Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks

Home , June 30, Moment of silence, Retreat (survivalism), Robert MacLean, September 11, September 11 attacks

National Park Service U.S. Department of the Interior

National Center for Cultural Resources

National Park Service Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks

Janet A. McDonnell

1 2 3 4 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

McDonnell, Janet A., 1952- The National Park Service : responding to the September 11 terrorist attacks / by Janet A. McDonnell. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. United States. National Park Service. 2. September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 2001. I. Title. SB482.A4M338 2004 973.931--dc22 2004026454

Cover: U. S. Park Police patrol New York Harbor after the attacks. Inside cover, Maj. Tom Wilkins, U.S. Park Police, holds the American ﬂag during rescue operations at Ground Zero. The National Park Service:

Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks

Janet A. McDonnell National Park Service Department of the Interior

iii Table of Contents

Preface ...... vii Introduction ...... x

I. National Park Service’s Initial Response ...... 1 Main Interior Building, Tuesday, September 11, 2001 ...... 1 Continuity of Operations ...... 4 Park Closures ...... 8 Support to the Department of the Interior ...... 11 Conclusion ...... 13

II. National Capital Region ...... 15 U.S. Park Police Headquarters ...... 15 Securing the White House, Monuments, and Memorials ..... 17 Motorcycle Unit ...... 18 Aviation Unit ...... 19 Evacuation of Cabinet Officials ...... 24 Traffic Management ...... 25 Additional Park Police Missions ...... 26 Park Rangers Respond ...... 26 National Mall ...... 29 Catoctin Mountain Park ...... 30 Conclusion ...... 31 III. New York City ...... 33 U.S. Park Police New York field office ...... 33 Manhattan Sites ...... 36 Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island National Monuments ...... 46

iv The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Gateway National Recreation Area ...... 55 Conclusion ...... 58 IV. Incident Management ...... 61 Convening Incident Management Teams ...... 61 Incident Management System ...... 64 Delegation of Authority ...... 65 Role and Activities of the Type 1 Team ...... 66 Type 2 Incident Management Team—Northeast Region ...... 70 Conclusion ...... 73 V. Challenges ...... 77 Communications ...... 77 Coordination ...... 80 Funding ...... 85 VI. Aftermath ...... 89 Impact on Parks and Visitors ...... 90 Shortage of Law Enforcement Personnel ...... 95 Multi-region Coordination Group ...... 101 Conclusion ...... 107

Notes ...... 111 Oral History Interviews ...... 123 Photo Credits ...... 125 Index ...... 126

Table of Contents v vi The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Preface

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and their aftermath left few Americans unaffected. As the federal agency with primary responsibility for protecting and preserving many of the nation’s most significant cultural and historic sites, the National Park Service had a unique perspective and role in responding to this tragedy. The most profound personal impact within the Service was no doubt on those employees who either witnessed the attacks firsthand or were directly involved in the immediate response, but every national park was affected to one degree or another. Park Service historians and ethnographers quickly recognized the need to record and preserve the experiences and perspectives of those who had witnessed or responded to the attacks. They conducted more than a hundred oral history interviews with Service employees throughout the country, in parks, regional offices, and the Washington headquarters. These unique interviews reveal the memories and interpretation of the event and aftermath in the words of those directly affected. In addition to conducting interviews, there was also a need to document and evaluate the official response of the National Park Service. With that in mind, I began to research the following questions: How did Service managers and staff respond at the national level and in the regional and park offices? What actions did they take and why? How did the attacks and their aftermath affect the way the Service and the parks operated? How did they affect park resources and the allocation of those resources? What impact did the attacks have on the way park staffs viewed their jobs and the way Americans viewed their parks? And finally, what lessons could the Service learn from this experience? What did the Service’s response say about its values and responsibilities? Simply put, my goal was to foster a deeper appreciation and understanding for the way the Service and its employees responded to the attacks and to create a detailed historical record of this unique and significant period in the Service’s history. This history is also designed to provide

View of the Statue of Liberty overlooking New York Harbor.

vii Service managers and policymakers with information they might find useful in responding to future emergencies. Writing this history presented some unique challenges. Many of the major decisions about the response operations were made in phone conversations or in meetings with little or no written record. A scarcity of written records meant a greater reliance on the oral history interviews that National Park Service historians and ethnographers conducted. This approach involved a certain amount of risk: memories can be faulty especially after experiencing such a traumatic event; oral accounts can sometimes be confusing or lack specific details. The September 11 event was truly unique in nature and scope. For the first time in our history, American commercial airplanes were used as terrorist weapons. Never before had a terrorist attack within the United States resulted in so many casualties. The resulting story is complex, involving a broad range of perspectives, activities, and locations. When dealing with such a traumatic and chaotic event, even determining an accurate sequence of events can be difficult. Memories are powerful. Witnesses were often more likely to recall vividly their sense of shock and fear, the acrid smell of burning debris, or their images of wounded victims than to recall factual details. Yet both types of information are important for the historical record. “The lived experience is more complex than subsequent interpretations reveal,” explains Mary Marshall Clark, the director of the Oral History Research Office at Columbia University.1 The personal stories conveyed in the interviews reflect the horror of what witnesses experienced before these stories were turned into a more acceptable narrative. This history reveals how the event strained Park Service resources, highlighted vulnerabilities in security, and brought into sharp relief the emotional and symbolic power of National Park Service sites, such as Independence Hall, the Statue of Liberty, and Manzanar. It also addresses deeply embedded cultural values. Weaving these threads together proved challenging: there were no historical prototypes or prior research upon which to draw. Finally, without the perspective of time, it is difficult to interpret the full meaning and impact of the event. Yet it is important to capture personal

viii The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks stories and operational decisions while memories are fresh. This report provides a snapshot of a moment in time, a preliminary assessment, and it highlights the challenges of balancing security with the Service’s statutory obligation to protect resources and provide for public enjoyment of those resources. It reveals the difficulty of making critical decisions in an uncertain and rapidly changing environment and the difficulty of responding to an emergency with a decentralized organizational structure. The goal was not to produce a definitive history of the response but to provide managers with a useful tool and future historians with a foun- dation upon which they can build. This history would not have been possible without the tremendous support and cooperation from managers and staff throughout the Service. Early on, the Park Service’s Northeast Region recognized the need to record the experiences and perspectives of employees affected by the attacks and launched a systematic effort to do this. Ethnographers Chuck Smythe and Mark Schoepfle conducted dozens of oral history interviews, which became valuable sources for this history. Doris Fanelli, Louis Hutchins, and George Tselos also conducted interviews. Above all, I am indebted to the dozens of Park Service members who graciously shared their time, experiences, perspectives, and in a few instances, their frustrations and anguish, in oral history interviews with me and other Service historians and ethnographers. Many of their names are listed at the end. Rick Gale, Einar Olsen, Dennis McGinnis, Dennis Burnett, and others not only participated in interviews but also reviewed the draft manuscript and provided comments. Historians Ed Linenthal and Dwight Pitcaithley also reviewed the manuscript and provided thoughtful comments. I am grateful to Lise Sajewski who, using her love of language and considerable editorial skills, did much to improve the manuscript. My sincere thanks to Marcia Axtmann Smith for designing and producing this book with so much skill, creativity, professionalism, and patience. Working and consulting with the individuals mentioned above proved to be a truly rewarding experience.

Preface ix Introduction

On the morning of September 11, 2001, a group of foreign terrorists launched an unprecedented, well-coordinated attack on the United States using as their weapons four California-bound commercial airliners, each loaded with the maximum amount of jet fuel for its long trip across the country. The first two hijacked planes slammed into the two tallest towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. These stun- ning 110-story glass-and-steel towers, which soared above the skyline in Lower Manhattan, had served as a major American business and commercial center. The third plane struck the Pentagon, and a fourth crashed in a field eighty miles southeast of Pittsburgh. At 8:45 a.m. (EST) American Airlines Flight 11 carrying ninety-two people from Boston to Los Angeles crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Twenty minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175 with sixty-five passengers and crew also heading toward California ripped through the South Tower. At 9:40 a.m. (EST) American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757 commercial airliner carrying sixty-four people and 30,000 pounds of fuel for its long flight from Dulles to Los Angeles, smashed into the west façade of the Pentagon with such force that it penetrated four of the building’s five interior rings. The Federal Aviation Administration promptly banned takeoffs nationwide and ordered all flights that were in the air to land at the nearest airport. Then came the alarming news that United Airlines Flight 93 with forty passengers and crew en route to San Francisco had crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Not long after, reports circulated that this plane had been headed toward Washington, D.C., and heroic passengers had intervened to thwart this plan. Back in New York, shortly before 10:00 a.m. (EST) the South Tower of the World Trade Center crumbled to the ground killing most of those trapped inside and blanketing Lower Manhattan with a thick coat of debris and dust. Approximately a half hour later, the North Tower tumbled down as well. None of the passengers and crews on the planes survived. Thousands of people were injured or killed at the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

x The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks In its long history the National Park Service has rarely had to worry about war threatening the safety of its visitors or the integrity of the natural and cultural resources that are under its protection. The terrorist attacks and their aftermath had a profound impact on the national parks—and on the National Park Service and its employees. The attacks reaffirmed the importance of parks as venerated symbols American values and culture. The events, traditions, and values represented at the parks, particularly at the historic sites, took on new resonance for the American public and for employees struggling to come to grips with the nature and scope of the tragedy. The Statue of Liberty, St. Louis Gateway Arch, Liberty Bell, Washington Monument, and the other landmarks that the Service is charged with protecting help define Americans as a people. Yet, at the same time, the attacks exposed these venerated sites as potential targets. The attacks and the response highlighted the critical role that the Park Service plays in the life of the nation and challenged the agency to reas- sess and reaffirm its missions, priorities, and resources. A careful study of the way leaders, managers, and staff responded reveals much about Service’s culture, values, and responsibilities. Though it is far too soon to identify and evaluate the long-term impact of the attacks, in some ways September 11 has been a transforming event for the National Park Service. The event prompted changes in the way the Service operates and is organized, and for many, gave the parks new meaning and significance.

Introduction xi xii The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Much like the rest of the country, in those ﬁrst hours Service leaders were stunned by the attacks and struggled to understand the full scope and implications of what had happened.

I. National Park Service’s Initial Response

Main Interior Building, Tuesday, September 11, 2001

Rick Gale, chief of the National Park Service’s fire aviation emergency response and head of its incident management program, was sitting in Associate Director Richard (Dick) Ring’s third floor office in the Depart- ment of the Interior’s Washington, D.C. headquarters, when a call came in advising Ring to turn on the television. It would prove fortuitous that Gale who normally worked at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho, happened to be in Washington that day. Ring turned on the television just in time to see the second plane strike the World Trade Center in New York City. Gale headed back to his temporary office in the ranger activities division. Not long after, Ring received word that the Pentagon had been struck. He stepped outside onto his small balcony and glancing south saw an ominous cloud of smoke rising in the distance.1 Meanwhile, a few floors above, the acting chief of the Park Service ranger activities division, Dennis Burnett, was working at his computer when an employee ran down the hallway announcing that a plane had hit one of the World Trade Center towers. Burnett walked down to the vacant office of chief of ranger activities at end of the corridor, where he knew there was a television. After checking the news, he returned to his office. Moments later, he learned of the second plane attack. At that point, Burnett gathered his small staff, which included national law enforcement specialist Maj. Gary Van Horn, U.S. Park Police, and Search and Rescue Emergency Medical Services Coordinator Randall

American ﬂag framed by the rubble at the World Trade Center after the attacks. Above, Pentagon damage.

1 Around 10:00 a.m. federal authorities ordered government ofﬁces closed and approximately 260,000 federal workers in Washington began pouring out into the streets.

Coffman. They headed to the department’s barrage of calls. When Burnett’s daughter law enforcement security office, where they called to check on him a half hour after the continued to monitor the television news Pentagon attack, he used this opportunity coverage.2 to establish what would become an important phone link. He asked his daughter to Major Van Horn, an experienced career law have the Eastern Interagency Coordination enforcement officer, quickly recognized the Center (EICC), a dispatch center located in need to immediately locate the Service’s Shenandoah National Park, call him. When decision-makers and get them to a secure the center contacted him, he asked the staff location in case there were incidents in to continue calling every twenty minutes so the Washington area. He hurried back to that they could maintain a landline connec- his office and got on his police radio. After tion. Although phone service was severely learning of the Pentagon attack, Van Horn restricted, Burnett was able to send an became concerned about potential threats e-mail message to the regional chief rangers to the monuments and memorials on the and to the dispatch center, informing them National Mall. He climbed into his police that the Washington headquarters had no cruiser and quickly drove to each of these communications capability.4 monuments and memorials to conduct quick inspections and to make sure that In his message, Burnett asked the dis- Park Police officers were in position in the patch center to become the agency’s event of another attack. He spotted a sus- “eyes and ears.” He directed parks and picious package on the Memorial Bridge, regions to channel all their messages for a major route in and out of downtown the Washington office through the center. Washington, and waited there until more Finally, he reported that the department officers arrived. After assuring himself that had activated its continuity of operations the bridge was secured, he returned to the plan and was relocating people in accor- Main Interior Building.3 dance with that plan. In another message he encouraged regional chief rangers to Meanwhile, Burnett and other employees step up security at Park Service facilities in Main Interior discovered that they could and sites.5 no longer make outgoing phone calls on either landlines or their cellular phones. The EICC had been established at Wireless networks had collapsed under the Shenandoah National Park in Virginia in

2 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks 1980 and had grown from a small center restored to most sections of the Main that coordinated responses to fires and Interior Building.6 local emergencies into a national coordina- The center performed the communication center. Combined with the coordina- tions role for both the Service and the tion center was a communications center Department of the Interior. It provided that provided emergency notifications of direct support to the parks and also to crisis situations and mobilizations for the FEMA in New York and New Jersey. When Park Service, other federal agencies such the staff for the intelligence, coordination, as the Federal Emergency Management and communications functions grew to Agency (FEMA), and for senior depart- more than twenty people, it became clear ment officials. While the communications that the modest 1950s-era building that had center did the notifications, the coordina- housed the communications center in the tion center directed the actual mobilization past could not hold them all. Ritchie got and demobilization of resources within the approval to bring in a trailer to house the Service. coordination center.7 Upon learning of the attacks, the center’s Meanwhile, back in Washington, direc- manager, Brenda Ritchie, an experienced tor of the National Park Service Fran emergency operations manager, immedi- Mainella; Pacific West Regional Director ately called in additional dispatchers to John Reynolds (who was acting as deputy staff the communications center. Her first director at the time); Associate Director task was to contact senior department for Administration Sue Masica; Associate officials to find out where they were and Director for Cultural Resources and verify that they were safe and to determine Partnerships Kate Stevenson; Dick Ring; the status of all the parks and employees Dennis Burnett; and others gathered in the in the Park Service’s Northeast Region. As deputy director’s third floor office to plan a already noted, initially officials in the Main course of action. They quickly recognized Interior Building were unable to make the need to get to a safe environment where outgoing calls, so the center called them they would have effective communications.8 every fifteen to twenty minutes. Faced with major communications problems, Ritchie When Rick Gale joined the group, Reynolds quickly arranged to bring in a mobile satel- introduced him to the director and rec- lite truck, a so-called cellular on wheels. ommended him to Mainella as someone The satellite truck and 150 cellular phones with extensive experience in emergency arrived within the first eight hours, and response. Dick Ring suggested that Gale the center distributed the phones to key stay close to the director to enhance com- managers and operational staff. Bringing munication and coordination with the in the satellite dish on such short notice department. He also wanted Gale to coor- was no small feat and required unprec- dinate the director’s activities, communica- edented cooperation between two major tions, and directions regarding the emer- telecommunications companies—Verizon gency operations within the Service. The and Sprint. As a result, phone service was director quickly tapped Gale to go with her to meet with department leaders on the

I. National Park Service’s Initial Response 3 sixth floor. Gale would remain close to the staffs to essential personnel only. She speci- director throughout the day and in the days fied that, if possible, parks should continue that followed. He offered her advice on minimum operations with basic visitor how best to organize the Service’s response contact services, provide updates on the and laid out possible missions. In effect, incidents, and monitor television and radio Gale became a self-described sounding reports. She directed that campgrounds board for the director.9 remain open as appropriate. Finally, the director encouraged superintendents to Much like the rest of the country, in those advise their employees to become more first hours Service leaders were stunned security conscious.11 by the attacks and struggled to understand the full scope and implications of what As the morning progressed, Service lead- had happened. They were just beginning ers learned that the federal government in to receive some reports from the Park Washington was shutting down its opera- Police about its security-related activities tions. Around 10:00 a.m. federal authori- and about the worsening traffic situation ties ordered government offices closed and around the city. The leaders were not approximately 260,000 federal workers aware of any specific immediate threats in Washington began pouring out into the to or attacks on any National Park Service streets.12 Secretary of the Interior Gale areas, so they were not yet focused on Norton ordered the evacuation of the Main planning a Service-wide response. They Interior Building and released a memo dis- knew that Federal Hall and Castle Clinton missing all nonessential employees for the National Monuments were located near remainder of the day. Her memo indicated the World Trade Center, but they did not that the dismissal would remain in effect yet know the status of those parks. Little the next day September 12, unless employ- information came out of New York in those ees were informed otherwise.13 first hours. Service leaders had concerns, but with landlines down and cellular Continuity of Operations phone system overloaded, they had little solid information and chose to proceed When officials gathered in the deputy cautiously. Years earlier, as superintendent director’s office, one of the first topics of Everglades National Park when under discussion was the need to Hurricane Andrew struck, Ring had learned implement the Service’s continuity of that the best approach was to proceed operations plan. The National Park Service slowly and to gather solid information headquarters, each regional and support before taking action. Since there were no office, and some individual parks had reports of a park being struck, he believed what is called a continuity of operations the immediate task was simply to gather plan, which outlines specific measures more information.10 to ensure that operations continue as smoothly as possible during an emergency. The director issued “Emergency Operations Park Service continuity of operations Instructions,” authorizing all regional direc- plans were designed to correspond to the tors, at their discretion, to reduce their department’s continuity of operations

4 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks The National Park Service headquarters, each regional and support ofﬁce, and some individual parks had what is called a continuity of operations plan, which outlines speciﬁc measures to ensure that operations continue as smoothly as possible during an emergency.

plan. The department’s plan spelled out of the building. The large conference room the succession of authority and provided became the department’s coordination cen- for the removal of the secretary, deputy ter. The director joined Deputy Secretary secretary, and each bureau head to a remote of Interior J. Steven Griles and other key location well outside the Washington area. department leaders there.15 The plan specified that the National Park Later in the day, the secretary decided to Service director would go to the same relocate to what the department’s continu- location as the secretary or to another ity of operations plan designated as Site location specified by the secretary.14 C, an hour’s drive outside Washington. As Initially the secretary wanted department noted, the plan provided that the director and bureau leaders to go to what the plan and other bureau heads would join depart- designated as Site B—an office about ten ment leaders at this alternate site. The miles away in Northern Virginia. Leaders Service’s own continuity of operations plan considered Site B to be a safe location provided that its deputy director and other where they could organize the depart- senior leaders would go to the Service’s ment’s operations. The director and Rick designated site in West Virginia. This facil- Gale got in a car to drive to the site, but ity had a conference room outfitted with with the horrendous traffic congestion in extra phone lines and all the other equip- downtown Washington it took them twenty ment these leaders would need to con- minutes just to get out of the Main Interior tinue their management functions. Staffs at Building’s underground parking garage. both alternate sites quickly and efficiently As the minutes passed, Gale observed that organized to receive the senior managers.16 with cellular phone systems overloaded, the At the request of department officials, a director would be without any communica- U.S. Park Police SWAT team came to the tions link for hours while she sat in traffic. Main Interior Building and escorted senior The director agreed with his assessment. department officials to Site C.17 They got out of the car and went back up Major Van Horn offered to escort the to the sixth floor. Soon after, the depart- director to the alternate site, and being ment set up operations in the department’s fairly new to the Service and unfamiliar National Business Center conference room with the site, she gratefully accepted. He in the basement, presumably the safest part led the way in his police cruiser, while the

I. National Park Service’s Initial Response 5 Reﬂecting the White House’s desire for the federal government to resume normal operations as quickly as possible, Secretary Norton made it clear that she expected as many parks as possible to be open on September 12.

director followed close behind in her own initiated twenty-four-hour security cover- vehicle. They stopped at her home first so age at Boston Navy Yard where the USS she could pack some extra clothing. While Constitution was berthed, Independence she did this, Major Van Horn went to his Hall in Philadelphia, the Gateway Arch at home where he quickly grabbed extra the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial clothes and a couple sandwiches that his in St. Louis, Mount Rushmore, and at wife had prepared for him and the director. the major monuments and memorials in He went back to pick up the director and Washington, D.C. the two headed for Site C.18 Meanwhile, The senior leaders at Site C also dealt with Gale returned to his hotel room and, at the the question of whether employees should director’s request, began contacting all the come to work the next day and, once the Service’s senior managers to arrange for decision was made, how to get the word out them to go to the designated West Virginia to them. They tried to gather accurate intel- site the next morning.19 ligence information about potential threats Once at the alternate site, department in order to make informed decisions. They officials and bureau heads discussed the were prepared to stay at the alternate site immediate challenges and made decisions as long as necessary. Later that evening about how to proceed. Their task was made when the initial frenzy had subsided, Van more difficult because they had no clear Horn quietly offered to escort the director sense of what sites were potential terrorist back to the Washington area. Both agreed targets. They knew that economic centers, that returning to work in the Main Interior such as the World Trade Center, and mili- Building the next morning would send a tary facilities, such as the Pentagon, were strong message about the resilience of targets but did not know if any of what the federal government. After some they considered to be the department’s discussion with department officials, the national “icons” were at risk. Since they director decided to return. Meanwhile, in did not know which sites, which national a televised address that evening, President icons, were potential terrorist targets, Bush had announced that federal offices initially they decided to increase security in Washington would be open for busi- at all areas and to close some parks and ness the next day, September 12, so many facilities.20 Service leaders immediately other officials returned to Washington

6 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks late that night as well.21 In line with the not be intimated by acts of terrorism.”25 president’s address, the Office of Personnel She announced that the monuments and Management announced that all federal memorials in Washington (except for the agencies in the Washington area would Washington Monument) had reopened reopen on September 12, though employ- at 11:30 a.m. and that the National Park ees would be allowed to take unscheduled Service sites were open, except for those in leave.22 the New York City area. In a press release, she said, “Our focus remains on the safety Before leaving the alternate site, Major Van of our visitors and our employees. We must Horn asked the dispatch center to send a remain vigilant as we provide the American message from the director to all regional people access to our nation’s monuments, directors directing that the parks “as much memorials, and parks for the solace and as reasonable” assume normal operations inspiration they provide.” The secretary on September 12. However, through del- added that operations at the New York sites egation from the regional directors, park were more limited and Manhattan Sites superintendents would have the discre- remained closed. In closing, she wrote, “We tion to limit or augment personnel and encourage everyone to draw inspiration operations at sites where they deemed such from our greatest national treasures and measures appropriate. They were to grant let them serve as reminders that this nation nonessential personnel unscheduled leave. will endure and prosper.”26 The memo went out to the field offices by e-mail.23 Bureau and department leaders, including Director Mainella, were back in their As soon as Gale received word that the offices on the morning of the 12th. In director was returning to Washington, he an effort to reassure employees, Deputy began calling the associate directors back Secretary Griles personally greeted them to advise them to cancel their plans to go to as they returned to work. All too soon, West Virginia. Around 10:00 p.m. Burnett however, it became clear that this work- sent word through the dispatch center in day would be far from routine. Griles was Shenandoah National Park that the secre- in a meeting with the secretary when she tary had canceled all activities at Site C. received a call advising her that an uniden- He advised Gale, Ring, and other Service tified and unaccounted for commercial managers to report for work in the head- airliner was heading from Canada toward quarters building the next morning.24 Washington. Griles immediately directed Reflecting the White House’s desire for that all employees move to the basement. the federal government to resume nor- Unfortunately, the department had no mal operations as quickly as possible, good mechanism for communicating with Secretary Norton made it clear that she employees throughout the building. There expected as many parks as possible to was no public address system. No indi- be open on September 12. In a memo to vidual or office had specific responsibility department employees the morning of the for informing employees that they needed 12th, she reiterated, “by providing unin- to evacuate to the basement cafeteria. terrupted service, we reaffirm that we will Confused and anxious employees did not

I. National Park Service’s Initial Response 7 As news of the tragedy spread, virtually every unit of the National Park System grappled with the impact to one degree or another.

understand why they were suddenly being with information and instructions. No sent there. When they arrived in the caf- group or function had been identified as eteria, the scene was chaotic and reliable having primary responsibility for this task. information was scarce. Officials tried to The Service’s head of risk management and organize employees by bureau, but were employee safety, Richard (Dick) Powell, unsuccessful.27 later emphasized that employees need to know where to go in an emergency. In the In the midst of the confusion, Griles and months after the attack, the department Mainella did what they could to calm would develop a more detailed evacuation employees and keep them informed. Griles plan for Main Interior.29 explained the situation and offered employees the option of leaving. Meanwhile, Major Van Horn contacted the Park Park Closures Police and determined that the informa- Repercussions from the attacks were felt tion about an unidentified plane heading well beyond the Main Interior Building toward Washington was inaccurate. He also that first day. As news of the tragedy learned that the U.S. Air Force had sent up spread, virtually every unit of the National fighter pilots as an added precaution. Van Park System grappled with the impact to Horn climbed up on a chair in the midst of one degree or another. At Independence the crowded cafeteria and used a hurriedly National Historical Park, for example, park borrowed megaphone to convey this infor- staff had the emotionally difficult task of 28 mation. explaining to visitors why the park was Notification of employees throughout closing and giving them their first infor- the building was haphazard. There was mation about the terrorist attacks. Across an existing plan for evacuating the Main the country, at Yosemite National Park, Interior Building in the event of a fire or the superintendent decided to keep the bomb threat, but the plan did not provide park open. He immediately increased the for an alternate site for employees. There ranger presence and the staff at the visitor was no operations center identified for center and the public information office. bureau heads that could provide employees He also quickly dispatched rangers out to

Park rangers at Independence National Historical Park increase security after the attacks.

8 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Hetch-Hetchy Dam, a major water supply monuments and memorials in Washington source for the city of San Francisco. As at were immediately closed.32 Independence, Yosemite staff had to per- Other parks were closed temporarily as form the delicate task of informing visitors well, either because they were considered about the attacks.30 Comforting distraught to be potential terrorist targets or because visitors in the midst of a national tragedy of their proximity to military or other sensi- was a new and unfamiliar role for many tive installations. park employees. At Golden Gate National Recreation Area Superintendents had to carefully weigh in San Francisco, the Park Police insti- a number of factors in deciding how tuted additional security measures within to respond to the attacks. At Delaware an hour of the attacks. The Park Police Gap National Recreation Area, Deputy San Francisco field office, which operated Superintendent Doyle Nelson closed the on a twenty-four-hour basis, was in the park and began implementing the park’s midst of a shift change when the attacks continuity of operations plan even before occurred. Officers on the first shift were receiving official word that government sent home but warned that they might be facilities would be closing. Nelson was called back in to duty. There was immediate not overly concerned that Delaware Gap concern that the Golden Gate Bridge might might be a terrorist target, but he and his be another terrorist target. California State staff began shutting down operations in operated the bridge, but since the footings order to free up rangers for duty in other stood on Park Service property, the Service areas that had been more directly affected. was responsible for protecting the bridge’s That morning Nelson received calls from foundations. Park Police officials decided the Sandy Hook unit of Gateway National to secure the north and south Bay coast- Recreation Area in New York requesting lines where the Golden Gate Bridge was ranger assistance.31 anchored. Officers maintained seven fixed Initially department leaders considered posts. Members of the criminal investiga- closing all 385 units in the National Park tions section manned several of the posts System. However, Rick Gale pointed out along with horse mounted patrol officers. to the director that closing parks could Implementing the closure took approxi- sometimes require more resources than mately one hour. Officers and supervisors leaving them open. Full closure often cleared away the construction crews work- required sweeping the backcountry areas ing on one side of the bridge and cut off all and in some instances could be difficult to pedestrian access.33 enforce. The director thus recommended The field office coordinated closely with to the secretary that they reduce services the California Highway Patrol, Golden Gate in the parks rather than implement a total Bridge District Police, San Francisco Police closure. The secretary and director decided Department, Marin County Sheriff’s Office, to keep the parks open, though there were CALTRANS, and the San Francisco and exceptions. For example, all the units in Presidio Fire Departments. The field office the New York City area and all the national doubled its patrols by using off-duty

I. National Park Service’s Initial Response 9 officers and extended tours of duty. The Point and San Francisco Maritime National next day, the field office reported that Historical Park remained closed.36 things were “safe and running smoothly.” At the Navy’s insistence, USS Arizona They had closed Alcatraz, all visitor cen- National Memorial remained closed to the ters, and Fort Point under the Golden Gate public for six days following the attack, Bridge and had halted pedestrian and bike and the Navy set the security conditions for traffic on the bridge.34 reopening. New security checkpoints were The day after the attacks, parks in New established and staffed by the Park Service York City remained closed. Minute Man and the Navy. The Navy required that the National Historical Park, which shared a Service provide law enforcement officers boundary with Hanscom Air Force Base, to enforce security measures. This task was and Boston Navy Yard in Boston National first accomplished by using law enforce- Historical Park remained closed. The U.S. ment rangers detailed from other parks for Navy had immediately assumed the high- twenty-one-day tours. Because of the high est security level at the naval yard, and in cost of using detailed rangers, the park response the park stepped up its secu- hired three seasonal law enforcement rang- rity staffing and patrols.35 Independence ers to meet the Navy’s requirements.37 National Historical Park, Independence Parks in the Alaska Region, though open, Hall, and the Liberty Bell were open, but faced special problems. Immediately all other visitor areas remained closed to after the attacks, the Federal Aviation the public. In the National Capital Region, Administration had grounded all commer- officials suspended public tours at the cial flights. Officials became increasingly White House indefinitely and closed the concerned that the employees and visitors Ellipse area. Catoctin Mountain Park, site (particularly hunters) awaiting pick up by of the presidential retreat, Camp David, plane would run out of food or that their remained closed. Elsewhere, visitor centers game would spoil. Also, since access to at the Oklahoma City Memorial and at many of the parks in Alaska was by air only, Organ Pipe Cactus National Park remained some employees were stranded away from closed. At the request of the National their permanent duty stations. Rangers Aeronautics and Space Administration, stuck in the backcountry were running out Canaveral National Seashore, a beach of food.38 near the Kennedy Space Center, remained closed. At Dayton Aviation Heritage Two weeks after the attack, in New York National Historical Park, a field located City, Federal Hall National Monument, on Patterson Air Force Base was closed. Castle Clinton National Monument, the Officials closed a short spur road to the Statue of Liberty, and Ellis Island remained observatory complex at Haleakala National closed, but Theodore Roosevelt Birthplace, Park in Hawaii at the request of the U.S. St. Paul’s Church, Hamilton Grange, and Air Force. Cabrillo National Monument General Grant were open. Also still closed, in San Diego was closed because of naval in other parts of the country, were parts of base closures. At Golden Gate, both Fort the George Washington Memorial Parkway near the Pentagon, the Boston Navy Yard, a

10 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks beach at Canaveral National Seashore, Fort only provide law enforcement support Point, and the spur road at Haleakala.39 under authority as deputy U.S. marshals. Each ranger had to be deputized as a Support to the special deputy U.S. marshal, a process Department of the Interior requiring considerable time and effort. The Service had difficulty responding because On the morning of September 11, depart- only a small number of its rangers had been ment officials quickly identified high prior- deputized. ity sites that they believed were potential terrorist targets to include some major Traditionally, the U.S. Marshals Service dep- Bureau of Reclamation projects in the utized the rangers for a single designated West. They called upon the Park Service site for a specific period of time. Officials and other bureaus to provide security quickly discovered this practice was too at the Main Interior Building and asked restrictive because they needed the ability to the Service to help protect some of the transfer rangers from site to site. They began department’s other high priority sites. The deputizing rangers for multiple sites for department’s list of national icons included thirty days. Later, rangers were deputized several Bureau of Reclamation dams. The for all department facilities, including the bureau had no law enforcement or secu- Main Interior Building, through December rity personnel of its own except at Hoover 31, 2003. Yet, even with the new, streamlined Dam, so department officials asked the process, months later there remained a Park Service to provide law enforcement backlog of 500 to 800 applications for rang- 40 personnel to protect these dams. Meeting ers waiting to be deputized. the Bureau of Reclamation’s long-term The Service sent several of its “special event security needs was a challenge. Service teams” to secure the departmental icons, leaders found themselves in the difficult each with ten to twelve trained law enforce- position of having to pull law enforcement ment rangers. Because of disruptions to rangers from their own key sites to provide commercial air travel, the Service tried to the security the department requested. assign teams to nearby installations. These Protecting Bureau of Reclamation sites teams were fully equipped and ready to presented two major problems for the Park deploy on short notice. However, there was Service: the first related to legal authority, growing concern that the Service could and the second related to resources. The not continue to rely on the relatively small Service had no statutory authority on land number of rangers on special event teams outside park boundaries. It had no jurisdic- who had been deputized. Four months tion on many of the Bureau of Reclamation after the attacks, park rangers remained dam sites. Hoover and Davis Dams were on duty protecting these sites, and these located within the boundaries of Lake special event teams, Burnett observed, had 41 Mead National Recreation Area, but the been “used to exhaustion.” By that time, legislation establishing the recreation area some teams had been on three or four rota- specifically excised the dams and related tions at various dam sites in the West, and facilities. As a result, park rangers could the Service had begun deploying individual

I. National Park Service’s Initial Response 11 rangers instead of teams. If there were not their ongoing mission of protecting visitors. enough individual replacements, the teams Providing around-the-clock coverage at had to extend their duty.42 Hoover and Davis Dams had taken “a tremendous amount of manpower, time, and Filling requests for law enforcement rang- resources,” he noted.44 ers at the Lake Roosevelt, Whiskeytown, and Lake Mead National Recreation Whiskeytown National Recreation Area Areas became increasingly difficult. On faced similar challenges. On September 11, September 20, Pacific West Region Chief park rangers joined with local and state Ranger Jay Wells reported that he had no law enforcement agencies and the Bureau indication that additional rangers would of Reclamation to enhance security at the be arriving soon and his rangers were bureau’s critical Central Valley Project “pretty well tapped out” with the cover- facilities located in or near Whiskeytown. age at the three recreation areas and their This massive project supplied water for traditional firefighting assignments. Wells irrigation and provided flood control for asked for assistance from other regions the Sacramento River basin. It also gener- and warned that it was “getting to be a ated and supplied a significant portion of safety issue,” particularly at Lake Mead the electrical power on the West Coast. National Recreation Area. If no relief came The secretary had identified the Bureau the following day, he added, the region of Reclamation’s Shasta Dam as “a critical planned to send a special event team to national asset.” Whiskeytown staff pro- Lake Mead National Recreation Area that vided continuous support to the Shasta it had been holding in reserve in case it was Dam security personnel and helped them needed in Washington, D.C., or New York close off the dam and the surrounding area City. Six rangers were providing twenty- to public access. On several occasions the four-hour security at Lake Mead, and the park’s entire law enforcement staff partici- park was clamoring for more rangers. Ten pated in this operation. Park rangers man- rangers were stationed at the Bureau of aged security at the dam and supervised Reclamation’s Grand Coulee Dam at Lake the twelve-member special event teams that Roosevelt National Recreation Area and rotated through every twenty-one days. As a four were assigned to the bureau’s Shasta result, the superintendent reported, “there Dam project.43 has been a major reduction in proactive ranger patrol and resource protection/ Months later, the Lake Mead National education as a result of Whiskeytown’s Recreation Area superintendent reported commitment to dam security.”45 that the post–September 11 security requirements had “heavily tasked” the park’s pro- By mid-October, the visitor center at tection division. At one point, the special Lake Mead National Recreation Area had event teams and park staff were providing reopened, but tours of Hoover and Davis maritime security above and below Hoover Dams remained suspended. The same Dam and also staffing highway checkpoints was true at Shasta Dam at Whiskeytown east and west of the dam. In addition to National Recreation Area and Grand securing the dams, the rangers still had Coulee Dam at Lake Roosevelt National

12 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Recreation Area.46 The Service’s support at flowed smoothly between department offi- Bureau of Reclamation projects and other cials and Service representatives.47 department sites continued to have a great As a result of the September 11 experience, impact on its law enforcement resources Service leaders later brought in a group to and capabilities. revise and update the continuity of operations plan. Over a ten-day period, the con- Conclusion sultants revised the plan to address the new Much like every other federal agency, the security concerns and risk management National Park Service found itself ill pre- concerns and added an even more remote pared to respond to an emergency of the alternate work site so that leadership could continue operations should another event type and magnitude of September 11. The 48 Service implemented its continuity of oper- occur in the Washington, D.C., area. ations plan quickly, and for the most part, While Service officials in the Washington effectively that first day, but the implemen- headquarters grappled with the immedi- tation was not as smooth as officials would ate issues of maintaining basic operations, have preferred. Some officials evacuated enhancing security, and supporting the reasonably quickly to designated alternate department, park superintendents through- sites, but traffic congestion hampered the out the country also faced the challenge of evacuation of others. With phone service maintaining operations and keeping park disrupted throughout the city, contacting employees, visitors, and resources safe. some officials was difficult. This challenge was particularly great in the The response also revealed some flaws in Washington area and in New York City. the Service’s continuity of operations plan. The plan was somewhat dated and designed more for responding to a fire or bomb threat than a terrorist attack. Officials discovered that in some instances, particularly with the confusion and traffic gridlock they encountered, it might be more effective to shelter employees on-site than to evacuate them. Some leaders concluded that the Service needed a more flexible plan. At the same time, the response demonstrated that Department of the Interior and Park Service leaders understood their roles under the plan and were willing to pitch in and do whatever was required. “It was,” Major Gary Van Horn said, “a combined effort of a lot of well-meaning, well- intentioned individuals.” Decisions were made in a timely fashion and information

I. National Park Service’s Initial Response 13 14 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks U. S. Park Police and park rangers in the Washington area responded immediately at the Pentagon and at treasured historic and cultural sites.

II. National Capital Region

While oﬃcials in the Main Interior Building struggled with the initial response, a few miles away at the U.S. Park Police and National Capital Region headquarters buildings in Washington’s East Potomac Park, managers were already mobilizing. Together the region’s Park Police and park rangers assisted in protecting the nation’s leaders, Washington residents, and visitors; helped evacuate the city; cared for young children from the Pentagon day-care center; and secured some of the nation’s most treasured historic and cultural sites.

U.S. Park Police Headquarters On the morning of September 11, Deputy Chief John (Jack) Schamp was at his desk in Park Police headquarters pouring over reports related to an upcoming World Bank/International Monetary Fund meeting in Washington. An officer interrupted to inform him that a plane had struck the World Trade Center. Not long after, deputy chiefs Schamp, Benjamin J. Holmes, and Edward Winkel activated the chief’s command post, a modest-size meeting room in the headquarters building outfitted with telecommunications equipment. Winkel was acting chief at the time. The Park Police chief’s position had been vacant for some months and each of the three deputy chiefs alternated as acting chief for a three- month period. Park Police officials began discussing the immediate measures that should be taken to secure the monuments and memorials. About fifteen minutes later, the Park Police counterterrorism unit arrived at the center and would play a key role in disseminating

Securing the capital’s memorials—including the Jefferson Memorial and Washington Monument— was an immediate priority for the Park Police of the National Capital Region. A Park Police helicopter, above, circles above the stricken Pentagon.

15 information and coordinating the Park their operations and would not interfere. Police response. He told the officers simply, “You’ve got it.” One Park Police official later observed that Acting Chief Winkel asked the acting he appreciated such a strong expression of operations division commander, Maj. confidence and support.3 Thomas Pellinger, and the acting commander for the special forces branch, Capt. The chief’s command post had direct com- Sal Lauro, to join the other officials in the munication links to the FBI, White House command center. As Captain Lauro quickly Emergency Operations Center, District of drove from his office in the Navy Yard in Columbia Emergency Operations Center, southeast Washington toward Park Police and the Federal Emergency Management headquarters and came over the Southeast Agency’s (FEMA) Operations Center. It Expressway, he saw an explosion in the also provided “real-time” information to vicinity of the Pentagon. When he pulled its officers on the front lines and to the off the ramp to East Potomac Park, he saw Interior department’s law enforcement smoke and flames rising from the direc- notification center, the dispatch center tion of the Pentagon and heard a report in Shenandoah National Park, U.S. Secret that a plane had struck that building.1 The Service, Department of Defense, and met- acting chief and two deputy chiefs; Major ropolitan police department. Park Police Pellinger; captains Henry Berberich, Dan officials had representatives on duty around Walters, and Sal Lauro; and others who the clock in the Secret Service, metropoli- gathered in the command post discussed tan police department, and the Arlington what needed to be done. Their most imme- County/Pentagon command posts, who diate concern was the security of the White provided ready access to the information House, as well as the need to evacuate and coming through those centers. Park Police secure the national monuments and memo- detectives worked with the FBI, particu- rials. They alerted all units of the attack and larly on cases involving suspicious packages contacted the Park Police New York field and people, contaminated mail, and bomb office where officers were already respond- threats. The command post coordinated ing to the attacks at the World Trade safe evacuation of cabinet members, park Center.2 visitors, and commuters.4 At the time of the attacks, organization- Public information officers stationed in ally, the U.S. Park Police came under the the command post responded to a steady National Capital Region and its regional stream of media inquiries and kept the director, Terry Carlstrom. The two head- public informed of increased security mea- quarters buildings were just a few yards sures, road closures, and other issues. In apart. At one point early on, Regional the days following the attacks, the com- Director Carlstrom strode over to the mand post prepared a daily time line chief’s command post where the Park of events that was included in the daily Police officials were assembled. When he briefing for Director Mainella. The post saw the command post operating smoothly, would remain in operation until Monday, he indicated that he was satisfied with September 17.5

16 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks The Park Police force mobilized fully. Securing the White House, Managers initiated an emergency action Monuments, and Memorials plan calling in off-duty personnel, institut- Understandably, protection of the president ing twelve-hour shifts, bringing in extra was the highest and most immediate prior- personnel from outlying districts, and ity for the Park Police. They immediately purchasing food and water. Many off-duty deployed various units around the White officers had already come in to work volun- House and the national monuments and tarily. Some officers called in to see if they memorials and began evacuation proce- were needed or find out where to report, dures. Minutes after the Pentagon was hit, but the Nextel cellular communications Major Pellinger deployed the Park Police’s system that Park Police managers used was mobile command post at Twelfth Street overloaded. Some officers simply drove to and Jefferson Drive on the National Mall. locations where they thought they would This mobile headquarters, a thirty-foot be needed rather than wait for assignments. long recreational vehicle that contained a As a result, it took some time to determine television, communications equipment, and where each officer was and which locations meeting space, served as a key operations were covered. center. Pellinger began directing opera- The massive traffic congestion made it dif- tions from the chief’s command post, while ficult for some officers to drive into work, Captain Lauro oversaw operations on the particularly when they were in their private street.7 vehicles. The Park Police home-to-work Park Police officers worked with the Secret vehicle program, which allowed officers to Service and the metropolitan police to drive their service vehicle home at the end secure an area of several blocks around the of their shift, proved to be extremely valu- White House. They implemented a full- able both in Washington, D.C., and New scale closure of the roads around the White York City. Officers who had their police House. This task, which required a lot of vehicles at home were able to report in rela- manpower, had rarely, if ever, been done tively quickly. Rather than respond to their before. Captain Lauro had first received normal duty station, these officers could be the new procedures for closures around dispatched directly to critical areas. Driving the White House at the beginning of the police cars allowed officers to navigate Persian Gulf War in 1991 when he was a through the traffic gridlock with greater lieutenant working as shift commander. ease. Their service vehicles had lights and He had stuck the document into a binder sirens, and radios that allowed them to and placed the binder in his briefcase, communicate. The home-to-work vehicle where it remained for ten years. When program greatly enhanced the park police’s word came on September 11 that they were ability to deploy personnel rapidly. The per- finally implementing the plan, he was able centage of officers participating in the pro- to quickly pull the plan out of his briefcase gram was relatively small at the time, but and begin executing the procedures.8 after September 11 officials expanded the program as more vehicles became While one group secured the area around available.6 the White House, commander of the

II. National Capital Region 17 Two Park Police motorcycle ofﬁcers rushed to the Pentagon and arrived on the scene within minutes of the attack.

central district Capt. Henry Berberich and the Pentagon. These two officers assisted his officers secured the area around the with search and rescue of survivors, helped Washington Monument. Lt. Pete Markland coordinate with Pentagon security, and per- 10 and several officers secured the Ellipse, formed other missions. and Capt. Dan Walters coordinated the Lieutenant Wallace was on the National closure of the Lincoln Memorial. Officers Mall writing tickets when Sergeant Beck immediately closed not only the Jefferson called his cell phone to tell him that a plane and Lincoln Memorials and Washington had hit one of the World Trade Center tow- Monument but also the Ellipse, White ers. Sergeant Beck called back a few min- House sidewalks, and Lafayette Park. utes later to tell him that the second tower Fortunately, in addition to their own had been struck. At that point, Wallace force, Park Police commanders were able climbed on his motorcycle and hurried to deploy forty officers who had been in back to Park Police headquarters. He knew the midst of riot training at a Park Police some additional security measures would facility in southeast Washington when the be put in place and that his unit might be attacks occurred. Officers initiated tem- called upon to assist with evacuations, road porary road and pedestrian closures and closures, and other missions. increased patrols throughout the day in response to potential threats.9 Wallace was on the phone with another officer, when the officer informed him that there had been an explosion at the Motorcycle Unit Pentagon. Beck and Wallace hurried out- The Park Police motorcycle unit typically side, saw the thick smoke, and got on their had responsibility for providing security motorcycles and rushed to the Pentagon. for the president, escorting dignitaries, and They arrived at the scene within minutes. enforcing traffic regulations. Two members Wallace later observed that President Bush of the motorcycle unit, Lt. George Wallace had been scheduled to land at the Pentagon and Sgt. Daniel Beck, were among the first helipad later that morning, near the site uniformed law enforcement officers to where the plane slammed into the build- arrive at the scene of the airline crash at ing. Wallace and other officers had been

Aerial photo of the Pentagon taken after the attack revealing some of the damage.

18 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Some of the crew grabbed their emergency medical equipment and ran toward the Pentagon building.

assigned to escort the president from the of the building started to crumble and col- helipad to the White House. lapse. Wallace and Beck then helped evacuate people from the site because of con- Lieutenant Wallace found what he cerns about another inbound plane. After described as “unimaginable” destruction about forty-five minutes of assisting at the at the Pentagon. He had witnessed cata- Pentagon, Wallace and Beck got back on strophic events before, but nothing had their motorcycles and began directing traf- prepared him for the gruesome scene he fic away from the site.11 encountered. At first, he saw no readily apparent signs of the plane except its out- Aviation Unit line in the side of the building. No airline parts stuck out of the building, and the sur- Lieutenant Wallace and Sergeant Beck rounding debris field was small. Some of were not the only Park Police officers to the injured were lying in the field near the respond at the Pentagon in those first helipad and people were running toward devastating minutes. Officers in the aviation them to assist. Wallace tried to help the section also played an important role at the injured, but there seemed to be enough scene. At the aviation hangar in southeast military personnel performing that task. Washington along the Anacostia River, So he ran up closer to the building where some of the crew were taking advantage the fire department was starting to operate of the warm weather and bright sunshine their hoses. Wallace and Beck, both volun- by washing the floor out in the aviation teer firemen at one time and no strangers hangar with the door open. Meanwhile, to firefighting operations, began pulling in an open field next to the hangar, one fire hoses. They moved near the entrance of the helicopter pilots, Sgt. Kenneth of the burning building and were preparing Burchell, was conducting riot training to enter to help rescue victims when one for the Defense department’s uniformed of the fire chiefs came out and announced health services unit in preparation for that no one could go in because the struc- the upcoming World Bank/International ture was unsafe. A couple minutes later, as Monetary Fund protest demonstrations. they were pulling back the hoses, the façade

Two casualties are loaded on Eagle II.

II. National Capital Region 19 One crew member saw the news account allowed them to carry four patients instead of the first plane hitting the World Trade of two. The installation took a few minutes. Center and called in the others. Sergeant Then Eagle II took off with pilots Burchell Burchell, his fellow pilot Sgt. Ron Galey, and Bohn, the two medics, aviation unit and a few others went inside to watch the commander Lt. Philip Cholak, and assistant television coverage. After seeing the sec- commander Sgt. Bernie Stasulli.12 ond plane strike and noting the clear blue Shortly after launching, Eagle II received its sky, they quickly concluded that the crash first report that there was an unauthorized was not an accident. Burchell and Galey aircraft inbound. Eagle I directed Eagle II headed back out to the hangar. They heard to land at the Pentagon to conduct medi- a loud thud and looked up to see a col- cal evacuations. Eagle II quickly landed on umn of smoke rising from the vicinity of a paved roadway 150 to 200 yards from the the Pentagon. Burchell immediately ran area of impact. Some of the crew grabbed back inside, yelling for his crew. Minutes their emergency medical equipment and later, the “aircraft crash phone” rang, set- ran toward the Pentagon building. At this ting off a distinctive horn alarm. The crash point, with the reports of an unauthorized phone was a direct communications line inbound plane, Sergeant Burchell realized from the control tower at Ronald Reagan they needed not only to evacuate the casu- Washington National Airport to the han- alties but also to be ready to get as many gar so that the aviation unit can respond people as possible away from the site before quickly to incidents at the airport. Sergeant there was another attack. Sergeant Bohn Galey took the call. On the other end of the kept the helicopter engine running and line, the air traffic controller indicated that Sergeant Stasulli stood outside to secure a 757 commercial airplane had crashed in the landing zone. Stasulli was particularly the vicinity of the Pentagon. Meanwhile, a concerned that people moving away from call had also come in on the police radio the building, particularly those who seemed indicating that the Pentagon had been somewhat dazed, would inadvertently step attacked. too close to the aircraft’s tail rotor blades The helicopter crews scrambled to gather and be seriously injured. Meanwhile, their equipment, get to the helicopters, Lieutenant Cholak, Sergeant Burchell, and and launch. The duty crew that day, which the two medics moved closer to assess the included Sergeant Galey, rescue technician situation. They initially anticipated fer- Sgt. John Marsh, and Officer John Dillon, rying hundreds of patients to hospitals ran out to Eagle I, a Bell 412 helicopter, all day long so they wanted to set up an and took off within two or three minutes. orderly process for this first. They checked Sergeant Burchell grabbed Sgt. Keith Bohn in with the triage officer who indicated that and two Defense department medics with there were only eleven casualties in need Uniformed Services University and Health of medical evacuation. Cholak and one of Sciences who were there for the training. the medics went to the triage area to assist. They began installing a mass casualty kit on Burchell headed back to get Sergeant Bohn Eagle II, another Bell 412 helicopter, which to move the aircraft closer, which he did.

20 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Eagle II landed near the area of impact and transported several seriously injured victims to the hospital.

Although both crews saw many frightened they had difficulty identifying what was left and injured Pentagon employees fleeing of the hijacked airplane. The hole where the building, they saw others actually mov- the plane pierced the building appeared ing toward the burning building to help relatively small and there seemed to be with the rescue operations. In contrast to little debris. The plane seemed at first to other response operations in which they have simply disappeared into the building. had participated, the crews were struck On Eagle I’s third pass over the building, by the calm, orderly nature of the scene. however, Officer Dillon saw that the plane They attributed this in part to the military had penetrated from one ringed corridor training and discipline of many Pentagon of the building to the next, nearly reaching employees. Sergeant Burchell found the the center courtyard. Soon after, he and the response to be better organized than most. others watched as the side of the building To illustrate this, he later recounted an inci- crumbled and collapsed.13 dent soon after they landed where military Eagle I was still circling overhead when personnel quietly spread out around the the control tower at the airport warned of helicopter. When Lieutenant Cholak saw a another unauthorized aircraft about twenty number of military officers quietly encircle minutes out. Then just as Eagle I prepared the aircraft, he became concerned that they to land, the air traffic controller radioed the might be injured by the tail rotor blade crew that the smoke from the Pentagon had and directed them to move back. The offi- overtaken them and they were abandoning cers immediately stepped back but calmly the airport control tower. In an unprec- explained that they were simply securing edented move, at the controller’s request, the landing zone for him. Eagle I assumed control of the airspace for While the Eagle II crew stood by to trans- the entire Washington area. The task was port the injured victims, Eagle I circled simplified somewhat by the fact that the overhead. From the air initially the damage airspace had been closed down. The con- did not look extensive. The crew saw the troller gave Sergeant Galey the radio fre- fire and a great deal of smoke pouring from quency for the North American Aerospace the building, but like Lieutenant Wallace, Defense Command (NORAD), which had

Park Police and others prepare to transport injured victims at the Pentagon.

21 II. National Capital Region taken over control of the national airspace. They also asked that a metropolitan police Since NORAD typically only performs this helicopter be put in the air to provide function during wartime, the crews inter- command and control, and stood by for preted this shift as a strong indicator of medical evacuations. The metropolitan the severe nature of the threat. No civilian police helicopter arrived and relieved plane would be allowed to fly in or out of Eagle I of its command and control the airspace without authorization from function. NORAD.14 Sergeant Burchell had received the same Meanwhile, Burchell had asked Bohn reports of an inbound plane and knew to move the aircraft in closer, and they there was an effort to disburse the aircraft boarded two patients who were suffer- at the scene. When it returned from the ing from severe burns. As noted, Eagle II hospital, Eagle II set down at the western was prepared to carry four patients, but end of Memorial Bridge where it was some- the triage officer did not have any other what sheltered by some trees and waited. patients for transport at the time. The crew The reported inbound plane never mate- carried the patients to the MedStar unit of rialized. Not long after, both helicopters Washington Hospital Center, the region’s learned that there were no more patients only advanced burn center. to evacuate. Presumably some of the eleven had been taken away by ambulance. While Eagle II was at the hospital, Eagle I landed in the same area that Eagle II had After learning that there were no more vacated. Sergeant Galey was preparing to patients to transport, Eagle II returned land when two F-16 fighter jets screamed to the aviation hangar to pick up a Secret past without warning. As soon as Galey Service agent to patrol the airspace around landed, the two paramedics left the aircraft. the White House. As the helicopter climbed The crew waited another ten minutes or out of the Pentagon grounds, Sergeant so for additional patients. Sergeant Marsh Burchell spotted an F-16 fighter jet com- came back and reported that there were ing in from the opposite direction. He later no patients ready for transport but the recalled a particularly tense moment when helicopter should stand by. Then Eagle I the fighter jet flew by so low and close that received an update that the unauthorized he could see the brand name on the fighter inbound plane was now only a few miles pilot’s sunglasses.15 out. They decided to move to a safer area The helicopters had microwave “downlink” a quarter mile from the Pentagon. The capability that proved to be extremely valu- crew realized it could not conduct medi- able. With this technology, the crews could cal evacuations and provide command fly over a crime scene, demonstration, or and control of the airspace at the same other event and transmit instantaneous time, so they requested assistance from video images back to the chief’s command other departments that had helicopters post and other locations. Soon after Eagle I which were equipped to transport injured arrived on-site, the FBI asked the crew to patients, such as the Maryland State Police turn on its microwave downlink. Dillon, and Fairfax County Police Department. who operated the downlink, found that in

22 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks his first few passes over the Pentagon, the During the recovery of victims from the terrible images on the monitor looked so Pentagon and collection of evidence, the surreal that he occasionally had to take his unit supported the FBI with photo mis- eyes off the monitor and look down to con- sions, crime scene search, and the use of firm what he was seeing. The crew was able the FLIR system in recovery of potential to transmit real-time images and informa- survivors. On September 11 and in the days tion to people who needed them to make following, the unit performed a number of decisions.16 missions in support of and in coordination with the FBI and Secret Service. The crews In addition to the downlink capabil- later described a new spirit of coopera- ity, the cameras on the helicopters could tion. Eagle II supported the Secret Service be switched to a forward-looking, infra- in protection of the president and White red heat detection device known as FLIR. House and conducted additional flights in This technology proved to be extremely support of FBI. By the time Eagle I returned valuable. The fire department was having to the hangar, the Eagle II crew was already some difficulty getting its equipment to the arranging to perform patrols for the Secret proper locations to fight the fire. The crew Service and to fly FBI agents out to Dulles took up the chief of the Arlington County International Airport, where the hijacked Fire Department several times and flew plane that flew into the Pentagon had origi- low over the Pentagon so that he could nated. They were also developing their own locate the hot spots. The infrared imag- plan for patrolling the metropolitan area.18 ery helped him locate the fire under the roof and enabled him to better position his The crews spent the next few days patrol- firefighting crews and equipment. Flying in ling along the Potomac River and check- this environment was challenging because ing bridges and overpasses in the city for of the thick smoke, poor visibility, and the potential threats. Major Pellinger deployed risk of inhaling hazardous materials, but the aircraft around the White House. The Eagle I spent the next four or five hours fly- areas around the White House and the U.S. ing overhead and transmitting video images Capitol were restricted airspace, and for to the FBI. several days the Park Police, in conjunc- tion with the Secret Service, flew hourly As the only aircraft on-site initially, the around-the-clock security patrols around Park Police helicopters performed mis- the White House and other restricted zones sions in support of the military. Eagle I in the Washington area. Pellinger arranged also took up the commander of the 82nd for twenty-four-hour coverage for the Airborne Division so that he could get an monuments and memorials. Four months aerial view that would assist him in deploy- later, these patrols had ended, but crews ing his troops around the building. By late continued to work twelve-hour shifts. As a afternoon, a number of military aircraft result of the September 11 attacks, the unit’s had arrived and the crews decided to com- priorities changed. Security became “para- plete their missions, leave the area, and go mount,” Ron Galey explained. As noted, back to the hangar to refuel and prepare for the crews began to routinely conduct aerial whatever missions were ahead.17 checks of the monuments and memorials,

II. National Capital Region 23 something they had not done in the past it was better to use 120- rather than in part because of concern that the noise 30-minute videotape because the tape would disturb tourists.19 compartment is mounted on the outside of the aircraft and changing tapes during The aviation unit’s response activities an ongoing operation could be difficult.21 involved a great deal of coordination with other departments and agencies. The contributions of the aviation unit were Fortunately, the crews had all the radio great both in the immediate aftermath and frequencies they needed to communicate in the weeks that followed. As Sergeant effectively with the Arlington County Fire Burchell observed, although the military and Police Departments and the other had tremendous assets, “when you have agencies. They were also in frequent con- an emergency in downtown Washington, tact with Alexandria City and some of the D.C., …you don’t get Air Force Special other fire departments on the scene. They Operations. You get two park policemen relayed information between fire depart- in a blue-and-white helicopter.” The unit ments on the ground that could not com- responded at the Pentagon within minutes municate directly with each other. The fact of the attack and provided considerable that the unit had experience dealing with support to the victims; to the military; and the Arlington agencies, as well as Fairfax to various federal, state, and local agencies. and Montgomery Counties, and had a good “We did our part the best that we could,” working relationship with those agencies Burchell concluded.22 made coordination easier.20 After September 11, the Park Police con- Evacuation of Cabinet Officials tinued to use three-person crews for most Along with the response at the Pentagon, missions. Although this approach added to one of the earliest Park Police missions was their costs, they had found the three-per- to help evacuate and provide escorts for son crews to be “invaluable.” Crews could cabinet officials and other senior leaders. operate more efficiently and effectively The Secret Service and the military had with a third person. The helicopters were responsibility for evacuating cabinet mem- packed with sophisticated equipment such bers, but a decades-old plan stipulated that as the microwave downlink, FLIRs, video the Park Police would support the evacu- cameras, moving display maps, and radio ation of these officials and secure the air- communication equipment. The pilot had craft landing zones used in the evacuation. to devote all his attention to flying, and the Officers had routinely practiced securing second person had difficulty operating all the staging area where cabinet officials were this sophisticated equipment effectively. scheduled to gather so that they could be Three-person crews were ideal: one person evacuated. flies the helicopter, the second operates the radios, and the third handles all the other Shortly after 11:00 a.m. on September equipment. The management sought to 11, Park Police officials learned that the maintain the expanded crews for as long as White House had activated the evacuation possible. The Park Police also learned that plan. This was the first time in his twenty- four years as a Park Police officer that

24 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Captain Lauro could recall the plan being Traffic Management activated. Park Police officers performed In addition to their other missions, the their assigned role and effectively cleared Park Police are responsible for managing the designated staging area. Soon after the traffic on a number of bridges and road- activation was canceled, but Park Police ways in Washington that are part of the officers did escort a few officials and their National Park System, such as Memorial staffs in a motorcade to a secure location. Bridge, George Washington Memorial Later, Park Police officials conceded that Parkway, Rock Creek Parkway, and the providing escorts created some strain at Baltimore-Washington Parkway. All serve a time when their officers were busy with as major routes in and out of the city. Park other missions. As noted earlier, a Park Police officers took a number of measures Police special weapons and tactics (SWAT) to improve the flow of traffic and move team escorted the secretary of the interior people away from the downtown area more and her senior staff to a secure location. quickly. When the federal government They provided motorcycle officers and an released its employees that morning, many escort vehicle to get them out of the city.23 other downtown businesses and agencies Police cars and emergency vehicles were did the same. With rumors about major able move through the thick traffic much disruption in the subway operations, the faster than private vehicles, and as a streets were jammed with several hundred result, throughout the day, the Park Police thousand confused and alarmed commut- received numerous requests for escorts. ers who were all trying to get out of the city Officers also escorted President Bush, Vice as quickly as possible, creating what Deputy President Richard Cheney, and Secretary of Chief Jack Schamp called “a monster traffic State Colin Powell. Traditionally, only the problem.”25 As traffic backed up around the president and visiting dignitaries receive city, workers trying to make their way home Park Police motorcycle escorts, not the became increasingly anxious. vice president. However, after the attacks, To help move traffic out of the downtown officers began escorting the vice president area faster and more efficiently, around to and from his office on a regular basis, 11:00 a.m. the Park Police decided to initiate which involved a significant commitment the afternoon/evening commuting traffic of resources. Motorcycle officers escorted patterns on all the major routes for which the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it had responsibility. This would direct traf- Gen. Henry H. Shelton, from Andrews Air fic out of the city. Officers quickly reversed Force Base to the Pentagon. One of the offi- traffic lanes on Rock Creek Parkway making cers recalled the stunned expression on the it one way outbound. They placed barri- general’s face as they came up over a rise in cades across the entrances to the parkway the highway and he got his first view of the but remained concerned that an inatten- damage. The motorcycle unit also escorted tive or reckless driver might go around the Montgomery County hazardous mate- a barricade and enter traffic going the rial unit down to the Pentagon.24 wrong direction. Lt. George Wallace could not recall any other instance where Park

II. National Capital Region 25 With the phone systems overwhelmed, the chief ranger for the National Capital Region, Einar Olsen, was forced to rely on a radio system based out of a vehicle to communicate.

Police had changed the traffic direction Agency. When a piece of the airplane that on Rock Creek Parkway outside of rush had struck the Pentagon was discovered hour. Memorial Bridge and Clara Barton some distance away at Arlington Cemetery, Parkway were restricted to outbound traf- Park Police officers quickly secured the site fic only, and the southbound lanes of the until the FBI arrived.27 George Washington Memorial Parkway Park Police canine units helped sweep for were closed at Interstate 495. In some bombs at the Little Falls Pumping Station instances these historic parkways fed traffic and the Washington Aqueduct in north- onto city streets or state highways, where it west Washington. These critical facilities jammed up. Park Police officials discovered provided drinking water to the city. Two that in the future they needed to coordi- SWAT teams and canine units deployed nate more closely with the metropolitan at Camp David provided security for the police to improve the flow of traffic. Park president. Between September 11 and Sep- Police representatives later worked with the tember 23, officers responded to roughly metropolitan police and FEMA in develop- seventy reports of suspicious vehicles, ing detailed plans for the evacuation of the packages, and persons. Through all of this, city.26 officers continued their day-to-day operations, which included investigating crimes, Additional Park Police Missions enforcing traffic and environmental restric- 28 In the days and weeks after the attacks, tions, and assisting citizens. officers responded to reports of suspicious packages and vehicles, assisted the FBI with Park Rangers Respond crime scene support, and cleared the core Working closely with the Park Police in monument area of pedestrians and vehicles. Washington was a significant contingent of They closed roads and increased patrols law enforcement rangers from the National in response to potential threats. Whenever Capital Region. Shortly after 9:30 a.m. on possible they responded to requests for September 11, the region’s chief ranger, uniformed patrols from agencies such as Einar Olsen, was sitting in a meeting at the Department of State, National Imagery the Anacostia Naval Station in southeast and Mapping Agency, U.S. Army Corps Washington with representatives from of Engineers, CIA, and National Security the Environmental Protection Agency,

26 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Department of Defense, and FBI. The meet- system could impede the ability to mobilize ing had just begun when suddenly a num- and transfer resources. He recommended ber of pagers began going off around the that Carlstrom “regionalize” the park law room. One Defense representative, who had enforcement rangers so that Olsen would left the room to take a phone call, bolted not have to secure approvals from individ- back in to announce that the Pentagon had ual superintendents before deploying those been hit. The other participants rushed to rangers. This would give Olsen the flex- the window and saw smoke in the distance. ibility and authority that he needed to shift resources within the region. The regional Olsen drove quickly back to his office, director gave him an emergency delegation arriving at the regional headquarters ten of authority to put rangers under regional minutes later. Soon after, he and others control, so that he could move them around who were meeting in the regional director’s in response to the immediate requirements. office heard a loud explosion. At the time Carlstrom thus placed the region’s law they feared there might have been another enforcement rangers under Olsen’s direct attack, but the noise was actually the sonic command. Unfortunately, Olsen found that boom from a U.S. Air Force fighter jet that he had no way to communicate with many had scrambled from Langley Air Force of these rangers. This dilemma, he said, Base in southeast Virginia. Faced with became a “major issue.”30 uncertain threats, Regional Director Terry Carlstrom decided to close the regional With the authority issue resolved at least office and send employees home. The temporarily, Olsen walked next door to the headquarters was located a short distance Park Police headquarters and offered the from the Pentagon and some of the assistance of the region’s law enforcement national monuments and he was anxious rangers. Regional officials were concerned to get employees away from the area in about possible future attacks on the monu- case there was another attack. As with the ments, the White House, or other facili- other federal workers released early from ties for which they were responsible. They the office, headquarters employees were also realized that Park Police resources unsure how to get home with the disrup- were stretched thin. They agreed that Olsen tions in mass transportation and traffic would try to get some fifteen rangers and gridlock. Some ended up taking off on foot. that the Park Police would relay assignments for them. As noted earlier, the Park Police were already mobilizing because they had pri- With the phone systems overwhelmed, mary responsibility for the security of the Olsen was forced to rely on a radio system national monuments and memorials. Olsen based out of a vehicle to communicate. He recommended that the region put all its law used one of the emergency vehicles in the enforcement rangers on alert to assist.29 parking lot outside the headquarters to Under the Service’s decentralized organiza- contact the regional communications cen- tional structure, park superintendents have ter in western Maryland. The center, which ultimate authority over their personnel. coordinated ranger activities through- Olsen recognized that in an emergency this out the National Capital Region, had only

II. National Capital Region 27 become a twenty-four-hour operation six arrived, Olsen asked the communications months earlier. In response to Olsen’s call, center in Maryland to contact Park Police the center put out a message informing headquarters to get the first assignment for parks that there was a regional emergency the rangers, and the Park Police relayed the and all rangers were under the region’s assignment back through the center.31 authority. The center then called all the out- The first assignment was to send rangers to lying parks where rangers worked. the Columbia Island portion of the George Olsen decided to establish a staging area at Washington Memorial Parkway to assist the headquarters of the George Washington the children who had been evacuated from Memorial Parkway. This was a convenient the day-care center at the Pentagon when location, outside the congested downtown the attack occurred. Roughly fifty adults area but near major roads, so there was and children from the day-care center easy access. He advised the communica- had crossed the footbridge by Columbia tions center to call the George Washington Island Marina, which is under Park Service Memorial Parkway headquarters and direct jurisdiction, and were sitting in a grass them to prepare to be the staging area. field known as the Lyndon Baines Johnson Olsen then got in his vehicle and began Memorial Grove. Olsen led the seven rang- working his way through what he described ers down the parkway in a convoy because as “horrendous” traffic in Washington. By they were unfamiliar with the area. He that time, federal offices had closed con- described the trip down the parkway as tributing to the traffic congestion, and even “very eerie” and quiet. The rangers passed emergency vehicles were having difficulty checkpoints but saw almost no traffic.32 navigating through the city. All of the major The convoy reached its destination around bridges providing direct access to the park- noon. Olsen left Dwight Dixon, a dis- way were clogged, so Olsen spent the next trict ranger from C&O Canal National hour slowly weaving his way north and Historical Park, in charge of the squad and west through downtown Washington and returned up the parkway to the staging into Maryland up to the American Legion area. At Lyndon Baines Johnson Memorial Bridge. He crossed the bridge into Virginia Grove, Dixon found dozens of small chil- and drove south on the George Washington dren, including infants and toddlers. His Memorial Parkway until he reached the team quickly set up a protective perim- park headquarters. eter around the children and blocked one Meanwhile, the park’s superintendent, lane of westbound traffic on the George Audrey Calhoun, had set up the stag- Washington Memorial Parkway to increase ing area. Rangers were already arriving safety. The rangers were not equipped to from other parks as far away as Antietam transport such a large number of children. National Battlefield, Monocacy National Eventually, they stopped an empty tour Battlefield, Harpers Ferry National bus and asked the driver to help trans- Historical Park, C&O Canal National port the children to a Virginia Department Historical Park, and Catoctin Mountain of Transportation facility near the Navy Park. As soon as the first seven rangers Annex just south of the Pentagon. Rangers

28 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks carefully loaded up the children, blankets, immediately evacuated and closed all park and other items and escorted the bus to sites. The site manager for the National the facility. Once there, they helped move Mall, Lance Hatten, was in the midst of children, staff, and portable cribs into the giving a presentation at the Old Post Office building. Someone brought in baby formula Tower on Pennsylvania Avenue, when a to feed the infants and lunch for everyone Park Police officer informed him of the else. The rangers set up a security zone attacks in New York City. By the time he around the building and waited for the returned to his office at the ranger station, parents to claim their children. By 5:30 that the National Mall area was already being evening all of the children had been picked evacuated and traffic was in near gridlock. up, and after determining that there were Faced with a great deal of uncertainty and no additional assignments, Dixon and the horrible traffic congestion, tourists looked other rangers drove home.33 to the rangers on the Mall for advice about what to do, where to go, and what road to National Mall take. Unfortunately, in this confusing situation the rangers had little information to While Dixon’s team was busy caring for the provide. Hatten released his employees young children from the Pentagon day- around noon. Later that afternoon, Hatten care center, enough rangers had arrived and the superintendent of National Capital at George Washington Memorial Parkway Parks–Central visited the various sites to headquarters to form a second squad. make sure that they were secured.34 The Park Police gave the rangers another assignment—to report to the mobile com- Meanwhile, while others fled the scene mand post located on the National Mall at the White House the morning of the at Twelfth Street and Jefferson Drive in attacks, Presidents’ Park grounds crews northwest Washington. About 2:00 p.m. remained on duty. In anticipation of the Olsen led a second convoy down the park- president’s return to the White House by way, across the Theodore Roosevelt Bridge, helicopter, they removed picnic tables that and into Washington. After receiving a had been set up on the south lawn for a briefing at the command post, the rang- planned afternoon event to create a land- ers led by Manassas National Battlefield ing space. President’s Park rangers and Park Ranger Gil Goodrich were assigned volunteers helped clear the area around the to provide security and enforce closures White House and comforted anxious visi- along the National Mall and at the Jefferson tors. Maintenance employees set up addi- Memorial. The squad was released later tional security barricades. that evening after enough Park Police offi- That evening, National Capital Parks– cers had arrived to replace them. Central maintenance staff installed snow As rangers from outlying parks assisted the fence to close off the periphery of the Park Police on the National Mall, employ- Jefferson and Lincoln Memorials and the ees from National Capital Parks–Central area around the base of the Washington were also hard at work in the same area. Monument. They installed snow fencing National Capital Parks–Central rangers and about ten miles of temporary

II. National Capital Region 29 chain-link fence in the National Mall area. when the president, vice president, cabinet Days later, when the decision was made to members, and other senior officials began close the entire Ellipse, the maintenance a series of high-level meetings at Camp crew worked from 5:00 p.m. on Sunday David. Security became a long-term assign- until 8:00 a.m. the next morning off-load- ment. During the months that followed, ing and placing Jersey barriers at the the Park Service would institute more than entrances.35 fifty-six days of twenty-four-hour closures at various areas of the park. Catoctin Mountain Park During the closures, typically four rang- While some of the region’s rangers and ers were needed each day to man posts and Park Police officers supported operations patrol. At the same time the staff was taxed in the Washington area, others took assign- with additional foot and vehicle patrols ments at Catoctin Mountain Park, site of outside its normal duty hours, whether the presidential retreat, Camp David. In the there was a visit in progress or not. Two first hours after the attacks, park staff tried shifts a day were needed to cover these to contact the regional headquarters but patrols. The additional patrols were not failed to reach anyone in the chain of com- covered by any reimbursable agreements mand. They began to route their commu- with the Secret Service. The park did not nications through the region’s communica- usually operate twenty-four hours a day, tions center in western Maryland. Initially seven days a week, and had not budgeted or Catoctin managers decided not to release staffed for such operations. Managers had the staff because they thought they might to draw on emergency law and order funds. be needed for security-related missions. Catoctin Mountain Park Superintendent The park, in fact, never received a call from Mel Poole observed that people did not the regional office directing it to close. Not immediately associate Camp David with until the next morning did employees learn Catoctin, so it was difficult to convince that neighboring parks had released their them that the park was as important as the employees. Statue of Liberty or Independence Hall because the president and vice president The day of the attacks the Secret Service were frequently in residence. A year ear- requested assistance from the park’s lier, the park had been cut from ten law rangers and from the Park Police to pro- enforcement positions to eight.36 vide twenty-four-hour security at Camp David. When the president evacuated When park managers needed additional from Washington, D.C., to Camp David, rangers from other parks, they submitted the region sent additional park rangers to their request to the regional communi- enforce various security perimeter zones cations center. Though this twenty-four- around that area. This Park Police and hour dispatch center had been operat- ranger support included additional patrols, ing for only a year, according to Poole, it manning four checkpoints, and closing had proved itself to be “one of the best the central portion of the park. The secu- things that this region has done in many, rity situation intensified a day or two later many years.” If the center could not fill the

30 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks request, the request went to the Eastern Conclusion Interagency Coordination Center (EICC) in The success of the region’s response to the Shenandoah National Park. There was also September 11 attacks can be attributed to a a less formal process for sharing and coor- number of factors: the superb cooperation dinating resources within the region. For between the region’s law enforcement rang- example, on September 12, Poole informed ers and the Park Police; the willingness of the regional director that Catoctin would parks to share their ranger resources; and quickly exhaust the existing ranger the dedication of individual law enforce- resources, and the regional director men- ment rangers and Park Police officers who tioned another park that might have some worked extended duty hours, sometimes available resources. So Poole informed the for weeks and even months. The region’s regional communications center that this law enforcement rangers and the Park park might have some rangers available Police had worked together in the past dur- who could meet his need. Having this unof- ing demonstrations or other special events. ficial communications system in addition With this event, however, said Capt. Sal to the official one, Poole noted, “makes us Lauro, the number of rangers who sup- more efficient.”37 ported the Park Police and the speed of The security mission prompted Catoctin their response was unprecedented.39 Mountain Park to draw on rangers from Another key to the successful response throughout the National Capital and in Washington was the close cooperation Northeast Regions to fill shifts. Rangers between the Park Police and the police came from as far away as the Gettysburg, and fire departments in Arlington County, Fredericksburg, and Spotsylvania battle- Alexandria, and Fairfax County in Virginia, fields, Delaware Water Gap, and Valley as well as with various federal entities. Over Forge. As a result some of the outlying the years, the Park Police, particularly its parks in the National Capital Region were special forces branch, had often worked stripped of most of their protection rang- closely with the Secret Service, U.S. Capitol ers and forced to close gates and buildings Police, FBI, and various local jurisdic- temporarily.38 tions—metropolitan police, metro transit After September 11 attacks, the National police, Arlington and Fairfax Counties. The Capital Region embarked on a compre- strong relationships that Park Police had hensive effort to enhance its emergency forged with those entities enabled them to response capability, focusing increased work effectively as a team on September 11. attention on safety, training, employee and The role that park rangers and Park Police public information, planning, mobilizing played in evacuating government leaders, pro- resources, and logistical support. It also tecting the public, and securing some of the took steps to improve communications nation’s most revered monuments and memo- among the parks, specifically establishing rials was unprecedented. The same remark- radio links and expanding the use of satel- able level of dedication and cooperation lite phones. would characterize the response of Park Police and park rangers in the New York City area.

II. National Capital Region 31 32 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Watching the second attack, NPS staff quickly concluded that this event was no accident. A minute after the building was hit, the jarring sound of the explosion reached them.

III. New York City

While Park Service employees in the Washington area struggled to respond to the terrorist attacks, many of their fellow employees in New York City were also grappling with the immediate impact. Some employees in New York personally witnessed the attacks on the World Trade Center; some were directly involved in caring for victims; and still others participated in search and recovery operations at the site of the collapsed towers, known as Ground Zero. Many of the roughly 450 National Park Service employees at the twenty-one Park Service sites in New York Harbor were profoundly affected by the events of September 11.1 The units most affected were no doubt two units of Manhattan Sites, the Statue of Liberty, Ellis Island, and Gateway National Recreation Area. Park staffs and the Park Police New York field office played a significant role in the response.

U.S. Park Police New York Field Office The Park Police field office in New York City traditionally provided law enforcement services at all the units in Gateway National Recreation Area as well as at Statue of Liberty National Monument and Ellis Island. Field office commander Maj. Thomas Wilkins was at his residence at Fort Wadsworth, across the harbor from Manhattan, when he saw television coverage of the first plane slamming into the tower. Grabbing his binoculars, he hurried up to the overlook near the Verrazano Bridge where he would have a clear view of Lower Manhattan. Capt. Neal Lauro (brother of Capt. Sal Lauro), who was district commander for the

Opposite page, the World Trade Center towers soared as a backdrop to Liberty Island before the September 11 attacks. Above, the United Airlines plane circles before tearing through the second tower.

33 Park Police responded quickly at the various park units in New York City and spent much of their free time participating in the rescue operations at Ground Zero.

Staten Island Station, the Statue of Liberty, another attack. He got on the phone and and Ellis Island, learned of the attack from the radio giving instructions and arranging his son who was on a bus heading into to bring off-duty officers back into work. Manhattan. Capt. Neal Lauro and two of Buckley who commanded the field office’s his officers, Lt. Dave Buckley and Sgt. Frank SWAT team made a call to ask the Park Abbatantuono, who were in his office at Police dispatcher to direct his team to go to the time, drove to the overlook where they Ellis Island.2 joined Wilkins and a few others. Against Before leaving for Ellis Island, Captain the brilliant blue sky, they could see smoke Lauro ordered the closure of Fort and fire pouring out of one of the trade Wadsworth. Major Wilkins began coordi- towers. Together they watched as a second nating with U.S. Coast Guard officials to plane swept in low across the harbor and institute security measures at the post. Fort slammed into the second tower. Wadsworth housed the command center Watching this second attack, they quickly for the Coast Guard’s New York Harbor concluded that this event was no acci- operations, an Army Reserve center, a dent. A minute after the building was hit, Defense Logistics Agency facility, and the the jarring sound of the explosion reached foot of the Verrazano Narrows Bridge. As a them. The officers said little. They all came result, security concerns for the area were to the same conclusion that the Statue of particularly great. Officers immediately Liberty was a potential target for another closed the back gate and placed guards attack, and they would be in a better posi- at the main entrance to control access. A tion to respond if they were at Ellis Island. police lieutenant was assigned to serve as Captain Lauro immediately contacted the liaison and help the park and the Coast commander at the Statue of Liberty and Guard put in place appropriate security directed him to evacuate the island. Lauro, measures.3 Buckley, and Abbatantuono quickly got Major Wilkins had just dropped in on a back in the car and drove to Ellis Island. Coast Guard briefing when the first tower Eight or nine officers were on duty at the collapsed. He returned to the overlook Statue of Liberty and at Ellis Island at the in time to see the second tower col- time. Lauro’s most immediate concern lapse. At that point, he decided to drive was to do everything possible to prevent into Manhattan to the New York Police

34 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Department (NYPD) command post at difficulty coming in to work because of One Police Plaza. Thick gray ash coated his traffic congestion and road closures. As windshield as he came across the Brooklyn in Washington, D.C., officers enrolled in Bridge. He pulled up at One Police Plaza the home-to-work program had an easier and with the electrical power out climbed time driving in. Captain Lauro contin- eight floors to the command post, where ued to oversee missions at Staten Island, representatives from various state and local the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island, and agencies were gathering. The major thought Captain Zweig, district commander for the his presence in the command post would Brooklyn and Queens unit, remained at enhance communications and coordina- Floyd Bennett Field dispatching Park Police tion with other agencies. He believed it was throughout the area. Zweig quickly called important to have a Park Police represen- in additional officers, closed off Floyd tative in the command center with enough Bennett Field, and dispatched several boats authority to make quick decisions if neces- to Manhattan. The Park Police field office sary, and he was confident that his two dis- was able to deploy its officers and boats to trict commanders, Capts. Neal Lauro and different areas based on information that Marty Zweig, could handle the operations Wilkins relayed from One Police Plaza.4 in their areas. Wilkins’s primary role at the The Park Police marine unit included a NYPD command post was to inform the forty-one-foot patrol boat (Marine 4); other representatives of the resources that twenty-six-foot Whaler patrol boat the Park Service had available. Later, he (Marine 3); twenty-five-foot Sea Ark patrol also relayed information about injured fire- boat (Marine 5); thirty-foot Intrepid patrol fighters who had been taken to Ellis Island. boat (Marine 2); and twenty-seven-foot While Major Wilkins performed his tasks Glacier Bay patrol boat (Marine 1). Fire at One Police Plaza, the Park Police field Island National Seashore dispatched two office continued operating under its normal boats with rangers to assist the Park Police structure. At 9:15 a.m. the field office had with marine operations. The Park Police notified all off-duty personnel to report vessels quickly formed a security perimeter for duty immediately. Some officers had around Ellis Island and Liberty Island and

Above, Park Police assist with debris removal at Ground Zero.

III. New York City 35 helped evacuate employees and residents the boats,” Officer Moen explained, on Liberty Island. The marine vessels trans- “we would have felt like we were help- ported wounded police and firefighters, less.” Without the boats, he said, travel- and frightened civilians from the Battery ing in and out of Manhattan would have Park area to Ellis Island. The marine unit been “next to impossible.” The boats evacuated the Secret Service’s entire New allowed the Park Police to travel back York field office from 7 World Trade Center and forth from Manhattan to Jersey and and also carried doctors, nurses, and sup- from Staten Island. Having a direct link plies that had been prepositioned on Ellis by water allowed them to get where they Island into Manhattan. were needed much faster. The marine unit coordinately closely with the Coast A couple days after the attack, as Officer Guard and provided support to the Coast David Moen and two other officers Guard and other agencies. The boats patrolled on Marine 5, they noticed one of provided escorts, enforced safety zones, the buildings near the South Cove marina and transported personnel between Ellis starting to collapse. Thousands of fright- Island and Manhattan.6 Throughout the ened rescue workers from Ground Zero response, Park Police officers continued to suddenly began running. Marine 5’s crew work closely with the staffs at Manhattan saw some deputy U.S. marshals running Sites, the Statue of Liberty, Ellis Island, toward the water to escape. The crew and Gateway National Recreation Area. motioned them toward the boat and held a line around the dock so the eight deputies and a construction worker could Manhattan Sites jump onto the boat. During this process, Manhattan Sites, an urban park in the New one deputy fell into the water and quickly York City area made up of six separate went under. The crew pulled him out and sites (Castle Clinton National Monument, took the deputies safely out into the har- Federal Hall National Memorial, General 5 bor and to Ellis Island. The marine unit Grant National Memorial, Hamilton Grange played a key role in the response. “Without National Memorial, Saint Paul’s Church

Above left, view of burning trade towers from New York Harbor. Above right, Park Police vessel patrols the harbor.

36 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks they heard the loud boom of the plane hitting the second tower. They hurried back The Park Police marine unit to the front door where they saw what they played a key role described as hundreds of people running in the response. down the narrow Wall Street. One passerby Its vessels provided a screamed that the World Trade Center had direct water link between been struck. Although no one on the staﬀ Manhattan and New Jersey. could yet fully comprehend what was going on, they decided to secure the building as a precaution.

National Historic Site, and Theodore While Brennan called down to nearby Roosevelt Birthplace National Historic Castle Clinton National Monument to Site), was one of the most immediately and find out what was going on, Merced and dramatically affected units in the National maintenance mechanic Archie Johnson Park System. All six sites were briefly closed walked up the street to get a glimpse of to the public immediately after the attacks the damaged trade center. After witness- and two of these remained closed for weeks ing the gruesome scene and assessing the after. The impact on Federal Hall National situation, they returned to Federal Hall and Memorial and Castle Clinton National asked for permission to go home. By that Monument was particularly great. Federal time the radio was reporting major disrup- Hall, located on Wall Street in the center of tions in traffic and public transportation the financial district just a few blocks east around the city so they decided to stay put. of the World Trade Center, became a disas- Meanwhile, Christopher Keenan, supervi- ter shelter moments after the trade towers sory park ranger at General Grant National collapsed. The small staff provided shelter Memorial and the only commissioned law and aid to an estimated 250 people flee- enforcement officer for the Manhattan ing the smoke, dust, and debris that rained Sites, was in a government van driving into down on the streets of Lower Manhattan.7 Lower Manhattan hurrying to the regu- larly scheduled monthly staff meeting at Interpretive Ranger Laura Brennan had Federal Hall. As he headed south he saw arrived at Federal Hall before 8:00 a.m. to a huge cloud of smoke coming from the prepare for the regular 9:00 a.m. opening. World Trade Center. He pulled over to let Promptly at 9:00 a.m. she and maintenance fire engines pass. He later vividly recalled laborer Daniel (Danny) Merced opened seeing the faces of those firefighters and the doors to visitors. When they walked cheering them on. Tragically, many of the outside, they were startled to find the front first firefighters to rush to the scene would steps completely covered with papers and later be trapped when the trade towers col- burning debris. A large column of smoke lapsed. As Keenan continued on at a much loomed overhead. They headed back into slower pace, frantic strangers ran directly the building so Merced could make sure into his van. He heard a thunderous explo- the burning debris did not start a fire on sion and screaming and wondered what the roof. As they walked toward the stairs was going on. When he could progress no

III. New York City 37 The small staff at Federal Hall provided shelter and aid to an estimated 250 people ﬂeeing the smoke, dust, and debris that rained down on the streets of Lower Manhattan.

farther because of road closures and traffic, The small basement quickly filled with he parked the van in Battery Park, grabbed strangers covered with gray dust and soot. his riot helmet, and set off on foot for Suddenly Brennan and the others felt the Federal Hall. building “rumble.” They had no way of knowing at the time that the frightening The superintendent had not yet arrived “rumble” they experienced was caused by at Federal Hall, so the chief of interpreta- the collapse of the first tower. Concerned tion for Manhattan Sites, Steven Laise, took about the safety of her coworkers upstairs, charge temporarily. After hearing news of Brennan ran from the basement to the the second attack on the radio, he directed third floor staff offices. The third floor the staff to close down the building. Laise was the least secure area in the building and Keenan carefully searched the building because of all the windows. As Brennan inside and out for explosives and suspi- hurriedly moved the staff off the third floor, cious packages. They were outside when the she noticed a dark cloud had engulfed the first tower collapsed. Shortly after the col- building. lapse, people came running down Nassau Street and Wall Street, frantically trying Johnson and Merced had decided to head to outrun an enormous cloud of dust and home, but they did not make it very far. debris, a scene that Brennan later com- When Johnson opened the back door to pared to something out of a Godzilla movie. leave, more people rushed into the building The dark cloud moved faster than the seeking shelter. He spotted a large cloud of people could run. As the darkness overtook debris and quickly closed the door. When them, they found it increasingly difficult he reopened the door, it was pitch black to breathe and desperately sought shelter. outside. He heard women yelling from Keenan, Merced, and Laise, who were at across the street, ran over to assist, and the Nassau Street entrance, began grabbing brought them inside. people and shoving them into Federal Hall. Meanwhile, out on the street, eyes sting- They slammed the door behind them. ing Merced was overtaken by the dust cloud when the South Tower collapsed. The

View of Federal Hall National Memorial along Wall Street.

38 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks dust aggravated his chronic asthma, and floor where the air was better. They moved he began to have difficulty breathing. As those who needed medical attention to the Merced tried to push down his own fears second floor where the air was better still. and struggled for breath, frightened strang- Meanwhile, the staff had to deal with fear ers who had seen him speaking to a police and uncertainty. They heard on the radio officer minutes earlier and seen his uniform about the attack on the Pentagon and wor- now approached him. A few frantic strang- ried about additional attacks. With the New ers grabbed onto him screaming for help. York Stock Exchange just across the street As Merced tried to calm them, he con- there was some concern that they were cluded that he had no choice but to bring perilously close to a potential target.9 them back to Federal Hall. Although he Manhattan Sites superintendent, Joseph was only two blocks from Federal Hall, the Avery, on his way to the monthly staff meet- smoke was so thick that he temporarily lost ing was delayed in traffic. He parked on his bearings. He had to feel his way along a side street near Federal Hall and began a wall leading the others until he found running. The overpowering dust and smoke the doorway. By the time he reentered the turned his blue coat gray and forced him to building, he was covered from head to toe take temporary refuge in a nearby building. with dust and dirt. After showering and By the time he arrived and went through changing into a clean uniform, he noticed the side entrance, he found his staff that other strangers had already taken ref- already busy caring for the stranded guests. uge in the basement. Merced grabbed some Roughly 150 visitors were in the cramped rags and pulled the bottled water machine basement covered with dust, with another from the maintenance shop area out into 100 sheltered on the first floor. Some were the basement so that people could clean off crying. Some were washing themselves off some of the dust and ash. The staff handed as best they could with water and paper out cups of bottled water. They took turns towels. Many had cuts and other minor standing by the door to let in the people injuries, several had asthma, some were who continued to seek shelter.8 understandably very distraught, and two The staff left the air-conditioning on, but women indicated they were pregnant and in this seemed to draw in even more dust. need of a place to rest. One asthmatic was As more people entered the building, having a particularly difficult time breath- the basement filled with dust, making it ing. Fortunately, Keenan and Brennan both increasing difficult for them to breathe. had emergency medical training. Brennan Fortunately, the park had recently received performed first aid up in the rotunda a large shipment of dust masks for its area, while Keenan tended to those who maintenance staff, which the staff now remained in the basement. Federal Hall handed out. The air quality in the now had little in the way of first-aid supplies crowded basement continued to deterio- and Keenan regretted that in his haste to rate. The staff realized that they needed to get there earlier that morning, he had left get the visitors out of that area. They asked his emergency medical kit behind in his those who were coated with dust to brush vehicle. themselves off and then move up to the first

III. New York City 39 People huddled on the floor while staff But they heard a gush of air pass and saw members did everything they could to make the sky become completely dark. More them comfortable and calm them. Some people rushed in from outside. Desperate visitors were panicky, while others stared strangers seeking refuge broke out a win- blankly into space. Still others settled into dow facing Wall Street.10 the benches in the Peter Zenger Room, the With so many people to care for, the staff only windowless room, and to provide a asked the Park Police for help. Capt. Marty diversion Merced put in a film that park Zweig sent two officers to Federal Hall. staff used for interpretation. He also took Sgt. Clyde Solomon had just dropped his one of the pregnant women who was com- children off at school when the dispatcher plaining of pain down to the maintenance directed him to respond to Federal Hall. area where she could put her feet up and be He and Officer Bekim Cobaj drove their more comfortable. He even shared his own police van through the smoke of Lower asthma medication with the young woman Manhattan to Federal Hall. The staff was who was having much difficulty breathing. relieved to see the two officers who arrived Another sympathetic staff member gave a in their SWAT uniforms. The officers joined pair of sneakers to a woman who had lit- the staff in trying to calm and reassure erally run out of her shoes in her frantic the visitors. They helped identify those in effort to escape the dust and debris. The greatest need of medical attention. While sight of well-dressed women in business Sergeant Solomon helped the staff move suits barefoot with their legs cut up left an the injured to the second floor, Officer incongruous and unforgettable image for Cobaj went in search of medical assistance. staff members. The staff managed to get Officials had set up triage centers with a working phone line and allowed their medical personnel in certain parts of the guests to call family members to let them city. One of these centers was a few blocks know that they were okay. Few had any idea away at the Federal Reserve Bank. The two where they were. People had run blindly officers used their police van to transport into the building and some were interested the injured, sick, and pregnant to this tri- in learning about the site, so Johnson gave age center where the most critical patients them a tour. The routine tasks of showing were placed in ambulances and carried to the interpretive film and leading a visitor the hospital. tour must have seemed somewhat surreal under these circumstances. After helping transport the injured to the Federal Reserve Bank, Keenan returned The force of the tower collapse shook open to Federal Hall where Merced brought his some of the building’s old windows allow- attention to a hot dog cart across the street ing dust to stream in. More than an inch of that had been abandoned. After checking dust piled up on the first floor. People were for suspicious packages, Keenan, Merced, terrified. The staff let them go up to the sec- and Solomon took bread, soda, and other ond floor. When the second tower fell, packaged food from the cart to give to the people did not hear the loud rumble as hungry and thirsty people inside. with the first one because the dust and debris hanging in the air muffled the sound.

40 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Federal Hall remained closed with tight security in the days after the attack.

By early afternoon, some of the dust had his way in to work. He relieved Keenan settled and the visitors began to head around 9:00 a.m. Park Police officers were home. Solomon distributed dust masks on-site, but Merced and Sheila Hamilton and advised them to walk across the were the only staff members to come in that Brooklyn Bridge, which seemed to be the day. Hamilton handled the phones while safest route out of town for pedestrians. By Merced cleaned the building. He made sure around 1:30 p.m., after the last visitors had that the basement area and bathroom were departed, Johnson, Merced, and Brennan clean and available to policemen and fire- began their long, somber walk home. Avery, men working in the area. Laise, and a couple others stayed behind Federal Hall remained closed on September to inspect the building for major struc- 13, but Keenan and Avery came in to assess tural damage. Laise and Avery finally left the damage. They conducted a preliminary at 5:00 p.m. Solomon and Cobaj remained examination of the building’s structure on-site until around 10:00 p.m. and then to determine whether a more extensive used their van to shuttle firefighters closer evaluation would be needed. More than to Ground Zero. Keenan would remain an inch of dust and debris blanketed the on duty at Federal Hall through the night. roof. On September 11, the air-conditioner During the night the cooling tower on the had pulled the dust into the air-condition- roof overflowed because dust had blocked ing ducts and filled the building with dust. the drains. The chief of maintenance at The two men concluded that the building’s the Statue of Liberty, Peter O’Dougherty, interior would have to be professionally came over around midnight to address the cleaned using hazardous material proce- 11 problem. dures and equipment before the staff could 12 The next morning transportation was be allowed to return. still disrupted and parts of Manhattan The imposing building was a solid masonry remained closed off. Despite this situa- structure of granite and marble that had tion, thinking that he might be needed a stood since 1842. It was so sturdy that the determined Danny Merced slowly made lowest floor had been designated an air

Park Police canine unit on duty at Federal Hall after September 11.

41 III. New York City Although Federal Hall was solid masonry, constructed of granite, the force of the crumbling trade towers and the resulting dust and debris caused signiﬁcant damage.

raid shelter during the Cold War. However, basement; and cleaning more than twenty the powerful seismic waves following the dust-filled air handler units. Reopening collapse of the towers caused serious struc- the site also hinged on providing adequate tural damage. The force of the collapse security for the site, the public, and the caused a significant expansion of pre- staff. Park Police officers were stationed at existing horizontal interior cracks along the the site twenty-four hours a day, and secu- west wall running parallel on the basement rity guards operated a magnetometer and and first floor. Vertical cracks extended inspected packages.14 above the interior doors and through the lintels.13 Over the next few days, the staff Just south of Federal Hall, Castle Clinton slowly resumed operations. Within roughly National Monument also struggled with a week, phone service, electrical power, the impact of the attacks. Castle Clinton is and water supply were fully operational and a circular structure that had been built in the broken windows had been replaced. the nineteenth century to defend New York Contracts were negotiated for cleaning the Harbor. It is located in Battery Park at the interior and the heating/air-conditioning southern tip of Manhattan, less than a mile system. Cleaning was particular challenge southwest of the World Trade Center. Site because the asbestos that had been used in manager Charles Markis arrived at 8:15 the construction of trade towers permeated a.m. on September 11 anticipating another the area. routine day. He had no way of knowing that this day would quickly become any- Preliminary estimates indicated that the thing but routine. With the mild tempera- cost of stabilizing the cracks could reach tures and clear skies, a number of visitors $15 million. Other needed repairs included had already gathered outside when Markis replacing the filters, gearbox, and chiller and other rangers opened the doors to the fan unit in the cooling tower on the roof; public promptly at 8:30. The site manager replacing glass in the skylight above the returned to his office, which looked out rotunda and in a Wall Street window; onto the central parade ground in Battery removing dust and debris from the roof Park. At approximately 8:45 a.m. he noticed and gutters; replacing soiled carpet in the people pointing as they looked north

Workers remove dust and debris from the entrance to Federal Hall.

42 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks With no telephone service, electrical power, or batteries for the radio, employees at Castle Clinton National Monument in Battery Park were completely cut off, without communications.

toward the World Trade Center and became to close up his office and discovered that curious. He stepped outside his door and they had no telephone or electrical service. looked up to see one of the trade towers He and his staff decided to evacuate. As in flames. Soon after the staff began to see they prepared to leave, they heard a loud papers from the offices and other debris explosion. Not knowing at the time that a floating in the air. tower had collapsed, they feared that the Back inside, Markis heard a radio noise might be a bomb or missile. Then announcement that there had been some they saw a huge debris cloud fast approach- kind of accident at the trade center and ing and realized it was not safe to leave. began to think about evacuating his staff. A The small group of employees and partners call came in from the regional office direct- hurriedly took refuge in the site manager’s ing the site to close. The first Circle Line office, donning dust masks that he pulled boat that carried visitors to the Statue of from a supply closet. With no telephone Liberty and Ellis Island was scheduled to service, electrical power, or batteries for depart at 9:00 a.m. and passengers were the radio, they were completely cut off, already boarding. Markis walked over to without communications. They heard the ticket office and directed the manager another explosion as the second tower col- to get the passengers off the boat. He also lapsed and heard the sirens and fighter jets instructed his staff to clear visitors from the overhead but could only surmise what was site, from the bookstore, restrooms, and happening. Peering out through a small museum area. After clearing out the visi- window they saw a frightening mix of ash, tors, they secured the back door. concrete, business cards, stationary, and other debris rain down. The sky turned The site manager and a few others were black. Markis tried to calm his staff as they outside the building preparing to secure the sat in the dark imagining the worst. doors when they saw the second plane fly overhead and dive into the second tower. The police were not letting civilians go Then came the chilling realization that they north of Battery Park so a number of were under attack. Markis went back inside people were huddled outside around the

Castle Clinton on the southern tip of Manhattan was less than a mile from the World Trade Center.

43 III. New York City Staff at the Manhattan Sites set aside their own fears and safety concerns to provide food, water, shelter, and medical assistance to the victims of the attacks.

monument where the dust and debris evacuate people from Lower Manhattan. were thickest. The staff could hear their Circle Line boats carried people to New voices, but Markis concluded it would Jersey. not be wise to invite them in. He worried The experience also highlighted unex- that the burning debris he had seen would pected problems. Castle Clinton’s rest- ignite the wood shingle and truss roof that rooms had been renovated with electronic covered the perimeter of Castle Clinton. flush mechanisms. These mechanisms If there was a fire, he knew his small staff could not function without a power supply, could retreat to the cellar, but they would so the staff was unable to draw water into a not be able to take care of more people. sink or flush a toilet. None of the drinking The staff remained secluded in Markis’s fountains functioned because emergency office for about an hour and a half under responders had tapped into the water sys- the rain of dust and debris. When the tem and the water pressure was low. Also, sky began to clear, they went out to look without electricity to operate the pump, around. One of the first things they did was sewage backed up within twenty minutes, look to reassure themselves that the Statue so the staff could not allow the public to of Liberty still stood.15 use the restrooms. They later allowed some The ticket office manager and one of the limited access to the restrooms and distrib- Circle Line owners had a cell phone with a uted some bottled water. When the situa- radio function so they were able to contact tion calmed down, the staff began to leave. the Circle Line boat captains and ask them Markis, the last to leave, began to walk to bring the boats in to help evacuate peo- home around 1:00 p.m. ple. Two Circle Line boats from across the Communications remained disrupted for East River where they were tied up arrived, days after the attack. The site manager and the staff provided the crews with dust could only contact employees who lived in masks. As with Federal Hall, the incident New Jersey and Connecticut by cell phone. highlighted the importance of having a sup- The city closed off the part of Manhattan ply of dust masks on hand for emergency south of Fourteenth Street. The military situations. Authorities used the seawall established a staging area for the National behind Castle Clinton as a staging area and Guard in Battery Park. Staff members were commandeered all boats in the harbor to temporarily placed at other sites. Markis

44 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks later took a position at Sagamore Hill satisfaction of knowing that he had done National Historic Site and did not return to “exactly what I was supposed to do.”20 Castle Clinton as site manager.16 For some, the experience changed the way Unlike Federal Hall, which sustained signif- they viewed their fellow workers. It forged icant damage, Castle Clinton came through a tighter bond among park staff. They felt attacks “in remarkably good condition.”17 renewed respect and appreciation for each It reopened a few weeks later without any other. “I could have been no prouder if special cleaning or additional security they were my children or my best friend personnel, though the sale of Statue of because they hung in there, man. They Liberty ferry tickets at Castle Clinton was really hung in there,” said Johnson. “I know suspended temporarily.18 that when push comes to shove and you need them,” he added, “they’ll be there for September 11 was a defining experience you.” Managers expressed great pride in the for employees at Manhattan Sites, particu- way the staff pulled together and responded larly at Federal Hall and Castle Clinton. to the crisis, especially the maintenance Superintendent Avery was justifiably proud employees and rangers. “We could have of his staff, describing them as patient, shut our doors and went home,” Keenan kind, and comforting. Staff members put said. “We didn’t. We stayed on, and I’m aside their own fears and safety concerns very proud of us.”21 to provide food, water, shelter, and medical assistance and to calm panicky and occa- In the weeks that followed, some of those sionally hysterical victims. For example, who had taken refuge in Federal Hall that despite his own serious asthma condition, traumatic day either sent notes or came Danny Merced worked continuously filling back to thank the staff personally. Another the water machine and helping the visitors. gentleman sent a poignant thank-you note Fellow employee Archie Johnson found on behalf of his daughter, a young attor- himself drawing on his Vietnam experience ney who had taken shelter at Federal Hall. that day as he went around calming indi- It was not unusual for strangers to stop viduals and making sure that everyone was Merced and Johnson on the street to thank all right. “Help your fellow man was just— them for their efforts that day. One woman that was the day to do that, you know,” he who had escaped the trade center returned explained.19 Steve Laise explained that to thank and embrace a Castle Clinton in helping people that day, staff members ranger who had led her safely to a boat that drew on the Service’s “strong tradition of carried her to New Jersey. service.” “It’s been that way ever since 1916, Federal Hall reopened to the public on when the Park Service was created, that October 15, but with new security measures rangers are there to help people,” he added. in place. Visitors now went through mag- “If it’s deep in the wilderness and some- netometer screening. Before September 11, body’s lost, or if it’s in Lower Manhattan the Park Police provided support at Federal and somebody’s seeking shelter, that’s Hall only in response to special circum- our job. That is what a park ranger does.” stances as needed. Now they had a con- Christopher Keenan, too, felt the personal tinual presence there. Castle Clinton did

III. New York City 45 not reopen until nearly a week later, on Committees toured both Federal Hall and October 22, because of the Army Reserves Castle Clinton, and Congress later appro- occupying Battery Park. Visitation did not priated $16.5 million to repair and rehabili- immediately return to its pre–September 11 tate Federal Hall. Counterterrorism funds level. Federal Hall and Castle Clinton had made possible the installation of surveil- always been considered secondary destina- lance cameras at Castle Clinton and Federal tions for visitors to Manhattan. To fur- Hall. As noted, security guards, magnetom- ther complicate matters, transportation in eters, and X-ray machines were employed. Lower Manhattan was disrupted for some A radio system was purchased for park time. With the major attractions in Lower communications and the park acquired Manhattan gone or closed and Ellis Island two emergency response vehicles. Castle and the Statue of Liberty closed, fewer Clinton received a surveillance camera and visitors came to Federal Hall in November public address system.24 2001 than in November 2000.22 Manhattan Sites was left with significant Statue of Liberty and Ellis concerns. The first was the high cost of Island National Monuments stabilizing the structure of Federal Hall Federal Hall and Castle Clinton were just and implementing the additional secu- two of the Park Service sites in the New rity measures required at Federal Hall and York City area that were directly affected. Castle Clinton. The magnetometers, X- Education specialist Park Ranger Vincent rays, and Park Police or protection rangers DiPietro was assembling children’s coat required at those sites added significantly racks for the education room in the main to costs. Months later, Superintendent building at Ellis Island when he heard an Avery reported, “Manhattan Sites continues explosion. He went outside and stood with to suffer from inadequate funding and FTE a few others scanning the Manhattan sky- 23 [staff positions].…” line. Soon they saw flames pour out the Senior staff of the House and Senate windows of one of the trade towers and Appropriations and Authorizations thick black smoke rising. It was eerily quiet,

View of the main building at Ellis Island. After the second plane struck the trade towers, park staff evacuated the building and gathered at the ﬂagpole.

46 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks As employees gathered near the ﬂagpole, park ofﬁcials worried that the Statue of Liberty might be attacked and decided to evacuate nearby Liberty Island.

he recalled, as they waited to see what Suddenly, the staff knew that this scenario would happen next. DiPietro waited to hear was no accident. Something was horri- the sound of sirens responding as they had bly wrong. Their minds simply could not after an attack on the World Trade Center absorb the horror of what they had just a few years earlier, or to see the smoke seen. Some started running back and forth, diminish as sprinkler systems kicked in and not knowing where to go or what to do. firefighters responded. Yet, nothing seemed Others grabbed their cell phones and began to happen for the next fifteen or twenty calling loved ones. For some, there was the minutes. uneasy feeling that the event they had just witnessed could affect them directly. In the Meanwhile, dozens of employees gath- back of their minds, they knew that both ered at the fuel dock, the best spot on the the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island could island for viewing Lower Manhattan. They be targets. watched a second plane fly in low directly overhead, so low they could see its United After the initial shock, managers and staff Airlines logo. The fact that it was a com- began to mobilize. They started to receive mercial airliner struck DiPietro as odd. reports of other attacks and began prepar- The plane sailed in at an angle around ing an appropriate response. After watch- the second tower and directly into the ing the second plane strike, few, if any imposing structure as if to cut it in half. It employees, were comfortable remaining appeared to explode inside the building as inside. Getting everyone out of the building if, DiPietro vividly recalled, “the building and accounting for them was paramount. just swallowed up that airline.” Witnesses Protection rangers quickly evacuated the stood in stunned disbelief. More than a building and gathered employees on the few described watching the plane hit as lawn near the flagpole at the front of Ellis “surreal,” much like watching a movie. “It Island. Unfortunately, those standing near was as if someone had just hit you over the flagpole were in direct sight line of the the head with a two-by-four,” DiPietro smoke and burning towers, which added explained, “and you’re just shaking your to the emotional distress of some. Standing head and thinking—What just happened? near the flagpole, horticulturist Alfred Did we all see the same thing?” Farrugio was struck by the fact that the seagulls, which normally circled the patio

III. New York City 47 area outside the cafeteria scavenging for wondered if the boat was a kind of suicide food, were on the ground. The seagulls sat bomber because it ignored warnings to turn perfectly still with their heads tucked into away and raced through a sign that said their bodies, as if they knew that something no docking permitted. Thinking they were was terribly wrong. under attack, terrified employees, some hysterical, began running to the opposite Meanwhile Assistant Superintendent Frank side of the island. Knowing how close they Mills quickly moved to stop traffic from were to the site of the attacks and feeling coming across the bridge that connects somewhat isolated on the island, they felt the island to Liberty State Park in New particularly vulnerable. Jersey. He positioned himself at the gate with the keeper of his weapon unsnapped, When the first plane hit the North Tower, determined not to let anything cross the boat captain Alfred Arberg was at the bridge. Park Police officers relieved him Marine Inspection Office next to the a few minutes later and he assumed the Staten Island Ferry in Battery Park chang- role of incident commander making sure ing the oil in the generator on Liberty IV. that structures were in place for the emer- This sixty-four-foot vessel usually carried gency medical operations. Only later did staff and VIPs to Ellis and Liberty Islands. he realize that if terrorists had driven a Captain Arberg launched the boat and as rental truck filled with explosives across, he headed toward Ellis Island, he received a there was little he could have done to stop call directing him to the Statue of Liberty to them.25 evacuate the staff and residents. Normally the staff boat went to Ellis Island first and As employees gathered by the flagpole, park then Liberty Island. After loading pas- officials decided to evacuate nearby Liberty sengers at Liberty Island, Arberg headed Island believing the Statue of Liberty might on to Ellis Island. Passengers who tried be at risk. Park Police officers evacuated the to get off at Ellis Island were instructed to island and then surrounded it with a cor- remain on the boat and go home. Some don of boats. Capt. Neal Lauro even pulled Ellis Island employees also got on the boat. his own officers off the island because he Unfortunately, the staff boat deposited its knew that they could not prevent an attack passengers in Battery Park just as the first from another plane. If the threat came tower collapsed, and they suddenly found by boat, however, they could take certain themselves in the midst of the dust and ash measures to defend the island. Fortunately, and hysteria. Police directed them onto the this early in the morning no visitors had yet Staten Island Ferry, which dropped them arrived on Liberty Island and the number off in an unfamiliar area to make their way of residents was fairly small, so the evacua- home from there as best they could. Once tion went smoothly. at Staten Island, some were taken in tempo- Back at Ellis Island, perhaps as many as rarily by staff who lived at Fort Wadsworth. 150 or 200 employees stood on the sea- In hindsight, Assistant Superintendent wall behind what is known as the “wall of Cynthia Garrett later conceded that honor,” waiting to evacuate. They spotted the decision to take that first group of a speedboat charging toward them. Some

48 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks employees to Manhattan had not been had restricted access, causing her some thought out carefully.26 delay. By the time she arrived, the second plane had struck and the towers were near While the first load of passengers made collapse. Dayson’s most immediate concern their way home, Captain Arberg had was the safety of her employees. Some returned to Ellis Island, picked up a sec- employees who were anxious to get home ond group of employees, and headed back and reconnect with loved ones as quickly as to Manhattan. By that time, however, the possible left the island, while others wanted second tower had collapsed and people to stay and help when they learned that were jumping off the dock at Battery Park evacuees from Lower Manhattan would be to escape the dust and debris. When Arberg arriving. The superintendent and the other saw the situation, he turned the boat managers wanted to limit the number of around and brought his passengers back to employees on Ellis and Liberty Islands Ellis Island. because of concerns about additional After Arberg returned to Ellis Island, attacks. Managers asked those staff Chief of Maintenance Peter O’Dougherty members who were involved in visitor directed him to put Liberty IV back in protection services or had some first-aid its berth and placed the sixty-five-foot skills or emergency medical training and Liberty II in service. Liberty II was a wider could help with a planned triage center to vessel with an open front normally used for stay. They advised the others to go home. hauling garbage, so it could better accom- However, some employees who lived in modate gurneys for the seriously injured. New Jersey were unable to get home Arberg headed back across the harbor to because of bridge and road closures. Manhattan with O’Dougherty and two Dayson and the boat captains discussed emergency medical technicians on board possible locations where the boats could to help with the evacuation of Lower safely drop off staff members and put them Manhattan. They stood by for half an hour, in a position to get transportation home. but there were so many boats that Liberty II Some were deposited in Upper Manhattan was not needed and they returned to Ellis and other boroughs in New York City. Island. The fire department commandeered Capt. Neal Lauro and two of his offi- another vessel, Liberty III, to carry fire- cers had arrived and established a com- men to and from the North Shore Marina. mand center at Ellis Island. Assistant Liberty IV, which could carry up to eighty Superintendent Garrett and no doubt many people, was later used to transport emer- other employees were very glad to see gency personnel from Brooklyn Navy Yard the officers that day. Lauro, Dayson, and to Lower Manhattan.27 Garrett would work side by side throughout As Arberg carried that first group of park the day as they determined what needed employees and residents to Lower Manhat- to be done. The spirit of cooperation tan, Statue of Liberty Superintendent Diane remained strong as they coordinated the Dayson was making her way into work. The response.28 only car access to Ellis Island was through Liberty State Park and New Jersey officials

III. New York City 49 In a hastily established triage center, Ellis Island employees cared for hundreds of wounded trade center victims, and injured rescue workers, ﬁremen, and police who arrived by boat from Manhattan.

Early on, the Park Police received word that Some struggled with broken limbs and Ellis Island would be used as a triage center respiratory problems; others appeared to for victims from Lower Manhattan. The be in shock. A few were soaked with jet idea of using the island as a triage center fuel. Months later, park employees recalled was not new. The Secret Service had previ- vivid images of seeing people in business ously identified Ellis Island as a possible attire walking around shoeless, in torn evacuation point for special major events clothing, with stunned, vacant expressions scheduled in New York City. The island was on their faces. One staff member noted considered a good evacuation site because that even if he had not seen the smoke and of its proximity to Lower Manhattan and fallen towers, he would have known that because of the land bridge connecting it to terrible destruction had occurred simply by 29 New Jersey. watching the victims come off the boats.30 Park staff immediately began preparing for An emergency medical services team from a the arrival of the first victims. Maintenance Jersey City hospital assisted with the triage workers carried chairs outside and set up center. Officials organized three teams, and the triage center at the front of the island a fairly organized process evolved. One with tables and portable toilets. Staff group made up of the Jersey City emergency started amassing emergency medical gear medical team, first responders, and a few on the front lawn. Not long after, boats staff members with emergency medical from NYPD, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, training provided medical treatment. A and other agencies began arriving with second group did what they could to calm trade center victims, as well as injured people and make them comfortable; and rescuers, firemen, and policemen. Staff the third group addressed basic needs members described the people coming off such as food, water, diapers, and restroom the boats as “walking wounded.” Although facilities. most arrivals did not have serious physical injuries, many were scared, disoriented, While the emergency responders and a few and coated with dust. They came off the staff members tended to the medical needs, boat, said one staff member, “grasping for others did what they could to comfort the air, coughing, looking like they had been victims and make them comfortable until through a snow storm, a sugar factory, New Jersey officials could transport them dust and everything covering their bodies.” to a hospital. Boats carrying victims from

50 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Lower Manhattan radioed ahead to let stories about what they had experienced staff know if they had any serious burn that morning. Some were in tears. Kelly victims, so that the emergency medical described the frustration many staff mem- team would have gurneys and stretchers bers no doubt felt that day. “You felt like ready. One boat arrived after another, each you wanted to make it all better for them carrying fifty to seventy passengers. As each and you couldn’t,” she explained. A few new arrival got off the boat, he or she was visitors left particularly lasting impressions. wetted down with a hose to remove the Kelly recalled a frightened little girl with a dust and soot. Joan Kelly, a secretary at the heart condition to whom she gave special park, then recorded their names, address, attention. Daniel Brown recalled a stunned telephone numbers, time of arrival, and female police lieutenant who was anxious the phone number of a contact. Kelly to contact her sister to let her know that passed the information on to Paula Castro she was safe. Brown placed the call for her who entered it into a computer database. and took satisfaction in knowing that he Another employee maintained a list of had brought some comfort to the lieutenant boats and their arrival times. The names of and her family. After a grateful hug from the the refugees were organized by the name lieutenant he moved on to assist others. of the boat on which they arrived. The By some accounts as many as 275 people information was ultimately provided to the had come through the triage center that Park Police and NYPD to help families and day, some of them badly burned. Fifty of friends locate the refugees. One employee, these were transported to local hospitals. drawing on his previous emergency train- Dozens of trained medical personnel were ing, placed a piece of tape around each positioned on the island and a long row person’s wrist with his or her name and of ambulances lined up on the New Jersey social security number as an identifier. side of the bridge stood ready to transport After recording the names, staff directed the injured. Tragically, the devastation at the arrivals to a shaded area with chairs the trade center was so great that the large were they could get out of the sun and pro- numbers of injured victims they expected vided them with water and sandwiches. The never materialized. As hours passed and park’s concessionaire and some employ- relatively few injured arrived, some employees prepared and brought out food for the ees began to feel increasingly helpless and visitors. Staff handed out T-shirts provided disappointed.31 by the concessionaire to replace the dust coated or torn clothing worn by some vic- Dayson spent much of the day out in front tims. They also fashioned baby diapers out of the main building supporting her staff. of T-shirts and distributed makeshift baby Periodically she came inside to try to con- bottles. After a few hours, refugees who did tact the regional office. There was no phone not need medical attention were trans- service, and with power disrupted, no com- ported by bus to Liberty State Park and puters or television. Fortunately the Park later to Brooklyn. Police had radio contact with NYPD and could find out what was going on in the Some of those coming through the city. The superintendent found that tending triage center shared heart-wrenching

III. New York City 51 to the injured while ensuring the safety of Service’s critical incident stress debriefing her staff was no easy task. team were on their way to provide support to employees in the New York City area. Later in the day, employees who lived in Six peer counselors arrived at the park on New Jersey were finally able to go home. Friday afternoon and began work the next As the last of the injured were taken away day, meeting with Ellis Island and Statue and operations were winding down, the of Liberty employees. These employees park received a call saying the island might had to deal with the trauma of witnessing be needed as a morgue. Dayson and a few the attacks and the collapse of the tow- others stayed to make the arrangements. ers. Some mourned the loss of a familiar O’Dougherty and his maintenance crew skyline. They had to come to grips with hurriedly set up a temporary morgue in one not only sight of the destruction, but the of the large storage buildings on the island. strong odor, a smoky, burnt smell, that They cleared out the building and set up permeated Lower Manhattan, what one lighting. Various self-contained morgue- employee called “the smell of tragedy.” On type units were brought over from New the day most employees returned to work, Jersey and staged on the island. The tempo- they found their supervisors lined up to rary morgue was never used and later when greet them, as if they were VIPs, a reception it became clear that few bodies would be Castro later described as “heart-warming.” recovered from Ground Zero, it was demo- bilized. By early evening there was little Each employee carried indelible memories left to do and most of the staff had headed of that day, memories easily triggered home. O’Dougherty, who felt particular by a particular action, image, or even responsibility as the facility manager, stayed smell. Months after the attacks as Vincent on duty all night to make sure all the equip- DiPietro straightened up the front desk, he ment and lights operated properly. The noticed the cancellation stamp normally concessionaire remained all night as well, used for the Park Service’s passport preparing food for the few who remained. program. Apparently no one had touched Dayson later praised her staff for “put- the stamp since that fateful day because the ting our emotions aside and our fears and date on it still read “September 11.” DiPietro anguish to deal with the moment at hand… decided to save the stamp as a tribute. “It’s to serve the victims that were brought over like one thing that froze that day in time,” from the World Trade.”32 he explained.33 The park remained closed for the next The issue of reopening Ellis Island and few days and managers directed employ- the Statue of Liberty was complex and ees to stay home. Frank Mills, one of the troublesome. The question was not just few employees to report for work the when to reopen but how to do so in a safe next day, had positive experiences with and secure manner. In those first weeks, the Service’s peer counseling program in Diane Dayson participated in a number of the past and was anxious to address the conference calls with the regional direc- issue of employee assistance and coun- tor and Director Mainella. They discussed seling. By September 13, members of the the impact of the tragedy on the staff

52 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks and on operations as well as the mea- forcefully. Employees understandably sures needed to improve security. Later, became more cautious or even suspicious Northeast Regional Director Marie Rust in the way they viewed visitors. Reflecting came to Fort Wadsworth and met with staff the new dilemma faced by managers at a from Manhattan Sites, Gateway National number of parks, Statue of Liberty offi- Recreation Area, and the other parks in cials struggled with the issue of enabling New York Harbor. Officials tried to deter- people to experience the park’s rich mine how best to get the parks back in resources while at the same time keeping operation.34 As islands, both sites were them and the Statue safe. Like managers vulnerable to attack by boat and air. Their at other parks, Garrett had to learn more staffs had watched transfixed as the plane about security than she ever imagined. had swooped low overhead before slam- The Service’s mission had always been to ming into the second tower and had seen balance preservation with use, but now the towers collapse. They were understand- managers had to weigh security concerns ably concerned about air traffic and keenly as well. Finding the right balance, she con- aware that the Statue was a potential terror- ceded, was “unbelievably complex.”35 ist target. Before reopening either Ellis or Liberty Reopening the Statue of Liberty was a Islands, officials had to develop effective particularly thorny issue. Park officials procedures for screening visitors. Managers reviewed the existing information about had to make decisions about security how long it would take to evacuate visi- inspections and where to place the metal tors from the various parts of the building detector and X-ray machine. They had to safely. Having this information and know- develop a screening plan that would sat- ing that the Statue was a potential target, isfy the director, the regional director, and managers questioned whether the Service others. It would take months of planning could do enough to guarantee the safety of and the recommendations of many experts visitors. With only one way up and down, before the park felt comfortable moving managers were left pondering how they forward. Officials adopted off-site screen- would get people out safely in an emer- ing. In the past officials screened visitors gency. Service leaders realized that they with a magnetometer after they arrived at needed to take extreme care not to put visi- the Statue of Liberty. Now they decided to tors in the same position as those who had screen visitors with X-ray machines and a been trapped on the top floors of the trade magnetometer at Battery Park and Liberty towers. State Park, before they boarded the Circle Line boats to go to Ellis Island or Liberty Assistant Superintendent Garrett observed Island. that the park was “forever changed” by the events of September 11. On some level Security changes brought an increased employees had already lived with the real- role for the Park Police. Off-site screening ization that Ellis Island and the Statue required the presence of Park Police, even of Liberty were potential targets, but the though a private security firm operated the attacks brought this reality home more equipment. In addition, before September

III. New York City 53 Although Ellis Island reopened to the public months after the attacks, the inside of the Statue would not reopen for several years.

11, the Park Police marine unit’s role at the of Liberty. From their perspective, off- Statue of Liberty had been limited. Park site screening slowed the flow of visitors. Police officials had received authorization Dayson later observed that she felt pressure and funding to buy a boat for law enforce- to reopen before she believed the park was ment purposes at the Statue of Liberty, as safe as it could be. but the boat had no dedicated crew. It was Dayson preferred instituting security sys- manned by what were called “incidental tems slowly and methodically. She wanted operators,” specially trained individuals the Secret Service and local police to con- who could be pulled temporarily to do this. duct security assessments and make their After September 11, the marine unit contin- reports. Then, based on their recommen- ued its patrols and played an integral role dations and on a series of meetings with in maintaining a security zone around the Washington and regional officials, they Statue of Liberty.36 would determine how best to phase in Superintendent Dayson and her staff spent these security measures. She would then many hours working with security experts share the plan with the city, the conces- from outside the Park Service who advo- sionaires, and the other partners, ask cated a slow, methodical approach to them to help fund it, and discuss how reopening. She sometimes felt she did not they might recoup their losses. The prop- have enough support for this approach erty in Battery Park where the screening from Service leaders who to her seemed occurred belonged to the city, and the park more focused on visitation than security. needed authorization from city officials Service leaders, she explained, were feel- to install temporary structures to house ing pressure from concessionaires who its metal detectors and X-ray machines. complained about losing money because of The property at Liberty State Park where the closure and from private foundations visitors entering from New Jersey would that complained the closing impeded their be screened belonged to the state of New fund-raising efforts. Before the attacks, Jersey. The park’s screening operations sig- more than five million people visited nificantly affected its partners and strained the park each year, and concessionaires relationships that had been cultivated over wanted to see that level of visitation again. the years. Instead of giving partners a com- They wanted full open access to the Statue plete plan to review to get their support, the

54 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Park managers soon discovered that there was a delicate balance between protecting park resources and visitors and contributing to the response effort.

Service implemented temporary measures. Although Ellis Island reopened to the pub- City officials complained that the huge tent lic months after the attacks, the inside of in Battery Park obstructed the view of the the Statue of Liberty would not reopen harbor just as they are beginning to revi- for several years. The temporary closure at talize the park. Everything was, she said, Ellis Island and prolonged closure at the “haphazardly done” in order to meet the Statue of Liberty gave staff the opportu- immediate need of reopening.37 nity to catch up on routine maintenance projects. At Ellis Island, they painted bath- Officials continued to regard the Statue of rooms, refurbished the historic floors, and Liberty as a potential target, and though undertook other long overdue maintenance visitors were allowed to walk around the projects. The museum program was able to island, the Statue itself remained close. significantly reduce its backlog of catalog- The decision about reopening the Statue ing. Over time officials developed a visitor ultimately would be made at the highest use and protection plan for the Statue of levels of government, after the introduc- Liberty that would provide visitors with tion of enhanced security measures. On increased access, and with the new security the positive side, with the Statue closed, measures in place the Statue was scheduled Garrett pointed out, visitors benefited from to reopen in August 2004.39 a “more intimate experience” of it. Rather than simply riding the elevator up inside the Statue, they walked around Liberty Gateway National Recreation Area Island, read the wayside exhibit signs, Gateway National Recreation Area also felt and enjoyed a quieter, more contempla- the powerful impact of the attacks. The tive experience. The park changed the way park encompasses more than 26,000 acres it interpreted the New York City skyline. of sandy beaches, marsh, wildlife sanctu- It began giving interpretive talks off-site aries, recreational and athletic facilities, at Battery Park and Liberty State Park. historic structures, and airfields in sev- While visitors waited to be screened, guides eral Park Service units surrounding New described what they would experience at York Harbor. When the attacks occurred, Ellis Island and talked to them about the the superintendent of the Jamaica Bay 38 skyline. unit of Gateway National Recreation Area, William (Billy) Garrett, quickly contacted

III. New York City 55 Part of Floyd Bennett Field in Gateway National Recreation Area became an important staging area for food and equipment to support recovery operations at Ground Zero.

Capt. Marty Zweig. They began coordi- their support functions, Garrett discov- nating with the FBI and NYPD to accom- ered that the idea that the field was part modate their needs. At the request of the of the National Park System somehow got police department, Jamaica Bay officials lost. He had to continually assert that it closed all entrances to Floyd Bennett Field, was a national park and should be treated which housed the police department’s spe- appropriately. Like many other park man- cial operations division and served as the agers, he discovered there was a delicate department’s central staging area in that balance between protecting the park and part of Brooklyn. The police department contributing to the response effort. He blocked the front gate with garbage trucks wanted to support the response effort but and Jersey barriers. The park had an exist- also leave the park in a position where it ing agreement with the police for the city to could resume normal operations as quickly use parts of the airfield for their helicopters as possible. Ultimately the park and the and other special programs. The FBI asked metropolitan police forged a cooperative to use some of the storage space at Floyd relationship and communication between Bennett Field. FBI and park officials dis- the two improved. cussed the FBI storing parts there or using The park also supported the American some of the aviation hangars as tempo- Red Cross. The American Red Cross oper- rary morgues. Eventually the FBI used one ated a major food preparation operation small hangar. Park Police officers provided out of a hangar on Floyd Bennett Field for security for an FBI evidence-collection site nearly four months after the attacks. At at the airfield. While anxious to accommo- one point, the relief agency was preparing date the FBI and the metropolitan police, ten thousand meals a day for relief work- Garrett and Zweig had to carefully weigh ers at Ground Zero. The presence of the the potential impact on park resources and American Red Cross, however, proved to address the need to reopen the site to visi- be a drain on park resources. Park staff had tors and resume normal operations.40 to quickly arrange housing for more than With so many agencies eyeing Floyd one hundred Red Cross workers as well as Bennett Field as a potential staging area for

View of building 7 at the World Trade Center after the attack.

56 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks maintain the restrooms and the electrical quickly and effectively with the crews on power for them.41 their vessels. Because of their grave concern about the security of their commu- At Fort Wadsworth in the Staten Island nications equipment, they often operated unit of Gateway National Recreation under a higher threat level than the Park Area, Superintendent Shirley McKinney Service, U.S. Army Reserve, or Defense quickly took steps to enhance security on Contract Management Agency. The Coast September 11. Capt. Neal Lauro assigned an Guard also set up a temporary camp to sup- officer to help her address security issues at port the two hundred additional person- Staten Island. McKinney’s responsibilities nel brought in to protect the harbor. At the included Great Kills Park with its marina Coast Guard’s request, park managers tem- and Miller Field, located near one of the porarily closed Fort Wadsworth and insti- major thoroughfares on Staten Island. She tuted a 100 percent identification check at directed the ranger in charge at each site to the main entrance. The post would remain clear out visitors and close their sites, with closed for two months.43 help from the Park Police. “It was really a good team effort,” she observed. After per- Much like her counterpart at the Jamaica sonally visiting each site and assuring her- Bay unit, Billy Garrett, McKinney found self that her employees were all right, she herself in the position of reminding other returned to Fort Wadsworth.42 agencies (and a particular Coast Guard captain) that Fort Wadsworth was a national The metropolitan police ultimately used park and she needed to allow public access. a historic hangar at Miller Field as a The Coast Guard captain agreed to the command center and as an equipment- reopening but installed barricades around staging area for two months. The mayor of the Coast Guard property within the post. New York City and the governor of New McKinney stationed a person at the main York used it as a landing area for their gate to provide security and asked the helicopters. captain to remove his personnel. She felt By legislation, the Park Service was the lead strongly that a visitor’s first contact should agency for the Fort Wadsworth complex, be a Park Service representative in the so final decisions about security rested green-and-gray uniform, not an officer in with McKinney. Decisions about security a blue uniform carrying a gun. The captain were complicated by the fact that the park’s understood her concerns. When the war partners at Fort Wadsworth, specifically in Afghanistan began and the Coast Guard the Coast Guard, Army Reserve, and the threat level went back up, however, she had Defense Contract Management Agency, had to close the park again. The closure lasted very different missions. No protocol existed until December 2001. Again, balancing the for an event of this kind, but McKinney need for security with the park’s funda- did what she could to accommodate the mental missions proved difficult. When varied security needs. In addition the Coast fishermen protested the closure, McKinney Guard’s mission was to protect the New worked out a compromise that would York Harbor. To do this job, Coast Guard allow them access but only after recording officials had to be able to communicate their fishing permit and license numbers.

III. New York City 57 The response in the New York City area clearly demonstrated the close connection between these parks and their surrounding communities and the value of having protected areas and facilities that can be used to support other agencies during emergencies.

McKinney had high praise for her staff at partially re-opened at the end of the week Staten Island. “I think we are stronger as a under heightened security to include Jersey result of it,” she concluded.44 barriers at park entrances. Portions of the park remained closed much longer because At the Sandy Hook unit of Gateway of their close proximity to the Coast Guard National Recreation Area, business man- facilities.45 ager David Luchsinger went to North Beach for a firsthand view of the trade towers when the attacks occurred. He immedi- Conclusion ately contacted the Coast Guard station at Weeks after the attacks, Fort Wadsworth, Sandy Hook. The Coast Guard indicated Miller Field, and parts of Floyd Bennett that they needed to borrow the park’s forty- Field remained closed to the public. one-foot patrol boat, named the George B. Superintendents from the parks in the New Hartzog, Jr. after one of the Service’s for- York City area met on Friday, September mer directors. The boat and crew assisted 14, to discuss transportation, peer coun- the Coast Guard by transporting volunteer seling for employees, security and law New Jersey firefighters and a Coast Guard enforcement, and other important issues admiral and his staff to New York City. and to assess the current situation at the Coast Guard officials also asked for help various sites. A few days later, Statue of patrolling New York Harbor. That evening, Liberty and Ellis Island employees gath- Luchsinger, along with three other park ered at Ellis Island for the first time since employees and a Coast Guard representa- September 11 and shared their emotional tive, took the boat out into the harbor and stories. On September 19 the Director positioned themselves at the foot of the Mainella addressed roughly three hundred Verrazano Narrows Bridge. Armed with Park Service employees from the New York automatic weapons, the crew chased and area who had convened on the main floor intercepted unauthorized vessels attempt- of the Ellis Island museum. The director, ing to sneak into the harbor. along with the Northeast Regional director Park managers decided to close the Sandy and her deputy, visited Ground Zero. They Hook unit to provide additional security for also visited Federal Hall and the New York the Coast Guard station at the tip of Sandy Stock Exchange, one of the Park Service’s Hook. The park closed on September 11 and partners. The visit no doubt gave these

58 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks leaders a fuller appreciation not only of the they could rely on the parks when they impact of the attacks on the parks and park needed them.48 employees but also of the pressing security The response in the New York City area concerns.46 clearly demonstrated the close connection Although park employees resumed their between these parks and their surround- tasks and all the park sites in the New ing communities and the value of hav- York City area except for the Statue of ing protected areas and facilities that can Liberty reopened to visitors, there was no be used to support other agencies during sense that things had returned to normal. emergencies. The response in New York, Managers and staff struggled with new feel- much like the one in Washington, D.C., was ings of vulnerability. As one superintendent characterized by and strengthened by the observed, “the emotional scars will last a close cooperation between the parks and lifetime.” Months after the event managers the Park Police and the outstanding service and staff still struggled to describe the of park managers and staff and Park Police shock they felt that day and the difficulty officers. At the same time, the Park Service’s they had accepting what had happened. experience dealing with the Coast Guard As Joseph Avery noted, “You just did not and NYPD highlights the complexities cre- believe what you were being told hardly. ated when agencies with contrasting mis- Or you didn’t believe it could happen. sions and functions are housed inside park It was bewilderment. It was confusion.” boundaries. Laura Brennan echoed that they were all in “total disbelief, much like—this can’t be happening.”47 The fear and uncertainty remained long after for some employees. Vincent DiPietro observed, “Not many people go home knowing that the place [where] they work influences so many other people for good or bad” or that the place they work gener- ates so much hatred that terrorists would be willing to kill employees and visitors. Statue of Liberty Assistant Superintendent Frank Mills, too, described a new element of uncertainty. “I think we’ve learned that the National Park Service plays a role in the community, in the local community as well as in the national community.…But I think mostly we learned that we are vulnerable.” The American people, said Mills, went to parks for comfort and were met by compe- tent, caring Park Service staff. They found

III. New York City 59 60 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Within the ﬁrst 24 hours the center at Shenandoah had set up a process in which every park unit would provide a regular update of their closures and special events.

IV. Incident Management

As park managers and staffs in Washington, D.C., and New York City struggled to respond in those first chaotic hours after the attacks, senior leaders in Washington took the extremely important step of activating the Service’s incident management system, its organizational structure and procedures for responding to extraordinary events. This decision would ultimately have a huge impact on the nature, effectiveness, and success of the Service’s response operations.

Convening Incident Management Teams Associate Director Dick Ring was among those who encouraged officials to immediately activate the Service’s national all-risk incident management team to coordinate the response. He recognized that the headquarters’ function had been disrupted and no orderly plans were in place to address that situation. He had learned through his experience with other major incidents that during an emergency, existing plans were quickly tossed aside. Incidents and events rarely unfold as anticipated, Ring observed, and the existing plan usually addressed the previous event, not the immediate one. The established, routine organizational structure was not the appropriate structure for responding to an emergency: the regular staff did not necessarily have the necessary skills, and the normal operating processes were not designed for the speed and coordination required during an emergency. No organization set up to provide routine day-to-day services, Ring explained, was designed to operate effectively in an emergency environment. The incident

View of Main Interior Building in downtown Washington, D.C. The rolling hills of Shenandoah National Park stood in stark contrast to the turmoil in Washington, D.C.

61 The incident management system was the most effective tool that the Service had to quickly deploy people who were pretrained to handle any kind of event.

management system was the most effective Historical Park in southeast Virginia, was tool that the Service had to quickly deploy meeting with York County officials when people who were pretrained to handle Greg Stiles called to alert him that the any kind of emergency situation or event. team might be activated. Team member Particularly with the temporary relocation Dennis McGinnis, chief of maintenance at of the headquarters function to West Shenandoah National Park, was on vaca- Virginia, the Service needed people who tion in the Outer Banks of North Carolina could respond quickly to rapidly changing having his hair cut in a local barbershop circumstances and coordinate effectively when he saw the planes strike the World with department senior leaders.1 Trade Center on television. McGinnis, who served as the team’s operations section Rick Gale, who had served as the incident chief, was one of the few members who had commander for both the Yellowstone fires responded to every incident since the Pearl in 1988 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992, Harbor commemorative event in 1991. He also recognized the need to convene and immediately contacted the dispatch cen- preposition the national incident man- ter and confirmed that the team was being agement team so that it could respond activated. McGinnis then drove to Colonial quickly if needed. Initially, Gale, Dennis National Historical Park to meet up with Burnett, and others opposed staging the Brooks and they headed to Shenandoah team in Washington because the situation National Park. When the two men arrived was so uncertain. They discussed conven- at the park later that night, they initially ing the team at Shenandoah National Park, were instructed to go to the alternate site safely away from the chaos, where it would where department leaders had gathered. have ready access to the dispatch center. Not long after, they were told to remain at Moreover, three of the team’s key mem- the park. By midnight four team members bers (Greg Stiles, Dennis McGinnis, and were at the park. They formally began oper- Chester Mikus) were already based at the ations early the next morning.2 park. On the Director Mainella’s behalf, Gale instructed the dispatch center activate Team members had always been confident the team. that they could be on-site within 24 hours, but this assumption hinged on being able Incident Commander Skip Brooks, chief to use commercial air transportation. The of maintenance for Colonial National

62 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks events of September 11 taught them not established in Shenandoah as a backup. to make this assumption again. As noted Although officials initially had wanted the earlier, all commercial flights were tempo- team safely outside the Washington area, rarily grounded, and team members scat- by the afternoon of September 12 they had tered around the country had great dif- concluded that the immediate threat of ficulty responding. Brooks found himself another terrorist attack had subsided, and two to three days behind schedule because the team needed to be physically closer to of delays bringing in his team members. support the leadership more effectively. Although each team member had a desig- The team began operations in the Main nated alternate, filling the positions proved Interior Building early on September 13, difficult. For example, Stiles, the team’s working out of the ranger activities office. planning section chief, was pulled to work A few days later, they moved across the for the department, leaving Brooks tem- street to the top floor of the South Interior porarily with a key position vacant. Stiles’ Building, into a well-equipped facility with alternate from Zion National Park in Utah phones and computers. It was the same did not arrive for two and a half days. facility the team had occupied earlier when The finance section chief spent three days they had worked on the Service’s facilities driving across country from Arizona to management software. By the end of the Chicago and then caught a flight after air week, forty team members were at work in traffic resumed. It took the team’s informa- Washington.4 tion officer nearly a week to travel from the The team’s arrival in Washington took some West Coast. Members of a regional incident pressure off headquarters officials and the team helped fill the gap until the national small ranger activities staff. The team was team, known as a Type 1 team, was fully able to establish itself quickly and pro- established. vide the needed oversight and staff sup- The alternate incident commander, J.D. port. With the decentralized authority and Swed, drove from Indiana to join the team limited law enforcement staff in the Park as Brooks’s deputy. In addition to Brooks, Service, Maj. Gary Van Horn observed, “We Swed, and McGinnis, the team included really couldn’t get done all that needed to Aniceto (Cheto) Olais as planning section be done at [the Washington headquarters] chief, Bob Howard as logistics section chief, without calling in a Type 1 incident team.”5 Kim Glass (later replaced by Ruth Kohler) The headquarters was in the midst of a as finance section chief, and Debee Schwarz move to a nearby building on G Street, and as information officer. Gale served as the all their operational plans were in boxes. team’s agency representative, the incident Despite this, Brooks found that the ranger command system’s advisor to the director.3 activities division knew exactly what to do and implemented the all-risk plans. That first night in Shenandoah National Park, Brooks found it difficult to communi- With the activation of the team, the Park cate effectively with officials in Washington, Service moved to the forefront in the D.C. He decided that his team needed Department of the Interior’s response to be in Washington, with another team because it was the only bureau in the

IV. Incident Management 63 Each incident management team operated under a “delegation of authority,” which deﬁned its mission and authorized its operations.

department with an all-risk incident sys- the implementation plan when the Service tem and the needed resources. The Service underwent a major reorganization in the had more resources for responding to this mid 1990s. kind of incident in the form of law enforce- The system was rooted in the concept of ment personnel, heavy equipment, and bringing in a preestablished team specifi- heavy equipment operators than any other cally trained and experienced in incident bureau.6 management to oversee a particular incident or event so that the affected park, Incident Management System region, or national organization could The Service’s incident management system focus on its normal day-to-day operations. had been in place approximately twenty Members trained, exercised, and deployed years. Its structure was loosely based on a as part of a team so that they did not lose military model of an incident commander valuable time becoming familiar with each with staff reporting directly to an incident other and with the operating procedures. commander. The typical staff includes an They were trained and equipped to handle information officer, safety officer, opera- a broad range of responsibilities to include tions section, logistics section, and plan- planning, logistics, and public affairs. All ning section. Although the Service initi- had completed training at the Federal Law ated the system years earlier specifically Enforcement Training Center. to respond to wildland fires, in 1985 it Under the all-risk incident management adopted the system for responding to all system, teams were organized at the local, types of emergency operations, so called regional, and national levels. A so-called all-risk incidents. Since that time, the sys- Type 1 team operated at the national level, tem had been used to respond to a large while Type 2 teams functioned at the number of events and incidents, both large regional level. There was an Eastern Type and small, and it has been used occasion- 2 team, for example, that was three deep, ally on an interagency basis. For example, meaning three individuals were designated in 1988 officials used the system to deploy for each position. Two of the three indi- roughly 12,000 people to respond to the viduals assigned to each position were from major fire in Yellowstone National Park. the Park Service’s Southeast Region, and They also used an incident team to develop

64 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks The Service had more resources for responding to this kind of incident in the form of law enforcement personnel, heavy equipment, and heavy equipment operators than any other bureau.

the third was from the Northeast Region. broadly written delegation of authority Type 3 teams were formed at the park level, gave the team the authority to act on the though not all parks had them. Teams at director’s behalf as well as the equally each level had the same five-person core important authority to expend funds. It that included section chiefs for operations, also specified the actions they could not planning, and logistics, as well as informa- take without the approval of the director tion and safety officers. By the time indi- or her designated representative.7 viduals worked their way up through the Typically, after the delegation of author- system from Type 3 teams to Type 2 to Type ity was signed, the incident team estab- 1, they were seasoned professionals with lished its objectives and developed a plan extensive operational experience. for its operations. During the September 11 response, Brooks’s team found itself con- Delegation of Authority tinually revising the operational plans. The Each incident team operated under what objectives, which could be fluid, described was called a “delegation of authority” what the team wanted or planned to do letter authorizing its operations. A team in a specific period of time known as the typically developed the delegation of “operational period.” To establish the authority in partnership with the official objectives, management worked with the who called them in. Depending on the advisor agency administrator (and for the scope and nature of the incident or event, September 11 event they worked with a the delegation of authority was signed representative from the secretary of the by a park superintendent, a regional interior’s office). Then the team developed director, deputy director, or the director. strategies and tactics that would enable Because the September 11 response was a them to meet their objectives. The “tactics” major, national event, Director Mainella were the specific task the operational staff signed the delegation of authority letter, performed to attain the objectives. During which conveyed her expectations to the the response, the objectives and the tactics team. The director’s letter delegated to frequently changed, sometimes on a daily the team “authority and responsibil- basis. The team put together an incident ity to manage the continuity of opera- action plan (a notebook) that laid out the tions for the National Park Service.” This incident objectives, command and control

IV. Incident Management 65 The requirement to coordinate with the department was a unique and ultimately very signiﬁcant provision. This situation was the ﬁrst time that the national team had been asked to provide such extensive resources in supporting the department.

structure, delegation of authority, phone its costs below $100,000 unless the direc- numbers for contacts, and other important tor approved an increase. Finally, the letter information. The objectives, strategies, and designated Rick Gale as the director’s rep- tactics were all rooted in that original del- resentative for this incident. egation of authority. The requirement to coordinate with the The director’s delegation letter for Sep- department was a unique and ultimately tember 11 outlined nine “responsibilities,” very significant provision. This situation which ultimately became the team’s objec- was the first time that the national team tives. The team’s first responsibility was to had been asked to provide such extensive “protect human life and operate safely.” resources in supporting the department. When appropriate, the team was to notify Although the team had worked with the managers and supervisors of the potential department in the past and had supported need to provide employees with alterna- department officials during the transition tive work sites or other accommodations. to the new millennium (known as the Y2K Team members were to analyze information event), the September 11 incident was very about the “overall situation” and determine different. With Y2K, the team had focused the best measures for maintaining essen- on safeguarding a process rather than sup- tial operations while keeping employees porting an operation with rangers, equip- safe. In addition they were to help develop ment, and other resources. The director and coordinate information about ongo- had given the team responsibility for looking response operations for employees in ing at the Service resources and response the Washington office. Particularly signifi- activities from a national perspective and to cant, the delegation of authority directed prioritize resources. The delegation letter the team to coordinate its activities with specified that the team would be financially the department as needed. The team was accountable and operate safely.8 to keep members of the Service’s National Leadership Council informed of significant Role and Activities of events and gather all the information about the Type 1 Team the parks that the director or her representative requested. Also significant, the autho- During the September 11 response, the rization specified that the team was to keep Type 1 team’s primary role was to develop plans and gather information. Its job was

66 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks to identify available resources and provide and her staff had no national database they the director with clear, accurate informa- could use to easily identify and locate avail- tion that would allow her to make informed able resources, so they created their own. decisions about responding to the incident. The regional law enforcement specialists Its goal was to give the director a reliable directed their parks call the center each day “snapshot” of all the resources she had with information about resource availabil- available at a particular moment in time. ity. Park Service areas reported in twice a She, in turn, conveyed this information to day and later once a day. The team collected the department. Though the team “never the information and prepared reports twice shoveled any dirt or moved any material,” a day.10 Gale explained, its role in planning was Director Mainella was keenly interested “vital.”9 in what was going on in the parks, how The team quickly became the agency focal they were doing, what parks were opened, point for gathering, consolidating, and and which ones were closed. Skip Brooks updating information about the status of briefed the director and senior staff twice individual parks. Within the first twenty- each day, at 7:30 a.m. and around 5:00 four hours, the center at Shenandoah had p.m. After the morning briefing, the direc- set up a process in which every park unit tor then took the information to her 8:15 would, by phone or fax, provide a regular a.m. departmental meeting. On weekends, update of their closures and planned spe- Brooks called her at home to keep her cial events. The center used the informa- informed. tion to generate a status report. They faxed The director also held daily conference the report to the Type 1 team and the team calls with the regional directors and asso- used it to brief the director. The report ciate directors at noon eastern standard changed over time as headquarters officials time. In this forum, regional directors requested certain types of information. reported on the situation in their parks and Early on September 12, officials directed the status of their resources. Participants all park units to report to the Type 1 team discussed key issues and shared updated the special events planned from September information that the director in turn pro- 12 to October 1 with a brief description of vided to the secretary. Gale and Brooks par- those events and any changes to park status ticipated in these calls. During these calls, as they occurred. the director or regional directors occasion- The center also received numerous requests ally asked Brooks or Gale to follow up on for law enforcement rangers and tried to specific issues or questions. Brooks found use the existing national fire system to fill these conference calls particularly useful these requests. But initially some park units because they provided information that he were reluctant to release resources and the did not get anywhere else. After the first or center had difficulty filling all the requests. second week when the situation had stabi- There were conference calls to discuss the lized somewhat, the director scaled back security priorities, but initially no real pri- the conference calls to every other day.11 ority system was in place. Brenda Ritchie

IV. Incident Management 67 The team established an effective system and if safe havens had been established for identifying law enforcement rangers, for employees. Another, much more nar- equipment, and other types of Service rowly focused, security-related task was resources. Working with facility manage- to evaluate security at the Main Interior ment experts, the team developed tem- Building, as well as at Park Service offices at plates that could be used in concert with 1800 G Street, 800 North Capitol Street in the existing Park Service facility manage- northwest Washington, D.C., and later the ment software to help identify and track Accounting Operations Center in Reston, emergency resources (e.g. people, equip- Virginia. Brooks brought in a group to con- ment) in a national emergency. Team mem- duct the security analysis under McGinnis’s bers contacted each of the 385 units in the direction. The team soon found that much National Park System at the time and asked of the security work for the Main Interior the chief rangers or chiefs of maintenance Building had already been done and was to identify their available resources. They under review at the departmental level, so tried to gather the information in a logi- they concentrated on evaluating security cal sequence so it could be entered into at the G Street and North Capitol facili- the existing Facilities Management Systems ties. They also drafted an evacuation plan Software (FMSS, also known as MAXIMO). for the Accounting Operations Center in This computer software allowed them Reston. By the end of its first week, the to track a variety of resources through- team had completed a security evaluation out the Service. As the facility manager for the department and continued its secu- at Shenandoah National Park, Dennis rity and risk assessment of Park Service McGinnis was already well acquainted with offices in Washington.13 the MAXIMO system. Other members were Managers were particularly concerned also familiar with the system.12 about the inadequate security at the G In addition to identifying and obtaining Street location. Approximately 130 Service needed resources, team members gathered employees had moved into new offices on critical information and disseminated it to G Street the weekend before the attacks high-level officials in the Interior depart- as part of a larger effort to free up space ment, Director Mainella’s senior staff, and for a planned renovation of the Main employees in regions and parks. They pre- Interior Building. Major Van Horn and pared reports on status of parks (based Risk Management Manager Dick Powell on information from dispatch center) for led the effort to address these concerns. directorate and secretariat and coordinated After the terrorist attacks, officials decided the flow of information to the dispatch to move those employees back into Main center. Interior. Brooks’s team hurriedly located a furniture supplier and negotiated a The team also performed security-related purchase agreement. The furniture was missions. The team’s operations section installed in the headquarters building by contacted all regional safety officers and the time employees arrived on Monday, risk managers to determine if evacuation September 18. The team’s logistics element plans were in place for their regional offices knew how to perform these tasks quickly,

68 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Initially, the process of gathering information from hundreds of individual parks was not as smooth or as precise as ofﬁcials would have liked.

and the contracting officer had $5 million park status reports that Brooks provided to authority. The department also ordered the director.15 various resources, everything from tables In those first critical days, team members to law enforcement rangers, through the compiled a list of significant dams located team perhaps because, as one team mem- within Park Service areas as well as a list of ber contended, the team could get these heavy equipment and operators available resources more efficiently. The team and within a day’s drive of New York City and senior officials focused primarily on the the Pentagon. They collected and provided security of parks, buildings, and monu- information about staffing levels and avail- ments. Although Powell tried to draw more ability for the Park Police in Manhattan. attention to employee health and safety issues, he found that he had little success The team compiled status reports on parks in this effort until the discovery weeks and dams and compiled resource availabil- later of the first anthrax-laden letter.14 ity lists organized by region. For two weeks after the attack, team members continued The information-gathering process was not to call every park to established a compre- as smooth or precise as officials would have hensive list of qualified people (e.g. people liked. Occasionally, there were discrep- with law enforcement commissions or EMS ancies between the information the team certification) and equipment (e.g. front provided to the director in its report and loaders, backhoes) that could be used in information in the daily electronic Service- emergencies. The focus was on resources wide newsletter called Morning Report similar to those needed in past incidents put out by the ranger activities division. such as the Yosemite floods and Hurricane Brooks became increasingly concerned Andrew. By September 27 the team had about these discrepancies and asked the contacted nearly every park unit.16 Morning Report’s editor, Bill Halainen, to join his team. Halainen’s primary function After the first week, officials brought in an was to ensure that timely, accurate informa- incident team from the Southeast Region tion was conveyed to the field through the to assist with the extensive communica- Morning Report. After he joined the team, tions requirements. They also wanted the there were fewer discrepancies between the team to serve as a backup in case there information in the Morning Report and the was another attack in Washington. With

IV. Incident Management 69 the director’s approval, Brooks mobilized in completing a risk assessment for the the eastern incident management (Type South Interior Building. 2) team, headed by Incident Commander At this point, Lopez’s team recommended Robert (Bob) Panko from Everglades that it transition to a smaller organiza- National Park, and directed them to tion which could provide limited incident Shenandoah National Park. Panko’s team support indefinitely. It recommended that was in place on September 20. The primary officials demobilize Panko’s Type 2 team function of this seven-person team was in the near future and demobilize most of to support the Service’s expanded com- Lopez’s team by October 3. It also recom- munications operations at the dispatch mended that officials detail personnel to center and serve as a backup in the event the Washington headquarters to provide that the Type 1 team had to be evacuated continued incident support and deactivate from the Washington area. Shenandoah most of the expanded dispatch function National Park Superintendent Doug Morris at Shenandoah National Park on October gave Panko’s team a limited delegation of 3. Having completed its missions, Panko’s authority, which authorized it to coordinate team officially ended its operations on the flow of information, provide support September 28. Lopez’s Type 1 team did to the expanded dispatch operations, and demobilize on October 3, and there was a use park facilities and resources. However, transition from a national incident manage- even though the superintendent signed the ment team to another team for a few more delegation of authority, the Type 2 team weeks to provide logistical and financial reported directly to Brooks who retained support. After October 12, all requests for the overall delegation of authority from the resources related to the ongoing security director.17 operations would be handled through the Brooks’s team completed its standard four- Service’s normal procedures for ordering teen-day tour, and on September 25 a new resources.18 Type 1 team under Incident Commander Eddie Lopez assumed responsibility for Type 2 Incident Management managing the incident. During its tenure, Team—Northeast Region this team either completed or assisted with the following tasks. It produced a Service- While the Type 1 team mobilized at the wide emergency resource inventory of law national level, the Northeast Region called enforcement rangers, emergency medical in a Type 2 team to support its response. service’s personnel, boat operators, main- Much like officials in Main Interior, after tenance mechanics, electricians, plumb- learning of the first attack, Regional Chief ers, carpenters, equipment operators, and Ranger Robert (Bob) Martin and others specific types of heavy equipment for all gathered around a television in a confer- the parks. It compiled daily status reports ence room in the regional headquarters for units affected by closures or restrictions in Philadelphia. Martin, who had come to related to the terrorist attacks. Team mem- the chief ranger job fairly recently after a bers reviewed and updated the Service’s seven-year vacancy in that position, began continuity of operations plan and assisted discussing what needed to be done with the

70 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks other staff. The small group that had gath- about their planned openings and closures ered around the television quickly formed on September 12, determining the availabil- an ad hoc incident command team and set ity of various skills within the region like up a command post. This team included heavy equipment operators and emergency representatives from interpretation, opera- medical technicians. Martin and Moore tions, and law enforcement. remained in the command post all night so that they could respond quickly if neces- With commercial flights grounded, Regional sary. Shortly before dawn, Martin received Director Marie Rust found herself stranded word that the decision had been made to in Florida, and the acting regional direc- reopen the parks on September 12 and his tor, Associate Director for Park Operations team began notifying the parks. Dale Ditmanson, was out of the office, so Martin temporarily assumed responsibil- The Type 2 team was able to mobilize ity for directing the region’s response. He more quickly than the Type 1 team in part would serve as incident commander until because its members were closer geograph- the Type 2 team arrived. After contacting ically and less dependent on air transpor- Dennis Burnett in Washington, Martin and tation. Regional staff set up a command others began planning their immediate center for the team in one of the training response. When Ditmanson arrived later rooms in the Philadelphia Support Office. that morning, officials began to discuss a They worked through the night to install more long-term strategy and made plans phones and computers so that Brown’s to activate the region’s incident manage- team would be able to begin work as soon ment team. Martin sent e-mail messages as it arrived. The team formally took over to all the park chief rangers encouraging operations in Philadelphia early the morn- them to become more vigilant about secu- ing of September 12. It included Planning rity and to consider possible evacuations Section Chief Carl Merchant, Operations and measures to secure their parks. The Section Chief Will Reynolds, Safety Officer region asked all the parks to report their Ben Morgan from Everglades National available resources. Ditmanson requested Park, Public Information Officer Paul that the Type 2 team under Incident Pfenninger, and Chester Mikus. Morgan, Commander Rick Brown immediately come who was in Manhattan at the time of the to Philadelphia to coordinate the response attack, had contacted the team knowing for the regional director.19 that they would need a safety officer. Until Brown’s team arrived, the original Pfenninger, an interpretive program man- team with Ditmanson, Martin, Clark Guy, ager at Shenandoah National Park, had Jimmie Moore, Russ Smith, and Kathy learned of the terrorist attacks on the Dilonardo would continue to oversee the radio while in his car that morning. He response. Martin assigned one of the man- immediately called into the communica- agers as a public information officer to tions center to offer assistance. At noon, respond to media queries. Team members he received a call back informing him that worked well into the evening answering his Type 2 team had been activated. That questions from the press, contacting parks evening Pfenninger and Mikus, also from

IV. Incident Management 71 The incident management structure could be rapidly expanded, contracted, and tailored to ﬁt the size and nature of a particular event.

Shenandoah National Park, set off for and upcoming events and transmit it to Philadelphia. They arrived at their hotel the communications center in Shenandoah around midnight. When they showed up National Park, which had a direct link to for work at the regional headquarters the Type 1 team. Information flowed pri- early the next morning they were quickly marily from the Type 2 team incident com- tasked to gather information about parks mander to the Type 1 incident commander, in the region that had been affected and though the various section chiefs occasion- available resources. Since the park units ally communicated with their counterparts in Manhattan were without communica- directly. The two teams were in constant tions, the first challenge was to establish communication. The members were famil- connections using cell phones and e-mail. iar with each other and had a good rapport. A Philadelphia company donated cellular Regional leaders decided to keep the team phones with a two-way radio feature that at the Philadelphia headquarters where it proved useful.20 had access to computers, telephones, and As noted, the Type 2 team had responsibil- all the resources and support it needed ity for coordinating the region’s response. from regional managers and staff rather More specifically, its task was to assist than send it to New York City. Some team parks, develop contingency plans, and members visited the parks in Manhattan help get information out to the public. to assess the situation firsthand, but for Martin worked closely with the team and the most part they relied on televised news together they began formulating a plan broadcasts and information gathered by of action. Team members began contact- phone. They were in daily contact with ing each park in the region to get a status Park Service employees in Manhattan. report and identify those parks in need of Operations Section Chief Reynolds, a law additional security—in effect to do a risk enforcement ranger, worked with security assessment. They then provided this infor- issues and coordinated with the Park Police mation to their counterparts on the Type 1 and the FBI. The FBI fed information to team in Washington, D.C., so that the infor- Park Police representatives who in turn mation could be passed on to the direc- provided information to the team. The team tor. The team’s primary responsibility was presented briefings to Ditmanson each to gather information about park closures morning and afternoon and occasionally

72 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks participated in conference calls with “the positive things are that they can take Marie Rust. The team conducted briefings, the stress away from the employees that handled questions, and occasionally made are working at the park.” Also the system operational decisions. It had the authority brought greater organization and con- to transfer resources within the region.21 tinuity to the situation and made ordering resources easier. On the other hand, Conclusion the teams sometimes created stress for the existing staffs by coming in and taking The Type 1 and Type 2 teams played a over.23 vital role in shaping and implementing the Service’s response to the events of Although the system worked well, some September 11. Although the all-risk inci- speculate that it might have functioned dent management system had never before more effectively at the regional level than been used in response to a terrorist attack, at the national level in Washington. The Dennis Burnett, Rick Gale, and other man- September 11 response posed unique chal- agers expressed great satisfaction with lenges for the Type 1 team. The normal its overall effectiveness. One of the major means of communication and transporta- strengths of this system was its tremen- tion were not available. As noted earlier, dous flexibility. The general framework with planes grounded and rail service dis- and guidelines for the system had enough rupted, bringing in team members from flexibility that decision-makers and opera- around the country proved difficult. Team tors could respond effectively to a broad members needed to be on-site quickly to range of incidents and events. The inci- accomplish the objectives, but for the first dent management structure could be rap- few days Skip Brooks had no finance per- idly expanded, contracted, and tailored son or planning section chief. Although to fit the size and nature of a particular Brooks had high praise for the system, its event. This allowed managers to bring in success, he said, depended on team mem- additional staff from around the country bers having the necessary tools. Typically in response to expanding mission require- his team completed its action plan within ments or to reduce staff as an incident drew the first twenty-four hours, but in this to a close. The teams were made up of sea- instance his team could not develop a plan soned professionals who were trained to until all its members arrived several days deal with fires, earthquakes, and even hur- later. The shortage of staff and resources ricanes and had worked with each other for for those first two to three days was a mat- years.22 They were well prepared to respond ter of serious concern for Brooks and oth- quickly to a variety of emergencies. ers. Because developing the action plan took three or four days, he explained, the In addition to its flexibility, incident man- team was already behind. Dennis McGinnis agement system freed up personnel at recommended that leaders take the neces- every level to focus on their normal day- sary steps to ensure that proper mecha- to-day operations. “Once the team hits the nisms were in place to bring in team mem- ground and gets going and has some clear bers more quickly in the future. Although assignments,” Paul Pfenninger explained, plans later developed to deal with the

IV. Incident Management 73 transportation problem, there remained a were, as McGinnis noted, “growing geo- need for greater redundancy in positions on metrically day by day.” The greater the the team. Having continuity in these posi- team’s success, the more people called tions was particularly important. Personal on it. With officials pulling the team in relationships were critical to the success of different directions, Brooks conceded, “It the incident management system. Members was difficult at times to meet everybody’s needed to be able to trust the information needs.”25 they provided and received was accurate. Defining the relationship of the incident The team also faced the challenge of tap- command system to the normal organiza- ping all the resources required. Under the tional structure also posed a challenge. The incident management system, the team relationship was generally fairly clear when issued what was called a resource order the incident command system performed (a request for a person or equipment, etc.) separate functions that did not interfere and the dispatch center called parks to with the normal operations of the agency identify and order that resource. During or when normal operations ceased. When this response, the team had difficulty filling both organizations were functioning but these resource orders. Some park officials some of the agency’s normal mission and were understandably reluctant to release functions had been disrupted or scaled resources because of concern about poten- back, defining the relationship between tial threats to their own sites. Some parks, the two became more difficult, confusing, such as Independence National Historical and time consuming. Inserting the team in Park, tried to respond to requests for the middle of existing bureaucracies some- resources but were already struggling to times created resistance. One team member meet their own security needs. As might recommended that the Service do more to be expected, parks farther away from high educate managers about the team’s pur- threat areas tended to be more willing to pose, function, and responsibilities. The share their personnel. Also, superinten- delegation of authority letter clearly stated dents might not have understood initially that the team would perform only the spe- that the resources were not only to help cific tasks that the director assigned. The other parks, but also to support the Bureau team was designed to free managers and of Reclamation. Whatever the reason, the staff to focus on their day-to-day opera- reluctance to share resources made it dif- tions. However, at times managers were ficult to get these resources into the system reluctant to hand off some of their respon- so they could be transferred to other areas sibilities to team members, and this reluc- with higher priority. Occasionally, some tance created tensions. In some instances, coaxing from the director was required.24 the team simply had to work around certain individuals.26 In addition to communications and resource challenges, team members found Finally, some of the Service’s most expe- themselves struggling to meet all of the rienced incident managers are nearing expectations of department and Service retirement, and the agency stands to lose a officials, especially when these expectations great deal of experience and institutional

74 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks knowledge in the coming decade. The Type 1 team already has several vacant positions. Brooks recommended that the Park Service develop and execute a recruiting strategy to fill the void and designate someone in the Washington headquarters to manage the teams, oversee funding and recruiting, and ensure ongoing training and exercises. The Service, he explained, needed a structure in place to support the rangers who are called up, house them, provide action plans and direction, and handle finances and the media. For fire response, a specially designated center in Boise, Idaho, directed the response, but the Service had nothing com- parable for all-risk response.27 Eddie Lopez’s team recommended that Service leaders enhance the response capabilities of the Type 1 and Type 2 teams and the nine regionally based “special event teams.” Specifically, the team recommended that managers fill all the existing vacancies on the Type 1 and Type 2 teams, schedule training, develop standard operating procedures, and consider establishing an additional Type 1 team. At the time, the Service had six regionally based Type 2 teams capable of rapidly mobilizing in their geographic regions. Finally, Lopez’s team recommended that Service leaders review administrative policies that might impede response, such as the policies concerning pay caps and back-filling positions.28 Despite the challenges, the incident management system proved to be an invaluable tool for Service leaders and had a huge impact on the effectiveness of the Service’s response.

IV. Incident Management 75 76 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Service leaders quickly learned that in an emergency they could not rely on the regular telephone system to meet their communications needs.

V. Challenges

While the incident management teams grappled with the challenges of setting up their operations and carrying out their missions, problems with communications, coordination, and funding continued to hamper the Service’s response.

Communications One of the most difficult and sometimes least successful aspects of the Service’s response to the attacks was in the area of communications. In the first hours after the attacks, there were difficulties with almost every aspect of communication, from notifying employees about evacuations and closures to gathering intelligence and sharing information. Communications lines within the Washington headquarters broke down or were nonexistent. As noted earlier, the department had no public address system and no formal systems in place to inform employees that Main Interior was being evacuated or to direct them to the basement. Other than phone and e-mail, the Service had no communications link between offices or buildings in Washington, D.C. When employees were directed to the basement of Main Interior on the morning of September 12, Park Service employees at the nearby G Street office and at 800 North Capitol Street were not immediately notified. Communication outside the Washington headquarters was not much better. Although some regional and park offices did an excellent job of communicating with their employees and reviewing their emergency procedures in the first hours after the attacks, in others there was confusion. Some parks had difficulty contacting their regional offices and

Park Police ofﬁcers in New York City relied heavily on their radio communications.

77 some regional offices had difficulty con- means of communication. Unfortunately tacting personnel in the headquarters. The relatively few managers had access to this Morning Report proved useful for Service- system, and in those first chaotic hours wide internal communications, but even not all of them immediately thought about when distribution of the report increased using their GETS access cards. Operations briefly to twice a day, it could not fill the became easier later in the day when man- need for real-time information and instant agers began using priority phones lines in communications. The Morning Report had the directorate offices. GETS access was never been designed for that role. Not all particularly useful to the senior leaders employees read this report on a daily basis who evacuated to West Virginia that first or even had access to it on computers. day and to Type 1 team members. The Park Police also found the system useful. At one As noted earlier, on September 11, many point, using GETS was the only way they landlines in the Washington, D.C., and New could consistently make long-distance calls York City areas were either down or over- on landlines. Park Police officials recom- loaded and cellular phone systems func- mended that in the future all key personnel tioned sporadically or not at all. Service have GETS access.2 leaders quickly learned that in an emergency they could not rely on the regular Communications problems were par- telephone system to meet their communi- ticularly severe in New York City in part cations needs. Officials throughout Main because the main telephone switch for Interior had great difficulty calling out of Lower Manhattan had been located in the the building. Senior leaders found them- basement of one of the collapsed trade selves relying to some extent on informa- towers. Its destruction left some areas such tion that Maj. Gary Van Horn was able to as Fort Wadsworth without phone service get from the Park Police using his police for several weeks. Although Park Police radio. With landlines unavailable, Type 1 used cellular phones and other means to team members also had difficulty getting compensate, the problems occasionally all the information they needed during the hampered operations. Initially, the police first forty-eight hours. The situation did relied mostly on radio communications. not improve significantly until the dispatch Cellular phones became a “lifeline,” said center in Shenandoah National Park set Capt. Marty Zweig.3 up a satellite dish and distributed cellular Nextel cellular phones, which had a “direct phones linked to that satellite. Although the connect” feature that functioned much like situation improved in the Washington area, a two-way radio or walkie-talkie, proved the Northeast Regional office continued to to be invaluable for employees through- have difficulty communicating with its field out the National Park Service, particu- offices.1 larly for the Park Police. A number of the Officials found that initially the Govern- officers, detectives, and supervisors had ment Emergency Telecommunications Nextel phones. Deputy Chief Jack Schamp System (GETS), a restricted emergency described these phones as a “very effec- phone system, provided the only reliable tive tool,” which allowed commanders to

78 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks In the ﬁrst hours after the attacks, there were difﬁculties with almost every aspect of communication, from notifying employees about evacuations and closures to gathering intelligence and sharing information.

communicate effectively with each other jammed, rangers could only contact the and supervisors to communicate with their Park Police by going through the regional officers. However, even the Nextel phone communications center, a time-consum- system occasionally became overloaded. ing process. Regional Chief Ranger Einar Also, although the Park Police used Nextel Olsen observed that the regional commu- for operational matters, it was not a secure nications center was “critical” in organiz- system. Park Police officials later recom- ing and communicating with personnel on mended that a satellite phone be available September 11.5 at major sites in the New York field office.4 Radio communications in the New York With the disruptions in both traditional area were complicated by the fact that per- and cellular phone service, the Park Police sonnel at the Statue of Liberty operated and park rangers relied more heavily on on a different radio system than neighbor- radio communications. Yet, this system had ing Park Service sites. Gateway National its own weaknesses. As with cellular com- Recreation Area operated on a VHF band, munications, radio communications can be while the Statue of Liberty system used scanned by outsiders and are not secure. a UHF band. Although the Park Police In addition, Park Police officers and park could operate on a UHF frequency from rangers in the Washington, D.C., area could Brooklyn, generally communication was not communicate with each other by radio difficult. They could talk to the dispatch- because they operated on different frequen- ers who, in turn, could talk to people at the cies. Most rangers did not have the Park Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island. However, Police frequency on their portable radios. Maj. Thomas Wilkins’s radio would not Signals from the portable radios that rang- operate from inside the building at One ers carried could not reach the National Police Plaza, so he had to rely on Nextel Capital Region’s communications center and landlines when they were operational. in western Maryland because there were He found that he could only communicate no radio repeaters in the Washington area. with his station commanders 50 percent The signals from the radios in their service of the time. “There were a lot of different vehicles could reach the communications channels of communication going on and center, but just barely. With phone lines there wasn’t always good overlap,” Wilkins

V. Challenges 79 conceded.6 Not until months later were that the Park Police had established over Park Police officers all on the same the years proved to be a valuable asset frequency. because intelligence information is often relayed through personal contacts to spe- Coordination cific individuals. Most sources are reluctant to share information with someone they do Even when phone lines and radios operated not know personally and trust.7 smoothly, sharing information effectively within the Service and with the department The chief’s command post transmitted remained a major challenge. Senior man- information to Major Van Horn and to the agers had considerable difficulty acquiring department’s operations center as appro- the timely, accurate intelligence informa- priate. Van Horn, in turn, provided depart- tion that they needed, particularly informa- ment and Service leaders and the Type 1 tion concerning potential threats to parks. team with as much information from the With no established mechanism in place to Park Police as he could, particularly infor- systematically gather such intelligence, the mation concerning potential threats to information they received was often spotty. parks, and he coordinated closely with the department’s office of security and law The Park Police served as a major source of enforcement. The Type 1 team had its own intelligence information for both depart- representative in the chief’s command post ment and Service leaders. As noted ear- who conveyed information. Park Police lier, Park Police representatives in various officials later reported that, “The ability of operations centers around the Washington the Force to access this type of information area shared information with the military, during this critical time played a significant FBI, Secret Service, metropolitan police, role in the coordination of emergency ser- and other agencies. Every morning, Major vices and the safe evacuation of department Van Horn contacted each representative personnel as well as visitors to our monu- by phone to gather the latest information. ments and memorials.” Occasionally ten- These agencies shared information well, sions surfaced when department or Service but the Service did not get the highly clas- officials who asked the Park Police for sified information that would come from classified information found their request the National Security Administration or the denied because they lacked the proper CIA. security clearance or the requisite “need to 8 The Park Police also assigned a detective know.” to an FBI counterterrorism task force who Transmitting intelligence information relayed intelligence information to individ- in a timely, efficient manner from the uals with the proper clearance, and some Washington headquarters to the individuals of this information was passed on to the in the field offices responsible for protect- department. This FBI task force, however, ing the parks also proved difficult. The Park was not strictly an intelligence-gathering Service had to develop its own process to mechanism and was not designed to pro- convey information to its field offices. As an vide agencies with the most current intel- added complication, few employees in park ligence on a regular basis. Personal contacts

80 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks and regional offices had the level of security that came into the Main Interior Building, clearance they needed to receive this type something that experienced incident man- of information. Nor did most field offices agers insist should not have happened after have the secured phones and fax machines the first few days. Under the existing struc- they needed in order to receive such infor- ture, information flowed from parks and mation. Even if Service leaders had been regions to the communications and coor- able to gather more security-related infor- dination center in Shenandoah National mation, they would have difficulty convey- Park, from the center to the Type 1 team, ing it to the parks because there was no from the Type 1 team to Park Service head- secured communications system. To acquire quarters, and from that headquarters to the intelligence information, individual parks department. Such a complex communica- for the most part had to rely on relation- tions chain increased the risk of transmis- ships they had established previously with sion errors. the local FBI office, Secret Service, other As Director Mainella’s representative to federal agencies, or state and local agencies. the Type 1 team, Rick Gale was responsible Managers in regional and park offices con- for providing her with the information she cluded that they needed to coordinate needed to make effective decisions or to better with the intelligence community. provide to the department leaders. He con- Regional officials in Philadelphia found ceded that there were occasional “glitches.” that they could not get from Washington There were alternative communications the intelligence information, particularly sources and mechanisms and sometimes information about potential threats to the director and other officials received parks, that they needed in order to make inconsistent or inaccurate information. At carefully considered decisions about staff- that point, she would appropriately ques- ing and resources. They decided to bring tion which information was correct. She in some of the region’s special agents and did not always receive the accurate, pre- place them in the counterterrorism task cise information that she needed to take to force that had been set up Philadelphia department leaders.10 and Boston to help coordinate the flow of Department leaders who remained at the information into those places. As a result, alternate site also had to be kept informed. regional officials were able to quickly access The director insisted that Skip Brooks send any information affecting a park’s security. information to these officials by fax twice These special agents were able to communi- a day, but sometimes he would later dis- cate with their counterparts at other agen- cover that no one had picked up the infor- cies. As trained investigators, they under- mation. Communications glitches like this stood the language.9 were not uncommon. People occasionally Conveying security-related information was complained that they had not received the but one aspect of more general problems information that the team had sent. with the flow of information. Park Service The director required a great level of detail, officials continued to struggle with the no doubt in part because she needed to timeliness and accuracy of the information pass that information on to department

V. Challenges 81 leaders. For the Type 1 team, getting that and resources were so great that they detailed information from park rangers threatened to overwhelm the center. It was and maintenance employees through their not always able to respond to the requests superintendents and regional offices was for information or resources quickly not easy. The team had to make sure that enough. The dispatch center transmitted everyone involved understood the direc- two reports each day, one listing current tor’s requirement for detailed information park closures and the other with status and do its best to ensure that the informa- reports on all parks. The reports sometimes tion was accurate. Although the team con- contained inconsistent and contradictory stantly strove to provide her with the most information.12 detailed, current, and accurate information The dispatch center was in an increasingly possible, the information varied depending difficult position. Its staff had a critical role on reporting methods and the time of day it in providing information, but as Dick Ring was reported. The difference in time zones observed, “often they were not allowed to sometimes contributed to the confusion, play it.” Rather than go through the center and not all parks followed the prescribed as procedures dictated, some officials in format for reporting the information. As a the directorate or secretariat began call- result, the team found errors in the infor- ing parks, regions, or the dispatch cen- mation that first week. Initially there were ter directly to get information or request also occasional problems with the way the resources. This further complicated the dispatch center interpreted the informa- flow of information and occasionally cre- tion it received, but these problems were ated confusion.13 addressed within the first weeks. Requests for information poured into Brooks later indicated that with informa- the dispatch center. The Type 1 team and tion changing so rapidly planning became various department officials all clamored more difficult. Sometimes the flow of for information. Yet, accurate up-to-date information to the team was too slow and information was not easy to come by. occasionally Brooks became concerned Some parks neglected to phone in their when things did not come together the way reports at the designated time. Information they should. Brooks observed that dur- changed depending on the time of day ing Hurricane Andrew the team lost all it was reported. Officials in Washington its phone systems and had to get a satel- might get more current information directly lite. It took three days, but once the phone from someone they knew in a park that links and satellite were in place, the team conflicted with what the dispatch center had a better handle on the movement of provided. resources than it did with the September 11 event.11 In the center’s defense, it was very difficult for the center to perform its coordination The Service’s primary conduit for informa- and communications functions effectively tion was the communications and coordi- for the Service and department when the nation center at Shenandoah National Park, staff was busy setting up its communica- but at times the demands for information tions structure. Lacking an established plan

82 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks to follow, the center had to improvise to a Park Service responses, he asserted, would great extent. Brenda Ritchie later recom- have been much more effective if leaders mended establishing a permanent facility had fully employed the incident manage- rather than ramping up the center every ment system.15 time there was an event. Other managers At a meeting with department officials, recommended devoting more resources Service representatives suggested creat- to telecommunications and other modern ing a unified command system that would technology.14 operate under the department’s direc- Just as there were communications difficul- tion. The Service had successfully used a ties, there were occasional problems coor- unified command system before, when it dinating the response within the Service coordinated with the FBI during the Bridal and between the Service and the depart- Trail murder investigation in Shenandoah ment. Some officials in this relatively new National Park. Department leaders rejected administration had never dealt with an this proposal. As noted, they might simply event of this nature and were unfamiliar have been reluctant to adopt a system that with the capabilities that existed within the was unfamiliar. They understandably might Park Service for responding, particularly its also have been concerned that the incident incident management system. Even those team could not acquire critical resources familiar with the Service’s response capa- quickly enough, and indeed this was some- bilities were sometimes reluctant to turn times the case.16 responsibility over to an outside manage- In addition to encouraging the department ment team. Feeling personally responsible, to adopt an incident management system, they tended to turn to the normal day-to- Service managers offered to share their day organization, which as noted earlier own Type 1 team. Again the department was not designed to respond to emergen- declined. Some Service leaders later cies. As a result, officials spent more time maintained that the department’s deci- than necessary figuring out what needed to sion hampered coordination, resulted in be done and how to organize the response. duplication of effort, and ultimately made Some department and Service leaders were the Service’s response more difficult. They never totally comfortable with turning recommended in the future the department aspects of the operation over to an incident adopt an incident command system and management team. Department officials utilize it fully. The department would be never adopted an incident management sys- much better positioned for its homeland tem and structure, and though Park Service security mission, they argued, if it did not leaders adopted the system and convened a have to deal with the day-to-day opera- team, they never delegated enough author- tions. Yet, some managers were simply ity for it to “do fully what it was designed unwilling to relinquish control or had other to do.” In the early stages of an event, Ring reservations. They tried to order resources explained, leaders needed to know enough and enhance security but had no efficient about emergencies to set clear objectives mechanism in place to do this. As a result, and then back out. The department and interactions between Service and

V. Challenges 83 There was no seamless mechanism for funding as there was with ﬁre incidents. Beyond the issue of funding authority, there was the very real concern about whether the Park Service and the other bureaus would be reimbursed for the costs associated with the response.

department managers sometimes became noted, they must first fully understand how strained. In an effort to promote better the system worked. coordination, the Type 1 team placed The response also revealed the need for the a representative in the department’s Service to better integrate its activities with command center and worked hard to those of the department. The lack of ade- ensure that the representative had access quate cooperation between the Service and to the most current information.17 the department expressed itself in various Although efforts to improve coordina- ways. On at least one occasion three dif- tion with the department had some suc- ferent department officials submitted four cess, supporting department requirements requests to the Park Service for the same was neither simple nor easy. This sup- information. In other instances, depart- port involved compromises, particularly ment officials informed Service leaders they when it came to allocating the Service’s did not want the Service’s resources and law enforcement ranger resources. Service declined their offer of assistance from its managers constantly had to balance the incident management team, but then they department’s need for law enforcement ordered those resources directly from indi- rangers to provide security at its sites with vidual parks. The Service, for its part, might their responsibility to protect the parks. not have always done all that it could to Rick Gale, acting on the director’s behalf, coordinate well with the department.18 often made the final determinations about Director Mainella, too, reiterated the resources. Ultimately, the Park Service met need for an organized structure that could the department’s needs, but the depart- be automatically activated for this type ment’s lack of familiarity with the inci- of response. She recommended that the dent command system created confusion. department’s office of managing risk and The response highlighted the need to bet- public safety help bureaus solve their emer- ter educate senior management about the gency operations policy problems, coordi- potential role and contributions of the nate interagency issues, provide technical incident management system. For senior assistance, and represent the department managers to feel comfortable and confi- to the Federal Emergency Management dent about bringing in an incident team Agency. The office of managing risk and with which they had never worked, Brooks public safety chose not to use the incident

84 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks command system. For several days, it strug- for wildland fire response. With wildland gled to organize emergency management. fires, the Service had the authority to establish an account and begin expending funds The response highlighted many lessons immediately so managers could begin learned in the areas of communication and recording expenses, but there was no com- coordination. Department law enforce- parable authority for other types of emer- ment lacked a centralized organizational gencies. There was no seamless mechanism structure. At the time of the attack, the for funding as there was with fire incidents. department’s small six-person law enforce- Beyond the issue of funding authority, there ment security team was located in the was the very real concern about whether office of managing risk and public safety. the Park Service and the other bureaus The secretary and senior managers had no would be reimbursed for the costs associ- meaningful single point of contact during ated with the response. If Congress did not an emergency. The historic lack of a promi- later authorize a supplemental appropria- nent departmental law enforcement office tion to cover the emergency expenditures, resulted in, what the department’s inspec- the agency would be forced to take the tor general described as, “a void in leader- money from land acquisition or some other ship, coordination, and accountability in source or perhaps delay certain construc- the law enforcement program.” The depart- tion projects. ment’s bureaus operated their own law enforcement programs with little oversight The funding issue caused confusion and direction from the department, creat- throughout the Service. Some parks and ing a “state of disorder” in the structure regions used the emergency law and order and operation of law enforcement through- funding provided by the Washington head- out the department. The post–September quarters. Managers in the National Capital 11 environment magnified the organiza- Region initially struggled with how for tional and management problems of the fund the additional ranger assignments. department’s law enforcement component. Ultimately, they determined that the unit To address the problem, in late October, receiving the support would bear the cost. the secretary appointed a deputy assistant Months after the event, Congress still secretary for security and established a new had not appropriated additional funds office of law enforcement security.19 to cover past and future expenses related to the response, and Service managers Funding reprogrammed funds to cover some of the costs.20 In addition to the problems of communications and coordination, Service managers The dispatch center faced its own funding had to grapple with the fundamental ques- challenges. It had no established account tion of how to pay for the response. At the and regular budget to fund its operations time of the attacks, the department had no but rather received funding only for spe- national contingency authority for emer- cific emergencies. When a fire occurred gency funding. Nor did the Service have and the National Interagency Fire Center any emergency funding authority, except in Boise, Idaho, asked the center to order

V. Challenges 85 personnel for a fire event, the center had September 20, the director agreed to lift the a series of account numbers that it could $100,000 cap in the delegation of author- assign to send people out. But this arrange- ity and replace it with a provision to “keep ment was not the case for other types of costs commensurate with the needs of the emergencies. The center lost valuable time incident.”22 grappling with the funding issue. Brenda Unfortunately the original cap had some- Ritchie observed that it was expensive to times forced the team to focus more atten- use emergency accounts and set up the cen- tion on funding issues than on the imme- ter each time there was an emergency. It diate requirements of the situation. The would be more cost effective, she argued, dilemma was whether operators should to have a permanent facility and an estab- base their decisions and actions on costs or lished account. Moreover, without an ignore the cost because some item or some established account, the center could not personnel action was needed for safety and sign contracts for services or lease equip- security. For example, although Brooks ment, both critical actions in responding to needed to bring his team members in as an emergency.21 soon as possible so they could begin to plan Funding has often been an issue when and execute the response, he decided not to responding to incidents and emergencies. bring them in by charter airplane because Bringing in and maintaining the Type 1 of the cost. If not for the cap, he could have team involved considerable expense. The brought his resources in more quickly and director’s original delegation of authority accelerated the response.23 included a $100,000 funding cap, and the To complicate the funding issues, ini- team made every effort to keep costs within tially the department assured its bureaus that cap. After the first few days, however, that their expenses would be covered Brooks realized that the team’s operat- and directed them to take the appropri- ing costs would quickly exceed $100,000. ate action regarding employee safety and He explained the situation to the director protection of facilities and resources. Days and asked her to lift the cap. The director later the department informed its bureaus agreed to consider removing the cap but that each would have to cover its own costs, only after Brooks provided her with ade- and in the case of the Park Service, each quate documentation indicating why this park unit would have to absorb much of the action was necessary and what the addi- expense. Since bureaus and parks were in tional expenditures covered. the last two weeks of the fiscal year, budgets In his presentation to the director, Brooks were tight.24 The department’s reversal had explained that the team had already what was described as a somewhat “chill- exceeded the initial operating cost ceil- ing” effect on the service’s response. The ing of $100,000. He pointed out that since decision sometimes caused managers to the original authorization, the team’s mis- hesitate and to second-guess expenditures sions and responsibilities had expanded, because of concern about money. to include help developing an evacuation The Service had existing statutory author- plan for the secretary and her key staff. On ity to spend money on missions related to a

86 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks national disaster or national emergency, but supplemental funding, and later the Park as with wildland fire response, the issue was Police received some additional funding. In who would ultimately pay the bill. Without a their after-action report, Park Police leaders supplemental appropriation from Congress, emphasized how important it was that man- as mentioned before, there was the risk that agers know funding is available for these the agency later might have to trade off some type of emergencies. They recommended major construction projects. However, Ring that an emergency operations fund be estab- explained, “If you try and hedge how you lished which could be immediately accessed operate in an emergency based on having with the approval of the assistant secretary those questions answered at that point in for policy, management, and budget.26 time, you will almost certainly impair the In the weeks after the attacks, managers effectiveness of your emergency operation.” worked to prepare a supplemental appropri- In the emergency phase, typically the first ation request for Congress. They instructed few days, he insisted, managers must sim- parks to establish holding accounts and ply agree to do whatever was necessary to start charging costs against it, believing meet their emergency objectives and worry that the money would eventually be reim- about funding later. During the September 11 bursed. Congress ultimately provided some response, the funding constraints during the additional funding for the Service’s internal emergency phase hampered the team’s abil- expenses and for its support to the Bureau ity to accomplish its tasks. Concern about of Reclamation. The department received costs and expenditures contributed to hesi- $92 million in supplemental funding from tation in making decisions, micromanage- Congress. More than $63 million of this ment, and second-guessing. Concern about money was allocated to the Park Service to funding delayed actions to communicate provide relief for the costs associated with more effectively and deploy resources longer increased security and emergency construc- than necessary. During the short-term emer- tion related to security at “icon” parks.27 gency phase, Ring argued, operators should However, the broader issue of funding spend whatever was necessary to respond emergency response operations remained effectively to the immediate emergency and unresolved. sort out funding issues later.25 The Park Police faced similar funding problems. Again, there was no emergency fund and existing operational funds were scarce because it was late in the fiscal year. There was an established procedure to request what was called emergency law and order funding, which included a cap on the amount of the request. If the Washington office approved the request, the funds were transferred from other projects and places. Park Police costs were wrapped into the department’s request to Congress for

V. Challenges 87 88 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks A year after the attacks, Congress established Flight 93 National Memorial to honor the passengers and crew.

VI. Aftermath

The September 11 attacks and their aftermath had profound and lasting affects on the national parks, park employees, visitors, and on the National Park Service. Although park units in New York City and Washington, D.C., might have felt the most intense and extensive impact initially, virtually every unit was affected to one degree or another. The attacks and the response also affected the organizational structure and processes of the Service. As one writer explained, “The attacks not only changed us as a nation, but also deeply affected the National Park Service and the sites under its care.” In the wake of the tragedy, park employees acknowledged this change. They spoke of adjusting to “a new normal.”1 The terrorist attacks prompted the creation of a new unit in the National Park System. A year after the attacks, Congress established Flight 93 National Memorial to commemorate the heroic passengers and crew of Flight 93 who gave their lives on September 11, 2001, to thwart what many believe was a planned attack on the nation’s capital. At the direction of Congress, the open field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, where the commercial airliner went down became a unit of the National Park System. Service representatives worked with the local community, assisted with public meetings regarding the future of the site and provided advice and technical assistance.

Opposite page, these words from the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial assumed new meaning for park employees and visitors. Above, visitors left tokens of remembrance at the Flight 93 crash site in Pennsylvania.

89 Service leaders as well as park managers and staff around the country instituted new or enhanced security measures and became more security conscious.

Impact on Parks and Visitors park employees encircled the Washington Monument with concrete Jersey barriers The terrorist attacks reaffirmed the sta- and installed barriers on the east side of tus of parks as symbols of fundamental the Lincoln Memorial. The Service installed American values but also exposed them as magnetometers at the White House Visitor potential targets. Though security concerns Center and at the Washington Monument. were not new to the Park Service, it now Independence National Historical Park had to address vastly increased terrorist installed metal detectors and introduced threats that could jeopardize the safety of new security procedures with restricted its visitors and employees and the integrity access. Parks near or bordering military of the natural and cultural resources for installations, such as Sandy Hook unit of which it was responsible. Gateway National Recreation Area and By all accounts, the attacks prompted Minute Man National Historical Park in greater security awareness among Service Massachusetts, stepped up their security.2 leaders, park managers, and park staff. As managers instituted new or enhanced A number of parks, particularly those security measures, park employees around considered to be at greatest risk, insti- the country became much more secu- tuted new security measures to include rity conscious, particularly in the way an increased law enforcement presence, they viewed visitors. Employees became surveillance cameras, and metal detec- more observant and vigilant. Valley Forge tors. Gateway National Recreation Area National Historical Park staff, for example, reported, “Security would become an issue, began to look for “red flags,” things that did not only for us, but for our tenants and for not “look right,” such as a visitor carrying other agencies that would call on us for a briefcase. “I think we all look at things help…we still witness the evolution of con- a little bit differently,” said one employee. cerns generated on that terrible day.” There The staff at Yosemite National Park, too, were major, easily visible, security enhance- became more attuned to potential threats. ments at the monuments and memorials “I think we’re all thinking about things in a on the National Mall, such as the installa- little bit different way,” the superintendent tion of barriers and increased screening explained. Security-conscious employees at of visitors. Immediately after the attack, Shenandoah National Park and Delaware

90 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks The parks became increasingly important to the American public as places of healing and reﬂection.

Water Gap National Recreation Area found but parks in or near major urban areas themselves observing visitors more closely.3 experienced dramatic increases. For example, visits to Shenandoah National Park, Along with the increased emphasis on secu- a few hours drive from the Washington rity, the events of September 11 prompted area, increased 22 percent. Visits to sites an immediate and significant overall that inspired patriotism, such as the his- decline in park visitation. Fear of com- toric battlefields and Mount Rushmore, mercial air travel, reduced flight schedules, also increased. Valley Forge National disruptions in the economy, and high gaso- Historical Park reported a decrease in visi- line prices contributed to the drop in visitors from outside the local community, such tation. In 2001, roughly 280 million people as those brought by tour companies, while visited park units, five million less than in the number of visits from locals increased. 2000. Almost all of this loss occurred in the Visitation to Valley Forge eventually began last quarter of 2001, after the September to climb.4 attacks. The sudden drop in international visitors had a particular impact on the For Americans who visited parks after the large scenic parks in the West. USA Today tragedy, the sites often took on new mean- reported that Grand Canyon had 60,000 ing and assumed greater significance. The fewer bus passengers in October 2001. parks became increasingly important to Visits to Independence National Historical the American public as places of healing Park dropped from 4.8 million in fiscal and reflection. The events of September year 2001 to 4.35 million in fiscal year 2002. 11, noted Director Mainella, “underscores Curtailment of school-sponsored trips, the value of parks as places of healing and decreased foreign travel, and the general introspection and of the high value of large decline in domestic tourism contributed to federal open spaces.” As the Park Service’s this drop. chief of communications, David Barna, explained, “This is where the public goes While overall visitation dropped off, partic- to renew their spirit.” A refuge manager ularly among travelers from overseas, more at Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge found that Americans were visiting parks closer to many visitors just wanted a quiet place for home. Statistics showed that visits to large, reflection. They expressed a new level of popular sites such as the Grand Canyon and appreciation for the park. Yosemite staff Yosemite declined by more than 20 percent,

VI. Aftermath 91 After September 11 events, traditions, and values represented at many NPS sites had new resonance for both visitors and park employees.

found that visitors came seeking solace, a were struggling to come to grips with the sense of security, and a place of reflection.5 attacks. For example, as site manager Lance Hatten walked through the outdoor Visitors from the Washington area Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial the who arrived at the entrance stations at morning after the attacks doing a rou- Shenandoah National Park on the after- tine check, he happened to glance up at a noon of September 11 explained to rang- quote carved into one of the granite walls: ers that they needed to get away from the “FDR—freedom from fear.” Suddenly this city and from nonstop news accounts of simple, eloquent quote took on a power- the tragedy. Visitation to the park spiked ful, new meaning for him. In the week after shortly after the attacks. Shenandoah the attack, people gathered on the National National Park visitors came not only seek- Mall for candlelight vigils in expressions ing a break from television news but also of patriotism and unity. They used chalk seeking comfort. The interpretive staff to write statements about freedom and sensed that the visitors had an emotional democracy on the pavement. Hatten saw need to connect with the park and changed opportunity amidst the tragedy. In the past, their behavior in response. Instead of tak- he said, Americans had sometimes taken ing their usual fifteen-minute breaks, the for granted the meaning of these sites, but interpreters used the time to move around September 11 gave them the opportunity to and connect with visitors. Instead of giving reconnect with these places. Visitors to Fort a thirty-minute talk, they looked for more McHenry in Baltimore told the staff that personal, creative ways to help visitors they came out of a sense of patriotism. The establish personal connections to the park. superintendent reported, “Visitors come to The chief of interpretation observed that look at the flag and experience solace and visitors seemed more interested in finding quiet at Fort McHenry.”7 meaning in the park.6 Manzanar National Historic Site in The events, traditions, and values repre- California, where Japanese Americans had sented at many sites had new resonance been detained after Pearl Harbor, was for both visitors and park employees who another site that assumed new meaning.

This monument at Manzanar is inscribed, “This is the place of consolation for the spirit of all mankind.”

92 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Visitors began to leave September 11 “offer- tion, and the pacifist Germans. The attacks ings” at the site. A huge American flag was prompted them to rethink this approach. hung on the existing Manzanar Relocation The way the park interpreted issues of Center signs. Smaller flags suddenly national defense changed and the dialog appeared around the cemetery, left there, with visitors became more provocative. Superintendent Frank Hays explained, The staff encouraged visitors to reflect on “as a kind of recognition of the site as an not only what the soldiers did at Valley important part of the civil rights story.” Forge but also on how the principles of the The park, said Hays, had a unique role American Revolution had shaped us as a advancing a public dialog about racism, people. Independence National Historical civil rights, and other controversial sub- Park Supervisory District Ranger Frances jects. Hays quickly recognized the connec- Delmar found that more visitors came to tion between September 11 and Manzanar Independence Hall seeking answers than and the “obvious parallels” between Pearl at any time she could recall. They wanted Harbor and the terrorist attacks. The morn- to learn about constitutional issues, such ing of the attack, he anticipated getting as balancing individual freedoms with media requests to address the connection national security. Park staff was able to pro- between what had happened to Japanese vide historical context for the questions Americans at Manzanar and the current visitors raised.9 climate of suspicion surrounding Arab In addition to giving new meaning to parks Americans. He and other park staff wanted and prompting changes in interpretation, to ensure that in their future interpretation, the September 11 event and its aftermath they allowed visitors to make the connec- illustrated the way parks, particularly those tion. September 11 prompted discussion in dense urban areas, were and continued about the Constitution that for Hays reaf- to be an integral part of their surround- firmed the relevance of Manazanar and ing communities. This was especially true provided park interpreters with a com- in the New York City area. Sites such as mon context they could use to explain that Federal Hall and Ellis Island sheltered and relevance. The park received a number of cared for their neighbors on September 11. media inquiries. The CBS Sunday Morning A number of New York sites allowed other television program filmed a segment with agencies to use their facilities and open reporter Charles Osgood highlighting the spaces. connection between September 11 and the Japanese-American experience after Pearl Managers at Gateway National Recreation Harbor.8 Area were keenly aware of the park’s role and responsibilities as part of the sur- The terrorist attacks prompted changes in rounding community. On September 23, interpretation at some parks. Staff at Valley 2001, the park co-sponsored a prayer vigil Forge National Historical Park used the at Fort Tilden with community groups and tragedy as an opportunity to address new churches in Rockaway, New Jersey. It pro- interpretive themes. Interpreters tradition- vided space for the Rockaway Chamber of ally talked about the experiences of an Commerce and other organizations that army in the field, the local Quaker popula-

VI. Aftermath 93 Park managers became more acutely aware of their ties to and responsibilities to their neighboring communities.

were collecting donated clothing and other When President Bush called for a national items for World Trade Center victims. Later, day of remembrance and a moment of when Flight 587 crashed in Rockaway, the silence, Superintendent David Mihalic New York Police and Fire Departments and began to think about how his park could the Transportation Safety Board temporar- participate. He arranged for a public ily used park facilities. “We’re part of the display of a fire engine, a rescue vehicle, community, while at the same time we’re a patrol bicycle, a ranger patrol car, one part of a federal system, a national system of the concessionaire’s security vehicles, of parks,” Superintendent Billy Garrett an ambulance from a local hospital clinic, explained. He believed it was important and a couple horse patrol rangers. The to have programs that lent support to the staff put out flags and white banners that parks neighbors. After learning of plans for said “In Remembrance” and invited visi- a memorial service for victims of the crash, tors to sign them. By noon, hundreds had Garrett approached the local chamber of gathered around the display. At the desig- commerce and offered support. Park staff nated moment of silence, all of the park’s helped organize the event (sponsored by shuttle buses pulled over to the side of the the city of New York and attended by 5,000 road and stopped. A uniformed ranger qui- people), helped with traffic, and helped etly brought her horse out into the middle with the clean up afterward. Garrett gave of the crowd and all the emergency vehi- the introductory remarks using the oppor- cles turned on their red lights. Staff and tunity to remind people of the value of visitors stood in silence for a moment. parks as places for people to come together. Then the red lights were turned off and As an expression of the increased level of bus service resumed. Visitors of all ages cooperation, the park signed a coopera- and backgrounds left their signatures on tive agreement with the police department a banner of 140 feet of plain brown and allowing it to use the airfield in future white craft paper. As Mihalic explained, disasters.10 “People were tying the National Park idea to the whole moment.” Yosemite later sent Yosemite National Park, too, was keenly one of the signed banners to Manhattan aware of its role in the broader community.

A candlelight vigil, sponsored in part by Gateway National Recreation Area, was held at Fort Tilden on September 23, 2001.

94 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks The dramatic increase in homeland security requirements created a strain on the National Park Service’s law enforcement capability.

Sites as a symbol of support for their col- Monument, and other parks. Their assign- leagues. “It’s not just the World Trade ments generally were twenty-four hours Center story,” Mihalic observed. “It’s not a day, seven days a week, for two to three just the Pentagon story. It’s not just the weeks at a time. A report by Interior hole in the ground in some rural county in department Inspector General Earl E. Pennsylvania. It’s something like blowing Devaney noted that for months after the up the Maine or like the Arizona or like the attacks, most of the protection rangers bridge at Concord. It’s something that… and Park Police officers assigned to “icon” transcends us as a nation.” It is a national parks worked twelve-hour shifts, seven story, he added, and the Park Service’s role days a week. “We have a concern about the was to preserve and tell the national story.11 long-term effectiveness of the protection staff and the officers who operate under Shortage of Law these intense conditions,” the report noted. Enforcement Personnel According to the inspector general, with the exception of Boston Navy Yard, no icon In the aftermath of the attacks, the National park had received a significant increase in Park Service grappled with severe short- permanent rangers since September 11 and ages in its law enforcement capability. At many parks were operating with smaller the time, the Service had approximately protection forces than before the attacks.12 1,500 commissioned law enforcement rangers (not including seasonal rangers) and Some parks already had existing coopera- roughly 600 Park Police officers. More tive relationships with neighboring parks than 200 of the law enforcement rangers that enabled them to share resources. became involved in special assignments For example, Boston National Historical resulting from the attacks. Half of these Park had relationships with Minute people were assigned outside of their home Man National Historical Park, Cape Cod parks, including sixty-one at Bureau of National Seashore, and Springfield Armory Reclamation dam projects, fourteen at the National Historic Site. Independence Interior department’s Washington head- National Historical Park had ties with quarters, and twenty-five at Independence Valley Forge National Historical Park, National Historical Park, Boston National Gettysburg National Military Park, and Historical Park, USS Arizona National Assateague Island National Seashore.

VI. Aftermath 95 Initially their chief rangers shared time, the National Park Service was called resources with each other somewhat infor- upon to do “some extraordinary things” mally. As the response continued, how- after the attacks, Maj. Gary Van Horn ever, “special event teams” were going out observed. The Service was asked to per- for their third or fourth rotation and there form functions that it had not performed in was growing concern for their health and the past, or at least not to the same degree, well-being. As a result, some superinten- such as providing extended security for dents began holding back their resources. Bureau of Reclamation sites in the West. Managers realized they needed a larger These new homeland security requirements pool of people. Parks that were already prompted managers to think more about understaffed became increasingly reluc- how to respond rapidly to several locations tant to release rangers for duty elsewhere. with enough personnel to provide protec- As time went on, some parks started to feel tion at the request of the president, depart- that they were contributing more than oth- ment, or Service leaders. The Service was ers. “We really don’t have a real under- such a decentralized organization that aside standing of what the National Park Service from deploying its special event teams in wants from us,” said Regional Chief Ranger response to specific requests, it relied on Bob Martin, “in this period of terrorism.” individual rangers who were available in They were not sure what help the Service other parks. Managers expressed frustra- expected from them during the national tion with the inability to identify individu- emergency.13 als who could respond rapidly and provide security until others could be brought in. The Southeast Region initially used its spe- The September 11 experience convinced cial event teams but they were being called leaders that they could not rely solely on out repeatedly. Regional leaders decided special event teams; they needed to be able they could no longer rely solely on these to draw on other resources as well. teams, they needed to tap other available resources. They asked each park prepare a Not until September 11 did managers fully minimum staffing plan to reveal the short- realize how desperately short the Service falls that would occur if its law enforce- was in law enforcement personnel. Some ment rangers were dispatched elsewhere. now worried that the Service would Then the superintendents were to identify burn out hardworking, dedicated law the specific resources they would need to enforcement personnel and put additional provide the minimum level of protection strain on their families. Van Horn and release the rest to support the national emphasized that regional chief rangers response. After the superintendents com- needed the authority and ability to call up pleted this plan and the regional director law enforcement rangers on short notice, approved it, the parks released all other without having to go through the various available law enforcement rangers to meet levels of management for approval. In Service-wide requirements.14 a crisis, managers needed to have pre- identified individuals in different parks and Having by far the largest law enforcement direct line authority to call them on duty contingent within the department at the immediately. In an emergency, there is no

96 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks New homeland security requirements prompted managers to think more about how to respond rapidly to several locations with enough personnel to provide protection at the request of the president, department, or Service leaders.

time to get permission from a number of alent of seasonal staff). The Park Police people. Van Horn recommended having had indicated a need for an additional 200 a direct line of authority within law officers. The studies had received little enforcement during emergencies.15 attention and had not sparked any major reforms or initiatives at the bureau or Well before the attacks, a series of stud- department level. No new law enforcement ies and reports had documented a signifi- positions had materialized. Meanwhile, cant shortfall in law enforcement person- according to Federal Times, the number of nel. Over the previous four years, reports reported incidents had grown by 39 per- from Congress, the department’s inspector cent from 1999 to 2000 for the Park Service general, the International Association of and other bureaus. The situation only grew Chiefs of Police, and the National Academy worse when rangers were pulled for home- of Public Administration had addressed the land security missions. Acting Chief Ranger issue of the increasing resource and visi- Dennis Burnett explained, “Basically, we’re tor protection demands and their impact overworking an already overstressed work- on law enforcement, fire protection, emer- force.” Rangers, he said, were trying to meet gency services, and other protection duties. the new security needs, “as well as the day- These studies revealed inadequacies both to-day protection of the resources in the in the Park Police and the law enforcement national parks that we’re charge with pro- ranger programs. They emphasized the tecting according to Congress.”16 need for increased staff, new training, and additional resources. Responding to requests for rangers for long-term security assignments was a major A congressional report on law enforce- challenge. While the number of requests ment within the Service called the for assistance grew significantly, the num- Thomas Report had concluded that the ber of rangers had not kept pace. To illus- Service needed 1,295 additional rang- trate the seriousness of the problem, Einar ers. The National Academy of Public Olsen explained that in a recent six-month Administration had made an assessment of period, the National Capital Region had the law enforcement programs. A study by lost 20 percent of its rangers. The ranger the International Association of Chiefs of force was often asked to perform special Police identified need for 615 additional law assignments, he added, “but we’re in dire enforcement rangers (roughly the equiv-

VI. Aftermath 97 Months after the attacks, ofﬁcers in Washington continued to work extended shifts to cover routine assignments and the additional security at the monuments and memorials.

straits.” Because of the security assign- the reduced force after September 11, the ments, parks were being asked to reduce number of incidents increased.18 their normal staffing levels. As a result, said Parks in the Northeast Region grappled Olsen, “We’re providing just the very basic with similar shortages. For example, public safety needs in the parks and things Shenandoah National Park sent rang- such as resource protection are really tak- ers to assist temporarily at Shasta and ing the backseat now.”17 Hoover Dams and to provide security at Catoctin Mountain Park was just one Independence National Historical Park, example of the problem the region faced. Boston National Historical Park and the The park had lost two of its ten rangers in Main Interior Building. These assignments the previous year, and Superintendent Mel left the park short staffed and falling fur- Poole worried about burnout. One major ther behind in its work plan. Even with lesson he saw coming out of September 11 some funding available to pay for overtime was that the Service needed a significant and to hire assistance, Ranger Rick Childs increase in ranger law enforcement person- said, “There are some traditional functions nel. “If September 11 was not a wake-up that just cannot be done as a result of this.” call,” Poole warned, “I don’t know what The park had to cut back the hours and the would be.” Ranger Dwight Dixon observed area of coverage. During certain times of that even under normal circumstances the day, rangers could not patrol as large an staffing the park and providing the neces- area. Nor could they always provide some sary protection was difficult. The response of the services that they had in the past, time grew longer. “If you’re highly visible such as assisting a visitor with a disabled you can probably deter a lot of crime, just vehicle. With lighter coverage, managers from being seen,” Dixon explained, “and if had to draw the rangers close in, leaving there’s only one or two rangers spread out fewer rangers to patrol the periphery. No over a 165-mile district, it’s not inconceiv- major tasks were ignored, but the rangers able that some visitors may come here fairly focused their response in the more devel- regular and never see a ranger.” A visible oped, heavily visited areas such as Skyland ranger force, he explained, helped deter and Big Meadows. Patrols in the extreme and ultimately reduce car break-ins, van- outlying areas in the north and south dalism, and other crimes in the park. With were less frequent. Homeland security

98 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks assignments typically involved twelve- not maintain closures without significant hour days, for either fourteen or twenty- overtime. These extended hours led to one days, plus a travel day on each end. exhaustion and “reduced long-term This meant rangers were away from their effectiveness.” 21 home parks for twenty-three or twenty-four Officers in the New York field office worked days at a time and were tired when they many hours of overtime to protect the returned. By late fall the rangers working Statue of Liberty and Federal Hall. Eight overtime were showing signs of fatigue.19 months after the attack, they were still At Valley Forge National Historical Park working ten- to twelve-hour shifts, some- as many as three protection rangers (rep- times six days a week. The first signs of resenting 25 percent of its ranger force) burnout started to appear. “We’ve been worked outside park at one time. Two able to accomplish our mission, but it has rangers left for the sky marshal program been close,” Capt. Neal Lauro said.22 and a third relocated when her husband To make the situation worse, both the took a position with that program. In fis- ranger force and the Park Police lost cal year 2002, Upper Delaware Scenic and trained personnel to the new sky mar- Recreational River sent eleven people to shal program. This was a federal program, support homeland security–related mis- established as a result of the September 11 sions and assist other areas, which reduced attacks, to place trained armed law enforce- its available staff during peak visitation ment personnel on commercial flights. season. The drain on the protection staff The Service could not compete with the prompted joint river patrols with other higher salaries that the newly created divisions and agencies in order to promote Transportation and Security Administration visitor safety.20 offered its sky marshals. Capt. Sal Lauro Much like the ranger force, the Park Police, estimated that ten to fifteen officers left in a too, was stretched thin as officers took on one-month period. In the first two months additional security missions. Months after that the Transportation and Security the attacks, officers in Washington contin- Administration was hiring, the New York ued to work extended shifts to cover rou- field office lost fourteen officers, roughly tine assignments and the additional security 10 percent of the force. Since these officers at the monuments and memorials. Weeks had already been through training at the of twelve-hour shifts proved draining, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and eventually the officers became tired. they could easily transition into sky marshal Though very proud of the professionalism jobs, with only a single week of additional of the officers, Deputy Chief Jack Schamp training.23 conceded that maintaining the desired level The expanded security missions and func- of alertness among officers who were work- tions and the loss of officers ultimately ing extended shifts for a prolonged period slowed the force’s response time. Deputy was a challenge. The Park Police after- Chief Schamp conceded that the overall action report highlighted “extreme staffing quality of Park Police services had been shortages.” The Park Police, it noted, could affected. Fewer officers were available to

VI. Aftermath 99 patrol the streets, parkways, and parks. In training. The officer had three full-time Washington, the specialized patrols felt the “jobs” in addition to his duties as shift greatest impact. There were fewer mounted supervisor. There were other similar cases. patrols on the horse trails in Rock Creek Maj. Thomas Wilkins observed, “They have Park. Some of the undercover officers who a tremendous amount of responsibility and had watched for car break-ins and assaults really not very much support in order to had been put in uniform and assigned to accomplish what they need to accomplish.” fixed posts. Some training and other pro- He praised his staff for doing an “excellent grams in Washington were postponed or job” in a difficult situation. The increased canceled. Outlying patrols were modified security requirements forced the New York because of the shortage of personnel. With field office to push back training and semi- more officers focused on the monument annual firearms qualifications. Wilkins area downtown, patrols in the outlying worried that despite his staff’s hard work it areas such as Dupont Circle in northwest would not be able to provide the same level Washington became less frequent.24 of service it had in the past.25 The New York field office faced simi- The New York field office’s SWAT team lar challenges. Not since Operation had played an important role helping with Desert Storm, a decade earlier, had Park triage on Ellis Island and patrolling the Police officers been at Federal Hall on an perimeters of Ellis and Liberty Islands. extended basis. In the past, officers had The team, said Lt. Dave Buckley, was an provided support to Manhattan Sites only “integral part” of the overall protection for limited periods during special events plan. In the months after the attacks, or investigations. After September 11, however, six people left the field office’s they assumed a continual presence. The Emergency Services Unit (as the team was expanded Park Police role in New York now called), four of these to become sky after September 11 strained the force and marshals. With so few members left, the left it with position vacancies. unit was disestablished.26 Even before the attack, the New York field At the same time, the field office was office had difficulty meeting all the require- assuming a more visible role in the ments placed upon its officers. The staff Northeast Region. When dealing with secu- in the field office was operations oriented. rity issues at the Statue of Liberty, Wilkins The office had only a small three-person worked directly with the regional director administrative staff to support more than and associate regional director and even one hundred officers. As a result, officers with the director and the secretary. These had had to take on nonoperational, collab- individuals all took a personal interest in orative duties. For example, one lieutenant, the Statue’s security plan. With a relatively a shift supervisor responsible for supervis- new Park Service director and no perma- ing operations on the street, also handled nent Park Police chief at the time, Wilkins radio communication and fleet manage- found that he had difficulty focusing atten- ment. His duties included ordering tion on the severity of the staffing problem emergency equipment and overseeing

100 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Providing adequate security for visitors at the Statue of Liberty remained an issue long after September 11.

and the planning for security at the Statue Multi-region Coordination Group of Liberty. Although the National Park Service Wilkins received additional funding for responded to the attacks quickly and effec- enhanced security but did not receive a tively and had enough resources to han- commitment of increased personnel until dle the immediate threat, leaders became months later. He had difficulty conveying increasingly concerned that they might not the significance of the fact that he had lost have enough law enforcement resources fifteen people at a time when the workload to respond appropriately to the increased had increased significantly. Wilkins did not security requirements over the long term. believe Park Police officials in Washington Months after the attacks, the require- understood the severity of the situation ment to protect park sites, Bureau of until April 2002 when he informed them Reclamation dams, and the Main Interior that the field office could not support any Building was beginning to take a toll. In of the upcoming scheduled events in the addition, the Service had committed itself city, such as the five-borough bike tour. Nor to providing more than one hundred rang- could he support reopening the Statue of ers to support the upcoming 2002 Winter Liberty. Olympics in Utah. The Service was compet- ing with other federal agencies for the same On the bright side, the centralized struc- law enforcement/protection candidates, ture of the Park Police made allocat- and despite its best efforts, it continued ing resources both in New York and in to have difficulty filling vacant positions. Washington, D.C., easier. Wilkins was able Leaders recognized that they could no to pool resources, for example, pulling offi- longer simply react to individual requests cers from Gateway National Recreation for ranger resources, they needed to have Area and directing them to the Statue of a more effective Service-wide system in Liberty. He concluded, “Your people are place to determine priorities and allocate your strength. They are what make the resources. organization.”27 Recognizing the growing strain on resources, on October 5, 2001, Deputy Director Deny Galvin convened a management assessment team to develop a plan

VI. Aftermath 101 for how the Service could best respond respond to the particular fire emergency. with its law enforcement personnel in the There had never been a similar system of post–September 11 environment. This small stages or levels of response in place for group headed by Rick Gale and made up of national security. Committing resources ranger activities division staff and regional at level one was relatively easy, Dick Ring chief rangers met in Main Interior over the explained, but that task becomes increas- Columbus Day weekend in October 2001 to ingly difficult at levels two, three, four, and develop what was termed a strategic assess- five. Describing in advance the trade-offs ment. In their assessment the team would and impacts at each level, he added, was address the issue of how the Service could “critically important.” But, as noted, no best respond with its law enforcement such system was in place on September 11. personnel in the face of national security The guidance from leadership was to send threats while still fulfilling its responsibili- all the personnel and other resources that ties of protecting its sites, employees, and were requested but also to maintain their visitors. It would also lay out alternative normal level of operations and keep the approaches to addressing the shortage of parks open. This task became inherently law enforcement rangers in the long term. impossible. To make matters worse, no one authorized the parks to hire additional per- The team spent the holiday weekend sonnel to backfill vacant ranger positions. developing an assessment of the current As a result, some parks found themselves situation and a plan to allocate resources struggling with conflicting demands they effectively on a large scale. They acknowl- could not possibly meet. Park managers edged that the existing system for allocat- wanted and needed information and guid- ing resources had not been efficient. At any ance concerning the trade-offs that were given time, approximately two hundred law authorized and the level of emergency that enforcement rangers were working out- existed.29 side their own parks and another hundred were working extended shifts in their own In its assessment report, the team reiter- parks. Team members concluded that they ated the Service’s statutory responsibility to needed a process similar to the national protect park property and the public. This fire response system to identify, deploy, and task was even greater, the report empha- manage resources.28 sized, because the Service was responsible for protecting many high-visibility national With the national wildland fire response, icons and parks that housed elements managers had a system in place based on of public utility infrastructure. Invoking clearly defined threat levels. As the level the familiar drawdown concept used in of fire threat increased and additional national fire response, the team laid out resources were required to respond to the predefined levels of personnel commitment treat, park operations were reduced or based on the level of threat severity. The drawn down. The levels went from level team’s proposal would require park chief one where a fire or fires affected a single rangers and superintendents to identify region to the highest level, level five, when acceptable drawdown levels and identify parks were closed so that the Service could

102 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Some regional chief rangers found that allocating park resources became easier with the creation of the multi-region coordination group.

protection staff who could be freed up for Service’s National Leadership Council.30 deployment elsewhere. On November 4, 2001, Service leaders In addition to the drawdown concept, the adopted the team’s recommendation and team’s proposal incorporated other aspects established a multi-region coordination of the existing fire response system. The group to coordinate the mobilization of fire response system included individual resources for the ongoing security opera- coordination centers around the country tions within the Service. Initially the group that fed resources into the firefighting sys- worked out of a coordination center in tem. There was a multi-agency coordina- Portland, Oregon. Later it moved to the tion group made up of representatives of Columbia Cascades Support Office in various federal agencies that established Seattle. Mark Forbes from the support priorities and allocated resources for fire office served as coordinator. response. This group had the ability to Over a period of a few weeks, the ranger draw on resources of the Bureau of Land activities division along with the multi- Management, Forest Service, Bureau of region coordination group developed the Indian Affairs, and other federal agencies. criteria for a drawdown and an exercise Experienced senior rangers recognized for parks to go through to identify the that a similar system could be used to feed resources they could temporarily make rangers into homeland security missions. available to other parks. The regional chief They argued that with the increased secu- rangers developed a national emergency rity missions the Service could no longer response plan to organize and coordinate continue to react in a piecemeal fashion all the law enforcement resources to handle to individual requests for law enforcement the current emergency and future emergen- rangers. Rather, the Service needed an inte- cies. The plan described five distinct lev- grated structure or system to set priorities els of preparedness and response, ranging and allocate resources, similar to the multi- from normal operations to national emer- agency coordination group that existed for gency, the level to be determined by the fire response. The team presented its final director. All parks were required to prepare assessment to Deputy Director Galvin on drawdown plans to keep the minimum staff October 9, 2001, and later Galvin formally required and release the other rangers for presented the team’s assessment to the security assignments elsewhere.

VI. Aftermath 103 The emergency response plan would be guidance from his or her regional director used in the future to manage any national to release resources up to that specific level crisis or large-scale emergency to “ensure a of impact. When superintendents reached unified and coordinated response.”31 that level of impact, they would inform their regional director or regional chief Director Mainella approved the Service’s ranger, so that a negotiation or brokering national emergency response plan on process could begin.33 November 16, 2001. In transmitting the plan to the regional directors, she explained Some regional chief rangers found that that the additional task of providing pro- allocating park resources became easier tection assistance at some department with the creation of the multi-region coor- facilities had “taxed the normal opera- dination group. With the drawdown plan, tion of our national parks.” To date, she all personnel who were not needed to pro- added, the Service had successfully met the vide support at the very basic levels were department’s immediate short-term emer- considered available for emergency opera- gency needs for law enforcement person- tions to move around as needed. Every park nel through voluntary reassignments from submitted a list of a reasonable amount of the parks, but long-term commitments resources considering what they had avail- required a mandatory program. These mea- able. Einar Olsen, however, found that the sures, she continued, would enable leaders National Capital Region simply did not to manage and allocate resources effectively have many rangers available for assign- during any national emergency or signifi- ments outside of their own parks even at cant incident. In accordance with the plan, the highest response levels. He did not she asked regional directors to have parks believe Service leaders fully recognized develop drawdown plans within two weeks. the strain on the ranger force. “In terms These plans would help parks determine of shifting resources and priorities in the how many rangers or Park Police officers agency,” Olsen added, “I’ve seen no differ- needed to remain in the park and how ence at all.”34 many could be made available to support Developing the multi-region coordination the national protection priorities.32 group and the national response plan were Under the Park Service’s emergency major accomplishments. In the Northeast response plan, the director would declare Region, Chief Ranger Bob Martin a specific level of response based on the expressed pride in the regional chief rang- requirements the department placed on the ers. They had only been together as a group Service. The director determined that the since May 2001 when the last two vacant Service would respond up to a certain level chief ranger positions were filled. Yet, they of impact on the parks. Then the multi- had taken on new, challenging issues and region coordination group would serve as formed a cohesive group.35 a broker to ensure that the demands were In addition to the emergency response evenly distributed among parks and that no plan, in the aftermath of the attacks there parks were disproportionately affected. An were several major initiatives at the depart- individual park superintendent was under ment and Service level that affected the

104 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks law enforcement program. At the director’s provide leadership and policy direction for request, Deputy Director Don Murphy various park ranger functions.36 organized a task force to review the previ- The aftermath of September 11 ultimately ous law enforcement studies and resolve a brought significant changes to the Service, number of law enforcement issues. The task its parks, and its people. Many of these force made up of Steve Calvery, Dick Ring, changes were positive, though not all. Park Dennis Burnett, a few regional directors, visitation declined but the sites and the val- and some Park Police officials, held its first ues they represented assumed new meaning meeting in February 2002. Members spent and significance. In some instances, exist- the first meeting developing a long-term ing bonds between individual parks and agenda and discussing the future of the their local communities were reinforced Service’s law enforcement program. and strengthened. The attacks contributed Secretary Gale Norton established the Law to a shortage of law enforcement personnel Enforcement Review Panel to evaluate the and revealed weaknesses in the Service’s law enforcement reforms the inspector gen- procedures for allocating resources, but eral had recommended in a January 2002 they also prompted promising reform and report, “Disquieting State of Disorder: An organizational change. Assessment of Department of the Interior Law Enforcement.” On July 19, 2002, she formally approved more than twenty measures proposed by the review panel to improve law enforcement throughout the department, including the appointment of a deputy assistant secretary for law enforcement and security. The measures were largely consistent with those recommended in the inspector general’s report. The secretary made it clear that she expected immediate action on the directives that affected the National Park Service. Not long after, Director Mainella outlined a series of reforms. “We must now demonstrate our commitment to move beyond planning and begin to take action,” she explained. The director also created the new associate director for resource and visitor protection position to coordinate the diverse protection ranger functions. This associate director would be considered the functional “chief ranger” of the National Park Service and would

VI. Aftermath 105 106 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks As a result of the terrorist attacks and the increased emphasis on homeland security, many park rangers who had been commissioned as law enforcement ofﬁcers were drawn to a greater degree into security and law enforcement functions as part of their day-to-day responsibilities.

Conclusion

Much has been learned as a result of the events of September 11— and even more remains to be understood and analyzed. The attacks and their aftermath clearly demonstrated the importance of the large federal areas and facilities with controlled access in supporting emergency response. Floyd Bennett Field with its open areas and storage facilities, for example, became an important staging area; Federal Hall became a place of critical refuge for people fleeing the collapse of the trade towers; and Ellis Island served as a triage center. The use of park property to support the response effort was readily apparent and relatively easy to document. Less apparent and more difficult to measure was the immediate and long-term impact of the response on park resources. Park rangers have always played a critical role in preventing crime and catching criminals in the act. Chief rangers in the parks warned that if they met the current requirements for drawing down their protection rangers they would not have enough rangers to catch poachers or adequately protect archeological sites. Some senior managers expressed concern that the monitoring and protection of natural and cultural resources in the parks had declined because rangers had been drawn away for homeland security missions elsewhere.1 More than a year after the attack, managers were still trying to determine the extent to which the shortage of protection rangers had jeopardized natural and cultural resources. No one had yet conducted a comprehensive study of the impact on cultural and natural resources in the parks. The protection rangers were traditionally the “eyes and

Interacting with visitors remains an important function for park rangers and Park Police.

107 ears” of the parks, and resource managers appropriateness of using these park rang- often relied on them to detect and report ers as guards. The inspector general con- changes, such as trees that had been cut cluded that requiring police officers and or bloodstains from a deer. These rangers protection rangers to perform sentry duties had not been out in the parks, particularly for extended periods of time was not in the in the more remote areas, to the same best interest of the officers or the depart- degree as before September 11 and thus ment itself. were not able to report the necessary Forte, like many other rangers, had come information about resources. “We know into the Park Service with the generalist there are impacts. We know they are out view that her job primarily was to protect there, but…you have to be out there to and interpret park natural and cultural see it and observe it or else you have to resources. Her duties included search and wait until somebody tells you about it,” rescue, interpretation, trail work, firefight- said the Southeast Region’s Chief Ranger ing, and other tasks. Law enforcement was Judy Forte. Though the full impact of the just one aspect of the generalist ranger September 11 response on park resources function. After the September 11 response, had not yet been revealed, some senior she said, the career of the park ranger rangers speculated that crime had probably became more protection oriented. For increased and some resources had been years, the Service had assumed the benefits lost in the absence of protection rangers.2 of the generalist ranger to the agency, but Also difficult to quantify was the impact of now it was weighing the benefits of gen- the attacks on the role of the park ranger. eralist rangers against the need for home- Traditionally the park ranger functioned land security. As regional chief ranger, as something of a generalist who fulfilled Forte found herself spending more time on many diverse roles and responsibilities. law enforcement, emergency services, and As a result of the terrorist attacks and the security than in the past and coordinating increased emphasis on homeland security, more with other law enforcement bureaus. many park rangers who had been commis- “Homeland security is what is hot on peo- sioned as law enforcement officers were ple’s minds right now,” she stated simply, drawn to a greater degree into security and “and that’s where we are.”3 law enforcement functions as part of their One side benefit from the increased empha- day-to-day responsibilities. The Service sis on security in the nation and in the had already begun to focus more on law National Park Service was that it prompted enforcement as a separate function, but a greater appreciation for police, firefight- after September 11 the pressure to narrow ers, and other law enforcement representa- the park ranger’s function from a general- tives. The public held Park Police in higher ist to more of a law enforcement function esteem after September 11, much as they increased. The inspector general reported did other police and firefighters. New York that with the additional security responsi- City officials became more aware of the bilities the role of the protection ranger had Park Police’s contributions, inviting Maj. “made a significant exemplary shift.” Some Thomas Wilkins to participate in a citywide managers and employees questioned the

108 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks counterterrorism subcommittee. Within grabbed on to Danny Merced after spotting the Service as well there was greater appre- his uniform. ciation for Park Police. Parks that in the The Service has always faced the challenge past discouraged a visible police presence, of balancing its responsibility for protect- now found that visibility reassuring.4 One ing visitors with its fundamental mission of New York Park Police officer observed that preserving resources and providing for the September 11 “really showed the American public enjoyment of those resources. This people that no matter where the danger is task became much more complex and dif- we’re going to be there.” Deputy Chief Jack ficult as a result of the September 11 attacks. Schamp noted that the public image of the In the aftermath, the Service struggled to Park Police had improved. The Interior adjust the effects of heightened security. department, he believed, had a better The Park Service had always been involved understanding of the role and missions of in security, Dick Ring observed, but the the Park Police, such as ensuring the safety level of resources and attention devoted of the secretary of the interior. Capt. Neal to that activity increased significantly. Lauro expressed what was probably the Managers struggled to find ways to ensure sentiment of many officers. “I was never that the security efforts did not disrupt visi- as proud to wear the uniform as that day,” tor services, normal park activities, or the he said. His brother, Capt. Sal Lauro, also normal enjoyment of the parks. The Park expressed great pride in the way the officers Service worked with and provided support had performed. Secretary Norton presented to the Bureau of Reclamation, the Navy, the Park Police with a unit citation for their and other agencies, so its workload had response to the events of September 11.5 increased.7 Much like the Park Police, protection rang- The long-term impact of the attacks ers were also viewed a little differently after on the National Park Service mission, the attacks. The public became increasingly resources, functions, and culture remains aware that security was part of the park unclear. Some veteran responders viewed rangers’ mission. Rangers in the Northeast September 11 as a transforming event for Region were instructed to maintain a high the Service. “I think we’ve got to balance level of visibility in part because their pres- being able to protect our resources, our ence reassured visitors.6 The green-and- visitors, our employees, and then also gray ranger uniform became an even more letting our visitors enjoy the parks,” Skip powerful symbol of security and protec- Brooks explained. Rick Gale noted that the tion. Thousands of Americans who visited attacks could be a transforming event for parks were reassured when they saw uni- the Service if it incorporated the lessons formed rangers. The power of the uniform it had learned. He encouraged Service as a symbol of safety and protection was leaders to continue to look at innovative perhaps most dramatically and poignantly ways to allocate resources and address illustrated immediately after the attacks staffing shortages, to focus less on obstacles in New York when people on the streets and more on opportunities. The greatest desperately fleeing the smoke and debris challenge, he conceded, was to think

Conclusion 109 strategically, to look ahead, and develop provided support to each other. Parks as a proactive approach in dealing with far south as Assateague Island in Mary- incidents and potential threats.8 land sent up boats to patrol around the Statue of Liberty. As Officer David Moen The National Park Service had reason to feel observed, people put their personal dif- proud of its response. The actions of many ferences aside and worked together as a individual Service employees represented team. New York and Boston area parks the very highest standards of service and received assistance from rangers from dedication. The efforts of the staff at Fed- Assateague Island National Seashore, Cape eral Hall, Ellis Island, and elsewhere on Sep- Cod National Seashore, Colonial National tember 11 certainly reflect their outstanding Historical Park, Fire Island National Sea- performance. The service and dedication shore, Richmond National Battlefield, to duty was also reflected in the dozens of Petersburg National Battlefield, Upper Del- law enforcement rangers who spent weeks aware Scenic and Recreational River, Dela- away from their homes and families work- ware Water Gap National Recreation Area, ing long hours to support the response. Gettysburg National Battlefield, Shenan- It was reflected in the Park Police officers doah National Park, and Blue Ridge Park- who worked extended hours for weeks and way. “We didn’t have the numbers that we sometimes months. It was reflected in the needed and we couldn’t provide as much actions of employees who spent their extra assistance as maybe we would like to or hours searching for victims at Ground Zero, maybe the department would have liked like Gateway National Recreation Area us to provide,” Dennis Burnett conceded, Ranger Theresa Marie Cervera. On Septem- “but I think that we were in place and ready ber 11 Cervera, who had arrived early for to respond with a phone call.” He aptly a 9:00 a.m. first-aid/CPR class, was bird- summed up the Service’s response by say- watching at the Great Kills section of Staten ing, “We did what had to be done and I 10 Island. After witnessing the attack through think we got it accomplished.” her binoculars, she rushed to Ground Zero The Service clearly demonstrated that to assist. Once there, someone placed a despite staffing shortages and communica- stethoscope in her hand and she immedi- tions problems, it could respond effectively ately went to work treating injured firefight- to the attacks. Yet, in ways recounted ear- ers and police. Cervera worked through the lier, the attacks might have left the National night treating injured rescue workers and Park Service forever changed. In the span shouldered the grim task of digging for vic- of a single morning, its mission and func- tims. In the following weeks, she drove to tions became more complex and the chal- Ground Zero each evening after her regular lenge of protecting its parks, its people, and 9 duty hours and worked until midnight. its visitors became much more difficult. Certainly one the most dominant themes of the National Park Service’s response was that of parks and park employees around the country pulling together and supporting each other. In New York City and Washington, D.C., rangers and Park Police

110 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Notes 9Ring, interview, p. 13; Gale, interview, pp. 1-2, 6, 10. Unless otherwise noted, copies of all 10 interview transcripts and all files cited below Ring, interview, pp. 3-4, 7-8. are located in the administrative 11Director Fran Mainella, memo, history files, National Register, History, “Emergency Operations Instructions, and Education, National Park Service (NPS), September 11, 2001,” NPS Morning Report, Washington, D.C. September 11, 2001, supplemental special edition, file: Morning Report [hereafter Preface cited as Morning Report]. 1Mary Marshall Clark, “The September 12Michael Grunwald, “Terrorists Hijack 11 Oral History Narrative and Memory 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Project: A First Report,” The Journal of Center, Hit Pentagon, Hundreds Dead,” American History, 89, no. 2 (September Washington Post, September 12, 2001, 2002): 569-79. www.washingtonpost.com [accessed March 12, 2003]. I. National Park Service’s 13Burnett, interview, pp. 2-3; Secretary Gale Initial Response Norton, memo, September 11, 2001, refer- enced in Morning Report, September 11, 1Richard Ring, interview by Janet A. 2001, supplemental special edition. McDonnell, May 29, 2002, p. 2; Richard T. Gale, interview by Janet A. McDonnell, 14Burnett, interview, pp. 7, 9. December 12, 2001, p.1. 15Gale, interview, pp. 2, 3, 5; Van Horn, 2Dennis Burnett, interview by Janet A. interview, p. 3. McDonnell, January 29, 2002, pp. 1-2. 16Ring, interview, p. 4; Gale, interview, 3Maj. Gary Van Horn, interview by Janet A. pp. 4-5; Van Horn, interview, p. 6; Eastern McDonnell, February 26, 2002, p. 2. Interagency Coordination Center (EICC) Log, September, 11, 2001, 1415 hours, file: 4Burnett, interview, pp. 4, 6. incident management; Director Fran 5 Dennis Burnett, e-mail to Bill Halainen, Mainella, memo (draft) to assistant secre- September 11, 2001, 8:38 a.m., file: 9/11 doc- tary for policy, management, and budget,” uments. [Time indicated on e-mail does not n.d., file: 9/11 documents. appear to be accurate.] 17Commander, Planning and Development 6 Brenda Ritchie, interview by Janet A. Unit, memo to Acting Chief, U.S. Park McDonnell, January 23, 2002, pp. 1-3, 6, 37; Police, “After-Action Report on Terrorist Mel Poole, interview by Mark Schoepfle, Attacks on World Trade Center/Pentagon,” December 17, 2001, p. 36. September 12, 2001, file: USPP [hereafter 7Ritchie, interview, pp. 10-11, 3-4, 13. cited as USPP, “After-Action Report”]. 18 8Burnett, interview, pp. 2, 7. Van Horn, interview, p. 7.

Notes 111 19Gale, interview, p. 4. 30Frances Delmar, interview by Doris D. Fanelli, March 15, 2002, p. 8; David A. 20Van Horn, interview, 9. Mihalic, interview by Louis Hutchins, 21Ibid., pp. 11-12; Burnett, interview, p. 14. February 4, 2002, pp. 11-16. 22EICC Log, September 12, 2001, no time, 31Doyle Nelson, interview by Chuck file: incident management; “Workers Smythe, May 13, 2002, pp. 4-6, 8. Offered Leave As Government Reopens,” 32Gale, interview, pp. 10-11. Washington Post, September 12, 2001, www. washingtonpost.com [accessed March 12, 33U. S. Park Police (USPP), “Lessons 2003]. Learned,” n.d., p. 1, file: USPP; Deputy Chief John D. Schamp, interview by Janet A. 23Ring, interview, p. 25; EICC Log, McDonnell, April 17, 2002, pp. 22-24. September 11, 2001, 2227 hours, file: incident management; SHEN Communications 34USPP, “The Force’s Response,” September Center, memo to all regional directors, 13, 2001, file: USPP; Gretchen Merkle, e- “Normal Operations,” September 11, 2001, mail to John D. Schamp, February 12, 2001, file: Morning Report. file: USPP. 24Gale, interview, p. 4; EICC Log, Septem- 35Superintendent’s Annual Narrative Report ber 11, 2001, 2145 hours, file: incident man- (SANR), Boston NHP, FY2001. agement. 36“Park Status Report,” September 12, 2001, 25Morning Report, September 13, 2001, file: incident management; Ibid., September morning edition. 14, 2001; Morning Report, September 14, 2001, afternoon edition. 26Department of the Interior (DOI), press release, “Washington Area Monuments 37SANR, USS Arizona NM, FY2001. Reopen,” September 12, 2001; Morning 38EICC Log, September 12, 2001, 1200 Report, September 13, 2001, morning hours, file: incident management; Ibid., edition. 1700 hours. 27Director Fran Mainella, memo (draft) to 39“Park Status Report,” September 27, 2001, assistant secretary for policy, management, file: incident management; Morning Report, and budget, n.d; Gale interview, pp. 6, 16; September 26, 2001; Ibid., September 28, Van Horn, interview, p. 12; Richard Powell, 2001. interview by Janet A. McDonnell, April 30, 2002, pp. 6, 8; Ring, interview, p. 5. 40Burnett, interview, pp.17-23; Einar S. Olsen, interview by Janet A. McDonnell and 28DOI, “September 11,” People, Land and Gary Scott, December 13, 2001, p. 24; Gale, Water, 8, no. 6 (September/October 2001): interview, pp. 24-25; Judy Forte, interview p. 19; Van Horn, interview, p. 13; Ring, inter- by Janet A. McDonnell, January 29, 2002, view, p. 6. p. 7. 29Director Fran Mainella, memo (draft) to 41Burnett, interview, pp. 21-22. assistant secretary for policy, management, and budget, n.d.; Powell, interview, pp. 7-8.

112 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks 42Forte, interview, p. 8. 6USPP, “After-Action Report”; USPP “Lessons Learned,” p. 3; Schamp, interview, 43Chief Ranger Pacific West Region (PWR), pp. 25-26; Capt. Neal Lauro, interview by memo to PWR Directorate, September 20, Janet A. McDonnell, May 7, 2002, p. 22; Sal 2001, file: incident management; Jay Wells, Lauro, interview, pp. 6, 48. fax to Skip Brooks, September 20, 2001, file: incident management. 7Chief’s Command Post, memo, “Daily Summary Report”, September 11, 2001, file: 44SANR, Lake Mead NRA, FY2001. USPP; Pellinger, interview, pp. 2, 3, 5; Sal 45SANR, Whiskeytown NRA, FY2001. Lauro, interview, pp. 5, 39-40. 46“Parks and Monuments: Some Open, 8Sal Lauro, interview, pp. 27, 34-35. Some Not,” New York Times, October 14, 9Ibid., pp. 5-6; USPP, “Lessons Learned,” 2001. p. 2; USPP, “The Force’s Response” 47Van Horn, interview, pp. 6, 16-18; Ring, 10“U.S. Park Police Lead Interior Security interview, p. 5; Gale, interview, pp. 4-5. Efforts in New York, Nation’s Capital,” 48Burnett, interview, p. 10; Gale, interview, p. 22; USPP, “The Force’s Response.” p. 29; Dennis McGinnis, interview by Janet 11Lt. George F. Wallace, interview by Mark A. McDonnell, December 5, 2001, p. 34. Schoepfle, January 16, 2002, pp. 2-7, 12-13. 12 II. National Capital Region Sgt. Ron Galey, interview by Janet A. McDonnell, December 17, 2001, pp. 1-3; 1 Capt. Sal Lauro, interview by Janet A. Sgt. Kenneth Burchell, interview by Janet McDonnell, March 28, 2002, p. 3. A. McDonnell, December 17, 2001, pp. 2-5; 2Sal Lauro, interview, p. 3; Schamp, inter- Sgt. Bernard T. Stasulli, interview by Janet view, April 17, 2002, p. 4. A. McDonnell, December 10, 2001, pp. 3, 5; Bill Lane, “NCR Contributes to September 3 USPP, “After-Action Report”; Schamp, 11th Help Efforts,”n.d., file: USPP. interview, pp. 1-3, 6, 33. 13Burchell, interview, pp. 7-12, 20-21; Galey, 4 Maj. Thomas Pellinger, interview by Mark interview by McDonnell, p. 3; Stasulli, Schoepfle, March 29, 2002, pp. 3, 5-6,10- interview by McDonnell, p. 9; Officer John 11, 22-23; Sal Lauro, interview, pp. 22-24; Dillon, interview by Janet A. McDonnell, Schamp, interview, pp. 10-11. December 10, 2001, p. 3. 5 USPP, “Lessons Learned,” p.2; Morning 14Galey, interview by McDonnell, pp. 4- Report, September 16, 2002; “U.S. Park 5; Stasulli, interview by McDonnell, p. Police Lead Interior Security Efforts in New 7; Dillon, interview, p. 10; Sgt. Bernard York, Nation’s Capital,” People, Land and T. Stasulli, interview by Mark Schoepfle, Water, 8, no. 6 (September/October 2001): January 16, 2002, p. 6. p. 23; Chief’s Command Post, memo, “Daily 15 Summary Report”, September 17, 2001, file: Burchell, interview, pp. 12-15, 18; Stasulli, USPP. interview by McDonnell, pp. 7-8; Lane,

Notes 113 “NCR Contributes to September 11th Help 26Wallace, interview, p. 15; USPP, “Lessons Efforts”; Stasulli, interview by Schoepfle, p. Learned,” p. 2; Chief’s Command Post, 7; Galey, interview by McDonnell, pp. 5-8. “Daily Summary Report” (time line), September 11, 2001, 1120 hours, file: USPP; 16Galey, interview by McDonnell, p. 8; Ibid., 1158 hours; Pellinger, interview, pp. Dillon, interview, p. 2. 3, 22-23; Sal Lauro, interview, pp. 8-9; 17 Dillon, interview, pp. 4, 6; Burchell, inter- Schamp, interview, p. 32. view, p. 27; Galey, interview by McDonnell, 27Pellinger, interview, pp. 9-10; “U.S. Park pp. 10-12. Police Lead Interior Security Efforts in New 18 USPP, “The Force’s Response”; Galey, York, Nation’s Capital,” p. 22; USPP, “The interview by McDonnell, p. 16; USPP, Force’s Response”; Sal Lauro, interview, “Lessons Learned”; Dillon, interview, p. 4; p. 12. Burchell, interview, p. 19. 28USPP, “The Force’s Response”; “U.S. 19 Dillon, interview, pp. 6-7; Galey, interview Park Police Lead Interior Security Efforts by McDonnell, pp. 13-14; “U.S. Park Police in New York, Nation’s Capital,” p. 23; Sal Lead Interior Security Efforts in New York, Lauro, interview, pp. 9, 16; USPP, “Lessons Nation’s Capital,” pp. 22-23; Pellinger, inter- Learned.” view, p. 9. 29Olsen, interview, pp. 1-5. 20Galey, interview by McDonnell, p. 9; 30Ibid., pp. 6, 32-33. Dillon, interview, pp. 11-12. 31Ibid., pp. 6-11. 21Galey, interview by McDonnell, p. 19; Stasulli, interview by McDonnell, pp.15-17. 32Ibid., pp. 10-11. 22Burchell, interview, pp. 25-26. 33Dwight Dixon, interview by Mark Schoepfle, pp. 2-3, 5-7; Olsen, interview, 23Sal Lauro, interview, pp. 12-13; Schamp, pp. 11, 14. interview, p. 8; USPP, “Lessons Learned,” p. 2; USPP, “After-Action Report”; Sgt. 34Olsen, interview, pp. 15-16; Lance Hatten, Robert MacLean, e-mail to Morning Report, interview by Mark Schoepfle, February 27, September 12, 2001, 6:45 a.m.; Chief’s 2002, pp. 4, 9, 14. Command Post, “Daily Summary Report” 35“Highlights of September 11th for (time line), September 11, 2001, 1020 hours, National Capital Region,” n.d., file: 9/11 file: USPP; Ibid., 1125 hours; Ibid., 1356 documents; Sean Kennealy, interview by hours; USPP, “The Force’s Response.” Mark Schoepfle, December 18, 2001, 24Pellinger, interview, pp. 4, 7; USPP, “The pp. 8-9. Force’s Response”; Wallace, interview, pp. 36Mel Poole, interview by Mark Schoepfle, 7-8, 17, 19. December 17, 2001, pp. 5-8, 15, 17, 20-21, 25Schamp, interview, p. 6. 23-26; SANR, Catoctin Mountain Park, FY2001; Olsen, interview, pp. 16-17. 37Poole, interview, pp. 34, 40, 42.

114 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks 38Olsen, interview, pp. 17-18. 8Laura Brennan, interview by Chuck Smythe, December 20, 2001, pp. 6-8, 39Sal Lauro, interview, pp. 21-22. 10-12; Merced, interview, pp. 5-13, 23; Archie Johnson, interview by Chuck III. New York City Smythe, January 23, 2002, pp. 5-7; 1Morning Report, September 15, 2001, after- Christopher Keenan, interview by Chuck noon edition. Smythe, December 20, 2001, pp. 6-7, 11, 14, 16-17; Steven Laise, interview by Chuck 2 Maj. Thomas Wilkins, interview by Janet Smythe, December 19, 2001, pp. 5-6. A. McDonnell, May 8, 2002, pp. 1-2; Neal 9 Lauro, interview, pp. 1-2; Lt. Dave Buckley, Johnson, interview, pp. 8, 17, 28; Sgt. Clyde interview by Janet A. McDonnell, May 7, Solomon, interview by Janet A. McDonnell, 2002, pp. 2-5. May 8, 2002, p. 2; Laise, interview, pp. 6, 8. 10 3Wilkins, interview, pp. 4-5; Neal Lauro, Joseph Avery, interview by Chuck Smythe, interview, p. 9; “U.S. Park Police Lead January 23, 2002, pp. 5, 14; Keenan, inter- Interior Security Efforts in New York, view, pp. 17-18, 22, 26; Brennan, inter- Nation’s Capital,” p. 22. view, pp. 13-16; Laise, interview, pp. 6-8, 14; Merced, interview, pp. 14, 17, 20-22; 4 Wilkins, interview, pp. 6, 12; “U.S. Park Johnson, interview, pp. 9-11; Zweig, inter- Police Lead Interior Security Efforts in view, p. 13. New York, Nation’s Capital,” p. 22; USPP, 11 “Lessons Learned,” p. 3; Capt. Martin Cynthia Garrett, interview by George L. Zweig, interview by Chuck Smythe, Tselos, June 6, 2002, p.18; Zweig, inter- December 11, 2001, pp. 1, 6-8. view, p. 13; Solomon, interview, pp. 1-5, 7, 9; Keenan, interview, pp. 27, 29-31, 36; 5 Zwieg, interview, pp. 7-8, 10; USPP, “The Laise, interview, pp. 8-9, 20-21; “U.S. Park Force’s Response”; Morning Report, Police Lead Security Efforts in New York, September 13, 2001, morning edition ; Nation’s Capital,” p. 22; Merced, interview, Wilkins, interview, p. 13; Morning Report, p. 18; “Nomination for the USPP Certificate September 15, 2001, afternoon edition. for Sergeant Clyde E. Solomon and Officer [By some accounts, there were seven U.S. Bekim Cobaj,” n.d., file: USPP; Johnson, marshals and two construction workers.] interview, pp. 26, 34; Avery, interview, p. Officer David Moen, interview by Janet 6; Peter O’Dougherty, interview by Mark A. McDonnell, May 7, 2002, pp. 5-8; Neal Schoepfle, February 1, 2002, pp. 9, 26; Lauro, interview, p. 9; “U.S. Park Police Steven Laise, e-mail to Janet A. McDonnell, Lead Interior Security Efforts in New York, February 11, 2004. Nation’s Capital,” p. 22. 12Keenan, interview, pp. 37, 40, 42; Merced, 6 Moen, interview, pp. 10-12. interview, pp. 34, 36; Laise, interview, 7Daniel Merced, interview by Chuck pp. 11-13. Smythe, December 19, 2001, p. 28; Morning 13Morning Report, September 13, 2001, Report, September 12, 2001, morning edi- afternoon edition; Ibid., September 14, tion; SANR, Manhattan Sites, FY2001. 2001, afternoon edition; Avery, interview,

Notes 115 p. 14; Laise, interview, pp. 15-16; SANR, 26Castro, interview, pp. 4-5; Joan Kelly, Manhattan Sites, FY2001; Steven Laise, interview by Mark Schoepfle, p. 3; e-mail to Janet A. McDonnell, February 11, O’Dougherty, interview, pp. 5-6; Neal 2004. Lauro, interview, p. 3; Diane Dayson, interview by Mark Schoepfle, January 28, 2002, 14Northeast Region Type 2 Team, “Daily pp. 3-4, 8-10; Cynthia Garrett, interview, Status Report,” September 18, 2001, pp. 5-6; Alfred Arberg, interview by Mark Operation Secure Parks, Box 1 of 2, file: Schoepfle, February 1, 2002, p. 3. Status Reports; SANR, Manhattan Sites, FY2001. 27Arberg, interview, pp. 4-6, 14-19; O’Dougherty, interview, p. 10; SANR, 15Charles Markis, interview by Louis Statue of Liberty/Ellis Island Immigration Hutchins, February 26, 2002, pp. 4-14, 17, 21. Museum, FY2001; Mills, interview, p. 30. 16Markis, interview, pp. 16-23, 35, 38, 40. 28Cynthia Garrett, interview, pp. 12, 14; 17 Northeast Region Type 2 Team, “Daily Dayson, interview, pp. 3- 4, 7-8, 11-12; Mills, Status Report,” September 18, 2001, file: interview, p. 28; Castro interview, p. 11; Neal incident management. Lauro, interview, pp. 8, 15. 18 SANR, Manhattan Sites, FY2001. 29Dayson, interview, pp. 4-5; Neal Lauro, 19Avery, interview, p. 13; Keenan, interview, interview, pp. 3-4. p. 32; Johnson, interview, pp. 11-12, 15. 30O’Dougherty, interview, pp. 7-8; DiPietro, 20Laise, interview, p. 18; Keenan, interview, interview, pp. 14-15, 20; Dayson, interview, p. 38. p. 5; Cynthia Garrett, interview, p. 12; Daniel T. Brown, interview by Mark Schoepfle, 21 Johnson, interview, pp. 43-44; Laise, January 29, 2002, pp. 5-6. interview, pp. 18-19; Keenan, interview, 31 pp. 51, 54-55. Kelly, interview, pp. 4-9; Castro, interview, p.12; Brown, interview by Mark 22 Johnson, interview, p. 19; Avery, inter- Schoepfle, January 29, 2002, pp. 18-20; view, pp. 20, 29; Merced, interview, pp. Dayson, interview, pp. 7, 9, 12-15, 17; Mills, 55-57; Laise interview, pp. 27, 29, 30; SANR interview, p. 33; Cynthia Garrett, inter- Manhattan Sites, FY2001. view, p. 10; Neal Lauro, interview, pp. 12-13; 23SANR, Manhattan Sites, FY2001. USPP, “The Force’s Response”; “U.S. Park Police Lead Security Efforts in New York, 24 Ibid., FY2002. Nation’s Capital,” p. 22; Morning Report, 25Vincent DiPietro, interview by Mark September 13, 2001, morning edition; Ibid., Schoepfle, February 1, 2002, pp. 2-8, 22; September 15, 2001, afternoon edition; Paula Castro, interview by Mark Schoep- Ibid., September 12, 2001, morning edition; fle, pp. 3-4; Alfred Farrugio, interview by DiPietro, interview, pp. 22-23. Mark Schoepfle, January 30, 2002, pp. 4-5; Frank N. Mills, interview by Mark Scho- epfle, January 31, 2002, pp. 3, 5, 16, 25-26; O’Dougherty, interview, p. 3.

116 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks 32Dayson, interview, pp.14-16, 18-21; 42Shirley McKinney, interview by Chuck O’Dougherty, interview, pp. 19, 23; Mills, Smythe, January 25, 2002, pp. 1-2. interview, p. 29; “U.S. Park Police Lead 43McKinney, interview, pp. 4, 7-8, 23; Security Efforts in New York, Nation’s Northeast Region Type 2 Team, “Daily Capital,” p. 22. Status Report,” September 18, 2001; 33Mills, interview, pp.15, 27; Morning Morning Report, September 15, 2001, after- Report, September 13, 2001, afternoon edi- noon edition; www.nps/gov/remembrance tion; Northeast Region Type 2 Team, “Daily [accessed May 5, 2003]. Status Report,” September 18, 2001, file: 44McKinney, interview, pp. 11-16, 24-25. incident management; Castro, interview, p. 17; DiPietro, interview, p. 50. 45David Luchsinger, interview by Chuck Smythe, January 23, 2002, pp. 5-8, 12,15; 34Dayson, interview, pp. 21, 23-26. Morning Report, September 14, 2001, after- 35Cynthia Garrett, interview, pp. 20-24; noon edition. DiPietro, interview, p. 28. 46 www.nps/gov/remembrance [accessed 36Dayson, interview, pp. 26-27; Schamp, May 5, 2003]; Northeast Region Type 2 interview, p. 28; Wilkins, interview, p. 14. Team, “Daily Status Report,” September 18, 2001; Mills, interview, pp. 13-14; Dayson, 37Dayson, interview, pp. 29-52. interview, pp. 21, 23-26. 38Cynthia Garrett, interview, p. 26; Dayson, 47Avery, interview, p. 11; Brennan, interview, interview, pp. 64-65. p. 8; SANR, Gateway NRA, FY2001; Morning 39Dayson, interview, pp. 21-23; O’Dougherty, Report, September 28, 2001. interview, p. 32; “Secretary Norton 48DiPietro, interview, p. 49; Mills, interview, Announces New Visitor Plan for Statue pp. 61, 67, 77-78. of Liberty,” Arrowhead, 11, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 1; “Statue of Liberty Reopening Date Announced,” June 30, 2004, www.inside. IV. Incident Management nps.gov/printheadline.cfm?type [accessed 1Ring, interview, pp. 9–11, 19. July 6, 2004]. 2Gale, interview, pp. 6, 8; Skip Brooks, 40Zweig, interview, pp. 13-14; William interview by Janet A. McDonnell, June 12, Garrett, interview by Chuck Smythe, 2002, p. 1; Ritchie, interview, p. 8; Dennis February 24, 2002, pp. 15-17; www.nps/ Burnett, e-mail to Bill Halainen, September gov/remembrance [accessed May 5, 2003]; 11, 2001, file: 9/11 documents; McGinnis, Northeast Region Type 2 Team, “Daily interview by Janet A. McDonnell, pp. 2, 7- Status Report,” September 18, 2001; “U.S. 9, 16; EICC Log, September 11, 2001, 1501 Park Police Lead Interior Security Efforts in hours, file: incident management; Morning New York, Nation’s Capital,” p. 22. Report, September 12, 2001, morning 41William Garrett, interview, pp. 18-21; edition. www.nps/gov/remembrance [accessed May 5, 2003].

Notes 117 3Brooks, interview, pp. 2-4, 9; McGinnis, 13Operation Secure Parks, “Narrative interview, p. 16; Paul Pfenninger, inter- Update and Discussion of Incident view by Janet A. McDonnell, January 23, Management Operations”; Brooks, inter- 2002, pp. 14-15; Operation Secure Parks, view, p. 35; McGinnis, interview, p. 34; “Organization Assignment List.” Morning Report, September 19, 2001. 4McGinnis, interview, pp. 12, 16; Gale, inter- 14McGinnis, interview, pp. 23-24; Gale, view, p. 11; Brooks, interview, p. 13; Morning interview, p. 15; Powell, interview, pp. 10, 22, Report, September 13, 2001, morning 28; Morning Report, September 19, 2001. edition. 15Brooks, interview, pp. 30-31; McGinnis, 5Van Horn, interview, p. 19. interview, p. 31. 6Brooks, interview, p. 7; McGinnis, inter- 16“Incident Objectives,” September 14, 2001, view, pp. 4-5, 11. file: incident management; Morning Report, September 19, 2001; Ibid., September 25, 7Director Fran Mainella, memo to Skip 2001; Ibid., September 26, 2001; Ibid., Brooks, “Delegation of Authority, NPS September 27, 2001. Continuity of Operations,” September 13, 2001, file: incident management; Brooks, 17Brooks, interview, pp. 5, 23-24; Operation interview, p. 8; McGinnis, interview, p. 4. Secure Parks, “Narrative Update and Discussion of Incident Management 8Brooks, interview, pp. 3, 8-9; McGinnis, Operations”; Shenandoah National Park interview, pp. 2-4, 14-15; Director (SHEN)Superintendent, memo to all Fran Mainella, memo to Skip Brooks, employees, “Eastern Incident Management “Delegation of Authority, NPS Continuity Team Activities,” September 20, 2001, file: of Operations”; Operation Secure Parks, incident management; SHEN superinten- “Narrative Update and Discussion of dent, memo to Robert Panko, “Limited Incident Management Operations.” Delegation of Authority, Operation Secure 9Gale, interview, pp. 12-13, 29; McGinnis, Parks Incident,” September 20, 2001, file: interview, pp. 5-6, 12. incident management. 10Ritchie, interview, pp. 11-12, 15-16; Bill 18Morning Report, September 23, 2001; Halainen, e-mail to SHEN EICC, September Operation Secure Parks, “Transition Plan 12, 2001, file: incident management; and Recommendations,” October 1, 2001 Morning Report, September 12, 2001, sup- (Approved October 2, 2001, by Acting plemental special edition; Morning Report, Director Denis Galvin), file: incident man- September 18, 2001. agement; Robert Panko, memo to SHEN 11Brooks, interview, pp. 6, 14-15, 26, 31-32; Superintendent, “Closeout of Limited Gale, interview, pp. 13, 17; McGinnis, inter- Delegation of Authority, Operation Secure view, p. 29. Parks,” September 28, 2001, file: incident management. 12McGinnis, interview, p. 4; Brooks, interview, p. 29; Gale, interview, pp. 13-14.

118 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks 19Robert Martin, interview by Janet A. V. Challenges McDonnell, February 5, 2002, pp. 1, 3, 5, 11; 1McGinnis, interview, 17-18; Martin, inter- EICC Log, September 11, 2001, 1600 hours, view, p. 9. ﬁle: incident management; Ibid., 1320 2 hours; McGinnis, interview, p. 10. Director Fran Mainella, memo (draft), to assistant secretary for policy, management, 20Kay Dilonardo, e-mail to Chuck Smythe, and budget, n.d.; Burnett, interview, p. 5; April 4, 2002, ﬁle: 9/11 documents; Martin, Van Horn, interview, p. 16; McGinnis, inter- interview, pp. 5-6, 10; Pfenninger, interview, view, pp. 17-18; USPP, “Lessons Learned,” pp. 4-5, 7, 14, 22. p. 2. 21Morning Report, September 12, 2001, 3Zweig, interview, p. 31. morning edition; Kay Dilonardo, e-mail to 4 Chuck Smythe, April 4, 2002; Russ Smith, Schamp, interview, pp. 15-16; USPP, e-mail to Northeast Region, September 12, “Lessons Learned,” p. 2; Sal Lauro, inter- 2001, 11:18 a.m; Martin, interview, pp. 13, 37; view, p. 51; Wilkins, interview, p. 9; Zweig, Pfenninger, interview, pp. 7-9, 11, 15-16, 18, interview, pp. 31-33; Neal Lauro, interview, 23; McGinnis, interview, pp. 10, 29; Brooks, pp. 6-7. interview, p. 15. 5NPS, “Lessons Learned,” (draft), 22Burnett, interview, pp. 12-13; Gale, inter- November 13, 2001, pp. 13-14; Sal Lauro, view, pp. 7, 14, 29-30; McGinnis, interview, interview, p. 50; Olsen, interview, p. 37. pp. 9, 15, 29; Brooks, interview, pp. 39-40. 6Wilkins, interview, pp. 11-13. 23 Pfenninger, interview, p.17, 19. 7Sgt. Robert MacLean, e-mail to Morning 24Martin, interview, p. 37; McGinnis, inter- Report, September 12, 2001, 6:45 a.m.; view, pp. 16, 19, 37-39; Brooks, interview, pp. USPP, “The Force’s Response”; Van Horn, 3, 17, 21, 37-48; Pfenninger, interview, p. 10. interview, pp. 20-22; Schamp, interview, pp. 20-21. 25McGinnis, interview, p. 22, 36; Brooks, 8 interview, p. 20. McGinnis, interview, 33; USPP, “After- Action Report”; Schamp, interview, p. 18; 26Ring, interview, pp. 15-16; Martin, inter- Sal Lauro, interview, p. 52. view, p. 16; McGinnis, interview, p. 20. 9Van Horn, interview, pp. 22-23; Brooks, 27Brooks, interview, pp. 43-45, 48. interview, p. 33; Powell, interview, pp. 24- 28Operation Secure Parks, “Transition Plan 25; Martin, interview, pp. 16-18, 39. and Recommendations.” 10Gale, interview, pp. 18, 22; NPS, “Lessons Learned,” (draft), p. 17. 11Brooks, interview, pp. 16, 22-23, 28-29, 31, 39-40; McGinnis, interview, pp. 26-27. 12Brooks, interview, pp. 28-29; NPS, “Lessons Learned,” (draft), p. 17.

Notes 119 13Ring, interview, p. 16; NPS, “Lessons 24Director Fran Mainella, memo (draft) to Learned,” (draft), p. 17. assistant secretary for policy, management, and budget, n.d. 14Ritchie, interview, pp. 32-35, 39; Gale, interview, p. 22; Martin, interview, p. 41. 25Ring, interview, pp. 13, 17-18. 15Ring, interview pp. 12-15; Director Fran 26Sal Lauro, interview, pp. 36-37; USPP, Mainella, memo (draft) to assistant secre- “Lessons Learned,” pp. 3, 5. tary for policy, management, and budget, 27Martin, interview, pp. 33-34; DOI, OIG, n.d. Assessment of Security at the National 16Brooks, interview, pp. 11-12, 20, 28-29. Park Service’s Icon Parks, August 28, 2003, Report no. 2003-I-0063, p. 5, file: IG 17Gale, interview, pp. 14-15; Martin, inter- reports. view, p. 36; McGinnis, interview, p. 25; Brooks, interview, p. 16. VI. Aftermath 18Brooks, interview, pp. 9-10, 50; Gale, interview, pp. 22, 33-34, 37. 1Todd Wilkinson, “On the Homefront,” National Parks Conservation Association 19Director Fran Mainella, memo (draft) Magazine, April/May 2002; Delmar, inter- to assistant secretary for policy, manage- view, p. 26. ment, and budget, n.d.; DOI, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Disquieting State 2An Act to Authorize a National Memorial of Disorder: An Assessment of Department of to Commemorate the Passengers and Crew the Interior Law Enforcement, January 2002, of Flight 93, September 24, 2002, 107th Report no. 2002-I-0014, file: IG reports. Congress, Public Law 107-226; SANR, Gateway NRA, FY2002; Pellinger, interview, 20Gale, interview, p. 21; Olsen, interview, p. p. 16; Delmar, interview, pp. 21, 26; Martin, 20. interview, p. 13. 21Ritchie, interview, pp. 25-28, 39-40. 3Ronald Boice, interview by Doris D. 22McGinnis, interview, pp. 39-40; Brooks, Fanelli, April 5, 2002, pp. 21, 23; William interview, p. 18; Director Fran Mainella, Troppman interview by Doris D. Fanelli, memo to Skip Brooks, September 20, April 5, 2002, pp. 11, 18, 29; Mihalic, inter- 2001, “Delegation of Authority, NPS view, pp. 38, 43; Nelson, interview, pp. Continuity of Operations.” [This docu- 13, 20-22; Rick Childs, interview by Mark mentation took the form of a report Schoepfle, May 6, 2002, p. 19. called Operation Secure Parks, “Narrative 4“National Park System Visitation Report,” Update and Discussion of Incident New York Times, May 7, 2002; “For Management Operations,” September U.S. Tourists, Vacation’s a Walk in 21, 2001, file: incident management.] the Park,” USA Today, April 18, 2002, 23Brooks, interview, pp. 47-48. www.usatoday.com [accessed April 22, 2002]; SANR, Independence NHP, FY2002;

120 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks “A Year Later the Travel World is Still Assessment of Department of the Interior Spinning,” Washington Post, September 8, Law Enforcement, Report no. 2002-I- 2002; Troppman, interview, pp. 14, 23. 0014, p. 20; International Chiefs of Police, Policing the National Parks: 21st Century 5Wilkinson, “On the Homefront”; Requirements, 2000, chap. 5. NPS, press release, “Media Report on Security at NPS Sites,” March 10, 2003, 17Olsen, interview, pp. 22-23. www.inside.nps.gov [accessed March 10, 18Poole, interview, pp. 23-24, 47-48, 50; 2003]; Don Reipe, interview by Chuck Dixon, interview, pp. 19-22. Smythe, December 19, 2001, p. 10; Mihalic, 19 interview, p. 24. Childs, interview, pp. 6-10, 12-14. 20 6 Tracy Thetford, interview by Mark SANR, Valley Forge NHP, FY2002; SANR, Schoepfle, April 4, 2002, p. 10; Pfenninger, Upper Delaware SRR, FY2002. interview, pp. 24-25, 28. 21Schamp, interview, pp. 27-28, 33-35; 7Hatten, interview, pp. 18, 32, 39; “American Pellinger, interview, p. 14; Sal Lauro, inter- History Lessons,” Washington Times, August view, pp. 34, 38; USPP, “Lessons Learned,” 7, 2002. p. 5. 22 8Frank Hays, interview by Chuck Smythe, SANR, Gateway NRA, FY2002; Wilkins, May 21, 2002, pp. 4, 12-19, 25, 30. interview, p.16; Neal Lauro, interview, pp. 19-21. 9Troppman, interview, pp. 12, 20, 26; 23 Delmar, interview, pp. 27-28. Sal Lauro, interview, p. 38; Wilkins, interview, pp. 16-17. 10William Garrett, interview, pp. 22-26, 36; 24 www.nps/gov/remembrance [accessed May Schamp, interview, p. 30; Pellinger, inter- 5, 2003]. view, p. 12. 25 11Mihalic, interview, pp. 26-35, 44. Neal Lauro, interview, p. 5; Wilkins, interview, pp. 15-19. 12Morning Report, November 28, 2001; DOI, 26 OIG, Assessment of Security at the National Buckley, interview, pp. 1-2, 7-8, 11. Park Service’s Icon Parks, Report no. 2003- 27Wilkins, interview, pp. 19, 21-24. I-0063, pp. 8-9. 28 13 Management Assessment Team, Burnett, interview, pp. 23-24; Martin, “Assessment of Strategic Alternatives interview, pp. 19-20, 28-29. for National Park Service Protection 14Forte, interview, pp. 5-6. Response,” October 9, 2001; Gale, interview, p. 22; Martin, interview, p. 21; Burnett, 15Van Horn, interview, pp. 24-28. interview, p. 25; NER, Bob Martin, “Thank 16National Leadership Council Journal, you to NPS for Post–9/11 Support,” November 15, 2002, file: 9/11 documents; www.inside.nps.gov [accessed October 7, Schamp, interview, pp. 43-46; Martin, 2002], file: 9/11 documents. interview, p. 28; Burnett, interview, p. 30; 29Ring, interview, pp. 23-25. DOI, OIG, Disquieting State of Disorder: An

Notes 121 30“Assessment of Strategic Alternatives 4Wilkins, interview, pp. 24-26; Neal Lauro, for National Park Service Protection interview, pp. 23-24; Sal Lauro, interview, Response”; Martin, interview, p. 22; pp. 59-60; Buckley, interview, pp. 17-18. Burnett, interview, p. 24; Gale, interview, 5Moen, interview, p. 10; Schamp, inter- pp. 22-23. view, p. 38; Neal Lauro, interview, p. 29; 31Morning Report, November 28, 2001; Sal Lauro, interview, p. 47; Secretary of Burnett, interview, p. 29; Olsen, interview, the Interior, memo “Unit Citation USPP p. 18; NPS, “Emergency Response Plan,” National Park Service,” n.d., file: USPP. November 7, 2001, p. 2. 6Martin, interview, pp. 25-26. 32Director Fran Mainella, memo to all 7Ring, interview, p. 20. regional directors, “National Emergency Response Plan,” November 16, 2001; 8Brooks, interview, p. 41; Gale, interview, Morning Report, November 28, 2001. pp. 30-32, 35. 33Ring, interview, pp. 25-26. 9Theresa Cervera, interview by Chuck Smythe, January 24, 2002, pp. 3-7. 34Forte, interview, p. 4; Olsen, interview, pp. 32-34. 10Burnett, interview, pp. 26, 32-33; Moen, interview, p. 12; Morning Report, September 35Martin, interview, p. 42. 15, 2001, afternoon edition. 36“Daily Headlines: Law Enforcement Task Force—First Meeting Report,” file: 9/11 documents; “Secretary Approves Measures to Improve DOI Law Enforcement,” www. inside.nps.gov/printheadlines [accessed July 25, 2002], file: 9/11 documents; Director Fran Mainella, memo to National Leadership Council, “Law Enforcement Reform Actions,” December 9, 2002, file: 9/11 documents.

Conclusion 1Ring, interview, p. 22; Martin, interview, pp. 30-32. 2Forte, interview, pp. 9-10; Martin, interview, pp. 31-32. 3DOI, OIG, Assessment of Security at the National Park Service’s Icon Parks, Report no. 2003-I-0063; Forte, interview, pp. 12, 14-15, 19-24.

122 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Oral History Interviews Cervera, Theresa Marie. Interview by Chuck Smythe. New York, NY. January 24, Copies of all interview transcripts listed 2002. below can be found in the administrative history files, National Register, History Childs, Rick. Interview by Mark Schoepfle. and Education, National Park Service, Shenandoah National Park, VA. May 6, Washington, D.C. 2002. Amato, Tito. Interview by Chuck Smythe. Dayson, Diane. Interview by Mark New York, NY. January 23, 2002. Schoepfle. New York, NY. January 28, 2002. Arberg, Alfred. Interview by Mark Delmar, Frances. Interview by Doris D. Schoepfle. New York, NY. February 1, 2002. Fanelli. Philadelphia, PA. March 15, 2002. Avery, Joseph. Interview by Chuck Smythe. Dillon, Officer John. Interview by Janet A. New York, NY. January 23, 2002. McDonnell. Washington, D.C. December 10, 2001. Bohn, Sgt. Keith. Interview by Janet A. McDonnell. Washington, D.C. December DiPietro,Vincent. Interview by Mark 17, 2001. Schoepfle. New York, NY. February 1, 2002. Boice, Ronald. Interview by Doris D. Dixon, Dwight. Interview by Mark Fanelli. Valley Forge National Historical Schopfle. Catoctin National Park, MD. Park, Pennsylvania. April 5, 2002. January 14, 2002. Brennan, Laura. Interview by Chuck Farrugio, Alfred. Interview by Mark Smythe. New York, NY. December 20, 2001. Schoepfle. New York, NY. January 30, 2002. Brooks, Gregory P. Interview by Janet A. Gale, Richard. Interview by Janet A. McDonnell. Colonial National Historical McDonnell. Washington, D.C. December Park, VA. June 12, 2002. 12, 2001. Brown, Daniel T. Interview by Mark Galey, Sgt. Ronald A. Interview by Janet A. Schoepfle. New York, NY. January 29, 2002. McDonnell. Washington, D.C. December 17, 2001. Buckley, David L. Interview by Janet A. McDonnell. New York, NY. May 7, 2002. Garrett, Billy. Interview by Chuck Smythe. New York, NY. January 24, 2002. Burchell, Sgt. Kenneth S. Interview by Janet A. McDonnell. Washington, D.C. December Garrett, Cynthia. Interview by George 17, 2001. Tselos. New York, NY. June 6, 2002. Burnett, Dennis. Interview by Janet A. Hanley, Joanne. Interview by Chuck McDonnell. Washington, D.C. January 29, Smythe. Telephone Interview. May 6, 2002. 2002. Hatten, Lance. Interview by Mark Castro, Paula. Interview by Mark Schoepfle. Schoepfle. Washington, D.C. February 27, New York, NY. January 30, 2002. 2002.

Oral History Interviews 123 Hays, Frank. Interview by Chuck Smythe. Mills, Frank W. Interview by Mark Telephone Interview. May 21, 2001. Schoepfle. New York, NY. January 31, 2002. Johnson, Archie. Interview by Chuck Moen, Dave. Interview by Janet A. Smythe. New York, NY. January 23, 2002. McDonnell. New York, NY. May 7, 2002. Kelly, Joan A. Interview by Mark Schoepfle. Murphy, Christopher. Interview by Janet A. New York, NY. February 1, 2002. McDonnell. New York, NY. May 8, 2002. Keenan, Christopher. Interview by Chuck Nelson, Doyle. Interview by Chuck Smythe. Smythe. New York, NY. December 20, 2001. Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area. May 13, 2002. Keneally, Sean. Interview by Mark Schoepfle. Washington, D.C. December 18, O’Dougherty, Peter. Interview by Mark 2001. Schoepfle. New York, NY. February 1, 2002. Laise, Steven C. Interview by Chuck Olsen, Einar S. Interview by Janet A. Smythe. New York, NY. December 19, 2001. McDonnell and Gary Scott. Washington, D.C. December 13, 2001. Lauro, Capt. Sal. Interview by Janet A. McDonnell. Washington, D.C. March 28, Pellinger, Maj. Thomas. Interview by Mark 2002. Schoepfle. Washington, D.C. March 29, 2002. Lauro, Capt. Neal. Interview by Janet A. McDonnell. New York, NY. May 7, 2002. Pfenninger, Paul M. Interview by Janet A. McDonnell. Shenandoah National Park, VA. Luchsinger, David. Interview by Chuck January 23, 2002. Smythe. New York, NY. January 23, 2002. Poole, Melville. Interview by Mark Markis, Charles A. Interview by Louis Schoepfle. Catoctin National Park, MD. Hutchins. New York, NY. February 26, December 17, 2001. 2002. Powell, Richard C. Interview by Janet A. Martin, Robert R. Interview by Janet A. McDonnell. Washington, D.C. April 30, McDonnell. Washington, D.C. February 5, 2002. 2002. Reipe, Don. Interview by Chuck Smythe. McGinnis, Dennis. Interview by Janet A. New York, NY. December 19, 2001. McDonnell. Washington, D.C. December 5, 2001. Ring, Richard G. Interview by Janet A. McDonnell. Washington, D.C. May 29, McKinney, Shirley. Interview by Chuck 2002. Smythe. New York, NY. January 25, 2002. Ritchie, Brenda. Interview by Janet A. Merced, Daniel. Interview by Chuck McDonnell. Shenandoah National Park, VA. Smythe. New York, NY. December 19, 2001. January 23, 2002. Mihalic, David A. Interview by Louis Hutchins. Yosemite National Park, CA. February 4, 2002.

124 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Schamp, John D. Interview by Janet A. Photo Credits McDonnell. Washington, D.C. April 17, 2002. Unless noted below, all photographs are credited to the National Park Service. Solomon, Sgt. Clyde E. Interview by Janet A. McDonnell. New York, NY. May 8, 2002. p. 1 – DOD Stasulli, Bernard. Interview by Janet A. p. 14 – Photodisc McDonnell. Washington, D.C. December p. 15 – U.S. Government 10, 2001. p. 18 – DOD by Tech Sgt. Cedric H. Rudisill Stasulli, Bernard. Interview by Mark p. 19 – U.S. Army Schoepfle. Washington, D.C. January 16, 2002. p. 21 – U.S. Government Thetford, Tracy. Interview by Mark p. 32 – Photodisc Schoepfle. Shenandoah National Park, VA. p. 33 – NPS by Eugene Kuziw April 4, 2002. p. 46 – Photodisc Troppman, William. Interview by Doris D. Fanelli. Valley Forge National Historical p. 60 – Photodisc Park, PA. April 5, 2002. p. 88 – Marcia Axtmann Smith Van Dorn, Maj. Gary. Interview by Janet A. p. 94 – NPS by Don Reipe McDonnell. Washington, D.C. February 26, 2002. Waite, Lt. Bryan. Interview by Janet A. McDonnell. New York, NY. May 7, 2002. Wallace, Lt. George. Interview by Mark Schoepfle. Washington, D.C. January 16, 2002. Wilkins, Maj. Thomas. Interview by Janet A. McDonnell. New York, NY. May 8, 2002. Zweig, Capt. Martin L. Interview by Chuck Smythe. New York, NY. December 11, 2001.

Photo Credits 125 Index Brown, Daniel 51 Brown, Rick 71 A Buckley, Dave 34, 100 Abbatantuono, Frank 34 Burchell, Kenneth 19, 20, 21, 22, 24 Alaska Region 10 Bureau of Reclamation 11, 12, 13, 74, 87, 95, American Airlines Flight 11 x 96, 101, 109 American Airlines Flight 77 x Burnett, Dennis ix, 1, 2, 3, 7, 11, 62, 71, 73, 97, 105, 110 American Red Cross 56 Bush, George W. 6, 18, 25, 94 Andrews Air Force Base 25

Antietam National Battleﬁeld 28 C Arberg, Alfred 48, 49 C&O Canal National Historical Park 28 Arlington Cemetery 26 Cabrillo National Monument 10 Assateague Island National Seashore 95, Calhoun, Audrey 28 110 Calvery, Steve 105 Avery, Joseph 39, 41, 45, 46, 59 Canaveral National Seashore 10, 11 B Cape Cod National Seashore 95, 110 Baltimore-Washington Parkway 25 Carlstrom, Terry 16, 27 Barna, David 91 Castle Clinton National Monument 4, 10, 36, 37, 42, 44, 45, 46 Battery Park 36, 38, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 53, 54, 55 Castro, Paula 51, 52 Beck, Daniel 18, 19 Catoctin Mountain Park 10, 28, 30, 31, 98 Camp David 10, 26, 30 Berberich, Henry 16, 18 cellular phone communications 4, 5, 17, Blue Ridge Parkway 110 78, 79 Bohn, Keith 20, 22 Cervera, Theresa Marie 110 Boston National Historical Park 10, 95, 98 Cheney, Richard 25 Boston Navy Yard 6, 10, 95 Childs, Rick 98 USS Constitution 6 Cholak, Philip 20, 21 Brennan, Laura 37, 38, 39, 41, 59 Circle Line 43, 44, 53 Brooks, Skip 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 81, 82, 84, 86, 109 Clara Barton Parkway 26

126 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks Cobaj, Bekim 40, 41 Eagle II 20, 21, 22, 23 Coffman, Randall 2 East Potomac Park 15, 16 Colonial National Historical Park 62, 110 EICC (Eastern Interagency Coordination Center) 2, 7, 16, 31, 62, 67, 68, 70, 74, Columbia Cascades Support Office 103 78, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86 Columbia Island 28 Ellis Island 10, 33, 34, 35, 36, 43, 44, 46, 47, concessionaires 51, 52, 94 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 79, 93, continuity of operations plans 2, 4, 5, 9, 100, 107, 110 13, 70 Everglades National Park 4, 70, 71 critical incident stress debriefing team 52 F D FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) x, Dayson, Diane 49, 51, 52, 54 10 Dayton Aviation Heritage National Farrugio, Alfred 47 Historical Park 10 FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 16, Delaware Gap National Recreation Area 22, 23, 26, 27, 31, 55, 56, 72, 80, 81, 83 9, 90, 91, 110 Federal Hall National Memorial 4, 10, 36, Delmar, Frances 93 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 58, 93, 99, 100, 107, 110 Department of Defense 16, 19, 20, 27 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Devaney, Earl E. 95 64, 99 Dillon, John 20, 21, 22 federal workers 2, 4, 27 Dilonardo, Kathy 71 FEMA (Federal Emergency Management DiPietro, Vincent 46, 47, 52, 59 Agency) 3, 16, 26 director of the National Park Service fighter jets 22, 27, 43 See Mainella, Fran Fire Island National Seashore 35, 110 Ditmanson, Dale 71, 72 FLETC (Federal Law Enforcement Training Dixon, Dwight 28, 29, 98 Center) 64, 99 downlink 22, 23, 24 Flight 93 National Memorial 89 Dulles International Airport x, 23 FLIR (forward-looking, infrared head detection) 23, 24

E Floyd Bennett Field 35, 56, 58, 107 Eagle I 20, 21, 22, 23 FMSS (Facilities Management Systems Software) 68

Index 127 Forbes, Mark 103 Guy, Clark 71 Forte, Judy 108 H Fort McHenry 92 Halainen, Bill 69 Fort Wadsworth 33, 34, 48, 53, 57, 58, 78 Haleakala National Park 10 Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial 89, 92 Hamilton, Sheila 41 Hanscom Air Force Base 10 G Harpers Ferry National Historical Park 28 Gale, Rick ix, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 62, 66, 73, 81, Hatten, Lance 29, 92 84, 102, 109 Hays, Frank 93 Galey, Ron 20, 21, 22, 23 Hetch-Hetchy Dam 9 Galvin, Deny 101, 103 Holmes, Benjamin J. 15 Garrett, Cynthia 48, 49, 53, 55 Howard, Bob 63 Garrett, William (Billy) 55, 57, 94 Hurricane Andrew 4, 62, 69, 82 Gateway National Recreation Area 9, 33, 36, 53, 55, 57, 58, 79, 90, 93, 94, 101, 110 I Sandy Hook unit 9, 58, 90 Independence National Historical Park 8, George B. Hartzog, Jr. 58 10, 74, 90, 91, 93, 95, 98 Independence Hall viii, 6, 10, 30, 93 George Washington Memorial Parkway 10, 25, 26, 28, 29 International Association of Chiefs of Police 97 GETS (Government Emergency Telecommunications System) 78 J Gettysburg National Battlefield 110 Jefferson Memorial 15, 29 Glass, Kim 63 Jefferson National Expansion Memorial 6 Golden Gate National Recreation Area Gateway Arch xi, 6 9, 10 Alcatraz 10 Johnson, Archie 37, 45 Fort Point 10, 11 Golden Gate Bridge 9, 10 K Goodrich, Gil 29 Keenan, Christopher 37, 45 Griles, J. Steven 5, 7, 8 Kelly, Joan 51 Ground Zero 33, 36, 41, 52, 56, 58, 110 Kohler, Ruth 63

128 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks L Marine 35, 36, 48 Laise, Steven 38, 45 Marine Inspection Office 48 Lake Mead National Recreation Area 11, 12 Markis, Charles 42 Davis Dam 11, 12 Markland, Pete 18 Hoover Dam 11, 12, 98 Marsh, John 20 Lake Roosevelt National Recreation Area 12 Martin, Robert (Bob) 70, 71, 72, 96, 104 Grand Coulee Dam 12 MAXIMO 68. See FMSS Lauro, Neal 33, 34, 35, 48, 49, 57, 99, 109 McGinnis, Dennis ix, 62, 63, 68, 73, 74 Lauro, Sal 16, 17, 25, 31, 33, 99, 109 McKinney, Shirley 57, 58 Law Enforcement Review Panel 105 Memorial Bridge 2, 22, 25, 26 Liberty Bell xi, 10 Merced, Danny 41, 45, 109 Liberty 48, 49 Merchant, Carl 71 Liberty State Park 48, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55 Mihalic, David 94, 95 Lincoln Memorial 18, 90 Mikus, Chester 62, 71 Lopez, Eddie 70, 75 Mills, Frank 48, 52, 59 Luchsinger, David 58 Minute Man National Historical Park 10, Lyndon Baines Johnson Memorial Grove 90, 95 28 Moen, David 36, 110 Monocacy National Battlefield 28 M Moore, Jimmie 71 Mainella, Fran 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 52, 53, 58, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 74, Morgan, Ben 71 81, 84, 86, 91, 104, 105 Morning Report 69, 78 Main Interior Building 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, Morris, Doug 70 15, 28, 61, 63, 68, 70, 77, 78, 81, 95, 98, 101, 102 multi-region coordination group 101, 103, 104 Manassas National Battlefield Park 29 Murphy, Don 105 Manhattan 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 69, 71, 72, 78 N Manhattan Sites 7, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45, 46, 53, 94, 100 National Academy of Public Administration 97 Manzanar National Historic Site 92, 93 National Capital Parks–Central 29

Index 129 National Capital Region 10, 15, 16, 17, 21, 26, P 27, 31, 79, 85, 97, 104 Pacific West Region 12 regional communications center 27, 28, 30, 79 Panko, Robert (Bob) 70 National Interagency Fire Center 1, 85 Patterson Air Force Base 10 National Leadership Council 66, 103 Pellinger, Thomas 16, 17, 23 National Mall 2, 3, 17, 18, 29, 30, 90, 92 Pentagon x, 1, 2, 6, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, monuments and memorials 2, 6, 7, 9, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 39, 16, 17, 23, 27, 31, 80, 90, 98, 99 69, 95 day-care center 15, 28, 29 Nelson, Doyle 9 employees 21 New York Stock Exchange 39, 58 Persian Gulf War 17. See also Operation NORAD (North American Aerospace Desert Storm Defense Command) 21, 22 Petersburg National Battlefield 110 Northeast Region ix, 3, 31, 65, 70, 72, 78, 81, Pfenninger, Paul 71, 73 98, 100, 104, 109 regional director. See Rust, Marie Philadelphia Support Office 71 Norton, Gale 4, 5, 7, 9, 12, 25, 65, 67, 85, 86, Poole, Mel 30, 31, 98 100, 105, 109 Powell, Colin 25 NYPD (New York Police Department) 35, Powell, Richard (Dick) 8, 68 50, 51, 55, 59 Presidents’ Park 29 O R O’Dougherty, Peter 41, 49, 52 ranger activities division 1, 63, 69, 102, 103 Office of Personnel Management 7 regional chief rangers 2, 96, 102, 103, 104 Oklahoma City Memorial 10 Reynolds, John 3 Olais, Aniceto (Cheto) 63 Reynolds, Will 71, 72 Olsen, Einar ix, 26, 79, 97, 98, 104 Ring, Richard (Dick) 1, 3, 4, 7, 61, 82, 83, 87, One Police Plaza 35, 79 102, 105, 109 Operation Desert Storm 100. See Persian Ritchie, Brenda 3, 67, 83, 86 Gulf War Rock Creek Parkway 25, 26 Organ Pipe Cactus National Park 10 Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport 20 Rust, Marie 52, 71, 73

130 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks S Type 2 team 64, 65, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75 San Francisco Maritime National Historical Type 3 team 65 Park 10 Schamp, John (Jack) 15, 25, 78, 99, 109 U Schwarz, Debee 63 U.S. Air Force 8, 10, 27 Secretary of the Interior. See Norton, Gale U.S. Capitol 23, 31 Shanksville, PA x, 89 U.S. Coast Guard 34, 57, 58, 59 Shelton, Henry H. 25 U.S. Congress 46, 85, 87, 89, 97 Shenandoah National Park 2, 7, 16, 31, 61, U.S. Marshals Service 11 62, 63, 68, 70, 71, 72, 78, 81, 82, 83, deputy U.S. Marshals 11, 36 90, 91, 92, 98, 110 U.S. Navy 10, 109 Site B 5 U.S. Park Police 1, 5, 15, 16, 33 Site C 5, 6, 7, 81 aviation hangar 19, 22 canine unit 41 Solomon, Clyde 40, 41 chief’s command post 15, 16, 17, 22, 29, 80 Southeast Region 40, 64, 69, 96, 108 counterterrorism unit 15 headquarters 15 special event teams 11, 12, 75, 96 home-to-work vehicle program 17 Stasulli, Bernie 20 marine unit 35, 36, 37, 53, 54 mobile command post 17, 29 Staten Island 34, 35, 36, 48, 57, 58, 110 New York field office 16, 33, 36, 100 Statue of Liberty National Monument vii, San Francisco field office 9 viii, xi, 10, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 41, 43, United Airlines Flight 175 x 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 79, 99, 100, 101, 110 United Airlines Flight 93 x, 89 Stiles, Greg 62, 63 Upper Delaware Scenic and Recreational River 99, 110 SWAT (special weapons and tactics unit) 5, 25, 26, 34, 40, 100 USS Arizona National Monument 10 Swed, J.D. 63 V T Valley Forge National Historical Park 90, 91, 93, 95, 99 Transportation and Security Administration 99 Van Horn, Gary 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 63, 68, 78, 96 Type 1 team 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 75, 80, 81, 83, 84 Verrazano Narrows Bridge 33, 34, 58

Index 131 W Wallace, George 18, 19, 21, 25 Walters, Dan 16, 18 Washington Monument xi, 7, 15, 18, 29 Whiskeytown National Recreation Area 12 Shasta Dam 12, 98 White House 6, 7, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 27, 29 Wilkins, Thomas 33, 34, 35, 79, 100, 101, 108 Winkel, Edward 15 World Bank/International Monetary Fund 15, 19 World Trade Center x, 1, 4, 6, 15, 16, 18, 20, 33, 36, 37, 42, 43, 47, 56, 62, 94, 95 trade towers 34, 36, 37, 38, 42, 45, 46, 48, 53, 58, 78, 107

Y Y2K 66 Yosemite National Park 8, 90, 94

Z Zweig, Marty 35, 40, 56, 78

132 The National Park Service: Responding to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks