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Country Fact Sheet, Democratic Republic of the Congo
Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets file:///C:/Documents and Settings/brendelt/Desktop/temp rir/Country Fact... Français Home Contact Us Help Search canada.gc.ca Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets Home Country Fact Sheet DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO April 2007 Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment. All sources are cited. This document is not, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed or conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. For further information on current developments, please contact the Research Directorate. Table of Contents 1. GENERAL INFORMATION 2. POLITICAL BACKGROUND 3. POLITICAL PARTIES 4. ARMED GROUPS AND OTHER NON-STATE ACTORS 5. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS ENDNOTES REFERENCES 1. GENERAL INFORMATION Official name Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Geography The Democratic Republic of the Congo is located in Central Africa. It borders the Central African Republic and Sudan to the north; Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania to the east; Zambia and Angola to the south; and the Republic of the Congo to the northwest. The country has access to the 1 of 26 9/16/2013 4:16 PM Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets file:///C:/Documents and Settings/brendelt/Desktop/temp rir/Country Fact... Atlantic Ocean through the mouth of the Congo River in the west. The total area of the DRC is 2,345,410 km². -
France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations
France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations Paul Belkin Analyst in European Affairs April 14, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32464 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations Summary The factors that shape French foreign policy have changed since the end of the Cold War. The perspectives of France and the United States have diverged in some cases. More core interests remain similar. Both countries’ governments have embraced the opportunity to build stability in Europe through an expanded European Union (EU) and NATO. Each has recognized that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the most important threats to their security today. Several factors shape French foreign policy. France has a self-identity that calls for efforts to spread French values and views, many rooted in democracy and human rights. France prefers to engage international issues in a multilateral framework, above all through the European Union. European efforts to form an EU security policy potentially independent of NATO emerged in this context. However, more recently, policymakers in France, Europe and the United States have come to view a stronger European defense arm as a complement to rather than a substitute for NATO. From the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States through the Iraq war of 2003 until today, France has pressed the United States to confront emerging crises within a multilateral framework. France normally wishes to “legitimize” actions ranging from economic sanctions to military action in the United Nations. -
"The World Culture Entered Turkey" New Conflict Lines and the Challenges for Democratic Consolidation in Turkey
PRIF Report No. 139 "The World Culture Entered Turkey" New Conflict Lines and the Challenges for Democratic Consolidation in Turkey Idil Gögüs/Sabine Mannitz the © Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2016 Correspondence to: PRIF Baseler Straße 27–31 60329 Frankfurt am Main Germany Telephone: +49 69 959104-0 Fax: +49 69 558481 E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] Internet: www.prif.org ISBN: 978-3-946459-05-7 Euro 10,00 € Summary Turkish society is politically divided to an extent that made even German Chancellor Angela Merkel mention the necessity of overcoming internal divisions when she congratulated Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu on winning the election on 2 November 2015. Divergences within Turkish society involving different views concerning the best path of development have a tradition that reaches back into Ottoman times. When the republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 the modernization project of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his followers set the goals for the country’s development in the decades to follow. The sweeping Kemalist reforms met with resistance from different sections of Turkish society from an early stage because they excluded the existing plurality conceptually, especially religion as a legitimate source for public moral order: Ethnic minorities such as the Kurds, whose striving for their own sovereign state had been ignored in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, were not willing to subscribe to the nationalist construction of the Turkish citizenry. The radical version of secularism that state founder Mustafa -
Codebook CPDS I 1960-2013
1 Codebook: Comparative Political Data Set, 1960-2013 Codebook: COMPARATIVE POLITICAL DATA SET 1960-2013 Klaus Armingeon, Christian Isler, Laura Knöpfel, David Weisstanner and Sarah Engler The Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2013 (CPDS) is a collection of political and institu- tional data which have been assembled in the context of the research projects “Die Hand- lungsspielräume des Nationalstaates” and “Critical junctures. An international comparison” directed by Klaus Armingeon and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. This data set consists of (mostly) annual data for 36 democratic OECD and/or EU-member coun- tries for the period of 1960 to 2013. In all countries, political data were collected only for the democratic periods.1 The data set is suited for cross-national, longitudinal and pooled time- series analyses. The present data set combines and replaces the earlier versions “Comparative Political Data Set I” (data for 23 OECD countries from 1960 onwards) and the “Comparative Political Data Set III” (data for 36 OECD and/or EU member states from 1990 onwards). A variable has been added to identify former CPDS I countries. For additional detailed information on the composition of government in the 36 countries, please consult the “Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set – Government Com- position 1960-2013”, available on the CPDS website. The Comparative Political Data Set contains some additional demographic, socio- and eco- nomic variables. However, these variables are not the major concern of the project and are thus limited in scope. For more in-depth sources of these data, see the online databases of the OECD, Eurostat or AMECO. -
FRANCE May 2007 COUNTRY Formal Name: French Republic
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: France, May 2007 COUNTRY PROFILE: FRANCE May 2007 COUNTRY Formal Name: French Republic (République Française). Short Form: France. Term for Citizen(s): Frenchman/Frenchwoman. Adjective: French. Capital: Paris. Major Cities: The country’s capital Paris, the only French city Click to Enlarge Image with more than 1 million inhabitants, has a population of 2,142,800 in the city proper (as of 2004) and 11,330,700 in the metropolitan area (2003 estimate). Greater metropolitan Paris encompasses more than 15 percent of the country’s total population. The second largest city is Marseille, a major Mediterranean seaport, with about 795,600 inhabitants. Other major cities include Lyon, an industrial center in east-central France, with 468,300 inhabitants, and the second largest metropolitan area in France, with 1,665,700 people. Further important cities include: Toulouse, 426,700, a manufacturing and European aviation center in southwestern France; Nice, 339,000, a resort city on the French Riviera; Nantes, 276,200, a seaport and shipbuilding center on the Atlantic coast; Strasbourg, 273,100, the principal French port on the Rhine River and a seat of the European parliament (in addition to Brussels); Montpellier, 244,700, a commercial and manufacturing city in southern France; and Bordeaux, 229,500, a major seaport in southwestern France and the principal exporting center for key French vineyard regions. According to the 1999 decadal census, more than 25 additional French cities had populations surpassing 100,000. Independence: July 14, Bastille Day, is France’s national holiday. Public Holidays: New Year’s Day (January 1); Easter Monday (variable date in March or April); Labor Day (May 1); Ascension Day (Thursday, 40 days after Easter); World War II Victory Day (May 8); Bastille Day (July 14); Assumption (August 15); All Saints’ Day (November 1); Armistice Day (November 11); and Christmas Day (December 25). -
Election by Default, 2002
Order Code RS21216 Updated June 27, 2002 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web France: Election by Default, 2002 Paul E. Gallis Specialist in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Summary On May 5, 2002, the French people re-elected Jacques Chirac president, and on June 16 gave him a center-right parliamentary majority. The tumultuous two-round presidential elections saw the elimination of Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin in the first round, and left the racist, extreme right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen as Chirac’s opponent in the second round. Chirac won by a wide margin, but many voters, perhaps a majority, were voting against Le Pen. Chirac and Le Pen both ran on a campaign to quell “insecurity,” a euphemism for a rising crime rate. Many observers believe that the main candidates did not address France’s principal problems during the campaign. A New Government On June 16, 2002, French voters elected a National Assembly that gave the center- right a majority. President Jacques Chirac named Jean-Pierre Raffarin prime minister. The parliamentary election and appointment of Raffarin ended five years of cohabitation, in which the president and prime minister were of different parties. Raffarin breaks a long tradition of prime ministers who have made their careers in Paris; he is a native of Poitou, and was president of a regional council. His appointment is in part an effort by Chirac to demonstrate that France will be governed more by a “man of the provinces,” close to the people, than by someone of the political elite that has dominated the Fifth Republic, founded by General Charles de Gaulle in 1958. -
France: Politics in the Fifth Republic Meelis Kitsing
France: Politics in the Fifth Republic Meelis Kitsing [email protected] http://faculty.uml.edu/mkitsing/46.112/ Source: Palmer 2004 • The evolution of French democracy has been marked by far more conflict than that of the United Kingdom. In comparison with British political traditions of tolerance and compromise, French have been characterized by revolution and violence. Source: Palmer 2004 France in Historical Perspective • Authoritarianism and democracy – sometimes bordering on anarchy – are both part of French political tradition. Their reconciliation has been difficult but has also made the system interesting. France’s historical roots are usually traced to Charlemagne, King of Franks, in 800 A.D. whose empire first united Europe. Like in Britain, the evolution of the French state began with its feudal kings’ need to extract money from their subjects. Unlike in Britain, this led to authoritarianism and the establishment of a centralized bureaucracy that taxed “with ruthless efficiency.” The French kings received political support from the Roman Catholic Church and the landed aristocracy. The Church legitimized the monarchy by preaching the divine right of kings and the kings granted the Church complete control over French religious life. The aristocracy financed the monarchy and maintained order in the countryside. Source: Palmer 2004 France in Historical Perspective • Both the Church and the aristocracy provided the manpower for the ever expanding bureaucracy. Cardinal Richelieu (1624) who modernized the bureaucracy and “established the groundwork for a modern standing army” is the most illustrious. Over time big businessmen (haute bourgeoisie) replaced the aristocracy and used their wealth to buy hereditary titles. -
Biography of Valéry Giscard D'estaing
Biography of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing Copyright: (c) Translation CVCE.EU by UNI.LU All rights of reproduction, of public communication, of adaptation, of distribution or of dissemination via Internet, internal network or any other means are strictly reserved in all countries. Consult the legal notice and the terms and conditions of use regarding this site. URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/biography_of_valery_giscard_d_estaing-en-f18cad10- b8b5-47a2-8d1b-e706c80facd4.html Last updated: 05/07/2016 1/3 Biography of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was born on 26 February 1926 in Koblenz, where his father, Edmond Giscard d’Estaing, had been posted, during the period in which the Rhineland was partially occupied under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. After attending several secondary schools, including Jansson-de- Sailly and Louis-le-Grand in Paris, he joined the First French Army commanded by Jean de Lattre de Tassigny and fought in France and Germany at the end of the Second World War. He was decorated with the Croix de guerre and joined the Polytechnic School before attending the National School of Administration (ENA). In 1952, having graduated in the botte, the top 15 ENA graduates, he joined the Inspectorate of Finance, where his father worked. He began his political career in June 1954 when he became Deputy Director of the Cabinet of Edgar Faure, then Minister for Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning in the government of Pierre Mendès-France until the end of that year. He was elected Member of Parliament in 1956, in a constituency of the Puy-de-Dôme where his grandfather, Jacques Bardoux, Senator in the Third Republic, and his great-grandfather, Agénor Bardoux, former Minister, had formerly been elected. -
An Analysis of the 2017 Election Cycle in France and the Netherlands
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Social Impact Research Experience (SIRE) Wharton Undergraduate Research 2017 Inequality and Political Extremism: An Analysis of the 2017 Election Cycle in France and the Netherlands Noah Katcher University of Pennsylvania Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/sire Part of the Business Commons, Comparative Politics Commons, Economic Policy Commons, and the Public Policy Commons Katcher, Noah, "Inequality and Political Extremism: An Analysis of the 2017 Election Cycle in France and the Netherlands" (2017). Social Impact Research Experience (SIRE). 51. https://repository.upenn.edu/sire/51 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/sire/51 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Inequality and Political Extremism: An Analysis of the 2017 Election Cycle in France and the Netherlands Abstract The 2017 election cycle in France and the Netherlands featured candidates widely defined as politically extreme rapidly gaining traction as Election Day approached. Though neither Marine Le Pen of France nor Geert Wilders of the Netherlands were victorious in their bids to lead their respective nations, their second-place finishes led many ot question how to typify this growing base of support for politically extreme candidates. As targets of their charged rhetoric felt increasingly threatened by their momentum, even after the elections, many seek to understand which underlying issues motivated support for candidates with such unprecedented views. In the context of their modern political histories, this paper searches for a possible association between economic insecurity and support for politically extreme candidates in the 2017 election cycle, finding a strong association in France and a tenuous association in the Netherlands. -
How Ballot Access Laws Affect the U.S. Party System
How Ballot Access Laws Affect the U.S. Party System Richard Winger, Ballot Access News The thesis of this article is that the United States does not have lenient ballot access laws for new parties; and that if the United States did have lenient ballot access laws, there would be one or two substantial third parties in existence most of the time, if not all the time. By "substantial third party," I mean a party which, although not competitive with the two major parties, is able to win seats in Congress on occasion, commonly wins seats in state legislatures, fields candidates for Congress in a majority of con gressional districts, and regularly polls at least two percent or three percent of the presidential vote. Developed nations with freedom of political expression, equal treatment under the law for all parties, and winner-take-all voting systems (as opposed to proportional representation), generally produce two-party systems. "Two- party system" means a system in which two particular political parties, at any given time, are substantially larger than all other political parties. In such systems, there are only two particular parties that can hope to control the national government. If the nation elects a president by popular vote, then only two parties have a realistic hope of winning that election; if the nation uses a parliamentary system, only two parties have any realistic chance of winning a majority in the national legislature. Nevertheless, in most two-party systems, there are substantial third parties. In Great Britain, the two major parties are obviously the Conserva tive and Labor Parties, but the Liberal Democratic Party is a very substan tial third party. -
CSESII Parties and Leaders Original CSES Text Plus CCNER Additions (Highlighted)
CSESII Parties and Leaders Original CSES text plus CCNER additions (highlighted) =========================================================================== ))) APPENDIX I: PARTIES AND LEADERS =========================================================================== | NOTES: PARTIES AND LEADERS | | This appendix identifies parties active during a polity's | election and (where available) their leaders. | | Provided are the party labels for the codes used in the micro | data variables. Parties A through F are the six most popular | parties, listed in descending order according to their share of | the popular vote in the "lowest" level election held (i.e., | wherever possible, the first segment of the lower house). | | Note that in countries represented with more than a single | election study the order of parties may change between the two | elections. | | Leaders A through F are the corresponding party leaders or | presidential candidates referred to in the micro data items. | This appendix reports these names and party affiliations. | | Parties G, H, and I are supplemental parties and leaders | voluntarily provided by some election studies. However, these | are in no particular order. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> PARTIES AND LEADERS: ALBANIA (2005) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 02. Party A PD Democratic Party Sali Berisha 01. Party B PS Socialist Party Fatos Nano 04. Party C PR Republican Party Fatmir Mediu 05. Party D PSD Social Democratic Party Skender Gjinushi 03. Party E LSI Socialist Movement for Integration Ilir Meta 10. Party F PDR New Democratic Party Genc Pollo 09. Party G PAA Agrarian Party Lufter Xhuveli 08. Party H PAD Democratic Alliance Party Neritan Ceka 07. Party I PDK Christian Democratic Party Nikolle Lesi 06. LZhK Movement of Leka Zogu I Leka Zogu 11. PBDNj Human Rights Union Party 12. Union for Victory (Partia Demokratike+ PR+PLL+PBK+PBL) 89. -
How Polarization Affects Political Engagement
10878-01_CH01.qxd 12/5/07 10:11 AM Page 1 1 Turned Off or Turned On? How Polarization Affects Political Engagement Marc J. Hetherington he scholarly debate about the existence of polarization in the U.S. electorate Tcontinues to rage. Using a wide array of survey data on people’s self- reported issue preferences, Fiorina argues that preferences are not moving toward the ideological poles. Rather most voters remain moderate on most issues.1 Others counter that the differences between party adherents have become significantly starker of late, which they take as evidence of polarization.2 Fiorina characterizes such mass-level party differences as relatively small and, to the extent that they have increased, a function of more effective party sorting, not polarization. To use the nomenclature of the debate, the United States has experienced some party polarization but little if any popular polarization. In either reckoning, elites are at the core of whatever movement has occurred. Elected officials and party activists are more polarized by any definition, which has made it easier for people to sort themselves into the “correct” party.3 The author would like to thank Corey Bike for his research assistance, Pietro Nivola for his insights, and Suzanne Globetti, John Geer, Bruce Oppenheimer, and Christian Grose for various forms of assistance. 1. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2006). 2. For example Jacobson (2006); Abramowitz and Saunders (2005). 3. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2006). 1 10878-01_CH01.qxd 12/5/07 10:11 AM Page 2 2 marc j. hetherington Fiorina’s pairing of consistently moderate mass attitudes with those of increas- ingly ideological elites suggests that a large chunk of the electorate might be turned off by the extreme choices they confront.