdu. ( Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1988), 244 . 229 Akhter Rashid, Election 77 and Aftermath: A Political Appraisal .( Islamabad: P.R.A.A.S Publishers, 1981), 121. 230 A.H. Kardar, Pakistan’s Soldiers o f Fortune. ( Lahore: Ferozsons Publishers, 1988), 205. 231 Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto o f Pakistan, 300. 232 Khan, Constitutional and Political History o f Pakistan, 568 233 Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto o f Pakistan, 299. (Draft minutes of “Top Secret” meeting between PM Bhutto and King Khalid in Ryadh, 18 June 1977) 234 Khan, Constitutional and Political History o f Pakistan, 568. 235 Niazi, Bhutto, 203. 236 Dawn ( Karachi) 21st June 1977 237 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy, 142. 238 Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto o f Pakistan, 300. 239 Ibid. 240 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy, 134. 241 Khan, Constitutional and Political History o f Pakistan, 568 242 Niazi, Bhutto, 210-211. 243 Ibid.,211. 244 Haider, Bhutto Trial, 395. 245 Dawn ( Karachi); Mourning News (Rawalpindi) 26th June 1977 246 Niazi, Bhutto, 212. 247 Ibid. 248 Dawn ( Karachi), 29 June 1977 249 Dawn ( Karachi); Nawa-i-Waqt ( Lahore), 29 June 1977 250 Niazi, Bhutto, 214.

214 251 Newspapers 29th June 1977 252 Niazi, Bhutto, 214. 253 Ibid., 215. 254 Ibid. 255 Anthony Hyman, Muhammad Ghayur and Naresh Kaushik, Pakistan: Zia and After.. ( New Delhi: Abhinav Publishers, 1989), 29. 256 Ibid. 257 Ghafoor, Martial Law, 233. 258 See report on “ Tortures claims in India and Pakistan”,Far Eastern Economic Review, ( June 13, 1977) 259 Abdul Ghafoor Burgri,Falcon o f Pakistan, (Karachi: ZABIST, 2002), 358. 260 Khan, Constitutional and Political History o f Pakistan, 568. 261 Allama Muztar Abbasi, Personal Interview. dated: March 5, 2011 262 Hyman, Pakistan, 29. 263 Ashok Kapur, Pakistan in Crises. (London: Rutledge Publishers, 1991), 128. 264 Trimizi, Profiles of Intelligence, 47. 265 Dutt, Inside Pakistan, 375. 266 Anwar Hussain Syed, The Discourse and Politics o f Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1992), 242. 267 Khan, Constitutional and Political History, 570. 268 Shah , The Army and Democracy, 143. 269Dr. Farid A Malik, The Nation Islamabad, July 21, 2014. http://www.nation.com.pk/columns/21-Jul- 2014/back-to-july-1977 270 Khan, Constitutional and Political History o f Pakistan, 571. 271 Majumdar, Pakistan: Jinnah to the present day, 619. 272 Niazi, Bhutto, 216 273 Haider, Bhutto Trial. 395. 274 Arif. Working With Zia, 93. 275 Joel Krieger, Craig N. Murphy, The Oxford Companion to Comparative Politics. edited ( London: Oxford University Press, 2012), 198. 2762011. Muhammad Hanif, Newsline. 13 June. http://www.newshnemagazine.com/2011/06/murshid-marwa- na-daina/ 277 Dennis Kux, United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. ( Washington: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 13. 278 Dennis Kux, United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. ( Washington: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 13. 279 Javed Sidiq Resident Editor daily Nawa-i-Waqt. PrivateInterview Islamabad dated: February 7, 2013 280 John L. Esposito, John Obert, Islam and Democracy. ( : Oxford University Press, 1996), 157. 281 Amit Baruah,Dateline Islamabad. ( New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2007), 183. 282 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan : The Path to catastrophe and the killing o f Benazir Bhutto. ( London: Penguin Books, 2007), 15. 283 Raza, Bhutto, 334. 284 Kapur,Pakistan in Crises, 133-134. 285 Lal Khan. Challenges to Bhutto's legacy. Published in Daily Times Islamabad. Dated: April 07, 2013 286 Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System o f Pakistan. ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), 139. 287 https://www.facebook.com/akmal.hussain.1806/posts/1527607620794789 288 Arif, Working with Zia, 85 289 Ibid. 290Tariq Ali, The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power. (New York: Simon and Schuster Publishers, 2008) ), 113. 291 Kardar, Pakistan’s Soldiers o f Fortune, 208. 292 Niazi, Bhutto, 217. Also see. Ahmed Farooq, 50 Years of Struggle: Reflections on Pakistan Political History, 1947-1997. ( Lahore: Publishers Emporium, 2000), 100 293 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 570, also see Rao Rasheed, Jo Ma Ny Dekha, 78. 294http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2b1tg4_why-zulfiqar-ali-bhutto-was-hanged-chachu- bush_news?from_related=related.page.int.behavior-meta2.91c6e0795679625adefcac5293fd9cfb141789485 295 Muhammad Sidique Qureshi,Political Culture in Pakistan. ( Islamabad: Dost Publications, 2002), 132 ...... 296 Sameel Ahmed Qureshi, An Analysis of Contemporary Pakistani Politics: Bhutto versus the Military. Asian Survey Vol. 19, No. 9 (University of California Press, 1979), 911. Accessed at: Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/264381 911 297 Qureshi, Political Culture in Pakistan, 132. 298 Khan, We’ve Learnt nothing from history, 146. 299 Arshad Khan, Islam, Muslims, and America: Understanding the basis o f their Conflicts. ( New York: Algora Publishers, 2003), 49.

215 300 Eamon Murphy, The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism.( New York: Routledge Publishers, 2013), 86. 301 Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto, 317. 302 Ibid., 320. 303 Urooj Hussain, Why the case of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto must be re-opened? Accessed at: https://lubpak.com/archives/46220 304 Nichola Khan, Mohajir Militancy in Pakistan: Violence and Transformation in the Karachi Conflict. ( New York: Routledge Publishers, 2010), 35. 305Anthony Hyman, Muhammed Ghayur, Naresh Kaushik, Pakistan, Zia and After. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1989), 41. 306 Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto, 325. 307 Subrata Kumar Mitra, Mike Ensakat, Clemens Spiess, Political Parties in South Asia. edited.( New York: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 18.

216 CHAPTER 4

ROLE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND OTHER FORCES BEHIND

OPPOSITION AGAINST BHUTTO

Defining the establishment, dominant role of establishment in pre-Bhutto

politics of Pakistan, causes for the dominance of military-backed establishment in the

state of Pakistan, the role of establishment to help Bhutto come into power will be

discussed in this chapter. Relations between Bhutto regime and establishment during

his years in power, Bhutto’s policies, and Bhutto’s role to curtail the powers of

establishment during his years in power, consequently the role of establishment in the

overthrow of Bhutto from power and his physical execution will also be glanced in this chapter.

4.1 Defining Establishment

The term Establishment is usually referred in Pakistan to the top brass of

military, intelligence agencies, those leaders of pro-military political parties having

affinity with the military standpoint on various issues, top officials in civil bureaucracy, business tycoons, some religious leaders following the line of military top brass and a new component of some of the media houses and journalists. Military top brass and the intelligence agencies form the core and the permanent component of the Establishment.1 Aristotle divided the system of governments into three categories

monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. Monarchy is the rule by one for the so called

common interest, Aristocracy is the rule by the few for the so called common interest,

Oligarchy, according to him, is the rule by few for the few. 2 Pakistani Establishment

fits well the definition of Oligarchy as described by Aristotle.

217 4.2 Historical supremacy of Military-led Establishment in the State Structure

The military-bureaucratic oligarchy, commonly known as establishment, acquired a

dominant position and an effective command and control of the state power just after

the inception of the country.

This military-bureaucratic establishment played a major role to install

governments and remove them from office during the first decade of the creation of

country. When in 1958 a prospect of the upcoming elections posed a threat to the

dominance of these unelected “guardians” of the state they decided to overthrow the

civilian dispensation and imposed Martial Law under General Ayub.3 During the

problematic years the establishment assumed more powers. Theory of threat

perception from India, regional conflicts, decline of parliamentary system, and

factional rifts in Muslim League the founder party of the country and above all the

inability of political leadership to formulate a consensus based constitution provided

opportunity to the forces of establishment to take over the control of the state. The

most significant administrative structure developed by British was the civil-military

relations in which the military was kept aloof from the politics and civilian

dispensation was in the hand of civilian bureaucracy.4 But just after eleven years of the creation of Pakistan military intervened and took over the control of the state.5

Military used to impose martial laws in October 1958, March 1969, July 1977 and

October 1999 and every time military tried to justify this extra-constitutional act on the pretext of ‘instability’ in the country. 6 General Ayub presented the justification

for his extreme action that country was in an utter ‘chaos’ and was ‘rescued’ by

military. This justification has become the mantra of all martial laws in the succeeding years. Ethnic and ideological divisions, problems of governance and security are the ultimate fallout of the successive martial laws. Other hindrance in the establishment

218 of parliamentary and participatory democracy can be attributed as the inability of

Muslim League to assume a form of institutional body and centralization of power,

least provincial autonomy. Provincial and central elected governments were

overthrown, most of the time through unconstitutional ways, so frequently weakened the foundation of already fragile democracy in the country. Tension between centre

and provinces, first with East Pakistan and then with other smaller provinces, were the

fallouts of constitutional and political weaknesses. Military and bureaucracy took the

full advantage of this vulnerable situation and assumed a dominate role in the state’s

power structure. 7

Pakistan is a classical example that how a powerful military could slowly be

involved into the political arena due to the weakness of political institutions, lust of

powers of generals, perceived security threats, low political mobilization and foreign

reasons. Being well organized and skilled force, it helped governments to maintain

law and order, until it slowly became an important factor in the decision-making

process, and eventually eroded civil authority. There are many causes for the military-

led establishment’s dominance in the state structure.8

The factors which led to the military establishment to become the most

powerful force in the power structure of Pakistan can be summarized as follows

At the time of the creation of Pakistan, the army role in rescue services for

migrants from various parts of India boosted its image as the savior of the nation. The

security threat perception from India also necessitated a strong military to defend its

fragile geographical boarders. The void created by the segregation of Pakistan army

from the Indian army was filled by giving quick promotion to the junior army

officers. Ayub Khan was promoted from Lieutenant Colonel to rank of General within

a period of only four years.9

219 Just after the creation of Pakistan the army officers started considering themselves as the guardians of the “national interests” of the country. The Rawalpindi

Conspiracy Case 1951 was an instance of the military mind set, even in the lifetime of

Liaqat Ali Khan the close aid of Quaid-i-Azam, the military generals launched a coup to overthrow the constitutional government.10

The army was called in Lahore to deal with anti-Ahemadya protest

processions in 1953 by the then government. It was for the first time that the army tasted the direct civilian control. ISPR started a public relation campaign.11

Interestingly and paradoxically that even after the end of the anti-Ahmediya

movement the army did not go back into barracks but started a “clean Lahore”

campaign under the overly ambitious commander Major General Azam Khan the then

GOC Lahore. It was a clear message sent to the common people that army was a better ruler than the civilian government.12

The mess caused by the politicians and their failure to make a democratic

constitution was another reason to improve the image of the military as compared to

politicians. The generals in GHQ were encouraged by the weak state of politicians to take over in the best “interests” of the country. Even some of the politicians, who

could not come in power otherwise, went to generals to persuade them to take over the power of the country.13

The successful coup of 1958, in which Ayub Khan abrogated the constitution

and imposed Martial Law and country went under direct military control just after 11 years of its inception. The success of this coup by Ayub Khan gave immense

confidence to army senior officers as regard to control the affairs of the state directly.

On the other hand the already weak political institutions further deteriorated. The

politicians further lost their confidence. On the other hand the highhandedness of the

220 army regime, suppression of human rights, heaviness against political class, under

Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) about seven thousand politicians were banned. These EBDOed politicians could avoid the prosecution if they agreed

not to participate in electoral politics. This act completely suppressed the political

activities in the country.14 The perks and privileges of the military as an institution boosted to its ever highest level but political institutions were ruined. During the ten years of military rule of Ayub Khan, military penetrated deep into every institution of the country. A complete suppression of press and media was carried out by

introducing Press and publication Order.15 The military was involved in business and big land holdings were allotted to the army officers. Thus their personal and

institutional stakes were involved in the civil affairs of the state.16 Ayub Khan’s son

Gohar Ayub khan was supported by Dawood group to start an automobile plant and in

return Ahemad Dawood of Dawood group was helped by Ayub to get elected a

member of National Assembly in 1964.17 Ayub’s Basic Democratic System was also

aimed at to prevent the emergence and growth of political parties and a democratic

political culture in the country. Thus strengthening the military rule in the country.18

Despite various attempts of PR and image building about the victory in the War of

1965 with India Ayub was on the path of decline after Tashkant Agreement with

India. A severe and rigorous movement was launched against Ayub Khan by deprived

masses in the both wings of the country. Keeping in consideration the situation in the

country military itself ousted the weak Ayub Khan and imposed Martial Law afresh under General Yahaya Khan on March, 25, 1969.19. He was forced by the

circumstances created by the rigorous movement launched by the masses against

Ayub Khan, pre-dominantly a class-conscious movement, to hold the first ever adult

franchise based elections in the history of the country.20 The results of these elections

221 lead to the dismemberment of Eastern wing of the country. Because the military-led

establishment was not willing to hand over the reign of the state to Bengalis, despite the fact that Awami League under Mujib secured a clear-cut majority in the election.21

At the severe political unrest, the military regime under Yahya Khan had no

political solution and a military operation was launched to deal with a political

problem. India overly intervened and a direct full-fledged war started between

Pakistan and India. The doctrine, “the defense of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan”

failed.22 East Pakistan dismembered from West Pakistan and became an independent

state of Bangladesh. After the dismemberment of one half of the country in result of a

military debacle and with more than 90000 Pakistani soldiers, officers and civilians in

Indian jails as POW, the military-led establishment left with no other option but to

surrender power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the popularly elected leader in the western wing of the country, that was now the rest of Pakistan.23 This was for the first time

and perhaps the last time till the date that a popularly elected civilian leader found it

an appropriate time to establish civilian constitutional supremacy over the powerful

military establishment. Ostensibly, the military generals were ready to hand over

power to the civilian leader though left with no other option. 24 A severe wave of

agitation started in the country against Yahya Khan and his coterie of generals. The

demonstrators demanded an open trial of generals and called to hand over power to

elected representatives of the country which the generals resisted till they were

compelled by the circumstances to hand over power to Bhutto on 20th December

1971.25 The media also played a role to criticize the generals for their role in East

Pakistan debacle. Just two days before handing over power by Yahya Khan to Bhutto the Urdu language dailies of the country published lead stories about the incapability

and criminal negligence of the generals. Media also published astonishing stories

222 about the personal moral disintegrated character of the generals.26 The military felt

down-graded in the country which provided an advantage to PPP over military. PPP tried to maneuver this situation to establish civilian supremacy over military

establishment. It condemned the role of military generals in East Pakistan debacle.

Many stories regarding the private life of the generals were circulated in public by the

government. The clips of the surrender in East Pakistan to Indian army were telecasted repeatedly on PTV that caused severe degree of resentment among the

ranks and files of the military.27 But later events proved that generals had not accepted

civilian supremacy wholeheartedly. They were waiting for an opportunity to regain their lost power. The generals succeeded to regain power on 5th July 1977 when the then army Chief Ziaul Haq, a handpicked general of Bhutto imposed Martial Law by toppling Bhutto’s constitutionally elected government.28 Bhutto was elected as the

prime minister as his party secured two-third majority for the second term in the

office in the elections of March 7, 1977. But the opposition alliance of nine distinct

political parties alleged that the elections were massively rigged by ruling PPP. The

opposition refused to accept the results of the elections, boycotted the provincial

assemblies elections, which were to be held on 10th March and started a country-wide

agitation movement against the alleged election rigging.29 After a long series of

negotiations of about four months, finally opposition and Bhutto breached an

agreement. Nevertheless, before signing the agreement the then army Chief General

Zia-ul- Haq imposed Martial Law and arrested almost all political leaders and put them in “protective custody”.30

4.3 Establishment and Bhutto

As discussed in Chapter 2 military generals played a significant role to help

Bhutto to come into power in 1971 for their own reasons of interests. At that time

223 they felt that by installing Bhutto in power they could safe their faces and would

succeed to divert the attention of people from the debacle of East Pakistan and would be able to continue their superior role in the state structure.

4.4 Bhutto’s Ascendency to Power and his Relations with Establishment

The 1970 elections were held under the LFO of Yahya Khan. The Government

agencies reported that no political party would hold absolute majority. But during the

election campaign it was quite evident that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League

in East Pakistan and Bhutto’s PPP in West Pakistan would secure more seats than

estimated by secret agencies. The Yahya Government collected funds from

industrialists of West Pakistan through Director Intelligence Bureau Mr. Rizvi and used these funds against Mujib and Bhutto to influence the elections. In West Pakistan

Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan was given the funds and East Pakistan Maulana Abdul

Hameed Bhashani was facilitated by Military Establishment. After coming into power

Bhutto held an inquiry against General Umer and Director IB Mr. Rizvi and

embezzlement was proved and Mr. Rizvi had returned Rs 3 lac. 31

The Military commanders wanted that no political party should get majority in the elections and constitution could not be made and consequently the military

continue in power.

Despite every effort of the military establishment the masses in Pakistan got

awaken to use their right of self determination. The Establishment was under

immense public pressure during the mass movement against Ayub Khan. It was quite

difficult for the military-bureaucratic establishment to change the results of the

election. Agha Muhammad Ali the brother of General Yahya Khan was Director IB

and made efforts to influence the elections. During the election campaign Agha

Muhammad Ali visited CMH Rawalpindi where Asghar Khan was admitted due to his

224 backache. He brought a hard bed for Asghar Khan and told him that President Yahya

sent this bed for Asghar Khan. He also brought a suite case filled with currency notes to gift Asghar Khan to use in election campaign, which Asghar Khan did not accept.32

The Military Establishment did never want to hand over power to Sheikh

Mujibur Rehman a leader of East Pakistan. Bhutto, to an extent, played a role in

connivance with military establishment.33 Rather the military establishment used

Bhutto to prevent Mujib to come in power.34 The Civil-military oligarchy conspired

against the verdict of the people of Pakistan which seriously limited the options for the politicians to reach an agreement.35 Yahya Khan had good relations with

Americans, Nixon and Kissinger, he paved way for Americans to develop relations with China. Yahya Khan facilitated the secret trip of Hennery Kissinger to China.36

Even after the dismemberment of East Pakistan, Yahya Khan wanted to retain power.

He planned to address the nation on radio on 17th December. General Abdul Hameed

Khan was also present. General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Raheem persuaded

Yahya to quit power as situation was severely detracted Yahya resisted the proposal

and showed his intention to go back into army as Commander-in-Chief but Gul and

Raheem opposed this and forced him to quit both government and army office.

Getting helpless Yahya proposed to Gul Hassan to become president and General

Abdul Hameed should become Command-in-Chief of the army. General Abdul

Hameed responded to take decision after consulting the senior army officer in GHQ.37

A meeting was held at the residence of Gul Hassan in which Air Marshal

Raheem, M.D PIA Shakir Ullah Durani and D.G ISPR Brigadier A.R Siddiqui

participated to decide new head of the country. Air Marshal Raheem wanted to hand

over power to Asghar Khan whereas Gul Hassan favoured Bhutto. Gul opposed the

proposal of Raheem by saying that how a person can become the prime minister of

225 Pakistan who was defeated by a Corporal in the elections. 38 Gul showed his

apprehensions that they have left with no other option except to hand over power to the “joker” (Bhutto) after all he was the leader of majority party of the West Pakistan,

What the left of Pakistan.39 Shakar Ullah Durani intervened and said that the type of

person Bhutto was he would fix the generals after coming into power. 40 On 19th

December a contingent of 6 Armed Divisions showed severe resentment against the

conduct of their seniors. On 20th December Chief of Staff General Hameed was to

address to the garrison officers in Ayub Hall. Adjutant General Major General

Khudad, Quarter Master General General Usman Mitha, Master General of Ordinance

General Khawaja Wasi ud Din and General Gul Hassan attended the meeting. General

Hameed addressed the officers in a defeated mood. When he said that the president

had gone to every length for a political solution of East Pakistan the Hall echoed with the shouts of “shame shame” of officers. General Hameed wanted to know the mood

of the officers so that they could continue with Yahya in power or to take over by

himself. 41

In Peshawar the infuriated crowed put the Yahya Khan’s house into fire in an

act of anger against the generals. 42 A severe internal intrigue was going on among the

high-ups in army to retain and attain the power. General Mitha ordered in SSG

contingent to march to Rawalpindi to squad Yahya Khan but the SSG Commander

Brigadier Ghulam Muhammad Malik refused the order of General Mitha and

informed General Gul Hassan about his decision and Gul Hassan appreciated

his role. 43

Bhutto was in New York to “defend” Pakistan’s case in Security Council of

United Nation. He was called by Khar and he reached Rawalpindi on 20th December,

1971 and went straight away to presidency to take over as the president and first

226 civilian chief marshal law administrator of Pakistan. Bhutto was need of the time. He was courageous, a marvelous orator and had a deep sense of history. 44 After coming

in power Bhutto sent General Abdul Hameed on forced retirement and nominated

General Gul Hassan Khan as the new Commander-in-Chief as Gul played a

significant role in the ouster of Yahya from power and installing Bhutto as president

and civilian Martial Law administrator. According to Gul Hassan he showed a

declination at initial stage but then put forward four conditions to become

Commander-in-Chief. Bhutto called Gull at Punjab House Rawalpindi and informed

him about his decision to appoint him as new COS. Gull reluctantly accepted the job

on four conditions.

• The COS would be in the rank of Lieutenant General and not be promoted to

the rank of four-star General. Bhutto agreed

• Troops would be disengaged from the boarders and efforts be made to bring

back the POW from Indian Jails as early as possible, Bhutto replied that he

was already started working on it.

• Martial Law should be lifted. Bhutto replied that after preparing a

constitution and passing from the assembly he would bury the Martial Law

“forever”.

• Gull wanted no interference from Bhutto and any of his ministers in the

affairs of armed forces. Bhutto assured him that the reason he chose Gull for

the job of COS. 45

In his first address to the nation Bhutto announced the retirement of senior

generals including Yahya Khan, General Hameed, General Pirzada, General Umar,

General Khudada Khan, General Kiyani and General Mitha but did not announced

227 any legal action against these generals. It was not an easy task to take over the country

after a severe military debacle and to restore the confidence of the nation. 46

Bhutto also announced that General Gul Hassan was appointed as acting COS but he would continue in the rank of Lieutenant General as the country’s poor

economic condition did not allow to give “unnecessary” promotions. Bhutto gave

impression that he himself did not give promotion to Gul Hassan and did not mention that Gul refused the promotion. Gul got offended.47

During first four months of power Bhutto removed 43 senior officers from

armed forces who had remained associated with Yahya regime. These forced

retirements were appreciated as people of the country were demanding rigorous

punishments for the generals responsible for the dismemberment of East Pakistan.

Table I shows the detail of the senior officers of the Armed forces forcibly retired

during the first four months of the assuming of power by Bhutto.48

228 Table. I Senior Military Officer Retired from Service THE ARMY General 2

Lieutenant-General 11

Major-General 10

Brigadier 6

THE NAVY Vice Admiral 1

Rear Admiral 4

Commodore 2

THE AIRFORCE Air Marshal

Air Vice marshal 2

Air Commodore 3

Group Captain 1

TOTAL 43

Source: Rizvi,Military and politics, 213.

4.5 Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report

After coming into power Bhutto under the wish of the people constituted a high profile commission to inquire the causes and those responsible for the dismemberment of East Pakistan. The three-member commission comprised of Chief

Justice of Pakistan Justice Hamoodur Rehman, Chief Justice Lahore High Court

Justice Anwarul Haq and Chief Justice Sindh-Baluchistan High Court Justice Taufail

Ali Abdur Rehman. The commission is known as Hamoodur Rehman Commission.

The Commission completed its report in two stages, first in 1972 and second part of

229 the report completed in 1974 after the release of Pakistani prisoners of war from

Indian Jails.49

Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report recommended a public trial of seven

generals including Gul Hassan for being a party to a conspiracy to usurp power from

Ayub Khan in connivance with Yahya Khan and to use unfair means to influence the

elections 1970 for their malicious motives. The Report says:

“(i) That General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan, Maj. Gen. Umar and Maj. Gen. Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common purpose they did actually try to influence political parties by threats, inducements and even bribes to support their designs both for bringing about a particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading some of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly to refuse to attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held at Dacca on the 3rd of March, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with each other brought about a situation in East Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and subsequently to the surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of Pakistan:

(ii) That the Officers mentioned in No. (i) above should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in the conduct of war both in East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The details of this neglect would be found in the Chapters dealing with the military aspect of the war”.50

But despite a clear cut recommendation of the Commission of trial of these

generals, Bhutto chose Gul Hassan for new Commander-In-Chief of the army and no

considerable punishment was given to the generals responsible for not only violating

the constitution of the land but held responsible of dismemberment of half of the

country by an apex judicial body. If Bhutto could take strict legal action to punish

these generals he might save the country from the menace of martial law in future.

Nevertheless, Bhutto failed to give any major or corporal punishment to any culprit of

constitution breaching or dismemberment of the one half of the country.51 So just after

230 five and a half years the generals came into power once again despite many self-

satisfactory measures taken by Bhutto to safeguard political system.

Bhutto did not publish the report of Hamoodur Rehman Commission for unknown reasons. His opponents always alleged that Bhutto wanted to keep his role unveiled in the dismemberment of East Pakistan that is why he did not publish the

report. Whereas his associates defended Bhutto for not publishing the report as some

of the brethren countries names were included in the report which Bhutto did not want to publish. Bhutto did not want to demoralize his generals at the time when already a

heavy number of POW were in Indian jails. Even the governments of Zia, Benazir

Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif kept this important report classified.52

Eventually some of the parts of the report were published in an Indian

Newspaper India Today in 2000 during Musharraf rule which was astonishing for

people of Pakistan that a report which was kept secret from the people of Pakistan was published in India. So under pressure from various quarters of Pakistani society

Musharaf government publish some parts of the report.53

The Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report suggested an open trial of all

those generals who abrogated the constitution of the country, usurp the power of the

country and were responsible for insulting defeat in East Pakistan, they surrendered

despite having potential and material to fight. Report suggested that General Yahya

Khan, General Abdul Hameed, General Pirzada, General Gul Hassan, General Umar,

General Mitha forged a criminal conspiracy on 25 th March, 1969 to usurp power by

force from Field Marshal Ayub Khan. These generals tried to maneuver the results by using threats, bribes and other negative tactics. They also conspired to prevent the

members of national assembly from western wing of the country to participate in the

assembly session called at Dacca on 3rd March, 1971.54 Report suggested taking

231 action against General Irshad Ahmed Khan on this criminal negligence on Shakarr

Gharr front to surrender 500 villages to India without struggle. Report suggested a

Court Marshal against General Ameer Abdullah Khan Niazi on 15 allegations against

him including an insulting surrender on Eastern Front. The commission also

recommended initiating cases against a number of high-ranking army officers

including Major General Abid Zahid, Major General B.M. Mustafa, Major General

Rahim Khan, Brigadier G.M. Baqir Siddiqui, Brigadier M. Hayat, Brigadier Aslam

Niazi, Brigadier Jahanzeb Arbab, Brigadier Muzafar Ali Zahid, Colonel Basharat

Ahmed, Colonel Taufail, Brigadier Hayatullah, Major Madad Hussain Shah and

others. Report also stated a numbers of questions on the moral character of the senior

officers of the army. The commission report envisaged that the professional

competency and capability of the armed forces was eroded due to usurping power in

1958. The military establishment failed to solve the problems of defense, foreign

affairs and diplomatic affairs. commission also criticize the role of Bhutto and

suggested that it was not a role of a democrat as he demanded that postponement of the assembly session in Dacca.55

The commission report suggested Court Marshal against General Gul Hassan

Khan and to start a legal proceeding against him but Bhutto nominated him army

chief after coming into power. He only got retired General Yahya, General Abdul

Hameed Pirzada, General Kiyani, General Khudadad, General Mitha, General S.G.M

Pirzada, and General Umar instead of initiating cases against them as recommended by report. Bhutto was demanding from Bangladesh not to initiate war crimes against

Pakistani army officers so it was difficult for him to initiate cases against them in

Pakistan. If Bhutto had initiated cases against these generals perhaps marshal laws

could have never been imposed in Pakistan.56

232 4.6 “Bonapatism”

The junta of military generals made every effort to interfere in the affairs of government. Raheem and Gul considered themselves “king makers” and used to express on a number of occasion that they brought Bhutto into power. On the orders of Gul Hassan the intelligence agencies used to tap the phones of Prime Minister

Bhutto. In an instance of such type when Bhutto came to know that all telephones of

Prime Minister House were bugged he shouted, “bastards are taping even my phones”57

Just a few months of taking power by Bhutto as the president the generals developed antagonistic differences with the president Bhutto. General Gul and Air

Martial Rahim obsessed that they were the main force to bring Bhutto into power and considered themselves psychologically supreme than the elected representative of the people of the country. After staying in power for a longer period the generals developed a sense of pride and superiority for themselves and considered them the only savior of the country, although the East Pakistan military debacle badly eroded this obsession. They did not accept the civilian constitutional supremacy wholeheartedly. It was only due to the military defeat and humiliating dismemberment of East Pakistan that the generals left with no other option but to hand over power to Bhutto. After all Bhutto was popularly elected leader of masses in the Western wing of the country, the leftover Pakistan.58

The generals’ junta continued their efforts to fail the civilian government to recapture power once again. They had to wait for little more than five years to

233 succeed to usurp the power with the help and connivance of other quarters of the

society whom interests were challenged by Bhutto’s PPP.59

Government asked General Gull Hassan to send army to help shun an agitation

of workers in Karachi, which Gul refused and suggested to use police only.60 Bhutto

once remarked about Gul that he did not know politics. Gull responded that he

should keep such politics away while dealing with him or have the right to bring

new army chief who was familiar with such “political language”. Bhutto got

annoyed on such harsh remarks from his handpicked COAS and started thinking to

appoint new army chief, but he had to choose one from within the army.61 It shows

the decree of arrogance the generals posed towards the constitutional head of the

state and for the norms of democracy. Bhutto wanted to bring army under firm

civilian control according to the democratic norms. After Karachi agitation instant,

Bhutto wanted the release of some cadets who were imprisoned after a court martial

that Gul refused. Bhutto showed his intension to make his first visit to army units

and asked Gul to accompany him which Gul refused by saying that he would visit

army units alone as army chief. Bhutto made visits of army units which Gul and his

commanders considered interference by Bhutto in the affairs of army.62 Keeping in

consideration of sad military debacle of East Pakistan and prolonged involvement of

army in the politics during the dictatorial regimes of Ayub and Yahya Bhutto wanted

to depoliticize the army officers for the smooth functioning of democracy. Bhutto

wanted that all army officers should be screened by police or intelligence agencies

and if found involved in politics or having political leaning than would be kept

under further surveillance this too was refused by Gul Hassan.63

The country were passing through very critical juncture of its history after the dismemberment of one half of the country in the hands of generals caught by lust of

234 power and the civilian government was in dire need of unconditional help and support

of the armed forces. But the “king makers” generals did not support to the civilian

government. During the police strike in Lahore the army chief refused to support the

government. On the similar instance when the miscreants besieged the gas fields on the boarder of Punjab and Sind the army chief declined the request of governor

Punjab to use the army helicopter and he was compelled to reach on the side by road.

Some of the reports revealed General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Raheem were using derogatory remarks about Bhutto and his government.64 There were reports that

Gul and Raheem were trying to influence the Hamoodur Rehman Commission

Report.65

On 3rd March 1972 Gul Hassan and Raheem were called by Bhutto in

president house and took resign from them in a mysterious manner. They were kept in

Governor House Lahore for a couple of days and then sent to Greece and Spain as

ambassadors. General Tikka Khan was appointed as new army chief and air marshal

Zafar Chaudhary as new air chief.66

On 4 March 1972 while addressing to nation on radio and T.V Bhutto said that

it was firm resolve of the people of Pakistan and the armed forces to diminish the

“Bonapatism” from the army. It was necessary to shun “Bonapatism” to save the

society from its contamination. It has happened during 1954 to 1958 that professional

generals became politicians not as professional but to use politics as plunder. This

“Bonapatists” badly affected the socio-political life of the people of the country and

destroyed its very fabric. It was the “Bonapatism” which destroyed the European

societies in 18th and 19th centuries. So in the best interest of the people of Pakistan and the armed forces this “Bonapatism” should be uprooted once for all.67 But after five

235 years Bhutto became victim of the same very “Bonapatism” in the hands of his

handpicked General Ziaul Haq and his coterie of generals and was sent to gallows.

Bhutto told the American Ambassador that Gul Hassan and Raheem were

conspiring against the elected government. In a private meeting Gul Hassan and

Raheem were heard to say that they had thought that army would not be able to rule

the country again but the way the government was being run it would take six months

for army to come into power again. For this very reason Bhutto replaced them. 68

Bhutto said that whenever he intended to publish Hamoodur Rehman

Commission report the senior military officers strongly opposed to publish the report

and to protect the image of the army he did not publish the report despite severe

pressure from opposition to publish the report.69

4.7 Asma Jilani Case

Bhutto got an edge over junta when in Asma Jillani case Supreme Court

declared General Yahaya Khan and his coterie of generals as usurpers. The act of

Yahya Khan and his fellow generals when they took over power from Ayub Khan on

25th March 1969 declared by court as an act of usurpation.70 Court maintained that

Ayub Khan had no legal powers to hand over power to Army Chief as he was bound under the constitution 1962 to hand over power to the speaker of the assembly in case

of his resign. Rather in case of resignation of the president, powers would have shifted

to speaker of the assembly but in a coup the powers were snatched by Army Chief in

clear violation of the constitution of which they took oath to abide by. The Court

ordered to initiate legal proceedings against these “usurper” generals. It was a serious blow to the military-led establishment who wanted to come into power again, and

naturally gave an edge to Bhutto over the establishment.71

236 For More than ten years before Bhutto came into power, the military had been directly ruled the country and involved in the governmental issues indirectly from very inception of the country. Military generals were never ready to give powers to political leaders.72

Military generals remained the chief opposition against democratic governments in Pakistan. Bhutto made all out efforts to strengthen the military after assuming power, but military led his ultimate downfall in 1977 and consequent execution.I ' l

4.8 Simla Accord POW

In result of East Pakistan military debacle and surrender of Pakistan army to

Indian army about 93000 army men and civilians were made POW by India.

According to the Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention 1949 prisoners of war should not be kept in confinement and should be released after the cessation of the active animosities of war. Mrs Indra Ghandhi the then Prime Minister of India did not honour the Geneva Convention in this regard. Bhutto met Ms. Gandhi on 28th June at

Simla and 2nd July 1972 Simla Agreement was reached between Bhutto and Ms

Gandhi.74 After rectification by Pakistan on 15th July and by India on 3rd August it came into effect on 4th August 1972. Under the agreement, India had to vacate 5130 square miles area of Pakistan and similarly Pakistan had to vacate 69 square miles area of Indian Punjab and Rajasthan. 75

The release of the POW completed in April 1974. Bhutto was a supplicant not an equal party while engaging in negotiations with Ms. Ghandhi but he managed to strike a better deal in favour of his country. The paragraph-2 of the Simla Accord says:

237 “The two nations are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful mean mutually agreed upon between them.”

This does not mean the wipeout, amend, cancel or deny the role of Security

Council Resolution to hold plebiscite to know the verdict of the people of Kashmir or

exclude the role of UN from the Kashmir Dispute.76

But in Pakistan there was a hue and cry by opposition and it was lauded by the

opponents of Bhutto that he had “sold” Kashmir Issue in the Simla Accord and much talked about the “secret” clauses in Simla Accord which never brought to surface by

accusers. Some of the POW after their return did not wish to continue owing to such a

humiliating defeat and imprisonment and got pensioned. Some were not able mentally

and physically to continue after the traumatic debacle of East Pakistan. They felt

resentment against the government that it did not carried out sufficient efforts for their

“early” release from the Indian prisons. Army Chief General Tikka Khan allocated

reasonable amount of funds for the resettlement of the POW.77

Keeping in consideration the history of Indo-Pak relations and the unassuming

condition of Pakistan after the East Pakistan debacle it was next to impossible for

Bhutto to negotiate with India to get released his heavy number of POW. His anti-

India posture making it more difficult to get his objectives fulfilled from Ms. Gandhi,

the leader of a country which considered herself victorious from every aspect. Despite

all these odds Bhutto succeeded to convince Indian leadership to sign Simla

Agreement for the release of POW and the Pakistani territories occupied by Indian

forces during the War of 1971.78

Despite Bhutto’s successful efforts to resolve the issues with India and got

released the POW there was a resentment in the army particularly among its senior

238 service as they thought that Bhutto deliberately delayed the release of POW for about

a year to keep pressure on military.79

Though the POW had started reaching Pakistan from India but the rumors were circulated by anti-Bhutto forces that he engineered the delay of the POW to bring further bad name to military. This anti-Bhutto disinformation campaign created

a responsive constituency of the families of the POW, who were already in a state of

grief. 80 The information ministry under Hafeez Pirzada released and telecast the films

of the “ceremony” of the surrender of the armed forces before Indian general in East

Pakistan. This act of Bhutto regime was termed as unpatriotic by the armed forces.

Hafeeez Pirzada was accused to spread provincialism and insulting Punjab by

releasing these disgraceful films on national media.81 These campaigns caused to

spread further hatred in armed forces against Bhutto and when Bhutto got weakened

military played its role to oust him from power.82

4.9 Structural Reforms in Military by Bhutto

Bhutto made a number of structural reforms in military including devolution

of power from the top slot, considerably heavy budgetary allocations, constitutional

amendments and other reforms to neutralize the political ambitions of the generals.

The situation in 1971, after the military debacle in East Pakistan and

dismemberment of half of the country was not much different from that of 1947 when

Pakistan came into being. To rebuild the country was as difficult as to create a new

one especially when the tenacious resistance from the institutional “king-makers” of the past years was to be faced by Bhutto.83 He had to pick up the pieces and

reconstitute the nation state. The military hegemonic system created constraints for

PPP to implement its policies independently.84 Bhutto tried to strengthen the political

system, cut the army to size and focused on developing a nuclear power to strengthen

239 his hands to deal with India, ambitious army generals and Americans at the same time, but he could not succeed.85 Despite taking a variety of steps to neutralize the

military’s threat to his regime Bhutto could not cut down even the military budget

instead he regularly increased it. Even after the dismemberment of East Pakistan the

size of the army reduced and the country was passing through the worst economic

phase of its history.86

After taking power Bhutto‘s survival was depended, to an extent, on his

relations and dealings with the civil bureaucracy and military establishment. He

needed the cooperation of civil bureaucracy for the implementations of his ambitious

reforms agenda and the tacit support of military establishment for the survival of his

regime.87 Bhutto decided to curb the power of the military and civil establishment

those powerful unelected institutions of the state which both inherited and upheld the

pre-independence traditions of British. Their consternation and disappointing role in

the wake of East Pakistan debacle provided Bhutto with an unprecedented, and

perhaps the last opportunity for breaking with the past. Bhutto did not or perhaps he

did not want to understand that the survival of his government and democracy itself as

an institution dependent on the strengthening of the democratic institutions and true

and genuine democratic norms. But Bhutto could not bring radical changes to the traditional civil-military imbalances. Soon he was caught by the circumstances and

left with least options but to rely on the civil-military establishment. Despite various

substantial steps Bhutto could not bring a praetorian state under true democratic

norms.

Bhutto took many steps in order to establish control over the army whose myth of

invincibility had been shattered in the debacle of East Bengal.88 Bhutto made five

structural changes in the administrative set up of the military high-command.

240 1. The designations of the Commander-in-Chief of army, Commander-in-Chief of air

staff and Commander-in-Chief of naval staff were changed as army chief, air chief

and navel chief respectively. Three services chiefs were put under the command

of a Joint Chiefs of Staff committee with the president of Pakistan as the

commander-in-chief. This was an effort to do away with the 24 years long British

inherited command system and to establish the civilian supremacy over the

military decision making.

2. Initially the tenure of service of services chiefs was fixed at four years but later in

1975 it was further reduced to three years. It was also decided that no extension of

service would be granted to services chiefs. It was decided for two advantages,

firstly to avoid the longer stay of chiefs and established control over their forces.

Secondly to avoid restlessness among the junior officers waiting for promotions.

3. Thinking to develop an integrated defense system, a highest body known as the

Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee was constituted. To consider the military related

problems and to gather advices from all three defense services.89

a. In May 1876 a White paper on higher defense organization was issued by

Bhutto government to highlight the government’s defense policy. An

integrated approach suggested in this policy. Defense council, ministry of

defense, JCSC, services chiefs and the services headquarters were made

responsible to chalk out and implement the defense policy.90

4. Navel headquarters was also shifted from Karachi to Islamabad to create better

liaison among the three defense services as army headquarters was in Rawalpindi

and Air headquarters was in Peshawar.91

For the first time a clear function of the armed forces was laid down in the

constitution 1973.under the Article 245 of the Constitution.

241 “The Armed forces shall defend the country against the external aggression or threat of war, and subject to law, act in aid of civilian power when called upon to do so.”92

The Constitution defined high treason as:

“...any person who abrogates or subvert or suspends or hold in abeyance, or attempt or conspires to abrogate or subvert or suspend or hold in abeyance the constitution by use of force or show of force or by any other unconstitutional mean shall be guilty of high treason”93 “.any person aiding or abetting or collaborating in the acts mentioned in Clause (1) shall likewise be guilty of high treason.”94

Parliament also included in the constitution a new oath for the armed forces to refrain

from indulging in the politics. The text of the oath says:

I....do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and uphold the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embodies the will of the people, that I will not engage myself in any political activities whatsoever and that I will honestly and faithfully serve the Pakistan Army/Navy/Air force required by and under the law.95 Later on in September 1973 the parliament passed a law which provides death

sentence or life imprisonment for the subversion of the constitution.96 By taking such

constitutional steps the political elite especially PPP under Bhutto hoped to prevent

any future military adventurism to impose martial law in the country. After making

efforts to neutralize the military’s political power Bhutto thought in his anticipation

secured, especially after removing commanders associated with Yahya’s military

dictatorial regime. Bhutto now turned to modernize the military given the security

concerns after the fall of East Pakistan and a humiliating defeat in the hands of India.

Despite the formation of new law enforcement agencies the reliance on military for

internal security and relief operations did not diminished. Keeping in view the India’s

increasing military capabilities and acquiring of nuclear weapon technology by

exploding in may 1974 on eastern fronts and on western front Sardar Daud’s

government in Afghanistan revived the dormant issue of greater Pakhtoonistan and

launched a massive agenda against Pakistan. In such security-threat like situation

242 Bhutto government focused on modernizing the military. In such security situation on both fronts government could not afford to antagonize the military command. To

remove that his government was against military Bhutto started to mend fences with

military after the assertion of perceived civilian supremacy.97 Bhutto stopped the

harsh criticism of the military and visited various military establishments and

addressed the officers of the three services to explain his strategies regarding the

internal and foreign issues.98

Bhutto also allocated massive budgetary allocations to military. His

government allocated much more financial resources to military than any other

government in the country’s history.

The following table shows the rising defense budget during Bhutto regime.

The increase is about 218 per cent.99

Table II. Defense Allocations 1970-1977\

Year Defense Budget in Million Rs. Percentage of total

Budget of the Country

1970-71 3,201.6 55.66

1971-72 3,725.5 59.09

1972-73 4,439.6 59.34

1973-74 4,948.6 42.02

1974-75 6.914.2 42.83

1975-76 8,103.4 46.00

1976-77 8,120.6 44.71

Source: Cloughly,Army, 219.

Considerably heavy increases were made in the pays and other benefits of the

officers and junior rankers in the three services.

243 Such measures succeeded the military under the civilian constitutional

supremacy at least ostensibly but it proved short term while military struck back in

1977 and imposed martial law under General Ziaul Haq.

Tikka Khan during his tenure as army chief from 1972-77 reminded the army

officers and men that they sworn in to protect the constitution and their role was to

protect the country from foreign aggression and internal security when called by the

civilian constitutional government.100

After Tikka Khan General Zia also advised the military men to adhere strictly to their professional duties. He paid rich tributes to Bhutto and his government on various occasion for its efforts to bring the nation out of the trauma of 1971 and

modernizing the military.101

4.10 Bhutto and Military Operation in Baluchistan

In 1948 Mir Ahemad Yar Khan, the Khan of Kalaat signed an accession

agreement with government of Pakistan on the perusal of Quiad-i-Azam Muhammad

Ali Jinnah, the then Governor General of the country. Mir of Kalaat agreed to end the

defecto independence of the state of Kalaat under the accession agreement. But Prince

Karim khan, the brother of Khan of Kalaat did not honour this accession and started

guerrilla warfare against the state of Pakistan while being based in Afghanistan.

Prince Karim Khan was killed by Pakistan army and army took over the control of the

State of Kalaat along with other areas of Baluchistan for the state of Pakistan. The

nationalists of the province did never accept this accession and called it a “forced

accession”.102 So the first Baluchistan operation was started in 1948. The second

phase of the operation was launched to quell the rebellious campaign of Nwab Noroz

Khan. Nawab Noroz Khan was arrested and confined in Hyderabad prison on the

244 charges of treason. Five members of his family including his sons and nephews were

hanged. Noroz Khan died while being in confinement.103

Third phase of the operation was launched to quell another armed struggle

started in 1963 and continued till 1969 when General Yahya Khan the second military

dictator agreed to abolish the One Unit. This third conflict with army was led by Sher

Muhammad Khan Marri, commonly known as General Sherov, for his Soviet

Socialist leanings.104 After the second conflict with army led by Noroz Khan, the

federal government sent army to build new cantonments in the major problematic

areas of Baluchistan. Sher Muhammad Marri and his thousands of militant aids

started guerilla armed struggle against the settlement of these cantonments. Sher

Muhamad Marri spread his influence of insurgency in about 72000 square kilometer

areas from Mangal Tribal areas in the south to the Bugti and Marri tribal areas in the

north. The tribesmen of these areas supported his struggle. Army destroyed a vast area

of Marri tribes and thousands of insurgents and common people were killed in results

of these conflicts. The army also suffered a loss of lives. Baluchistan was made the

fourth province of the country after the abolition of One Unit Scheme by Yahya

Khan.105

The third phase of the Baluchistan operation was launched in 1973 after a

drama of capturing an arm cache in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad. The incident of

Iraqi Embassy seemed a maneuvered move to build pressure on government to launch

an operation in Baluchistan. 106 Anwar Ali the Director IB told that the drama was

staged on the information of Military Intelligence and ISI. 107

Bhutto was quite upset on the highhandedness of the army officers engaged in

Baluchistan operation. Bhutto showed his resentment on the allegations of target

killings, forced disappearances of the Bloch nationalists and other atrocities of the

245 army and called it a worse kind of mutiny than that of the Bloch mutiny. Army was

practically running the government in the province and civilian government was

totally ineffective in the province. This gave a taste of power to the officers in army

and an erosion of civilian institutions was on high pace.108

1n result of the election of 1970 for the first time nationalists managed to

reach the helm of affairs of the province when NAP-JUI coalition formed

government. Many policies introduced by the Baluchistan government resented the

forces ruling in the centre.109 A police strike in the province provided federal

government to withdraw Punjabi bureaucrats from the province serving at various

departments in Baluchistan. This large scale withdrawal of Punjabi and non-Bloch bureaucrats from the province created a considerable vacuum of civil officers. This withdrawal necessitated the role of military and Para-military forces to fill the vacuum. This provided an opportunity to penetrate the military in the political affairs.

Baluchistan government wanted to withdrawal of Punjabi military and civil bureaucracy from the province, what they called it. 110

Sadar Atta Ullah Mangal was the Chief Minister of the province, heading the

coalition government of NAP-JUI. Sardar Khuda Baksh Marri was representing

Baluchistan in centre as member National Assembly. On the other hand Nawab Akber

Khan Bugti and Mir Ahmad Yar Khan of Kalaat were supporting Bhutto government.

Baluchistan was passing through a severe draught during the period from 1970 to

1973 which severely affected the already fragile economy of the provinces based

largely on live stock. The Marri tribesmen started migrating from the draught-affected

areas. While passing through the Pat Feeder areas they had severe clashes with Jamali

and other local tribes on the issue of cattle grazing in the standing crops. These

clashes led to the dangerous arms conflicts between these tribesmen in which several

246 men were killed. The Baluchistan government tried to solve the issue through traditional jirga, a mediation system prevalent in Baluchistan111. This was also a factor

along with other factors to provide an excuse to the army for the resumption of the

operation in the province. The Iraqi Embassy arms cache incident forced federal

government to approve the army action in the province as the incident was widely

propagated and federal government was compelled to take action. At least ISI was well aware of the drama.112

Bhutto used this incident for the justification of his action against the NAP-

JUI coalition government. 113

Yahya Khan Regime tried to reach peace agreements with Bloch insurgents

groups involved in the resistant movement against Ayub Khan’s dictatorial regime.

Yahya Khan wanted to restore peace in the province. Bloch were severely against the

One Unit Scheme as they considered it an alien control over the rich natural resources

of the province and the deprivation of the people of the province.114

Bhutto’s role in launching a military operation in Baluchistan has consistently been criticized by his opponents and many among impartial scholars. But more than

Bhutto it was the army establishment to launch that brutal operation in Baluchistan.

Though Bhutto used this operation as an opportunity to dethrone the government of

his opponents in the province but he was upset on the tactics and highhandedness of the military commanders in the province.115

Bhutto did not have many options in his hands except to lead a confrontation with the all powerful military-led establishment. Perhaps he wanted to avoid this

confrontation. Secondly he got benefited of the opportunity to oust his political

opponent NAP-JUI government from power and established his rule in all four

provinces of the country, though without an acceptable legitimacy. 116 Despite his

247 reluctances his confrontation with military-led establishment led to his “judicial

murder” in 1979. 117 Bhutto was not “driver” but perhaps a driven force in the fourth

Baluchistan operation. Bhutto agreed to it under pressure from the military

establishment on the other hand he also used Baluchistan operation for his political

maneuvering to oust his political opponent’s provincial government of NAP-JUI

coalition in the province.118 So it would be next to exaggeration to hold Bhutto solely

responsible for military operation in Baluchistan.

More than Bhutto it was the army which considered most of the leaders in

NAP as “secessionists” and wanted their government to be removed from the

province. Islamopatriatic army did not accept a “secessionist” force to rule in a

province which had been of a strategic importance for army since 1948 when first

operation was launched in Baluchistan. 119

Bhutto did not start the operation rather army restarted its operation in

Baluchistan which was first started in 1948 and then continued in 1958, 1963 and

once again resumed in 1973.

In 1958 Nawab Noroz Khan an old aged nationalist started a resistant

campaign to the One Unit Scheme formulated by the then military government. The

aims and objectives of the initiative of the One Unit Scheme expressed by the

government were to eliminate provincial and ethnic prejudices and divides.

Nevertheless, the real aim of the launching of One Unit Scheme was counter the

majority of the eastern wing of the country. The military-led establishment never wanted to hand over power of the state to the leadership of the eastern wing of the

country, mainly comprising of the middle class intelligentsia. Which, the

establishment considered a serious threat to its hegemonic power in the state

structure.1201 90

248 Army planned and executed Baluchistan Operation but violated the mandated

laid down in the constitution. This volition of constitutional mandate is continued

even today and the political governments are unfortunately helpless if not naive.121

This operation severely damaged the democratic credentials of Bhutto regime and

opposition used it tacitly against Bhutto politically. The gulfs between Bhutto and

opposition caused by the military operation could never be bridged and NAP, JUI

and other forces played a vital role against Bhutto in PNA movement against Bhutto

to the level of animosity against the later without bothering for the worst results for

democracy. In the final debate Bhutto alone could not be held responsible for the

Baluchistan operation, though he used this operation to topple the NAP-JUI

coalition government of his political opponents. But the operation was started in

1948 for the first time against the resistant started by the Prince of Kalat, then

continued during Ayub and Yayha regimes and then after Bhutto once again re

started in Musharraf’s period.122

4.11 Federal Security Force (FSF)

Bhutto wanted to keep the army away from the civilian matters as he knew the

history of military interventions and wanted that military should not be called to

maintain law and order. To maintain law and order he took measures to upgrade the

police and established Federal Investigative Agency (FIA). He created Federal

Security Force (FSF) on modern grounds and equipped with modern weapons and

resources. After the consistent refusals of army under Gul Hassan to use army in various cases ordered by the government Bhutto decided to create FSF for

maintaining law and order and political matters and for maintaining security of high- ups in the government. The creation of FSF was another factor for the tense relation between military high command and the Bhutto. The creation of such Para-military

249 force caused a provocative effect on the already fragile civil-military relations in the

country.123 General Gul Hassan opposed the idea of the creating FSF. Had Gul Hassan

remained the C-N-C he would have resisted the creation of FSF as he declined many

other orders of the civilian government. Bhutto asked a senior Lieutenant General to

head the FSF who refused. The general told that he did not want to indulge in

combating political opposition and media as according to him Bhutto wanted to use

“stick” against his opponents to rule. The frequent use of “Stick” made the “stick” to think to rule itself directly.124 FSF was created in October 1972 but formally came

into existence functionally in June 1973 under an Act of the parliament. The total

initial strength of FSF was 14000 personnel, 8000 in Punjab, 4000 in KPK, 1100 in

Sind, 300 in AJK, 200 in FATA and only 23 in Baluchistan. The force was equipped with modern weapons and other equipments.125

Modern weapons and other equipments were generously provided to this

force, it was planned to acquire re-conditioned tanks from the army for FSF.126 By

creating FSF one of the motives of Bhutto was to dissociate military from the civil

law enforcement and keep away from the public matters. However, during the

devastating floods and earthquakes military was called for relief activities which

provided it to regain the trust of the common people which was badly shattered on the

humiliating defeat and dismemberment of East Pakistan.127 Comprising of retired

military and senior police officers FSF was to work in close collaboration with office

staff of Prime Minister. Initially this force was deployed to maintain law and order

and surveillance of the political opposition and allegedly used against political

opposition and even descendents in the party as well.128 This force became so

notorious and alleged by opposition to be involved in political murders. FSF was

allegedly responsible of the murder of Nawab Muhamad Ahemad Khan Kasuri father

250 of Ahemad Raza Kasuri a former MNA of PPP who used to oppose Bhutto so openly.

Later during the martial regime of Zia Bhutto was executed and hanged to death in the

same case of the murder of Nawab Qasuri on 4th April 1979 as some of its officers

including its head Masood Mehmood became state approver against Bhutto and

alleged before court that they killed Nawab kasuri on the direct orders of Bhutto129.

So the formation of FSF was another bone of contention between military high

command and Bhutto as the former considered it as a parallel personal force of Bhutto to military.130

4.12 Mukhtar Force

Despite taking various actions to neutralize the military supremacy Bhutto

remained always concerned about any military action against his government keeping

in view the history of military hegemonic role in the politics of Pakistan.131 Bhutto

established a special cell in IB to get himself informed about the day to day

happenings in the military and to collect the details information of the general

officers.132 Colonel ® Mukhtar Khan who was considered very loyal to Bhutto made the head of this cell.133 The officers of this cell were known as “Mukhtar Force” in

military circles as an act of ridicule. Col. Mukhtar tried to hire other officers to collect

secret information from various cantonments for this purpose.134 Within two days of the formation of this cell it’s all information reached to ISI and MI and such

information were spread to all cantonments and the officers of Mukhtar force were

ridiculed everywhere so that they could not get any substantial information. But

despite being ill informed the officers of this force were sending reports to Bhutto to

sustain their lucrative jobs. After the imposition of Martial Law Col. Mukhtar was

first officer to be terminated. His office was sealed and during the examination of the

record of the office interesting information were revealed that how superficial and

251 poor information were send to Bhutto by this cell.135 The senior officers got annoyed

on their surveillance by the civilian government. The formation of this secret cell sent

a severely negative impression of Bhutto to the senior hierarchy of the military.

4.13 Attock Conspiracy Case

0n 30th March, 1973, 59 officers of army and Air Force were arrested by army

for a plot of coup against Bhutto, Bhutto appointed Brigadier Ziaul Haq to head

commission for the court martial of plotting officers.136 Bhutto tried to secure the

loyalty of the armed forces by making the constitution 1973 but before the formal

signature by the constitutional head of the state a conspiracy erupted by Army and Air

Force officers.137 These officers forged a conspiracy to overthrow Bhutto and

eliminate some senior officers who they felt were responsible for the insulting defeat

and the consequent dismemberment of East Pakistan and were still in power despite

the recommendations of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report to launch a

public trial of them. This act was known as “Attock Conspiracy Case”.138 Major

General Ziaul Haq was made the head of the military court to trial these conspiring

officers reportedly on the suggestion of Bhutto. Zia exploited the opportunity to the best in his favour to impress Bhutto by showing his devotion and commitment to

democracy and sentenced an overly harsh punishment to the officers involved in the

conspiracy.139 Zia found an opportunity to develop close connections with Bhutto to brief him personally so often about the proceedings of the case and showing his

loyalty to Bhutto. Out of total fifty nine, four Air Force and fifteen Army officers were found guilty of their involvement in the conspiracy against the government.

Brigadier F. B. Ali and Colonel Aleem Afridi were sentenced with life time

imprisonment and thirteen other with rigorous punishment ranging from two to ten

252 years. Bhutto persuaded army chief General Tikka Khan to enhance the punishment

and wanted at least two officers with death sentenced. Tikka Khan could not do

anything except to refer the case to the court martial again. Relatively the junior

officers in the court martial did not comply with the wishes of their chief and

continued the punishment.140 Brigadier F. B. Ali and Colonel Aleem Afridi

challenged the decision of the military court in Lahore High Court, Lahore high Court

rejected their petition and finally the matter was heard by the Supreme Court of

Pakistan. Supreme Court also upheld their punishment.141 Bhutto wanted to project

himself kind to the army and impress the younger officers by moderating the

punishment sentenced by the court martial when it reached to the government for

review. He adopted the similar fashion while dealing the cases of air force officers

involved in the conspiracy. Air Chief Zaffar Chaudri, who was appointed by Bhutto

after the forced ouster of Air Martial Rahim as the Air Chief, ordered the forced

punishment of all fourteen officers involved. But Bhutto government reviewed the

cases and ordered the reinstatement of the seven officers and removed the restrictions

of reemployment on the rest of the seven. Air Chief Zaffar Choudri resigned in protest

against the decision of government.142 By reversing the decisions of the military high

command Bhutto wanted to establish the impression of civilian supremacy over the

military, and this happened for the first time in the history of the country but this

supremacy could not last for a longer period. He tried to develop a constituency for

his favour in the middle ranks in the military by reducing the punishment. This

attempt of Bhutto was also taken by military command an undue interference in the

“delicate matters” of military.143

253 4.14 Appointment of Zia as Army Chief

On 1st April 1976 Bhutto appointed General Zia as the new army chief ahead

of many senior general.144 Zia, a personally religious minded general was appointed by super ceding a number of senior generals and even against the advice of Bhutto’s

outgoing and loyal army chief. Why Bhutto chose Zia for the top slot of the army

there are many theories. Bhutto met General Zia for the first time during his visit to

Multan in 1975 where Zia was GOC. On the invitation of the Governor Punjab

Nawab Sadiq Qureshi Bhutto visited his ancestral home. On the occasion Zia

requested Nawab Qureshi to provide him with a copy of holy Quarn which he

presented to Bhutto by saying that he used to recite the holy book every morning and

evening and pray for the long life and government of Bhutto, who according to Zia

gave a hope to the people of Pakistan.145 Bhutto thought of Zia a professional soldier

of Islam, a mediocre and a general with no political ambitions.146 Bhutto’s private

secretary Saeed Ahemad Khan sent a report about Zia that he was an ambitious and

capable officer, quite and watchful a clever with a doubtful reliability.147 It is believed by many that someone was tutoring Ziaul Haq smartly to win over Bhutto’ trust.148 It was quite possible that he developed connections with CIA during his training in USA

in 1962-64.149 Ms Joanne Herring was his close associate and honorary consul and

Pakistan’s Consulate General in Houston America. She remained Zia’s consul during the Afghan jehad and worked as the “image builder” of General Zia in USA and to

convince US administration to pour heavy funds and assistance and to trust Pakistan

army against Soviets.150 Shah Hussain of Jordan also advised Bhutto to appoint Zia as

army chief.151 General Zia remained in Jordan as advisor to Jordanian army and was

known as responsible for “Black September”, the massive killings of Palestinians

encamped in Jordan.152 Zia’s stay in Jordan made him associated with CIA.153 These

254 relations of Zia-CIA were used to conspire against Bhutto to oust him from power, if

one believes the theory of military-US nexus in the ouster of Bhutto from power.154

Bhutto’s choice later proved the most fatal error of personal judgment of his life.155

Bhutto might have thought to appoint a practicing Muslim as the Army chief under

the concerns in his mind about the immoral activities of senior generals of Yahya

Junta as revealed by Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report. So it too might have been one of the reasons to appoint Zia as the Army Chief.156 He appointed Zia bypassing seven senior decorated generals and against the recommendations of

outgoing COAS Tikka Khan. Bhutto might had in his mind that being a junior officer

Zia would not be popular to take a decision against the interests of the government.157

Zia used to arrange the receptions of officers’ wives and children by standing them in

lines during the visits of Bhutto to the corps headquarters Multan where the former was GOC and later corps commander where Bhutto met him for the first time.158 Zia

represented Bhutto the Sword of Honour and commended him to award him the

honorary Colonel-in-Chief which is normally awarded to senior army officers only.159

Bhutto got impressed by apparent humility, sycophancy and flattery of Zia.160 Zia

headed the army tribunal to trial the military officers who conspired to topple Bhutto

government in 1973, known as Attock Conspiracy Case. This provided an opportunity

to Zia to meet Bhutto frequently to report him directly about the proceedings of the

case. He tried to show his loyalty to Bhutto by showing his concerns about the case.161

Bhutto kept the portfolio of defense ministry in his own hand during his tenure to

have a control on military affairs. Once he told Hennery Kissinger that he kept the

defense ministry to establish the control to avoid any military coup.162 Just after

sixteen months of his appointment Zia deposed the government of his benefactor and

mentor.163

255 4.15 Bhutto’s dependency on Army

In 1977 a coalition of nine political parties called PNA, though diverse in

ideologies, launched a strong movement against Bhutto on the charges of rigging in

elections with the support of various quarters of the opposition to Bhutto regime. PNA

charged the people of Pakistan with the demand for the imposition ofNizam-i-

Mustafa, the system of the Prophet (SAW).164 As the movement got momentum the

Bhutto regime started facing legitimacy crises and consequently he started depending

on military.165 In the end of April 1977, Bhutto decided to hand over three main cities

that were more turbulent than rest of the country to the Army and imposed martial law

in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore.166 It was quite evident that he was losing his

control over the helm of affairs and was increasingly dependent on army. By the end

of April he started holding frequently the meetings of Corps Commanders in Prime

Minister House which shows the level of his dependency on army regarding the

dealing with the ongoing political crises. 167These meeting provided with ample

information to the generals and his increasing dependence on the army generals had

provided them with the confidence to take over power later on.168 A joint statement of

the services chiefs issued on the eve of tense situation during the PNA-government tussle. This also depicted his dependence on the generals and expressed a

psychological impression of Bhutto’s weakness.169

Bhutto involved the military generals in political matters from 1973 onward.

Military was used in Baluchistan and Dir operations; it was called to deal with the

protest of workers in Karachi, in police strikes. Bhutto introduced limited Martial Law

in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore during PNA movement in April.170 His attorney

general Yahya Bakhtyar argued before High Court and later Supreme Court the

necessity for the imposition of Martial Law and called it a “national interest”, the

256 same argument was used by Martial Law administration in favour of coup against

Bhutto.171 During the PNA movement Bhutto was overly dependent on military

generals. They were frequently called in the cabinet meetings. He included the

generals in political discussions and assessments, matters like referendum. They were

keenly witnessing his political weaknesses and his growing dependence on them for

political matters.172

4.16 Bhutto and Bureaucracy

Bhutto dismissed more than 2000 civil officers on the charges of corruption.173

Before Bhutto the pattern of governance was a partnership between military and bureaucracy with the military being the senior partner. Bhutto tried to establish the

civilian-political supremacy over these powerful institutions of the colonial era.174 He

introduced “lateral entry” to bring brilliant brains from various spheres of life into bureaucracy.

4.17 The foreign Factor against Bhutto

Pakistan’s debut in international politics was as an American’s client state. In

mid 1950 Pakistan became a close ally of US through mutual anti-Communism

agreements including Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed in 1954, The

Baghdad Pact which later named as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) signed in

1955, and South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955. These pacts were the results of the Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership’s keen interest to build its

military strong with US assistance programs to counter militarily strong India.175

Through SEATO America wanted to internationalize its military expedition in

Vietnam and for this lent the services of Pakistan. Through CEATO Americans

257 wanted containment around the great Cino-Soviet landmass and Pakistan was of a

salient importance.176

The deepening feelings of insecurity due to military disparity with India the

government gave free hand to military to forge alliances to meet the challenges

imposed by Indian military superiority.177 During the years 1948, 49 the military budget was 59.5 percent of the total spending of the country.178 Ayub Khan as C-N-C visited US to make deals with US to join US-led security agreements. Ayub

persuaded the political government to forge an alliance with US even if US may not

provide any guarantee of security assistance against India. Thus the army managed to

influence the budget and foreign policy of the country which is continuing even today.179 Bhutto after coming into power left the Commonwealth in January 1972, a

Western-led accord as the countries of Commonwealth had recognized Bangladesh as

an independent country. But after two years Bhutto himself recognized Bangladesh as

an independent country on the eve of Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore in

February 1974.180 On 7th November 1972 Bhutto withdrew Pakistan from SEATO as

he wanted to play a role in Non-Aligned Movement for which he wanted to dissociate

him from West-led anti-Communist pacts. He also wanted to withdrew from CENTO

and shown his intentions to do so on many occasions but keep on with this pact to

keep relations with the two Muslim member countries of the Pact i.e. Iran and Turkey

rather than approving American’s anti-Soviet policy.181 Pakistan had no enthusiasm

for SEATO and CENTO as it was evident that these pacts were of no use in war with

India. But Bhutto wanted a symbolic anti-US posture by quitting these pacts to attract the support of anti-US quarters.182 While coming in power Bhutto took on all the

centers of power including the establishment, feudal, capitalists, religious right and

the US simultaneously but could not bring any substantial blow against any of them or

258 to bring the powerful institutions under the constitution firmly.183 The working class

and downtrodden felt that Bhutto betrayed them by not providing them what he had

promised with them that is why they did not come to stand by him considerably when

he was persecuted by his opponents.184

After just four days of the dismemberment of East Pakistan on 20th

December 1971 Bhutto was handed over with power of the what leftover Pakistan. He took over power as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan. There was no permanent constitution in the country and these posts were incepted under the

Legal Framework Order (LFO), under which the Yahya Regime held elections

in1970. 185 Although Bhutto succeeded to muster the support of masses due to his

socialist agenda but reached to the power with the aid of the generals. Soon he started

emphasizing to act as a popularly elected leader of the masses. Being the leader with

largest following in the country Bhutto was handed over with power by military high

command, until the time ripe for them to recapture it.186 Military generals of Yahya junta handed over power to Bhutto not by design but by default as they left with no

other option. Some of the generals considered Bhutto as “insider” as he remained a

key minister in the military government of Ayub Khan.187 On 3rd December he joined

hands with military by assuming the office of deputy prime minister and foreign

minister with Noor ul Ameen as prime minister, under Yahya regime. With pleading

Pakistan case in United Nation’s Security Council providing him an opportunity to get

closer to US government as Pakistan’s reliance on USA was increased to get the

foreign support.188 Though for the first time in the history of South Asia Bhutto led

successfully a class-based mass movement and took the control of the state of

Pakistan through populist democratic mean. The forces of status-quo, the local and

global establishment could not digest that a leader of class-conscious movement came

259 into power for the first time in the history of the country. 189 Pakistan was a pro-

America, pro-West, pro-Capitalism, pro- imperialism country before the class-based

movement against Ayub khan and that was lead by Bhutto. During the movement

Bhutto not only charged the crowd against local establishment, feudal lords, capitalist but raised slogans against global capitalist imperialism which alarmed the Western

capitals against Bhutto. 190After coming into power Bhutto not only implemented

egalitarian reforms to curtail the powers of local forces of status-quo including feudal

lords, big industrialists and establishment but took Pakistan out of the West-led

security agreements like CENTO, SEATO and Common Wealth. These actions along with his alignment with the Arab Muslim countries and Third World and his chanted

nuclear program antagonized the big capitalist powers particularly USA.191 Bhutto

challenged the interests of all these powerful local and global forces but could not

crush their powers in a systematic and scientific manner. These forces of

establishment joined hands one or the other way to oust Bhutto from power, which they successfully managed. 192

In Pakistan the institutions like strong parliament, independent and impartial judiciary and free media were not allowed to be strengthened which lead to the

frequent military-led establishment’s intervention in the country. The military was

one of the two most powerful institutions in the British colonial system in Indian

Subcontinent. The feudal class was created by the British in result of the large scale

establishment of the canal colonies in Punjab and Sindh. Both military and newly

created feudal class was the primary recipients of lands in these canal colonies. This

military-feudal nexus of the British era continued to control the helm of affairs of

state after the creation of Pakistan with civil bureaucracy as the senior partner to run the state affairs.193

260 4.18 Foreign-Indigenous Convergence against Bhutto

The coup against Bhutto was not a simple local movement against Bhutto by

PNA or Army but the army generals, bourgeoisie business classes, the rightist-led

PNA and foreign forces like USA, even Saudis and Iranians to an extent were the

combined opposition to Bhutto.194 These opposition forces, both internal and external, joined hands against Bhutto obviously for significantly varied reasons. The opposition

against Bhutto was a “marriage of convenience” between the PNA and other anti-

Bhutto actors. Army generals tolerated rather encouraged Bhutto to come into power

early in 1971 because the ruling junta of generals lacked the ability and lost the

legitimacy in result of East Pakistan defeat, and Bhutto possessed the both, ability and

legitimacy.195 Army found an opportunity to oust Bhutto when his populism eroded

and he became expellable in the eyes of army-led establishment and other forces also became his stern enemies.196 The PNA wanted electoral reforms, re-elections as they

claimed massive rigging by Bhutto regime in the election 1977 and imposition of

Nizam-i-Mustafa the system of the Prophet (SAW). 197Army enjoyed a hegemonic

position in the state structure of Pakistan, even during the early days of Bhutto in

power. Bhutto appeased the army in terms of budgetary support and equipping it with

modern arms but took steps to curtail the political role for military. Though the

military was still a hegemonic power in the state and society of the country but it was

no more a dominant political force. The army considered itself in the zero-sum game

in the presence of Bhutto in power so they wanted him to go by all means.198 PNA was a front phase of the ambitious army generals, at least some components of PNA

acted on the directions of the generals.199 Some of the ambitious leaders had already

developed connections with foreign elements against Bhutto.200 There were persistent

rumours that some of the secret agencies were playing a role in the troubles against

261 Bhutto. 201 The argument that army generals never reconciled themselves in the

secondary role with civilian government carries a considerable weight. The generals

ruled the country directly or indirectly before Bhutto came in power. They were not

only directly linked with foreign powers in the dealing of security issues and weapons purchase but were also concerned with internal planning and budget of which they used the highest percentage. So they tasted the power just after the

creation of the country and were never ready to quit the power so easily which Bhutto

compelled them to do.202

Keeping in consideration the prolonged military hegemonic role in the state of

Pakistan there were talks of a “constitutional role” for military. Bhutto also discussed

in details with his associates in length about the forming of a Council of National

Security in which services chiefs might be included to avoid any “us and them”

situation and hopefully any future military intervention. He considered this option for

security and emergency situation. Later during the PNA movement Bhutto discussed

the same proposal with general Zia but it was perhaps too late for such an action as

action.203

The Shah of Iran was against Bhutto as Bhutto could not suppress Bloch

nationalist resistant movement which had direct impact on the Bloch resistant in Irani

Bloch areas. Iranian Bloch Sardars had relations with Pakistani Bloch Sardars.204

During the whole tenure of Bhutto there was a constant pressure of provincial

autonomy from Bloch nationalist government of NAP-JUI coalition. So the Iranian

discontent was also a factor against Bhutto.205

262 4.19 Role of USA against Bhutto

Despite his rhetoric against US-Vietnam war and his pro-China and Pro-

Russia stances during his tenure as foreign minister Bhutto came in power with the

support of Americans, President Nixon and Hennery Kissinger.206 Hennery Kissinger

and President Nixon played a role to help Bhutto come in power in 1971. Before

coming in power Bhutto stayed in US and hosted a dinner in the honour of some

American high ups including George bush. He met President Nixon before leaving for

Pakistan on 18th December 1971. He assured American president that he was not an

anti-America leader and would work for the stability in South Asia.207

Later on United States developed serious differences with Bhutto on nuclear

issue. Bhutto was being emerged as a prominent leader of Third World particularly

getting a fame and reputation in Muslim countries. His image of a popular Muslim

leader frightened various quarters in western world, especially USA. With the passage

of time the control of Bhutto on domestic fronts started eroding and the opposition

forces started to unite against him.208

On 19 October 1976 Bhutto invited Shah Khalid the King of Saudi Arabia on

an official visit to Pakistan. He sought financial help from King Khalid for atomic

program and Indus Super Highway. Bhutto persuaded King Khalid to recognize

USSR and he could manage if the king agreed. He told King that USA had a plan to

get control over the oil industry of Saudi Arabia and with Pakistan-Saudi Arabia this

plan could be failed. Saudi Arabia did not recognize USSR but Bhutto was sent to

gallows.209 During the PNA movement Bhutto visited many Muslim countries

including Iran. Shah of Iran’s response to Bhutto was very cool and Bhutto firmly believed that Shah was working hands in gloves with USA to destabilize his

263 government by supporting PNA.210 Bhutto’s highhandedness and vindictive and

authoritarian style was also one of the contributing factors for uniting his small

opposition despite their stirring ideological differences.211

When opposition succeeded to start a movement against him it was supported by USA politically and financially.212 According to candid intelligence reports PNA

movement was backed by USA through various means and PNA leaders were backed by Carter administration financially and politically to remove Bhutto.213 Some of the

high ranking bureaucrats and even some PPP stalwarts had developed connections with CIA and under their influence Bhutto took wrong political decisions and got trapped in the situation where he could not get out from. Through these “friends” CIA

managed to get inside news. 214 These “friends” advised Bhutto that two-third

majority was necessary for him and to achieve two-third majority wrong deeds were

carried out despite the fact that all surveys and impartial analysis were declaring

Bhutto’s PPP hot favourit to win the elections.215 When the PNA movement was at

full swing these “friends” cultivated by CIA, advised him to quench the movement with weapons, thus violence means were adopted to deal with the protesting

opposition which aggravated the neutral masses in favour of opposition and against

Bhutto. Some officials of USMAAG 216got accessed to the services headquarters they

“advised” military officials with their “precious” advises. Some of the US diplomats

developed direct relations with some of the leaders of PNA and supported them with

finance and advises.217 ISI gathered candid information about the contacts of leaders with foreign journalists and photographers and were provided them with information

and got directions from them. These were CIA agents in the guise of journalists and

photographers.218 Jan M. Gibney, Political Officer, US Consulate General Lahore, with the support of some Pakistanis was active and was frequently visiting a number

264 of political leaders including Maulana Maudoodi and Maulana Obaid Ullah Anwar of

JUI. Americans gave importance to the thinking and knowledge of Maulana

Maudoodi. Gibney was the same diplomat who was known for his famous telephonic

conversation with Howard B. Schaffer, Chief of Political Affairs US Embassy in

Islamabad. In that telephonic conversation he said “The party is over, Merchandise

has gone.” This conversation was intercepted by Pakistani intelligence agencies and in

response Bhutto said in national assembly that, “Well, gentleman, the party is not

over”.219 The telephonic incepts further fueled the Bhutto’s suspicion that US was

conspiring against him to down him from power. The American consul general in

Karachi Robert Moore was informed by a Pakistani journalist that Bhutto was forcibly

detained at a reception, Moore called Howard Schaffer American Political counselor

in Islamabad. When Moore learned that the news was incorrect he called Shaffer

again and in code word told that “My source tells me the party is over”, to disguise the earlier comments, this was the US explanation about the telephonic intercept.220

PL-480 funds 221 were also released and some of JI workers were seen by

intelligence agencies to get heavy amounts of money and spending them so

lavishly.222 Heavy flow of dollars was there in the markets of Pakistan and its value

decreased, even dollars were found with the common men who even did not know its

exchange value and were giving to the merchants and dealers cheaper than its real

value. There was a sudden rise in the flow of dollars in the Pakistani currency markets which caused increase in comparison rate.223

His efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities for his country was irking USA. US

made many efforts and engaged Bhutto give up Pakistan’s nuclear program. Initially

Hennery Kissinger showed intentions to make a deal with Bhutto even in August

1976 on nuclear issue. 224 Under this deal US would provide modern conventional

265 weapons including 110A-7 modern aircrafts which Pakistan direly needed for the balance of air power with India, if he agreed to abandon nuclear program.225 Hennery

Kissinger met Pakistani ambassador in Washington after former’s visit to Pakistan in

August 1976 and a widely believed rumours that Kissinger ‘threatened” Bhutto that

if Democrats came in power they would make a “horrible example” of Pakistan if the

later did not drop the idea of nuclear reprocessing plant.226 The democrats were

severely criticizing the Ford administration’s nonproliferation policy specially its

relaxed reaction on India’s nuclear test. President Ford and Kissinger were trying to

demonstrate that they were carrying out every possible effort to prevent Pakistan from

acquiring nuclear technology. Kissinger adopted a two-pronged strategy, on one hand

he offered modern weapons and aircrafts on the other hand he warned that there was a

likelihood of democrats to come in power and they would adopt a tougher

nonproliferation policy and would make Pakistan an “example”.227

During his visit to Saudi Arabia Bhutto told king Khalid that the former had

considerable evidences about the US involvement in the current political turmoil and

US was not only financing to PNA but also guiding them strategy and tactics of

agitation.228 US endeavored to persuade France to cancel its nuclear deal with

Pakistan. They made other efforts to persuade Bhutto not to acquire nuclear technology but Bhutto did not. Many ups and downs remained in US-Bhutto relations

during this period.229 Hennery Kissinger raised nuclear issue directly with Bhutto in

New York in February 1976. He made three tours to Pakistan to persuade Bhutto to

abandon nuclear program. Pakistan had not signed the nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty and was not willing to allow the international inspection of its nuclear

program. US used muscular diplomacy succeeded in derailing such project in

Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan but not Pakistan. Kissinger offered an

266 international fuel reprocessing facility in the region to cater the energy resources of the area if Pakistan abandons its nuclear program.230

Bhutto remained always concerned about American role against him. Perhaps

the level of US involvement in the Third World countries particularly in Pakistan

makes worried any wise leader of these countries. US could not tolerate any leader of the Muslim countries with nuclear ambitions so they did same in case of Bhutto.231

The best way to deal with US pressure was to develop a national consensus which

Bhutto drastically failed to develop. Bhutto thought that there was no clearly defined

leader of opposition whom he could take on board to deal with US pressure, secondly

he was apprehended about the perceived demands of PNA regarding the elections.232

When the situation worsened Bhutto received a public “slap” from

Washington. Carter administration cancelled the deal of tear gas sale to Pakistan on

the grounds that the sale of tear gas to be used against opposition would reflect US

support a “repressive regime’.233 The cancelation aggravated the Bhutto’s suspicions

about the US involvement against his regime.

When Bhutto was removed and was being tried in a murder case in the apex

court of the country the ISI captured some evidences of US interests to get Bhutto

hanged by all means. Brigadier ® Irshad Ahemad Trimizi was the then Chief of staff

Directorate General ISI claimed an informer who had “access” to USIS sent a “most urgent” code message to him. Trimizi received a secret paper from the informer which was a telegraphic massage from Washington to US office in Islamabad and after

decoding the message by Timazi it was revealed that Washington directed its

Islamabad office that “ Bhutto’s hanging must be ensured, in the same paper some

other directions regarding the retirement and transfer of some general officers were

included. According to Trimazi he took the matter to the then DG ISI General Riaz

267 Abbasi, who called the informer and after the whole night interrogation reached to the

conclusion that the telegraphic massage was genuine and not fabricated. It revealed

the clear violation of diplomatic norms and interference of the big power in the

internal affairs of a “sovereign” state.234 General Riaz decided to get the specialists’

opinion about the document. Next morning he took the document to the then secretary

defense General Jillani. It was the same General Jilani who was DG ISI during the whole tenure of Bhutto. General Jillani advised the ISI people to be “careful”.

Keeping in view the fragility of the matter General Riaz took the memo to the Chief justice of Lahore High Court Mr Justice Shamim Qadri to get the legal position of the

memo. Justice Qadri told them that according to law Bhutto could not be hanged as he was not involved in the murder case in person secondly if any such corporal

punishment was given that would not be unanimous. That was why such memo was

issued to ensure the hanging of Bhutto in any case.235 Trimizi claims that ISI had

many other proofs of US involvement in Bhutto’s case. When the Bhutto’s lawyers

prepared notes of the case in the Faletti's Hotel Lahore such notes reached to the state

lawyer very next morning. All these information were sent to General Zia the then

President and Martial Law Administrator but Bhutto was hanged as it was already

‘decided’. 236

Many senior officers of Pakistan military attended training courses in US as

most of the military hardware was supplied by US until 1950s. The US influence on

the military top echelon is undeniable. A heavy number of Pakistani leaders, both

military and civilians, were accused of being US CIA agents. US have always had a

pervasive role in Pakistan especially in the sudden changes of regimes and

movements. Thus, when the interests of US and military converged they planed

Bhutto’s ouster from power.237

268 It is obviously axiomatic for the US in its global interest to view with

suspicion a third-world leader especially with nuclear ambitions and trying to emerge

as prominent Third World leader. It was most unlikely that US missed the opportunity

to encourage a movement, if at least not stir up, to oust him from power when Bhutto

got vulnerable.238

Bhutto believed firmly of the US involvement against him. Before his famous

speech on 28th April 1977 in the National Assembly he held a meeting with the heads

of intelligence agencies, foreign office and other officials but no one came with

considerable proofs of the US involvement.239 Whether they did not have the solid

proofs or deliberately not provided him as their own involvement.

Bhutto was the spokesperson for the poor and downtrodden classes. 240 He

picked up the pieces and rehabilitated the nation after the traumatic debacle of East

Pakistan.241 He freed the downtrodden classes from the submission to the forces of

horrible status quo.242 His egalitarian reforms involved making a number of enemies

of him.243 Bhutto himself accused army generals, PNA and US conspiring against

him. Bhutto’s presence in the power no longer suited US so they obviously wanted his

early ouster from power as they openly confronted them and covertly conspired

against other ambitious Third World leaders including Fiedal Castro, Colonel

Qaddafi, Khamini and others. These leaders survived with the better management of

the mass support for them in their respective countries. But Bhutto could not

anticipate the conspiracy well in time or he was unable to successfully deal with

that.244

Even some of his colleagues and those promoted by him out of the way like

General Zia, Masood Mehmood and others were responsible to be involved with

opposition in his ouster.245

269 According to Bhutto there were four major power blocs in Pakistan including the Military, the Bureaucracy, the big business tycoons and politicians. These all blocs were antagonistic against him due to his reformist policies and, to an extent, his

personal arrogant vindictive nature. He alienated almost all powerful groups, both

internal and external.246

On one hand, he could not deliver what he promised and the downtrodden

sections of society expected from him on the other hand he antagonized the powerful

elitist groups. Like any reformist, he was unable to satisfy the conflicting classes that

he vehemently tried to reconcile. 247

Saudis were also apprehended about Pakistan’s nuclear program for their

reasons in the region. They, according to some, supported PNA financially against

Bhutto in 1977 movement.248 The Saudis used to support religious parties of

Deobandi faction generously; especially they funded JI so heavily.249 According to

many PPP leaders large amounts of Saudi Riyals were reaching to the coffers of the of

leaders religious parties those were against Bhutto.250

The generals of the army opposed Bhutto for their own reasons to get rid of the “menace” of Bhutto.251 From Tariq Ali’s account a foreign-backed coalition of

opposition with remarkable diplomatic and financial support was working against

Bhutto even before the announcement of the elections 1977 by Bhutto. This foreign- backed opposition to Bhutto poured heavy funds and strategy, the strategy was

adopted by PNA during its election campaign. The major focus of this strategy was to

daub Bhutto as an ‘unreliable” figure who did not care for democratic norms.252

Similar kind of campaign was carried out by General Ziaul Haq later against Bhutto

and published volumes of White Papers on Bhutto’s “wrong doings” in the election

1977.253 Bhutto was not as discredited publically before the election 1977 as it was

270 made discredited after the allegations of rigging by the alliance of opposing forces.

The generals of army did not allow PPP and PNA to solve the problem through

negotiations as according to Asghar Khan, General Zia decided to impose Martial

law when he listen from Bhutto that the later was going to sign an agreement with the

opposition in a cabinet meeting where the former was also present on 4th July 1977.254

The strategy to malign Bhutto was succeeded to achieve the support of a considerable

section of people in Pakistan as Bhutto antagonized both “left and right”. The leftist

ideologues considered Bhutto who betrayal Socialism after getting in power by using

Socialism as slogan. The right was already deadly against Bhutto as the later achieved

power against the rightist ideology by raising slogans of Socialism, liberalism and the

measures his government took on the basis of class conflicts such as industrialization,

land, labour and industrial and other socialistic reforms.255 Another reason for taking

that severe action to impose direct martial law by army was that the generals were not

sure that their rightist allies would win the elections in October, which were to be held under the “supervision” of the army, proposed by PNA and PPP under the

agreement.256 The idea was already planted in the public opinion that elections of

1977 would be rigged by the ruling PPP when Bhutto announced election in January

1977.257 It was a main point of the election campaign of PNA, which suggests that

“someone” in the politics of Pakistan was planning and thinking to discredit Bhutto

on the alleged rigging of elections. The scenario was created to discredit Bhutto on the charges of rigging. After long deliberations of negotiations Bhutto was agreed

almost all the demands of PNA specially the holding of new elections, representations

of PNA in Implementation Council and calling back the army troops from

Baluchistan. But army generals were not ready by any mean to abandon their

dominant position in Baluchistan affairs as they did not compromise their dominant

271 position in East Pakistan led to the dismemberment of East Pakistan. By refusing the withdrawal of army troops from Baluchistan the generals showed their dominant

authority vis-a-vis Bhutto and refused to accept anymore the civilian supremacy of

Bhutto.258 On the other hand their ally PNA hardliners were forcing Bhutto to

immediately call back army from Baluchistan. Thus Bhutto was caught between

“Devil and the deep sea”.

Army generals always remained fearing about the elections and reforms in the

country and to loss political powers to civilian constitutional supremacy. One another

reason for the imposition of Martial Law was that the junta feared the mutiny of junior officers if the political parties were allowed to reach an agreement and to hold

elections in October 1977.259 Ideologically the junior officers were affiliated with the

right-wing parties especially JI as its ideology was influenced the minds of the junior

officers during Bhutto years. General Zia distributed theTafheem-ul-Quran written by

Maulana Maudoodi to the soldiers as prize. It was also proposed thatTafheem-ul-

Quran to be included in the examination for the promotion of captains to the rank of

majors. Bhutto showed his severe concerns and wrote to General Zia about this.260 So

the generals feared a rightist religious ideological reaction in the officers which could

lead to overthrow thejunta of generals. So there was an internal political split in the

army. During Yahya regime the political split within higher ranks of army was

reformist vs. conservatives. During General Zia it was Islamic ideology, its place in

army and national politics.261 Though Bhutto by adopting anti-India stance tried to

cultivate his influence in the officer corps but he did not pay any heed to their

ideological shift towards fundamental ideology.262 Another reason for the coup was to

prevent the civil war in the country, and this was the public explanation to justify the

coup by General Zia who declared that he would hold fair elections within 90 days

272 and then army would go back to its barracks. It was not more than a cover to the

political ambitions of the generals’ junta. Army generals always considered themselves as the guardians of the national internal security.263 A politically

dissatisfied army motivated by foreign forces imposed martial law as Bhutto’s control

over domestic political affairs and foreign affairs was not remained tightened

anymore.264264

In the last phase of the PNA movement Bhutto was concerned about the mood

of the generals to act adversely against his government. He was trying to anticipate

the mood and body language of the generals so he called them in the cabinet meetings

frequently. In those days a rumour spread that Bhutto was going to remove General

Zia and some of his fellow generals but waiting for an appropriate time. The generals

got the information and they removed Bhutto prior to his action.265

Bhutto held General Ghulam Jillani the then DG ISI responsible to reveal his

reforms agenda to his fellow generals and remained informing them about the

intentions and plans of Bhutto.266 Bhutto was immensely dependent on the reports of

ISI more than any other intelligence agency.267 It was the same General Jillani who

had been praising Bhutto of his brilliance and knowledge. General Jilani had played a

role to convince Bhutto to appoint General Zia as army chief by super ceding six

senior generals. But the martial authorities arrested everyone in the bureaucratic aids

of Bhutto except General Jillani, rather promoted him to the secretary defense which

showed their connivance.268

On the other hand American involvement with the army generals since 1950s was a significant factor for the imposition of Martial Law by army under General Zia because the Americans were historically ambivalent about the democracy in

Pakistan.269

273 4.20 Role of Business Classes

According to the reports of intelligence agencies heavy secret funds were provided to the workers and leaders of JI. Compensations were provided to the families of those who were arrested and sent into jails by government. Students of religious madrassas were givingazans while standing on the roof tops after the isha prayers and they were paid fifteen rupees per azan.270 Such azans were given when some severe calamities hits a Muslim society in past. On the other hand heavy funds were generously being provided to agitators by local industrialists and businessmen who were severely affected by the nationalization policy of Bhutto regime and they were severely anguished with Bhutto.271 These heavy amounts were provided as

“charity”. As there was no maintained record of these funds with the parties of PNA the heavy amounts went in the personal pockets of leaders.272 Leaders of relgio- political parties made heavy amounts during PNA movement. Hefty amounts were given as “donation’ by big business tycoons of Punjab and Karachi who were against Bhutto due to his nationalization and other anti-capitalist policies.273

The military-led establishment remained the most powerful force in the state of Pakistan and enjoyed a complete autonomy. The military-led establishment put its autonomy temporarily into cold storage knowing the legitimacy crises after the military debacle of East Pakistan.274 It needed time to regain its power and legitimacy to rule again. It allowed Bhutto to rule for five years to serve as a buffer between the military and the public. After the dismemberment of East Pakistan the military and its all time pattern USA decided to rely on civilian “buffers” such as

Bhutto, an advocate of popular rule in Pakistan. This buffer was not meant to work as the substitute of the power and authority of the military in internal and external

274 affairs. After managing the civil faced of the military rule the buffers were ousted from power. This military-US alliance managed to bring the governments in power and then after using those for their purposes damaged them. 275 This alliance helped

Bhutto to come in power in 1971 as they had no other workable options in hand.

When he became un-maneuverable they damaged him in 1977 from power and physically executed him in 1979 by using other political forces like PNA and other classes affected by the Bhutto rule specially by his reforms and his third world leader’s posture.276 After being served as buffer, Bhutto became unnecessary rather dangerous given his high political ambitions and challenging the military authority.

Therefore, the military-led establishment used all quarters of his opponents against him to regain its “lost” power. 277 The military-led establishment changed its position from weakness to strength and Bhutto turned vulnerable in 1977 thus the military- led establishment along with other anti-Bhutto forces paved way for his ouster from power.2780*70

Role of Opposition against General Zia (MRD) will be discussed in next chapter.

275 NOTES & REFERENCES

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280 220 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. (New York: Oxford University Press , 2001) , 230. 221 A USAID fund for food and peace working in various countries. 222 Trimizi, Profiles of Intelligence, 46. 223 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's drift into extremism : Allah, the army, and America's war on terror. (London : M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 88. 224 Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People’s Power?, 127. 225 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. (New York: Oxford University Press , 2001) ,222. 226 Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto, 299. 227 Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 222 228 Wolpert, 299. quoted ( Draft minutes of “TOP SECRET” meeting between PM Bhutto and King Khalid in Riyadh, 18 June 1977 229 Raza, Bhutto, 36. 230 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000 : disenchanted allies. (Washington, D.C. : Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 222. 231 Raza, Bhutto, 326. 232 Ibid., 327. 233 Kux, Disenchanted Allies, 229. 234 Trimizi, Profiles of Intelligence, 48. 235 Ibid.,49 236 Ibid.,362 237 Ibid. 238 Ibid., 363. 239 Ibid. 240 Ibid., 378. 241 Ibid., 379. 242 Ibid. 243 Ibid. 244 Ibid., 379-80. 245 Ibid., 380. 246 Ibid. 247 Bhutto, If I am Assassinated , 156. 248 Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People’s Power?, 127. 249 Anthony Hyman, Muhammed Ghayur, Naresh Kaushik, Pakistan, Zia and After.... ( New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1989 ), 23. 250 http://www.dawn.com/news/1128830 251 Hyman, Pakistan, Zia and After, 23. 252Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People’s Power?, 114. 253 White Paper on Misuse of Media (Dec. 20, 1971-July 4, 1977) Government of Pakistan, Aug. 1978; White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vols I, II and III, Government of Pakistan, 1979; White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977, Government of Pakistan, 1977. 254 Muhammad Asghar Khan, Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1958-1982. ((New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House 1983),142-43. 255 James Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Pakistan. ( New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009), 208 256 Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People’s Power?, 135 257 Khan, Generals in Politics, 102. 258 Kapur,Pakistan in Crisis, 132 259 Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People’s Power ?, 131. 260 Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto, 281. 261 Kapur, Pakistan in Crises, 132. 262 Ibid, 140-42. 263 Indrajeet Singh, Spawning Militancy-Pakistan A Home Ground for Terror.( New Delhi: Gaurva Books, 2015), 232. 264 Kapur,Pakistan in Crisis, 133. 265 Raza, Bhutto, 360. 266 Bhutto, If I am Assassinated, 51. 267 Trimizi, Profiles of Intelligence, 28. 268 Bhutto, If I am Assassinated. , 50-52.

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NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES

Chattan (Lahore)

Dawn (Karachi)

Imroze ( Karachi)

Jang (Rawalpindi)

Jassarat ( Karachi)

Masawat (Lahore)

395 Morning News (Karachi)

Nawa-i-Waqt (Rawalpindi)

Pukkar (Islamabad)

The Muslim (Islamabad)

The Nation (Lahore)

The Pakistan Times (Lahore)

396 CHAPTER 5

ROLE OF OPPOSITION AGAINST GENERAL ZIA UL HAQ

MOVEMENT FOR THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY (MRD)

This chapter is on opposition movement (MRD) against General Zia:

The political condition of the country after Martial law,

Reversal of the egalitarian policies of Bhutto regime

Unfulfilled promises of General Zia to hold elections,

Formation of MRD and its role

Role of various political parties and sacrifices of the people for democracy

and rule of law, especially in Sind against the General Zia’s dictatorial regime are

discussed.

Role of other segments of Pakistani society against General Zia will also be

glanced in this chapter. After imposition of Martial Law by overthrowing the

constitutionally elected government of Bhutto General Zia showed his firm intention to conduct general elections within ninety days of assuming office, but he did not. He

adopted a policy of Islamization and broad reactionary orientation in particular, torturing and stoning and flogging.1. General Zia regime hanged former Prime

Minister Bhutto in a flawed prosecution by ignoring a large number of appeals from various heads of governments and states and was hanged on 4th April 1970. 2 At initial

phase of his Martial Law Carter Administration did not openly endorsed the unconstitutional regime of General Zia. But Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

provided General Zia with an opportunity to forge an alliance with United States and to received heavy investment of USA in Afghanistan through the Pakistani agencies

specially Inter-services Intelligence Agency (ISI). General Zia was transformed from

a dictator to a trustworthy ally in the US war against communist Soviet Union.3 The 283 PPP of Bhutto was put on a way of immense difficulties more than 3000 workers and

sympathizers of PPP were put behind the bars and some of them were kept in the

prisoners even for next decades of dictatorial regime. General Zia reversed the

egalitarian reforms of Bhutto government. The nationalized industries were restored

back to capitalists just after assuming powers. Students and labour unions were

banned, along with political parties.4 The opposition to dictatorial regime managed a

considerable breakthrough when eleven political parties succeeded to forge an

alliance with the name of Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in

February 1981. The alliance includes:

• Tehrik-e-Istiqlal, (TI)

• Quami Mahaz-i-Azadi, (QMA)

• Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan, (MKP)

• National Awami Party, (NAP)

• National Democratic Party, (NDP)

• Jamiatul-Ulemai Islam, (JUI)

• Awami Tehrik, (AT)

• Pakistan National Party, (PNP)

• Pakistan Muslim League (Khairi Group) and Pakistan people’s Party

as the leading party of the alliance.5

Begum Nusrat Bhutto the wife of late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and their daughter

Benazir Bhutto as chairperson and co-chairperson respectively headed Pakistan

People’s Party. Muslim League Khawaja Kairuddi Group now known as Qasim

Group, NAP of Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Pakistan National Party of Mir Ghaus Bux

Bizenjo, who earlier dissociated from NAP and formed his own party, National

284 Democratic Party (NDP) of Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)

headed BY Maulana Mufti Mehmood and later on after his death a faction (JUI-F)

headed by his son Maulana Fazalur Rehman,6 Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP)

headed by Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan, Mazdoor Kisan, a party of left leaning

headed by Fatehyab Ali Khan, Tehrik-i-Isatklal headed by Asghar Khan and Qaumi

Maaz-i-Azadi headed by Miraj Muhammad Khan a former prominent minister of PPP under Bhutto and later on dissociated ways with Bhutto and formed his own party, were the member parties of MRD. Most of the parties of MRD were of left-

orientation and considered anti- establishment and against the undue interference of west especially USA in the affairs of Pakistan. These parties though of diverse

ideologies joined hands against the dictatorial rule of General Zia. Sind was the major

support base of MRD.7 After parting of ways with martial law regime with the former

PNA started looking towards democratic forces, especially PPP but it was quite

difficult for PPP to join hands with them. Formation of an alliance of diverse political

parties, including rightist and leftist was a big breakthrough for democratic forces in the country.

After the execution of Bhutto Zia regime used iron hand to crush protesters.

Lashes, confinements, public beating and even kidnapping was commonly used

against them. The student wing of Jamat-i-Islami, Islami Jammiyat-i-Tulaaba IJT also joined hands with police and other agencies to use the highhandedness against the

PPP workers. The issue was not of political differences but of blood for PPP to join

hands with the parties which supported the military regime to overthrow Bhutto and

his execution.8 PPP took time to come out of the severe shock of Bhutto’s “political

murder” what they used to term it. Both the sides, PPP and former PNA felt the need

of the day and rose up their slumber and decided to start a new struggle against the 285 military dictatorship and for the restoration of democracy. JI continued its support to

Zia regime but rest of the parties of PNA decided to join hands with PPP to form an

alliance against military regime.9 On 5th February 1981 the components parties of

MRD signed on a joint declaration. The declaration said:

5.1 PPP and the Formation of MRD

5th July, 1977 General Ziaul Haq the then Army Chief imposed Martial Law

overthrowing the constitutionally elected government of Bhutto sending him to jail

in the murder case of Nawab Muhammad Ahmad khan Kasuri..10 The general

opinion was that the charges of murder against Bhutto were false and politically

motivated, but in support of General Zia Lahore High Court held Bhutto responsible

of Nawab Kasuri murder case. His appeal in Supreme Court was dismissed by four

judges against three and he was hanged on 4th April 1979. Bhutto family was in

great shock. It was also a shock for the people of Pakistan and specially PPP

Benazir Bhutto was arrested and confined in her family house in Karachi and were

not allowed to attend the funeral of Bhutto, a religious obligation.11 After Bhutto’s

execution Benazir became Co-Chairperson of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) along

with Begum Nussrat Bhutto as Chairperson. Begum Nussrat Bhutto was unable to

carry out the leadership, due to severe shock of his husband’s death, as Benazir

could as she was young and full of energy. The following years followed were hard

for Benazir and her party. Therefore, as a Co-Chairperson of Pakistan People’s

Party, Benazir started her struggle for the restoration of democracy in the despite

being confined in jail.12 During this period, Benazir and Nusrat Bhutto continued

their efforts for the restoration of democracy.

286 On 16th October, 1979 General Zia banned all political parties and political activities in the country. On 23rd March 1981 General Zia announced Provisional

Constitutional Order (PCO), first ever in the history of Pakistan to curb the constitutional powers of judiciary. Although superior judiciary showed its fully alignment with the dictatorial rule of General Zia by “legitimizing” its rue under the

“doctrine of necessity” in Nusrat Bhutto Case. Supreme Court gave its verdict that in

“dangerous” political situation in the country General Zia’s action to overthrow

Bhutto’s constitutionally elected government by imposing Martial Law was “legal” on the ground of ‘necessity”. However General Zia asked judges to take fresh oath under PCO.13 When General Zia invited the judges to take fresh oath Supreme Court judges who refused to take oath under the PCO were Dorab Patel and Fakhruddin G.

Ebrahim. Chief justice Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain who presided over Bhutto’s case at

Lahore High Court was willing to take oath under the PCO but was not invited by the government. Those who took oath under PCO were Justices Abdul Qadir Shaikh,

Mohammad Haleem, K. I. Chauhan, Aslam Riaz Hussain, Nasim Hassan Shah,

Shafiur Rahman, M.A. Zulla, Abdul Hayee Qureshi, Zafar Hussain Mirza,

Naimuddin Ahmad, S.A. Nusrat, Ajmal Mian, Mohammad Zahoorul Haq, Sajjad Ali

Shah, Ghaus Ali Shah, Tanzilur Rahman, Saeeduz Zaman Siddiqi, M.J. Kaurejo,

Nasir Aslam Zahid, K.A. Ghani and Saleem Akhtar. Those who were not invited or refused to take oath and had to resign were: Justice Dorab Patel, Anwarul Haq,

Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain, Agha Ali Hyder, Abdul Hafeez

Memon and G.M. Shah 14 General Zia also ordered a crackdown on political activities. Only in the month of March 1981 about 6000 thousands political workers were arrested including Benazir Bhutto. To prevent the laborers, peasants and other workers to join hands with MRD Genera Zia issued a “black” Martial Law Order 287 No. 54 under which death penalty could be awarded to laborers and political activists if any public building or property would damage during the protest demonstrations. 15 Under the Article 16 of the PCO the president was given the powers to amend even the constitution of the country.16 PCO also imposed unprecedented curbs on judiciary. Only those judges could be continued as judges who would take fresh oath under Genera Zia’s PCO. The military regime was made unquestionable by any court and none of its order could be challenged in any court of law. Parallel military courts were established to award punishments to political workers. The oppressive Martial Law orders and other atrocities of the military regime on political workers forced MRD leaders to postpone their protest demonstrations for time being. General Zia silenced the processions of MRD by using brute force. MRD leaders took a wise decision to postpone its struggle till

August 1983. Brute use of state power General Zia succeeded to silence the movement in three provinces but in Sind MRD movement received unprecedented popularity.17 On 14th August 1983 MRD restarted afresh its protest demonstrations with full swing by taking out a big rally from Regal Chowk Karachi. The huge rally was attended by students, laborers, even writers and scholars in large number besides political workers. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi led the protest demonstration. The plan of the movement was to hold rallies to raise the awareness against the atrocities and unconstitutional acts of the military regime and when it needed arrests should be given through courts. Jatoi himself presented court arrest in the presence of protesters. Following his arrest such large scale arrests were made that prisons and lock-ups turned short to keep the political prisoners. Police kept the political prisoners in sports stadiums.18 Movement continued in other parts of Sind province.

Movement was on full swing by the end of December 1983 and despite the 288 confinements in jails and public flogging of political workers movement was increasing with every passing day. Only in the province of Sind more than 20000 people were put behind the bars for taking out processions against the government on the platform of MRD and about four thousands were flogged. Military government thought that the flogging to the “political criminals” publically would be productive as the other people would learn the lesson so the public lashing increased. 19 Organizations of human rights raised voices against detention of political workers without trials in courts and keeping them incommunicado and they were not given the rights to appeal in the courts. Sindhi Awami Tehrik (SAT) led by

Rasool Bakhsh Palijo also started playing an active role in various areas of Sind. Its workers sat great example of protest demonstration against the military regime. A famous Sindi nationalist leader and scholar G.M Syed did not join PPP-led MRD movement in Sind. According to G. M. syed MRD was not of any use for the Sindi people. On the other hand he joined hands withmuhajir-dominated Muhajir Qaumi

Movement. G.M Syed was deadly against PPP as he was of the view that PPP was undermining the nationalist character of Sind. General Zia successfully exploited

Syed’s rivalry against PPP and himself visited Syed to neutralize him.20 Progressive muajirs and leftist student organizations including Sind National Student Federation played a considerable role in MRD.21

There were media reports that the MRD leaders in jails were discussing their share in the would-be government after the General Zia’s ouster from power which sent negative massage to the struggling workers on ground that their leaders were discussing the end which did not seem to be happened instead of planning a strategy for the success of the movement.22 After returning from his official visits of Turkey

General Zia decided to visit the Sind province. Intelligence agencies reported him an 289 unrealistic and toned-down picture of agitation in Sind. He met very unpleasant and

ugly scenes at various areas in Sind where agitation movement of MRD was at high

pace. In Badin, Dadu and other areas of Sind he met severe agitation by political

workers of MRD so that he was forced to be encamped Sukkhur Cantonment.23

Even in the rural areas of Sind the people were rose in protest against the military

regime’s anti-people policies and brutal use of power against the agitating political

workers for the establishment of rule of law and democracy in the country.

The first official meeting of the leaders for the arrangement of Alliance was

held at 70 Clifton Karachi on February 6, 1981.24 An alliance was formed and named

Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD).25

The alliance announced a four points agenda at the eve of its formation:

• Ending of Martial Law

• Restoration of the 1973 Constitution

• Parliamentary elections

• Transfer of power to the public representatives. 26

These parties joined hands against the dictatorial rule of General Zia-ul-Haq.

Eleven diverse political parties formed a coalition called Movement for the

Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and started mounting pressure on General Zia’s

regime to hold elections. Bhutto’s PPP was prominently included along with other

parties of diverse leaning but predominantly of left orientation. 27

5.2. Role of Lawyers in the formation of MRD

Benazir Bhutto, Begum Nusrat Bhutto and other leadership of PPP was in

jails. A huge number of PPP workers were facing severe punishments including

public flogging, confinements and other punishments in the hands of martial law

290 regime. Wali Khan and Asghar were giving statements to hold accountability before holding elections. Benazir and other leaders of PPP were sure that in such critical circumstances without the support and collaboration of other political parties no effective movement against military regime could be launched. On 1st June a country-wide lawyers’ convention was held in Lahore to strive for the restoration of democracy, independence of judiciary and holding of free and fair elections in the country. 9028

Taking the advantage of validation of Martial Law from Supreme Court in Nusrat

Bhutto Case, on 27th May 1980 General Zia promulgated a constitutional amendment barring the superior judiciary from making any order regarding the validation of Martial Law. The amendment restricted the courts from their writ jurisdiction regarding any order against the martial law Regulations.29 This amendment in the article of the constitution No. 212 purged the powers of high courts and Supreme Court. The lawyers’ community was already in a state of distress started a protest movement against the constitutional amendment made by

General Zia to curb the power of judiciary. Lawyers’ movement was led by Abid

Hussain Manto, Hafeez Lakho, Syed Afzal Haider, Barrister Zahoor, and many others. The leaders of lawyers’ movement belonged to different political parties so they invited leaders of various political parties at bar level and provided them with an opportunity to come closer to one another. On 19th and 20th June a two-days lawyers’ convention was held at Lahore in which leaders belonging to various political parties and about four thousands lawyers from across the country participated. Military government took action and arrested a number of lawyers and political leaders.30 Aitazaz Ehsan a prominent leader of PPP was also among those who were arrested. Other conventions were held in August 1980 at Lahore and 20th 291 November 1980 at Peshawar a large number of lawyers including Barrister Latif

Afridi also participated. The Faisalabad, lawyers supported the cause of MRD. The

prominent leaders from Faisalabad were, Chaudhary Taalib Hussain, Zaman Khan,

Badruddin Chaudhary, Chaudhary Ummar Draaz, Shams-ul-Islam Naaz, Ahmed

Saeed Awan, Fazal Husain Raahi, Ghiyas-ud-din Janbaaz. The people of Multan

played an important role in the movement such as Ch Arshad and Mukhtar Ahmed

Awan. Aitazaz Ehsan and Mahmood Butt from Lahore were well known in MRD.31

On 7th October 1982 all Pakistan lawyers’ convention held at Lahore in which a

large number of lawyers from various parts of the country participated to discuss a

strategy for the restoration of democracy and rule of law in the country. Abid

Hassan Manto, Syed Afzal Haider, Aitzaz Ehsan, Mehmood Ali Qasuri and a

number of other lawyers were the organizers of this convention. A protest day was

organized by lawyers on 19th October 1983 against the volitions of human rights by

Martial Law regime and for the restoration of democracy in the country. Police

forcibly stopped the protest rallies in Lahore. Police started baton charge on lawyers

in the premises of Lahore High Court (LHC). A number of lawyers were injured and

many were arrested by police. Talat Yaqoob a woman lawyer threw her bangles on

police to embarrass them. 32 In November 1985 an international Women Lawyers

Conference held in Lahore. Pakistan Women Lawyers’ Association arranged this

conference. The participants of the conference urged the government to sign the

United Nations convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against women and

adopt other international standard of human rights.33

On 21st February 1981 at the residence of Mian Mehmood Ali Qasuri in

Lahore the first declaration of MRD was announced. Lawyers struggle played a vital

role bring closer the leaders of various opposition political parties and the successive 292 lawyers conventions and conferences and processions of lawyers played a vital role

not only in the formation of MRD but played an active role in the struggle of MRD.

Many of the parties in the MRD were formerly at loggers head with each

other, especially those of PNA against PPP, but became united in opposition to

General Zia.34 Some of the parties included on MRD played a major role in PNA

Movement against Bhutto. The primary base of support for the MRD lay in the Sind

Province though it was also struggled to a limited extent in Punjab. People of Punjab,

did least participation in the movement as compared to the common masses in Sind

did. However, the PPP workers and other progressive elements played a role in

opposition against Zia regime but MRD could not succeed to ignite the common

people of Punjab to the extent of the mobilization of the people of Sind.35 . Most of the political parties included in MRD were those who were a part of PNA movement

against Bhutto and now joined hands with PPP as part of MRD against General Zia.36

MRD was consisting of eleven political parties ranging from religious fundamentalists

like JUI, centrists like Muslim League, Leftist like Mazdour Kissan Party and PPP,

Nationalist parties like NAP. There was a visible division in Fundamentalist religious

party JI as it was part of General Zia’s dictatorial regime but its two prominent leaders

Professor Ghafoor Ahemad and Syed Munawar Hassan were vehemently criticizing the Zia government and consequently supporting the MRD stand point.37 On 11 May

1983, the leaders of MRD announced 31 points program and wowed to fulfill it.

Among those points, followings were the key demands

i. Greater provincial autonomy ii. Independent judiciary iii. Restoration of fundamental rights iv. Lifting of restrictions on the press v. Promotion of trade unions 293 vi. End of discrimination against women vii. No discrimination on religious basis. viii. Strict accountability of all civil and military personnel ix. Reduction in tax burdens on workers with fixed incomes x. Clear demarcation between private industry and public xi. Corporations Establishment of compulsory military training xii. Making Pakistan a non-aligned state xiii. Questioned the heavy transfer of American weapons to Pakistan xiv. Urged the government to pursue good relations with all the neighbouring countries xv. Good relations with the Third World countries xvi. Cordial relations with Muslim countries 38

After its organizational process MRD decided to launch a country-wide strike

only from 14th August 1983. The uprising started from 14th August 1983 was named

as “Save Pakistan Movement. Black banners were waved by MRD workers at the

tomb of Quaid-i-Azam. On 18th August MRD workers attacked Dadu jails and

managed to escape 102 political prisoners from the jail. For next three months the

movement continued intensely. Government properties were damaged, railway

tracks were uprooted and other losses to the government buildings. Majors effects of

the movements were in Sind, though lawyers and other segments of society from

Punjab and Karachi took active part in the movement but the movement could not

assume an outlook of a country-wide strike.39

5.3. Benazir Bhutto’s Exile

Unwillingly under international stress and the MRD, General Zia had to

release Benazir and she was freed on September 10, 1984, workers, especially of PPP were kept behind the bars.40 PPP gained its full strength as single political party in

Pakistan. Some saner members in the cabinet advised General Zia that if continued

harsh treatment with opposition leaders the agitation would continue escalating and

294 asked him to use some other means to settle political issues. Keeping in consideration

he decided to open talks with jailed leadership of MRD and General S. M. Abbasi, the

military governor of Sind was given the task to hold talks with detained leaders of

MRD. To show seriousness the military regime released about 2000 political workers

from various jails. The government proposed to take a surety bond from the workers

as a condition of releasing that they would not take part in politics but General Abbasi

opposed this idea and the workers were released unconditionally. Despite these

reconciliatory moves General Zia was not in a mood at all to step down under the

pressure of MRD’s agitations.41 Benazir Bhutto was in solitary confinement in

Karachi Jail where she was brought on 15th August 1981. Her doctor advised her to go

abroad for the treatment of her ear’s infection but she did not applied for permission till December 1983. She was allowed to go abroad for treatment under the policy that

her release would pacify the mounting pressure from international organization and

secondly her departure would put negative impacts on the moral of the agitating workers. Some bureaucrats opposed the idea that Benazir Bhutto would be affectively vocal about the atrocities of the military government abroad and would cause a severe

dent to the already ailing reputation of the government. However General Zia

allowed her to leave the country. On 9th January 1984 Benazir was informed by Sind

government that she was allowed to leave the country for her treatment. She left the

country for London on 10th January 1984.42 During her two years stay at London her younger brother Shahnawaz Bhutto was murdered in France, Benazir visited Pakistan

for the burial of her brother then again left the country.43 She continued her political

struggle during her stay abroad while making London a centre of her political

activities. She launched a journalAmal" ' from London during her stay there, till her

return to Pakistan in 1986.

295 Benazir was kept in jails and confinements by military regime after imposing

martial law and overthrow of Bhutto regime in 1977. She showed her firm

commitment to strive for the restoration of democracy during her confinement in

Sukher jail.44 She was a strong opposition to the Martial Law regime. She left the

country putting her political future on stake when she was allowed by General Zia

regime to leave the country for her treatment in 1984, after a mounted pressure from various channels. 45 She vowed to continue her struggle against the regime even from

abroad. Her departure was a blow to the MRD movement as she was a symbol of

struggle and charisma for the movement. She got operated her ear in London and met

her brothers there. Her both brothers Mir Murtaza Bhutto and Shahnawaz Bhutto

never visited Pakistan and met their sister after the overthrow of the government of their father by military in July 1977.46 Benazir felt more productive for her cause while being free in London as compared to be in jails of Pakistan. 47 She could

mobilize and educate a large number of Pakistanis living abroad. Only in England

about 400000 Pakistani were living. Many PPP workers managed self-exile from the jails in Pakistan by military regime.48 Doctors advised that her ear would be operated

once again within nine months and if she went back to Pakistan, it would not be

possible to operate it again. But she was also deeply concerned about her absence

from the country which adversely affected the movement against the dictator. It was

clear that military regime would not allow her to leave the country. She set up an

office in London residence and started campaign from there to tell the level of

atrocities of the military government against the political workers in Pakistan. She did

not gain much success during this period. There was no leader in MRD as charismatic

as Benazir was after her charismatic father. She made alliances with various groups of

civil societies in West.49 Her own party leaders in Pakistan were more concerned of 296 their own position then the miseries of party workers in various jails of Pakistan.

Many of the senior party leaders, whom she later called “uncles” considered themselves senior than her and were reluctant tro accept her leadership wholeheartedly as she was too young than them. She traveled across Europe and

America, addressed local communities of Pakistanis and held talks with government

and opposition leaders in various countries to tell them about the suffering of the

political workers and leaders in her native country.50 She was invited to speak by

Carnegie Find for International Peace in Washington in April 1985.51 Benazir

accepted the invitation and used this opportunity with the help of her American

friends Peter Galbraith and others for lobbying against General Zia regime and

massive human constitutional rights’ violation in Pakistan. 52 During her stay in

America, she addressed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the sufferings

of the political and human rights workers in Pakistan at the hands of military

government. She also recognized and appreciated the efforts of Senator Charles Percy

and Pell as well as expressed before the Senate committee the condition in Pakistan

specially the treatment of the military regime with the women including women of

Bhutto family.53 It was a crucial time in Pak-US relations as the debate was in

progress about the American aid to Pakistan despite the continuation of nuclear

program.US government enacted a law which restricted America to provide military

assistance to any country which had not signed the NPT. Benazir tried to convince the

committee of Senators that termination of financial assistance will be a setback to

country instead it should be linked to stop the human rights abuses in the country.

Nevertheless, US paid no e heed to the oppression of by General Zia. 54 Meanwhile

Benazir was invited to address European Parliament in June 1985. In Strasburg, she

criticized the oppression of the military government and stressed the return of 297 democracy in the country. 55 Benazir received a good response from the members.

Benazir continued playing her advisory role to PPP in its struggle while her stay in

London. She knew the sore reality that General Zia was a need of West in the war

against Soviet Communism in the region so he was allowed to carry out any action

against his domestic opponents, as he desired.56 Benazir started a journal of Urdu

language named Ammal from London with Bashir Riaz as editor, a close associate of

Bhutto family. The Journal was widely circulated. Not only to Pakistani community

living in various parts of globe but was also smuggled to Pakistan to describe her

efforts abroad. Another objective of this journal was to put pressure on General Zia

regime and the official media of Pakistan.57 As a result General Zia regime’s agents in

England put pressure on the calligraphers, printers and publishers and tried to

influence the publishers not to publish the text of the journal. 58 However, despite various efforts the journalAmal played a vital role to withhold the death penalty of those four PPP workers who were given death sentence by high court on the

instruction of General Zia directly. He had written a letter to governor Sind showing

his displeasure on the life imprisonment of those workers for whom he envisaged a

death punishment. The letter was published inAmal and was widely noticed by

human rights organizations which save those four workers.59

5.4. Presidential Referendum

On one side there was unrelenting pressure on General Zia from the protest

demonstrations of MRD on the other hand he was facing some pressure from his aids,

especially from within army to take some steps to bring country to the normalcy. One

school of thought was in favour of referendum to seek the legitimacy from the people

of Pakistan and the other supported to hold elections and hand over power to the

elected representatives of the people of Pakistan. General Zia wanted to averse the 298 idea of holding elections as he had done for a number of time in past so he decided to

hold referendum for seeking legitimacy.60 Political forces instantly opposed the idea

and tried to remind Genera Zia that it was he and his colleagues in army who had

rejected the idea of referendum launched by Bhutto during PNA movement. 61

General Zia’s administration propagated the idea of holding referendum. After getting

approval from his military colleagues General Zia announced on 1st December that

referendum would be held on 19th December 1984.62

To continue and strengthen his authoritarian control on the country General

Zia decided to hold a presidential referendum in an effort to “legitimize” his rule.

General Zia announced the presidential referendum. He wanted to get President-ship

for another five years term. He was terrified from the political and public

representatives and the mounting pressure of the public agitation especially in the

province of Sind. With every passing day he was losing his trust in the non-elected

members of his regimes.63 General Zia decided to take a significant political move to

seek a constituency beyond the military and to seek political legitimacy but he could

not dare to hold general elections but presidential referendum.64 The referendum was

held on December 19, 1984. The aim of the referendum was to elect General Zia as the President of Pakistan for an additional period of five years after the Martial Law was lifted.65 According to Hamid Khan:

“He did not want to face a national election and risk of recruitment of people against him by the political parties. He knew that he could not be elected in a fair election. Supports in the elections were also not easy and not without its many risks and dangers. So, ingenious scheme was made by his brilliant and contriving advisors. A referendum was to be held for a vote of support to the process of Islamization (Policy of Implementing Islamic Laws). Who would against Islam? The affirmative and positively vote was deemed to have given him a term of five years as President”.66

299 A complicated and puzzling question was asked from the voters that if they wanted Islamization (Policy of Implementing Islamic Laws) and peaceful transfer of

power to the elected representatives they should tick “Yes” and “Yes” means the

General Zia designated as a President for five years after the lifting of Martial Law.67.

“The question put to the voters was ‘Do you endorse the process initiated by the President of Pakistan, General Zia for bring the laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunction of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet PBUH and for the preservation of the ideology of Pakistan and are you in act of kindness of the constitution of that progression and for the smooth and logical transfer of power to the elected representation of the people? Every voter was mandatory to answer Yes or No".68

General Zia made sure that people would participate in the referendum and

cast their votes in column of “Yes”. Zia made efforts to use the influentialwaderas

and other notables and the name of Islam to get “positive” results in the presidential

referendum. He included a “tricky” question in the referendum that “they want to

implement Islamic Law in the country”? It was next to impossible for any Muslim to

say “No” to this question. Majority of the people preferred not to cast their vote in the

referendum. Secondly his notorious track record of atrocities against political workers, journalists, intellectuals, women and other segments of society made him unpopular among common people to vote in favour of him.69

On the eve of referendum, General Zia addressed to the nation on December

01, 1984, and said:

“If the majority of the voters and electorate responds to this question in Yes, it will mean that the people of Pakistan have expressed confidence in the present government, and authorized his policies and have elected General Zia-ul-Haq (as President) for the next five

300 Urdu language Daily Nawa-e-Waqt was a strong supporter of the Islamization

and Martial Law in the early days of General Zia, as its management developed

severe differences with Bhutto government and emerged as the strong supporter of

PNA, also observed his policies and wrote on its edition on January 1, 1985:

“It is a sour truth and bitter reality that we talk of Islam as a fashion, while our deeds are apart from Islam”71. Overwhelming majority of the people of the country boycotted the referendum

and did not cost their votes on the appeal of MRD, especially the turnout in rural Sind was nominal. The martial law government managed to manipulate the loyalties of

some of anti-Bhutto waderas of Sind. These waderas along with the local

administration made efforts to pursue the people to cast the votes in referendum but

people did not listen to their “orders”, as Hamid Khan wrote:

“All the polling stations gave a deserted look and the government staff on the duty stuffed the ballot boxes with affirmative votes”72.

Prior to referendum visited various cities and vicinities as his “election campaign” to

attract the support of the voters. A considerably large number of people were

brought in the meetings he addressed by the force of district administration. But on

the polling day the exercise of referendum proved a complete failure, especially in

the province of Sind. The turnout of the people during the campaign meetings was

heavy. The confined administration ensured that the referendum was completely

failed in the country and mainly in Sind Province. According to independent sources

the turnout in the referendum was two to three percent but the government claimed

that 97 percent of the people of Pakistan endorsed the policies of Zia government.73

Despite being aware of the “fraud” played on the nation in the name of referendum

Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan announced that the polling regarding this

301 act was fair, orderly and out of 34,992,4256 registered voters, 21,750, 902 (about 62

percent) had cast their ballots. Moreover, 21,253,758 (97.7 percent of the total

polled) answered in the confirmatory and only 316,919 in negative. The 180,227

ballots were found to be invalid.74 Such figures about the results were released by

the government but the people of Pakistan at large considered referendum a fraud. A

large number of scholars also called the referendum an ‘embarrassment’ for the

military government. According to impartial sources the voters’ turnout in

referendum was not more than 10 percent in which the question of an endorsement

of Islamization policy by military government was sought. 75 MRD boycotted the

referendum whereas Pir Pagara and JI under Mian Tufail supported the referendum.

These two parties supported military regime throughout its years in power. General

Zia and Tufail belonged to Arian clan of Jullundur, India. Their cultural, social and

economic background was same.76 Pir Pagaara also supported General Zia and his

government as he claimed for a number of times to be an “agent” of GHQ.77

5.5. Election of 1985 and MRD

After securing desired “victory” in referendum and getting himself elected for

next five years General Zia decided to hold non-party based elections in the country.

On 12th January the government announced that elections for National and Provincial

assemblies would be held on 25th and 28th February respectively. After getting

“desired” results in referendum General Zia had to confront another promised which

he made to held general elections in the country during the MRD protests on 12th

August 1983.78 At the same time he tried to achieve his objective to reduce the vote bank of PPP and other left-wing parties.. The human rights violations including the treatment meted by political workers by the military regime raised concerns in the

Western supporters of General Zia regime. When in 1984 Benazir was released and

302 allowed to go abroad she raised effectively the human rights violations and

suppression of political workers by Genera Zia regime. She also stressed the needs of

restoration of democracy in Pakistan during her visits to the capitals of western

countries.79 General Zia himself announced on Radio and Television on January 12,

1985, that the elections of National Assembly and all the four Provincial Assemblies would be held on the given dates 25th and 28th February 1985 respectively. Members

and office bearers of the parties not registered with Election Commission were

illegible to contest the elections as independent candidates. Total allocated seats for

National Assembly were 237 including 207 general seats, 20 reserved for women and

10 reserved for non-Muslim minorities.80

Mir Zaffar Ullah Khan Jamali, Muhamad Khan Jonejo, Illahi Bux Sumro and Mohi

Udeen Bloch were declared unopposed. 81 On 19th January the leaders of MRD held

a summit meeting at Abbotabad in the house of Asghar Khan leader of Tehreek-i-

Istaqlal to consider der the political situation erupted after the announcement of the

elections by General Zia. In the absence of Benazir Bhutto and Begum Nusrat

Bhutto, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi represented PPP in the meeting. Ghaus Bux Bizenjo

of of PNP, Maulana Fazul Ur Rehman of JUI and Khawaj Khairuddin of Muslim

League were in favour of participating in election whereas Khan Abdul Wali Khan

of NAP, Asghar Khan of TI, Nawabzada nasrullah Khan of PDP along with other

parties were in favour of boycott. So, on the majority bases MRD decided to boycott

the elections. 82 On 21st February 1985 Benazir Bhutto, on behalf of MRD,

boycotted the elections. She called them a conspiracy to continue the military regime

as these elections were announced to be held on non-party base. She also demanded

the restoration of 1973 constitution. 83 Though General Zia crushed the processions

of MRD with brutal use of force but even then MRD created a latent fear in his mind 303 that the passion of MRD could defeat his wits one as Ayub Khan could not resist the people wrath. So he decided to restore a controlled and dubious kind of democracy in the country by sharing some powers with like-minded politicians and landed aristocracy after getting himself elected through referendum for next five years.84 In

August 1983 he conditionally agreed to hold elections with an approximate date of

March 1985. He wanted a culminate ways and means to get elected a parliament of new comers who could act as his “yes men”. Although MRD boycotted the elections and even the parties of PNA, with the exception of JI and Pir Pagarra’s faction of

Muslim League, other parties also decided not to take part in the elections but a measures were taken by military government to keep PPP and other liberals away from the polls including introduction of amendments in Political Parties Act 1962.85

General Zia, as CMLA promulgated a Martial Law Order No 65 on 8th January

1985 which said that government could disqualify any person to take part in politics.

This was a clear message that government would disqualify any “undesirable” person.86 A.K. Brohi and Sharifuddin Pirzada drew a long list of amendments to disqualify the undesirable candidates of PPP and other liberals who would dare to contest elections despite boycott of their respective parties. The amendments in the

Political Parties Act, 1962 disqualified majority of the members of PPP, its former ministers and other office-bearers.

The amended Act implied:

that any person who had at any time after Dec 1, 1971, been an office bearer or a member of the executive committee at the national or provincial setup of a party which had not been registered nor declared eligible to participate in elections by the Election Commission by Oct 11, 1979 stood disqualified for seven years to be elected as member of the National Assembly or a Provincial assembly. Further, any person who had been a federal minister, minister of state, an adviser or provincial minister between Dec 1, 1971 and July 5, 1977 stood disqualified for seven years from participating in the elections.87

304 These amendments provided guarantees to General Zia that no PPP supporter would

reach any assembly.88

Elections for National Assembly held on 25th February and for provincial

assemblies on 28th February. More than three thousands political workers and leaders

of MRD were captured and held in jails and under house arrests until the balloting

ended.89 A number of close confidants of General Zia lost the elections including

seven members of his cabinet. But many PPP members won the elections as

independent candidates because PPP as party boycotted the elections. 90 Six out of

nine ministers of General Zia’s cabinet contesting in elections were defeated. JI

secured only six seats out of sixty-one contesting candidates on its tickets. Candidates

claiming association with PPP won fifty seats out of total contesting fifty-two. After

about a week of the elections General Zia announced massive amendment in the

constitution, gave immense powers to himself as president, including power of

appointing prime minister, services chiefs, provincial governors and powers to

dismiss governments and parliament.91

According to official sources turnout for National Assembly was 53.69

percent and for Provincial Assembly was 57.36 percent. However opposition claimed that the turnout was not more than 15 percent. In result of a number of new faces

including the members of landed aristocratic families and business tycoons returned

successful due to the boycott of the major political parties and support of military

regime to these families. Some political parties claimed that some elected members belonged to them as they were elected with their support. 92 Elected National

Assembly with some constitutional powers replaced Majlis-i-Shoora.93 The results of the elections were not according to the expectations of General Zia as a number of

305 leftists and liberals succeeded to reach in the parliament. A number of cabinet

ministers and members of Majlis-i-Shoora could not succeeded and were defeated by

less known candidates which reflected that people of Pakistan did not approve his

policies.94 Now military regime started to search for a “suitable” prime minister from

non-party based parliament. Mir Zafar Ullah Khan Jamali, a decent of PPP, Illahi Bux

Sumro a moderate Sindi land lord and Muhammad Khan Jonejo were the expected

contenders of premiership. General Zia wanted an influential Sindi to be the Prime

minister to counter the agitation of MRD in Sind and to diminish the Bhutto factor.95

On 23th March 1985 Muhammad Khan Jonejo, a moderate Sindi feudal lord, took

over as Prime Minister. President General Zia nominated him and he got vote of

confidence from the Assembly.96 Due to the circumstances General Zia decided to

restore a so-called civilian rule in the country, as many members of US Congress were severe critic of the US policy to support and aid so generously to a military

dictator in Pakistan. 97 Despite the introduction of a so-called civilian dispensation

General Zia continued as President and army chief so there was no considerable

change in the outlook of the state of Pakistan. General Zia promised withdrawal of

Martial law from the country by the end of 198 5.98 Jonejo was nominated by General

Zia on the recommendation of Pir Pagara, a staunch rival of Bhutto in Sind but just

after two and a half years General Zia deposed him and even elected assemblies by using powers vested to him under notorious Eighth amendment of the Constitution,

58-2 B section of the constitution. This undemocratic action of General Zia adversely

affected the future political course of the country and four elected governments were

dismissed by this black clause of the constitution, intruded in the constitution during a

military regime.99 Previously General Zia announced election for a number of times but did not fulfill his promises. Due to severe pressure of MRD and other segments 306 struggling against the cruelties of dictatorial regime and a sizable pressure

internationally forced him to hold elections. Second reason for holding elections was

his quest for legitimacy to deal with the international forces specially the US. As an

ally in Afghan War there was a pressure on US government from within that they were dealing with an illegitimate dictatorial government.100 Despite various pressures

general Zia did not want a strong Parliament and strong members of Assembly, as he was well aware of the fact that non-affiliated (Independent of any political party)

members would be weak as compared to the affiliated members. To detach the large

number of Hindu community voters in rural Sind General Zia adopted the separate

electorates system as he knew that due to its liberal and secular orientation majority of the Hindu community was the supporter of PPP.101

The first serious blow to General Zia regime was in 1983 when MRD re

launched rigorous movement against his dictatorial rule, especially the people of Sind

created a serious threat to his rule, more severe than the execution of Bhutto did.102

Military regime of General Zia crushed the MRD brutally. On 23rd March 1981

General Zia regime issued a PCO which reduced the power of civilian judiciary

regarding the discussions of military courts giving the punishments of flogging and

execution to the political workers. On the other hand, except Jamaat-e-Islami and

major faction of Muslim league almost all the other political parties had already joined the alliance (MRD), they once again arose against the wicked killing of

innocent people and arrest of thousands of people. During the movement, General Zia was quite afraid of his future Therefore, he avoided the elections in Pakistan. In an

interview General Zia replied to journalist:

“It is Miss Bhutto’s superfluous impractical ambition and her attitude towards acquiring power which is objectionable”.103

307 During only the month of March 1981 almost, about 10000 PPP workers were

arrested including its leader Benazir Bhutto and she was kept in Sukhur jail which was considered the hard jail in the whole country. In an effort to keep the peasants

and labourers away from the agitation of MRD General Zia issued Martial Law order

No. 54 under this order death sentence was to be given to the protestors if they would

damage public property during their agitation. Due to the brutal measures of the

military regime MRD change its strategy and to save its workers stopped the protest

demonstrations for the time being. MRD sat fresh 14th August 1983 as a fresh date for

revising its strong agitation activities. MRD planned to launch its agitation against

General Zia’s military dictatorship from all four provinces obviously but it could not

get the strength in other three provinces ad it got in Sind. The first opening agitation

procession was started from Regal Choke in Karachi. Political workers of various

member parties, students, lawyers, labourers and even universities teachers and

scholars of modernist leaning also participated in this big protest demonstration.

Along with men, women from various walks of life also participated in this protest

rally made a huge number of arrests that jails become short to keep the political

prisoners, so the sport stadiums were used to keep the arrested political workers.

Despite brutal use of police and other governmental agencies the protest

demonstration were increasing.104 PNA supported General Zia when he imposed

Martial Law by toppling Bhutto’s constitutionally elected government but in 1983

situation was totally different when Martial Law started showing its real cruel face

most of the parties of PNA joined hands in MRD with PPP. 105 As Mushahid Hussain

noted:

“Most of the MRD members had previously belonged to the PNA movement which had helped push General Zia to power and he was jolted by its preliminary success”. After the failure and malfunction of 308 referendum the government was under pressure. It was after the referendum that the President made overture to the MRD: for the first time even according legitimacy and recognition to the opposition alliance to allowing its leadership to meet the Abbotabad summit in January 1985”.106

General Zia got him elected as president of Pakistan for next five years through a controversial referendum, though people of Pakistan by and large not

participated in the referendum. After getting himself elected he decided to share

power with the civilian, “acceptable” to military regime. He started meetings with the

loyalist political figures, land lords, industrialists and business men to get their

support in upcoming elections which he planned to hold on non-party base. General

Zia and his agencies were frightened the return of PPP and its allies in a fairly

conducted party base elections. Due to this fear General Zia made amendments in the

political parties Act 1962 in January a month before the election of 198 5.107 He did

not want any prominent PPP leader in the assembly elected in non-party based

elections even in individual capacity to create any problem for o the government in

National assembly, or Senate or any provincial assembly. Ho took measures keep

politicians related to PPP in past out of assemblies.108 The Political Parties Act

promulgated with amendments against political parties as stated by Hamid Khan:

“The Political Parties Act provided that any person who had at any time after December 01, in 1971, been office bearer or even a member of the executive committee at the national or provincial system of a political party which had neither been registered nor declared qualified to participate in elections by the election costs by October 11, 1979, would not be qualified for a period of seven years to be elected or selected as a member of parliament or any Provincial Assembly. However, the members of the Federal council (selected by General Zia and his underlings) were not to be hit by the abovementioned disqualification. It was further provided that any person who had been a federal minister or minister of State, any advisor or provincial minister at any time between December 01, 1971 and July 05, 1977, during Bhutto regime, would not be qualified for a period of seven years to be elected as a member of the parliament or a provincial

309 Assembly. These provisions undoubtedly and noticeably ensured that the whole leadership of the Pakistan People’s Party was disqualified from being elected to the parliament or the provincial assemblies”.109

A number of conditions were included in the Political Parties Act 1962 to put pressure on democratic political forces. Some of the salient conditions are as follows: i. All political parties must register with the Election Commission. ii. All political parties must submit an annual statement of income and expenditure with the Election Commission for scrutiny. iii. The political parties must publish a political manifesto iv. All political parties will hold internal elections annually for their offices; and v. Submit a list of office-bearers and ordinary members to the Election Commission.110

PPP and most of the other parties of MRD refused to register them with the

Election Commission. For the first time in Pakistan elections were held on the basis of

separate electorate system whereby the voters casted their votes for the candidates of

their own religion. 111

General Zia made all out efforts to meet land lords, politicians, industrialists,

peers and sajada nasheens and others contesting elections, to get their support after

winning the elections. Many power-hungry Waderaas and Chaudharies readily

accepted his offer and joined hands with him on his conditions.112 MRD boycotted the

elections and asked members of its component parties not to participate in elections.

The members of JI and Muslim League of Pir Pagara fully participated in elections. JI

could secure only seats four from rural areas of NWFP and four from Lahore and

Karachi while contesting on sixty seats of National Assembly.113 The candidates

related to Muslim League Functional of Pagara secured 42 National Assembly seats.

Nonconformists of PPP secured 38 seats. Benazir Bhutto in her personal opinion was

in favour of participation of election and not to leave the space for the military aids

but she had to follow the decision of MRD.114 To honour the decision of the MRD

leaders Benazir and PPP boycotted the elections and appealed to people all over the

country not to cast their votes. However a number of PPP’s members participated in 310 the elections and contested for National Assembly and provincial assemblies as

independent candidates by violating the MRD’s decision of boycott. PPP ousted those members from party by initiating a disciplinary action as it provided a moral

legitimacy to the military regime. The participation of ex-PPP MNAs and MPAs

created an embarrassing situation for Benazir in MRD. 115

Many waderaas and a number of the feudal families participated in the elections,

most of them for the first time. People of Pakistan, by and large, did not respond to

the appeal of the boycott and participated in the election process. About 44.7 percent

people of Sind and 59.4 percent people of the Punjab participated in the elections.

Overall 52.98 percent voters of the country casted their vote in the elections.116 The

turnout was very high than the expectations of all including military, opposition and

the participating candidates. 117 A large number of people casted their votes in the

elections but the policies of General Zia regime as the ministers of General Zia’s

cabinet were defeated and majority of the members of the Majlis-e-Shoora could not

be successful in the election.118

The district of Punjab including Rawalpindi, Multan, and Faisalabad, Vehari,

Sargodha and Sahiwal where turnout was not more than 30 percent, according to

Asghar Khan, whereas EC declared 59.9 percent turnout in these areas. 119

Benazir termed the results of the elections a rejection of policies of General

Zia regime special its policy of so-called Islamization and Martial Law itself. Six out

of nine cabinet members of Zia Cabinet who contested the for the National Assembly were defeated, as were many associates. Raja Zafar Ul Haq a senior member of the

cabinet whom General Zia used to call his “opening batsman” was defeated by a new

comer in politics a retired Air Force officer Khaqan Abbasi from the constituency of

Murree and Kahuta. PPP’ local chapter leaders and workers calmly supported Khaqan 311 Abbasi in animosity with Zafar Ul Haq for his association with Zia.120 Candidates backed by religious and right-wing parties were out voted in these elections as they were in the elections of 1970.121 Candidates claimed association with PP secured

more than fifty seats.122

The military government claimed that the elections were fair, free and transparent and to testify the claim the instance of the defeat of ministers of the Zia

cabinet was quoted. General Zia was satisfied with his moves as his main opposition

MRD and especially PPP boycotted the elections he did not rig the elections.

Secondly he took a number of ‘engineered’ measures to get the favourable results. He was sure that anyone who returned as victorious in the election would be left with

least options but eventually to join his government. General Zia government used brutal use of powers against his political opponents. He did not believe in the sanctity

of the vote but want just a “democratic cover” not the real democracy.123

The boycott of the elections by MRD was a pleasant surprise for General Zia

as there was no considerable opposition to regime was in the run of the election to

confront the government the government. In referendum due to the boycott of MRD the turnout was very low. The people of Pakistan responded positively to the call of

MRD in referendum, but in election situation turned different, and turnout was

reasonably high as compare to referendum. The turnout and the result elections were a

source of satisfaction for the military regime. Unlike referendum a large number of

people casted their votes in the elections. Over twelve hundred candidates contested

for the 207 seats of National Assembly for the Muslim population.124 Turnout was

large because the candidates made every effort to persuade the voters. They appealed

and convinced voters and used the personal as well as the religious card. In rural areas

312 of Sind, Waderas were most influential but even then they sent their women to the

ladies voters to encourage them to cast the vote in their support. The turnout of the voters in Punjab was more than other provinces. 125 Total turnout of the voters in the

National Assembly elections was 52.92 percent of which 60.16 percent in Punjab,

40.62 percent in NWFP 44.38 percent in Sind and 37.44 percent in Baluchistan. 126

The turnout was increased in the provincial elections due to the result of the National

Assembly elections as well as due to the small constituencies and more number of

candidates. It was 57.39 percent nationwide from which 62.31 percent in the Punjab,

48.22 percent in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 50.53 percent in Sind and 46.89 percent in

Baluchistan.127 After the elections, daily Pakistan Times, on March 03, 1985 reported

concerning turnout that:

“The mass participation of the people in the elections, an average of 55 percent which is comparable with the best turnout anywhere and has resulted in the total isolation of the proponents of negative politics which have done immense harms to democracy and the political process in the country in the past. Relatively heavy turnout was definitely a plus for the era because it allowed everyone to contest individually and local political rivalries played a big role in ensuring a big turnout but to interpret it as a vote against political parties was not right. Soon after the appointment of the Prime Minister, the treasury benches had to join the Muslim League for better discipline in the house”.128

Parties of MRD had anticipated a positive response to the appeal of boycott

from the voters as they did in referendum on the other hand military government and

its allies also feared of a low turnout in the elections. The high ratio of elections turnout was a surprise for all, both government and opposition parties.129 General Zia

regime outlawed political parties and banned political activities which caused a kind

of suffocation among the common people. Election provided them a big political

activity. General Zia had promised to lift martial law from the country after the

313 election this also encouraged the large number of voters to cast their votes. Sindi waderaas played a vital role to take the voters out to cast their votes. The political

rivalries among Sindiwaderaas was another factor for a high turnout as they wanted to muster the support of maximum number of votes as compared to their rival waderaas. These waderaas paid a considerable amount of money to buy the loyalties

of voters through tribal chiefs and other influential people of their respective areas.

The boycott of the political parties paved ways for thesewaderaas to win the

elections being held on non-party basis.

An Economist Shahid Kardar also favored this idea by noting that:

“A major factor was the price in the rural Sind for 20 or more votes, Rs.10,000 considering the amount of poverty and households which could deliver 20 votes, facing no real alternative choice, were willing to vote for Rs.10,000. This eased the burden of the poverty”.130

For the first time in Pakistan purchasing of votes became a common trait in the

politics which later on proved disastrous for the democracy which is still very fragile

in the country. Those got themselves elected by using money to purchase the voters

and other unfair means played a notorious role to promote corruption and other flaws

in society these practices ultimately strengthened the hands of nondemocratic forces

in the country. These members of the feudal families elected in the non-party based

elections later on became influential and managed to intrude in political parties as

“electables” and cause a severe dent to the ideological politics in the country. These

electables played the role of “investors” in politics. These “political investors”

introduced the traditions of getting back their invested money from public exchequer.

During the Jonejo government development funds were given to the assembly

members in cash for the development of their respective constituencies. This practice

remained continued in the later regimes as well. These funds were misused 314 massively.131 Te Sindi landlords were divided on the issue of participating in the non

party based elections. A large number of feudal lords in the elections s responded to

MRD’s call for boycott positively others took the opportunity in their favour and

participated in the election. In Punjab and NWFP the members of big land owning

families themselves contested elections or filed candidates of their preference whereas

Sardars of Baluchistan were not much attracted in the elections. A considerable

number of PPP members who contested elections on PPP tickets in the elections 1977

participated in non-party based elections by causing a serious damage to the party. 132

Aitazaz Ehsan notes; “Even Benazir talked and directed many of them directly not to participate in the elections but they ignored all the instruction and directions of their leader”. 133

Thirty one members of PPP were expelled in Sind who violated the boycott

and contested in the elections.134 The non-party based elections left a bad impact on

the already poor Pakistani society. These elections further promoted the bradari ,

tribal, racial and sectarian rifts to maneuver the support in the absence of main

stream political agenda and program. 135

As scholar Rai Shakeel Akhtar says:

“Elections primarily concerned were with the local issues and seldom took up bigger national issue. Islam, Economy, Democracy, Foreign Affairs, Martial Law, etc. were not part of electioneering. These elections reduced national politics to municipal level”.136

Non-party based elections paved way for the creation of many ethnic and

regional groups. Military junta supported the creation of these groups to keep the

people away from the main-stream political parties, especially from PPP which was

federalist political party having its roots in all four provinces of the country. Benazir

criticized the non-party based elections and creation of such nationalist and ethnic

315 organizations. MQM, Pashtoon Federation, Sind National Alliance and other

nationalists and ethnic groups were encouraged to come into being.137 The elections

of 1970 brought on forefront the question of class consciousness and PPP under

Bhutto swept the poll in western wing of the country on the basis of its socialist

ideology but non-party based elections of 1985 weakened the ideological basis and

sectarian, religious and ethnic ideals were come on front. Bradari system was another

ideal in the elections which supported feudal lords to get elected easily in the absence

of political programs and manifesto. Though MRD boycotted the elections but

Benazir Bhutto severely criticized the non-political ideals used in the elections and

said that such sectarian and religious ideals would damage the ideological foundations

of the country and promote the ethnic and regional bifurcations in the country. New

political elite emerged in result of the non-party based elections. Sindi waderaas and

even some criminal elements who were under the influence of thesewaderaas. After

getting elected on non-party based elections this new political class was easy to

maneuver for military regime to strengthen its rule in the country.

PPP expelled a large number of its members for participating in the non-party base elections. 31 members were expelled in the province of Sind and 66 in Punjab.

Most of these members were from the feudal families of Punjab and Sind who were

awarded with party tickets in the election of 1977.138 These members of feudal

families now had no affiliation with any political party so it was quite easy for the

military dictator to maneuver their loyalties as the junior partner in the regime as a

large number of Zia’s associates, ministers and members of majlis-i-shoora were

defeated in the elections and he had to rely on these newcomers. 139

General Zia claimed that the reasonably high turnout is an evidence of the

mass support for his policies but in reality five out of nine members of his cabinet and 316 sixty three members of majlis-i-shoora were defeated in the elections. 140 In result of

non-part based elections people came in assemblies with no political program or

agenda. Consequently military junta kept tight grip on the foreign policy, economic

policy even during the so-called civilian government under Junejo and this military

control continued during the later regimes to come and weakened democratic

institutions in the country and promoted the corruption and political bribe. 141

To protect the Martial Law and secure his authority General Zia promulgated

Revival of Constitutional Order (RCO) on 2nd march 1985, just a few days after

holding elections. It was a modification in the already existing PCO which was

introduced in on 23rd March 1981 by General Zia.

According to the new modification in RCO:

The executive authority “Shall vest in the President and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers’ assistants to him”. 142

A new provision was added to further strengthen the hands of the President.

143

To keep his tight grip on power General Zia decided to introduce a number of

amendments in the constitution in consultation with his legal advisors, Sharifuddin

Pirzada. General Zia was in favour of changing the character of constitution from

parliamentary to presidential. His legal advisors told him that he had authority to

amend the constitution under the verdict of Supreme Court given in Nusrat Bhutto

case of November 1977. As many as sixty five Articles of the Constitutions were

amended/substituted/added/modified/deleted/omitted and varied in one day.144 On 2nd

March 1985 General Zia promulgated Revival Constitution Order (RCO) which

changed 67 clauses and a number of sections of 280 articles of the Constitution 1973.

These heavy numbers of amendments were carried out just in one day which was 317 unprecedented in the modern history.145 These amendments were made to strengthen the grip of General Zia on power. By introducing Eighth Amendment General Zia

altered the constitution from parliamentarian to presidential. This amendment gave

immense powers to General Zia as president. 146 In parliamentary system of

government under the Constitution 1973 most of the powers vested in the prime

minister and president was the constitutional head of the state and had no

administrative powers. Under these amendments president was given with immense

powers including executive powers to appoint and remove prime minister, judges of the supreme judiciary, services chiefs and provincial governors. These amendments

gave unprecedented powers to president to dissolve National Assembly even without the consultation of the prime minister. Under the RCO presidential referendum was

also “legitimized” to authorize General Zia to continue as president till 1990. The

only motive behind these amendments under RCO was to give unchecked powers to

president.

“Duties of Prime Minister in relation to President” it said: “It shall be the duty of the Prime Minister to communicate to the President all decisions of the cabinet relating to the administration of the affairs of the Federation and proposal for legislation; to furnish such information relating to the administration of the affairs of the Federation and proposals for legislation as the President may call for. At the commencement of each session of the Parliament the President shall address both houses assembled together.” Under the headline “Exercise of executive authority of the Federation” it pronounced: conduct of business of federa Federation shall vest in the President and shall be executed by him, either directly or through officers according to the Constitution. On the status of ministers and prime minister it said: “There shall be a cabinet of ministers with the Prime Minister at its head to aid and advice the President in the exercise of his powers. The Prime Minister shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.” About the conduct of business of federal government it said that all executive actions of the government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the president. The president shall make rules for the allocation of and transaction of the Federal government.147

318 General Zia enforced the amended articles on 10th March but kept 27 articles

suspended. These suspended articles were related to fundamental human rights and the jurisdiction of the superior courts. Article 6 was also not enforced which was

regarding the abrogation or subversion or abating the constitution and envisages high treason punishment for abrogation of constitution. 148 General Zia as president had the

discretion, under RCO, to appoint prime minister from amongst the members of

National Assembly. On 23rd March 1985 General Zia nominated Muhammad Khan

Junejo an elected member from Sind, as prime minister, who won unanimous vote of

confidence from National Assembly on next day.149 The election of speaker National

Assembly took place before Junejo secured vote of confidence which shocked

General Zia and his associates as official candidate and chairman of the erstwhile majlis-i-shoora Khawaja Safdar was defeated by Fakhar Imam. This upset result

showed that even the elected members of National Assembly did not endorse the

policies of General Zia regime.150

The provincial chief ministers were also to be nominated by the “handpicked”

governors of General Zia against the basic norms of democracy. The assemblies were

powerless and were dependent on General Zia even to elect the prime minister after the promulgation of RCO. 151

The nomination of the prime minister was totally against the democratic

norms and the appointment of the chief ministers from an appointed governor was not

against the provincial autonomy but the basic rules of the federation and the violation

of the will of the people. The “appointment” of the provincial chief executive by a

representative of the federation in the province was a sheer disgrace of the mandate of the people.152

319 Nawabzada Abdul Ghafoor Hooti, Muhammad Aslam Khattk, Meer

Zafarullah Jammali, Elahi Bakhsh Soomro, Makhdoomzada Hassan Mahmood and

Hamid Raza Gilani were the considerable people their names were being rumored for the slot of the prime minister. The names from the Punjab and were not considered

due to their large share in armed forces. General Zia himself was Punjabi and COAS belonged to NWFP. Secondly the military regime wanted to pacify the MRD

movement in Sind to by allocating the premiership to the province and undermine the

Bhutto factor in the province. The name of Zafarullah Jammali of Baluchistan was

also under consideration but finally it was rejected due to inexperience and favor and

support of Sind. The selection of Sind Province for the Prime Minister ship also was the result of the struggle against General Zia’s military government. Finally, Ellahi

Bakhsh Soomro and Muhammad Khan Jonejo, for premiership were selected from the

Sind. General Jahan Dad Khan mentioned:

“The candidates in the field were Ellahi Bakhsh Soomro and Muhammad Khan Jonejo. I was asked to give my recommendations for the future Prime Minister of Pakistan. I recommended Muhammad Khan Jonejo as the first choice”. 153

A meeting of MLAs was held in which the names of Ellahi Bakhsh Soomro

and Muhammad Khan Jonejo were selected for the next Prime Minister of the

country. President also agreed with the recommendations of MLAs. Khalid

Mehmood Arif wrote:

“On March 18, 1985, a small exclusive meeting was held in the President’s office. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Sahabzada Yaqoob Khan, General Rahimuddin Khan, Major General Abd ul Waheed and I attended it. The President apprised the group for the recommendations made in the conference and asked for the comments. The group endorsed the MLAs’ views. Soomro was preferred to Junejo.”154

On the recommendation of Pir Pagaro, General Zia nominated Muhammad

Khan a moderate Sindi land lord as the prime minister of the country. Pir Pagara 320 belonged to the native land of Bhutto and a large number ofmureeds (followers) in the province that is why Pir Pagaro had importance for General Zia. 155 Junejo was

railway minister during the Ayub Khan’s dictatorial regime. During the MRD

campaign in Sind Junejo supported General Zia regime and won his confidence.

Junejo did not have any relations with army which was also a reason for General Zia to choose Junejo as prime minister, but the main merit for the selection of Junejo that

he was a Sindi. General Zia was also apprehended to appoint prime minister from

Punjab or NWFP as he might have any relations with the top brass of army, so he

decided to appoint a prime minister from Sind. 156. After the MRD’s appraisals of

1983, General Zia was afraid of uprising any movement from Sind. Therefore, he tried to compensate the Sindis in the government formation. Junejo was a minor

political figure, but had a major qualification that he was from Sind.157 The first

session of newly elected National Assembly held on March 23, 1985. President

General Zia addressed to the session. He highlights on the members of the Assembly that they would not link themselves to any political party. In his address, he officially

nominated Junejo as Prime Minister. After the selection of the Prime Minister, the

process of the formation of the government completed. After getting the vote of

confidence from the National Assembly, Muhammad Khan Junejo announced,

“Democracy and Martial Law could not exist together”158.

This declaration alarmed General Zia and after the resolution from National

Assembly and three provincial assemblies for lifting the Martial Law he was startled..

He feared the representatives of the people. So, even after lifting the Martial Law on

December 30, 1985 he did not vacate the post of Chief of Army Staff.159

General Zia crushed MRD with military means but he still was afraid of the

force of MRD and decided to share power with the civilian government. General Zia 321 held election on non-party so that MRD could not come in power. In the

consequences of those elections, elected government of Junejo came into being on

March 23, 1985. 160. MRD did not accept the Jonejo government as constitutional

government and launched the movement against General Zia and his nominated

government of Jonejo in 1986. 161

MRD leaders faced a number of challenges in the hand of Junejo government,

despite being its position of a junior partner in the ruling set-up. The Junejo

government banned the holding of public meeting of MRD at Lahore, Ghulam

Mustafa Jatoi the leader of PPP was ousted from Punjab and his entry in Punjab was banned. A number of politicians supported Junejo government who had affiliation with MRD in past on the other hand the internal rifts erupted within MRD. MRD was

not as organized as it was in 1983 during its formatting phase.162

MRD was divided on the making of the new constitution, registration of political

parties, provincial autonomy and on other issues. Asghar Khan the leader of Tahreek-

e-Istiqlal favored the registration of parties while other leaders opposed it. Khan

Abdul Wali Khan, Ghous Bakhsh Bazinjo and Rasool Bakhsh Paleejo demanded for a

new Constitution. 163

5.6. Benazir’s Return and Glaring Phase of MRD

Benazir Bhutto felt comparatively secure after the lifting of Martial Law and

formation of a civilian government and assurances from the Western capitals she

decided to come back. She returned to Pakistan on April 10, 1986, and selected

Lahore for landing in Pakistan. For a long period from 1979 to 1984 Benazir had been under confinement along with her mother Nusrat Bhutto. Both were allowed by

General Zia’s military regime to go abroad for medical treatment in 1984. Benazir

322 stayed abroad for about two years and carried out her political activities from there.

After lifting of martial law on 30th December 1985 she felt secure to return to

Pakistan and takeover the party. Benazir chose Lahore for her landing in Pakistan on

10th April 1986. A huge gathering of PPP workers and common men and women from

across the country received her warmly. According to media reports about 2 million

people were at Lahore to receive Benazir Bhutto.164 As she herself wrote about the

scenario:

There are moments in life which are not possible to describe. My return to Lahore was one of them. The sea of humanity lining the roads, jammed on balconies and roofs, wedged in trees and on lampposts, walking alongside the truck, and stretching back across the fields, was more like an ocean. The eight-mile drive from the airport to the Minar-i-Pakistan in Iqbal Park usually takes fifteen minutes. On the unbelievable day of April 10, 1986, it took us ten hours. The figure of one million people at the airport grew to two million, then three million by the time we reached the Minar-i-Pakistan. 165

She enthusiastically addressed the gathering and wowed to complete her father’s

mission to provide basic necessities to the masses. She travelled many cities and

addressed rallies where she was given similar enthusiastic reception by large

crowds. A friendly foreign country gave guarantee of her security and freedom of

political activities on her arrival.166 The Sindhi nationalists, who had wholeheartedly

supported MRD to emerge in Sind and set unique instances of public resistance

against the military dictator, were not happy with Benazir’s decision to choose

Lahore for her return back to country from exile and ignore the Sindis. 167 Ashe was

received at Lahore by a large crowd of her supporters including women. It took nine

hours for her to cross a distance of 7 kilometers due to heavy crowd. She addressed

at various places during her procession. On 12th April 1986 she planned to visit

Gujranwala to address a public meeting there at 5pm but due to heavy crowd in her

323 procession she could reach only next morning. After addressing a mammoth crowd

in Gujranwala she travelled to Faisalabad next day. It took sixteen hours to cover the

journey of fifty six kilometers from Gujranwala to Faisalabad due to heavy number

of workers’ participation.168 At Gujranwala she visited the grave of Pervez Yaqoob

to pay tribute. Pervez Yaqoob was the first to immolate himself over the “judicial

killing” of Bhutto.169 Although a good number of workers of other member parties

of MRD were participating in the agitation movement but the military government

held PPP workers soul responsible and made victim of the wrath of the government

agencies. Tariq Khursheed and a number of other PPP workers were arrested on the

charge of conspiracy in connivance with Colonel Qaddafi of Libya against General

Zia. They were arrested on 5th January 1981 and were sentenced for life

imprisonment by a military court on 10th March 1985. They were released just after

Benazir took over as prime minister in 1988.170

Benazir also visited the mothers of those three young men who were hanged by military regime in Rawalpindi. After addressing large gathering at Peshawar she travelled to Okarra, Pakpattan, Veharri and Multan where she addressed bar councils

as well, she travelled to her native province Sind. She travelled to Quetta the capital

city of Baluchistan to address a big public meeting. At the next phase of her campaign to boost the feelings of her party workers against military regime she travelled to

Thatha, Badin, Hyderabad and then her hometown Larrkana in the month of

Ramadan.171

After visiting other cities of Punjab she reached Karachi on 3rd May 1986, where she was received by a heavy crowd on airport. It took eight hours to reach

Quaid-i-Azam mausoleum from Karachi airport where she addressed the public

meeting of hundreds of thousands of people. She announced there that she would 324 celebrate 14th August Pakistan Day in a befitting manner and 5th July would be observed as “black day” throughout the country. 172 PPP wanted to prepare itself to put pressure on government to hold midterm elections as Benazir noted:

July 5, 1986 the ninth anniversary of the coup. We called it "Black Day" and planned public meetings in all the district headquarters of Pakistan, from the Khunjrab Pass into China to the Arabian Sea. No one knew if the political structure of the PPP was strong enough yet to coordinate such simultaneous demonstrations. "Black Day" was almost a rehearsal to see if the local and regional party officials were organized enough to manage the massive civil protests we were planning for the fall to force the regime to hold early elections. To ensure the effectiveness of the demonstrations in the autumn, we needed to recruit over one hundred thousand "Doves of Democracy," PPP sympathizer who would be willing to court arrest by staging hunger strikes and sit-ins. Every detail had to be worked out in advance as July 5th neared, I crisscrossed the country to help with the organizational state of the party. And "Black Day" went remarkably well. One hundred fifty thousand PPP supporters turned out in Karachi, more than two hundred thousand in Lahore.173

Benazir started demanding new elections on party basis as MRD did not accepted the non-party based elections of 1985. She demanded not only mid-term election on party basis but the restoration of 1973 Constitution in its original shape, and she made it the policy of PPP.

According to Muhammad Waseem:

“The real dilemma for the PPP leadership was how to force the era to hold the midterm elections under the 1973 Constitution. In the aftermath of her volcanic tour of Pakistan in April 1986, Benazir called for autumn elections in the same year. In pursuit of her demand for election, she enlisted the support of other MRD parties and called for the agitation from September 20, 1986”.174

Benazir decided to confront the government on the issue of mid-term elections

as she succeeded to secure confidence after holding rallies at various parts of the

country attended by huge gatherings. She also took in confidence the MRD

325 leadership and announced that if government did not hold elections in the month of

September MRD will launch a protest movement from 20th September 1986.175 A violent movement was started by MRD on 14th August when government did not allow PPP to hold public rally at Minar-e-Pakistan Lahore. Clashes between MRD workers and law enforcing agencies started in various cities of the country. Lahore and Karachi turned the main centers of violent clashes between political workers and police. Before holding a protest rally at Minar-e-Pakistan Lahore on 14th August, nine members delegation of MRD leaders visited Benazir to launch the demonstrations on the platform of MRD which she agreed. After some indifferent talks PPP and other parties agreed to hold joint protest demonstrations jointly on 14th

August. On 11th August MRD announced that PPP and other opposition groups would hold joint protest rallies in Karachi, Lahore and other cities of the country to force government to hold elections by 20th September.176 On 13th August government put all major leaders of MRD behind the bars and more than one thousand workers and leaders of PPP and other parties of MRD were put in detention.177 Benazir was also arrested and detained for thirty days as PPP held a rally at Lahore and other cities in violation of ban by the government.178 Benazir’s arrest prompted severe kind of protest demonstrations throughout the country but worst in Sind. Six workers of PPP were killed by police firing on Independence Day rally and more than hundred injured. Police entered in hospitals and opened baton charge on the injured workers admitted in the emergency wards of the hospitals.

Police entered into the mosques and brutally beat the workers. Similarly police and other law enforcing agencies killed sixteen political workers and injured hundreds of others in Karachi.179 Benazir was kept in Landhi Borstal Jail near Karachi as there was no room for her in Karachi Central Jail filled with political workers. A large 326 number of workers were kept in sport stadium and other places and this all was done after the restoration of “democracy” in the country. 180 Benazir was kept in solitary confinement. Her arrest fueled the protest demonstrations all over Sind province. In many cities clashes between PPP workers and law enforcing agencies escalated.

Many government buildings were targeted by protesters. In Liyari a police station ablaze by protesting workers. Protesters attacked Thatha Jail and forty eight political prisoners managed to escape from the jail. One worker killed and many other injured by police firing. Nine people were killed including two policemen on 17th and 18th

August in Sind. 181 In Khesana Mori village near Hyderabad a big protest demonstration held. Two workers Gul Muhammad and Hakim Ali Wassan were killed in result of firing by law enforcing agencies personnel who were in civil dress.

182 A large number of protesters reached police station to register the case against the attackers but police instead of registering case arrested villagers. Police raided on villages and maltreated women and arrested them. In Badin police opened fire on protesters and killed Naeem Khatri a PPP worker. Police and law enforcing agencies warned that if anyone from the villages found involved in processions against government the whole village would face the punishment. Police along with other agencies attacked Thaheem village of Sanghar district and injured a large number of people including a young boy Noor and captured all the male members of the village on 22nd August.183 On 23rd of August, police repeated the same action in the village

Birhmani near Dadu. Police fired on the villagers and at least 5 people including 80 years old Chhutto Birhmani and 10 years old youth were killed.184 Police and other agencies of state attacked on many villages and treated the villagers as a force of enemy. Lala Asad a PSF member and activist was killed by law enforcing agencies.

Agencies and police raided his flat in Federal. B. Area of Karachi and when he tried 327 to escape he was shot dead on the spot. He was alleged by police an associate of

AZO.185

Fazal Hussain Rahu was one of a few most prominent leaders of MRD against

General Zia. When Rasool Bux Palejo the head of SAT was confined in jails by military regime Fazal Rahu continued struggle by leading SAT along with his comrades Professor Abbdullah Malha, Qasim Mirjat, Doctor Akash Ansari, Doctor

Munir Ahemad Bhurgi, Hussain Bux Narejo, Suleman Daheri and other friends and associates. Fazal Rahu staged a number of large public meetings to protest against the atrocities of military regime and to mobilize the people against the regime. It was a time when more than one thousand workers of SAT along with hundreds of workers of PPP When five nationalist parties including National Democratic Party led by Wali Khan, Pakistan National Party of Ghous Bux Bizenjo, Qaumi Mahaz

Azadi Party of Meraj Mohammad Khan and Iqbal Haider, Mazdoor Kisan Party of

Sardar Shaukat Hayat and Sind Awami Tehrik led by Rasool Bux Palejo had merged into one party to make Awami National Party Fazal Rahu was elected its senior vice president.186 Fazal Rahu had emerged as the icon of the struggle of oppressed classes, especially haris (Peasants) and against military dictatorships. He not only struggled against General Zia but against all the dictators including General Ayub and General Yahya as well. Fazal Rahu played a considerable role in the election campaign against General Ayub Khan. On 17th January 1987 Fazal Rahu was murdered at Galarchi town of Sind in bright day light. 187 His murder escalated unrest in various parts of Sind.SAT and other parties called it a conspiracy of military regime to kill him.

328 The guerrilla-like war in Sind, especially in the rural areas surprised even the

leadership of MRD, they openly dissociated them from the protest demonstration of the people of Sind, calling it a “PPP show”. 188

More than 50 people were killed in various areas of Sind by police firing on

demonstrators and about ten thousand workers of MRD were arrested in one day on

13th August 1986 by police and treated brutally. 189 The brutal use of force by General

Zia regime was condemned internationally. England and Germany showed severe

concerns over the highhandedness of against the political workers. Two American

Senators raised their voice against the brutalities of regime in Pakistan. But the

Reagan administration showed its approval to General Zia and his civilian Prime

Minister Junejo as they still needed their support in Afghanistan.190 The

demonstrations of the people of Sind were much more than any other province of the

country and more violent than the protest demonstration of 1983. Army and police used oppressive measures to calm the movement. In Punjab the biggest incident of violence was on 14th august 1986 at Minar-e-Pakistan where Independence Day rally was held and in scuffles with police three people were killed. 191 The attitude of the

military was different in Punjab as they avoided using oppressive measures as they

did in Sind. As noted by Anees Jillani:

“The differences in the style and intensity of the agitation in the provinces of Sind and Punjab are striking. In Punjab some main PPP leaders have escaped capture too far, while this is not the case in Sind. In Punjab, protests are confined to urban areas while in Sind, unlike the 1983 agitation, it is intense both in rural and urban regions; in Punjab students and working class are not as active as in Sind: in Punjab middle business men, shopkeepers and commission agents are opposed to the agitators while in Sind, they are generally cooperating with them, in Punjab, the commitment of the protestors is not as deep as in Sind”.192

329 After the movement got violent in Sind Benazir herself decided calm the

movement as she did not want to allow bloodshed and give the regime an opportunity to use against her movement. Secondly she was not satisfied with the role of Punjab in the movement. She knew that it was quite difficult to bow the regime unless the

Punjab played a decisive role in any movement. She announced on 8th September to withdraw the deadline for the fresh elections.193 PPP gave great sacrifices in the

movement, especially in Sind. Its hundreds of workers were killed and injured by sate

forces, thousands were flogged publically and put behind the bars by military regime.

Benazir did not want to further diminish her party workers in the hand of military so

she decided to adopt a non-violence strategy and decided to use other democratic

measures which were apprehended by people of Sind specially the nationalist

elements. 194 When the participation of the people of Punjab was not as vigilant as it was in Sind it further raised the feelings of nationalism among the people of Sind. 195

As compare to the uprising of 1983 the role of elitist groups dimmed during the

struggle of 1986. The waderaas and other elitist groups joined hands with army to get their share in the power. Even the pro-PPPwaderaas like Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi,

Mumtaz Bhutto, “talented cousin” of Bhutto and many others did not actively

participated in the movement. Mumtaz Bhutto demanded for a confederation and toed

a different line than PPP and opposed MRD. More than twenty five members of the

parliament during the Bhutto era joined hands with the regime.196 The establishment

of MQM in the urban middle class of Sind influenced to dissociate these classes from

the movement. Ostensibly MQM remained “neutral”. The government used such

“neutrality” against the democratic forces and in its own favour. 197 The sense of

deprivation prevailing among the Sindis played a vital role in the movement against

the military government. Under the pressure of MRD demonstration and to reduce the 330 nationalist leaning Junejo government offered jobs and other concessions to the Sindi

speaking people who actively participated in the movement.198

5.7. Punjab and MRD

Punjab being the largest populous province of the country has always played a

significant role in the mainstream political activities of the country, especially the city

of Lahore, even during the British period. Lahore was the main centre of agitation

and protests of the PNA movement against Bhutto. The scholars do not have one view

on the role of Punjab in MRD. One group of the scholars envisages that common

masses in Punjab did not play any significant role in MRD as people of Sind played.

Had Punjab played a substantially significant role in MRD as played by people of

Sind, it could have not been possible for the dictator to stay in power. Thus, it was the

failure of MRD to convince the masses in Punjab to play a role against the dictator.199

A number of scholars are of the opinion that the movement was not as much admired

as it was in Sind but even then the people of Punjab rendered valuable services for the

restoration of democracy during General Zia era. Punjab, a major recruitment centre

for military, remained historically pro-military for certain other reasons also. In the words of General ® Jahandad Khan:

“The Pakistan army and Martial Law were considered to be synonymous with the Punjab. The majority of Sindis felt that their interests were no longer safe in the hands of Martial Law and the army dominated Punjab.” 200

The dealing of the military regime to the protesting people in Punjab and Sind was

different as it used brutal methods of killing, baton charges, imprisonment, flogging

and cases against the pro-MRD people in Sind but in Punjab the regime was not as

brutal. 201 PPP Punjab participated in MRD movement and a large number of its

workers and leaders were arrested, confined in jails, flogged publically, baton

331 charged and faced other punishments but party could not mobilize common masses

to struggle against the dictatorial rule of General Zia. General Zia junta launched a

vigorous campaign and well planned plots to create division between Punjabis and

Sindis. They planned to dub MRD as Sindi rebellion against Pakistan and its army.

This impression was further strengthened when a PIA plan was hijacked.202 Middle

and Lower middle classes have traditional affiliation with PPP; they were on

forefront of struggle against military rule on the platform of MRD. 203

. On 26th March 1981 leaders of MRD in a meeting at Lahore passed a

resolution against the unconstitutional steps of the military regime specially the

abrogation of the constitution 1973 by General Zia, and leaders of MRD called him a traitor. Judges from various courts including Baluchistan refused to take oath under the PCO of General Zia, the Lahore meeting appreciated those judges.204 On 24th

March 1981, Zia regime promulgated PCO after the grant of validation by Supreme

Court under the “Doctrine of Necessity” and allowed General Zia to amend

constitution. General Zia regime forced judges of superior judiciary to take fresh oath under the conditions of PCO. Those judges who refused to take oath under PCO and

preferred to quit were highly appreciated by bar councils, civil society and common

people of Punjab and were treated as heroes.205 Honoring the decision of Abottabad

summit of MRD the Punjab chapter of MRD also boycotted the non-party based

elections in a three-day long meeting at Lahore from 14th to 16th September and called the non-party based elections a sheer violations of the Constitution of 1973. The

leaders of MRD also announced to contest any future elections on the platform of

MRD.206 MRD central committee presented its demands that elections should not be

held under the General Zia ruler and before elections; the Constitution of 1973 should be restored in its original condition. The committee of MRD also demanded that 332 Martial Law must be lifted, political prisoners be released and elections should be

held on party bases. Unless these demand met MRD would not take part in the

elections.207 The Railway Workers Union also supported the cause of MRD and wowed to start struggle against the unconstitutional regime of General Zia. Thousands

of labourers and workers of Railway launched a protest demonstration in Lahore

against the violations of basic human rights, civil liberties and suppression of trade unions. 208 Labour Unions had natural affiliations with PPP as during its regime under

Bhutto a number of reforms were introduced for the wellbeing of the labourer

community.209 A huge rally of thousands of workers launched in Lahore under the

leadership of basher Zafar on 26th October 1983 in which about ten thousands railway workers, factory workers and other labourers participated and chanted slogans against

General Zia and atrocities of his authoritarian rule. Police tried to confine the rally within the premises of railway station and arrested its leaders. The protesting

labourers got flared up and burnt a number of busses, cars, buildings and petrol pumps

and also burnt the posters and photos of Martial Law authorities.210

5.8. Hijacking of PIA Plane

On 13thy march 1981 a Pakistan International Airlines plane leading to

Peshawar from Karachi hijacked reportedly by Al-Zulfikar and Mir Murtaza Bhutto the elder son of former Prime Minister Bhutto, in a press statement he took the

responsibility of the plane hijacking. Salamullah Tipu a former active member of PSF

along with a cousin and another member of PSF Nasser Jamal hijacked the plane and

diverted it to first Kabul and then Damascus.211 The hijackers kept the plane for thirteen days and during this period killed Lieutenant Tariq Rahim , while believing

mistakenly that he was son of General Rahimuddin a close associate of general Zia.

333 212 The hijackers demanded the release of 55 PSF, NSF and other leftists workers

confined in various jails of Pakistan. General Zia’s military regime accepted the

demands, released about 50 prisoners, and allowed them to leave the country. 213

Many even within PPP, especially in Punjab, criticized plan hijacking. Benazir Bhutto

denounced the act of plane hijacking and other tactics of Murtaza Bhutto and wowed to continue her struggle for the restoration of democracy through political

means.214.Benazir condemned the act of hijacking of plan in a statement from her

house detention. Plane hijacking and taking responsibility by Al-Zulfikar headed by

Murtaza Bhutto left negative impression among the common people in Punjab

especially when a military officer was killed by hijackers. Military regime propagated that PPP leadership was involved with the plan hijackers. Hijacking incident severely

harmed the momentum of the movement instead bringing any benefit. In impression was in air that the plan hijacking was plotted by the secret agencies of the regimes to

defame the PPP the main component of MRD especially in Punjab as later on Murtaza

Bhutto denied to own the hijacking.215 Zia regime propagated that it was a Sindhi

rebellion and people of Sind were struggling for freedom from Pakistan and not for the restoration of democracy. This propaganda campaign worked to an extent and

people of Punjab inspired by these allegations of military regime against MRD and thus affected the momentum of the movement in Punjab. Zia regime also propagated to create a division among the people of Punjab and Sind. Keeping in view the traditional support base of military in Punjab the regime’s policy was different in

Punjab from that used in Sind. The protesting people in Sind were treated in a brutal

manner whereas the treatment in Punjab was bit mild to retain the traditional support

of the largest recruitment centre and support base of military. Thus, the movement

334 proved a significant landmark in the politics of Sind but could not get a considerably high response from common masses in Punjab.216

The Zia regime well propagated that PPP and its leadership was conspiring against the army, and the killing of Lieutenant Tariq in plan hijacking incident this propaganda got an effective response in Punjab.

Leaders of MRD were kept confined for two to four months in Faisalabad, Multan,

Sahiwal and Lahore jails. 217 The government kept on shifting these leaders from

one jail to another. In these months, they were sent from one prison to another.

Benazir was confined in Sukhar jail from there she was shifted to Karachi jail. Rafi

Butt and Fazal Bhatti were shifted to Gujranwala jail from Rawalpindi, Aitzaaz

Ehsan shifted from Multan to Lahore, Omer Kasoori and Khurshid Kasoori sons of

Mehmood Ali Kasoori were moved to Kot Lakhpat, Mahmood Ali Kasoori from

Kot Lakhpat jail to Sahiwal, Mehnaaz Rafi shifted to Kot Lakhpat jail Lahore,

Qayyum Khan from Lahore to Multan and Asif Vardag shifted to Bahawalpur jail

from Faisalabad. Some of the leaders of PPP offered themselves their arrests to

police, including Chaudhary Ummar Daraaz, Sayed Zulfikar Bukhari, Zamaan Khan

and many others and many went underground to escape arrests. 218 To escape the

arrests many leaders of MRD went underground for time being. Rana Aftab

Ahemad, Captain Nisar Akber, Ahemad Saeed Awan, Faisal Saleh Hayat, Choudry

Zaheer, Badarud Deen and Choudry Talib Hussain were among those.

Punjab Home Secretary issued specific order for Ghulam Mustafa Khar to keep him

confined in isolation. 219 To keep an eye on the visitors of the confined leaders,

personals of special branch in plain clothes were deployed. Kaswar Gardezi, Malik

Qasim, Muhammad Ali Kasoori his sons Khursheed and Omer Kasuri, were

confined in Lahore. A large number of workers were arrested by law enforcement 335 agencies in Karachi. Police continued rids on the houses of political workers in cities of NWFP. On 23rd March 1981 a women labour unionist was killed in Mardan.

Bashir Riaz a close associate of Benazir and former editor of Amal a journal of PPP, received threatening calls. 220 Public flogging and other punishments were awarded to political prisoners from military courts. Punjab Government under Mian Nawaz

Sharif decided in its cabinet meeting to use strict hand to crush the movement. 221

General Zia regime badly tortured the workers of MRD and they met severe punishments of various kinds. Birdwood Barracks in Lahore, Baldia Centre,

Division 555 in Karachi which was notorious headquarters of CIA in Karachi, Mach jail, Khalli camp and other centers where workers of MRD and PPP were tortured during their detention. Haji Yousaf Lachiwala died in Karachi jail on 5th September

1983 allegedly by police torture, Sherbaz Khan Mazari a prominent leader of MRD met a severe heart attack in police captivity in forest rest house Multan, Kanwar

Abbas a Peshawar-based lawyer of PPP was tortured and remained admitted in hospital for many days, Imdad Ali Chandio a PPP local leader was beaton in

Larrkana police station, Nazir Abbasi, Hameed Bloch, Annayet Maseh, Gul Sher and other were tortured in cells. Lala Asad a close associate and worker of PPP was shot to death by police in Karachi. Idres Beg, Usman Ghani, Idrees Toti and Razzaq

Jharana, Ilyas Sidiqi, Ayaz Samu and Rehmatullah Hakim were hanged after getting death sentenced from the military courts. They were alleged to work for Al-

Zulfikar.222 Nasir Bloch a PPP associate and worker of Steel Mills Karachi was sentenced to death and hanged in August 1984 when he was busy in taking his intermediate exam from jail.223 After the incident of plan hi-jacking the military regime opened a new and worse chapter of oppression and against the workers of

MRD and especially PPP. A large number of PPP workers were captured from 336 various cities. Fifty-four workers who were detained in Kot Lakhpat Jail were charged for their alleged involvement with Al-Zulfikar and to topple the government of General Zia, along with forty others in absentia including the two sons of Zulfikar

Ali Bhutto, Mir Murtaza Bhutto and Shahnawaz Bhutto.

The proceedings were carried out in-camera as there were thousands of political prisoners kept in Kot Lkhpat jail. The prisoners started hunger strike till death against the military court. MRD leaders appealed to detainees to end their hunger strike. On 4th April 1985 all the accused workers were told about the decision of the military court and shifted to other jails. Thirty-six were given death sentences and eighteen were given life-time imprisonment. Those who were given punishment were from various cities of Punjab. Akhlaq Ahemad, Muhammad Sabir Piya,

Muhammad Rafique Baber, Javed Akhter, Javed Iqbal Moazam, Muhammad Boota

Khokhar, Riaz Shahid, Nasim Iqbal. Hakeem Ejaz Bhatti, MasoodIqbal, Muhamad yousaf Khattak Muhamad Jehangir Advocate from Lahore, Rana Farhat Ali

Advocate, Talat Mehmood, Zahid Mehmood Butt, Muhammad Azam Bhatti, Rana

Laeq Ali, Abid Hussain, Arshad Mehmood, Muhammad Anwar, Muhammad Saeed,

TalatMehmood Jafri, Muhammad Asghar, Muhammad Younis, Muhammad Tahir,

Muhammad Sadiq Qureshi, Ghulam Hussain, Muhammad Raza Butt from Sialkot,

Sheikh Gul Muhammad, Muhammad Zubair Shad, Munawar Ali Asim from

Gujranwala, Abdul Hameed Niazi, Ghulam Shabbir, Mehr Atta Muhammad from

Bhakhar, Muhammad Aslam Ludhianvi, Khan Muhammad, Hafiz Nusrat Udeen,

Abdul Razaq Bajwa from Raheem Yaar Khan, Muhammad Azam Butt, Muhammad

Rafi Malik, Iqbal Pervez Masseh, Sufi Ameen from Faisalabad, Mufti Muhammad

Shafi, Syed Saleem Abbas, Malik Atiq Urehman from Daska, Sheikh Abdul

337 Qayyum, Muhammad Riaz Sajid, Aurangzeb Zafar, Muhammad Shafi, Muhammad

Akhter Warsi, Hamis Saeed Piya, Muhammad Ashfaq Rana from Rawapindi and

Muhammad Hussain from Bhawalpur were the among those political workers of

PPP who were sentenced under Al-Zulfikar Conspiracy Case.224 In July 1984 forty- one PPP workers were accused of launching a conspiracy against General Zia, known as Libya Conspiracy Case and their case was preceded by a special military court in Rawalpindi jail. Eighteen accused were arrested and rest were declared absconders. Case proceedings were carried out in Rawalpindi jail by a special military court and in November 1985 five were given fourteen-years imprisonment and rest were freed.225 On 1st October 1978 PPP workers staged a protest rally at

Shaheed Choke Rawalpindi in which thousands of workers participated despite severe baton charge and other actions by Police. Two PPP workers set themselves in fire by raising the slogan j eeay Bhutto One was Arshad Nagi a revolutionary poet and other was Abdul Waheed Qureshi, both were from Gujranwala. Police opened baton charge and both were burnt completely and died. On 2nd October two other workers of PPP set themselves in to fire and burnt, they were taken to hospital by fellow workers but could not survive. They were Abdul Rasheed of Faisalabad and

Yaqoob Masseh of Gujranwala. On 5th October 1978 Abdul Aziz Malik of Azad

Kashmir handed himself over to fire and died in Rawalpindi. On 7th October

Munawar Hussain of Okarra and Munawar Hussain of Sukhur burnt themselves while raising the slogan of jeeay Bhutto.226 Such incidents of sacrifices of life for a political leader were unprecedented in the modern world history. Those young men who went up in flames of fire to protest against Bhutto’s detention and consequent hanging were from working-class Punjabi families and not from Sind, the native province of Bhutto. But due to certain reasons PPP and MRD could not muster the 338 support of common masses in Punjab as of Sind in the movement against General

Zia.227

A former minister of PPP Malik Mukhtar Awan, Shaukat Mehmood secretary

general of PPP Punjab, additional general secretary of PPP Punjab Jehangir Baddar,

Faisal Saleh Hayat, Nazim Shah and other PPP local leaders were captured and tried to establish their links with Al-Zulfikar. 228 Police captured PPP supporters including

Anees Advocate, Abdul Rauf, Dr. Anwar Hussain and others in Multan. Many workers and leaders went underground to escape arrests. Qazi Sultan Mehmood, a

short-heighted general secretary of PPP Rawalpindi chapter and an intellectual of left

ideology was captured from Rawalpindi and was shifted first to Rawalpindi jail, then to Gujranwala jail and then finally was kept in Lahore Fort. A group of about twenty

doctors of Rawalpindi were arrested by police for holding talks on MRD struggle and

showing their support to the movement on 2nd February 1981. Doctors all over the

country showed their severe resentment on the arrest of these doctors and decided to

launch protest demonstrations across the country. A meeting of MRD leaders held in

Lahore in the month of February in violation of Martial Law regulations to observe the “Political Prisoners Day”. Police started baton charge on the participants of

meeting and dispersed it by force. 229 Police captured a large number of people

including women who were not required in any case but their male relative were

PPP’s activists and were underground and to force them for arrest, captured their

family members. Shaukat Rana’s wife Nasira Rana was captured and kept in Lahore

Fort by agencies and forced her to give the whereabouts of her husband. Wife of Arif

Bhatti a minister of Punjab was also captured by police to force her about her husband who was not at home. Safooran Begum and Farkhanda Bukhari were also kept in

339 torture cells for their association with MRD. 230 Due to lesser support in other

provinces the MRD was labeled as a “Sindi rebellion”. 231.

Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi expressed her sympathy with MRD which

damaged the outlook of the movement, especially in Punjab as noted by Mushahid

Hussain:

“During the autumn of 1983, when the campaigning in Sind seemed to have the potential to over flow into the Punjab, Mrs. Indra Gandhi showed with a public statement of sympathy with those against the era. This military exercises of late Indian Prime Minister back-fired and the rule able to exploit quite skillfully the situation in a way that, many observers posed a certain linkage between the agitation in that province and India”.232

General Zia regime used coercion policies to influence the landed gentry to keep them away from the movement. Aysha Jalal notes:

“The regime’s policies of differential patronage and selective mobilization had won over substantial segments of Punjab’s dominant socio-economic strata, landlords and industrialists and, most promisingly, emergent commercial groups.”233

General Zia might have stepped down and held elections if the people of Punjab

played a significant role in the movement as did by the people of Sind.

Despite great sacrifices of PPP, MRD failed in Punjab. The local politics of

Punjab is generally influenced by government. Ayesha Jalal notes:

“The era’s policies of discrepancy patronage and selective mobilization had won over substantial segments of Punjab’s dominant socio economic strata, proprietors and industrialists and, most promisingly, emergent commercial groups”. 234

The lesser participation of people of Punjab in MRD dubbed it as a Sindi uprising for the redress of sense of deprivation among Sindis. Less involvement of the common masses in Punjab and a Sindi tag on the movement, it could not develop

it national appeal. 235 The landowners, industrialists and other privileged classes

played a vital role in PNA movement as their class-interests were at stake due to the 340 egalitarian reforms of Bhutto and they managed to ignite the common men against

Bhutto. But in MRD they did not play any role. The real power of PPP and other anti

status-quo parties had their support base in middle and lower middle working classes.

In the main cities of Punjab including Lahore, Multan, Faisalabad MRD succeeded to

gather large public meetings. People of Punjab rendered great sacrifices against the

atrocities of General Zia’s dictatorial regime. They faced cases, confinements,

flogging, life-time imprisonment, death sentences for their association with MRD.236

5.9. Role of Women in MRD

Women of Pakistan played an important role against the tyrannies and

suppression by military regime under General Zia. The female section of MRD was

also very active. In Faisalabad, Lahore and Gujranwala, female workers of MRD

distributed fruits in the jails to the workers. Ameena, Shahida Nafees, Ameena

Zamaan, Nasreen, Rukhsana Zahour, Nafees Siddiqi, Mrs. Tahira Mazhar Ali Khan,

Mumtaz Noorani were the prominent personalities. The Women Action Forum

(WAF) was formed by Begum Ra’ana Liaqat Ali, wife of late Prime Minister Liaqat

Ali Khan at Karachi in September 1981 to resist the discriminatory laws

promulgated by General Zia regime against women including the infamous Hadood

Ordinance.237 Though WAF was not a formal part of MRD but struggled against

General Zia regime side by side with MRD against a number of discriminatory

measures of the regime including flogging in adultery and other cases, strict dress

code for air hostesses and news announcers on TV and other discriminatory

treatment against women by General Zia regime.238 On 12th February 1983 about

two hundred women led by Mehnaz Rafi of WAF launched a protest demonstration

in Lahore. To disperse the women protest police used tear gas and baton charge.239

341 Aitzaaz Ehsan’s mother and wife were put under house capture in Lahore. Another procession of working women took out on 24th September 1983 in Lahore against atrocities of the military regime.240 Police arrested renowned lawyer and human rights activist Asma Jilani along with other fourteen protesting women. The educated and literary women also played their role against the highhandedness and human rights violation by the military regime. Attiya Dawood, Fehmeeda Riaz and others famous poetesses mentioned the atrocities against women and political workers by military regime in their poetry. 241 All the women organizations including WAF, APWA, DWA and other played a significant role against the cruel measures of military regime against the women in the name of Islam and for the restoration of rule of law and democracy in the country.242

5.10. Role of Journalists

General Zia’s Martial Law regime was the most obnoxious and ignominious period in the history of journalism in Pakistan.243 On 16th October General Zia postponed elections, banned political parties and imposed censorship on press.244

Renowned journalist Zamir Niazi quotes General Zia’s words:

“I could close down all the newspapers, say, for a period of five years, and nobody would be in a position to raise any voice against it. If they try to organize a meeting or a procession, I will send them to jail.”245

More than one hundred dallies, weeklies and other periodicals were banned and printing presses were confiscated. Musawaat (Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad),

Nusrat (Lahore), Tamir (Rawalpindi), Sadaqat (Karachi), Al-Fatah and Mayar (

Karachi), Dhanak , Sada-e-Watan (Lahore), Parbhat ( Nawabsha), Awaz (Karachi) and many other newspapers were banned by General Zia regime under the black censorship rules.246 Editors of the newspapers devised a tactics to make the readers

342 aware about the severity of censorship. When the government officials delete the slide they published the blank space on the newspaper and continued the practice for weeks. 247

On 13th May 1979 our journalists who did not comply with the military dictatorial regime of General Zia including Nasir Zaidi, Iqbal Jafri, Khawar Naim

Hashmi and Masudullah Khan were ordered to be flogged publically by a military summary trial court.248 Within 70 minutes after the judgment of the military courts three journalists were flogged. Masood Ullah Khan was left off as he was physically handicapped. Not only newspapers but all literary books, magazines and other printed material were subject to censorship. Blanket censorship remained imposed for two years from 17th October 1979 to 31st December 1981.249 More than one hundred other newsmen were arrested and tried by the military courts. The journalists started agitation and courted arrests and started hunger strike. Nisar

Usmani president Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists along with a number of other journalists was also arrested. For signing a memorandum supporting the restoration of democracy in the country ten senior journalists were terminated from

National Press Trust (NPT) in September 1983. Most of them had twenty years service in the organization.250 In April 1984 Federal Shariat Court (FSC) declared

Pakistan Press Ordinance (PPO) the 1963 unislamic and directed the government to make suitable amendments in PPO by September 1984. Chief Justice of FSC had to pay the price and was removed from his post.251 During the struggle for freedom of expression eleven other journalists were arrested and prosecuted under for defying

Martial Law Regulations and sentenced by military court on 13th May 1978.252 A large number of journalists were terminated from their services on the directions of

343 General Zia regime, as those journalists were not complying with the directions of the government. Ahemad Hassan Ahemad Bashir, Hussain Naqi, Abul Barkat, Imran

Aslam, Aziz Sidiqi, Mushahid Hussain Syed, Maliha Lodhi, Razia Bhut, Hassan

Musana, Aziz Mazhar, Zohra Yousaf, Saneeya Hussain, Rafiq Jabir, Mumtaz

Ahemad, Aurangzeb, I.H. Rashed, Riaz Malik, Masood Ashar, Shafqat Tanvir

Mirza, Rakhshanda Hussain, Azhar Javed, Rehana Hakim, Umber Khairi, Sahira

Irshad, Tehmina Ahemad, and a number of others were terminated for not complying with the regime or supporting the cause of democracy and rule of law in the country.253 Hundreds of journalists were trialed in military courts and sentenced to jails and flogging, termination from services but they continued their struggle against the tyranny of the military regimes along with other forces working for the restoration of democracy in the country.254

5.11. Role of Students in MRD

The student played a major role in the anti-Zia MRD headed by PPP. PSF, the student wing of PPP, along with other progressive student organizations left great example of struggle and sacrifices for the restoration of democracy and rule of law in the country against General Zia’s military regime. Daragai was the first town where the students started there procession. These processions reached Lahore,

Rawalpindi, Multan and Quetta soon from Daragai. 255 Police raided the protesting students in Daragai, a number of students were captured by police and one was wounded by police baton charge.256 The students of universities also held strikes and protest demonstrations. These student demonstrations were started from NWFP.

Such protest demonstrations also started in Multan, Bhawalpur and Sheikhupura and other cities of Punjab and Quetta in Baluchistan province. 257 Many active members

344 of PSF joined Al-Zulfikar Organization and were involved in militant and violent activities including the PIA’s plan hijacking, although the plan hijacking incident caused a damaging blow to MRD. In early 1981 a United Students Movement

(USM) was formed which included Bloch Student Organization (BSO), Pukhtun

Khwa Students Organization (PKSO), Peoples Students Alliance (PSA) and All

Pakistan Muhajir Students Organization with Zafar Arif as his head.258 Another alliance was formed by PSF and National Students Organization (NSF) named as

Taleba Jamhoori Mahaz (Students Democratic Front), which supported USM in campus politics and student unions elections against IJT backed by General Zia regime.259 NSF, PSF and other progressive students’ organizations were fully involved in anti-Zia activities. Violence acts were so common in campuses in those days. Students kept lethal weapons in the hostels of the campuses, especially by government-backed IJT. In 1983 the second phase of protest demonstrations by

MRD was activated mainly by PSF cadres in Sind.260 The Jeeay Sind Movement headed by G. M. Syed did not join MRD rather opposed it, but its student wing

Jeeay Sind Student Federation (JSSF), against the decision of its mother party, joined PPP and MRD along with other progressive and nationalist organizations against the military regime.261 PSF and FSF along with other wings of PPP and

MRD launched a severe movement in various parts of interior Sind including Dadu,

Moro, Larkana and other areas. The intensity of the movement was such high that

General Zia had to send tanks and other heavy military machinery to quell the movement and hundreds of protesters were killed by military.262 The progressive and leftist students unions won the elections in all major cities of the country due to their role in anti-Zia movement. Students also launched protests in the universities and colleges. All universities of Pakistan were closed for few days so that the weight 345 of MRD might be maximized.263 Fearing the effectiveness of the protest

demonstrations Student Unions and students’ politics were banned by the General

Zia government in March 1984 to keep the student away from participating in the

struggle of MRD.264 Another reason for government’s fear was the devastating

defeat of government-backed IJT across the country. Students retaliated against the

ban and started protest demonstrations. Ironically IJT joined the protest

demonstration by defying the decision of its mother Party, JI. IJT demanded JI to

withdraw its support to the military regime. The students’ demonstrations were so

violent that dozens of government vehicles were burned and severe battle between

police and students left dozens injured from both sides. Police raided the hostels of

Karachi university to evacuate the hostels from the students belonged to USM. After

a bus accident in which a mohajir girl was killed by a pukhtun driver riots between

pukhtuns and mohajirs in Karachi and APMSO leaders founded Mohajir Qaumi

Movement (MQM) under Altaf Hussain as its head. 265There were repeated

allegations that the formation of MQM was backed by Inter-Services Intelligence

Agency (ISI) to neutralize the support of PPP in urban centers of Sind as when other

parties were banned by General Zia and MQM formed in 1984.266 When Benazir

was house arrested by General Zia PSF launched a massive campaign in the country,

especially in Karachi. In 1987 PPP issued a list of those political workers and PSF

activists lingering in jails since the early years of 1980, many of them were feared to

have been tortured to death in jails as they were missing.267 Students of various

opposition political parties played a major role in the movement against General Zia.

Although the MRD movement put lasting impacts on the politics of the country but despite a great examples of sacrifices it could not overthrow the dictator to establish genuine democracy in the country. Anti-imperialist character of PPP 346 dimmed and PPP eventually chose the compromising path by quitting the violent

resistance to the regime. 268 The Sindi waderas made alignment with the regime for their vested material interests. When General Zia offered them share in power they

compliance readily. 269 Military regime made efforts to maneuver the strength of

opposition parties to create rifts among the component parties of MRD. Sindi land

lords showed softer attitude towards military regime for their class interests,

especially in the second phase of movement. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Abid

Zubairy’s role was skeptical as they were pressing for talks with the military

government. They were of the view if the movement continued antagonizing the

regime it would be disastrous for their ‘class interests”. 270 Benazir wanted to contest

elections without the support of MRD in coming election as she thought that the

major sacrifices were rendered by workers and leaders of PPP. She became skeptical

about the politicians of other parties. She was convinced that MRD had no standing without PPP on the other hand other parties of MRD wanted to contest next elections

on the platform of MRD. 271

The ethnic and nationalist feelings emerged among the Sindis due to the brutal

military and police actions against them. Awami Tahreek of Rasool Bakhsh Paleejo,

Watan Dost Inqalaabi Party, and some little groups such as Sind Dost Inqalaabi

Party successfully emerged on the political scene of Sind.272 Military regime

considered these nationalist groups against their interests and curbed them with

force. In urban Sind Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) emerged ostensibly against

Punjabi and Sindi speaking ethnic group but it was common perception that military

regime secretly supported MQM against PPP.273 So the military establishment

succeeded to create a serious tension between rural and urban Sindis. If the Sindis

347 had not been at loggers head with one another on rural and urban basis and

continued struggle against government it would have been quite difficult for the

government to suppress the movement.274 The riots between urban and rural Sindis

were in great favour of government. The riots betweenMuhajirs and Pashtoons and

between Muhajirs and Punjabis were secretly supported.275 In the local bodies

elections MQM secured Karachi and Hyderabad and quarrels between Muajirs and

Sindhis aggravated. General Zia successfully divided the political parties on the

ethnic basis to calm the anti-army movement. Even the student wing of PPP Sind

Peoples Students’ Federation (SPSF) was also found involved in ethnic riots in

various parts of Sind. 276 The participatory democracy was considered by General

Zia against his rule and he wanted to replace the parliamentary system with

presidential and unitary form of government. On 29th May 1988 General Zia sacked

the government of Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo and dissolved National

and all four assemblies and announced fresh elections within 90 days, stipulated in

the constitution. When Prime Minister Junejo tried to assert the powers by restoring

the status of parliamentary system, General Zia dismissed the government and

assemblies. 277 As Shahid Javed Burki also quoted the words of General Zia:

“It was mistaken on my part to have accepted the advice of some of my colleagues that a parliamentary system of some kind is the only political system that would work in Pakistan. I should have gone for a presidential form of government. After all, it is working in other countries. I am also not so sure whether a federation based on a four provinces is suitable for Pakistan. We should perhaps divide the country into twenty or so managerial units but have a unitary form of government at the center”. 278

. After developing severe differences between “handpicked” Prime Minister

Junejo of General Zia, and military establishment General Zia dismissed the govern

Constitution.ent and assemblies by using the power of the Article 58-2B which he 348 vested to himself under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. Junjo was the

choice of military establishment as they wanted to counter the growing influence of

Bhutto factor in Sind and the great struggle of people of Sind in MRD movement but when he started asserting his constitutional powers he was sacked altogether by

military president. 279 As General ® Khalid Mehmood Arif quoted Muhamad Ai

Durani, military secretary to the President:

“In October 1986, Brigadier Muhammad Ali Durrani that was Military Secretary to the President was posted back to the army. When he made his farewell call on the Prime Minister Jonejo, he amazed him by saying; I am trying to run the country in accordance with the formation. If the President did not like this establishment, he could have promulgated one similar to that of Sri Lanka”. 280

After dismissal of Junejo government and dissolution of assemblies General Zia

wanted to hold election on again on non-party basis as his experience of Junejo

further strengthened his belief in depoliticizing the system. He was well aware that

non-partisan and on-political people can easily be managed and manipulated that

those have political ideologies. Above all he feared the expected victory of PPP in

the party-based elections which he could never afford. 281 General Zia was greatly

inspired by the public response Benazir received all over the country he played his

trump card of Islamization. General Zia dissolved parliament and government of his

handpicked Prime Minister Junejo on 29th May 1988. After dissolution of parliament

and government, on 15th June 1988 General Zia announced the promulgation of

Islamic Shariyah Laws in the country. Some of the analysts speculated that the new

“exploitation’ of Islamic laws by General Zia was directed to keep Benazir out of

election process. According to some bigot Islamists women cannot become head of

an Islamic state, according to Islamic teachings.282 On 20th June Supreme Court gave

a unanimous verdict in favour of Benazir Bhutto and strike down General Zia’s 349 registration clause. Now PPP under Benazir Bhutto could take part in election process.283 He clearly expressed that power would be transferred only those who were pious Muslims. 284 General Zia wanted to keep Benazir away from taking part in the elections, perhaps he suggested the election dates keeping in consideration her pregnancy dates, so that she may not be able to launch her election campaign.285

Benazir struggled for about three years to muster the support of large crowds in

Pakistan and gathered international support for the restoration of democracy in

Pakistan. Now she was not ready to allow General Zia to repeat a non-party based elections to get favourable results and continue as president. She challenged the decision of holding elections on non-party base in the court. 286 On 17th August 1988

General Zia’s plane crashed near Bhawalpur a town of Punjab, all thirty passengers including General Zia, some of his senior military colleagues and American ambassador to Pakistan Arnold Raphel died. Supreme Court gave its verdict, in

Benazir Bhutto’s petition, in favour of party-based elections. Military establishment, reading the situation and pressure of great sacrifices of the workers of MRD, and notable members of civil society including lawyers, students, poets and others, decided to hold elections on the given date.

This movement weakened the rule of General Zia. His own designed non party system was buried with his own hands due to unpopularity in public as well as his own conflicts with his so-called representatives of the public. Therefore, he dismissed National Assembly, governments and all provincial assemblies and announced new elections. MRD could not bring in the very outlook of the civil- military relations and true norms of democracy but it set notable examples of struggle for the restoration of rule of law and democratic values by consistently

350 working rendering great sacrifices, specially by PPP against the dictatorial rule of

General Zia.

MRD could not achieve its objectives fully and following other factors contributed in its failure. The irrational alliance of PPP and anti-Bhutto elements could not impress upon common people across the country to make MRD a country wide strike. The “Afghan jihad” and the lauded promises of Islamization won some support for General Zia among rightist Islamist elements of the country especially in

Punjab. MRD had decided not to take part in any election under military regime but

PPP announced to take part in the local bodies elections in 1987. PNA had a deep impact on the politics of Pakistan for its massive struggle against a democratically elected government. MRD could not bring an utter change in the politics but played an important role to awaken politically the people of Pakistan. MRD could not overthrow the military dictatorship. General Zia’s dictatorial rule ended with his accidental death in a plane accident on 17th August 1988.

General Zia tried to crush the movement with state force. About twelve hundred political workers and others were killed brutally. Even army helicopters were used against the political agitation in rural areas of Sind. More than twenty thousand people were kept in jails including political workers and leaders, journalists, students, women, lawyers and other members of civil society. Their cases were trialed in military summary courts. More than eighty thousand people were publically flogged.287 Military government under General Zia used every brutal action to suppress the movement. His rule was tyrannical against women. A number of discriminatory laws were imposed against women. People of Pakistan, especially

Sind rendered great sacrifices against the martial law regime for the restoration of democracy and rule of law. Although the movement could not overthrow the dictator 351 but shaken the state by setting great examples of struggle and sacrifices. The brutal use of force by powerful military who was backed by big international forces of

Capitalist bloc in a war against Soviets in Afghanistan, the least participation of common masses of Punjab, support of rightist forces to General Zia, PIA plan hijacking and other activities of AZO are the factors which contributed the fact that movement could not fully its objectives.288

352 NOTE & REFERENCE

1 Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Sposito,Islam Gender, and Social Change. ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 133. 2 Muhammad Shoaib Pervez,Security Community in South Asia: India-Pakistan. ( New York: Routledge Publishers, 2013), 109. 3 Radha Kumar,Making Peace with Partition. ( New Delhi: Penguine Books, 2005), 11. 4 Lal Khan, Pakistan ’s Other Story: the 1968-69 revolution. (Lahore : The Struggle Publications, 2008), 302 5 Amir Ali Chandio;Mughis Ahmad;Fouzia Naseem, Struggle for Democracy in Sindh: A Case Study of Movement for Restoration of Democracy 1983 Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences ol.1, No.1, Jan 2011. accessed at: http://berkeleyjournalofsocialsciences.com/Jan%205.pdf 6 Mufti Mehmood joined MRD but after his death there was a division in JUI to join MRD. Maulna Sami Ul Haq and Maulana Abdullah Darkhwasti were against joining MRD whereas Mufti Mehmood’s son Maulana Fazal Ul Rehman decided to join MRD, consequently JUI was divided into two factions: JUI Fazal Ull Reman group and JUI Darkhwasti group. 7 Subrata Kumar Mitra, Mike Enskat, Clemens Spiess, Political Parties in South Asia. ( Washington: Praeger Publications, 2004), 144. 8 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 643 9 Ibid., 644 10 Hassan Nawaz Gardezi; Jamil Rashid, Pakistan, the roots of dictatorship: the political economy of a praetorian state. (London : Zed Press, 1983), 294 11 Gerdezi, Pakistan: the Roots of Dictatorship, .294. 12 M. G. Chitkara, Benazir, a Profile. (New Delhi: APH Publishing. Corporation, 1996), 67. 13 Accessed at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad_Zia-ul-Haq 14 Shaikh Aziz, The King and his Courtier, Daily Dawn Karachi. May, 31, 2015 15 Bhutto,Daughter of the East, 200 16Surendra Nath Kaushik, Politics of Islamization in Pakistan: a study of Zia regime .(New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1993), 93 17 Madhavan K Palat, Anara Tabyshalieva,History of civilizations of Central Asia. 6, Towards the contemporary period, from the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century.(Paris : UNESCO, 2005),433 18 Shaikh Aziz, United the politicians stand: MRD formed. www.dawn.com.May 24, 2015. Accessed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1183539 19 Anthony Hyman; Muhammed Ghayur; Naresh Kaushik, Pakistan, Zia and after.(New Delhi : Abhinav Publications, 1989), 47 20 Alexander Maxwell, The Comparative Approach to National Movements: Miroslav Hroch and nationalism studies.(New York : Routledge, 2012), 22. 21 Nadeem F. Paracha, The General, the Dog & the Flasher. Daily Dawn Karachi, April 12, 2012/ Accessed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/709925/the-general-the-dog-and-the-flasher 22 General Zia Phase II - Controlled Democracy. Accesses at: prr.hec.gov.pk/chapters/308s-5.pdf 23 Lt. Gen. Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan leadership challenges.(Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1999), 173 24 Anwar Hussain Syed, Pakistan : Islam, politics, and national solidarity. (New York: Praeger, 1982),50. 25 Anita M. Weiss Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern, 136 137. 26 Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985. (Lahore : Vanguard, 1987), 71. 27 The Political Risk Yearbook, Issue 1, Part 2, Frost & Sullivan, 1987., 37 28 News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean. (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses., 1983), 966 29 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 638

353 30 Strategic Analysis, Volume 4, Issues 2-12. (New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 1980), 554 31 Benazir Bhutto,Daughter of Destiny: An Autobiography. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 337. 32 Ibid., 379-380. 33 Anita M Weiss, Islamic reassertion in Pakistan: the application of Islamic laws in a modern state. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 103. 34 Subrata Kumar Mitra, Mike Enskat, Clemens Spiess, Political Parties in South Asia. ( Washington: Praeger Publications, 2004), 144. 35 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical perspective. (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1995), 106. 36 K L Kamal; Prabha Arun, Pakistan : democracy at the cross-roads. (Jaipur : Yuvraj Publishers and Distributors, 1989), 41. 37 Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 531. 38 Pakistan, a country study, Volume 48.American University (Washington, D.C.). Foreign Area Studies, 217 39 Khyzar Kapoor, Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. Accessed at: http://historypak.com/movement-for-the-restoration-of-democracy/ 40 Benazir Bhutto,Pakistan: the Gathering Storm. ( New Delhi: Vikas Pub. House, 1983), 55. 41 Shaikh Aziz, A truce in the offing? www.dawn.com. June 28, 2015/ Accessed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1190609 42 Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan and the changing regional scenario: reflections of a journalist. (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), 20 43 Anita M. Weiss Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern, p.139. Also see Salmaan Taseer, Bhutto: A Political Biography.( London: Ithaca Press, 1979), .369. 44 Bashir Riaz, Blind justice. ( Lahore: Fiction House, 2000), 38. 45 J.Jensen, Women Political Leaders. (Palgrave: Macmillan 2008), 29. 46 Raja Anwar, The terrorist prince : the life and death of Murtaza Bhutto. (London : Verso, 1997), 67. 47 Ibid., 391. 48 Jane S Jensen, Women Political Leaders: Breaking the Highest Glass Ceiling. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press, 2008), 29. 49 Ibid 50 M G Chitkara, Human rights in Pakistan. (New Delhi : A.P.H. Pub. Corp., 1997), 208. 51 Shahid Javed Burki, Craig Baxter, Robert LaPorte, and Kamal Azfar.Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia Ul-Haq. (Boulder: Westview Press, 199), 195. 52 Ibid., 91-392. 53 Benazir Bhutto,Daughter of Destiny: An Autobiography. (Michigan: Simon and Schuster Publishers , 1989), 221. 54 Corinne J Naden, Benazir Bhutto. (New York : Marshall Cavendish Benchmark,2011),76. 55 M. G. Chitkara, Human Rights in Pakistan. (New Delhi: A.P.H. Publishers, 1997), 209. 56 Grenville, J. A. S. Grenville.A History of the World from the Twentieth to the Twenty-First Century. (London: Routledge, 2005), 635. 57 Bashir Riaz, Bhutto Khandan: aikjehad-e-musalsal. ( Bhutto Family: A constant Struggle). Urdu. ( Karachi: Pakistani Adab Publications, 2001), 201. 58 Mary Englar, Benazir Bhutto : Pakistani prime minister and activist.(Minneapolis: Compass Point Books, 2006),59. 59 Riaz, Bhutto khandan, 202. 60 Surendra Nath Kaushik, Politics of Islamization in Pakistan: a study of Zia regime. ( New Delhi : South Asian Publishers, 1993),189 61 Kausar Niazi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan: Last Days. (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1992), 164 62 Pandav Nayak, Pakistan, Dilemmas of a Developing State .(Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, 1985), 39 63 Ibid., 661. 64 Hussain, Pakistan's politic, .261. 65 Sherbaz Khan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment. ( Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1999),563

66 Khan, Constitutional and political history of Pakistan, 660

354 67 Taseer, Bhutto.395. Also see Saha, C. Saha, Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, 2001), 30. 68 Craig Baxter, Pakistan on the Brink: politics, economics, and society. (Lanham, Md. : Lexington Books, 2004), 106. 69 Taseer, Bhutto, 395, 70 Saha, Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries, 28. 71 The Daily Nawa-e-Waqt, Islamabad, January 1, 1985. 72 Khan, Constitutional and Politcal History of Pakistan, 660. 73 Craig Baxter, Zia’s Pakistan: politics and stability in a frontline state.(Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 13. 74 Khan , Constitutional and Politcal History of Pakistan, 660 75 Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan, 243. 76 General Zia and Mian Tufail were relatives 77 Saha, Religious Fundamentalism in Developing Countries,.29. 78 Pandav Nayak, Pakistan, Dilemmas of a Developing State.(Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, 1985), 39 79 Benazir, Daughter of Destiny, 265 80 President of Pakistan, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq: January - December, 1985,Directorate of Films & Publications, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan - Presidents, 59. 81 http://historypak.com/1985-elections/ 82 Hyman, Pakistan, Zia and After, 52 83 Iqbal Akhund, Trial and Error: The Advent and Eclipse of Benazir Bhutto.(Karachi:Oxford University Press, 2000), 6 84 Shaikh Aziz, Elections held on non-party basis.www.dawn.com. August 09, 2015. Accssed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1199038 85 Nazeer Ahmad, Political Parties in Pakistan: a long way ahead.( Islamabad: The Network Publications, 2004),25 86 IDSA News Review on South Asia/Indian Ocean, Volume 18. (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1985), 91 87 Surendra Nath Kaushik, Politics of Islamization in Pakistan: a study of Zia regime.(New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1993), 58 88Shaikh Aziz, Elections Held On Non-Party Basis. WWW.Dawn.com. August 09, 2015. Accssed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1199038 89 Bhutto,Daughter of Destiny, 228 90 Peer Muhammad,Electionary: Election in 1985, The Express Tribune Islamabad, April 25, 2013. 91 Bhutto,Daughter of Destiny, 229 92 Thomas M. Leonard, Encyclopedia of the Developing World.(New York : Routledge, 2006), 1756 93 Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan , 244. 94 R G Sawhney, Zia's Pakistan : implications for India's security. (New Delhi : ABC Publishing House, 1985), 176 95 Surendra Nath Kaushik,Politics of Islamization in Pakistan: a study of Zia regime .(New Delhi : South Asian Publishers, 1993), 9 96 Rafi Ullah Shehab, Fifty years of Pakistan. ( Lahore: Maqbool Academy, 1990), 408. 97 Murad Ali, US Aid to Pakistan and Democracy. (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, Policy Perspectives , Volume6 , Number2, July - December 2009. Accessed at: http://www.ips.org.pk/security-and-foreign-policy/1080-us-aid-to-pakistan-and-democracy.html 98 Peter R Blood, Pakistan: A Country Study. (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995), 68. 99 Veena Kukreja; Mahendra Prasad Singh, Pakistan: Democracy, Development and Security Issues.(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005.), 44 100 Partha Sarathy Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia. ( New Delhi : Manohar Publications, 1989.), 48 101 Report on the General Elections, 1985: Detailed result of election, Election Results, Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1987. Also see Taseer, Bhutto, 394. 102 Iftikhar Haider Malik, Culture and Customs of Pakistan, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 18.

355 103 Amir Ahmed Khuhro; Ali Nawaz Soomro, The Role of Benazir Bhutto in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy: An Analysis. (Karachi: IACSIT Press 2013), 36. 104 Afzal Haider, Tehreeke-bahali-e-jamhooriyat 105 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror,( Islamabad: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 86. 106 Hussain, Pakistan's politics: the Zia years, 268. 107 Ahmad, Political parties in Pakistan, 25 108 Taseer, Bhutto, .396. 109Khan, Constitutional and Politcal History of Pakistan, 684. 110 Hassan Askri Rizvi, The First 10 general election of Pakistan: A Story of Pakistan’s Transition from Democracy above Rule of Law to Democracy under Rule of Law: 190-2013. ( Islamabad: PILDAT, 2013), 16 111 Ibid. 112 Arif, Working with Zia, 403. 113 Filippo Osella; Caroline Osella,Islamic reform in South Asia. (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013), 479. 114 Naden, Benazir Bhutto, .83. 115 Noman, Pakistan, 128 116 Philip Oldenburg, India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths. (New York : Routledge, 2010), 79 117 . Hassan Abbas , Pakistan's drift into extremism : Allah, the army, and America's war on terror. (London : M.E. Sharpe Publishers, 2005), 63. 118 Europa World YRBK 1991 2V, Volumes 1-2. (New York:Taylor & Francis, 01-Aug-1991), 2060 119 Mohammad Asghar Khan, My Political Struggle. ( New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 26 120 IDSA News Review on South Asia/Indian Ocean, Volume 18. (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1985), 329 121 Sreedhar, John Kaniyalil, Savita Pande,Pakistan after Zia.(New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1989 ), 89 122. Osella, Islamic reform in South Asia. (), 480 . 123 Ibid., 407. 124 Report on the General Elections, 1985: Detailed result of election, Election Results, Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad 1987. 125 Ibid.. 126 Shahid Javed Burki,Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood. (London: Westview Press, 1999), 58 127 Ibid. 128 The Pakistan Times, Pakistan Publishers, Islamabad, March 3, 1985. 129 Burki, Pakistan, 58. 130 Shahid Kardar, The gathering economic crisis and the dwindling options : M.L. Qureshi memorial lecture.9Lahore, Pakistan : Group 83, 1986), 11. 131 Masroor Hussain, Muzammil Pasha,1988: The Year of Fomenting Change.(Lahore: Profile Publishing, 1989), 92. 132 Ibid., 397. 133 General Zia Phase II - Controlled Democracy. 134 Ibid., 406. 135 Anthony Hyman, Pakistan: Zia and After, .89. 136 Rai Shakil Akhtar, Media, religion and politics in Pakistan. (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2000), 164. 137 General Zia Phase II - Controlled Democracy. 138 Noman, Pakistan, 128. 139 Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan under martial law, 1977-1985. (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987), 44. 140 Noman, Pakistan, 128 141 Taseer, Bhutto, 399 142 Ibid.,77. 143 Rafiq Dossani; Henry S Rowen, Prospects for peace in South Asia. (California : Stanford University Press), 2005.70 144 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 668 145 Ibid, 674

356 146 For details of Eighth Amendment see Appendix 2 147 Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 669 148 Ibid, 675 149 Ibid. 150 Role of Opposition in Controlling Government Policies: Election of The Speaker. Accessed at: http://financial-system-news.com/role-of-opposition-in-controlling-government-policies-election-of- the-speaker.html 151 Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan, 166. 152 Amita Shastri, A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Post-Colonial States of South Asia: Political and Constitutional Problems. (Hoboken : Taylor and Francis, 2013), 50.. 153 Khan, Pakistan leadership challenges, 257 154 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-1988. ( Karachi: Oxford University Press,1995), 234 155 Viberto Selochan, The Military, the state, and development in Asia and the Pacific. (Boulder : Westview Press, 1991), 167. 156 Craig Baxter, Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society, p.69. 157 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: a Long Way Ahead, pp. 169-170. 158 Junejo Rajputs: Muhammad Khan June jo, Jan Muhammad Junejo, Jam Sadiq Ali, Chakar Ali Khan Junejo, Historical Description, p.435. 159 Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Martial Law Lifted, Constitution Fully Restored: Address to Majlis-e- Shoora (Parliament). (Islamabad: Directorate of Films & Publications, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, 1985), 1-2-3 160 Report on the General Elections, 1985: Detailed result of election, Election Results, Election Commission of Pakistan. 161 Suranjan Das, Kashmir and Sind: nation-building, ethnicity, and regional politics in South Asia, p.119. 162 Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985.(Lahore: Vanguard, 1987 ), 85 163 General Zia Phase II - Controlled Democracy. 164 Dilip Hiro, The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry Between India and Pakistan .(New York : Nation Books, 2014), 264 165 Bhutto, Daughter of Destiny. 271 166 Khan, Constitutional and Political History, 681 167 Suranjan Das, Kashmir and Sind: nation-building, ethnicity, and regional politics in South Asia, p.1120. 168 Bhutto, Daughter of Destiny, 274 169 Ibid., 275 170 Afzal Haider, Tehreeke-e-bahali-e-Jamhooriyat. Urdu. ( Movement for the Restoration of Democracy). ( Lahore: Jamhoor Publications, 2015), 152 171 Bhutto, Daughter of Destiny, 346 172 Corinne J. Naden, Benazir Bhutto, p.132. 173 Bhutto, Daughter of Destiny, 278 174 Mohammad Waseem, Pakistan Under Martial Law, 1977-1985, p.243. 175 Pakistan Horizon, Volume 39. (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs., 1986), 99 176 I A Rehman, Pakistan Under Siege.(Lahore : Rohtas Books, 1990), 272 177 Bhutto, Daughter of Destiny,281 178 Partha Sarathy Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia. (New Delhi : Manohar Publications, 1989), 35 179Bhutto, Daughter of Destiny,285 180 Ibid 181 Veena Kukreja, Military intervention in politics: a case study of Pakistan. (New Delhi: NBO Publisher's Distributors, 1985), 124-125. 182 General Zia Phase II - Controlled Democracy. 183 Sindh Inquiry, Summeyr 1990: Report. (Karachi: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 1990), 89 184 General Zia Phase II - Controlled Democracy.

357 185 Nadeem F. Paracha, Revisiting the Al-Zulfiqar saga: What really went down. September 17, 2015. Accessed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1207360 186 Hanif Samoon, Mohammad Fazal Rahu: A memoir. daily Dawn Islamabad, January 17, 2013 187 Verinder Grover; Ranjana Arora,Pakistan, Fifty Years of Independence: a chronology of events, 1947-97. (New Delhi : Deep & Deep Publications, 1997), 376. 188 Rehman, Pakistan under siege, 262. 189 Anees Jillani, Advance towards democracy: the Pakistani experience. ( Lahore : Progressive Publishers, 1991), 55. 190 Bhutto,Daughter of Destiny, 286 191 Raza Mehdi, Pakistan today. ( Lahore : Progressive Publishers, 1987).24. 192 Jillani, Advance towards democracy, 75. 193 P. L. Bhola, Benazir Bhutto, Opportunities and Challenges .(New Delhi: Yuvraj Publishers & Distributors, 1989), 8 194 Hussain,Pakistan's politics: the Zia years, 113. 195 Veena Kukreja, Military Intervention in Politics: a Case Study of Pakistan, p. 129. 196 General Zia Phase II - Controlled Democracy. 197 Rasul Bux Rais,Ethnic Politics in Sind, p.34. 198 General Zia Phase II - Controlled Democracy. 199 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: a comparative and historical perspective .(New York : Cambridge University Press, 1995),106. 200 Khan, Pakistan leadership challenges, 172 201 Amir Ali Chandio; Mughis Ahmad and Fouzia Naseem,Struggle for Democracy in Sindh: A Case Study of Movement for Restoration of Democracy (1983). (Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences Vol.1, No.1, Jan 2011), 6 202 Ibid. 203 Noman. Pakistan. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013. .(accessed on 15 November 2014) 204 Khan, My Political Struggle, 257 205 PCO and its victim Judges. www.dawn.com. dated: January 07, 2010. Accessed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/841674/pco-and-its-victim-judges 206 Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism, 106. 207 Feroz Ahmed, Ethnicity and politics in Pakistan. (New York : Oxford University Press, 1998),122 . 208 Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics.( Massachusetts : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 236 209 S. Akbar Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan's Economy. ( Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2005 ), 49 210 Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan, 363 211 Basharat Hussain Qizilbash, Questioning the heroes. (Lahore: Sh. Hussain, 1998)126. 212 1981 Pakistan International Airlines hijacking. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Accessed at: https ://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/1981_Pakistan_International_Airlines_hij acking 213 Nadeem F. Paracha, Al-Zulfikar: The unsaid history. www.Dawn.com. Accessed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/813223/al-zulfikar-the-unsaid-history 214 Anas Malik, Political survival in Pakistan : beyond ideology. (New York : Routledge, 2011), 97. 215 Ayesha Jalal, The struggle for Pakistan : a Muslim homeland and global politics.(Massachusetts : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 236. 216 Anthony Hyman; Muhammed Ghayur; Naresh Kaushik, Pakistan, Zia and after. (New Delhi : Abhinav Publications, 1989), 48. 217 Ibid., .385. 218 IDSA News Review on South Asia/Indian Ocean, Volume 18. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1985, 185 219 Ibid., 386. 220 Bashir Riaz, Bhutto Khandaan: jehd-e-musalsal. (Urdu). ( Bhutto Family: A continues Struggle. (Karachi: Pakistani Adab Publications), 202. 221 Muhammad Ali Shaikh, Benazir Bhutto: a political biography. (Karachi: Oriental Books Publishing House, 2000), 90. Also see. Bidanda M. Chengappa,Pakistan, Islamisation, Army and Foreign Policy, 02. 358 222 Paracha, Revisiting the Al-Zulfiqar Saga. 223 Ibid 224 Rana Shaukat Mehmood, Pakistan ma inqalaab or rad-e- inqallab ki kahani. Urdu. ( The Story of Revolution and anti-revolution in Pakistan). ( Lahore: Fiction House, 2005), 484-85 225 Ibid., 487. 226 Ibid., 488-89. 227 Paracha, Revisiting the Al-Zulfiqar saga: What Really Went Down. www.dawn.com. Accessed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/1207360 228 Bhutto, Daughter of Destiny, 146 229 Richard F Nyrop, Pakistan, a country study -volume 48. (Washington, D.C.: American University (Washington, D.C.). Foreign Area Studies,1984), 216. 230 Amnesty International Report. Amnesty International Publications., 1982., 227. Accessed at: https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=1PcvAQAAIAAJ 231 S. Akbar Zaidi, Regional imbalances and the national question in Pakistan. (Lahore : Vanguard, 1992), 132. 232 Mushahid Hussain,Pakistan's politics: the Zia years, p.162. 233 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia : a comparative and historical perspective. (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1995), 106. 234 Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, .83. 235 Sohail Mahmood, Sind Report.(Lahore: Classic, 1989), 12. 236 Rana Shaukat Mehmood , Inqalaab or Rad-e-Inqalaab ki kahani, Urdu. ( The Story of Revolution and Anti Revolution), ( Lahore: Fiction House, 2005), 489 237 Deniz Kandiyoti, Women, Islam, and the State. (Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1991), 103 238 Christophe Jaffrelot,A History of Pakistan and Its Origins. ( London : Anthem Press, 2002), 81 239 Rina Saeed Khan, Profiles. (Lahore: Vang uard, 1998), 67. 240 Christophe Jaffrelot,A history of Pakistan and its origins. ed, (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 81. 241 Khan, My Political Struggle, 383. 242 Kamala Visweswaran, Perspectives on modern South Asia : a reader in culture, history, and representation.(Malden : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 323. 243 Zamir Niazi, The Web of Censorship. ((Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1994), xii 244 Ian Preston, A Political Chronology of Central, South and East Asia. (London: Europa Publications, 2001), 221 245 Niazi, The Web of Censorship, xii 246 Ibid., xv 247 Shaikh Aziz, Four journalists flogged, two newspapers shut. www.dawn.com., May 07, 2015. Accessed at: http://www.dawn.com/news/! 179170/a-leaf-from-history-four-journalists-flogged-two- newspapers-shut 248 Shahid Husain,Ziaul Haq period was worst for press freedom in Pakistan. The Fact, Issue No.9, June 2004. Accessed at: http://fact.com.pk/archives/june/feng/zia.htm 249 Niazi, The Web of Censorship, xv 250 Mass Media in Pakistan: ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN THE ERA OF 1977 TO 1988. Accessed at: http ://www.vutube.edu.pk/forum/attachment/322/post/131/format/file. 251 Zamir Niazi; Zubeida Mustafa, The press in chains. (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2010), 178 79 252 Aziz, Four journalists flogged, two newspapers shut 253 Niazi, The Web of Censorship,xxiii 254 Suppressed voices: Remembering the struggle of journalists in 1977.Pakistan Press Foundation. May 18, 2015. Accessed at: http://www.pakistanpressfoundation.org/2015/05/suppressed-voices- remembering-the-struggle-of-journalists-in-1977/ 255 This is a small city near Mardan which is famous for the training of armed officials. This area is located in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 256 Mushahid Hussain,Pakistan's Politics: the Ziayears.(New Delhi : Konark Publishers, 1991)T21.

359 257 Ibid., 379-380. 258 Nadeem F. Paracha, A History of student politics in Pakistan. Accessed at: http://www.siasat.pk/forum/showthread.php?85271-A-History-of-student-politics-in-Pakistan 259 Laurent Gayer, Karachi: Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City.(New York : Oxford University Press, 2014), 64 260 Paracha, A History of student politics in Pakistan 261 Ibid. 262 Jahan Dad Khan, Pakistan leadership challenges.(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 173 263 Farhan Hanif Siddiqi, The politics of ethnicity in Pakistan : the Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir ethnic movements. (New York : Routledge, 2012.), 85 264 Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics. (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2014), 242. 265 Why Karachi Grew Divided. Aboard the Democracy Train. Accessed at: http://www.aboardthedemocracytrain.com/why-karachi-grew-divided 266 Oskar Verkaaik, Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan. (New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 2004), 4 267Nadeem. F. Paracha, A Concise History of Student Politics in Pakistan. Pak Tea House. July 22nd, 2009. Accessed at: http://pakteahouse.net/2009/07/22/a-concise-history-of-student-politics-in-pakistan/ 268 Sreedhar, John Kaniyalil, Savita Pande, Pakistan after Zia.(New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1989), 33 269 Rasul Bux Rais,Ethnic Politics in Sind, p.35. 270 Khan, My Political Struggle, 329. 271 K L Kamal; Prabha Arun, Pakistan : democracy at the cross-roads.(Jaipur : Yuvraj Publishers, 1989), 105. 272 Surendra Singh, Politics of regionalism in Pakistan: a study of Sind province, p.115. 273 Iram Khalid, Conflict Within State: A Case Study of South Asian and South East Asian Insurgencies.(Lahore: Maktaba Tamir-i-Insaniat, 2006), 304 274 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 223 275 Charles H. Kennedy, The Politics ofEthnicity in Sindh. Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 10 (Oct., 1991), 938-955. Accessed at: http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 276 Muhammad Soaleh Korejo, A testament of Sind: ethnic and religious extremism a perspective, p.136. 277 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: a Long Way Ahead, p.185. 278 Shahid javed Burki,Pakistan under Bhutto: 1970-77, p.267. 279 Nazeer Ahmed, Political Parties in Pakistan: a Long Way Ahead,p.186. 280 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-1988. ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 240 281 Omar Noman, The political economy of Pakistan 1947-85. (London : KPI Publishers, 1988), 130. 282 Bhutto,Daughter of Destiny, 305 283 PLD 1988 Supreme Court 416. Accessed at: http://www.nasirlawsite.com/historic/pld416.htm 284 Lubna Rafique,Benazir & British press, 1986-1990, (Lahore : Gautam Publishers, 1994), 32. 285 Libby Hughes, Benazir Bhutto : from prison to prime minister. ( Minneapolis: Dillon Press, 1990),58 286 Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan, 260 287 Khan, Pakistan’s Other Story, 302 288 Ibid.

360 CONCLUSION

Under the British Raj, the Indian political response to the Raj may be broadly

divided into two main categories,

A. The elite classes military and bureaucracy were by-and-large pro-British

B. The mass-oriented anti-British classes.

It may be suggested that British had won various wars in different parts of Asia with the help of Indian Armies. These armies were predominantly from Punjab. The British

had developed a “loyalist” class through large-scale establishment of canal colonies

and distributed the rich cultivable land to their loyalists who emerged as feudal lords.

These developments strengthened the already existing feudal-military-British nexus.

These powerful classes were mostly in rule during the whole British Era in India. On the other hand, most of the anti-British classes and revolutionaries were largely from

middle and lower middle classes who suffered the most at the hands of British. They

had nominal role in the governmental and state affairs. After the inception of

Pakistan, the newly born state inherited both these classes. The same pro-British

classes mostly retrained the helm of affairs of Pakistan after its creation. It may be

suggested that the military-bureaucratic-feudal nexus reached to the top stratums of the state and control of the material resources of the state. On the contrary, in new

Indian state the pro-British elitist classes could not come in power rather the mass-

361 oriented, staunch anti-British Congress came into power. Both the states decided to

follow different trajectories. Pakistan joined American bloc and became the member

of pro-American defense treaties SEATO and CENTO just after a few years of its

creation and did not become a member of Non-aligned Movement till the Bhutto’s

inception to power in 1970s. On the other India decided to join the Socialist Russian bloc, assumed a leader’s role in NAM, and did never joined pro-American pacts like

SEATO and CENTO. After the early demise of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali

Khan there was hardly any leader of the national stature, and the vacuum was filled by

military-bureaucratic oligarch headed by Generals.1 It is a common public perception,

even scholars believe, in Pakistan that the ultimate power of the state lies in the hands

of AAA, which stands for Allah, referring to religious forces, Army and America.

This military-bureaucratic-oligarchy, known as establishment in the present day term,

had been ruling the country until the fall of Ayub resulted from a class-conscious

popular movement in both the wings of the country during 1968-69. This movement was led by PPP under Bhutto in the western wing of the country, the present day

Pakistan. The class-based movement severely threatened the set patterns of the elitist

control over the state affairs and the interests of military-led establishment. For the

first time in the history of Pakistan, rather in the history of this region such a strong

movement was launched based on economic disparities. The masses rose up in revolt

against traditional ruling elite. This tradition of ruling elitist alliance was ruling the

362 country since its inception after the departure of the British. This tradition of ruling

elite was based on the nexus between feudal lords, religious clergy and powerful

military elite backed by Western big powers specifically US. The ruling elite

commonly known as establishment and its allies devised a state policy largely serving the interests of these traditional ruling elite. The ruling establishment had penetrated

deep in the minds of the people the policy they formulated for the state. This elitist traditional politics and state policy had not allowed the mass intrusion in the politics

or the state policy. They gave the outlook to the state of Pakistan what served their

class interests. Even the first general elections based on adult franchise held in 1970.

These groups did not allow making a permanent constitution for the country, which

ensured the equal rights for the common masses. They adopted a distinct kind of

religious orientation, which suited their class interest and their firm control over the

state. They developed a typical standard of Islam and patriotism in the minds of

common people. This standard is based on animosity with India and Russia, following their policy on Kashmir, the policy of strong military and love for military as the

guardian of Islam. Similarly according to this elitist standard of patriotism, Bloch,

Pashtuns and Sindis are against the patriotism. These smaller nationalities are

considered against military. Only Punjabis are considered the true patriots and

custodian of patriotism and Islamic values as the ruling elite belongs to Punjab by in

large.

363 They forged alliances with the West specially US by signing mutual defense

agreements and other agreements. The common masses and downtrodden were

deprived of their basic rights and even were declined the right of vote till 1970 when

first adult franchised based elections were held in the country. In 1968 the common

people of Pakistan rose up in revolt against the elitist control of the state of Pakistan.

They launched a rigorous movement, ostensibly against the dictatorial regime of

Ayub Khan but in fact against the elitist politics. The newly formed PPP on the left-

oriented manifesto judging the mounting pressure against the elitist group played the

role of torchbearer in this movement under its popular leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

This first ever, and the last so far, mass revolt against the ruling Tradition of elitist

politics shook the very bases of it. In the wake of this class-based movement, Bhutto

emerged as the most popular leader in the Western wing of the country, the most

popular leader after Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Bhutto, being the leader of a proclaimed

Socialist party and the 1968 class appraisal, secured overwhelming majority in West

Pakistan, specially Punjab and Sind by challenging the status-quo of the Tradition of

elitist politics. Bhutto emerged as an “anomaly” in the state of Pakistan. Before

Bhutto’s rise to the power the policy of the state of Pakistan was pro-feudalism, pro

capitalist, pro-religious clergy, and pro-West dominated by the military-bureaucratic

oligarchy. This was a new experience in Pakistan that a mass movement was launched by the downtrodden and middle classes for their rights and the leader of the

364 movement took over to the power of the state. This new experience was not accepted by the forces of set Traditions of elitist politics, which had firm control on the state

and then was badly shaken by the movement. The decision-making was slipping from their hands. Therefore, it was quite natural to unite against Bhutto to regain their lost

power. Bhutto brought substantial changes in the state policies of the Tradition of

elitist politics. Bhutto not only challenged but also defeated the traditional ruling elite

including feudal lords, military elite, religious clergy and US at the same time.

However, he could not bring a permanent change and crushed down the supremacy of the elitist politics but succeeded to reach the helm of affairs of the state with the help

of poor and downtrodden classes of the country. These Traditional ruling elitist

classes were patronized by British before 1947 and by both British and US after the

creation of Pakistan. It was obvious for these elitist forces to forge an alliance with

British and US. The traditional forces joined hands against Bhutto and in 1977

launched a movement against Bhutto, ostensibly against the rigging in the election but

in real to eradicate the “anomaly” in the shape of Bhutto who brought down the traditional forces from power.

The removal of Bhutto from power had far-reaching impacts on the politics

and the state policy of Pakistan. Though Bhutto challenged all these forces of

Traditional elitist politics but could not crush any of them. There are many causes for

his least success mentioned in Chapter 2 and 3 of this study. The conspiracies of the

365 forces of tradition are the major cause in his removal but his failure to deliver to the best what he promised was a contributing factor, though to a small extent. There were two Bhuttos in the guise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. One Bhutto was leader of 1968-69

class-based movement, who not only formed a party with the Socialist orientation but took it to the power height of state. Bhutto became the most popular leader of the

country as a result of his leading role in the 68-69 movement. The movement made the popular Bhutto. The Bhutto who challenged the century-old Tradition of elitist

politics, he challenged the all powerful forces with the support of the downtrodden

and lower middle classes, which was for the first time in the history of the country.

The Bhutto who gave a Socialist manifesto of his party and made the party extremely

popular in the country especially in worker classes, poor masses and downtrodden.

However, there was another Bhutto, who made compromises with the forces of

Tradition against whom he lauded the slogans of change and revolution. There was a

severe economic and political conflict among two classes, the downtrodden and the

elitist classes. This class-conflict gave birth and rise to the 68-69 movement and

Bhutto emerged as a popular leader and revolutionary for masses. But after coming

into power Bhutto severely damaged PPP and consequently PPP damaged the fruits

for the 68-69 movement of the poor masses. Bhutto made a number of compromises with the forces of Tradition. Bhutto made rapprochements with military-led

establishment and US to come into power and the objectives of the 68-69 movement

366 were put behind, for which the poor masses made him their leader. The very weakness

of Bhutto was that PPP was not a Bolshevik party like Russia, which stood for its

Socialist revolution, or like the Communist Party of China. For a successful

revolution against powerful strata a scientific and organized revolutionary party was a

pre-requisite, with many other conditions. Without a strong, organized on scientific bases party at the grass rout level no revolution could be sustained. Bhutto was weak

so he could not stand the strong forces of Tradition and he made a number of

compromises with the same forces. So two Bhuttos remained at loggerheads with one

another throughout his years in power, one the feudal Bhutto son of Sir Shahnawaz

and the other revolutionary Bhutto the messiah of poor classes, son of Lakhi Bai.2

Non-Bolshevik Bhutto suffocated the 68-69 Bhutto. The decades-long rule of

Tradition of elitist politics was challenged and to an extent put down by the 68-68

Movement. The movement was a sever conflict between “Tradition and Anomaly”.

Bhutto emerged as the leader of “Anomaly” against the forces of “Tradition” through this movement. But to the weaknesses of Bhutto the “Tradition” fire backed and joined hands with other forces against Bhutto and threw him out of power. PNA

movement was clearly according to the mainstream Tradition of Pakistan, the AAA,

i.e. Army, America and religious forces. Bhutto wanted to break the Tradition which

fire backed and martial law was imposed in the country. Once again, PNA

367 strengthened the status-quo, which was broken by 68-69 Movement and put Pakistan back on the course of Tradition.

After the “success” of the PNA Movement, the state of Pakistan and politics was put on the same Tradition of elitist political path, which was snatched by the 1968

Movement in the shape of PPP under Bhutto’s coming into power and starting a

reformist agenda. After the “success” of the PNA Movement as a result of which a

democratically elected government was toppled and martial law was imposed in the

country, the fruits of the 1968 mass appraisal were wasted. PNA Movement against

Bhutto had far-reaching impacts not only on the politics but also on the state policy

of Pakistan. On the other hand, MRD was a weaker movement as compared to PNA

as MRD could not bring any substantial change in the politics and the state policy.

MRD could not succeed to break the Tradition of elitist politics, which was reinforced by the “success” of PNA Movement.

PNA was against a government, which wanted to break the Tradition of elitist politics whereas MRD was against a dictatorial regime, which was a representative of

Tradition. The “success” of PNA Movement not only seems strengthening the

Tradition of elitist politics but also determining a future course of action for Tradition.

Despite heavy sacrifices and strong role of popular parties against military

dictatorship, MRD failed to break the Tradition of elitist politics and state policy brought into fashion by the “success” of PNA movement. Even the people of status-

368 quo intruded in MRD, who deviated it from its track to bring back the popular

democracy in the country in its true form. PPP, the leading party in MRD, left

Bhutto’s pro-Socialism, anti-America, anti establishment stance and became a part of

Tradition from a proclaimed Socialist party to a traditional party.

MRD was water down form of anti-Tradition elitist politics whereas PNA was

a staunch supporter of pro-Tradition politics. MRD could not break the Tradition

consequently it compromised with the Tradition. Thus, PNA was a pro-America, pro

religion and pro-establishment movement means it was a pro-Tradition movement whereas MRD was an anti-Tradition movement but it could not bring any substantial

dent to Tradition as its actors were weak.

By-and-large MRD failed to achieve its objective to break the Tradition of

elitist politics and bring back the real democracy with major decision in the hands of

masses, which they could exercise, through their genuinely elected representatives.

After failure of MRD the four democratically elected governments of Benazir Bhutto

and Nawaz Sharif could not take back the state power and key decision making from the military-led establishment. They were helpless in front of the powerful military-

led establishment. These democratic governments could not restore the 1973

constitution in its original form, the same very constitution under which these

governments came into power. The military remained in power under General Zia for ten years after the success of PNA Movement and then for ten years under General

369 Musharaf. The military remained in power for about ten years in power after PNA

movement with the help and support of the forces of Tradition of elitist politics. The

only differences were that during the Zia dictatorial regime “AAAs” were in alliance but during Musharaf regime these “AAAs” were cut to “AAs”, the religious “A” was

removed, because the third and the most powerful “A” America did not need the

religious “A” this time and launched War on Terror against the old staunch ally.

There is a solid fundamental reason for the strength of PNA and weakness of MRD.

The Tradition had developed and deepened a specific standard of Islam and patriotism

in the minds of the common masses, the standard which could suit and strengthen the

supremacy of the forces of Tradition. Under this Islamo-patriotic standard love for

Islam meant staunch animosity towards India, Russia and Communism, deep love and

sacredness for military. Under this standard of traditional patriotism, the Bloch,

Pashuns and Sindi nationalism was considered an animosity with military and against the patriotism. Punjab was the main centre of this standard of tradition. MRD could

not bring a breakthrough in Punjab, the mainstream of the politics of tradition. MRD

could not bring a breakthrough in the mindset of Punjab, which the tradition was

strengthening since the decades of 68-69 movement for the first and so far for the last time broke this decades-old traditional mindset.3 Another reason for the success and

failure of a Movement was determined through its time in the regional and world

history. There are two eras of the political appraisals; one was era of Traditional

370 politics and the second was the era of mass movements. In 1968-69, there were many

revolutionary movements in the region and other parts of glob, so those movements

also influenced Pakistan and that era of movements inspired downtrodden masses to

launch a strong movement. Nevertheless, when MRD was started the Russian bloc was diminishing and there was no source of inspiration and support for a movement

launched against the forces of traditional status-quo. Therefore, MRD was a weak

Movement to look towards America.

The success of Bhutto after the 68-69 Movement proved that common masses

could be the source of power in Pakistan, for the first time in its history. However, the

“success” of PNA Movement eroded this impression badly as in result of this PNA

movement military under General Zia imposed martial law, which lasted for eleven years. With the ‘success” of PNA it was proved that the governments those come in

power with the common masses’ support were weak and vulnerable whereas those

come in power with the support of military, America and other forces of Tradition were strong and comparatively long-lasting. For instance, Zia and Musharraf whose

governments lasted for 11 and 10 years respectively but no constitutionally elected

government completed its five years constitutional term after Bhutto until 2008. There

is another stirring difference in these two movements, which reflects through their

names. PNA, Pakistan National Alliance , the Traditional nationalism given by the

371 forces of Tradition whereas MRD, Movement for the Restoration of Democracy,

means striving for democracy; an anti-Tradition in itself.

Even today in 2014 that ‘anomaly” represented by Bhutto after 68-69

Movement could not be restored. Recently Imran Khan a national leader along with

an elected Chief Minister of the Provinces decided to visit the school attacked by the terrorists but he was told by the administration that he could not visit as on the same very day COAS was going to visit. It shows that who is in the real power, “Tradition

or masses’ power”.

372 FINDINGS

• 1. Under the British Raj, the Indian political response to the Raj

may be broadly divided into two main categories:

• Pro-British Ruling elite

• Mass oriented anti-British forces

2. British legacy prevailed and popular movements against British Rule

were overlapped by pro-Western civil-military bureaucracy.

3. Gap of political leadership paved way Bhutto to emerge

4. Bhutto deviated from the set pattern of pro-West, Pro-Capitalist foreign

policy.

5. Success of PNA was actually the success of retrogressive forces and

failure of MRD was the sign that Pakistan would become extremist and

fundamentalist state.

6. Traditional elitist powers succeeded in undermining mass movement

by using political victimization, mass torture and brutality, not through

political means.

8. Establishment has an ultimate powerful role in the politics.

9. Bhutto’s compromises led to the failure of his struggle

10. Bhutto challenged severely the forces of “Tradition”, but not brought them down completely, rather compromised with them, specially at later

stages of his rule.

373 11. Typical religious / rightist society could not accept the slogan of

“Socialism”, propaganda of rightist forces to daub Bhutto a paganist and

Socialism as paganism.

12. Bhutto could not toppled the exploitative system base on Capitalism and Feudalism but gave voice to the downtrodden sections of society by his rhetoric and reforms

13. Bhutto’s compromises with the forces of Tradition not only weakened him but could not make any substantial change in the status-quo of exploitative system.

14. Deep-rooted foreign role in politics and important decision making.

15. Despite great sacrifices and continuous struggle MRD could not bring any substantial change to bring down the dictatorial regime.

• ( elections held only when dictatorial regime ended after General

Zia’s

• death)

• 16. MRD could not succeed to break the Tradition of elitist

politics, which was reinforced by the “success” of PNA Movement.

374 RECOMMENDATIONS

After going through in detailed study in the area and topic of study it has revealed there is a dire need to study the opposition movements and their impacts on the

politics in an objective and scholarly manner. In this regard, following

recommendations are made for the future study.

1. A scientific and objective analysis should be carried out on the Opposition

Movement of East Bengal in 1970-71

2. An objective study should be carried out on the Baluchistan Movement.

3. The role of ruling elite and the forces of Tradition should be researched,

particularly role of various forces including America, other foreign forces,

military, feudal and other forces of status-quo in the opposition movements.

4. The causes for the weakness of democratic governments and the strength of

the establishment should be objectively investigated and analyzed.

5. The causes for resentment among the Sindis, Balochis and Pashtoons against

the forces at centre should be investigated.

375 1 Abual Ka;am Azad India Wins Freedom. ( New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1959), 209. also see R. S. N.Singh, Asian Strategic and Military Perspective. (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 2005), 243 2 Philip E Jones, The Pakistan People's Party : rise to power. (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2003), 65 3 Punjab supported Bhutto’s movement and Bhutto secured overwhelming majority from the provi nce in the elections of 1970 held after the 68-69 Movement. On contrary MRD could not motivate the common masses in Punjab to rise in revolt against the military dictator as the People of Sind did.

376 APPENDIX I

AIR MARTIAL (RETD.) ASGHAR KHAN’S MESSAGE TO THE OFFICERS OF THE DEFENSE SERVICES OF PAKISTAN

"I am addressing this message to the Chief of Staff and the Officers Defence Services of Pakistan.

It is your duty to defend the territorial integrity of Pakistan and to obey all lawful commands of superior officers placed over you. To differentiate between a ‘lawful’ and an ‘unlawful’ command is the duty of every officer. Every one of you must ask yourself whether what the army is doing today is ‘lawful’ activity and if your conscience tells you that it is not and you still carry it out, you would appear to lack moral fiber and would be guilty of a grave crime against your country and your people.

You should by now have realized that military action to East Pakistan was a conspiracy in which the present Prime Minister played a Machiavellian role. You know the circumstance in which military action in Balochistan was engineered and how completely unnecessary this action has been. You are also probably aware of the utterly unnecessary military action taken last year in DIR in the North West Frontier Province. If you have any interest in national affairs you must also be aware that during the election campaign the nation expressed its powerful disapproval of the present regime. Following the People’s reaction of the Government, you should have been surprised at the election result in which the ‘Pakistan National Alliance’ which could muster such overwhelming popular support, could only get 8 out of 116 seats in the Punjab. You must surely know that many people were not even allowed to file their nomination papers. Was it not too much of a co-incident that no paper could be filed against the Prime Minister and all the Chief Ministers of the four provinces? That those who dare to try ended up in spending a few nights in police custody? One of them has still not been traced.

Those of you who were even remotely connected with duties in connection with the 7th March election would also know of the blatant manner in which rigging took place; Of the hundreds of thousands of the ballot papers of PNA candidates that had been taken out of ballot boxes and were found in the streets and fields of Pakistan following the elections on 7th March. You would also have seen the deserted polling stations on 10th March, the day of the provincial polls, following the call for boycott of provincial elections by the PNA. Nevertheless, Government media announced that an unprecedented number of votes had also been polled at the provincial elections and the percentage was said to be more than sixty. Then surely you must have followed the movement which called for Bhutto’s resignation and re-elections in the country.

The coming out of women in thousands on the streets in every city and town with babies in their arms was a scene that no one will forget. These were the women

397 who claimed had voted for him. The movement proved within a few days that he and his government had been completely rejected by the people. The death of hundreds of our youth and the beating of our mother and sisters was a scene that may well have stirred you to shame and sorrow. Have you ever thought why the people put themselves to so much trouble? Why must mothers come out to face bullets with babies in their arms? Why do parents allow their children to face police lathis and bullets? Surely it is only because they feel that they have been wronged- that they have been cheated. That their basic right of ‘HIRE and FIRE’ their rulers has been denied them. They understood, when we told them the truth that the constitution which you as officers of the Defence services are sworn to defend had been violated. Article 2118 (3) of the Constitution of the ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ says: ‘It shall be the duty of the Election Commission constituted in relation to an election to organize and conduct the election and to make such arrangements as are necessary to ensure that the election is conducted honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with law, and that corrupt practices are guarded against.’ This, my friend, was not a just and fair election. Bhutto has violated the Constitution and is guilty of a grave crime against the people. It is not your duty to support his illegal regime nor can you be called upon to kill your own people so that he can continue a little longer in office. Let it now be said that Pakistan armed forces are a degenerate Police Force fit only for killing unarmed civilians. How else can you explain the shooting of a spirited lad whose only fault was to show the ‘V’ sign to the army in Lahore the other day. The spirit of the adventure; of defiance rather than servility needs to be encouraged in your youth and this unfortunate incident is a blot on the name of the army which would be difficult to wipe out. Similarly, shooting by the army in Karachi on an unarmed crowd is unpardonable. Didn’t you realize that the poor and hungry people of Pakistan, throughout the 30 troubled years of your history had shown only love and affection of your armed forces. That they wept when you laid down arms in East Pakistan; that they have always prayed for your glory and have literally starved themselves and their children so that you are well feed and our generals and Senior Officers can live a life that even their British and American counterparts would not dream of. It pains me to say that, that love is now gone. Pray do not let it term to hate. For should that happen, a tragedy would have occurred in the history of this nation which we in our lifetime may not be able to undo.

As men of honour it is your responsibility to do your duty and the call of duty in these trying circumstances is not the blind obedience of unlawful commands. There comes a time in lives of nations when each man has to ask himself whether he is doing the right thing. For you that time has come. Answer this call honestly and safe Pakistan. God be with you.

M. Asghar Khan (Air -Martial -Retd.)

398 APPENDIX II

ACCORD

(BETWEEN PNA AND PPP)

This Accord arrived at between Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the Chairman of the Pakistan Peoples’ Party, hereinafter mentioned as the First Party, and Maulana Mufti Mahmud, MNA elect and President of the Pakistan National Alliance, hereinafter mentioned as the Second

Party, recites as follows: -

Where as a political crisis had arisen in Pakistan following the first general elections held in the month of March, 1977;

AND WHEREAS the Parties to the Accord in their individual and representative capacity were desirous of finding a peaceful solution.

AND WHEREAS talks were held by the parties to the Accord in their representative capacity wherein the first Party was assisted by Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada and Maulana Kausar Niazi and the second Party was assisted by Nawabzada Nasurllah Khan and Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed;

AND WHEREAS the first Party had with a view to establishing normal and peaceful conditions Pakistan ordered the release of all the leaders of Pakistan National Alliance; lifted Martial Law within the Division of Karachi and the District of Lahore and Hyderabad; announced compensation to all such persons who had not lost their lives or received grievous injuries, lifted pre - censorship on newspapers, allowed public meetings and procession released all persons arrested for violation of orders under section 144 of the code of Criminal Procedure or our few orders as well as all such other persons ( excluding 524 persons) in custody on substantive charges of crimes;

AND WHEREAS the Second Party had agreed to call off agitation following the first general elections held in the month of March 1977,

AND WHEREAS with a view to restoration of congenial atmosphere, mutual confidence and tranquility necessary for honest, just and fair elections, the parties have arrived at an Accord. The terms of the Accord shall be as follows: -

1. The National Assembly of Pakistan and the Provincial Assemblies of the four Provinces shall be dissolution on______. The National Assembly shall before its dissolution pass such amendments in the Constitutional and other enactment as are necessary in pursuance of this Accord.

2. The Provincial Governments consisting of the Chief Minister and the Ministers in the four Provinces of Pakistan shall cases to hold office on the date mentioned in

399 paragraph 1. Consequential amendment shall be made in the Constitution to provide for powers to the Government as nearly as may be in accordance with the provision of Article 234 of the Constitution.

3. Elections to the National Assembly shall be held on October 7, 1977, and to the four Provincial Assemblies on the same day or within three days of the elections to the National Assembly.

4. Such members of the Senate who are does to retire on August 5, 1977, shall continue to be member until the said date. Of the reminding members of the Senate such members as have been elected by the National Assembly or the Provincial Assemblies after the first general elections would be resign their seats after the new National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies are elected in accordance with paragraph 3.

5. All persons detained or arrested after January 6, 1977, in connection with agitation and disturbances under all laws including laws relating to preventive detention as have not already been released shall be released forthwith who are accused of heinous off once including murder, loot, rape and arson shall not be released. However, a committee consisting of one representative of each party shall examine the cases against them to determine whether any of them may be released.

6. Any difference of opinion between the members of the committee refused to in paragraph 5 shall be referred to the Implementation Council.

7. Personable compensation shall be paid to all such persons who as a result of agitation or disturbance after 6th March, 1977 received grievous injuries or suffered destruction or damage to their property and in like manner responsible compensation shall be paid top the legal heirs of such person who lost their lives in such agitation of disturbances. The compensation shall be fixed by the Government of Pakistan and such compensation shall be determine and paid regardless of party affiliation of person who died or received grievous injuries or suffered destruction or damage to property.

8. On the signing of this accord, emergency imposed under Article 232 read with Article 280 of the Constitution shall be lifted.

9. On the signing of the Accord, the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance shall be repealed together with the rules framed and orders issued there under, provided that the provision relating to enemy property and the requisition of property shall be continued in force.

10. On the signing of this Accord, all Tribunal established and functioning under the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance shall cases to functions, and the cases pending before the Tribunals shall stand transferred to the normal courts of the country for trial under the ordinary law.

400 11. On the signing of this Accord, amendments made in the Pakistan Army Act on April 21, 1977, by Act No.1 of 1977 shall be replaced without prejudice to the appeals that may be pending in or may arise.

12. The Armed Forces deployed in parts of the Province of Balochistan shall cases to act in add of civil power after a periods of four months of the signing of the Accord.

13. The Representation of the People Act shall be so amended as to provide-

(a) For the abatement of all election petitions filled and pending as a result of the election held in the month of March, 197.

(b) That the result of the ensuing elections shall not be published by Radio Pakistan, Pakistan TV Corporation and the newspapers, before the announcement by the Election Commission.

(c) For the Armed Forces of Pakistan and the civil armed forces including the police being called by the Federal Government to render aid and Assistance to the Commission for maintenance of law and order during the election campaign and the polls.

14. The parties to this Accord shall prepare or cause to be prepared a Code of Ethics within a week of the spinning of this Accord and such code shall provide for -

(a) Rules for election campaign,

(b) Protection to Lawful political activity during the election campaign,

(d) The freedom of press including restriction of declaration of newspaper the publication whereas has been banned

(e) Arrest detention or prosecution of any person committing of force during election campaign.

(f) Holding of public meetings and processions during the election campaign, and

(g) Ensuring impartially and convenient balance in the projection of news and views by media controlled or owned by the Government in accordance with the law declared by Supreme Court of Pakistan.

15. The Constitution of Pakistan shall be so seemed as to -

(a) Incorporation the amendment enumerated in the schedule.

(b) Provide for reconstitution of the Election Commission in accordance with paragraphs 16 and 17.

16. The Election Commission shall consist of a chairman and four members.

401 The Chairman shall be a person having the same qualifications as are stated in Article 213 of the Constitution and one member shall be appointed from among the judges of each High Court. The appointment shall be made by the resident of Pakistan on the advice of the First Party tendered after consultation with the Second Party.

17. A new Chief Election Commission shall be appointed.

18. In case a difference or dispute arises between the parties to this Accord in implementation of the terms, the same shall be resolved by the Implementation Council to be constituted under paragraph 19.

19. The Implementation Council shall consist of 10 members including the Chairman and the composition and procedure of the Implementation Council shall be regulated as stated here in below: -

(a) Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Prime Minister of the Pakistan, shall be the Chairman of the Council.

(b) In the absence of the chairman of the council from any meeting thereof Maulana Mufti Mahmud shall act as the chairman of the meeting.

(c) Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Maulana Mufti Mahmud shall each nominates 4 persons on the Council from amongst members of the Parliament or member - elect to the National Assembly at the first general election.

(d) The unanimous decisions of the Council shall be implemented by the First Party, by exercise of his executive powers as Prime Minister.

20. The Implementation Council shall oversee the holding of elections so that the same are conducted in an honest, just and fair manner. The Implementation Council can take cognizance of all or any matters connected with or related to the election suo-moto or on complaint by any member.

21. In case the Implementation Council fails to arrive at a unanimous decision the matter shall be referred for arbitration to the Supreme Court.

22. In relation to all such matters as are referred to in paragraphs 21 the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to decide the dispute. The Chief Justice may nominate himself as one of the arbitrators.

23. The arbitrators appointed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan under paragraph 22 shall bear the nominees of the two parties to this Accord and decide the dispute within 72 hours. No party shall be represented by a legal practitioner. All proceedings before the arbitrators shall be held in camera.

24. While hearing a dispute, the arbitration shall not be bound to record any evidence but they shall briefly record the reasons for their decision.

402 APPENDIX III

Article 6 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973

HIGH TREASON

6. 1 [(1) Any person who abrogates or subverts or suspends or holds in abeyance, or attempts or conspires to abrogate or subvert or suspend or hold in abeyance, the Constitution by use of force or show of force or by any other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason.]

(2) Any person aiding or abetting [or collaborating2] the acts mentioned in clause (1) shall likewise be guilty of high treason.

1 Subs. by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amdt.) Act. 2010 (10 of 2010), s.4 for —clause (1)1. 2. Ins. Ibid

403 APPENDIX IV

Third Schedule

Oaths of Office

Members of the Armed Forces

[ARTICLE 244 OF THE CONSTITUTION ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN]

(In the name of Allah, the most Beneficent, the most Merciful.)

I, ______, do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and uphold the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embodies the will of the people, that I will not engage myself in any political activities whatsoever and that I will honestly and faithfully serve Pakistan in the Pakistan Army (or Navy or Air Force) as required by and under the law.

May Allah Almighty help and guide me (A'meen).

404 APPENDIX V

Pictorial Illustrations of MRD Protest

1. Political works (MRD) are being flogged by Police and Law Enforcement Agencies 406 2. Begum Nusrat Bhutto severely beaten by police

407 3. Women protestors are being beaten by Police and other agencies

4. Miraj Muhammad Khan former Minister being baton charged by police in a protest of MRD against Martial Law regime

408 5. Meetings of MRD Leaders (Benazir Bhutto, Malik Muhammad Qasim, Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Maulana Fazal Ur Rehman, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and others

409 6. A large public protest really (MRD) against Martial Law regime

410 7. Headings of various Newspapers depicting the MRD protests

Source:https://www.google.com.pk/search?q=mrd+picture&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKE wis1NS309bKAhVRTo4KHe57CcgQ_AUICCgC&biw=2133&bih=1012&dpr=0.9. Accessed on November13, 2015

411 8. PNA and PPP teams’ negotiation

412 10. PNA leader Asghar Khan addressing the protestors

413