INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION UNDER ONE HEAVEN

Geremie R Barmé

Image: Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan disembarking in Moscow Source: Dai Ou/Flickr1 xiii CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven xii 2014 Geremie R Barmé of submission attendant on this ties ties this on attendant submission of sense The a subordinate. toward directed reward or investiture of act an denote also could it duty and the institution of proper government. This is reflected in the term term the in reflected is This government. proper of institution the and duty term term The brings. it what and luck of nature impermanent and variable the fortune, to thus and dynasties. In these changes or rotating phases, phases, rotating or changes these In dynasties. of decline and rise the or seasons the in as cosmos, the or life in cycles to refer can It The character character The Mingyun Yun The supposed moral nature of destiny gives gives destiny of nature moral supposed The lifespan. allotted one’s and of life nature ofpredetermined the sense inthe specifically more be an expression of the Mandate of Heaven. Heaven. of Mandate the of expression an be can destiny state, the and individuals both For affairs. human managing in legitimacy claims 命 predetermination and individual volition. and individual predetermination mutual benefit gional andbroader globalengagement at atimewhen thePeople’sRepub a concept a concept emphasised by Xi Jinping In the Under OneHeaven multilateral relationships were to bebasedonamity a seriesof ‘Confucian-style’positive expressions: one-word bilateraland engagement between thePeople’sRepublic anditsneighbours by using 2013, XiJinping further developed theideawhen hesummed up the inaugural Diplomacy Work Periphery Forum held in Beijing on 24 October the issue of China’s relations withthecountries that surround itat the Mainland andTaiwan formed aCommunity of SharedDestiny. Addressing pronouncements from asearly as2007when itwas declaredthat the Community of Common Destiny.featured Theexpression inChinese of a Community of Shared Destiny state, in October 2013 when he spoke of the People’s Republic being part , ‘Mandate of Heaven’, used when talking about the superior moral power of a ruler who who aruler of power moral superior the about talking when used Heaven’, of , ‘Mandate

运 He who does not words understand is incapable of understanding men. . ... agentleman as behaving of incapable is fate understand not does who He mingyun mingyun Shared Destiny hasbecomeacatchall category for re thecountry’s has the meaning of ‘to carry’ or ‘to transport’, but also ‘to revolve’ or ‘to move around’. around’. move ‘to or revolve’ ‘to also but transport’, ‘to or carry’ ‘to of meaning the has China Story Yearbook 2014: SharedDestiny, we take asour theme 命运 ming 命运 , the ‘Destiny’ in ‘Shared Destiny’ ‘Shared in ‘Destiny’ , the

惠

thus encapsulates the various tensions between fate and luck, as well as as well as luck, and fate between tensions various the encapsulates thus 命 andinclusiveness has the meaning of ‘a decree’ or ‘a command’. In early Chinese texts, texts, Chinese early In command’. ‘a or decree’ ‘a of meaning the has — Confuciu ming to the related meaning of ‘fate’ or ‘destiny’, often often ‘destiny’, or ‘fate’ of meaning related the to s in s in 命运共同体 容 ming 习近平 yun The Analects The . a place in debates concerning decision, decision, concerning debates in a place , by also refers to the vagaries of the times, times, the of vagaries the to refers also , the leader of China’s party-

Nathan Woolley Nathan , officially translated as a as translated officially , ,

20.3, translated by Simon Leys Simon by translated 20.3, 亲 , sincerity tianming

诚

天 - - , lic of China is under the leadership of a focused, powerful and articulate leader. It provides substance and diplomatic architecture to the revived concept of All-Under-Heaven or tianxia 天下, one which assumes a belief that China can be a moral, political and economic great power. In the China Story Yearbook 2013: Civilising China, we noted the efforts by Chinese international relations thinkers to rejig dynastic-era concepts and expressions so that the Communist Party can assert uniquely ‘Chinese ideas’ in world affairs. Otherwise vainglorious attempts to promote such formulations are now backed up by immense national wealth, and they may gain some traction. The historian Wang Wang Gungwu Gungwu 王赓武 has written incisively about All- Source: Flickr1 Under-Heaven in contemporary China; among his observations is the following:

From China’s point of view, talk of a ‘peaceful rise’ suggests that a future rich and powerful China might seek to offer something like a modern vision of tianxia. This would not be linked to the ancient Chinese empire. Instead, China could be viewed as a large multinational state that accepts the framework of a modern tianxia based on rules of equality and sovereignty in the international system today.

… this overarching Confucian faith in universal values was useful to give the Chinese their distinctiveness. As an ideal, it somehow survived the rise and fall of dozens of empires and provided generations of literati down to many modern intellectuals with a sense of cultural unity till this day.

Worrying about China

But there is anxiety associated with tianxia and its Shared Destiny as well. These grand notions do not address the many concrete problems associat- ed with the pace and direction of the country’s reforms, about which many xiv CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven xv 2014 Geremie R Barmé society. Some were nationalists who opposed ‘pro-Western influences’ that moral decline caused by the commercialisation of both the economy and purpose and capable of taking action against endemic corruption and the there were thosewho wanted astronger Communist Party, one with more what happensin Chinaisof growing concernto peopleeverywhere. environment, socialchange, politicalmovements oreconomicgrowth, before, theseissues have aglobalimpact. Whether with regard to the its scale, its problems and its future. At the same time, more than ever China’: about ‘worrying thinkers Chinese sees century twenty-first the of China in therightdirection?Assomany earlierthe seconddecade eras, major world economy andpotential world power: were they even moving Party —to dealwith the vast array of challenges that China facedasa the abilityofof— theleaders thepoliticalclass theChineseCommunist a newwave of ‘Chinaworry’ was sweeping thePeople’sRepublic. of national self-congratulation in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, good reason to be worried. Even during the excitement and popular mood about China’. As theevents of 1989andbeyond would prove, peoplehad malaise of the Hu Jintao and longanalytical works theyabout theperceived raisedconcerns policy titure astheheadof China’s party-state andarmy Inessays in2012–2013. Chinese analysts expressed frustration in the lead-up to inves Xi Jinping’s and a sclerotic political system generated the first major wave of post- Mao ‘crisisconsciousness’ wave major first the generated system political sclerotic a and inequalities, environmental degradation, weakness ontheglobal stage began to remake the country, anxieties over socialchange, economic improving theregionalandglobalstandingof thePeople’sRepublic. sues, take an active role in the information revolution and be decisive in politicaland the country’s economic systems, address pressingsocialis They wanted the new leadership to confront the need to transform further Among themany critics who painted theHu–Wen decadeaslacklustre, Both publicly and privately, commentators expresseddoubts about In thelate 1980s,asadecadeof China’sReformpolicies andOpenDoor 胡锦涛 忧患意识 – Wen Jiabao , orwhat GloriaDavies calls‘worrying 温家宝 decade of 2002–2013. - - PUBLIC APPEARANCE, by Geremie R Barmé

In March 2014, President Xi Jinping and China's First Lady, Peng Liyuan 彭丽媛 , em- barked on a series of state visits, including to Belgium. Peng, who previously enjoyed a successful career as a singer, is known for her personal style and engaging manner. She was particularly prominent during the couple's European tour for her wardrobe.

'First Lady Diplomacy' and the dress of leaders' wives have a chequered history in the People's Republic. Wang Guang- mei 王光美, wife of president Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇, attracted considerable attention when she wore a white cheong-sam/qipao and a pearl necklace during a state visit to Indonesia in April 1963. A few years later, she was subjected to cruel parody by Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution and suf- fered public humiliation by being dressed in a mock cheong-sam and made to wear a China’s President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan in formal wear during their visit to Belgium necklace made out of ping-pong balls dur- Photo: press.cn ing a mass denunciation rally.

Jiang Qing 江青, Mao Zedong's wife and paragon of the Cultural Revolution, was known for her austere style of dress. She even had a hand in designing a 'national costume' 国服 for women in 1974 to parallel the 'Mao suit' (known in Chinese as the Sun Yat-sen or 'Zhongshan suit' 中山装 ).

The wives of party-state leaders have enjoyed a renewed public profile since Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, then among other things Chairman of the Central Military Commission, visited the US in 1979 with his wife, Zhuo Lin 卓琳. It was Jiang Zemin 江泽民, however, Chi- na's president and party leader from 1989 to 2002, who formalised First Lady Diplomacy, even though his wife, and that of his successor Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, left little impression on international audiences.

Peng Liyuan is the first leader's spouse since Jiang Qing to make a fashion statement and, in the March 2014 trip to Belgium, she appeared in a heavily embroidered traditional- style ensemble. For his part, Xi Jinping wore a reimagined Zhongshan suit, the four pockets of the Mao jacket being replaced by two pockets and a concealed pocket on the chest with a Western-style pocket square. The Chinese media extolled the First Couple for sporting 'Diplomatic Lovers' Wear' 外交情侣装. xvii xvi CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven 2014 Geremie R Barmé Prosperity’ 世 Chinese TV Spring Festival Gala with therestof theworld. the solutionswillrelate, oneway or another, to China’sSharedDestiny aboutChina worry fromworry within or without, they areallaware that Party’s power. But whatever their ideological bent, and whether those who and ideological control orfor constitutionalreform andnewlimitsonthe and theirfates, bethey for arevival austerity, of Mao-era masspolitics two previous ChinaStory Yearbooks , we outlined many of thesehopes, managed by astrong partywas thebesthopefor China’s future. Inour media openness. Still others believed that a program of limited reforms of extensive political and legal reforms, greater official accountability and by thosewho hoped that achange inleadershipwould usherinaperiod encouraged the dangerous riseof civil society. Their views were countered 李敖 盛世大联欢 party-state — that China had entered a opposite— thisoneheartily sense embracedby the dented level of general prosperity alsofostered an the risingstandardofcresting, living andunprece Even asthe latest wave ofwas ‘crisisconsciousness’ The ProsperousAge of the Qing Tang dance performances was called‘GrandCelebration of theProsperous Age’ al moment of celebratory, national culturalunity — one of thefeatured the mostwatched television event intheChinesecalendarandanannu- enjoying its first true Prosperous Age Prosperous true first its enjoying Song Zuying shengshi , a ‘Prosperous Age’, or an ‘Age of Harmonious declaredinaspeechat TsinghuaUniversity inBeijingthat China was 唐 dynasties. (Ever thecontrarian, Li pointedly overlooked thezenith of Chinese history.) Alsoin 2007, thenationally famous singer . Two years later, the Taiwanese historian and writer Li Ao 清 和谐盛世 宋祖英

period, 1644–1911, commonly recognised as the third great sanginapaean to theSeventeenth Congressof the . In2005,during the Central 春节联欢晚会 shengshi shengshi

— 盛世

盛 - sincetheHan Source: Flickr1 Taiwanese writerLiAo 汉

and

Party that China was now ‘Walking Towards an Har- monious Prosperous Age’ 走向和谐盛世. Yet as applied to the ‘golden ages’ of the Han, Tang and Qing dynasties, shengshi refers to universally acknowledged periods of remarkable social grace, political rectitude and cultural richness. The self- proclaimed Prosperous Age of today’s People’s Republic has been nearly a century in the making; its achievement is far more contentious. The following semi-official statement provides a shorthand, popular definition of the term ‘Prosperous Song Zuying Age’ as it is presently used in the People’s Republic: Source: Flickr1

A nation can be said to be enjoying a Prosperous Age when it has re- alised certain achievements both in terms of its domestic affairs and international politics.

Internally it features economic prosperity, scientific and technological advancement, intellectual creativity and cultural efflorescence; inter- nationally it features military might; booming trade and considerable influence.

The general definition of a Prosperous Age includes the following measures:

Unparalleled military strength Unsurpassed economic prosperity Unsullied political life Unprecedented scientific and technological advancement, and Unprecedented international exchanges.

盛世，即一个国家内政外交均有建树时的状况： 内政方面：经济繁荣，科技发达，思想活跃，文化昌盛； 外交方面：军事强大，贸易繁荣，影响力大等等。 盛世的界定，一般来说为以下标准： xviii xix CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven 2014 Geremie R Barmé China of strong leaders establishingtheirown LeadingSmallGroups to waxed and waned over theyears. However, there is ahistory inpost-1949 range of policyareas. bodies calledLeading Small Groups and outsideChina, asdid his rapid establishment of supra-governmental the Party, the state surprised and the military many both observers inside China sincethelate-nineteenth century. turally revitalised Chinesenation. Itisadreamthat hasbeendreamt in than thedreamof aneconomically, socially, politically, militarily andcul- American Dream,the China Dream was lessabout individual aspiration ant albeitanxious. enlightenments,and revivals. renaissances The current moodisexuber- both governments andindividuals have beenhastyto announceandhail usuallyare in retrospect. farclearer InChina’smodernhistory, however, our.) Heroic figures, pivotal historical moments, crises and ‘tipping-points’ whethereconomic activity frenetic istheneplusultraof human endeav- Prosperous Age before it is over isill-advised. (Italsobegsthe question change — to be a Golden or era — especially one of rapid socio-cultural Common would sense suggestthat toa particularperiodoran declare to bethedecadeof his rule. Itwas the‘China Dream’ in November 2012,XiJinping announced theleitmotif Upon assuming the position ofof General Secretary the Communist Party Leading theChinaDream Such groups, large and small, short-term and semi-permanent, have The speedwith which Xinotonly took thereinsof power covering 对外交流空前活跃. 科技空前发达 政治空前清明 经济空前繁荣 军事空前强大 领导小组 to overseehis agenda ina of what isexpected 中国梦 . Unlike the push through change in the face of bureaucratic inertia or opposition. In the mid-1960s, Party chairman Mao Zedong 毛泽东 established a Central Cultural Revolution Leading Group 中央文革领导小组 to dismember both party and state mechanisms that he perceived as obstructing his radical socio-political agenda; he wanted the group to reinvigorate the revolu- tion and crush bureaucratic obfuscation. As a result, by the early 1970s, the Party and the state were in such disarray that Mao had to bring Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, a man who had early on fallen foul of his Cultural Rev- olution Leading Group but a capable bureaucratic manager, back from obscurity to help run the country. Deng himself established a series of leadership-like groups to for- mulate and implement policies for a country damaged by so many years of political extremism, educational collapse and administrative malaise. Although Deng was purged again in 1976, he returned to power and be- came the first major leader of the post-Mao era. The bureaucrats he had employed in leadership groups to rebuild a functioning state from the rubble of the Cultural Revolution would eventually guide the country into the new era of Reform and Opening Up inaugurated in late 1978. These achievements were documented in great (if highly fictionalised) detail in the forty-eight-hour docu-drama, Deng Xiaoping During the Historical Transition 历史转折中的邓小平. The series aired throughout China in August 2014 to commemorate the 110th anniversary of Deng’s birth and to celebrate his achievements in turning the coun- try away from Maoist ideology and launching the reforms that continue to transform the Communist Party-led People’s Republic of China. Directed by Wu Ziniu 吴子牛, a member of the once avant-garde Fifth Generation of Chinese film-makers, the series also extolled the establish- ment of China’s first Special Economic Zone in Shen- Director of Deng Xiaoping zhen under what it showed to be the far-sighted and During the Historical Transi- tion, Wu Ziniu sagacious leadership of Xi Zhongxun 习仲勋, an ally Source: scol.com xxi CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven xx 2014 Geremie R Barmé titles thanany rulerof China sincetheQingdynasty’s Qianlong party leadership since the1940sincluding of generations five the in leader any than powers formal and titles more going intheopposite direction.In titularterms alone,hehasamassed man power until his demise in 1997). Xi Jinping, however, appears to be posing for photographs with soldiers, workers, foreign leaders;demon- us ality cult? And why is the mainland media presenting him more asprim- his will on the system and encourage something reminiscent of a person- Why hasXiJinping acted with such pressing haste to amasspower, impose One amongMany long-term. policy options,and damage crucialinstitutional support in themedian- to of powerfulsuch predecessors as Mao, and Deng as well) did not narrow neutering of large swathes of thestate bureaucracy (thenemesisat times to callinghim,hadbecomeChina’sCoE, ‘Chairmanof Everything’. two years into power ‘BigDaddy Xi’ as well asthePeople’sRepublic itself,to seven smallleadinggroups. Only now effectively headof ten party-state bodies,from theParty andarmy, and his cohort are said to have realised and are planning to surpass. He is emperor in the eighteenth century, one whose Prosperous Age Xi Jinping Source: molihua.org Zhongxun father,Xi Xi Jinping’s than China’s primus inter pares?Heisomnipresent: making speeches; Yet speculation remainsrife asto Xi’smotivations, andwhether his if Denghimselfenjoyed level anextraordinary of one- who followed generally adhered to that approach (even mini-Maos would notappear. Theparty-state leaders the forging of an ethos of collective leadership that new personality cultof MaoZedong,and to ensure through new paramount leader. of Deng Xiaoping — and the father of Xi Jinping, China’s Deng, in his day, worked hard to dismantle the 习大大 , as the official media has taken Mao. Hemay well have more 乾隆

Chairman of Everything

Xi Jinping was appointed General Secre- tary of the Party’s Central Committee in November 2012. He assumed top state leadership roles, as President of the Peo- ple’s Republic and Chairman of the Cen- tral Military Commission, the following March. Chinese President and Chairman of the Central Military He currently heads a number of Commission Xi Jinping visits the troops in Fujian province, on 30 July 2014. The visit came just days smaller decision-making bodies within before Army Day, which falls on 1 August and marks the the Central Committee. The Central Lead- founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Photo: Li Gang/Xinhua ing Group for Financial and Economic Affairs has traditionally been led by the General Secretary since Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳 took office, but Xi’s leadership was only publicly revealed on 13 June 2014, when the Xinhua News Agency 新华通讯社, which had already broken with tradition by publishing multiple reports on the group’s traditionally closed- door meetings that year, printed an article that provided titles for Xi and Deputy-Director Li Keqiang 李克强.

As General Secretary, Xi also assumed leadership of the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs, as well as the Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs and its congruent sister organisation, the Central Leading Group on National Security. In November 2013, the Third Plenum of the Party’s Central Committee established the Central National Security Commission (CNSC) to consolidate decision-making on national security issues, a decision that Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang 秦刚 said ‘should make terrorists, extremists, and separatists nervous.’ The Politburo appointed Xi Jinping to head up the CNSC on 24 January 2014. Three additional leading groups were formed in the wake of the Third Plenum and its emphasis on deepening reform. The Central Leading Group for All-Around Deepening Re- form, established in December 2013, the Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization, established in February 2014, and the Central Leading Group for Deepen- ing Reform on National Defense, established in March 2014, are all led by Xi.

• General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee 中共中央总书记 • President of China 国家主席 • Chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission（ 党 、国 ）中 央 军 委 主 席 • Head of Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs 中央财经领导小组 • Head of Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs 中央对台工作领导小组 • Head of Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs (head of sister organisation, the Central Leading Group on National Security) 中央外事工作领导小组（中央国家安全工作 领导小组） • Chairman of Central National Security Commission 中央国家安全委员会 • Head of Central Leading Group for All-Around Deepening Reform 中央全面深化改革 领导 小组 xxiii xxii CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven 2014 Geremie R Barmé bile phoneappnamedStudy Xi Series of Important Speeches’ Jinping’s ‘Xi as theory body the of milestoneParty’s in fifth the as shrined larity issavvy and social media-friendly. His elucubrations arealready en- what Germanthinkerscalled theFührerprinzip once teria andadulation achieved by theMaocultin1960s, butsignsof personality cult,indeed, the popularity of Big Daddy Xistilllacksthehys Some might reason that underXi Jinping China is notwitnessing arevived other public declarations of loyalty andadoration of theleaderandsoon. of theleaderinParty history, theproduction ofentertainments songs, and of allforms of opposition bypolice, anexaggeration the secret of therole were used by bureaucrats as justifications for political action, the crushing as therepeated useof quotations from Stalin’s speechesand sayings that Stalin. Khrushchev includedinhiscondemnation such features of thecult then recently of deceased general theParty secretary and premier Joseph the Cultof theIndividual (or PersonalityCult)that had thrived underthe into hiswisdomontheflyand follow hisofficialitinerary. Source: DaiOu/Flickr1 Moscow inMarch2013 China’s FirstLadyPengLiyuanandXiJinpingarrivein In February 1956,theSoviet leaderNikitaKhrushchev denounced 习近平系列重要讲话 学习 to facilitate peoplewho want to delve Liyuan his celebrity-singer wife Peng holds up press the state-run use of classicalquotations, for itseruditionand canny lyse and praisehis language ana- commentators Official hoods and cheap restaurants. unannounced in neighbour- by showing up(relatively) strating his‘commontouch’ onslaught behind Xi’spopu womanhood. The propaganda icon andmodelof Chinese ; and there is even a mo 彭丽媛 (abeliefthat certain asafashion - - - gifted men are born to rule; that they deserve unswerving loyalty; and, that they take ab- solute responsibility for their leadership) are in evidence. This is hardly surprising in a country where the Crown A street poster in Shanghai promoting ‘The China Dream’ Source: flickr.com/hj223 Jurist of the Third Reich Carl Schmitt enjoys considerable prestige among left-leaning thinkers. As we noted in our China Story Yearbook 2013: Civilising China, Xi Jinping says China must learn to tell The China Story better. But under his dispensation, in an increasingly ideologically policed China, there is an unsettling possibility that everyone may have to repeat the same sto- ry. In recent years, independent creative writing and reportage has flour- ished in China, so it is hardly surprising that now the pumped up deci- bels of the official China Dream as well as the crafted China Story of the party-state threaten to drown out the recent polyphony of the country’s online graphomaniacs. Will such renewed attempts to replace the many with the one enjoy success? It is worth noting that Xi has led the Communist Party’s Polit- buro in a number of study sessions devoted to Dialectical Materialism; it is equally sobering to recall what Simon Leys (the pen name of Pierre Ryckmans, the Australian-Belgian Sinologist who passed away in August 2014) said about this underpinning theory of the Marxist–Leninist state a quarter of a century ago (notwithstanding Slavoj Žižek’s dogged burlesque defence of an ideal Marxism–Leninism):

Dialectics is the jolly art that enables the Supreme Leader never to make mistakes — for even if he did the wrong thing, he did it at the right time, which makes it right for him to have been wrong, whereas the Enemy, even if he did the right thing, did it at the wrong time, which makes it wrong for him to have been right. xxiv xxv CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven 2014 Geremie R Barmé Xi is photographed sitting cross-legged on a on cross-legged sitting photographed is Xi province Hebei county, Fuping in villages Impoverished December: 29–30 Shenzhencent’s headquarters. Ten giant Internet the and troops military visits also He up. opening and reform ther fire-heated bed) talking with villagers. with talking bed) fire-heated resources. natural and trade talk to visits State Mexico and Rica Costa Tobago, and Trinidad June: May–6 31 destiny. shared of communities of speaks he Africa and Russia both In Africa. South Durban, in summit ca) Afri South and China India, Russia, BRICS (Brazil, fifth the attends Xi influence. tour, the European During and US to terweight diplomatic sphere are to develop a coun the in aspirations Xi’s suggests countries of choice The countries. four to visit state day nine- a is president as tour foreign first Xi’s (Brazzaville) Congo of Republic and ca Afri South Tanzania, Russia, March: 22–30 many peoples. non-Han home to China’s less developed northwest, in conditions living improve to promises Xi Gansu Province and Villages Communities in February: 2–5 2013 kang South the a Tour of as known tradition Qing and Ming imperial the in and Xiaoping Deng leader reformist of footsteps the in following Guangzhou, and Foshan Zhuhai, Shenzhen, of atour during is Party Communist the of Secretary eral Gen as appearance major first Jinping’s Xi South the of Tour 7–11 December: 2012 XI AT THE HELM: AN ITINERARY AN HELM: AT THE XI

炕 (traditional Chinese rural northern 南巡

. Xi commits to fur to commits . Xi

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Liaoning Organisation summit in Bish in summit Organisation , China’s only aircraft , aircraft only China’s steamed steamed ------2014

6–8 February: Sochi Winter Olympics 3–4 July: South Korea Xi is an enthusiastic guest at the Winter Xi leads a delegation to South Korea in- Games. cluding representatives from more than one hundred Chinese companies including 25 February: Walking around Beijing Baidu and Alibaba. hutongs in the Smog After five days of heavy smog in Beijing, 13–23 July: Greece, Brazil, Argentina, Vene- Xi is photographed walking around some zuela and Cuba of the city’s hutong alleys and talking with En route to Brazil, Xi stops over on Rhodes residents without a face-mask. State media Island to meet the Greek Prime Minister headlines and social media promote the and discuss their countries’ deepening ties. images under the rubric ‘breathing togeth- In Brazil, Xi attends the sixth BRICS summit er, sharing one destiny’. in Fortaleza and spends three days with Pu- tin and other BRICS presidents. 22 March–1 April: Netherlands, France, Germany, and Belgium 30 July: Troops in Fujian Province On state visits to four European countries, Xi visits troops stationed in Fuzhou, Fujian Xi attends the third Nuclear Security Sum- province, a key military location across the mit in The Hague and a G7 meeting on the straits from Taiwan. Xi vows to strike hard side. against corruption in the military ahead of the eighty-seventh anniversary of the 27–30 April: Xinjiang founding of the PLA on 1 August. Xi vows to ‘strike first’ against terrorism during a visit to the Xinjiang Uyghur Au- 21–22 August: People’s Republic of Mon- tonomous Region, which he calls China’s golia ‘frontline of terror’. State media quotes him During a two-day state visit to Mongolia, Xi saying that China must ‘make terrorists be- agrees to give Mongolia access to China's come like rats scurrying across a street as northern ports and the two countries agree everybody shouts “beat them!” ’ He visits to double annual bilateral trade. a village and a school near Kashgar, chats 12–19 September: Tajikistan, The Maldives, with Uyghurs, inspects troops and watches Sri Lanka and India military training. Xi attends the Shanghai Cooperation Or- 20–21 May: Shanghai CICE Meeting and ganisation summit in Dushanbe, meeting Russia Gas Deal Putin before the summit opens. Other Xi meets Russian President Vladimir Putin countries in the group are Kazakhstan, Kyr- in Shanghai where they attend the Fourth gyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Xi then Conference on Interaction and Confidence- proceeds on a South Asian tour, with the Building Measures in Asia and oversee the final stop his first state visit to India. signing of a thirty-year gas deal between

China and Russia estimated to be worth US$400 billion. xxvii xxvi CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven 2014 Geremie R Barmé 荣剑 including DengYuwen proliferated, ‘crisisconsciousnesswriters’, In previous years, when China’s many stories 1. reins of power: Chairman Xi’s unseemly haste since takingthe China. Here we positourown Ten Reasons for 6. 5. 4. 3. 2. as aperiodof strategic opportunity newmillennium the of decades two first the identified long have leaders Chinese the system, heknows hewill notachieve thesegoals. Unless he cansidelinesclerotic or obstructive forcesand elements of lead thenation and themasses—akindof secular Messiahcomplex. providentielhimself l’homme Men’, heconsiders salvation. Believing that in the theory history is created by ‘Great his missionisto restore thepositionof theCommunist Party asChina’s nomenklatura, encourages thepersonalself-belief ifnothubris that His status asamember of theRed ‘princelings’,orrevolutionary transformation of theChineseeconomy. nomic andsocialproblems, inparticularthecrucialnextstage inthe pelling China to confront anddealwith some of itsmostpressingeco internationalHe faces market andpoliticalpressures that arecom- and enhanceChina’sregionalglobalstanding. pursue anevolving agenda that aims to strengthen party-state rule He isriding a wave of support for change and popular goodwill to than thosearound him. the profound systemicfacing China crises the government XiJinping is moreaware of ious local,provincial andcentral levels of Given hishistory asacadreworking at var- China bestto advance itsinterests. and the globalbalanceof power enable 机遇期 , enumerated listsof ten problems facing during which regional conditions 邓聿文 andRong Jian 战略

dhnews.zjol.com.cn (bottom) Source: news.takungpao.com(top); Deng Yuwen (top);RongJian(bottom) whose destiny isto

- 7. He is aware of the seriousness of the public crisis of confidence in the Party engendered by decades of rampant corruption. 8. He is sincere in his belief in the Marxist–Leninist–Maoist worldview, which is tempered by a form of revived Confucian statecraft that is popularly known as ‘imperial thinking’ 帝王思想. 9. Resistance to reform (including of corrupt practices) by the bureau- cracy can only be countered by the consolidation of power. 10. The consensus among his fellow leaders that China needs a strong figurehead to forge a path ahead further empowers him.

In the process of expanding his power, Xi and his Politburo colleagues were handed a windfall when, in early 2012, the Chongqing security boss Wang Lijun 王立军, said to be in fear of his life after falling out with the city’s powerful Party Secretary Bo Xilai 薄熙来 and his (as it turned out) homicidal wife, Gu Kailai 谷开来, fled to Chengdu to seek asylum at the American Consulate. These bizarre events gave the incoming leadership a chance to purge a potentially dangerous (and popular) political rival all in the name of dealing with corruption and the abuse of power. Following the consolidation of his power, Xi proceeded to undertake a gradual elimina- tion of prominent party and army leaders implicated in corrupt dealings (some would note that it was surprising that, given their prominent role in central politics, neither he nor his predecessor, Hu Jintao, had effective- ly addressed the problem before). By September 2014, some forty-eight high-level Communist Party cadres, military officials and party-state bureaucrats (that is, those ranked at deputy provincial or ministerial level or above 副省、副部、副军级以上 干部) had been swept up in the post-Eighteenth Party Congress anti-corruption campaign led by Xi and Wang Qishan 王岐山, Secretary of the Party’s Central Commis- sion for Discipline Inspection. The highest level targets of the purge were the Hu–Wen-era Party Politburo mem- ber Zhou Yongkang 周永康 and the People's Liberation PLA General Xu Caihou Army (PLA) General Xu Caihou 徐才厚. As this Yearbook Source: tw.aboluowang.com xxviii xxix CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven 2014 Geremie R Barmé Second Generation’ similarly humble origins. None camefrom theranksof Xi’speers,the‘Red they of the ‘Office-holders' Second Generation’ Second ‘Office-holders' the of they from theYan’an erathrough to theearly People’sRepublic. Neither were Tigers Too BigtoCage vealing state secrets(terminal cancerallowed Xu to escapeprosecution). was going to press,Zhou was sentenced to life andre injailfor bribery It isnoteworthy ‘Tigers’ that allforty-eight above RankThirteen intheTwenty-four RankCadreSystem as defined (then cadres high-level of generation first the of members of officials, are reportedly from ‘commoner’ from reportedly are officials, the conclusionto ourChinaStory Yearbook 2012:Red Rising,Red Eclipse. The China Story Project for someyears, and they featured in ‘Red Eclipse’, business of corruption.Membersof thisgroup have beenof interestto party-state went to ontherecord state why they areabove thegrimy two years of the campaign, members of the privileged families of the comfy: businessasusual.It’s allvery discreetly relocated, shunted into early retirement orquietly ‘redeployed’. to have campaign: being in the anti-corruption enjoyed a‘soft landing’ gentry arerumouredto beimplicatedthey incorruptpractices, appear tigers andswat flies.) he fell foul of thesystem before XiJinping launched his campaign to kill Xilai belonged to theRed SecondGeneration andwas aPolitburo member, NationalPolitical Consultative People’s Committee(Although Bo in1954. 部制 of the ageing party gentry, their fellows and their families should not the closedsystem of China’s party-state theseseemingly defunctmembers What hasbeenrather moreunexpected, however, isthat after nearly And so while an impressive number of the progeny of the Party’s ) and members of the inaugural National People’sCongressand the 红二代 —childrenof theCommunist Party founders 老虎 平民 , that ishigh-level corrupt familieswith peasant or 官二代 —thechildren 二十四级干

In - be underestimated; they cannot be dismissed, as some would have it, as marginal figures or has-beens. Nor is it wise to overlook the fury that their hauteur and unthinking air of superiority provokes among those members of the bureaucracy without such lofty connections, or among China’s aspirational classes more generally. In particular, members of the Red Second Generation, along with optimists of various backgrounds, privately argue that Xi Jinping has amassed power as a stopgap measure to enable him to deal with fractious Party colleagues. Among other things, and to assuage hardline attitudes at senior levels, he has conceded to repressive policies across the board of a kind not seen since the early months of Jiang Zemin’s 江泽民 decade of tenure from 1989. Over time, and with the inauguration of a new Polit- buro in 2017, it is reasoned, Xi will reveal his reformist agenda and guide China towards a major political transition. ‘Gorbachev Dreaming’ of this kind has offered respite for wishful thinkers for a quarter of a century. It continues to kindle hope even among some of the most hopeless.

Sagacious Revivalism

For the nomenklatura, the notions of All-Under-Heaven and Shared Des- tiny underpin the role of the Party in the state; they see these ideas as closely aligned with the Marxist–Leninist–Maoist ideology that justifies the Party’s leading role. While the formulation Shared Destiny might be relatively new, party thinkers have always emphasised that the Party gives political expression to a community of shared aspirations and val- ues. In earlier eras the vanguard of this community was the rev- olutionary workers and peasants, and later the worker-peasant- soldier triumvirate of the Mao era. In the post-1978 reform era, Deng Xiaoping added intellectuals to the community and the Jiang Zemin dec- ade of the 1990s folded business people and capitalists into its embrace as well. Under Hu Jintao, who led the party collective in the first decade xxxi xxx CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven 2014 Geremie R Barmé ter, Deputy Director of the China Mayors’ Association Association Mayors’ China the of Director Deputy ter, 副会长 Ye Xiangzhen Tigers Explain Tigers and eldest daughter of Marshall Ye Jianying Ye Jianying Marshall of daughter eldest and the founders of the PLA): Head of the All-China Confucius Academy Academy Confucius All-China the of Head Tao Siliang 协会 Photo: powerapple.com niece ofZhouEnlai Zhou Bingdeisthe : pursuing campaign anti-corruption the out carrying in Jinping Xi Secretary General support and role positive natural, our play to us for time is It revolutionaries. of generation second the of] [a member I am, what just that’s because Generation Second aRed I’m that admit to willing I’m forward. it carry will we because lustre, its lose ever will gene this that are not easily corruptible. easily not are speaking, relatively and, fathers their by influenced profoundly are They nation. the for themselves tyr mar and blood shed to willing were they that fact the generation, parents’ their of struggles and ity frugal the witnessed Generation Second Red The to bequeathed parents our blood of heritage the and revolution Through , member of the Fourth Generation of film-makers of film-makers Generation Fourth of the , member 陶斯亮

叶向真 reform to the end. the to reform

, the pre-1966 Party elder Tao Zhu’s Tao Zhu’s elder Party pre-1966 , the , also known as Lingzi Lingzi as known , also us the Red Gene Gene Red the us Agency and niece of former premier Zhou Enlai Enlai Zhou premier former of niece and Agency Zhou Bingde placing the People and the Nation above all. of parents their from tradition the inherited have they that is corruption in involved rarely very only are background Generation Second aRed from bureaucrats that reason The 周秉德 红色基因 叶剑英 中华孔子学会 凌子 , former Deputy Chief of the China News News China the of Chief Deputy , former , Deputy , Deputy . I don’t believe believe . I don’t (one of 陶铸 - - 中国市长 daugh Photo: Sina.cn business powerful inbothpoliticsand remains oneofChina’smost Ye Xiangzhen.TheYe family -

com Photo: zhts20062006.lofter. Tao Siliang 周恩来 :

Hu Muying 胡木英, the daughter of Party prop- agandist and writer extraordinaire Hu Qiaomu 胡乔木, and the organiser of The Children of Yan’an 北京延安儿女联谊会:

The Centre under General Secretary Xi Jinping has raised high the banners of ‘Opposing the Four Winds’, Anti-Corruption Pro-Frugality and Mass Line Education. These Three Banners are backed up by real action against the ill-winds ‘It is for real now! The breeze is blow- ing away the evil air,’ said Hu Muying and pernicious miasma that has suffused when she convened The Children of our world for many years, and he has taken the Yan’an at Spring Festival in 2014. Hu Muying is the daughter of the late Hu knife to both Tigers and Flies. Qiaomu, a former politburo member and writer who served both Mao This is a Life and Death Struggle! I sincerely Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Photo: dvpd.com.cn hope that our Red Second Generation will clearly recognise the [gravity of the] situation, and during this struggle firmly support and closely coordinate with our Central Committee led by General Secretary Xi Jinping so that we can contribute our meagre energies, carry on the revolutionary legacy of our fathers’ generation of party members, pass on and enhance the positive energy of the past, discover and support all of society’s healthy energies, not create interference by means of distracting broadsides, not create more problems than we help resolve, not believe in or spread rumours, not interfere with the strategy of the Centre and, like our fathers before us, and for the sake of the enterprise of the Party and the greater good of the People, to cast aside our individual needs, overcome our present or historical resentments and grudges, unite as one and work to make China wealthy and strong and realise the great dream of the renaissance of the Chinese nation. xxxiii xxxii CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven 2014 Geremie R Barmé mon’ or ‘co-joined’. From the Red SamaritanLeiFengmon’ or‘co-joined’. collective suffuses thepublic life of thePeople’sRepublic. Thecontributors Jinping’s China‘WestJinping’s Korea’ of conscience in every sphere, have even led some Beijing wits to call Xi 1989 purge, uprooting thesprouts of civil societyandpersecutingpeople Internet, dissent repressing with a vigour notseensincethe post-4 June ty, on traditional values over Western norms,onquelling the boisterous ite terms inaword cloudintheshapeof theChinesecharacter Shared Destiny. Thecover of thisYearbook dists preferto days,it these call issuffused withideasof collective and martyr party member JiaoYulu Source: chineseposters.net Emulate Comrade JiaoYulu, GoodStudent Comrade MaoZedong’s Party education and propaganda, or ‘publicity’ as China’s propagan - 西朝鲜 焦裕禄 . , to PLAheroics, the ethosof the includes many of theirfavour - collective, on Party probi- newed emphasis onthe ty legitimacytoday. Are forms thebedrock of Par- of Chinese society, that communities and strata 中华民族 ests of the‘Chinese nation’ Party represents theinter- is just thisclaim,that the revolutionary edge. But it Union of having lostits when accusingtheSoviet as revisionist inthe 1960s denounced his colleagues Maoand — anexpression a party of ‘all the people’ became finally Party nist ry, theChineseCommu- centu- twenty-first the of 雷锋 includingallthe to themodel 共 ‘com- - to this Yearbook examine this topic from various angles. Paradoxically, it was under the rubric of collectivity during the Maoist era that the greatest damage was inflicted on Chinese individuals and families. Today, China promises that its revived collective mentality, shored up by a piecemeal use of traditional political thinking, is the only way to realise national goals, even as many observers note that the collective aspirations articu- lated and pursued by the state will come at a high cost, perhaps making it impossible for Chinese society to become mature, modern, self-aware and politically responsible even as it becomes rich and prosperous. In its stead, we see another Chinese leader drawing inspiration not only from modern political ideology but also from the tradition of state Confucianism to promote their vision for China. In our 2013 Yearbook, Civilising China, we noted attempts in the 1930s by the Nationalist lead- er Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 to modern- ise the Republic of China by employing ideas and values from the Confucian past in his New Life Movement 新生活 運動. Today, Xi Jinping refers to the body of thinking and practice that was used by dynastic leaders for over two millennium to re-introduce Confucian ideas about virtue, morality, hierarchy, acceptable behaviour, social cohesion and prosperity (the countervailing ele- ments of Confucianism that supported dissent, criticism of excessive power and humanity are quietly passed over). A punctilious Xi Jinping has also called for the institution of new state ceremo- nies that will intermesh with numerous new regulations regarding how public Jiao Yulu, the model cadre officials should comport themselves Source: chineseposters.net xxxv xxxiv CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven 2014 Geremie R Barmé a Greater EastAsiaCo-prosperity Sphere perialism andimposing itsown rule,announcedthat itwould construct omy Japan was bestplaced to lead the region by expelling Western im- made itclearthat as Asia’ssuperior power/econ nation/race/military gional harmony, in 1940 the Japanese imperial government, which bly Hsi-sheng ghost-written partytheorist,T’ao by Chiang’s Kai-shek’s 1943 wartime book Chiang of echoes find we pronouncements such In funds. public use and internally, as well as externally. While many in Asia and the Pacific may Pacific the and Asia in many externally.While as well internally,as every sphere of activity — will continue to shape the country’s behaviour of China’s Maoistera—that of the collective outweighing the individual in China more confidently engages in global governance, anand as abiding element discourse, official Chinese in embedded further becomes theme nity of SharedDestiny during the APECSummit held inBeijing. As this that earlier era. Shared Destiny, somerecallthe grand rhetoric, and failed ambitions, of talk of creating inEastAsiaaharmoniousregionorCommunity of Realms Under One Rule. It is hardly surprising then that with renewed All-Under-Heaven. InJapanese this was calledhakkō ichiu Japanese versionof thetianxia wouldan age-old realise Source: blog.goo.ne.jp/nihon-revival ichiu hakkō Eight RealmsUnderOneRule Prior to Chiang Kai-shek’s talk of destiny, joint concerns and re In November 2014,XiJinping returnedto thetopic of theCommu-

八紘一宇

China’s Destiny Communist Party. the Chinese of vision fining entirely theincreasingly con- partners will want to share China’s neighboursortrade lic, itishardly certainthat destiny to thePeople’sRepub bound by aneconomicshared indeed concede that they are 《中國之命運》 大東亞共榮圏 八紘一宇 陶希聖 . Thesphere (most proba- vision of ). , Eight - - -

China’s Destiny: Quotations from Generalissimo Chiang To make China strong and independent, it is necessary that all citizens, from the highest to the lowest, must be united in one purpose; that we rouse ourselves for thorough reform, eliminate frivolity by insisting upon honesty, and discourage indolence by upholding active endeavor. Our thinking must be realistic, our living disciplined; our duties must be per- formed with a sense of responsibility, and our actions must be orderly; and we must seek the truth through practical work, and progressively strive for improvement. Only in this way can China stand on a footing of equality in the Family of Nations and share the responsibility for permanent world peace and the liberation of mankind.

Our Chinese nation must crystalise into a solid, rocklike body of national defense, needless to say, no individual may Nationalist Party leader Chiang Kai-shek’s 1943 wartime book enjoy the ‘freedom’ of a loose grain of sand. …[I]n the rela- China’s Destiny tion between the individual and the state, whether during or Photo: bbs.tiexue.net after the war, ‘individual freedom’ of the type of loose grains of sand cannot be tolerated.

If China’s adult citizens cannot unite on a large scale, our unity cannot long endure, and we shall experience the humiliation and shame of being ‘a pan of loose sand’ [一盤散沙] and be laughed at for our ‘five minutes of boiling blood’ 五分鐘的熱血[ ].

If our internal affairs are unified, if the strength of our state is centralized, and if, in ad- dition, all the citizens can join in a united effort, then China’s destiny may be epitomized by the following words: ‘Be sincere and united, uphold the Government and obey the law’; and in that event, China’s destiny will be independence and liberty.

It has been previously stated that the inherent virtues of the Chinese people consist of the ability to endure humiliation, accept responsibility, understand thrift, and possess a sense of honor. Because the Chinese people possess these virtues, they are not afraid of strong enemies, and do not take advantage of minorities and the weak, but rather apply their traditional principle of magnanimity, and treat others as they wish to be treated themselves. For this reason they have been for thousands of years the leaders of the people of Asia in ‘preserving the perishing and sus- taining those that might be destroyed’, and in ‘helping the weak and assisting the fallen’. As a consequence, there is no historical evidence of economic exploitation or of po- litical domination of the peoples of Asia during the period when China was strong and prosperous; nor was there any imperialism or colonialism.

[A]fter China has become independent and strong, she will definitely not wish the sufferings she has endured to be

Chiang Kai-shek inflicted upon other countries, and furthermore, after the Source: chenmodemaque.blog.163. overthrow of Japanese imperialism, she will not even con- com sider assuming the mantle of Japanese imperialism with the idea of ‘leading Asia’. xxxvii xxxvi CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven 2014 Geremie R Barmé value for theengaged public. sciences. The resulting admix has, we believe, both policy relevance and by supportingthat research humanities-led engages actively with the social CIW encouragespolitical, economicandculturalrealities. such anapproach while attempting to understandthebroad spectrumof China’s socio- one thatthe forces, considers and ideasatpersonalities work inChina allow for amoreholisticapproach to thestudy of contemporary China: Seventieth George E Morrison Lectureat ANU. The Centre was created to minister, theHonKevin Rudd MP, inAprilofon theoccasion 2010 the ment–ANU initiative that was announcedby thenAustralian prime from various otherperspectives. CIWisaCommonwealth Govern- China Story It ispartof(ANU). abroad undertakingaimedat understandingThe on China in the World (CIW) at The Australian National University China Story Yearbook isaproject initiated by theAustralian Centre The politics, social activism and law, economics, the Internet, cultural mores China in theWorld. They survey China’s regional posture, urban change, Destiny greater insightsinto andnecessary Chinaanditsplaceintheworld. international academy,metrics-obsessed but they may readily fail to offer who pursue narrow approaches disciplinary to China today well serve the Socialism with Chinese Characteristics thinking and agendas in the guise ofan understanding of neo-liberal the dialecticprestidigitations of MaoZedongThought. Similarly, itrequires and ideas Marxist-Leninist of influence abiding the appreciate literature, China toChinese thought,history befamiliarwithbasicclassical and Chairman of Everything requires the serious student of contemporary China is agifttoXi Jinping’s theNew Sinologist, for theworld of the the disparate living traditions of Chinese thought, language and culture. Sinology, that isastudy of Chinaunderpinned by anunderstanding of

Most of thescholarsand writers whose work features inShared The Australian Centre on China in the World promotes a New China Story Yearbook are membersof orareassociated with the Australian Centre on 中国的故事 , both as portrayed by official China, and China, official by portrayed as both , 具有中国特色的社会主义 . Those and arts, history and thought during the second year of Xi Jinping’s tenure as party-state leader. Their contributions cover the years 2013–2014, updat- ed to December 2014, and offer an informed perspective on recent develop- ments in China and what these may mean for the future. Shared community, shared values, the imposition of collectivity — it is under such a system that difference is discriminated against, policed and co- erced. The account in this Yearbook is a sobering one. We position our story between two plenary sessions of the Chinese Communist Party, the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress in November 2013, which focused on economics, and which is the topic of Chapter 1 by Jane Golley, and the final chapter by Susan Trevaskes and Elisa Nesossi, which concentrates on the new legal regime under Xi Jinping, the theme of the Party’s Fourth Ple- num in October 2014. In Chapter 2, Richard Rigby and Brendan Taylor look more closely at Xi’s foreign policy, an area which saw some major missteps in 2013 and 2014, perhaps due to what we might well call the Maoist style of Xi and his advising generals. This approach has been celebrated in the official Chinese media as a form of ‘foreign policy acupuncture’ 点穴外交. I would suggest that the general tactics used — action, reaction, recalibration, withdrawal — is a disruptive style that recalls Mao’s famous Sixteen-charac- ter Mantra 十六字诀 on guerilla warfare: ‘When the enemy advances, we re- treat; when the enemy makes camp we harass; when the enemy is exhausted we fight; and, when the enemy retreats we pursue’敌进我退，敌驻我扰，敌 疲我打，敌退我追. It is an approach that purposely creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension. To appreciate the mindset behind such a strategy students of China need to familiarise themselves with such Maoist classics as On Guerilla Warfare《论游击战》and On Contradiction《矛盾论》. Chapter 3, by Jeremy Goldkorn, looks at the cordoning of the Chinese Internet from a world wide web that proffers a community of shared infor- mation, while in Chapter 4, Gloria Davies considers how official China talks to and about itself. In Chapter 5, Carolyn Cartier examines the shared desti- nies of people flooding Chinese cities from the countryside and the common spaces shared by Chinese tourists and immigrants around the world. xxxix xxxviii CHINA STORY YEARBOOK Under One Heaven 2014 Geremie R Barmé rials areavailable onlineat: http://thechinastory.org/dossier/ under discussion.Footnotes andtheCIW–Danwei Archive of sourcemate The Chronology at theendof thevolume provides anoverview of theyear of finally,topic the Tomba,and, Luigi by global Li Ran Wernli designed thebookandcover image. uscript, and to Lindy Allenand Sharon Strange for typesetting. Markuz her extensive and painstaking editorial work on various drafts of the man- formation windows in chapters. We aredeeply grateful to Linda Jaivin for vant to theproject, aswell ashelped to compile thematerial usedinthe- — who provided updates and English-language material of Chinese- rele codify family values, in particular in XiJinping speeches by Benjamin Penny; anessay onrulesthat seekto These includeanoverview of andculturalreferencesliterary theclassical chapters oroffer a dedicated discussionof atopic of relevance to theyear. tics, people and events. Forums, or ‘interstices’, expand on the contents of information windows that highlight particular words, issues, ideas, statis leagues at Danwei MediainBeijing — Joel Martinsen,AidenXia Linda Jaivin and Jeremy Goldkorn, has worked closely with Jeremy’s col- The editorial group that hasoverseenthis project, GeremieRBarmé, Acknowledgements policy ontheartsby LindaJaivin; Chinesecinemaby QianYing Groot; thepoliticsofGerry protest inTaiwan by Mark Harrison;official by Rebecca Fabrizi; by David relations Murphy; and Sino-European portraitsof Sino-Russian temporary Chineseartby ChenShuxia a meditation on the concept of the right to speak or huayuquan look at confusingtimesfor foreign businessinChina by Antony Dapiran; Chapters arearranged thematically and they are interspersed with 李然 , Jay Wang a discussion of the United Front work of the Party by 王造玢 , Tessa Thorniley and Joanna (Yeejung) Yoon filial piety, by Zou Shu Cheng 陈淑霞 shared airby Wuqiriletu. ; Chinesefamiliesgoing . 钱颖 邹述丞

夏克余 话语权 ; con- ; a - - - ,

The Cover Image

The Yearbook cover consists of a word cloud

in the shape of the character 共 gong, ‘shared’, 集体主义共亲亲 假公济私 敬大臣 修身同呼吸同圈 子 意 识 柔远人 自同生同死 立 共 同 前 进 大 义 灭 亲 忧 患 意公 识 柔远人 诚信 信 来百工共 共公而忘利 同呼 命 运 吸 力 圈 子 意 识 双 赢 同 呼 吸 同生同死 ‘collective’ or ‘common’, followed by the three 铁面 治民富民 修 身 无私 大我小我 双 烹小鲜 共同命运 赢 尊贤 族群意识 自立自强 假同呼吸 公 济 私 廉洁奉公 体群臣 共同繁荣族群意识 动真格的 服务国家 大我小我 铁面无私 同舟 自 共济 尊 普强 天 同 庆 亲 烹小鲜 体群臣 修 贤 亲 铁面无私 身 亲 亲 尊 诚共 信 共同前进贤 共 患尊贤 遇柔 难 人 other characters that make up the expression 诚 信公信力 执行力 ·公 信远 力

普 天 同 庆 亲亲

烹 小鲜 Shared Destiny 共同命运, the theme of this 藏 污 纳 垢 治民富民·爱民敬民·动真格的·服务国家 孤掌难鸣 诚 信 克 己 复 尊 同 呼 吸 礼 贤 铁 面 无 私 损人 公 克 集体 铁 信 集体主义 修身 主义 力 损公亲 亲 克己奉公 损公肥私 爱民敬民 治民富民 风雨同舟 面 肥私 公而 忘利 己 普 天 同双 庆 体群臣柔远人 服务国家 爱民敬民 共 复 无 修 子庶民 执行力 赢 个人主义身 多难兴邦利己礼 烹 私鲜 book. 共 诚尊贤 信诚信尊 贤小 公 信力尊 贤 执 行 力 自私自爱 子 庶 民 共

圈 一 心 为 公 亲 同 前 进 子 自私风雨同舟 亲 亲 意 集体主义·惠诚睦和 自利 廉洁 烹 小 鲜 The word cloud features expressions and 识 亲 奉公 尊 修身、尊贤、亲亲、 体群臣、子庶民、柔远人。 诚信 贤 执行力 尊 圈子意识同呼吸 共同繁荣 贤 烹小鲜 亲亲 公而忘利 克己奉公 廉洁奉公· 惠诚睦和 廉洁奉公 同呼吸 柔远人 怀诸唯我独尊侯诚 惠诚 修身 信 修身 共同 家园 亲亲 睦和 尊贤体群臣 多 难兴邦共 克己复礼 official clichés that have gained purchase, or 集体主义 共同命运 惠诚睦和 同呼吸 renewed currency in the Xi Jinping era. For example, the top left-hand corner of the char- acter gong includes such terms as: ‘self-culti- Edited by Geremie R Barmé with Linda Jaivin and Jeremy Goldkorn Cover of the China Story Yearbook vation’ 修身, taken from the Confucian clas- 2014 with a word cloud, featuring expressions and official clichés in sic The Great Learning《大学》; ‘breathing the shape of the character 共 gong Artwork: Markuz Wernli the same air’ 同呼吸; ‘sincerity and trust’ 诚 信; and, ‘advancing together’ 共同前进. Or, in the top right-hand corner: ‘self-reliant and self-strengthening’ 自立自强; ‘exploit the public to benefit the private’ 假公济私; and, ‘mollify people from afar’ 柔远人. Other terms date from the Maoist era (1949–1978) of the People’s Republic or earlier, expressions that feature in Xi’s remarks on the Community of Shared Des- tiny, or in pronouncements contained in his ever-expanding ‘series of im- portant speeches’. As mentioned earlier, the Xi era is a boon for the New Sinologist: in today’s China, party-state rule is attempting to preserve the core of the cloak-and-dagger Leninist state while its leaders tirelessly repeat Maoist dicta which are amplified by socialist-style neo-liberal policies wedded to cosmetic institutional Confucian conservatism. The Yearbook word cloud cover, which employs the white-on-red palette used for billboards featuring party slogans and exhortations, was designed by Markuz Wernli and succinctly reflects this exercise in the incommensurable. This text is taken from Shared Destiny, edited by Geremie R Barmé, Linda Jaivin and Jeremy Goldkorn, published 2015 by ANU Press, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.