California State University, Northridge

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE

Unemployment, Immigration and the Rise of the National Front in France

A graduate project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

For the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science

Sigfredo Ramos Martinez

May 2019

The graduate project of Sigfredo Ramos Martinez is Approved:

______Dr. Jennifer DeMaio Date

______Dr. Tyler Hughes Date

______Dr. Alexandra Cole Macias, Chair Date

CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE

Table of Contents

Signature Page ii List of Tables iv List of Figures v Abstract vi

Part I 1

Introduction 1 Party Leadership and Organizational Capacity 4 Political Opportunity Structure 9 The European Union, Unemployment and Immigration 14 Voting for the National Front 17

Part II 23 Data Analysis 23 Electoral results 24 First Environmental Factor: Unemployment 28 Second Environmental Factor: Immigration 33

Part III 36 Conclusion 36 Bibliography 38

iii

List of Tables

Table Page

1 Comparison of Electoral Support base (%) 1987 20

2 Percentage votes of National Front by Demographic 1988,20017 & 2012 21

3 The Percentage and Number votes of National Front Legislative Elections 1986-1997 24

4 Percentage and Number support for the FN during 2002-2017 Legislative Elections 26

5 Bivariate Correlation For Unemployment During Legislative Election Years 30

6 Bivariate Correlation Analysis for Immigration and Party Votes Received 34

List of Figures

Figure Page

1 National Unemployment in France During Legislative Elections 1986-2017 28

2 Amount of Immigrants arriving in France During Legislative Election Years 1986-2017 32

Abstract

Unemployment, Immigration and the Rise of the National Front in France

Sigfredo Ramos Martinez

Master of Arts in Political Science

The National Front which was founded in 1972, has become one of the oldest continuously running political parties in France. It has also become a model for all European parties of the far right. Although it has never been in government, the National Front has slowly expanded over time and was on the verge of winning the French presidency in 2017. This paper will take a look at some of the factors that have helped the party establish itself in French politics. While some attention will be paid to the manner in which the party has established itself and how it was able to do, the main focus of this paper is the influence of unemployment and immigration as the top two most important issues for voters of the National Front. The paper will seek to determine if there is a correlation between unemployment and immigration rates in

France, and electoral support for the National Front.

PART I

Introduction

In the 1970s, a new political party appeared on the French political stage bent on challenging the established political parties of the left and the right alike. This new “extreme party of the right” was the National Front, led by a veteran of both the wars in Indochina (1946-

1954) and of Algerian Independence (1954-1962), Jean Marie Le Pen. Under his leadership, the

National Front slowly grew from a fringe party to a political contender. The party has contested

French presidential elections four times, and in two of these presidential elections they made it to the second round. The 2017 presidential election marked the closest the party has ever been to the presidential palace. The rise of the National Front has been the topic of numerous research articles, with many scholars studying the different factors used to explain their rise in French politics. There are three factors which I attribute to the rise of the party. First there is what one could call a personal factor which is the leadership of Jean Marie Le Pen (and eventually his daughter Marine Le Pen) as well as the organizational capacity of the party. Second there are factors that are internal to the French political system. These factors are political cleavages and the importance of media access in the system. Third, and last there is what I would call the environmental factor. This third factor can be split into two categories, the first being factors from outside the French political system which have had an impact on French society. An example of this is the rise of globalization and the centralization of power of the European Union in Brussels, which could be argued to have aided in a resurgence of right-wing populism throughout Europe. Secondly there are the factors that impact French politics and originate from within the country itself. Of these there are two main factors that I will argue have had great

effect on the rise of the party. The first of the two is the issue of immigration in France, which has been present since the 1980s. The National Front has used this issue several times since decolonization, and up to the more recent Syrian refugee crisis. The second environmental factor is that of high unemployment levels in France. As France moved away from an industrial economy and transitioned to a more globalized and service-based market, many of the workers who worked in factories that were shut down found appeal in the National Front’s promise to bring those jobs back. In addition to these environmental factors which have contributed to the

National Front, there have been smaller events which have helped improve the party’s electoral profile. Such events have been: the normalization of the party’s issue granted by media airtime and mainstream parties bringing the issues of the FN to the forefront. (Schain 1997).

Scholars have suggested that the National Front has served as a prototype party for the

European far right (Mudde 2007). Given this, it is important to understand the National Front in order to understand the other parties of the European far right. By studying how this party gained traction, it will be possible to look at other such parties and draw comparisons between the personal, institutional, and environmental factors that may have led to their rise. The aim of this paper is to focus on the internal environmental factors to see if there is a empirical relationship between rising unemployment & immigration, and the rise of the FN. This argument is not unheard of, there have been scholars who point to socioeconomic factors which may have helped push the National Front forward (Veugelers 1997, Perrineau 1988, Taylor 1997, et al.) as well as demographics of the FN’s voter base (ie. Perrineau 1988).

Given the prevalence of the FN’s anti-immigration platform and its repetitive promise to bring working class jobs “back into France”, it seems wise to determine if there is a correlation

between the actual conditions and the support for the National Front. Such an analysis was applied to some of the explanations for Brexit, where unemployment in working class jobs and rising immigration were prevalent issues emphasized by the conservative proponents of the leave campaign (Calhoun 2017). Research found that there was actually no correlation between rising unemployment & immigration and voting for “Leave”. In terms of immigration, researchers have found that some of the areas with the least immigration (i.e. rural) tended to have voted ‘leave’ as compared to urban centers where immigration rates were substantially higher, yet these centers (ie. London) voted to remain. This paper will undertake a similar analysis and ask the question “are Unemployment or immigration levels correlated with the growth of the National

Front”? It is also important to take note of the other factors that have influenced the rise of this party, such as the personal and institutional factors. This paper will take a brief look at these additional factors and their roles in the rise of the National Front in order to help give context to the rise and the solidification of the party in French politics. The leadership of the Le Pens, rise of anti-globalism, and the high unemployment and immigration levels in France are important to explain FN success. This work will examine these factors as well in order to determine the role they played in the growth of the party.

Party Leadership and Organizational Capacity

The National Front is not a party that emerged organically but came about as a reaction to events and the ongoing failure of the far right in France to unite and win seats in government.

The outcome of the second World War left a strong and negative view of not only fascism, but of the far right for most French people. After the war, the far-right parties of France were small and fragmented into groups. None of these parties could gain any traction due to the ties many officials in these parties had to the Vichy government that had been set up by and collaborated with the Nazi government (Williams 2011). The support that groups such as nationalists had shown these parties had diminished greatly. However, far right sentiment began to reappear during the decolonization era as France lost long time colonial possessions in Vietnam and throughout Africa. France’s military defeats prompted disgruntled former soldiers to form small political groups such as l’Ordre Nouveau and L’Occident. It was from the Ordre Nouveau that the National Front planted it’s roots. In the late 1970s the Ordre Nouveau sought to unify the

French far right parties under one banner in order to create a strong presence in the French

National Assembly. In June 1972, the Front National pour une Unite Francaise (UNFUF) was formed, then later in October of the same year, it was renamed the Front National (Stockemer

2017). The party’s most prominent members, Francois Duprat and Jean Marie Le Pen were both experienced politicians by the time the party had been formed. Jean Marie Le Pen was a veteran from Indochina, the Suez expedition and the Algerian conflict as well. Le Pen was known for his strong anti-Gaullist stance and his policies which were targeted in aiding small business owners and artisans (Lowy & Sitel 2016).

Previous to the National Front Le Pen had played a prominent role in the groups of the far right and was a prominent campaign organizer. His extensive experience and knowledge led him to become the party’s leader upon its creation. The FN was a significantly small party, and had no presence on the national stage. In order to grow, Le Pen tried to expand its membership base by incorporating more groups (Williams 2011). In 1974 the national socialists and catholic fundamentals both joined the FN. However, this did not improve the National Front’s legislative performance and the party would continue to remain on the far fringes until the 1980s.During the

1980s the National Front found itself gaining support from a new base of voters, such as students and professionals (Mayer 2013). This came as a result of several events that occurred in France during that time: a prolonged economic crisis, Mitterrand’s decision to grant amnesty to nearly

14% of France’s inmates, and Mitterrand’s lax immigration policies (Stockemer 2017). All these factors caused great discontent amongst the populace and could be said to have thrown voters looking for alternatives. The National Front was one such alternative.

In order to take advantage of their newfound success during this time, the National Front realized they needed “to open the party to a clientele the widest possible ... while highlighting the competition and retaining an original label.” (Birenbaum 1987). Le Pen and other FN leaders knew that their integration into the political system was not enough to ensure the continued success of their party. Therefore, they sought to reform not only their platform but the party. The

National Front began to “diffuse” their ideology. They maintained stances such as anti-muslim immigration and restricting the expansion of EU regulations. However, they also began to strive for less government bureaucracy and lower income taxes. These new stances began to appeal to the newly emergent French middle class. Aside from these policy changes,

Jean Marie Le Pen also oversaw the creation of various organizations through the party to reach out to new voter bases and mobilize wider spread support. Such established organizations included the party’s own police unions, teachers’ unions, student organization and association of small and medium businesses (Schain 1999). However, not all of these attempts were successful as there was strong disapproval of teachers’ unions formed by the party. In the Bretagne region mathematics professors led public protests and many mayors throughout France had FN members who had been appointed to teacher’s boards sign a document stating they would

‘renounce racism and xenophobia’ (Schain 1999). Despite some of these setbacks, these institutions demonstrated the increasing organizational capacity of the party which may have helped it retain its growth and expand further throughout the French electorate and compete with the established parties in the system.

The party increased its opposition to Communist parties in France by feeding on the “red fear” that was present during the height of the Cold War. The National Front played on rhetoric which blamed the three established ‘band of three” PS, UDF and RPR parties as responsible for

‘ambient and rampant socialism’ (Birenbaum 1987). This rhetoric may have won the party electoral success. In 1986 the party gained 10% of the vote, giving them 10 representatives, equal to the number the communists gained that year (Birenbaum 1978). The party would go on to see further success in the 1988 elections, and a continued presence thereafter. The party even gained a significant percentage of the vote in the presidential elections of 1988, 1995, 2002 and

2017. In 1988 the FN gained 14.4% of the vote, while in 1995 they gained 15% (Schain 1999).

However, in neither of these years they did make it to the second round. The presidential election of 2002 was different. After gaining 16.86% of the vote, the National Front advance to the run

off against the conservative party Rassemblement pour la République and Jacques Chirac.

However, in the second round of voting the National Front was dealt a decisive defeat losing the election 17.79% to 82.21% (Mayer 2013). Then, in the 2017 French Presidential election the party, under the leadership of Marine Le Pen found itself in the second round of voting against the Republique en Marche candidate Emmanuel Macron. The election was aggressive and divisive yet, in the end Macron won the French presidency with 60.93% of the vote to Le Pen’s

39.07% (The Guardian 2017). In the 4 times the FN was in sight of the presidency, 2017 marked the closest the party truly ever got to the Elysee Palace. Although it was a devastating blow,

Marine tried to rally support by focusing on the upcoming Legislative Elections. In these elections National Front won only 8 out of 577 seats in the National Assembly (The Guardian

2017). In less than half a year the National Front went from the doorstep of the Elysee into near political oblivion.

Although the FN did not advance into government, it is important to note that in 2002 and 2017 they did make it to the second round of voting against Chirac in 2002, and Macron in

201 gaining 17% and 33.9% respectively (Le Monde 2002 & 2017). However, their presence in the second round of presidential elections is an indicator that this party found the necessary support and although they may have not won the presidency, their 2nd place finish alone is a significant. The reason for this is that even though in Legislative elections the National Front gained only a handful of seats; they were still able to garner enough support across the country to contend for the most powerful office in the country. Then in two of these elections they were able to make it to the runoff election, coming only in 2nd place for the office of presidency.

Part of the more recent success of the FN may have to do with the change in leadership from Jean Marie Le Pen, to his daughter Marine Le Pen. When Jean Marie Le Pen first founded the party, his platform put forth a new “National French Identity”. This identity he applied to the voters of French citizens of nonimmigrant heritage. His rhetoric and platforms sought to rouse the far-right populists in the country and with them unify the far right. Over time Jean Marie Le

Pen accomplished this unification, though, it came at the cost of the party being branded as racist and extremist. In 2011 Marine Le Pen took over the presidency of the party from her father after

40 years of his ‘ideological crusade’. During this time the new party leader sought to make changes to the party to “de-demonize” it (Stockemer 2017). Upon seizing the presidency in a internal democratic vote, Marine Le Pen sought to try and revert this stigma. The first step was replacing her father through a democratic vote in order to showcase that her sentiment was shared with many of the party and not just her. Marine Le Pen then went on to shift the FN platform towards more fiscal issues and to shy away from controversial issues such as immigration by strongly stressing that the National Front was now a moderate Republican party

(Stockemer 2017). Her moves were in clear contrast to those of her father throughout his entire reign. However, while Marine Le Pen made moves to steer the party towards the center, close inspection of the party platform that not much has actually changed (Williams 2011). The party's stances on issues like immigration were still the same and they still appealed to the same voter base that they have been depending on for decades.

Voter Cleavages and Media Access

One important aspect that must be understand of any political party are the voter cleavages upon which that party builds its support on. Without support from voter cleavages, political parties would not be able to obtain any seat in local or national government.

Understanding where the support the National Front comes from is vital in understanding the party.

In his study Social Cleavage and the revival of Far Right Parties, John Veugelers (1997) looks at the National Front and how they arose as a response to a new dimension of political issues. In his study he claims that the National Front arose from a conflict between post-material values (parties that focus primarily on non-economic issues such as immigration, and other issues) and traditional political values. Traditional and established political parties have stuck to the old dimension of politics, referring to traditional economic issues. Such issues entailed short term allocation of resources and who would allocate these resources and who would receive the most benefits (worker-owner struggle). However, the National Front posed a challenge to traditional parties, they have been able to draw voters all across the political spectrum in France

(Schain 1999, Mayer 2013, Declair 1999). Veugeler notes that far right parties such as the

National Front target working class voters who have been left behind from countries progressing from industrial economies, with the promise of bringing industrial jobs back to the country. The far right also targets middle class voters by stating they will lower taxes, allow more laissez faire economic policies and reducing the government bureaucracy. His study confirms that the

National Fronts has preyed upon rising immigration and unemployment levels in France, as well as rising taxes and tariffs on the emerging middle class (Veugelers 1997). Veugeler states that the

National Front had two phases of growth and noted their effect on the political electoral stability in France. He has called the two phases “Phase A” and “Phase B”. In Phase A (1972-1983) the

FN was new to the political scene and saw very small electoral support during its first few election cycles as it tried to make its existence known to the French electorate. During this phase there was, as Veugeler described high political stability in which he recorded that the established traditional parties received between 96.9% to 99.4% of the electoral vote in the first round of voting. The established parties as put by Veugeler were the “Communists, non-communist left,

Gaullist right, and the non-Gaullist moderate right.” (Veugeler 1997). However, during phase B

(1984-onwards) the National Front affected the stability of the system as votes for established parties declined by 11.3%, with the National Front taking 9.8% of the vote. Veugelers points out that during this phase, up until 1993 the gap between left and center right parties was becoming narrower. As a result the FN was able to capitalize on picking up voters from parties of the right which were gravitating towards more moderate stances. His study found that the FN even picked up voters from the left, with 5% of socialist voters switching to the FN between 1988 and 1993

(Veugelers 1997). The points put forth by Veugeler have been expressed by Guy Birenbaum

(1987) in his work The Strategies of the Front National. Birenbaum took a look at the National

Front 10 years before Veugeler, just a few years after the party’s first major electoral breakthrough. Birenbaum attributed the rise of the FN to economic crisis, rising unemployment levels and rising immigration, with all of these issues emerging from the breakdown of the traditional voting cleavages in France.

Bornschier discusses the dominance religious moral values as opposed to economic class struggles in voting (Bornschier 2010). However, starting in the 1970s (the same time period the

National Front was founded) there was a breakdown in traditional religious cleavages which in turn led to cultural and counter cultural revolutions within French society (Bornschier 2010.) As

Bornschier notes, the right in France began to fragment into several parties all focusing on different issues. De Gaulle’s Rally for the Republic focused heavily on national sovereignty and a more prominent position for France in international politics. On the other hand parties that had traditionally religious voter bases such as the UDF began to take more liberal stances on social issues (Bornschier 2010). Over the course of the 1980s the parties of the left and right found themselves at odds over many issues such as immigration (with the right advocating for patriotism and the left advocating for laxer immigration policies), and that the constant public discussion and debate on this issue helped paved the way for parties such as the National Front to capitalize on the newly emergent voter cleavages, and in due time take ownership of the issues of these cleavages. With “the turn of French mainstream parties toward national identity”

(Ellinas 2014) and other such topics, the National Front considered its claims on immigration to be legitimized. Schain and Birenbaum noted the importance of the established parties tackling these issues. The Communist party initially tackled the issue of immigration, calling for less entitlements to be given, but then gave this up due to ideological conflict within the party

(Bornschier 2010). This would allow the National Front to pick up the mantle nearly a decade later, and in doing so it is likely that they also picked up the voters lost by the communists.

In his work, The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe (2014), Ellinas looks at the success far right political parties have had with the help of the media. During its first few elections, the FN’s electoral failures could be attributed to the party’s lack of media access. This lack in access in turn was a result of the party’s failure to attract media attention during the

election cycle because of its marginally small electoral support. The only attention they received accumulated to a total of seven minutes (Ellinas 2010). Without easy access to any media representation the FN had to rely on their organizational structure to spread their message as widely and as efficiently as possible. Thus, during the early 1970s the FN had setup a central committee, regional organizations, a youth organization and even their own party newspaper.

Initially these organizational structures did not serve seem to have served the party well as shown by their election results during the 1970s.

In France the media was publicly owned, and the political parties would only receive media coverage if they were in government, parliamentary majority or the parliamentary opposition. (Ellinas 2010). Thus, while parties such as the Socialist party could receive regular national coverage, other smaller parties such as the National Front would have no chance in broadcasting their message to such an audience through the national media. However, in anticipation of the upcoming elections in 1983 President Mitterrand wanted to find a way of easing up the field for the left-wing parties. As such he came up with an idea to try and divide the right by pressing media officials to give Jean Marie Le Pen national airtime. He hoped that by bringing the far right into the limelight, it would divide the right and make them weaker in the elections. What Mitterrand did instead was raise awareness of a previously marginalized political party. Le Pen’s controversial rhetoric and eccentric personality made him very popular with the

French people. This was not necessarily because they supported his politics, but because of his ability to sensationalize politics. As a result, Le Pen became a highly sought after on talk shows on national radio and live television (Ellinas 2010). These appearances broadcasted the FN party message to millions of French citizens nationwide and helped put them on the map of French politics. Over the next few electoral cycles the party’s media success allowed them to achieve their first national electoral breakthrough in 1983. The National Front achieved their first electoral success in the town of Dreux (Brehcon & Mitra 1992). Even through the French media may have opened the door to the National Front, it was not the sole factor contributing to its success. The National Front had been able to capitalize on emerging voter cleavages as well as take advantage of the opportunity given to them by Mitterrand and broadcast their message at every talk show and interview given to them. These events alongside other factors that will be discussed have helped it expand its voter base and enabled it to both advance and persists in

France. as long as it has.

Although Jean Marie Le Pen’s leadership may have helped attract voters through his sensational rhetoric, and the media attention gave the party the spotlight it needed to broadcast its message on a scale it would have not been able to on its own at the time. This in turn led to the party gaining its first seats. However, the FN now faced a whole new challenge. It had to expand while holding on to seats in the National Assembly. The aforementioned events alone would not allow the party to expand further, and rhetoric alone would not increase their electoral support.

As a result, the party sought to seek ownership of certain voter cleavages and secure its foothold in the French political system.

The European Union, Unemployment and Immigration

The National Front has a long record of appealing to voters who place great emphasis on immigration and unemployment, as well as voters who express anti EU sentiment (Schain 1997

& 1999, Mayer 2013 and Declair 1999). After its initial electoral success, the party sought to secure its ownership on these topics. Looking at each issue individually and their importance in

French society is important to understand why the National Front has received continued support from these electoral bases. The immigration issues coupled with unemployment caused by the

‘de-industrialization’ of the French economy are two strong factors which have helped the

National Front expand.. Party platforms and candidates have looked to reach out and target demographics most affected by these issues and throughout the years they have created a solid voter base which can has been loyal to the party since their initial breakthrough in 1983.

The Maastricht treaty of 1992 marked the creation of the European Union out of the

European Community. Maastricht gave the EU the ability to impose laws and regulations on all the member states, one of which was France. At the time a lack of institutional organization made it very difficult for member states to appeal. Far right parties all throughout Europe, particularly the National Front saw this as an attack on their respective country’s sovereignty and used this as a rallying cry for nationalists and other parts of the electorate who wished for less consolidation of power in Brussels. (Liang 2007). With respect to European elections, the

National Front has performed particularly well, even gaining the youth vote in the second

European parliament elections of 1984 (Declair 1999). Since then the National Front has continued to see strong support in the European Parliamentary elections (Declair 1999). It is significant to note that the National Front received strong support in European

elections just one year after its first national breakthrough. However, it should be noted that turnout, as pointed out by Declair, is lower in European parliament elections, as opposed to national elections. As a result, smaller parties such as the National Front enjoy more success here with their success in 2014 “exceeding even the left’s most pessimistic predictions” (Lowy &

Sitel 2016). This success in turn only gave the National Front more drive to seek further expansion on the national stage.

A second issue that has been important to the FN is that of unemployment.

Unemployment has been a long-standing issue in French politics, and the National Front has been able to increase its support by capitalizing on the issue (Birenbaum 1987, Schain 1997).

Since France’s involvement in the European Economic Community (predecessor of the

European Union) in the early 1950s France began to move towards a globalized which saw many factory jobs leave the country. As a result, France experienced a rise in unemployment in these old industrial centers, which culminated in French citizens expressing great concern over unemployment (Charlot 1986, Perrineau 1988, Declair 1999). The issue of unemployment is one issue that the party has referenced since its inception, and in fact the National Front has targeted unemployed voters or those at risk of unemployment from its foundation in 1972 until its breakthrough in 1983 (Belin 1984). That said, even though the party sought support from the unemployed, support from this demographic only began to grow after the 1983 elections. This was evidenced by French voters citing unemployment as their main concern in 1988 as a result of mounting economic pressure (Schain 1997 and Declair 1999).

As salient as the issue of unemployment had become, it became an even stronger issue for the

National Front when tied to immigration. Since 1945 French immigration policy had 3 mains

aspects. “containment of the migration 'flows', prevention of illegal immigration, and the integration of immigrants who are accepted as legal residents.” (Valk 2003). In the mid-1980s

Mitterrand’s government had announced it would decrease the requirements for foreigners to gain residence status in the country, thus making it easier for immigrants to enter the country.

(Stockemer 2017). The National Front staunchly opposed these policies stating that immigration

“disrupts the national French community” (Weil 1986). Weil also notes that although the

National Front gained less than 15% of the votes in the legislative elections in 1988, the general expressed opinion showed that 30% of French voters saw immigration as an issue. Perrineau and

Schain both observed this as well by noting how by 1986 46% of voters who supported the

National Front prioritized immigration above other issues (Perrineau 1988, Schain 1999).

A 2013 study conducted in France found that “as immigrant levels rise, so does the perceived threat natives have towards immigrants” (Posta 2013). In his study Posta found that voters who did view immigration as an issue of priority were usually the groups with the least contact with immigrants. Groups of voters who had more contact with immigrants tended to prioritize other issues over immigration. Posta did not clarify whether these same voters still voted against or for the National Front, however, a wide range of cultures and nationalities does not sit well with ‘native French citizens’ who are used to a very unified national culture. (Weil

1991). In every election the National Front has participated in since 1983, the majority of their voters have prioritized immigration over any other issues, with unemployment coming in at either second or third, (Schain 1997 & 1999). Immigration is prevalent to FN voters even today.

Voting for the National Front

The National Front has an extensive history with both an emphasis on unemployment and immigration, and targeting demographic groups seemingly affected by these issues. Yet, the question remains, how effective has the party been in attracting voters from these groups? In the

1986 and 1988 legislative election, the National Front gained 9.7% and 9.6% respectively

(Schain 1999). Although not enough to exert influence, it is important to determine whether their messaging was on target, because identification of the right issues with the right demographic in this phase of the party would be an important basis for understanding future growth. So the main question of this section is did the party demonstrate continued support from its previous voters, and was it able to expand its voter base? One of the reasons the National Front has been so successful is its ability to keep voters loyal while attracting voters from other parties (Schain

1999). Schain’s study showed that in 1988 the party retained 65% of the voters who had voted for them in 1983. In 1993 that number had risen up to 89% exceeding the loyalty rate of all other parties in the system, furthermore, the party had mobilized absentee voters as well as left wing voters (Schain 1999). Schain’s data also seems to support what Veugelers hypothesized about the party’s growth during ‘Phase A’, and what Bornschier has observed about where National Front voters come from. As resentment with established traditional parties rose among voters, and as new nontraditional issues such as immigration began to gain traction, the National Front was able to draw new voters to its ranks with its ability to compete with the established parties on these issues. However, this analysis seems to apply only to the initial growth phase of the

National Front. Upon transition into Veugelers’ ‘Phase B’, the same data provided by Schain shows that the issues that once made the National Front distinct from other parties was not

as important, as these issues saw increased voting priority from voter bases across all parties from 1988 to 1993. In 1988 12% of Socialist party voters priority was immigration, which rose to 16% in 1993 (Schain 1999). Other parties such as the Communists saw similar increases in the priority of immigration among their voters, however, the National Front saw the biggest increase from 59% in 1988 to 72% in 1993 (Schain 1999). However, in 1997 the other parties had a slight decrease in immigration as a priority among their voters. The Socialists for example went back down to only 15%, however, the National Front voters still remained with 72% in 1997 (Schain

1999). It is important to note that voters of the party still see immigration as the most important issue today.

Posta’s study in 2013 looked at France as a whole to gauge the salience of the issue of immigration. Posta found that French citizens who had little to no contact with immigrants prioritized the discussion of immigration in politics as compared to groups who had frequent contact with immigrants. Posta gathered a sample from departmental and communal voting results from the 2007 presidential elections. He found that a percentage change immigration population had a negative relationship with votes won by the FN. Areas with higher levels of immigrants did generally reflect higher support for the National Front, although it did not necessarily lead to any significant increases in support. Posta notes that in areas where there was a high concentration of immigrants, as well as, a rising unemployment rate, the votes for the

National Front did increase. Posta’s research thus points to an interdependency between unemployment and immigration levels in regards of support for the National Front. However,

Posta’s study looked at only a few departments within the French system. This, at most only represented a few million voters. Such a small sample can indicate, the presence of a phenomena,

but given the limited scope of his study, no assumptions can be made about this at the national level. This paper will in effect look at immigration at the national level coupled with unemployment to broaden his analysis and attempt to generalize the results.

Apart from understanding why some FN voters see immigration as such an important issue, it is also just as important to see who votes for the party and how this has changed over time if at all. In a 1988 study, Pascal Perrineau looked at the comprised structure of the National

Front supporter base. Perrineau looked at a survey published in 1987, approximately half a year before the 1988 elections. They survey polled responses from 1,944 individuals from a diverse range of demographics spread between urban and rural voters. The poll collected information on gender, education, age and the occupation held the head of the voting household. Alongside the

National Front (FN), Perrineau also looked at the center right party called Union for French

Democracy (UDF) and the Gaullist conservative party Rally for the Republic (RPR). Perrineau was able to provide a clear picture of the demographics most likely to vote for the French right.

From his research we can also compare which segments of right-wing voters were most likely to vote for the National Front. It is important to use Perrineau’s table to look at the initial demographic breakdown of the National Front’s voter base. From these results, one can then look at data at different points in time (as shown in Table 2) and compare the increase or decrease in support for the party from certain groups. The results from Perrineau’s research are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Comparison of Electoral Support base (%) 1987

UDF RPR FN Men 52% 48% 61% Women 48% 52% 39% 18-24 years 8% 13% 22% 25-34 years 17% 17% 14% 35-49 years 26% 18% 23% 50-64 years 24% 25% 32% 65 + years 25% 27% 9% Agriculture 11% 7% 6%

Industrial/small business 9% 8% 12%

Liberal profession 8% 12% 5%

Intermediate professions 11% 14% 10% Employees 4% 6% 14% Working Class 21% 18% 27% Unemployed 36% 35% 26% Source: Perrineau, L'écho politique de l’anomie urbaine 1988.

The data in Table 1 shows that National Front polled higher with men than women, with the highest share of men voting for the National Front compared to the other parties of the right.

In contrast women would most likely vote for the conservative Rally for the Republic (RPR).

Voting results from the age groups are very spread out, although there is a noticeable amount of support for the National Front coming from the youth (18-24) and those aged 50-54. However when looking at breakdown by professional fields the results are interesting. When it comes to agricultural voters, only 6 out of 100 would vote for the National Front, while the UDF and RPR received 11% and 7% support respectively. On the other hand, working class and unemployed voters for the FN 27% and 26% of the time respectively. Yet, individuals working higher paying jobs that require higher education like liberal professions (lawyers, architects, doctors, etc),

as well as managerial staffs for industries, businesses and tradespeople have very low support towards the National Front. Furthermore, intermediate professions (i.e technicians) and

“employees” (sales assistant and other low level staff) also have very low levels of support. From

Perrineau’s analysis then, one can conclude that the National Front has received most of its support from men, who are most likely unemployed, or in low level jobs that do not require a secondary education, as well as being aged mostly under the age of 35. However, these figures are from 1987 and are long outdated. Nonna Mayer provides a more up to date analysis in her

2013 study. Mayer studied the change over time of the National Front’s voter base from 1988 to

2012. I will excerpt data from her results in order to provide a more recent table of the party’s voter demographics.

Table 2: Percentage votes of National Front by Demographic 1988, 2017 & 2012 (%)

1988 2007 2012 Men 18% 12% 19% Women 11% 9% 17% 18-24 years 14% 10% 23% 25-34 years 15% 10% 23% 35-49 years 15% 11% 18% 50-64 years 14% 12% 21% 65 + years 16% 9% 10% Agriculture 10% 10% _ Employees 14% 12% 23% Working Class 17% 16% 33% Secondary Education 17% 13% 31% Bachelor Degree 13% 8% 18% Source: Mayer, Jean-marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right 2013.

Mayer measured this support for the party during presidential elections. Although different from Perrineau’s survey which measured legislative support, Mayer’s data is relevant given the high-fidelity voters have displayed towards the party throughout elections (Schain

1999, Mayer 2013). Because voter loyalty to the National Front is so strong and given that these presidential elections took place only a few months apart from legislative elections, the data in

Table 2 is likely to reflect survey results from the legislative elections during these years. Table 2 shows the National Front’s performance across all demographics in 1988 is reasonable given the survey results by Perrineau’s study in 1987. Yet, 19 years later in 2007 Mayer finds that the party’s support has decreased all along the spectrum only to see significant increases just one election later. Support from men dropped from 18% to 12% between 1988 and 2007. It would then increase to 19% in 2012 surpassing its levels from 1988. However, Mayer’s data shows significant increase in support for the party in 2012 from women (17%), 23 % of voters in both age groups of 18-24 and 25-34 supported the FN (13 points higher than 2007) and 33% support from working class voters (17 points higher than 2007).

The data points towards how voters may have responded to the rhetoric and image change brought by Marine Le Pen after she replaced her father as party leader. This may explain the increase in support from women, as some women may find the image of a single mother of three running for political office in a historically patriarchal party. Furthermore, the strong increase in support from youth may be a testament to the party’s long-established student organizations and youth groups. It could also be further indication of anti-establishment sentiment from young voters. These are all possibilities to take note of in subsequent presidential and legislative elections.

PART II

Data Analysis

The first part of this paper has looked at the theories and research surrounding the rise of the National Front. Several explanations for their success have been noted, including their emphasis on issue of unemployment and immigration which were intended to appeal to groups more receptive to these issues. Quantitative analysis is necessary in order to provide empirical evidence to the discussion. The data section of this paper will look at French National Assembly legislative electoral results from 1986 until 2017. Because the party made its first breakthrough in 1983, every election since then can be used as a point of reference to measure growth or decline since their initial emergence. Alongside with election results, unemployment and immigration rates (measured in how many immigrants arrived for said year) will be looked at in comparison to first round votes given to the FN. Due to the voting system in France, elections occur in two rounds. The first round is open to all candidates running to office, then the top two candidates head into a second, run off, round. This paper, however, will only look at first round results. While the National Front did make it into the second round of legislative elections, this has not always been the case. The same can be observed of other parties, whose support varies greatly from round to round. Such an example with the National Front is the 2012 legislative election. the FN received 13.6% of the vote in the first round, only to receive 3.6% in the second round. Thus, in order to achieve consistency within the data only first round electoral results will be looked at. This paper will not look at presidential elections as the party has only made it to these elections four times. From these four occasions the FN has gone on to round two twice.

Electoral Results

Since 1983 the National Front has won seats in every single National Assembly election in France. There have been elections in which the party share has declined, but when there has been growth it has been because of a surge in voters. Part of the challenge of not only the

National Front, but European far right parties in general is that they often have to find their footing in a crowded political field. According to results given by the French Ministry of the

Interior, the FN competed against eight other “main” parties. (The far left, regionalist, ecologist and “miscellaneous left/right” parties were all lumped into broad into categories over individual parties.) The table below shows the legislative results from 1986-1997 for the FN alongside these other parties in the system.

Table 3: The Percentage and Number votes of National Front Legislative Elections 1986- 1997 1986 1988 1993 1997

National Front 9.7%(2.7) 9.6%(2.4) 12.6%(3.1) 15%(3.8)

RPR 27.2%(7.6) 19.2%(4.7) 4.9/19.7%(4.9) 16.8%(4.3)

UDF 15.7%(4.4) 18.5%(4.5) 18.8%(4.7) 14.7%(3.7)

Socialists 30.7%(8.6) 36.4%(8.9) 17.6%(4.4) 25.6%(6.5)

Communists 9.8%(2.7) 11.3%(2.8) 9.1%(2.3) 9.9%(2.5) Source: Schain, The National Front and the French Party System 1999

Table 3 shows how the National Front grew, or declined, in relation to these other parties.

From this table we can see how aside from the .3% dip in 1988, the National Front saw a gradual increase in the votes received every election during this period. The other political parties saw a gradual decline throughout this same period. Noticeably the Socialists saw a drastic

downward spiral between 1988 and 1993 where they went from 36.4% to 17.6%, a decline of nearly half. At the same time the Communists also saw a significant change in their votes as well. The fall of the Socialist party was the opportunity for the FN to grow. The Partie Socialiste

(PS) has been the oldest and most long-lived player of French politics. From 1981 to 1995 they held the presidency and for most of their history have either had majority or led a coalition to hold power onto government. Yet in 1993 they saw their second worst electoral defeat in their history (The worst being the 2017 legislative elections with less than 10% of the vote). Some of the causes which may have contributed to this downfall were a reaction to the National Front which lead to the PS’ “immigration policy initiatives, agreeing with established right while threatened electorally by the opposition” (Schain 1999). From the loss of the PS, the FN improved by 3% in 1993 and then another 3% in 1997, taking advantage of the instability in the system. This instability in the French system, caused in part to the rise of the National Front as reported by Veugelers goes to demonstrate how difficult it can be for any single party to maintain stable support and can account for the rise of parties such as the FN. As support for the

FN grew, the other parties in the system saw their support drained away as a result of the FN’s policy initiatives, possible disillusionment with established parties, or simply voters who felt that the FN was more representative of their beliefs as opposed to the PS.

Schain’s data observed legislative results only until 1997. In order to continue the analysis and provide more recent data I have created Table 4. This table continues Schain’s observation which compare the FN’s results to parties which have continued to compete alongside it for the last thirty-six years. It is important to analyze the FN’s performance alongside other parties because of the volatility of the

French system in which parties can disappear such as the UDF after 2007. This table also demonstrates how the established parties have been influence by the rise of the National Front and the appeal it has had on millions of French voters throughout the electoral cycles in France.

As a result, the National Front has now become an established party in its own right given its continued presence in legislative elections.

Table 4: Percentage and Number support for the FN during 2002-2017 Legislative Elections 2002 2007 2012 2017

Front National 11.1%(2.8) 4.3%(1.1) 13.6%(3.5) 13.2%(2.9)

Socialists 23.8%(6.1) 24.7%(6.4) 29.4%(7.6) 7.4%(1.6)

Communists 4.9%(1.2) 4.3%(1.1) 6.9%(1.3) 2.7%(0.6)

UDF 4.8%(1.2) 1.9/7.6% N/A N/A Source: French Ministry of the Interior, (https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/fr/Elections/Les-resultats) calculations by author

As depicted throughout table 1, and now as seen in table 2 the Communist party in

France has gradually decreased in size and popularity over the years. The Communists have only broken the 5% point once since 2002 when in 2012 they rose to 6.7% of the vote. The UDF on the other hand saw a drastic drop in support from 1997 to 2002. In 2007 the party ceased operations and transformed themselves into the “Mouvement Democratique” (Democratic

Movement) a liberal centrist movement, which has formed a coalition government with the current Macron administration. The Socialists were able to recover from their 1993 blunder, only to face their most catastrophic defeat in 2017 where they received only 7.4% of the vote.

However, this loss did not have to do with the party’s inability to deal with the FN. Instead the

Socialist party lost its long-standing hold to one of its former members and the current President,

Emmanuel Macron. Président Macron’s centrist party La République En Marche and its coalition ally the MoDems (Democratic Movement), a minor centrist party won a total of 350 seats out of the total 577 seats in the National Assembly (New York Times 2017).

Since 1997, the National Front has continued to contend legislative seats in French politics. However, as shown in table 4, their legislative success would never be higher than it was in 1997. In the 2002 elections the National Front dropped by nearly a full 4% (1 million votes), then in 2007 they dropped even lower and gained only 4.3% of the legislative vote. This was the lowest the party has ever been post 1983. This drastic drop may be a result of the inflammatory rhetoric of Jean Marie Le Pen or the impending financial crisis of 2008. However, this second variable is not likely as the average voter may not have been fully aware of the impending crisis. Furthermore, the FN shot back up in the elections of 2012 with 13.6% of the vote. As discussed previously, this was the FN’s first election with Marine Le Pen at the helm of the party. Marine Le Pen wanted to attract more moderate voters to the party in an attempt to further expand the party’s support cushion should they suffer another blow such as 2007.

Although the National Front saw a nearly 4% decrease in votes in 2002, from 1997 and dropped to 4% in 2007, in both 2012 and 2017 the party saw an approximate increase of 13% of the vote during these elections. From the table, one can see that the party has been able to not only grow throughout the years, but as stay relevant and establish itself as a permanent presence in the

French system. Although this table does not include all the parties in the French system, the parties represented are parties that have been around as long and longer than the National Front.

Being able to track their progress alongside the FN demonstrates how the party has been able keep up or stay in the game against these other parties.

First Environmental Factor: Unemployment

As discussed previously, the National Front has long had job growth and the reduction of unemployment as one of their policy aims. Initially the party was in support of the European economic community as the prospect of an increasing market would mean more jobs for French citizens. However, in the present day they advocate for reduction of EU policies as the party now condemns the loss of many industrial jobs from France towards other European countries. Figure

1 shows the national unemployment rate in France for every legislative year as well as the percentage vote received by the National Front.

Figure 1: National Unemployment in France During Legislative Elections 1986-2017

Source: International Monetary Fund 2018 and French Ministry of the Interior, calculations made by author

France reached an all-time unemployment high in 1997, with unemployment at 10%

(Carnegy 2013) with the second and third highest in 1993, 2012 respectively. A likely explanation for such unemployment rates in 1993 and 1997 was France’s transition from an industrial economy to a service-based economy, as well as the slow transition of the remaining

industrial jobs to other parts of Europe and the world. As a result of this, millions of previously employed labourers are now unable to find new jobs due to a massive skill mismatch between the economy and the labor force. Over a decade later in 2012, unemployment once again was reaching the high end over the last twenty years at 9.8% (Carnegy 2013). This was most likely due to the Eurozone crisis of 2010 which sent shockwaves throughout all of Europe, causing large spikes of unemployment all throughout the European Union. The constant throughout all these years was the FN’s constant clamour of lost French jobs and the promise to increase employment in the economy.

By looking at Figure 1 we can see that the National Front’s strongest legislative run was in 1997, which also had the highest national unemployment rate of any election year during this time since the party took to the field. In 2012 the party saw its second highest legislative success which coincided with the 3rd highest national unemployment rate (during the represented legislative election years). Overall however, there is a trend in the data. As unemployment rises or falls, so does the support for the National Front. However, aside from 2007, the percentage change in the votes received every year are too small to merit a ‘cause and effect’ relationship.

Although there is a simple relationship, the changes in the National Front vote are more likely due to other factors such as global events or the internal events of the party (i.e. the ousting of

Jean Marie). Furthermore, if one were to take a look at this data by city or municipality there may be a more evident relationship between unemployment and votes received. Such study would reveal that there may be in fact a stronger relationship between unemployment and support for the parties in those areas, yet the purpose of this data is to measure overall national support and not regional stronghold of the party.

In order to test if there is a correlation between unemployment and electoral support for the National Front I conducted a bivariate Pearson Correlation test to see if there was any significant correlation between votes for the National Front and competing parties with the unemployment rate. The results are shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Bivariate Correlation For Unemployment During Legislative Election Years

Unemployed FN Socialist Communist Republicans Pearson Unemployed Correlation 1 . 830* -0.202 0.396 -0.569 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.011 0.632 0.332 0.141 N 8 8 8 8 8 Pearson FN Correlation .830* 1 -0.278 0.178 -0.56 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.011 0.505 0.673 0.149 N 8 8 8 8 8 Pearson Socialist Correlation -0.202 -0.278 1 0.68 0.056 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.632 0.505 0.063 0.896 N 8 8 8 8 8 Pearson Communist Correlation 0.396 0.178 0.68 1 -0.524 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.332 0.673 0.063 0.182 N 8 8 8 8 8 Pearson Republicans Correlation -0.569 -0.56 0.056 -0.524 1 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.141 0.149 0.896 0.182 N 8 8 8 8 8 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Calculations by author

The analysis included only the political parties that have competed with the National

Front every election. This was done in order to have consistent data for analysis. Given that En

Marche has only participated in one election cycle and the UDF disappeared after 2007, those two parties would not have comparable results and thus the data was excluded.

The analysis showed that with a Pearson coefficient of .830 legislative vote share for the

National Front is the only party to have significant correlation with national unemployment levels. On the other hand, the analysis demonstrated that the Socialist (-0.202) and Republicans

(-0.569) parties both have negative correlation with unemployment, although not significant.

From these results, it can be inferred that the National Front does experience higher electoral support during years of higher unemployment as compared to those years where unemployment has decreased. This would mean the party may have been able to successfully co-op the issue of unemployment and secure voters from other parties on this issue, especially the older and larger

Republican and Socialist parties. This is likely caused by increasing anti-establishment sentiment, particularly in the youth vote as discussed by Schain (1999) and Mayer (2013). This is also supported by the 2017 Legislative exit polls conducted by IPSOS in which the National

Front received 14% of the vote from voters aged 18-24, compared to just 10% for the Socialists and 11% for the Republicans (IPSOS 2017). Therefore, this data suggests the unemployment hypothesis to be correct.

Second Environmental Factor: Immigration

The most well-known issue for the party, immigration, has been the most prioritized issue for FN voters as shown by Perrineau (1988) and Schain (1997 & 1999). Perrineau and Schain have observed how voters who vote for the National Front have remained loyal throughout the years and have prioritized immigration over any other issue in the party’s platform, including unemployment. As such I have hypothesized that immigration would have a positive relationship with support for the FN.

Figure 2: Amount of Immigrants arriving in France During Legislative Election Years 1986- 2017

Source: French Ministry of the Interior & World Bank 2019. (Numbers with ~ represent figures based off official World Bank estimates)

Figure 2 shows the votes received per party each legislative election (left vertical axis) while on the right vertical axis it shows the amount immigrants arrived that year by the ten thousand (i.e. a 40 on the chart would reflect 400,000 immigrants). The date that stands out the most is the year 2007 which has the highest recorded number of immigrants arriving in France,

though also showing the National Front’s lowest percentage votes received. There are also several instances in which support for the FN has increased while number of immigrants has decreased or vise-versa. Such examples include 2012-2017 where support for the party decreased as immigrants arriving increased. Then in 2007 to 2012 where the number of immigrants dropped by over 200,000, yet the party grew by nearly 10% in votes during the 2012 elections.

All throughout the table the data does not seem to have any sort of direct relationship, and instead we see there is, for the most part, an inverse relationship in the data. As immigrants rise, support for the party decreases.

The contrast in the data points to the conclusion that the number of immigrants in France does not have any correlation with the growth of vote share for the National Front. Instead it seems that increased immigration is actually detrimental (for the most part) to the party’s legislative success. One explanation for this, to reference Posta’s study in 2013, is that as as voters are exposed to immigrants more frequently in social settings, they are less likely to view them as ‘some sort of threat’ to their way of life. While the National Front may hold on to its long term voter base which will always vote in favor of anti-immigration legislation, it seems that nationally, voters will be put off by the party’s anti-immigration stance and instead vote elsewhere on the spectrum. In addition to Posta’s conclusion, I would add that it is possible that the rhetoric put forth by the party against immigrants also adds on to this declining support as such remarks may have generally been seen a derogatory and offensive. It also became common practice for racist and derogatory rhetoric to be heard from many of the party’s candidates throughout France. Thus, disapproval from the electorate may have had something to do with the massive surge in the polls. Given the information by this data we can assume that immigration

does not in fact have any relationship with the rise or decrease in electoral support for the

National Front in France. In order to verify this assumption another Bivariate Pearson

Correlation analysis was conducted with the gathered data. Table 6 shows the results of this analysis.

Table 6: Bivariate Correlation Analysis for Immigration and Party Votes Received

Correlations Immigrants National Front Socialists Communists Republicans Pearson Immigrants Correlation 1 -.812* 0.311 -0.277 0.552 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.014 0.453 0.507 0.156 N 8 8 8 8 8 Pearson NationalFront Correlation -.812* 1 -0.278 0.178 -0.56 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.014 0.505 0.673 0.149 N 8 8 8 8 8 Pearson Socialists Correlation 0.311 -0.278 1 0.68 0.056 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.453 0.505 0.063 0.896 N 8 8 8 8 8 Pearson Communists Correlation -0.277 0.178 0.68 1 -0.524 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.507 0.673 0.063 0.182 N 8 8 8 8 8 Pearson Republicans Correlation 0.552 -0.56 0.056 -0.524 1 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.156 0.149 0.896 0.182 N 8 8 8 8 8 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Calculations by Author

The UDF and En Marche parties were also excluded in this analysis for the same reasons they were excluded in Table 5. The results recorded in Table 6 supports the conclusions drawn from Figure 2. With a Pearson coefficient of -0.812 the National Front has a significant negative correlation with the number of immigrants arriving in France per election year. Interestingly enough, the Socialist and Republican parties have a positive correlation of .311 and .552 respectively. However, neither of these coefficients indicate a significant correlation between support for these parties and immigration. The only other party to have a negative correlation with immigration were the communist party with a coefficient of -.277, yet this coefficient is not significant either. It is very interesting that although immigration is the number priority of

National Front voters, the party actually lost electoral support as immigration numbers increased.

One possible explanation for this might be found in Posta’s study. Posta found that as immigration rose within certain departments and communes in France, the support for the

National Front did increase. However, in these same areas there was a simultaneous increase in unemployment levels as well. Thus, taking into consideration Posta’s findings and my own analysis it seems that immigration levels has no direct effect in electoral success for the party.

Instead rising immigration may only result in FN voters prioritizing immigration as a political issue more than they would in election years with lower immigration values.

PART III

Conclusion

While some previous research has suggested there may be no direct relationship between immigration and electoral support for the party, analysis of the gathered data has shown that there is a correlation between immigration and electoral support for the National Front. The analysis conducted has yielded a significant negative correlation between support for the party and immigration. Higher immigration values actually seem to be detrimental to the electoral success of the party. On the other hand, looking at unemployment and the legislative results for the National Front, there is a significant positive correlation between unemployment and increased support for the party. However, as mentioned before in 2002 and 2007 the party saw a steep drop in the polls. This was most likely the result of factors internal to the party, such as the change in leadership and not directly related to immigration and unemployment. Based on this analysis I believe there is enough support to believe that while higher unemployment rates in

France will lead to higher support for the National Front, higher immigration figures will instead lead to decreases in support.

There are some possible explanations for this. As mentioned before, Posta’s conclusions may provide the framework for further study as to why increased immigration does not correlate with party support. Another factor to consider is rhetoric. Does inflammatory rhetoric dissuade support from potential voters? Marine Le Pen’s “de-demonization” campaign upon her election to party leader speaks to the party’s attempt to attract more centrist voters, and Mayer’s data does show strong increases in support from the youth, as well as the party having picked up votes from women. However, this is a recent development and the National Front has seen steadily

expanding support throughout the years despite the inflammatory remarks from party members.

Furthermore, given the high levels of fidelity from voters to the party, it is unlikely that any previous FN supporters have withdrawn support due to rhetoric alone. As a result, it is best to look elsewhere for explanations. Two other variables which may provide an explanation are anti- establishment sentiment, and resentment towards the European Union. Further analysis may do well to examine the role of these sentiments on party support for the National Front, and other political parties in the French system.

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