Why NATO Must Win in Afghanistan: a Central Front in the War on Terrorism Sally Mcnamara

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Why NATO Must Win in Afghanistan: a Central Front in the War on Terrorism Sally Mcnamara No. 2148 June 23, 2008 Why NATO Must Win in Afghanistan: A Central Front in the War on Terrorism Sally McNamara Jonathan Evans, director general of Britain’s imperative that all NATO members recommit to the security service MI5 describes al-Qaeda and its mission in Afghanistan. The terrorist attacks on associated groups as “the main national security London and Madrid serve as stark reminders of why threat that we face today.” Through a series of NATO undertook the Afghanistan mission in the attacks and attempted attacks, Islamist extremists first place. Europe cannot afford to underestimate have declared war on the values that underpin the the incredible momentum that Islamist extrem- liberal democracies of Britain, Europe, and the ists—at home and abroad—will gain from signs of entire West. weakness by the Alliance in Afghanistan. A Growing and Evolving Threat. In an It is significantly obvious that al-Qaeda and its extraordinary public speech, Mr. Evans detailed a associates remain committed to a long, asymmetric growing and evolving al-Qaeda threat to the United war against the West and to attacking the values of Kingdom, where at least 2,000 individuals have liberal democracy. They must be fought tactically been identified as a threat to national security and strategically. On a tactical level, increased coun- because of their support for terrorism. He went on terterrorism operations have contributed to major to identify the increased threats posed by the successes in the war on terrorism. Britain and “extension of the al-Qaeda brand” in both the Mid- Europe, like America, must continue to increase dle East and Europe. their capacity to conduct counterterrorist opera- When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in tions and vigorously pursue efforts to thwart terror- 1949, NATO’s founding members agreed on the ist plots, many of which are deeply interwoven. sacred Article 5 clause stipulating that “an armed Al-Qaeda Plots and Conspiracies. The cata- attack against one or more of them in Europe or logue of plots and conspiracies sponsored, inspired, North America shall be considered an attack against and directed by al-Qaeda and targeted against Brit- them all.” As a collective defensive military alliance, ain and Europe reveals a number of patterns that NATO rightly invoked Article 5 following al- must be addressed: Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks on the United States. The Alli- ance must now follow through on that invocation and continue to deny al-Qaeda a safe haven in This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: which to operate by winning in Afghanistan. www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg2148.cfm The Need to Recommit to the Mission. With a Produced by The Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Published by The Heritage Foundation catalogue of successful and thwarted al-Qaeda ter- 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE rorist attacks on Britain and Europe since 9/11, it is Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No. 2148 June 23, 2008 • The prevalence of terrorist training camps in Sean O’Neill has noted, “al-Qaeda has proved itself Afghanistan and Pakistan, to be a resilient organization that absorbs blows, • The role of hate preachers and extremist clerics, regroups, reforms its networks, and returns.” • The importance of the mission in Afghanistan as The war in Afghanistan is ultimately not yet won, a central front in the war on terrorism, and and gains made there remain under threat so long as the region remains susceptible to al-Qaeda and Tal- • The continuing crucial need to maintain close iban insurgencies. Now is the time for the NATO cooperation and intelligence-sharing among Alliance to show its backbone and defeat the Britain, Europe, and America. scourge of al-Qaeda. NATO members cannot afford Faced with these needs, if the war on terrorism is to underestimate the threat that al-Qaeda continues to be won, America and Europe must remain strong to pose to the West and its collective values of free- and reliable allies to each other. Europe must be dom, liberty, human rights, equality, and democ- under no illusion that it is not a prime target for al- racy. The political expediency of keeping troops out Qaeda attacks—as well as a base of operations. A of harm’s way grossly miscalculates the long-term former Islamist extremist revealed last year that al- strategic implications of a resurgent Taliban and an Qaeda held a summit in London to coordinate its al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan. activities in Britain: Such is their strength of pres- —Sally McNamara is Senior Policy Analyst in Euro- ence there. pean Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Free- Conclusion. Although al-Qaeda took some dom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis heavy hits to its command and control structures Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage when NATO first went into Afghanistan, it contin- Foundation. The author is grateful to Oliver Horn, ues to motivate affiliated groups and to regroup in Research Assistant in the Margaret Thatcher Center, for the tribal areas of Pakistan. As Times correspondent his assistance in preparing this paper. No. 2148 June 23, 2008 Why NATO Must Win in Afghanistan: A Central Front in the War on Terrorism Sally McNamara Jonathan Evans, director general of Britain’s secu- rity service MI5 describes al-Qaeda and its associated groups as, “the main national security threat that we Talking Points 1 face today.” Through a series of attacks and attempted • British and European security services have attacks, Islamist extremists have declared war on the enjoyed significant tactical success, disrupt- values that underpin the liberal democracies of Brit- ing many terrorist plots and conspiracies ain, Europe, and the entire West. In an extraordinary through effective counterterrorism measures public speech, Mr. Evans detailed a growing and and international cooperation. evolving al-Qaeda threat to the United Kingdom, • Al-Qaeda and its associates remain commit- where at least 2,000 individuals have been identified ted to a long, asymmetric war against the as a threat to national security because of their support West on both the tactical and strategic levels. for terrorism. He went on to identify the increased • One key tactic is to recruit, radicalize, and threats posed by the “extension of the al-Qaeda brand” train homegrown terrorists for the purpose of in both the Middle East and Europe.2 attacking their homelands. When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in • Al-Qaeda systematically uses hate preachers 1949, NATO’s founding members agreed on the and extremist clerics to recruit and radicalize sacred Article 5 clause stipulating that “an armed homegrown terrorists for the purpose of attack- attack against one or more of them in Europe or North ing their homelands, often sending significant America shall be considered an attack against them numbers to terrorist training camps abroad. all.”3 As a collective defensive military alliance, NATO • A significant number of terrorist cells and rightly invoked Article 5 following al-Qaeda’s 9/11 plots overlap through a network of individu- attacks on the United States.4 The Alliance must now als and sleeper cells coordinated by al-Qaeda follow through on that invocation and continue to and its associates. deny al-Qaeda a safe haven in which to operate by • NATO’s success or failure in Afghanistan will be winning in Afghanistan. a major factor in determining whether the war against al-Qaeda ends in victory or defeat. With a catalogue of successful and thwarted al- Qaeda terrorist attacks on Britain and Europe since This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: 9/11, it is imperative that all NATO members recom- www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg2148.cfm mit to the mission in Afghanistan. The terrorist attacks Produced by The Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom on London and Madrid serve as stark reminders of Published by The Heritage Foundation why NATO undertook the Afghanistan mission in the 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect- ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No. 2148 June 23, 2008 first place. Europe cannot afford to underestimate Britain’s first al-Qaeda–related terrorist plot was the incredible momentum that Islamist extrem- uncovered in November 2000, and Bangladeshi- ists—at home and abroad—will gain from signs of born Moinul Abedin was found guilty of planning weakness by the Alliance in Afghanistan.1234 to detonate a bomb and sentenced to 20 years 7 It is significantly obvious that al-Qaeda and its imprisonment. Since September 11, 2001, how- associates remain committed to a long, asymmet- ever, the number and scope of Islamist terrorist ric war against the West and to attacking the val- threats in the United Kingdom have increased sig- ues of liberal democracy. They must be fought nificantly. The following plots and conspiracies can tactically and strategically. On a tactical level, be identified from public information. increased counterterrorism operations have con- Plotting Aircraft Attacks on Key London tributed to major successes in the war on terror- Landmarks: Mohammed Afroz, September 11, ism. Britain and Europe, like America, must 2001. Indian Mohammed Afroz confessed to being continue to increase their capacity to conduct part of a global network of al-Qaeda operatives who counterterrorist operations and vigorously pursue had planned to follow the 9/11 atrocities with efforts to thwart terrorist plots, many of which are similar attacks on the Houses of Parliament, Big deeply interwoven.
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