JANUARY 2021 Vol. 105 No. 1 www.mca-.org/gazette

28 Cover Article: 27 A Letter from the 89 Articulating Doctrine Intelligence- MARSOC to Junior Marines Driven Commander Capt James Whitcher MajGen James F. Glynn 92 Learning from the Operations 64 Sleeper Cell Logistics Germans Part II: Marines of Intelligence Co., Capt Michael Sweeney The Future 1st Marine Raider Support Bn Marinus

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Logistics Chair: FM Chair: Marine Corps Chair: Philanthropy Chair: Bryan Wood Robert Speer Mark A. Brilakis Mike Barrett

Former A.DC Former Acting Secretary of Lt General (Retired) 17th Sgt Major of the the Army and Assistant Installations & Logistics Marine Corps Secretary of the Army for Financial Management & Comptroller January 2021 Volume 105 Number 1

IDEAS AND ISSUES Strategy & Policy 10 Channeling Realism to Avert a War Over Taiwan Maj Franz J. Gayl 21 The Economics of Warfare Capt Conor T. Bender 24 North Korea LtCol John W. Black

Special Operations/MARSOF 27 A Letter from the MARSOC Commander MajGen James F. Glynn 28 Intelligence-Driven Operations Marines of Intelligence Co., 1st Marine Raider Support Bn 28 Cover Article 33 Avoiding the False Choice Maj Joshua C. Waddell & MARSOC DST Marines conduct Maj Brent C. Birchum maritime operations. (Photo by Intelli- 38 Green Water SOF Maj William H. Strom gence Company, 1st MRSB.) 43 China’s Quest to Maximize Status and Sovereignty in the South China Sea MSgt Marc Arrington DEPARTMENTS 47 Artifi cial Intelligence in the Future Operating Environment GySgt David Nass 3 Editorial 51 Irregular Warfare Maj David Pummell 5 SMMC “Non-Negotiables” 57 We Are Not Inventory LtCol Gregory DeMarco 6 Special Notices 59 SOF and the ARG/MEU Maj Michael Stevens 8 Letters 96 Observation Post 2020 Trainor Military Writing Award 98 Books 64 Winner: Sleeper Cell Logistics Capt Michael Sweeney 67 104 Index to Advertisers Honorable Mention: A Letter Home from 104 Writers’ Guidelines a Marine in the Future LtCol Neal K. McCarthy 70 Out With the New, In With the Old GySgt Blake Gratton 74 Between a Rocket and a Hard Place Dr. Heather Venable & LtCol Nate Lauterbach 77 2030 Joint Forcible Entry Operations Capt Daniel L. McGurkin & 1stLt Jack W. Hanly 82 Expeditionary Data Capt Eugene Yang & Capt Chris Adsit

Learning 86 Analog Combat Capt Jamar Alexander 89 Articulating Doctrine to Junior Marines Capt James Whitcher

Maneuverist Papers 92 Learning from the Germans 98 Book Review Part II: The Future Marinus

The Marine Corps Gazette (ISSN 0025–3170) is published monthly by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas that will ad- vance knowledge, interest, and esprit in the Marine Corps. Periodicals postage paid at Quantico, VA, USPS #329-340, and at additional mailing offi ces. • OPINIONS expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect the attitude of the Department of Defense, Navy Department, or Headquarters Marine Corps. “Marine Corps” and the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor are trademarks of the U.S. Marine Corps, used with permission. • MEMBERSHIP RATE: Annual $42.00 • MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION: Contact Member Services, 1–866–622–1775. • ADVERTISING QUERIES: Defense Related Industries/Business: Contact LeeAnn Mitchell, Advertising@mca-marines. org 703-640-0174. All other Advertising Contact James G. Elliott Co. Inc., Phone New York: 212-588-9200 Chicago: 312-236-4900 Los Angeles: 213-624-0900. • COPY- RIGHT 2021 by the Marine Corps Association & Foundation. All reprint rights reserved. • EDITORIAL/BUSINESS OFFICES: All mail and other queries to Box 1775, Quan- tico, VA 22134. Phone 703–640–6161. Toll Free 800–336–0291. Fax 703–640-0140. Location: Bldg #715, Broadway St., Quantico, VA 22134. • E-MAIL ADDRESS: [email protected]. • WEB ADDRESS: www.mca-marines.org/gazette. • CHANGE OF ADDRESS: POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Marine Corps Gazette, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134 or e-mail: [email protected]. • For credit card orders, call 866-622-1775. PUBLISHER’S STATEMENT: Publication of advertisements does not constitute endorsements by MCA&F except for such products or services clearly offered under the MCA&F’s name. The publisher reserves the right to accept or reject any advertising order at his absolute discretion. Marine Corps Writers… WANTED! to challenge the status quo and provide their insights on radical change.

The MajGen Harold W. Chase Prize Essay Contest

Submit entries anytime from 1 January to 30 April. See p. 91 for instructions.

The writing contest is open to active duty Marines and members of the Marine Corps Reserve.

This contest is sponsored by: President & CEO LTGEN W. MARK FAULKNER, USMC(RET) www.mca-marines.org/gazette • 1–800–336–0291 Publisher, Editor, & Chairman, Ed. Adv. Panel COL CHRISTOPHER WOODBRIDGE, USMC(RET) JANUARY 2021 [email protected] Ext. 163 Senior Editor Editorial: Special Operations Forces and the Marine Corps LTCOL JOHN T. QUINN II, USMC(RET) On behalf of the Corps’ Professional Association, I hope everyone has recovered [email protected] Ext. 109 from their holiday celebrations and is prepared for whatever the new year brings. As Layout/Editorial Production Coordinator in the past three years, our January edition focuses on Special Operations and Marine CHARLENE K. MONROE Corps Special Operations Forces. Beginning on page 27 with an introductory letter [email protected] Ext. 139 from the Commander of MARSOC, MajGen James F. Glynn, we present a series Assistant Editors: of eight articles on a range of special operations-related topics. In addition to our WILLIAM TREUTING cover article, “Intelligence-Driven Operations” by the Marines of Intelligence Co., [email protected] Ext. 193 1st Marine Raider Support Bn, several other articles are noteworthy in their focus CARRIE EMERSON-COYLE on “relationships” between MARSOC and various elements of the Joint Force. [email protected] The relationship between SOF and the conventional Marine Corps is the focus of Administrative Assistant “Avoiding the False Choice” by Maj Joshua C. Waddell and Maj Brent C. Birchum HARLEY Q. PARKER-COLLINS on page 33. MARSOC’s relationship with naval expeditionary forces is explored on [email protected] Ext. 180 page 38 in “Green Water SOF” by Maj William H. Strom and on page 59 in “SOF Advertising Queries: and the ARG/MEU” by Maj Michael Stevens. SOF lessons applicable to Marine Defense-Related Industries/Business: Corps Talent Management are presented on page 57 in “We Are Not Inventory” Contact: LEEANN MITCHELL: 703-640-0174 [email protected] by LtCol Gregory DeMarco. Once again, a special thanks to MajGen Glynn All Other Advertising Contact: and LtCol Tony “Bull” Marro, USMC(Ret), for personally ensuring MARSOC’s JAMES G. ELLIOTT CO. INC. content for this edition of the Gazette was “on time and on target.” New York: 212-588-9200 Chicago: 312-236-4900 Of note this month, on page 5, we publish a letter from SgtMaj Troy E. Black, Los Angeles: 213-624-0900 the 19th Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, in which the Corps most senior enlisted leader lays out the “SMMC ‘Non-Negotiables’” of success for individual Editorial Advisory Panel Marines and the Corps. COL STAN S. COERR, USMCR(RET) As our cover highlights, this month’s edition also presents the winner of the COL AARON A. ANGELL 2020 LtGen Bernard E. “Mick” Trainor Military Writing Award: “Sleeper Cell Logistics” by Capt Michael Sweeney on page 64. We are also proud to present a COL MARIA J. PALLOTTA group of outstanding essays submitted for the contest including the Honorable COL BRIAN E. RUSSELL Mention on page 67, “A Letter Home from a Marine in the Future” by LtCol Neal K. McCarthy, and “Between a Rocket and a Hard Place” on page 74 by Dr. COL CRAIG WONSON Heather Venable and LtCol Nate Lauterbach. LTCOL HARRY P. WARD, USMC(RET) We also continue to present articles in our Strategy & Policy Ideas & Issues series as well as the latest installment of the Maneuverist Papers. In Maneuverist #5 LTCOL SCOTT CUOMO “Learning for the Germans Part II: The Future” on page 92, “Marinus” continues LTCOL GARY W. THOMASON, USMC(RET) to examine the importance of the German military tradition in the development and application of Maneuver Warfare in the Marine Corps while addressing LTCOL NATHAN FLEISCHAKER the “elephant in the room:” learning from the Germans while recognizing the MAJ ANDREW B. WARREN, USMC(RET) indefensible atrocities of Nazi Germany in World War II. Finally, as we look forward to potential obstacles and opportunities in the MAJ JONATHAN P. BURGESS coming year, this winter we should all look back on the recent 70th anniversary of MAJ JEFFREY CUMMINGS the ’s heroic breakout from the Chosin Reservoir during the ESERT TORM MAJ REID HOUCK Korean War and the upcoming 30th anniversary of Operation D S . Those Marines faced challenges and took chances with tenacity and daring just MAJ AUSTIN M. DUNCAN as Marines do today. Then as now, the Association remains dedicated to their SGTMAJ SCOTT BURTON, USMC(RET) professional development, and the Gazette remains the platform for the free exchange of ideas in our Corps, giving voice to the dedicated Marines who use 1STSGT FORREST ALLEN their personal time and effort to contribute to the robust intellectual life of the Corps. Christopher Woodbridge

MCA&F President and CEO, LtGen W. Mark Faulkner, USMC(Ret); Chief Operating , Col Dan O’Brien, USMC(Ret); Director Foundation Operations, Col Tim Mundy, USMC(Ret); Director of Strategic Communications & Editor, Leatherneck magazine, Col Mary H. Reinwald, USMC(Ret); Member Services, Jaclyn Baird; Chief Financial Officer, Johnna Ebel.

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 3 The SergeanT Major of The Marine CorpS SMMC “NON-NEGOTIABLES”

by SgtMaj Troy E. Black, 19th SMMC

he Marine Corps has a long and The following eight “Non-Negotiables” are fundamental to illustrious history of success on the battlefield. our identity and success as Marines, regardless of the battles T We are unique in the way we train and fight. Our being fought or the generation of Marines fighting them. culture is one of competing and winning with a Within them, there can be much debate, but in general, they time-tested tradition of evolving to adapt to the current and are time proven and lay at the heart of being a Marine. future warfighting environment. 1. Core Values. This is our The Marine Corps is always foundation. They exist in order evolving, but the foundation of to make us better citizens, better who we are never changes. We have leaders, and better warfighters. constantly reinforced the basics Our Core Values give us some- throughout our history. We know thing to aspire to as men and wom- that in every battle and skirmish, en of honor. When we enter into the ingenuity, leadership, and abil- uncertainty, it is Honor, Courage, ity of Marines wins the day. New and Commitment that carry us weapons, new equipment, and new through to victory. It is on these tactics have always been a part of insoluble elements that all other how we fight new enemies in new “Non-Negotiables” are built. environments, but the adaptabil- 2. Discipline and Good Order. ity and strength of the individual Discipline and good order are the Marine remains at our core. This is hallmarks of a Marine. At its core, a valuable point when considering discipline is about self-control and how we prepare the next genera- a willingness to do the right things tion of Marines for the next battle. in the right ways for the right rea- To remain a certain force for an sons for organizational success. uncertain world, our tolerance Discipline is also the instant and for change must increase, but we willing obedience to lawful orders, must never accept mediocrity or respect for authority, and respect the lowering of our standards. We for each other. Living a disciplined are all standing beside one another life is what all Marines must strive on the front lines of the future, to do. We cannot simply choose Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps Troy E. Black. to be “the most ready, when the what orders to follow and which Nation is least ready.” to disobey. Discipline is behind Our Commandant has laid out in his planning guidance the unrelenting drive for perfection described in the NCO his vision for the future of the Marine Corps. In it, he out- and SNCO Creeds. This discipline applies to seniors and lines our priorities as a Naval Expeditionary Force, the need subordinates. It applies to everything from uniform regula- to adapt to constantly evolving and complex warfighting tions to rules of engagement. From the moment we arrive on domains, the perils of failing to outpace a peer threat, and the yellow footprints or at OCS, we strive to develop in each the increasing reliance on the critical thinking abilities of the and every Marine the commitment to live up to our Core individual Marine. Values. This takes discipline, and the result is good order. As the Marine Corps evolves to meet this mission, there 3. Professional Military Education (PME) and Professional are some aspects that must never change. I call these simply and Personal Development. There is a difference between “Non-Negotiables.” the three. PME develops understanding of the functions of

4 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 our Marine Corps. Warfi ghting, ethics, and critical thinking us. These traditions include seemingly minor things like the skills are all honed within PME, regardless of an individual’s celebration of our birthday, the use of naval terminology, our military occupational specialty or their unit’s mission. Profes- manner of dress, our pride in physical conditioning, pride in sional development is where we learn our craft and refers to our uniforms, pride in grooming and personal appearance, those core elements associated with our service that apply to standing when a senior offi cer enters the room, saluting, all Marines. Strenuous and demanding professional develop- administrative accuracy, and simply being respectful. Having ment schools, courses, and evaluations are the bedrock of our respect for our Nation, the civilians we serve, and to each winning culture. Personal development refers to the education other are essential to our existence and as a Corps. Being opportunities that exist through tuition assistance and other a Marine means setting the standard, and we must never means. Each Marine should strive to accomplish excellence diminish the importance of who we are, what we stand for, in all these areas. Off-duty education and other vocational and the rigorous military bearing that makes the Marine programs that help to develop cognitive skills and problem- Corps the world’s fi nest fi ghting force. solving capabilities are vital to developing enlisted Marines 7. Leadership and Leadership Development. Developing, to operate in a competitive environment. There is no doubt sustaining, and expanding the leadership skills of subordinates the combination of PME focused on warfi ghting and Marine is the responsibility of each and every leader. There is no Corps common skills combined with the individual pursuit greater responsibility or better use of our experience. Consis- of higher education and advanced vocational certifi cation tent mentorship, coaching, teaching, and training is critical makes the Marine Corps a more lethal and capable fi ghting to developing the next generation of leaders. Our leadership force. principles and traits are time tested. The best leaders are 4. Physicality and Expeditionary Mindset. Those who have those who are bold, take initiative, display fearlessness, have been in combat know it is a physically and mentally demand- the ability to inspire others, and are worthy of emulation. ing environment. We know physical fi tness has bearing on a Inspiration and emulation are two key elements that appear in leader’s ability to sustain their presence of mind during pe- both the NCO and SNCO creeds. The duty of every Marine, riods of extreme stress. To ensure we are able to keep a clear from one generation to the next, is to mentor subordinates. head during combat, we must demand the highest standard By passing on our knowledge, skills, and experience, we are of fi tness from ourselves and our subordinates. This focus ensuring that hard won lessons learned in combat are being on fi tness leads to a competitiveness that fuels the winning passed to the next generation of battlefi eld leadership. nature of Marines. Fitness includes more than just the physical 8. Drill and Ceremony. Drill is more than just a show aspects. Physical, mental, and spiritual fi tness all combine to piece. Success in nearly every element of combat can still fi nd form total fi tness. These elements of fi tness allow Marines to a correlation with profi ciency in drill. Seemingly routine tasks persevere in any clime and place. Developing perseverance is such as pre-combat inspections, pre-combat checks, fi rst aid, key to success on the battlefi eld and in truly mastering the and CBRN responses are learned behaviors that cannot be ability to operate in expeditionary environments. The past taught at the time of incident. The precision and attention to has shown us we can expect to operate from locations where detail that drill and ceremony demands directly contribute the most meager of infrastructure exists. We must prepare to success on the battlefi eld. every day to be fi t of mind, body, and soul. General Carl E. Mundy Jr. said it best when he published 5. Training for the Purpose of Warfi ghting. As Marines, Leading Marines in 1995: “Our actions as Marines every we fi ght, and we win. To be “the most ready when the Nation day must embody the legacy of those who went before us. is least ready” is the purpose of everything we do. In order to Their memorial to us—their teaching, compassion, cour- achieve this, we must be prepared to conduct combat opera- age, sacrifi ces, optimism, humor, humility, commitment, tions at any time in any place. Our core belief that “every perseverance, love, guts, and glory—is the pattern for our Marine is a rifl eman” is central to our identity and key to daily lives.” our ability to accomplish this mission. Utilizing available time and resources on training that is realistic and demand- ing while remaining focused on warfi ghting must remain a priority. In short, we train hard to affect real outcomes in combat. We train as we fi ght, and we fi ght to win. 6. History, Tradition, and Protocol. Starting with initial , training, every Marine is indoctrinated in the Corps’ rich TROY E. BLACK history. By constantly reinforcing and reminding Marines of 19th Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps that legacy, we sustain the transformation from civilian to recruit and from recruit to Marine. As Marines, we do not earn the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor, but the right to wear it. With the right to be called Marine comes the responsibility to live up to the history set down by those who came before

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 5 Special NoticeS

The 2020 Kiser Family Warfare Essay Contest

The Gazette is proud to announce the winners of the 2020 Kiser Family Irregular Warfare Essay Contest. This writing contest was presented in collaboration with the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity and made possible through the personal interest and generosity of Mr. John Kiser and the William and Mary Grieve Foundation. 1stLt Matthew Capt Wayland J. Blue The 2020 theme was “The Future of Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Beattie-Callahan Marines.” Competitive authors were asked to address the following questions: “As our Service implements a historic effort to modernize the Marine Corps for the era of great power competition, how should it plan and execute Civil-Military Operations across the competition and conflict continuum? What relevant lessons should the Corps sustain from almost two decades of war among the people to prepare commanders and posture our Civil Affairs Marines to inform, influence, shape and gain access to the cognitive civil environment in support of a naval campaign against a peer adversary?” The first place winner is 1stLt Matthew Beattie-Callahan, for his essay “Closing the Gray Zone Gap: Future Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations in the South China Sea.” Second place goes to Capt Wayland J. Blue, for the essay “Preparing for War among the People in the Indo-Pacific.” Maj Leo Spaeder’s essay, “Canary in the Coalmine: Civil Maj Leo Spaeder Capt James L. Affairs as Augur of Force Design 2030,” was awarded Third Place. Finally, an Honorable Johnsen, USMCR Mention is presented to Capt James L. Johnsen, USMCR, for “The ‘One Love’ Approach to Expeditionary Advance Base Operations: Learning to Use Civil Affairs for Sea Control from the Jamaican Coast Guard.” Readers may look forward to publication of the winning articles as early as the February edition of the Gazette.

LtGen Anthony Lukeman Passes

Anthony Lukeman, a retired lieutenant general who was the driving force behind the modernization of the Marine Corps Association during his decade-long tenure as executive director, died on 11 November 2020, at the age of 87. LtGen Lukeman came to the MCA in 1989 and was responsible for leading efforts to computerize the association. He also took an active role in Leatherneck and Marine Corps Gazette, reading every word in the magazines before they were published each month. “I was thrilled to be in the company of writers. There is nothing more important than informing Marines,” said LtGen Lukeman. Before LtGen Lukeman took the helm of MCA, he served for 35 years in the Marine Corps. He was commissioned a second lieutenant after his 1954 graduation from Dartmouth College. He later earned a master’s degree in business administration from University, and he is a graduate of Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the National War College. He served in all three active Marine Divisions and commanded infantry Marines at the platoon, company, battalion, and regimental level. He served tours in Vietnam with in 1966 and 1967 and with the Vietnamese Marine Corps in 1974 and 1975. He helped plan and execute the evacuation of U.S. and Vietnamese citizens from Saigon in 1975. Other assignments included Director of the Manpower Plans and Policy Division, Headquarters Marine Corps; Commanding General, Marine Corps Base Camp LtGen Anthony Lukeman, USMC(Ret). (Credit: Pendleton; CG, Marine Corps Recruit Depot/Western Recruiting Region, San Diego; History Division.) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Manpower and Personnel Policy). His awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal; Bronze Star with combat “V”; the Meritorious Service Medal with two gold stars in lieu of a second and third award; and Joint Service Commendation Medal. When LtGen Lukeman retired from the MCA in 1998, he was honored by the staff of Marine Corps Gazette with a bronze plaque of his final editorial for the magazine. The plaque read: “In appreciation for the 115 issues that you so diligently proofread. We thought it only appropriate to return the favor—we could find no errors in this editorial.” LtGen Lukeman later said, “the two magazines were the most important part of my job. You could be 22 or 90 years old, they bound the generations of Marines. That’s what makes us a special breed.”

6 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021

Letters

Maneuverist Papers “Winning Battles Will Not Be was the beginning of a long-term relation- 2 It was interesting to learn the value of Enough in a Great Power Conflict” ship between Lind and the Marine Corps as studying the German war experience has been 2 A quick salute to Col Tom Greenwood well as the inclusion of some of my classroom questioned and its role in warfighting educa- for his November 2020 article, “Winning exercises as an appendix in Lind’s 1985 tion diminished. This is certainly evident Battles Will Not Be Enough in a Great Power publication, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, in a review of the current Commandant’s Conflict.” It is thoughtful and provocative, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). The Professional Reading List. The Marine Corps telling us things we need to keep in mind but healthy debate that ensued was productive. professional philosophy—embracing the im- do not always. The notes offer a superb guide Col Michael D. Wyly, USMC(Ret) portance of study as vehicle through which to for further exploration. Col Greenwood is improve through the experiences of others—is continuing in the tradition of service by his a Prussian, and therefore German, construct. father, Col John Greenwood, editor of the Response to “Let Boyd Speak” Nov Scharnhorst and Clausewitz made study a Gazette for twenty years (1980–2000). Col 20 centerpiece as they collaborated in the wake John kept the door open wide for provoca- 2 Maj Kerg’s article offers great perspective of the Napoleonic wars to professionalize the tive ideas. It was always open even for young on FMFM 1/MCDP 1 and the doctrine of Prussian military. The Germans were Western whippersnappers, as I learned first hand. This maneuver warfare in general. If there was pioneers in the concepts of maneuver warfare was true even when he disagreed with those anyone who answers the question, “what is in two world wars as they struggled to over- ideas. maneuver warfare?” I think Maj Kerg has come the primary operational feature of 20th Col Nick Reynolds, USMCR(Ret) gone a long way in doing so. He decouples century warfighting, the defense in depth. the discussion from the German experi- Previous articles by Marinus asserted ence, which—while a singular example of the theory of maneuver warfare addresses “Re-Maneuverizing the Marine maneuver warfare in action—has problems the timeless nature of war. Changes to the Corps” as well. He moves the discussion away from character of war follow changes in technol- 2 I must correct a discrepancy in our article mission type orders as a leadership approach ogy. Not only can we learn of war’s nature published in the November issue of the some have conflated with maneuver warfare from the Germans, the German development Gazette, pp. 36–40, “Re-Maneuverizing the doctrine and point to as a “say-do gap.” He of combined arms through the employment Marine Corps” by Maj Sean Barrett, Mie Au- also steers the discussion clear of controver- of armor and attack aircraft in the early days gier, and myself (Col M. Wyly, USMC[Ret]). sial attrition versus non-attrition warfare. All of World War II provides insight on innova- I thought I had raised the issue with my this is really good. tion and the challenges of rapid institutional fellow co-authors, and it is my fault for not I thought his insights into how doctrine change. With the exception of ethics, the making the finalLetter check. Removed can be watered down as it goes through edit- nature of war and innovation are arguably The article as writtenat the states, “While at ing and review was spot on. He only missed the two most critical pillars of study for any AWS, Col WylyAuthor’s invited Request Bill Lind.” I had one piece: he describes the OODA loop as military professional. There is plenty of both never heard of Bill Lind when I put together a “cognitive decision making model.” I had to glean from the Germans. my realtime decision-making exercise, “Bat- always thought the same. Recently though, As Marinus noted, there is more worth- talion Tactical Execution.” I briefed “the I have recognized in labeling it as such, we while material to study than any Marine has boss” on it in advance, “the boss” being miss the the “act” part of the model. It is the time to read and consider. This is why then-MGen Bernard Trainor, Director of one thing to make a decision, but it is quite guided professional education is critical. the Marine Corps Education Center. Still in another to act on that decision—perhaps to Guided education provides shortcuts, sorts advance of the exercise, the general told me have to force action against institutional iner- the wheat from the chaff, and identifies qual- he would try to get a Congressional Aide by tia. Calling the OODA loop a decision cycle ity material to those seeking improvement. the name of William Lind to come down and neglecting action is a mistake. This is why formal schools exist and is the to Quantico on the day of the exercise and Alex Vohr intent behind the Commandant’s Profes- observe. The general went on to say Mr. Lind sional Reading List. Harvard Business School had been critical of the Marine Corps’ (and recognizes the importance of guided study in Army) tactical doctrine, that Lind was a stu- their case study approach. Perhaps invest- dent of history (as was I), and that given the ment to develop a library of Marine Corps opportunity to observe what was happening case studies as an addition to what is offered at Quantico, Mr. Lind might come to realize through formal PME and the Commandant’s that we were going full out to modernize our reading list is warranted. A robust library of preparedness—especially in view of the Cold case studies addressing the broad spectrum of War threat of war with the Soviets. conflict could act as a learning rapid acceler- Mr. Lind appeared in the AWS classroom ant when time is the limiting factor. some fifteen or twenty minutes into the Alex Vohr exercise and introduced himself to me. This

Letters of professional interest on any topic are welcomed by the Gazette. They should not exceed 300 words and should be DOUBLE SPACED. Letters may be e-mailed to [email protected]. Written letters are generally published 3 months after the article appeared. The entire Gazette is now online at www.mca-marines.org/gazette.

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mericans do not want to see Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, or >Maj Gayl enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1974, where he served as an Anti-Tank A Marines sacrifi ced in a for- Assaultman and attained the rank of sergeant. Later, he served as a Marine Corps eign war when it is known in Infantry Offi cer until his retirement in 2002. He has since served as a civilian Sci- advance that the cause is questionable ence and Technology Advisor in Headquarters Marine Corps. and there is no path to victory. We also do not want outdated legacy policy to lull us into a war that is ill-advised in or politically incentivized by China- States recognizes the expedition is both contemporary context. averse members of Congress, to militar- misguided and unwinnable.2 Nevertheless, in the absence of ily intervene on Taiwan’s behalf under The origins of the crisis are clear. In informed debate, the path to war be- the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Since 1971, the United Nations (UN) seated tween the United States and China China’s sovereignty over Taiwan is the the mainland PRC as China’s legitimate over Taiwan is predestined. If Taiwan PRC’s core national security priority, representative and ejected the Republic attempts to secede from One China, the confl ict will escalate without limit. of China (ROC) ruling Taiwan. Despite the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) In contrast, Taiwan’s fate does not pose U.S. ideological preference for the ROC, will act under its Anti-Secession Law an existential threat to U.S. sovereignty in 1979, the United States followed UN to prevent it, likely preemptively. Any or democracy. Many Americans will suit by abrogating its security treaty with sitting U.S. President will be pressured, likely be sacrifi ced before the United the ROC and severing formal relations. We then established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC.3 Three communiques jointly devel- oped by the United States and PRC are the foundation of formal diplomatic re- lations between the two countries. The Three Joint Communiques delineate an agreed path to political unifi cation of the mainland and Taiwan that leads to the end of the . None of the communiques entertain Taiwan’s secession, and all seek peaceful unifi ca- tion. Still, the PRC maintains that the civil war is an internal Chinese affair and has not ruled out the use of force to unify.4 Separately, a lingering fear of PRC invasion prompted Congress to enact the TRA in 1979. The TRA ignores One China sovereignty and mandates U.S. provision of military capabilities Figure 1. One China.1 directly to Taiwan for its self-defense.

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It also requires the United States to remain militarily ready to intervene if the PRC acts to unify One China non- peacefully.5 The TRA is not a binding treaty, and ambiguous language affords the United States options including inaction in re- sponse to PRC aggression. But fearing a loss of credibility with regional allies, U.S. decision makers feel pressured to treat the TRA suggestions of inter- vention as legal obligations. The PRC warned that a U.S. security relationship with a Chinese province countermand- ed the joint communiques and would lead to conflict—and has prepared for war with the United States ever since.6 Initially, prospects for peace were hopeful as the PRC Chinese Commu- nist Party (CCP) and ROC Kuomin- tang worked cooperatively towards unification. But in 2000, the separatist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Figure 2. Qing Dynasty in 1644–1912. won the presidency and reversed prog- ress. Emboldened by TRA suggestions, the DPP pursued an independence plat- form that alleged Taiwan’s non-Chinese identity. Since 2016, the DPP has held the presidency and dominates the leg- islature.7 Today, the DPP’s independence ambitions are encouraged by China- averse U.S. Cabinet-level officials and the 163-member, bicameral, bipar- tisan Congressional Taiwan Caucus. Over time, Taiwan’s relationship with the United States has become indis- tinguishable from a security alliance. PRC skepticism with the TRA in 1979 proved prescient, as the United States has abandoned the spirit and intent of the communiques.8 Still, the PRC continues to look for reasons not to force unification consid- ering the devastation that war would bring to Taiwan, the mainland, the United States, and the region. However, in recent years, PRC doubts regarding the sincerity of U.S. commitment to One China have grown.9 To emphasize its seriousness on Tai- wan’s secession, the PRC imposed on itself a legal obligation to forcefully pre- vent the renegade province’s split from China. All the while, the balance of military power shifted as China’s ca- pabilities came to overmatch previously Figure 3. One China in 1979.

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For more information, visit mca-marines.org/legacy-gift-planning Ideas & Issues (Strategy & Policy) unchallenged U.S. military supremacy Chinese with deep cross-strait familial The legitimacy of Taiwan’s secession is in many areas. The TRA no longer has ties, economic interdependencies, and a equivalent to that of the Confederacy.15 the deterrence value that it did when shared Mandarin language, culture, and Additionally, China’s history of enacted.10 dynastic history. As for U.S. acknowl- whole of society commitment to regime Taiwan’s independence advocates de- edgement, Figures 2–4 are official maps survival is legendary. The Taiping, Mus- ride PRC claims to sovereignty over Tai- dating from the 19th century through lim, and other 19th century unrest cost wan as propaganda and talking points. 1979 showing the United States’ con- 60 million Chinese lives. Twentieth cen- Yet, since the 1600s, the territories of the temporaneous knowledge of Taiwan’s tury civil war losses ranged between five Qing Dynasty have defined China, and provincial status within the sovereign and eight million, and 400,000 Chinese they encompassed the mainland and nation of China.13 perished in Korea. In each case, the Taiwan. Taiwan’s recent alienation is in- As the last major unresolved civil war regime(s) emerged stronger, and this stead an artificial byproduct of China’s contention, Taiwan is the PRC’s core resolute traditional self-narrative is a humiliating century-long colonization national security priority. Civil wars source of great pride for all Chinese. by foreign powers, to include Taiwan’s are particularly brutal because of the These civilizational precedents are use- occupation by Japan beginning in ful in anticipating PRC actions as they 1895.11 pertain to Taiwan.16 In 1927, the Communist PRC chal- If the Chinese Civil War is reignited, lenged the Nationalist ROC for Chi- Taiwan is the PRC’s massive societal costs and casualties nese leadership, igniting the Chinese core national security will not demoralize a motivated PRC Civil War. Following Japan’s defeat in citizenry but rather fuel its patriotism. 1945, all Qing Dynasty territories were priority. Nationalist fervor is sure to tolerate returned to the still-reigning wartime battlefield setbacks and extend CCP ROC. But, in 1949 a tactically defeated, legitimacy. Militarily, the PLA will also though politically intact ROC with- have distinctive advantages. These in- drew to Taiwan from the mainland. underlying passions prompting them, clude fighting along internal lines and The civil war paused as the strategically as demonstrated in China, Korea, and benefiting from an extant PRC com- undefeated ROC and PRC adversaries Vietnam: the three deadliest civil wars mand economy that enables recovery continued to claim legitimate rule of in modern history. We had our own from losses faster than the United States all China.12 emotionally charged experience with and its allies.17 DPP assertions of a non-Chinese the attempted secession of renegade ter- In contrast, core U.S. national secu- Taiwanese identity present a false his- ritories resulting in the American Civil rity interests will not be at stake, and tory. Taiwan’s citizens are ethnic Han War: the deadliest war in U.S. history. historical precedents are again relevant. A cold calculus deliberately delayed U.S. entry into the European theater even though U.S. leaders knew the Holo- caust had begun. Also, costs, casualties, and debatable justifications for military expeditions compelled U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Lebanon, and Soma- lia short of mission accomplishment. Likewise, pragmatism discouraged the United States from intervening when at different times the Soviet Union in- vaded Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and . Finally, desperate humani- tarian need was insufficient to motivate U.S. action to stop the Rwandan, Cam- bodian, or Darfur genocides.18 Neither the United States nor Great Britain intervened on Hong Kong’s (HK) behalf in response to the PRC crackdown because the cause did not justify the costs. With these interest- based precedents, there is no U.S. ideo- logical or national security justification to militarily intervene on Taiwan’s be- Figure 4. Republic of China in 1912–1949.14 half, especially as HK’s fate would mir-

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ror Taiwan’s in a politically unified One special interests in dire warnings and and free enterprise in Southeast Asia. China.19 noble arguments.23 Their choice of words is ominously The United States blames the PRC Congressional interests are deeply similar to statements of the American for the Taiwan dilemma. But it was conflicted. Since 1979, the TRA has Friends of Vietnam (AFV), the pow- the DPP that voluntarily and with full opened Taiwan as a major market for erful lobby that pressured the United knowledge of the dangerous conse- foreign military sales by the U.S. de- States to commit to the fateful Vietnam quences brought on the current crisis. fense industry. The total value of arms War.28 The DPP chose to depart from the spirit sales since its enactment now exceeds But the balance of power between the of the communiques by rejecting both 100 billion dollars. More importantly, PRC and United States has shifted in political unification in One China and Taiwan has an outsized impact on the ways we did not anticipate in 1979, and the One Country, Two Systems model overall U.S. defense budget and defense the opponent we face is in many respects under which both Taiwan and HK have industry profits, as Taiwan is portrayed a peer superpower. What we think of and will continue to get rich and prosper as crucial to U.S. strategic objectives in the PRC’s government, ideology, cul- in One China.20 the western Pacific.24 ture, internal behaviors, and sovereign These and other incendiary DPP The reciprocal relationship between claim to Taiwan is irrelevant from the actions baited the PRC and likewise defense contractors, lobbyists, contribu- perspective of realpolitik. Taiwan will energized the Congressional Taiwan tions, and a member of Congress’ re- always mean more to China than the Caucus. The DPP can wag the Ameri- electability is well established. It renders United States; in terms of U.S. interests, can dog by holding the U.S. military obvious the Congressional support for we are no longer capable of dictating hostage to its irresponsible rhetoric. It increasing both arms sales to Taiwan foreign outcomes in our favor.29 takes TRA assurances for granted, as and U.S. defense capabilities in the U.S. Others optimistically assume the a blank check to employ American pa- Indo-Pacific Command. Our fawning PRC’s citizenry longs for a western-style triots as it suits Taiwan’s whims. Even admiration for and default dismissal liberal democracy like Taiwan’s, and though the United States has gener- of PRC positions on Taiwan form a that war will trigger popular revolt on ously provided arms and training to bipartisan U.S. echo chamber.25 the mainland. But throughout Chinese history, it has been political elites that prompt change from within, not the masses, and the PRC political class is Some insist we must stand up for Taiwan as a beacon fiercely nationalistic.30 of hope and last line of defense for liberal democracy Still, others believe that Taiwan’s status is undetermined, and the PRC and free enterprise in Southeast Asia. should accept Taiwan’s democratically enabled self-determination. But for the PRC, Taiwan never ceased being sov- Taiwan to defend itself and ensure Many experts minimize the dan- ereign China. Also, centralized CCP peaceful unification, the DPP behaves gers of a military confrontation with messaging motivates 1.4 billion citizens as though U.S. military protection is a the PRC over Taiwan. They contend to speak with one emotional voice that permanent entitlement.21 the status quo will hold, and if not, a renegade Taiwan is sovereign China. Independence fervor of older seces- conflict would be swift and limited. The United States’ lack of such a uni- sionists and naivete of younger Taiwan- Also, a U.S. alliance that includes Tai- fying message will be evident when a ese who lack twentieth century Chinese wan, Japan, Australia, and others can be violently polarized public reacts to a Civil War memories ignore the suffering counted on, while the PRC will be iso- major, costly, and above all optional and renewed devastation that will come lated as a pariah without axis friends.26 foreign military expedition.31 from conflict with the PRC. Similarly, But U.S. allies are conscious of Chi- Strident PRC-averse politicians and Taiwan’s U.S. champions dismiss omens na’s grit on the topic of Taiwan, and lobbyists have suggested replacing the in Chinese history that U.S. support for alliance considerations are tempered by ambiguously worded TRA with the clar- Taiwan’s independence will contribute their countries’ PRC proximities and ity and certainty of U.S. intervention to that bad ending.22 vulnerabilities. Also, the PRC shares a under a legally binding defense treaty The Congressional Taiwan Caucus mutual defense treaty with the nuclear- that extends the U.S. nuclear umbrella continues to imply that Taiwan’s fate armed Democratic People’s Republic of to cover Taiwan. U.S. military profes- is core to U.S. national security. While Korea (DPRK). A war with the PRC sionals have joined the chorus proposing the caucus includes an ideologically over Taiwan is primed to escalate with- the United States station thousands of diverse membership, its most hawkish out limit, and short of PRC victory will U.S. forces on the island as a casualty members hold sway on caucus policy. not end swiftly.27 tripwire.32 Neoconservative advisors, journalists, Some insist we must stand up for But Chinese military potency is con- authors, and think tanks are incentiv- Taiwan as a beacon of hope and last firmed, and evidence from Chinese his- ized to assist with messaging that cloaks line of defense for liberal democracy tory, such as the PRC’s mass entrance

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Western Pacific assures that Marines and Sailors will bear the initial brunt of a collision between strong existential PRC and weak elite U.S. interests in Taiwan. Rational Taiwanese will un- derstand when the United States steers clear of the unresolved Chinese Civil War in the best interests of both the United States and Taiwan. Of course, in the end, the Taiwanese will do as they please, but as honorable people, they should not expect the price of their free will decisions to be paid in American blood.38

Figure 5. China’s global port ownership clusters around key trade routes and maritime choke- Notes points.35 1. Information available at https://favpng.com.

into the Korean War, guarantee such For example, if premeditated PRC cau- 2. Ted Galen Carpenter, America’s Coming War reckless actions would not deter but sation of a pandemic, socialism-inspired with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan, rather ignite war. In fact, they would violence in the United States, or other (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005): probably trigger PRC preemption and existential threat to our nation were “That vulnerability whereby a security patron an end to the PRC’s no-first-use nuclear proven with certainty, total war might can be dragged into a confrontation (perhaps even a full-blown war) by an excessively assertive weapons policy. In short, such actions be justified. But supporting the DPP’s client is the problem that Nikolas Gvasdev and would cause the very catastrophe that prideful ambitions falls well short of Travis Tanner scholars at the National Interest 33 36 must be averted. that high bar. aptly refer to as the ‘wag the dog’ phenomenon. Finally, some will ask what the Tai- The United States could advise DPP Taiwan is a textbook example of that danger”; wanese think, and do they even have a secessionists to peaceably accept One and Consular Jia Xiudong, Interview by ICAF say? Yes, they do. But fate made them Student Researcher, Governmental Affairs and Chinese just as fate made us Ameri- Congressional Liaison Office, (Washington, DC: cans. No peoples can wish away their ... if the PRC threatens March 2007): “For China, the importance of historical identities. We also know that resolving the issue of Taiwan in strict accordance inventing and carving away a country the United States direct- the 3 Joint Communiqués transcends any other from an existing nation incurs a steep national priority. … No matter who governs ly, achieving a whole of One China, or under what pretext, Taiwan price, one the Confederacy paid not would always stand out separately as China’s long ago. American society com- Number One national security priority.” Still, there does exist a broad spec- mitment to defeat China trum of righteous causes to confront 3. U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Resolution the PRC. They include enforcement of is guaranteed ... 2758-Seating of China and Expulsion of Taiwan, UN-verified allied claims to resources (New York, NY: October 1971); U.S. Congress, in the South and East China Seas and Joint Resolution-Mutual Defense Treaty between neutralizing armed artificial islands if the United States of America and the Republic of they come to threaten freedom of navi- Country, Two Systems and cease Tai- China, (Washington, DC: 1955). gation in international waters. Other wan’s independence ambitions. If the 4. Peoples Republic of China and the United causes are threats to allied sovereign DPP does not modify its rhetoric, we States, The Joint U.S.-China Communique, nations with whom we have binding could rescind the TRA, as baiting the (Shanghai: 1972); and United States and Chi- treaties. Figure 5 (on following page) PRC to fight is of the DPP’s own choos- na, Joint Communique on the Establishment of shows how Chinese footholds in the ing. If the Taiwan Caucus obstructs Diplomatic Relations Between the United States Middle East, Africa, and South America TRA recension, the President could of America and the People’s Republic of China, could also come to threaten vital U.S. direct all national security agencies (Shanghai: January 1979): “The United States interests.34 to stand down if the PRC takes DPP of America recognizes the Government of the Additionally, if the PRC threatens bait.37 People’s Republic of China as the sole legal the United States directly, achieving a Otherwise, we will sleep-walk into Government of China [and] acknowledges the whole of American society commitment a catastrophic war with China, lacking Chinese position that there is but one China to defeat China is guaranteed—just as both a compelling cause and whole-of- and Taiwan is part of China”; and United States and China, August 17 Joint Communi- we mobilized to defeat Imperial Japan. society buy-in. The FMF mission in the que, (Shanghai: August 1982): “Respect for

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each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity Japan (and Korea and the Philippines) and its Business Insider Australia, (October 2014), and non-interference in each other’s internal obligations to Taiwan. In each case, the U.S. available at https://www.businessinsider.com. affairs constitute the fundamental principles declares certain actions to be threat to ‘peace au: “Without a signed peace treaty, there is still guiding United States-China relations”; and and security’ and promises to use its constitu- some debate about whether the Chinese Civil Staff, Xi Jinping Says Taiwan “Must and Will tional processes to formulate a response. … War between the Republic of China and the be” Reunited with China, BBC, (January 2019), Ultimately, the core of any security guarantee is Communist Party of China ever legally ended available at https://www.bbc.com: “Mr Xi said, not legal obligation, but political will”; and Ibid. because the nationalist forces fled to Taiwan and adding would never tolerate any form Interview by ICAF Student Researcher, Govern- established a competing government”; and Ste- of activity promoting Taiwanese independence. mental Affairs and Congressional Liaison Office: phen Roach, “Opinion: What the U.S. Misses Instead, unification was ‘an inevitable require- “For China, the importance of resolving the about China: Beijing Takes the Long View,” ment relations with Taiwan were ‘part of China’s issue of Taiwan in strict accordance the 3 Joint Market Watch, (July 2019), available at https:// domestic politics’ and that ‘foreign interference Communiqués transcends any other national www.marketwatch.com: “Time and again, the is intolerable’ Beijing ‘reserves the option of tak- priority. … No matter who governs One China, long view in China has stood in sharp contrast ing all necessary measures’ against … Taiwanese or under what pretext, Taiwan would always to America’s short-term approach.” separatist activities.” stand out separately as China’s Number One national security priority.” 13. World Heritage Encyclopedia, “Taiwan 5. Lyushun Shen, “Goldwater: Unwavering Under Quing Dynasty Rule,” (Salt Lake City, Friend of ‘Free China’,” Washington Times, 9. Ibid. Interview by ICAF Student Researcher, UT: Project Gutenberg Self-Publishing Press, (November 2014), available at https://www. Governmental Affairs and Congressional Liaison n.d.): “The Qing Dynasty ruled Taiwan from washingtontimes.com: “The senator strongly Office: “America’s is perceived as encouraging 1683 to 1895. The Qing court sent an army led argued that it is a core American value and in Taiwanese independence advocates by means of by General Shi Lang and annexed Taiwan in the country’s best interest to stand by Taiwan veiled military assurances in the Taiwan Rela- 1683 … Taiwan was governed as part of Fujian as it faced an existential threat from tyranni- tions Act (TRA), and the continued sales on province at the time, only becoming a separate cal communists … Goldwater challenged the modern weapons to the Province of Taiwan province later … Taiwan was then considered administration through a lawsuit against the that are in blatant violation of the Joint Com- the most developed province in China”; infor- president of the United States and argued all the muniqués, documents that the Chinese cherish mation on Overseas China is available at https:// way to the Supreme Court, where he ultimately as inviolable”; and Kathrin Hille and Christian wikiperdia.org. failed”; and U.S. Congress, H.R.2479 Taiwan Shepherd, “Taiwan: Concern Grows Over Chi- Relations Act, (Washington, DC: 1979). na’s Invasion Threat,” Financial Times, (January 14. S. Augustus Mitchell, Hindoostan, Farther 2020), available at https://www.ft.com. India, China and Tibet, Map, S. Augustus 6. Ibid; Interview by ICAF Student Researcher, Mitchell, in Mitchells 1864 New General World Governmental Affairs and Congressional Liaison 10. 10th National People’s Congress, Presiden- Atlas, 1864. Office: “America’s is perceived as encouraging tial Decree No. 34-Anti-Secession Law, (Beijing: Taiwanese independence advocates by means of 2005): “In the event that the ‘Taiwan inde- 15. Kyle Mizokami, “5 Most Lethal Civil veiled military assurances in the Taiwan Rela- pendence’ secessionist forces should act under Wars of All Time: War Within Nations are tions Act (TRA), and the continued sales on any name or by any means to cause the fact of Some of the Most Brutal Conflicts in His- modern weapons to the Province of Taiwan Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major tory,” The National Interest, (July 2015), avail- that are in blatant violation of the Joint Com- incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from able at https://nationalinterest.org: “When muniqués, documents that the Chinese cherish China should occur, or that possibilities for a a country is threatened with dissolution or as inviolable”; and Richard Bush, “The Unit- peaceful re-unification should be completely partition it strikes at the heart of nationalist ed States Security Partnership with Taiwan,” exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful sentiment. For that reason, civil wars can be (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, means and other necessary measures to protect uncommonly brutal,” and “[During] the Chi- 2016): “Despite the ambiguity of public Ameri- China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”; nese Civil War … [more] than eight million can rhetoric, the capabilities that the PRC has and U.S.-China Economic and Security Review people were killed … mostly civilians killed acquired to complicate any U.S. intervention Commission, USCC Annual Report, (Washing- by disease, starvation and reprisals … [During suggest that it assumes the United States will ton, DC: November, 2019): “Chinese military the technically unresolved Korean Civil War in fact act to defend Taiwan.” strategists see AI as a breakout technology that ,nearly] one million South Koreans died dur- could enable China to rapidly modernize its ing , or just under five percent of the 7. Xu Shiquan, “The 1992 Consensus: A Review military, surpassing overall U.S. capabilities population [and] North Korea … suffered an and Assessment of Consultations Between the and developing tactics that specifically target estimated 1.5 million killed … ten to fifteen Association for Relations Across the Taiwan U.S. vulnerabilities.” percent of the overall population … [During Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation,” Vietnam Civil War, military] dead amounted American Foreign Policy Interests, (Washington, 11. Ibid; Peter Gries, China’s New Nationalism, to … 300,000 South Vietnamese personnel … DC: National Committee on American Foreign (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, up to 1.1 million North Vietnamese personnel Policy, 2001); and information for Democratic 2005): “Official Chinese sources frequently de- [and up to] 2.5 million civilians.” Progressive Party is available at www.wikipe- clare that [the Century of Humiliation] ended dia.org. in 1945 with Chinese participation in the Allied 16. Henry Kissinger, On China, (New York, NY: victory over Japan”; and Melissa J. Brown, Is Penguin Group, 2011): “[The] conflict between 8. Julian Ku, “Taiwan’s U.S. Defense Guarantee Taiwan Chinese, (Berkeley, CA: University of the Taiping and the [Qing] ranks as one of is Not Strong, But It Isn’t That Weak Either,” California Press, 2004). history’s most deadly conflicts, with casualties Lawfare, (January 2016), available at https:// in the tens of millions … it is estimated that www.lawfareblog.com: “[There] is little dif- 12. Ibid. Jeremy Bender and Amanda Macias, “5 during the Taiping, Muslim and Nian upheav- ference between the U.S. defense obligation to Of The 10 Deadliest Wars Began In China,” als China’s population declined from roughly

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410 million in 1850 to roughly 350 million 19. Staff, “The Hong Kong Protests Explained regardless of whether the PLA actually manages in 1873”; and Bevin Chu, “The Myth of Ca- in 100 and 500 Words,” BBC News, (Novem- to capture the island and eliminate organized sualty Aversion: Your Death is Acceptable,” ber 2019), available at https://www.bbc.com: opposition … China will likely want to terrorize Antiwar.com, (November 1999), available at “Anti-government protests have rocked Hong the civilian population into submission early www.antiwar.com: “Beijing is willing … to lose Kong for months and the situation shows no with its initial missile and airstrikes … once hundreds of thousands, possibly even millions sign of dying down”; and Gordon G. Chang, fighting starts in urban areas casualties will of Chinese troops’ lives to prevent the loss of “Hong Kong May Topple Communism,” WSJ, be in the tens, if not hundreds, of thousands Taiwan, which is sovereign Chinese territory. (September 2019), available at wsj.com: “A con- … the society and economy will be brought to Beijing is willing to lose at least as many lives stant of Chinese history is that regimes begin to their knees.” preventing Taiwan secession as the Union was disintegrate along the periphery.” willing to lose preventing Confederate seces- 23. Ibid; “Taiwan Separatist Lobby Try Hi- sion, or North Vietnam was willing to lose to 20. Staff, “Xi Jinping Offers ‘One Country, jacking U.S. Policy,”: “Especially with the con- prevent the partition of Vietnam into northern Two Systems’ for Taiwan’s Unification,”The servative Republicans with anti-Communist and southern halves.” Economic Times, (September 2014), available at mentality, the island has found common ideo- https://economictimes.indiatimes.com: “Chi- logical ground with them … in the 1980s, the 17. Ibid. David Lampton, “Why The Taiwan nese President Xi Jinping today said Taiwan Democrats also found they have political values Issue Is So Dangerous,” PBS, (n.d.), available at independence is ‘unfeasible’ and ‘no secession- in common, so even though Taiwan politicians https://www.pbs.org: “Chinese leaders believe ist act’ will be tolerated, even as he proposed provided material benefits to influence U.S. that, if they were to let Taiwan go independent the Hong Kong model of ‘One country, Two foreign policy, they would not be criticized in and not respond, they would probably be over- systems’ for peaceful reunification of the island U.S. public opinion due to ideological reasons”; thrown by their own nationalistic people ... they with mainland China,” and “Chinese President and Rosie Gray, “The Free Beacon Fired A Top would be willing to engage in what we might Xi Jinping today said Taiwan independence Reporter For A ‘Financial Transaction’ With call ‘self-defeating military adventures’ in order is ‘unfeasible’ and ‘no secessionist act’ will be Someone He Frequently Covered,” Buzzfeed, to prevent that result, even if they knew they tolerated, even as he proposed the Hong Kong (October 2019), available at https://www. were going to lose”; and Robert Farley, “We model of ‘One country, Two systems’ for peace- buzzfeednews.com: “On Friday, the Free Bea- Asked an Expert to Imagine a U.S.-China War. ful reunification of the island with mainland con’s leadership published a note saying that We Wish We Hadn’t,” The National Interest, China.” the site ‘recently learned that senior editor Bill (October 2019), available at https://nationalin- Gertz entered into a previously undisclosed fi- terest.org: “China will not find it difficult to 21. Staff, “What is the ‘One China’ Policy?” nancial transaction with an individual or an reconstruct war losses … we can expect that BBC News, (February 2017), available at www. affiliate of that individual whom Mr. Gertz the Chinese shipbuilding and aviation indus- bbc.com: “Taiwan is not recognized as an inde- had covered in some of his reporting.’ … Guo tries will replace most losses within the de- pendent country by much of the world nor even lives in New York and has been a vocal critic of cade … the war will, by necessity, ‘modernize’ the United Nations [however, it] leverages on the Chinese government, and has applied for the PLA by destroying legacy capability … its long-term emotional relationship with the asylum in the U.S.” [the] United States may have a harder time U.S. to extract concessions. It employs a small replacing losses, and not only because U.S. group of powerful lobbyists in Washington DC 24. Information regarding U.S. arms sales to warships and aircraft cost more than their including former senator Bob Dole, who U.S. Taiwan available at https://en.wikipedia.org and Chinese counterparts.” media reported helped to arrange contacts that Kensaku Ihara, “Taiwan Invites U.S. Defense culminated in a controversial phone call be- Contractors as Diplomatic Chess Heats Up,” 18. History.com Editors, “American Response tween Mr. Trump and Taiwan’s President Tsai Nikkei Asia, (May 2018), available at https:// to the Holocaust,” History.com, (October 2009), Ing-wen”; and Yang Sheng, “Taiwan Separat- asia.nikkei.com: “Taipei is eager to build up Tai- available at www.history.com: “The extermi- ist Lobby Try Hijacking U.S. Policy,” Global wan’s submarine force, part of which is pictured nation of European Jewry began when the Times, (May 2020), available at https://www. here at a naval base in Kaohsiung, ‘Taiwanese German army invaded the Soviet Union globaltimes.cn: “When the U.S. established for- and U.S. defense industry executives gathered in June 1941. … But the State Depart- mal diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic here on Thursday for a first-of-its-kind confer- ment … decided not to inform Wise of China in 1979, Taiwan had used its lobby ence that shows President Tsai Ing-wen’s desire … until November 1942”; and Dominic groups to ensure the U.S. passed the Taiwan for closer ties with Washington at a time when Tierney, “Why Has America Stopped Winning Relations Act to maintain some connections Beijing is whittling away at the island’s diplo- Wars?” The Atlantic, (June 2015), available at between the island and the U.S. under table, matic partners.” https://www.theatlantic.com: “Since 1945, the including arm sales.” United States has experienced little except mili- 25. Matthew R. Kambrod, Lobbying for De- tary stalemate and loss—precisely because it’s 22. Anna Fifield, “Taiwan’s Born Independent fense: An Insider’s View, (Annapolis, MD: a superpower in a more peaceful world … Millennials are Becoming Xi Jinping’s Lost Naval Institute Press, 2007): “While ethically The Korean War … deteriorated into a grim Generation,” Washington Post, (2019), avail- one could take the high road and say that it is stalemate ... In Vietnam, the United States faced able at https://www.washingtonpost.com: “A wrong for Members of Congress at times key outright military defeat … [We] swaggered into generation of young Taiwanese, who like to to the funding cycle, understand that this is [Afghanistan] … but the recovered … say they were ‘born independent,’ have never part of the process of lobbying and contribut- setting the stage for today’s stalemated conflict thought their homeland could be subsumed ing does give you an advantage,” and “In the … In Iraq [we] triggered the collapse of civil into the People’s Republic of China the way plus-up process it can be very useful to have government and widespread unrest … Since Hong Kong was in 1997”; and Grant Newsham, powerful Members of Congress dealing with 1945 … United States is one for five ... The “War in the Taiwan Strait is Not Unthinkable,” Defense appropriations in one’s corner”; and in 1991 is the only success story.” Asia Times, (January 2020), available at https:// Dr. Jeffrey Record, Japan’s Decision for War in asiatimes.com: “Taiwan will suffer immensely, 1941: Some Enduring Lessons, (Carlisle, PA: U.S.

18 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 Ideas & Issues (Strategy & Policy)

Army War College, 2009), “There can be no People’s Republic of Korea, (Beijing: July 1961). ued support”; and Senator John F. Kennedy, justification for a foreign policy that consciously In the event of one of the Contracting Parties “America’s Stake in Vietnam,” (speech, Ameri- propels a state into a war against an inherently being subjected to the armed attack by any state can Friends of Vietnam, New York, NY: 1956): undefeatable enemy. [Clausewitz stated] ‘[The] or several states jointly and thus being involved “It is a genuine pleasure to be here today at this presumption of moral or spiritual superiority in a state of war, the other Contracting Party vital Conference … sponsored by the American can fatally discount the consequences of an shall immediately render military and other as- Friends of Vietnam, an organization of which enemy’s material superiority.’” sistance by all means at its disposal; and Emma I am proud to be a member … Vietnam rep- Moore, “Attrition and the Will to Fight a Great resents the cornerstone of the Free World in 26. Bartlett, Duncan Bartlett, “How Far Will Power War,” (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Southeast Asia … Her economy is essential to Japan Go to Help Keep Taiwan Free?” Japan Press, 2019): “The first 48 hours of a hot war … the economy of all of Southeast Asia; and her Forward, (October 2018), available at https:// with China could see erosion of U.S. credibility political liberty is an inspiration to those seeking japan-forward.com, “Taiwan’s president has call into question which allies would respond to to obtain or maintain their liberty in all parts urged Japan to help protect the island from a call for support against China … The public of Asia—and indeed the world … However … what she calls ‘tremendous pressure’ from tolerance for casualties may be low compared the rising prestige and influence of Communist mainland China”; and U.S. Department of to twentieth-century conflicts.” China in Asia are unchangeable facts … If this State, U.S. Relations with Taiwan: Bilateral democratic experiment fails … then weakness, Relations Factsheet, (Washington, DC: 2018): 28. Karla Jones, “At a Time When Global De- not strength, will characterize the meaning of “The United States does not support Taiwan mocracy Is in Retreat Taiwan Offers Hope,” democracy in the minds of still more Asians. independence … The United States insists on American Legislative Exchange Council, (Febru- The United States is directly responsible for this the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differ- ary 2018), available at https://www.alec.org: experiment … We cannot afford to permit that ences, opposes unilateral changes to the status “Against this bleak backdrop, Taiwan serves experiment to fail.” quo by either side, and encourages both sides as a democratic beacon of hope … Taiwan’s to continue their constructive dialogue on the steadfast commitment to democracy is all the 29. Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Realpolitik basis of dignity and respect.” more remarkable because its democratic tra- Political Philosophy,” available at www.bri- ditions developed so recently … Taiwan has tannica.com: “Realpolitik, politics based on 27. PRC and DPRK, Treaty of Friendship, Co- upheld rule of law and democratic values in practical objectives rather than on ideals. The operation and Mutual Assistance Between the the face of significant geostrategic challenges word does not mean ‘real’ in the English sense People’s Republic of China and the Democratic and has definitely earned America’s contin- but rather connotes ‘things’—hence a politics

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 19 Ideas & Issues (Strategy & Policy)

of adaptation to things as they are. Realpolitik Mills, “Deterring the Dragon: Returning U.S. ing the two political systems and populations thus suggests a pragmatic, no-nonsense view, Forces to Taiwan,” Military Review, (Fort Leav- into a fight to finish, ending in unconditional and a disregard for ethical considerations. In enworth, KS, Army University Press, 2020): surrender, dictated peace, occupation, regime diplomacy it is often associated with relentless, “U.S. ground combat forces are the most ca- extinction, and domination”; and Jeffrey Re- though realistic, pursuit of the national inter- pable in the world, and it would be extremely cord, Japan’s Decision for War in 1941: Some est”; and “We Asked an Expert to Imagine a unlikely that the U.S. government would not Enduring Lessons, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War U.S.-China War. We Wish We Hadn’t”: “The commit to a larger conflict after U.S. ground College, 2009), “The Japanese decision for war United States will have to face the ‘was it forces were engaged in Taiwan … Without U.S. against the United States was the product of worth it?’ question. In victory or defeat, the forces in Taiwan, it is increasingly likely that Japanese fatalism, racial arrogance, cultural U.S. will suffer substantial military and eco- China will attempt to integrate Taiwan into its incomprehension … Yet the end result of this nomic damage.” republic by force.” drive for power, honor, and reputation was Japan’s complete destruction and subsequent 30. Ibid; and Yuhua Wang, “Can the Chinese 33. Kuni Miyake, “What if U.S. Forces Return occupation by the United States.” Communist Party Learn from Chinese Emper- to Taiwan?” Japan Times, (September 2020), ors?” in The China Questions, (Cambridge, MA: available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/: 37. Ted Galen Carpenter, “Will the U.S. Go Harvard University Press, 2018): “Lesson two: “Hu Xijin, the editor of China’s Global Times, to War with China over Taiwan?” Financial Elite is the most important cause of tweeted, ‘I must warn people in the U.S. and Times, (October 2020), available at https:// dynastic fall. Most dynasties were overthrown Taiwan who hold this kind of thinking. Once www.ft.com: “However, U.S. leaders should not by foreign enemies or the masses, but by they take the step of returning U.S. forces to also make it clear that Taiwan is on its own, political elites … the biggest threat was from Taiwan, the PLA will definitely start a just and alter the TRA’s language to remove any within the regime rather than from society or war to safeguard China’s territorial integrity’”; implied defense commitment. As fond as we foreign countries”; and Timothy R. Heath, “The Department of Defense, China Military Power might be of a vibrant, democratic Taiwan, risk- Consolidation of Political Power in China Un- Report, (Washington, DC: 2019): “China con- ing a catastrophic war with China is far too der Xi Jinping,” (Washington, DC: RAND tinues to improve its ground and submarine- great a price to pay to preserve the island’s de 2019): “Potential involvement in elite politics. based nuclear capability and is pursuing a viable facto independence”; and Riyaz ul Khaliq, “Stop The possibility of powerful political leaders nuclear ‘triad’ with the development of a nuclear Arms Sales to Taiwan: China Tells U.S.,” AA, conspiring with PLA units raised itself in the capable air-launched ballistic missiles.” (May 2020), available at https://www.aa.com. Politburo aspirant Bo Xilai’s shocking downfall tr: “Beijing says recent U.S. arms sale to Taiwan in 2012. News reports have suggested elements 34. United Nations, Bulletin Number 91: Law could further harm ties, warns against meddling of the 14th Group Army had supported Bo’s of the Sea, (New York, NY: 2017): “Historic in China’s ‘internal affairs’ ... Foreign Ministry bid for power.” rights and the ‘nine-dash line,’” and “Accord- Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said ‘We urge the U.S. ingly, the Tribunal concluded that, to the ex- to earnestly abide by the one-China principle 31. Charles I-hsin Che and Ingrid Tang, tent China had historic rights to resources in and the three China-U.S. joint communiques “America vs. China: a Proxy War Through the waters of the South China Sea, such rights and stop arms sales to and military ties with Taiwan?” The National Interest, (September were extinguished to the extent they were in- Taiwan, lest it should further harm China-U.S. 2019), available at www.nationalinterest.org: compatible with the exclusive economic zones relations and cross-straits peace and stability.’” “For Taiwan, this new and emerging proxy provided for in the Convention”; and James war is both good and bad. In a way, Taiwan Holmes, “China’s Nightmare: How the U.S. 38. Henry A. Kissinger, “Former U.S. Secretary may benefit from this new model; it could be a Navy Could Sink Its Prized Aircraft Carriers,” of State Comments before the National Com- free-rider relying on Washington to secure its The National Interest, (April 2019), available mittee on U.S. China Relations,” (remarks, diplomatic relations. In another way, Taiwan at https://nationalinterest.org: “PLA ballistic National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, may be the victim of this proxy war for it is missiles could menace U.S. and allied war- New York, NY, November 2019): “[a conflict likely to lose allies depending on the power ships plying the seas anywhere within Asia’s between the U.S. and China would result in] a competition between the United States and second island chain. The upper figure for DF- catastrophic outcome that will be worse than the China”; and Anne-Marie Brady, “Regiment- 26 range, moreover, would extend ASBMs’ world wars that ruined European civilization.” ing the Public Mind: The Modernization of reach substantially beyond the island chain.” >Author’s Note: The opinions expressed in this Propaganda in the PRC,” International Jour- article are the author’s and do not reflect the nal, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publishing, 35. James Kynge, Chris Campbell, Amy Ka- December 2002). zmin, and Farhan Bokhari, “Beijing’s Global views of the Marine Corps, the Department of Power Play: How China Rules the Waves,” the Navy, the DOD, or the United States Gov- 32. Shay Khatiri, “Treat Taiwan Like the Inde- Financial Times, (January 2017), available at ernment. The author extends special thanks pendent Ally It Is,” The Bulwark, (April 2020), https://ig.ft.com: “Beijing has spent billions to Col Robert “Ogre” E. McCarthy III for his available at https://thebulwark.com: “The U.S. expanding its ports network to secure sea lanes extensive insights and continuous emphasis should also explicitly extend its nuclear security and establish itself as a maritime power.” that one must reflect on classical perspectives umbrella to cover Taiwan … Stationing Ameri- on warfare in order to fully understand state can troops on the island is a key factor: Even 36. David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and civilizational behaviors today. if the United States extends a nuclear guaran- Cristina L. Garafola, War with China: Thinking tee to Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party Through the Unthinkable, (Washington, DC: might still take a gamble and invade Taiwan. RAND Corporation, 2016): “[I]t cannot be But if such an invasion led to thousands of dead excluded that such a Sino-U.S. war could de- Americans over a few days, the American people velop characteristics of the two great-power wars would be outraged and would demand their that became “world wars”: drawing in others, leaders punish China”; and Capt Walker D. engulfing and spilling beyond the region, lock-

20 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 Ideas & Issues (strategy & PolIcy) The Economics of Warfare Weaponizing costs and economies by Capt Conor T. Bender

can only imagine how David felt when he slew Goliath. A mere boy >Capt Bender is the former 2d MLG Innovation Officer and Information Manage- with little more than a rock was ment Officer. While active duty, he was a 0402, Logistician, and 0570, Foreign I Military Advisor. He has recently left active duty service and currently works as able to slay a giant. Divine inter- vention or not, David brought down a process improvement analyst in the airline industry. his opponent—the pride of the Phi- listine army—with a mere rock, win- ning a war. A rock costs nothing, but a Philistine warrior trained to win wars by single combat? The costs include his armor, horse, basic allowance for quarters, dependent pay, spears, and food. My point with this parable is that the Israelites got their money’s worth. Throughout the records of history, we see a significant advancement of weap- ons with the progression from a rock, to the spear, to the pike, and eventually the machine gun. In Dr. T.X. Hammes’ book, The Sling and the Stone, the au- thor discusses not just the evolution of weapons but the evolution of warfare with the implementation of economics, demographics, religion, and society. Of these, economic warfare has come The Stinger missile was an inexpensive weapon that proved its worth. (Photo by Christopher O’Quin.) a long way in the last 40 years. Since the 1980s, we have seen combatants economic strategy is just one example of Flashback to the 1980s: the Soviet fight thriftily and trigger economic di- how economics can be a brutal tool for Union has invaded Afghanistan. The sasters with overarching consequences. warfare. By forcing an opponent to ex- CIA, seeing an opportunity to weak- Economics may seem benign in com- pend more capital, we are weaponizing en Russia, wages a cost-effective war parison to an inter-continental ballistic economics and attacking our opponent against them. Working with Afghan missile or tank, but the stock market on a fiscal battlefield. By learning the fighters, the CIA attempts to imple- can be weaponized with an impact on lessons of the past 40 years, we can begin ment economic warfare on the Russian the scale to incorporate this into our strategic- military through the introduction of the of a powerful political player. This level plan for future conventional wars. Stinger missile. A counter to the lethal player can dictate trade policies, influ- The implementation of this strategy can Russian Mi-24 Hind Helicopter, the ence elections, determine interest rates, be seen in past conflicts with CIA and Stinger missile system proved to be a place limits on national social policy the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, al- budget savvy counter. This cost-effec- decide acceptable banking practices, Qaeda’s use of commercial airliners as a tive weapon was the tipping point for and drive other activities of a nation.1 terrorist weapon on 9/11, and insurgent the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The way that economics can be lever- forces’ use of IEDs in Iraq and Afghani- The Stinger missile was an incredibly aged to benefit a military campaign stan. Though these are not near-peer effective system that was able to lever- can be best seen today in the form of engagements, they are examples of how age $70,000 against $20,000,000.2 The sanctions. The implementation of this the strategy has been implemented. CIA, a nonmilitary entity, with assis-

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 21 IDEAS & ISSUES (STRATEGY & POLICY)

tance from a handful of other countries was able to take down a near peer to the US Department U.S. military with limited funds, equip- ment, and lightly trained Mujahedeen Government Of Defense fi ghters. With limited fi scal muscle, they Economic Strategy Military Strategy were able to force the Soviet military to spend an excessive amount of money to counter the Stinger missile and attempt to protect their helicopters. This use of economic warfare eventually brought the Soviet Union to their knees and USMC forced them to retreat from Afghanistan because of the fi nancial costs of waging a war against the Afghan forces and the unpopularity of the invasion at home. Economic Tactics Although the CIA’s tactics in the 1980s were nearly twenty-years-old, these tactics still held true in 2001. ACE GCE LCE On 11 September 2001, we suffered a crippling attack on our Nation’s soil. With limited fl ight training, some box Incorporating American Economic strategy with our Military Strategy allows us o develop economic cutters, and $500,000, a handful of in- tactics that allow us to orient on the enemy through their fiscal means. novative fanatics dealt a serious blow to the American mainland.3 As much as Figure 1. this terrorist attack was a physical one, it also had severe economic ramifi cations. Taliban were able to cause a combined much of a fi scal edge over our opponents Their attack cost America $789 billion arms dilemma. Deploying the MRAP as we did in Iraq and Afghanistan. The dollars in physical damage, economic lowered our casualty rate, but now in- purpose of a military is to serve as an impact, and homeland security costs; surgents were attacking us fi scally. Each extension of a nation’s foreign policy. In this number is not counting the cost of MRAP cost more than $100,000 per order to win a war, we must make it so the war in Afghanistan.4 In addition, vehicle to airlift into theater in addition costly to not just the military but to our 2,996 people were killed, two interna- to maintenance costs and the purchase enemy’s people that they cannot stom- tional airlines went bankrupt, and four of the vehicle.7 The average cost of an ach fi ghting us. This is not just on the fi led Chapter 11.5 As barbaric as this IED ranges from $50 to $20,000.8 If battlefi eld but also on the home front. tactic was, the economic cost it put on one $20,000 IED out of 54 completely By fi ghting cost effectively and forcing America, as well as a major worldwide our enemy to spend more than us, we industry, was signifi cant. It provoked are forcing the civilian populace of our America into a war in Afghanistan with opponent to spend more of their money an entity that we are currently unable In a conventional fi ght, to support their military. As Marines, we to achieve victory against. we will not have as must look for a fi nancial victory and not The fi nal example of economic war- just the maneuver warfare ones. Finance, fare can be seen in Iraq and Afghani- much of a fi scal edge like cyber, is a battlefi eld that is being stan. A consistent problem we have over our opponents … implemented more and more. How often encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan do we go after our opponent’s supply is the fear and issue of being attacked chains? With al-Qaeda, we went after by IEDs. As these devices continued to their poppy fi elds for a time; with Japan cause problems, we developed the Mine destroys an MRAP, then it is a fi scal and Germany, we targeted their facto- Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle victory for Afghan or Iraqi insurgents. ries. In order to wage an economic war, (MRAP), a vehicle that costs about This is an example of our costs being the ends cannot justify the means. The $1 million, which was able to protect driven up by combat insurgents, which means must cost less than the end for Marines, Sailors, Airmen, and Soldiers led to them defeating us on the fi scal us, and more for our opponent. To do from IEDs.6 There is no question that battlefi eld. this, we must ask the following: How can this vehicle has saved many service If a near peer applied any of these we project power for half the cost? How members’ lives. I am not advocating examples on a larger scale, we would can we force our enemy to spend more that we limit the cost we are willing be signifi cantly debilitated. A peer to than us? What is an economic victory? to pay for the safety of troops on the peer confl ict looms on the horizon. In With the DIME construct (dip- ground; however, al-Qaeda and the a conventional fi ght, we will not have as lomatic, informational, military, and

22 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 economic), this mindset of economic We often discuss combined arms di- sis. We have seen this time and again victory can be viewed as the tactical lemmas in the Marine Corps as an ideal throughout history: the privateers in the employment of economics through a way to destroy the enemy. Our oppo- seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, military prism. Economic sanctions, nents, who lately have been on the lower the Union Anaconda Plan during the embargos, and trade wars are examples end of the economic spectrum, have Civil War, and the atomic bombs at Hi- of strategic economic tools adopted by done an exceptional job of attacking roshima and Nagasaki. Hampering an a nation. Since the Oakland A’s success us financially, but with the exception opponent in the economic spectrum is with the employment of the “Money- of 9/11, they have been unable to inflict nothing new, but we have drifted away ball” strategy, the military has been significant harm to our economy. At the from this strategy. We need to get back striving to incorporate a cost-effective end of the day, this implementation of a to the basics. strategy into an effective military doc- budget as a weapon of war is something trine. This has been used in conjunction the Marine Corps must adopt. with the counterinsurgency strategy but As Marines, implementing a finite Notes has yet to make an impact with con- budget and limited resources is a model 1. Thomas X. Hammes, Sling and the Stone: on ventional warfare.9 Rather than asking War in the 21st Century, (St. Paul, MN: Zenith how we can effectively streamline sup- Press, 2012). ply chain management or our table of We must learn from our organization to manage cost, we need to 2. George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War, (New ask how a $1,000 weapons system can failures and learn from York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004); and destroy a multi-million dollar airfield or National Commission on Terrorist Attacks our opponent’s suc- Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission $35 million aircraft. Rather than buy- Report: Final Report of the National Commis- ing “runs,” we need to be buying “kills.” cesses. sion on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, This is the implementation of the eco- (Washington, DC: 2004). nomics of DIME at the tactical level. By doing this, we are rewiring our ma- that pairs well with us. When fighting 3. Ibid. neuver warfare concepts to bring about near-peer foes, we will not have the fis- a victory through economic warfare. cal depth that we had during the Iraq 4. Shan Carter and Amanda Cox, “One 9/11 This change requires little effort and and Afghanistan Wars. Our adversar- Tally,” The New York Times, (New York, NY: modification to our doctrine or strategy ies, such as Russia, China, and North September 2011). but rather a more objective look at what Korea, have the conventional firepower we are using to accomplish tasks. This and budget to finance their forces. We 5. Staff, The Impact of September 11 2001 on Aviation, (Montreal, CAD: International Air concept of getting more with less when need to force them to spend it in an Transport Association, May 2006). it comes to weaponry can be applied to inefficient manner: on MRAPs, coun- conventional warfare and applied by the termeasures for a Stinger missile, and 6. Alex Rogers, “The MRAP: Brilliant Buy, Marine Corps at the strategic level. In keeping their skies safe. or Billions Wasted?,” Time, (October 2012), the future, as we look to combat a near- In conclusion, we need to take the available at http://nation.time.com. peer or peer adversary, chances are high lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan and that it will be a sovereign nation with a implement them in how we face peer-to- 7. David Axe, “The Great MRAP Debate: Are large civilian populace. By leveraging peer enemies. We must learn from our Blast-Resistant Vehicles Worth It?,” Breaking an opponents’ economy against them, failures and learn from our opponent’s Defense, (October 2012), available at https:// we can make victory more achievable successes. We need to learn to develop breakingdefense.com. by bankrupting our opponent. As Ma- cost-effective ways to close with and 8. Tom Vanden Brooke, “Afghan IEDS: Warfare rines, we need to begin to ask at the destroy our enemies while forcing them on the Cheap,” USA Today, (June 2013), avail- strategic level, “What are we buying to expend more money to counter us. able at https://www.usatoday.com. with our weapons systems?” With this This is a mindset, not a one-time evolu- 500-pound bomb attached to the joint tion. We need to consistently enter our 9. Marc Tracy, “Military ‘Moneyball’,” The New strike fighter, I can disable an airfield. enemies’ observation, orientation, deci- Republic, (March 2013), available at https:// Can I do the same with a $100 drone sion, action loops, and continually force newrepublic.com. and 50 pounds of explosives attached? them to use the most costly ways to We need to start ensuring that destroy- counter us to force an economic victory ing our enemies is cheaper for us than it over our opponents in a conventional is for them. This is a mindset we must warfare theater. By doing this, we can adapt when fighting near-peer enemies dominate an intangible aspect of war- because, more often than not, they will fare by refining our maneuver warfare have similar, if not identical, financial doctrine and force our enemies into a capabilities to support the manufactur- new type of combined arms dilemma: ing of equipment and weaponry. a deliberate, weaponized financial cri-

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 23 Ideas & Issues (strategy & PolIcy) North Korea A dangerous threat to the United States by LtCol John W. Black

he Marine Corps is the United States’ expeditionary force-in- >LtCol Black is an Infantry Officer and currently the CMC’s Fellow at the Mas- readiness. As such, it is criti- sachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program. He has deployed T throughout Indo-Pacific twice with the 31st MEU (Special Operations Capable), cally important for Marines to observe the operating environment to Iraq twice in Support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and to Afghanistan once in and orient on threats to the United support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. States’ interests. One of the most dan- gerous threats facing the United States kilotons.2 It fired 23 ballistic missiles, North Korea to protect U.S. interests right now is the Democratic People’s Re- including an intercontinental ballistic in Northeast Asia and deter North Ko- public of Korea (from now on referred to missile (the Hwasong-15) that can range rean aggression. The United States has as North Korea). North Korea’s devel- the entire United States and nearly ev- focused its elements of national power opment of offensive cyber, nuclear, and ery country in the world.3 It launched in the following ways: ballistic missile capabilities endangers offensive cyberattacks, including the Diplomacy. The diplomatic element the United States’ homeland, threatens “WannaCry” cyberattack that crippled of national power has been the most American interests, disrupts the balance banks, companies, and hospitals across crucial element of the pressure cam- of power in Northeast Asia, and disre- the globe.4 Kim Jong-un, the leader of paign. The short-term political objec- gards numerous United Nations (UN) North Korea, verbally threatened to at- tives are three-fold: deter North Korean Security Council resolutions. If left un- tack the United States and three U.S. al- aggression and provocation, stop North addressed, these North Korean capabili- lies (South Korea, Japan, and Australia) Korea’s development and proliferation ties may potentially plunge the United in the Asia-Pacific region.5 Additionally, of nuclear weapon and ballistic missile States into a state-on-state conflict or in October 2020, North Korea parad- technologies, and stabilize Northeast evolve into a wicked regional problem— ed four Hwasong-15 intercontinental Asia. The long-term political objective both of which would have disastrous ballistic missiles on transporter erector is to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. consequences globally. To reduce the launchers and a new nuclear-capable To pursue these objectives, the United chances of either of these things from submarine-launched ballistic missile States has diplomatically engaged nu- happening, the United States has em- (the Pukgugkson-4).6 These actions merous countries and international ployed all elements of national power and Kim Jong-un’s fiery rhetoric pose stakeholders on a bilateral and multi- (diplomacy, information, military, and a clear and present danger to the United lateral basis. economic) to protect its interests and States as well as its allies and partners. The United States has attempted to shape the actions of regional actors to They also raise several questions. What rally and focus collective international maintain the stability and prosperity in would happen if North Korea effectively action to accomplish these objectives. Northeast Asia. This article will identify pairs its nuclear and intercontinental The United States has focused most of several dangerous threats originating in ballistic missile capabilities? Would it its diplomatic efforts on Japan, South North Korea, identify ways the United preemptively strike the United States Korea, China, Russia, and the UN, all States has adapted to these threats, and or a U.S. ally? Most people assume of which are important partners in this propose additional options the United “no, North Korea wouldn’t do that.” complicated situation in Northeast Asia. States should consider to reduce and However, North Korean propaganda The United States has increased eliminate these threats. videos show nuclear devices exploding diplomatic visits and strengthened In 2017, Secretary Mattis said, over Washington, DC.7 How has the diplomatic relationships in Northeast “North Korea is the most urgent and United States adapted and responded Asia and within multinational forums.9 dangerous threat to U.S. national secu- to these provocative actions? Since 2017, the President of the United rity,”1 and this remains true today. In The United States has adapted and States, Secretary of State, and Secretary 2017, North Korea did several things responded to these threatening devel- of Defense have visited Northeast Asia, that endangered U.S. interests and upset opments by implementing a pressure and the United States Ambassador to the balance of power in Northeast Asia. campaign against North Korea.8 The the UN has advocated for stronger in- It detonated a hydrogen bomb with an pressure campaign has focused many ternational measures to force North estimated yield of approximately 100 elements of national power against Korean compliance of numerous UN

24 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 Security Council Resolutions concern- Economically. In support of UN Se- States with credible military operations ing North Korea. Additionally, U.S. curity Council resolutions, the United should diplomatic and other options Embassies, Department of State’s Bu- States has aggressively pursued the fail. It is evident from the information reau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, implementation and enforcement of above that the U.S. pressure campaign and the DOD’s U.S. Indo-Pacific Com- economic and financial sanctions on is comprehensive, but it does not answer mand personnel conducted numerous North Korea. Sanctions have done the question, “what next?” senior political-military-economic en- the following: banned the import of The United States (in conjunction gagements with Northeast Asian leaders arms, dual-use technology, industrial with South Korea, Japan, China, and and stakeholders. These actions dem- machinery, luxury goods, metals, mili- Russia) must decide if it will or will onstrate that the United States desires tary equipment, natural gas, transport not accept or allow a nuclear-armed to work by, with, and through allies, vehicles; imposed sanctions and frozen North Korea. If it does accept a nuclear- partners, and international commu- assets on people, firms, and ships in- armed North Korea, perhaps it is time nity to maintain peace, prosperity, volved in the development of North for South Korea and Japan to become security, and stability. This collective Korea’s nuclear program; limited the nuclear nations as well. If the United approach may have been one of the import of oil and refined petroleum States does not allow a nuclear-armed primary reasons why the UN Security Council unanimously adopted several of the strongest resolutions in history, including banning North Korean ex- Since 2017, the President of the United States, Secre- ports, restricting fuel imports and trade, tary of State, and Secretary of Defense have visited and reducing the ability of its citizens to work abroad.10 Northeast Asia, and the United States Ambassador to Information. The U.S. strategic com- the UN has advocated for stronger international mea- munication campaign has promoted transparency and informed countries of sures to force North Korean compliance of numerous U.S. concerns and policy intentions. The UN Security Council Resolutions ... United States is concerned that North Korea intends to develop a nuclear bal- listic missile capability, in violation of numerous counter proliferation treaties products; banned the export of electri- North Korea, then the United States and UN Security Council resolutions, cal equipment, coal, minerals, seafood, must escalate. The United States can and use that capability to strike the U.S. food and agricultural products, wood, escalate with diplomatic, economic, and homeland or U.S. allies. This concern textile, and earth and stones; limited military elements of national power. may be understood by watching one of the export of agricultural, labor, and Possible courses of action include the the many North Korean propaganda metal exports; and restricted fishing following: videos that shows a North Korean nu- rights.13 The United States has called Diplomacy. The United States in clear missile striking Washington, DC, on other countries to implement and conjunction with the UN and global/ or by listening to North Korean news enforce sanctions, but two countries in regional actors could deliver and en- agencies that vow to unleash an “un- Northeast Asia (China and Russia) have force harsher sanctions, approve the imaginable strike at an unimaginable not fully enforced the sanctions yet. denuclearization of North Korea, and time [on the United States].”11 To ensure Military. The U.S. military has re- (if North Korea refuses to denuclearize) the international audience understands mained postured in and forward de- authorize the use of force to impose the U.S. concerns and intentions, the United ployed to Northeast Asia to deter ag- denuclearization of North Korea. Ide- States has strategically communicated gression, assure U.S. allies and partners, ally, authorization of the use of force several messages: “The U.S. cannot al- protect U.S. interests, and respond to would include broad international sup- low a nuclear-armed North Korea,” “If crises. In response to North Korean port and the fielding of a multinational other countries won’t solve the North provocations, the United States has force to support the denuclearization of Korean problem, America will,” “All op- forward deployed numerous advanced North Korea. If there were not broad tions (including military ones) are on military capabilities to the Asia-Pacific international support, the United States the table,”12 and “A threat to America region, including three Carrier Strike would have to determine whether or not or its allies will trigger a massive mili- Groups, Aegis-equipped cruisers and it should employ unilateral actions to tary response.” The United States has destroyers, submarines, B-1/2/52 stra- protect the homeland and U.S. interests. also reiterated it will use military force tegic bombers, F-22 and F-35 fifth- Information. The United States if diplomatic solutions fail to achieve the generation aircraft, Terminal High should continue to communicate it desired political objectives. The United Altitude Area Defense Batteries, and does not desire regime change—just the States is not willing to endanger the U.S. Amphibious Ready Groups/MEUs. removal or destruction of capabilities homeland or U.S. allies. These capabilities provide the United that threaten U.S. security. The United

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 25 Ideas & Issues (strategy & PolIcy)

States should continue to communicate In the final analysis, it is evident 4. Jeremy Wagstaf and Josh Smith, “Multi-Stage to the primary regional stakeholders, that North Korea’s development of Cyber Attacks Net North Korea Millions in especially North Korea, South Korea, offensive cyber, nuclear, and ballistic Virtual Currencies,” Reuters, (December 2017), China, Japan, and Russia, that it desires missile capabilities endangers the U.S. available at https://www.reuters.com. a diplomatic solution but will resort to homeland, threatens American inter- 5. Amy Remeikis, “Australia Will ‘Not Be a military solution if diplomacy fails. ests, disrupts the balance of power in Cowed’ by North Korea Threats,” The Guard- Economically. Harsher sanctions Northeast Asia, and disregards numer- ian, (October 2017), available at https://www. (from other global/regional actors) ous UN Security Council resolutions. theguardian.com. could include the severing of economic The American pressure campaign has ties (including the full cut of oil im- affected North Korea, but it has not 6. Bruce Klinger, “U.S. Will Face Stronger, ports) with North Korea, the freezing achieved the designated objectives yet. More Provocative North Korea in 2021,” The of North Korean bank accounts and To achieve those objectives, the United Heritage Foundation, (October 2020), available financial transaction, the forced closure States must continue to work by, with, at https://heritage.org. of joint venture companies, the forced and through its allies and partners. If al- 7. Anna Fifield, “North Korea Puts Out New Video Showing the White House in Crosshairs and Carriers Exploding,” The Washington Post, North Korea’s development of offensive cyber, nu- (April 2017), available at https://www.wash- ingtonpost.com. clear, and ballistic missile capabilities endanger the 8. Thomas Joscelyn, “One Term of ‘Maximum United States’ homeland, threaten American inter- Pressure’ on North Korea,” FDD, (October ests, disrupt the balance of power in Northeast Asia, 2020), available at http://fdd.org. and disregard numerous United Nations (UN) Security 9. Roncevert Ganan, Almond, “The Policy Significance of Trump’s Asia Tour,”The Dip- Council resolutions. lomat, (November 2017), available at https:// thediplomat.com.

10. United Nations Security Council, “Security return/expelling of overseas North lies, partners, and international organi- Council Tightens Sanctions on Democratic Peo- Korean workers, the severing of North zations like the UN cannot help achieve ple’s Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Korean internet traffic, and increased those objectives collectively, the United Resolution 2397 (2017),” (December 2017), isolation/embargo/sanction. The States may be forced to take unilateral available at https://www.un.org. United States has largely maximized action to protect the U.S. homeland its economic pressure on North Korea. and interests. That is where the U.S. 11. Denis Slattery, “North Korea Threatens To generate additional economic pres- military, including the Marine Corps, to Unleash ‘Unimaginable’ Nuclear Strike on sure on North Korea, the United States comes into play; we need to be the most U.S.,” New York Daily News, (October 2017), available at http://www.nydailynews.com. would have to entice or negotiate that ready when our Nation is least ready. pressure from other actors—especially We need to remain forward deployed 12. Joshua Berlinger, “Trump Says ‘All Options China and Russia. and forward engaged: shaping, training, on Table’ after North Korea Fires Missile over Military. The military should con- deterring, and responding to all manner Japan,” CNN World, (August 2017), available tinue to increase its readiness, improve of crises and contingencies, especially at http://www.cnn.com. its posture, and refine its plans to sup- when deterrence fails.14 port the degradation and destruction 13. Eleanor Albert, “What to Know About of North Korean capabilities that en- the Sanctions on North Korea,” Council on danger the U.S. homeland and inter- Notes Foreign Relations, (January 2018), available at https://www.cfr.org. ests. The military element of national 1. Anonymous, “U.S.: North Korea ‘Most Ur- power could be used to implement a gent and Dangerous Threat’,” Al Jazeera, (June 14. Gen James F. Amos, “Forward Deployed 2017), available at http://www.aljazeera.com. naval blockade of North Korea. If and Forward Engaged: The Marine Corps North Korea detonates another nuclear Approach to 21st Century Security Coopera- 2. Elise Hue, “North Korea Claims Successful device or launches another interconti- tion,” (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Hydrogen Bomb Test,” NPR, (September 2017), nental ballistic missile, the United States Corps, 2012). could pursue the targeted destruction available at https://www.npr.org. of North Korean military capabilities 3. Joshua Berlinger, “North Korea’s Missile Tests: that endanger the Nation, U.S. allies What You Need to Know,” CNN World, (De- and partners, and countries within the cember 2017), available at http://www.cnn.com. intercontinental ballistic missile engage- ment zone.

26 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 IDEAS & ISSUES (SPECIAL OPERATIONS /MARSOF)

★ ★

30 October 2020

Over the past two decades, our armed forces have rightfully been focused on the global counterterrorism effort. We concentrated our efforts on the skills required to be successful in the military fi ght against violent extremist organizations (VEO) and countering insurgencies, becoming highly effective in this arena.

As we move forward, however, it is clear that we must re-assess the skills and organizational capabilities required to maintain our military advantages in every domain. Our Commandant has set forth reimagining our force to answer this challenge through ongoing Force Design efforts. These changes have broad effects that compel the MARFORs, especially a functional MARFOR like MARFORSOC, to rapidly ensure we are bringing the capabilities and organizational construct required to conduct strategic shaping in support of the Joint Warfi ghting Concept and Service concepts like Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment.

With our Marine ethos and “Gung-Ho” attitude, MARSOC is well suited as an experimentation force, test bed, and innovation engine for distributed operations in contested environments. As we continue to imple- ment the tenets of Marine Special Operations Forces 2030, it will be of utmost importance to leverage our small size as an advantage to be the nimble, fl exible, and pliable force that can understand, wargame, and experiment with developing operating concepts, leading edge technologies, and the latest equipment to refi ne employment and enable the joint force. As with the Marine Corps writ large, MARSOC is undergoing a capabilities review to ensure we integrate and enhance the capabilities to operate in the information en- vironment, increase our understanding of developing situations, create asymmetric advantage, and further evolve the role of SOF in competition and confl ict. The ability to compete in multiple domains simultane- ously and synchronize those effects is an essential element as we defi ne objectives derived from the decades of experience in counterterrorism.

In our role as a connector between United States Special Operations Command and our Service, MARSOC remains positioned to capitalize on the forward deployed placement and access to help prepare the operating environment for potential future operations in competition and confl ict. As a complementary force in the contact layer, Marine Special Operations Forces are poised to do the advanced work to assess EAB loca- tions, footprints, and capabilities while also working as part of the stand-in force to buy time and space for joint force physical and virtual maneuver. All aspects of operations in the information environment (Elec- tromagnetic Spectrum Operations [EMSO], Cyberspace Operations, Space Operations, Infl uence Opera- tions, Deception Operations, and Inform Operations) will need to be enabled by SOF, and MARSOC is positioning for such.

As we look ahead, we acknowledge the hard fought effort and skills learned during our continuing counter- VEO missions. Concurrently, we fully accept the changing world environment and the imperative to adapt. With the articles included in this issue, we look to challenge and question what and how we think in order to chart a path to achieve the Commandant’s intent and remain prepared as the Nation’s expeditionary force- in-readiness.

We thank the leadership of our professional journal for an opportunity to share our perspective and prog- ress, and invite feedback from the Fleet. Semper Fidelis and Spiritus Invictus!

James F. Glynn Major General, U.S. Marine Corps Commander Marine Forces Special Operations Command

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 27 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF) Intelligence-Driven Operations Getting it right for the future fight by the Marines of Intelligence Company, 1st Marine Raider Support Battalion

he bloating of the intelligence footprint as you move up the >The Marines of Intelligence Company, 1st MRSB represent all intelligence disci- chain of command was not plines and have spent between two and seven years training and deploying with only flawed for a counterin- MARSOC at the team, company, and Special Operations Task Force level. They Tsurgency environment but is enough have deployed in support of a wide variety of missions in PACOM, CENTCOM, to sink efforts to effectively compete and AFRICOM. with a great power.1 Despite this, the Marine Corps is largely organized, trained, and equipped in this manner, the organization makes the force more MARSOC’s force employment. Hav- thus undermining the tactically-focused uniquely able to meet mission require- ing intelligence Marines continuously intelligence that will be sorely needed ments than any other Marine Corps alongside the special operators created in the competition sphere. The lessons unit. It starts with the special opera- a unique, interwoven capability that learned from the Marine Forces Special tions training pipeline and continues required no forced integration and re- Operations Command (MARSOC) In- through pre-deployment training and sulted in a light, fast, lethal targeting telligence Enterprise, and in particular deployment. This article will focus on element to operate in contested and de- the Direct Support Teams (DST) op- how MARSOC intelligence has gotten nied areas with tactical, operational, erating in both counter-terrorism and this right, with a particular emphasis and strategic impacts. Nearly twenty great power competition realms over the on developing the capabilities of Intel- years later, we examine the modern day last ten years, would benefit the broader ligence Special Operations Capable Spe- MARSOC and cite lessons learned and Marine Corps as it reinvents itself to cialists (SOCS), which includes the four concepts to replicate. meet present and future threats. disciplines (F=SIGINT, G=GEOINT, The way MARSOC Intelligence H=HUMINT, I=All-Source) and how MARSOC Intelligence Training and units man, train, and equip is far more they are built into an interoperable team. Equipping closely matched to its force employment MARSOC intelligence candidates model than the broader Marine Corps. Historical Context undergo a six-month pipeline to become The only thing that comes close is a In 2003, the Marine Corps was S___ O___ C____ S__ (SOCS) with MEU Si2 Section MEU when rein- tasked by the Secretary of Defense to the most important course being the forced with intelligence battalion and create a special operations unit with eighteen-week Multi-Discipline Intel- radio battalion detachments, but the the well-documented resulting proof ligence Operations Course (MDIOC). parent units are doing little, if any, inte- of concept being Marine Corps Spe- The majority of SOCS intel candidates gration because they are not organized cial Operations Command Detachment are already somewhat seasoned and have to do so (root problem) and do not have One—colloquially referred to as “Det volunteered to be part of MARSOC. the proper training to create a com- 1.” The lesser known detail of Det 1 is MDIOC creates a transformation in mon basis for integrating (contributing that of the 81 Marines that comprised students’ paradigms from having a pri- factor). Ultimately, the Marine Corps the unit, 32 of them were intelligence mary MOS tunnel-vision to instill that is doing itself a disservice in structur- Marines (roughly 40 percent). The intelligence fusion is more important ing force-generating organizations in a heavy focus and prioritization of tacti- than any single intelligence discipline, a manner completely foreign to how they cal level self-sufficient intelligence per- key principle that is reinforced through- organize when employed operationally. sonnel was a break from the traditional out this article. The mission-oriented structure and mold but validated itself as a guiding The pipeline is unique because it equipping of MARSOC throughout principle for the next two decades of forces all intelligence disciplines to learn

28 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 baseline knowledge needed to facilitate for their first special operations deploy- known as TRX I and TRX II. TRX I integration and overall successful intelli- ment. The premise of cross-discipline brings the individual skill sets together gence operations in a SOF environment. work that starts in MDIOC continues and provides the DST with dedicated Initial classes are designed to educate through the pre-deployment training cy- time to establish standard operating analysts and collectors on basic capabili- cle. Gone are the days of closed doors, procedures, become deeply familiar ties, limitations, and their overall role compartmentalized workspaces, and a with teammates’ capabilities, work on within the intelligence cycle. Because removed officer-in-charge (OIC). UTP processes, and determine information of the wide variety and independent I begins with a Raider Support Team flow protocols. An intelligence scenario nature of the billets and operating en- Orientation Course, which is the first is provided to test how the DST fuses vironments to which multi-discipline time the DST is exposed to the Marine the information collected from mul- intelligence operators (MDIOs) are Special Operations Company (MSOC) tiple sources. TRX II is a varsity-level assigned, the pipeline exposes MDIOs and Marine Special Operations Team intelligence exercise where the DST is to capabilities, requirements, and as- (MSOT) leadership and vice versa. A expected to be fully ready to deploy. set availability in an effort to prepare classroom-style introduction, followed The deep intelligence scenario tests all them for the circumstances they will by a demonstration of the employment disciplines at the highest levels of col- encounter. While the MDIO pipeline concepts that the DST provides, build lective training tasks and simulates the provides an unmatched foundation for early and often integration. The next DST entering a deployed environment integrating intelligence disciplines, it portion of the UTP I is an academics with a low-profile footprint. is still founded on training and readi- week where the Marine Raider Support After proving capable of support- ness standards with periods of instruc- Team (MRST) of intelligence, commu- ing Marine Raider operations, the tion being continually updated with nications, and logistics comes together DST changes operational control to the experience of recent deployments to learn about each other’s disciplines as the Raider Battalion and completes and emphasizing interoperability of well as topics to include but not limited UTP II. UTP II consists of two or intelligence disciplines. The ability to to embassy protocols, cultural familiar- three MSOC-level exercises where frequently refine training to adapt to ization, concept of operations process, the DST is charged with supporting current intelligence employment enables counterintelligence concerns, and many the four disaggregated teams and the MARSOC to produce MDIOs with a more educational topics. MSOC headquarters. The importance baseline capability to meet ever-evolving The MRST then moves on to the of integration with MSOC and MSOTs mission sets. Team Readiness Exercise (TRX) series cannot be overstated, and this is why Marines who successfully graduate MDIOC earn the necessary MOS of 8071 and are subsequently assigned to a Marine Raider Support Battalion within MARSOC. Here, they are en- couraged to take advantage of oppor- tunities to attend individual training schools that are Marine occupational specialty (MOS) critical, essential, and enhancing. Examples include various courses run by national intelligence agencies, conferences, new equipment fielding, and many more opportunities. Innovation in this regard is highly en- couraged, as the command will support training with time and funding so long as Marines are able to communicate its purpose and relevance, along with com- prehensive feedback upon their return. Following the individual training phase, Marines then form a DST and begin the first part of their unit training phase (UTP I). This training block is flexible and can take a variety of forms depending upon mission analysis, re- gion-specific knowledge required for the deployment, and concepts that may Preparations to conduct low-signature collection in an urban environment during TRX II. be unfamiliar to a Marine preparing (Photo by Intelligence Company, 1st MRSB.)

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 29 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF)

a full six-months is dedicated to this wide variety of mission objectives. The self-sufficient in satisfying their own phase despite the DST already being SOCS, with a knowledge of capabilities intelligence requirements … once ex- deemed deployment-ready. The DST as well as practical usage of the gear, can ecution starts, our organic intelligence typically splits personnel to spread load anticipate requirements and purpose- and reconnaissance assets generally the capability, while the OIC and chief build a DST or DSE independent of provide the most reliable and respon- manage all collection and analysis from outside resources or guidance. sive support to Marine units.2 the MSOC headquarters’ location. Direct relationships with the MSOC MARSOC accomplishes the targeting Training is not the only part of MAR- and MSOT commanders are extremely cycle at the MSOC and MSOT level SOC that drives integrated intelligence; important. At the MSOC level, the DST (equivalent to a squad+ or company-) the same can be said for the equipment is able to receive the commander’s guid- only by having a DST and DSE. MSOT set and the operational employment of ance/intent and execute intelligence commanders are provided the smallest the force. A DST’s equipment density operations in an autonomous manner possible footprint that allows for an- list is driven purely by their own mis- that may not be possible in the FMF swering their own intelligence require- sion analysis and validated up the chain of command. This process is crucial to identifying the essential equipment Not only has there been FMF and MARSOC integration to bring on deployment, especially for the agile operations in which SOCS but also across the entire joint force, interagency, and thrive. Having a plethora of tools and contracted support. equipment to fit any mission is one of the key factors in making SOCS cha- meleon-like in their flexibility to meet a huge array of operational requirements. because of bottlenecked approval struc- ments. Highly capable maneuver units Despite this, the gear list remains de- tures. In an MSOC, the mutual trust with small footprints are the way of the liberately tailored, avoiding the large and confidence between operators and future, and the DST/DSE construct is footprint that comes from the “this is MDIOs is established early because of critical to making this achievable. how we’ve always done it” and “just the unique work up process and the sub- On recent deployments to the West- bring everything” mindset. With the ject matter expertise that each SOCS ern Pacific, the DST has been in charge wide variety of gear and equipment also brings to the table. This mission com- of a large intelligence section responsible comes a responsibility to train. Not only mand of the DST and each SOCS sets for advancing many lines of effort at do SOCS of a specific discipline train MARSOC apart from a conventional various tactical and operational lev- on their own equipment, but they also unit and allows members of the DST to els. Not only has there been FMF and cross train with that of other disciplines. integrate with other units, commanders, MARSOC integration but also across Gear is maintained at the company interagency partners, and U.S. interests the entire joint force, interagency, and level, not the battalion, which makes worldwide. On a recent deployment, the contracted support. With regard to in- it much simpler to train and become Special Operations Task Force leveraged tegration, interoperability, and interde- familiar with the equipment set. an opportunity to employ intelligence pendence, this mission has proven that collection systems aboard a Navy asset MARSOC working in conjunction with Operational Employment transiting nearby. This could only be fa- 3d Radio Battalion and other I & III With operational employment, the cilitated through common understand- MEF Marine augments is mutually ben- common theme remains the MDIO ing among the SOTF commander and eficial. The collection coverage vastly concept. Each DST retains the flex- intelligence personnel, and relationships increases because of more teams and ibility to quickly stand up and break with conventional forces and leverag- collection assets. 3d Radio Battalion down Direct Support Elements (DSE), ing operational-level staff support. It Marines are exposed to and trained on typically a two to four Marine element also introduces a concept more com- equipment that SOCS-Fs employ, and of various disciplines sent out to sup- monly found in MARSOC: operations MARSOC benefits from the reachback port an MSOT or conduct independent can frequently be designed to support processing, exploitation, and dissemi- intelligence operations. The cumulative intelligence. The close-knit nature of nated cell and linguist support at 3d knowledge across the SOCS allows for the MSOC and DST personnel enable RadBn Virtual SIGINT Operations quick establishment of a DST or DSEs a fluid switch back and forth between Center. On the same token, SOCS-Hs because they can project requirements intel supporting ops and vice versa. can be freed up for more missions or for their fellow SOCS, even outside of The DST/DSE concept does a vastly emerging opportunities from the 0211 their primary discipline. The gear set better job of accomplishing the endstate Marine support, which is consistently organic to the DST allows the SOCS for intelligence operations outlined in dependable. The DST OIC has other to act on this initiative. Between collec- MCDP 2: officers as direct reports, and the offi- tion assets and communication nodes, Commanders should aim, to the cer-to-officer cross talk proves highly the DST is well equipped to meet a greatest extent possible, to become beneficial especially when not from the

30 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 same original MOS discipline. The au- entry-level training tailored to the low- the fusion of intelligence, and MAR- tonomy the DST OIC gives the RadBn est common denominator. SOC reinforces this concept through Det OIC develops that officer to a great SOCS-Gs have routinely found training, experience, and tailored selec- extent, and the relative closeness in rank themselves controlling multiple ISR tion of those individuals (while rank provides a less pressurized environment assets simultaneously, serving as col- is an important factor, sometimes it where collaboration is encouraged and lections managers, foreign disclosure of- has to be a secondary consideration to hierarchical challenges do not get in ficers, and targeting chiefs. One of those experience); this foundation is not set the way of mission accomplishment. duties is often a full-time job for the at the Intelligence Battalions to make SOCS-Is and Gs have shown time majority of the DOD, but MARSOC the concept succeed. The 0231 com- and again how they are force multi- looks to maximize capability with the munity is further set up for failure to be pliers. An example of SOCS-I diver- minimum-required personnel. Without the driving force in intelligence fusion sity is from a deployment as recent as overwhelming an individual or unit, through having less tactical exposure 2019. The DST split their two SOCS- consolidating tasks forces inherent fu- and substantially less pipeline training Is to cover two geographically sepa- sion. than other intelligence MOSs. Further rate missions. One SOCS-I deployed degrading integration efforts, the false to the Southern Philippines and was Where the FMF Falls Short and What wall that has been built by having a the intelligence chief, responsible for We Can Do About It separate Radio Bn results in a real-world the fusion of over 40 intelligence per- Over the last ten years, Intelligence divide between SIGINT and the wider sonnel’s collection, information, and Battalions, 1st and 2d in particular, intelligence enterprise. analysis. The other SOCS-I, a young have attempted to restructure their task Fleet intelligence team integration staff sergeant, deployed to Yemen and organizations into readily deployable does occur when detachments from ra- was the only intelligence Marine for a detachments in an attempt to create dio and intel battalions are chopped to significant area of operations. The lat- integrated intelligence teams. Despite MEUs and SPMAGTFs, but it still con- ter found himself serving as the focal these attempts, Marines are realizing the trasts sharply with the levels achieved point for the intelligence process at the concept has failed for want of effective by the DST. Part of the discrepancy MSOT level while coordinating with all-source fusion and SIGINT person- lies with a lack of mission, as MEUs higher commands, external SOF units, nel. The all-source fusion typically falls spread their intel focus thin by track- and being appointed by an O-5 level short because of the seniority of 0211 ing issues in dozens of countries in an commander to serve in a J2 capacity—a HUMINT specialists and 0241 Imag- area of responsibility, along with the billet reserved for an O-3 or higher. The ery analysts (typically seasoned E-5s to high demand of Geographic Combat- expectation and responsibility histori- E-7s) over their 0231 all-source intel ant Commands for MEU SIGINT and cally placed on SOCS-Is is in a com- counterparts (typically E-3 to E-6). HUMINT teams being chopped to pletely separate class from that expected While the DST concept relies upon units with a more specific mission and of an average all-source analyst, given the OIC and senior SOCS-I to drive focus. The other primary detractor is the lack of cohesiveness in the intelli- gence team throughout all phases of the workup, including those prior to CHOP. While there is a substantial amount of integration done post-CHOP, which is heavily dependent upon the MEU S-2 and Expeditionary Operations Training Group, intelligence tasks are never a primary objective of the training. Thus, scenarios are tailored so that intel per- sonnel are often simply pawns to ensure MEU operations take place at the right time. While this is necessary to ensure complicated MAGTF operations are properly synchronized, it is no means to guarantee intelligence teams are ef- fectively prepared to drive operations in a complex environment. While the DST concept is bol- stered by leveraging both SOCOM and Marine Corps resources, it is still Intelligence must have forward presence to support the targeting cycle against any adver- achievable by the FMF. Moreover, the sary. (Photo by Intelligence Company, 1st MRSB.) emerging battlefield demands that the

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 31 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF)

foreign to newly-minted Basic School graduates. As high-performing teams only break down walls insofar as they trust one another, character, compe- tence, and personality must all be con- sidered when selecting their leaders. Further, the leadership of the tactical decision maker that is supported by these intelligence teams must balance commitment to mission and military standards with freedom of thought and action. • Personnel: Create All-Source Intel- ligence Specialists that are worthy of their mandate to be the foxes among the hedgehogs of the intelligence field, and push them to be exposed to the requirements of tactical-level deci- sion makers early and often. If any intelligence MOS has a lateral-move DST Marines conduct maritime operations. (Photo by Intelligence Company, 1st MRSB.) requirement, the 0231 field should be the priority. Cross-train 0241 Imagery Marine Corps widely institute the con- through the pre-deployment workup. Analysts and 0261 Topographic Spe- cept. Light, highly capable teams of Create realistic training that forces cialists, and continue to seek a solu- intelligence personnel designed to oper- all intelligence specialties to come tion to merge them into a common ate independently with a tactical focus together and truly fuse intelligence, GEOINT MOS. are essential to success in competing with TRX II being a baseline model. These recommendations represent with and, when necessary, defeating a Tactical commanders must also un- jumping-off points for a continued dia- great power. To achieve this, the authors derstand they are just as much of a logue that will be mutually beneficial. recommend the following changes in training audience as their assigned While there are a number of lessons how the Marine Corps addresses cur- Marines when it comes to understand- that the FMF can learn from what rent gaps to more closely mirror the ing proper employment of intelligence MARSOC has learned, there are also DST: capabilities. Training cadre must be inputs from across the FMF essential • Doctrine: Intelligence is often the mature and experienced enough to to MARSOC, with the vast majority main effort and key maneuver ele- mentor and educate commanders of SOCS coming from the FMF rep- ment in Phase 0 and can be all the along these lines. resenting one of the many invaluable way through Phase 3 (you cannot kill • Materiel: Streamline the equipment inputs. Continued engagement between it if you cannot find it). Though this set from large servers and heavy com- Marine SOF and conventional forces is concept is reinforced in intelligence munication nodes to reflect the lighter not just enhancing to present mission publications, it is rarely done in the footprint carried by the DST and oth- sets; rather, it is critical to guaranteeing references in other fields. er SOCOM intelligence personnel. success in the future fight. • Organization: Match the structure A light footprint for even the most of force-generating organizations to highly classified means of communi- those employing them. Keeping a cation is becoming more of a reality. Notes MEU/SPMAGTF continually com- Commercial-off-the-shelf collections 1. Michael T Flynn, Matthew F. Pottinger, and posited with its intelligence personnel equipment is also quickly approaching Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for and equipment is a perfectly viable the capabilities of the DOD, thus an Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan, COA when the MEF maintains the adaptable acquisition system is vital. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American resources to train those personnel and More interaction between MARSOC Security, 2010). maintain the equipment. At the very and FMF intelligence personnel will least, pull SIGINT personnel and lead to shared lessons learned when it 2. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 2, In- (Washington, DC: 1997). equipment under the same roof as comes to equipment. telligence, the other key intelligence disciplines • Leadership: Leading small and to break down the wall. highly capable teams demands a brand • Training: Apply the MDIO concept of leadership from officers that may across the training pipeline for intel- be familiar to those with a large base ligence Marines, from MOS school of leadership experience but is likely

32 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 Avoiding the False Choice Marine Corps growth through SOF integration by Majs Joshua C. Waddell & Brent C. Birchum

ollowing the release of his plan- ning guidance last year, the >Maj Waddell is an Infantry Officer with recent experience as a Company Com- FCommandant of the Marine mander and Battalion Operations Officer in a forward-deployed infantry battalion. Corps recently unveiled the He also holds a MS from the Naval Postgraduate School in Information Technology initial results of the Force Design 2030 Management and is currently serving as an Olmsted Scholar at Tel Aviv Univer- working group. This initial rudder- sity, Israel, pursuing a MA in Diplomacy and Security Studies in Hebrew. He has steer has solicited lively discussion in previous combat experience as an Infantry Platoon Commander and Company the defense community regarding the Executive Officer in , Afghanistan. wisdom of the Commandant’s deci- sion to re-orient toward developing >>Maj Birchum is a Special Operations Officer with recent combat experience as a 21st century FMF. The core of the a Marine Special Operations Team Commander for multiple combat deployments argument has congealed around the in the Middle East. Prior to special operations, he served as Infantry Platoon Com- dispute as to the risks associated with mander and as a Company Executive Officer in Sangin, Afghanistan. He currently the Marine Corps divesting of capa- serves as the MARSOC Liaison Officer to Special Operations Command-Central. bilities that have traditionally been He is formally trained in cyber warfare through the Joint Special Operations employed in the last twenty years of University as well as an alum of the United States Naval Academy, Air Force Air counterinsurgency warfare in favor of Command and Staff College, and the Army’s Maneuver Captain’s Career Course. pursuing modernization goals tailored to high-end competition against peer threats—particularly China. formation, there is an opportunity to Advocates for the Commandant’s ac- correct the mistakes of the past with tions note the necessity for the Corps regard to special operations by adding to return to relevance in naval cam- a focused line of effort to Marine Corps paigning after decades of serving as a force design targeted at overhauling the second land army. This “return to roots” Corps’ integration and interoperability is supported by warfighting concepts with United States Special Operations such as Expeditionary Advance Base Command (USSOCOM). Force Design Operations and Littoral Operations 2030 contains capability developments in Contested Environments, which and modernizations that would also be show how a small, lethal, dispersed highly useful against unconventional FMF could augment a naval strike threats alongside partners in the spe- group and confound adversary actions cial operations forces (SOF). Critically, through anti-access/aerial denial (A2/ most of the remaining barriers to SOF AD) methods.1 Skeptics rightfully note, integration reside at the policy and however, that the true history of the doctrine levels, not materiel, requiring Marine Corps is not in landing craft as- little in the way of resource investment. saulting Pacific isles but rather as practi- This integration effort can be thought tioners of unconventional operations in of as managing risk associated with the a myriad of small wars since the nation’s Corps’ enemies’ “most likely courses 2 3 first overseas military adventures. The Legends of the Corps like Puller and Daly of action” while undertaking the nec- reality, however, is that this dispute is learned their tactical skills fighting small essary preparations to confront future centered around a false choice. As the wars in Nicaragua, Cuba, and Haiti. (Leath- adversaries’ “most dangerous course of Corps undergoes this decade of trans- erneck file photo.) action.”4

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 33 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF)

Just as in the past, whether in future small wars or peer-on-peer conflict, the quality of Marine infantry will be crucial. (Leatherneck file photo.)

Marines and Small Wars hesitant to fully employ MEUs, there target whose destruction, elimination, The Marine officers and NCOs that is a continual demand for MARSOC or rescue (in the case of hostages), is a formed the core of the forces storming teams, which comprise roughly 1.5 per- political or military imperative.10 trenches and assaulting the beaches cent of the Marine Corps’ manning. In The Corps’ forward-deployed nature in the last wars between great powers the eyes of combatant commanders, the and culture of operational flexibility gained their combat experience fight- force provider for traditional Marine inherently positions Marines as a Special ing in small wars, taking part in what Corps missions such as raids and strikes Operations Force. To further the work- we would label today as “Special Op- has shifted to USSOCOM, relegating ing relationships, the Corps will need to erations.” The iconic LtGen “Chesty” the Marine Corps to a low-end crisis gain more interoperability with USSO- Puller was awarded his first Navy Cross response and/or disaster response force. COM; thus, a focused effort should be as a lieutenant conducing raids on Ni- Gen Berger is aggressively acting to ad- made to increase staff-level integration caraguan bandits in 1930.5 Dan Daly dress this identity crisis for the Service. between existing Marine Corps staff of- earned his first fighting These efforts, however, run the risk of ficers and those at both the Theater Spe- in a counterinsurgency action in China focusing too heavily on “Mahanian” cial Operations Commander (TSOC) during the Boxer Rebellion long before concepts of conventional fleet battle and USSOCOM headquarters level. he stepped foot in France during the while ignoring the unconventional roots While Marines already have a signifi- First World War.6 However, the estab- of the U.S. Navy itself, dating back to cant capability in terms of staff training lishment USSOCOM in 1987, and the the raiding days of John Paul Jones.9 through its resident professional schools, Marine Corps’ decision to not partici- We argue, therefore, that the Corps’ additional certification courses could be pate in said organization’s founding,7 path to relevance should be twofold: provided through the Joint Special Op- has resulted in the Marine Corps taking continued wargaming and force devel- erations University in order to educate a back seat in global contingency opera- opment actions aimed at high intensity and train Marines in the peculiarities tions. The Marine Corps largely accept- conflict in accordance with the NDS of USSOCOM authorities, capabilities, ed this as it stood by the MAGTF con- and advancing the Corps’ relationship and funding lines. The Marine Corps cept that worked so effectively during and interoperability with SOCOM by should pursue changes to the joint man- the early days of Operations ENDURING using MARSOC as the point of entry ning documents related to USSOCOM FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. In for other units of employment. This staffs in order to increase its equity in the years that followed, however, the second path should be simultaneously those organizations and develop resi- Corps found itself again fighting what enabled through staff integration and dent competency among Marine staffs became protracted small wars in Iraq training as well as force modernization for future utilization alongside TSOC and Afghanistan, which persist to this and maturation. staffs. Examples include filling out the day. In fact, doctrinal employment of J37 Training Section in SOCOM with the MAGTF has been increasingly rare Path to Integration additional capacity to evaluate and cer- because its capabilities have become less The ultimate goal in this line of ef- tify Marine Corps and SOCOM re- relevant to the conflicts America sees fort should be to provide USSOCOM lated schools and exercises. The Marine itself engaged in. In parallel with this, a natural partner in their global opera- Corps should source additional billets USSOCOM grew exponentially and tions. ADM McRaven defines a Special within the TSOCs to cross-level staff remains deployed nearly to the breaking Operation as, capacity across each Geographic Com- 8 point in conflicts around the globe. conducted by forces specially trained, batant Command (GCC) and facilitate While combatant commanders remain equipped, and supported for a specific MEU and Special Purpose MAGTF

34 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 opportunities. It is highly likely that tical proficiency in designated direct dant noted in a recent interview, the providing more support to USSOCOM action and reconnaissance tasks. With design philosophy of the force design staffs would be welcomed because of USSOCOM as a full partner in the cer- planners assumes that a force capable existing shortfalls. As noted by one re- tification of deploying units, combatant of winning against a peer threat can cent analyst: commanders will gain the confidence also be employed against lower tiered 13 The most glaring and critical opera- they need to deploy Marines alongside, threats. To demonstrate this, Gen tional deficit is the fact that, accord- or even in place of, SOF as an economy Berger’s team specifically highlights ing to doctrine, the theater special of force measure. This would allow the large investments in long-range preci- operations commands are supposed Corps to reclaim many of its traditional sion rocket artillery, high endurance to be the principal node for planning missions with the full confidence of unmanned systems, and additional and conducting special operations in joint force commanders while allow- investments in countering “grey zone” a given theater—yet they are the most ing SOF to focus on the missions to activities.14 These capabilities would be severely under resourced commands.11 which they are uniquely trained. enthusiastically welcomed by TSOCs Thus, the Marine Corps’ first step to- wherever Marines are deployed. wards becoming SOF’s natural partner Force Development In terms of force maturation, it most logically begins at this staff level. In order to meaningfully contribute has already been noted that Marine In order to gain the full confidence to USSOCOM missions, the Marine Corps infantry units must undertake of USSOCOM and test the interop- Corps will need to continue on its path new mission sets and employ new ca- erability of the FMF with SOF ele- to develop certain critical capabilities pabilities.15 This requirement applies ments, the Corps must also revise how as well as mature legacy capabilities. to integration with SOF units as well. it certifies its units for deployment. We In terms of newer capabilities, recent The reality is that the future operat- propose reviving the “Special Opera- history in Syria and Iraq has shown ing environment, be it in future small tions Capable” qualifier as a training the effectiveness of partnering special wars or high-end conflict, will require standard for deploying units. This operations teams with Marine Corps more from our infantry than can be certification should be developed and fires and other supporting agencies.12 effectively trained at a thirteen-week evaluated with the full participation of Traditionally, the Marine Corps has boot camp (of little tactical training SOCOM planners and warfighters in balked at the thought of splitting up value) and a five-week basic infantry order to determine what mission sets the MAGTF into component units in course. The Commandant’s decision to the Marine Corps can most directly such a manner. However, Gen Berger’s decrease the overall size of the infantry support. The pinnacle of Marine Corps guidance has already noted that new force should be seen as an opportunity ground combat evaluation can no lon- formations will likely be necessary in the to slow the training pipeline in order ger be the traditional combined arms future operating environment that do to re-develop entry-level training into breach exercise at Twentynine Palms, not mirror traditional MAGTF employ- a more comprehensive course aimed at evaluated only by fellow Marines. At ment. This flexibility should be applied producing “naval commandos” more in a minimum, this SOC certification to tailor-made support to USSOCOM, line with the British Royal Marines. Fu- should include command and control informed by Joint Special Operations ture conflicts will demand professional “plug and play” interoperability between and Marine staff cooperation. warriors, and the attrition of experi- any deploying units with its geographi- In terms of capabilities, there are enced NCOs from combat units can- cally associated TSOC, demonstrate few investment decisions in the Force not be tolerated much in the same way rapid response planning capabilities in Design 2030 report that cannot also be talent retention is prioritized in SOF. partnership with TSOC crisis response utilized in the small wars and special This new infantry formation must be methodologies, and demonstrate tac- operations context. As the Comman- treated like a technical specialty and

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 35 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF) be exempt from any administrative re- gence and logistical support to ensure this capability across all GCCs except quirements, such as traditional assign- the facilitation of FMF employment is Northern Command. Additionally, we ments of infantry NCOs to recruiting possible. recommend allocating helicopter lift or drill instructor duty. Reduced future In terms of penetrating the Weap- support, intelligence support as well force manning requirements also allows ons Engagement Zone (WEZ), there as a command slated O-5 or O-6 to for greater discretion in quality control are a multitude of non-standard pos- represent the unit to the TSOC and at the schoolhouses. sibilities to insert low-profile Marine/ GCC commanders as his primary crisis Put simply, our infantry should of- MARSOC elements to create battlefield response force. This could be done sepa- fer unique capabilities both to Naval effects at key locations within the ac- rate from existing SPMAGTF structure planners and to TSOCs that justify the ceptable risk threshold. To achieve this or as an expansion of those existing or- risk associated with their employment. requires years of battlefield preparation ganizations. This expanded mission for As a Marine infantry officer recently and targeting training efforts, which the Corps relieves the requirement for a put it, “I’ve never heard anyone in a cannot violate the SOF maxim that SOF Liaison element program because wargame say they wish they had more “Competent Special Operations Forces the Reconnaissance Company can allo- light infantry.” This problem can be Cannot Be Created After Emergencies cate personnel and provide a direct link solved by developing a naval commando Occur.” However, we argue the best between SPMAGTF, the MEU, and force that can open new options to com- way to conduct an amphibious land- other SOF elements or country teams. batant commanders while maintaining ing is to already be there prior to the We recommend working with the high standards of professionalism. In crisis, which is a condition best facili- MARSOC Raider Training Center to absolute terms, this would be a modest develop a shooting package that meets investment that could help address the the Advanced Reconnais- question, “What makes a special opera- ... the symbiotic rela- sance, Target Analysis, and Exploitation tions unit of action?” We argue that the Techniques Course and Special Forces Marine Corps has the resident capabil- tionship between Ma- Sniper Course levels of training. We rec- ity of filling many missions reserved for rine Forces and SOCOM ognize there are historic issues with the “special” units, and this capacity could Crisis Response Force mission, but if the be greatly expanded though changes to can prove to be a fruit- Marine Corps scopes the mission well, manning and training of the Corps’ it could give Marines access to resources principal units of employment. ful investment. and allow Marines to fully retake their role as the primary crisis response force Force Employment to the GCC. Rather than being a loss of To achieve the Commandant’s guid- capability for MEU commanders, this ance from the Force Design 2030, the tated through activities in partnership concept instead increases the utility of Marine Corps must invest in sensitive with SOCOM. Once within the WEZ, the MEU’s traditional reconnaissance areas that require a high degree of inter- the Marine Corps could benefit from asset. The best way the reconnaissance agency support typical of special opera- fires capabilities already developed by element can be the eyes and ears of the tions. The TSOCs routinely facilitate MARSOC in concert with forecasted MEU commander is to be forward de- missions that support the country plans capabilities acquisition by the FMF ac- ployed in key locations with networks already developed within host nations cording to Force Design 2030. linked to the Nation’s most sensitive of and deliberately engage with the assets With regards to crisis response opera- intelligence capabilities. at U.S. Embassies. The major drawback tions, access and placement are key to Lastly, we recommend that the is that typical TSOC units of action enabling the Marine Corps to remain emerging Littoral Combat Regiments lack the size and assets to be a mean- the Nation’s “crisis response force-in- operate, at least in part, much like SP- ingful threat against a near-peer sized readiness.” While the MEU traditional- MAGTFs have operated in Iraq. As element. This is where the symbiotic ly sought to fill this role, recent conflicts in that conflict, cooperation between relationship between Marine Forces have necessitated the creation of new MARSOC and conventional Marine and SOCOM can prove to be a fruit- force construction to meet battlefield units can be utilized during the Phase ful investment. The Commandant requirements such as the SPMAGTFs 0 operations focused on that regiment’s comments, “Force design places new in Europe and Central Command. A area of responsibility. Missions would demands on our FMF that require us ready opportunity exists to expand this include confronting violent extremist to revisit our current manpower policies role. The recently vacated position of organizations and pre-positioning as- supporting MARSOC.”16 We recom- the Crisis Response Force mission by sets to respond to potential regional mend increasing MARSOC structure U.S. Army Special Operations Com- crisis escalations. These actions could to enable their ability to be the shaping mand is a mission that could logically be be taken in tandem with traditional the- force of choice and to allow expanded undertaken by existing Marine Corps ater security cooperation activities and roles in all GCCs to support FMF ob- structure.17 We recommend assigning humanitarian assistance and disaster jectives. This includes greater intelli- a reconnaissance company to backfill response operations. The addition of

36 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 SOCOM authorities and capabilities to 4. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National DID YOU these traditional missions opens entirely Defense Strategy of the United States of America, new possibilities for the Corps. Though (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, operating in this manner may violate 2018). KNOW historically sacred Marine Corps axi- 5. Jeff Shogol, “Is it Time to Give Chesty Puller oms, consistent engagement of this type the Medal of Honor?” Marine Corps Times, will ensure that Marines are postured (February 2017), available at https://www. ThatThat youryour lifelife to respond to hostilities in an expedi- marinecorpstimes.com. tionary fashion in line with the com- insuranceinsurance mander’s intent of Force Design 2030. 6. U.S. Congress, Congressional Record S13334, (Washington, DC: November 2005). cancan supportsupport Conclusions At its heart, Force Design 2030 seeks 7. Mark A. Clark, Should the Marine Corps Ex- ourour work?work? to forecast what the Marine Corps pand its Role in Special Operations?, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 2003). needs in terms of capabilities in support You can name a of “our historical roots as Fleet Marine 8. John Grady, “SOCOM: High Optempo cre- charitable organization Forces” in a manner that “directly sup- ates Recruiting Challenges in Special Opera- like the Marine Corps ports our Title 10 responsibility to seize tions Community,” USNI News, (May 2017), and defend advanced naval bases, and available at https://news.usni.org. Association Foundation perform all such duties as directed by the President.”18 While planners rightly 9. Benjamin Armstrong, Small Boats and Daring as a beneficiary of your prioritize the requirements of the future Men, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma life insurance policy operating environment against high end Press, 2019). and help us further our threats, they should also address how the Corps might accomplish the type 10. William McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in mission. Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, of missions that have historically been (New York, NY, Presidio Press, 1996). its specialty. We reject the notion that A gift of life insurance there is a binary choice between great 11. Linda Robinson, The Future of U.S. Special is a wonderful way to power competition and competency in Operations Forces, (New York, NY: Council on small wars and other steady state opera- Foreign Relations Press, 2013). support our work at a tions. The answer to the problem largely significant level, but at a rests on the bureaucratic decision to 12. Shawn Snow, “These Marines in Syria Fired choose to engage with our brothers and More Artillery than Any Battalion since Viet- fraction of the cost of other sisters in USSOCOM and exploit the nam,” Marine Times, (February 2018), available gifts. opportunities that will be generated as at https://www.marinecorpstimes.com. a result. As the Marine Corps looks to 13. Gen David H. Berger and Ryan Evans, “A shape its future, it is increasingly clear Chat with the Commandant: Gen David H. that a strong relationship with SOCOM Berger on the Marine Corps’ New Dirction,” must be a key element of that future War on the Rocks, (April 2020), available at force. https://warontherocks.com.

14. Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030, Notes (Washington, DC: March 2020). 1. T.X. Hammes, “Building a Marine Corps 15. Jeff Cummings et al., “Marine Warbot Com- for Every Contingency, Clime, and Place,” War panies: Where Naval Warfare, the U.S. National on the Rocks, (April 2020), available at https:// Defense Strategy, and Close Combat Lethality warontherocks.com. Task Force Intersect,” War on the Rocks, (June 2018), available at https://warontherocks.com. 2. Benjamin Jensen, “The Rest of the Story: Evaluating the U.S. Marine Corps Force Design 16. Force Design 2030. 2030,” War on the Rocks, (April 2020), available at https://warontherocks.com. 17. Stavros Altamazoglou, “Army Special Opera- tions Command is Planning to Disband Elite For more information, visit 3. John Vrolyk, “Insurgency, Not War, is China’s Green Beret Units,” (March 2020), available at Most Likely Course of Action,” War on the Rocks, https://www.businessinsider.com. mca-marines.org/ (December 2019), available at https://waron- therocks.com. 18. Force Design 2030. legacy-gift-planning

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 37 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF) Green Water SOF How MARSOC can achieve the Commandant’s vision for Navy-Marine Corps integration in the return to great power competition and beyond by Maj William H. Strom

arine Forces, Special Operations Command >Maj Strom is an Infantry Officer and Marine Raider who has held multiple billets M(MARSOC) can achieve across the infantry and special operations community to include command at the the Commandant’s vision platoon, MSOT, rifle company, and MSOC levels during six combat deployments for naval integration and serve as a syn- to CENTCOM and one UDP to INDOPACOM. He is a recent graduate of the Naval thesizing function between the Marine War College. Corps, Navy, and United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). of MARSOC are the optimal warriors for littoral, or Green in the 2018 National Defense Strategy tion and synchronization of U.S. global Water, special operations in the return (NDS).2 A key component of this vi- capabilities with interagency, coalition, to great power competition. sion is to pivot from sustained combat and partner forces.4 In several recently published docu- operations ashore in the Middle East First, MARSOF can achieve the ments, the 38th Commandant of the and re-align the service to comply with Commandant’s vision by supporting Marine Corps, Gen David Berger, di- its Title 10 responsibilities to seize or expeditionary advanced base operations rected sweeping changes to the Marine defend advanced naval bases and con- (EABO). Second, MARSOF can act Corps to prepare for future challenges duct land operations to support a naval as a connector between Special Opera- as the Nation’s naval expeditionary campaign.3 Concurrently, the previous tions Forces (SOF), conventional forces, force-in-readiness.1 His vision lays out Commander of U.S. Marine Forces, coalition forces, partner forces, and the plans and intent to reshape the Ser- Special Operations Command pub- interagency. Finally, MARSOF can vice to better address how the Marine lished his long-range vision of the future support the Joint Forces Commander Corps will integrate with the Navy to of Marine Special Operations Forces (JFC), Joint Forces Land Component gain advantages over adversaries in (MARSOF) that included guidance for Commander (JFLCC), and Joint great power competition as outlined the component’s role in greater integra- Forces Maritime Component Com- mander (JFMCC) by integrating its cross domain core capabilities across warfighting functions to gain access to maritime terrain and facilitate the movement of naval forces inside the weapons engagement zone (WEZ) of an adversary’s anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) bubble. MARSOF can do all these things while maintaining a small footprint and low signature profile. Past to Present MARSOF has a rich history of sup- porting maritime campaigns and en- abling naval operations. Perhaps most well-known is the Marine Raider Bat- talions’ support to naval campaigns in during the Second World War. In the fall of 1942, Marine Raiders from 1st Raider Battalion, commanded by LtCol Merritt “Red Mike” Edson, SOFs have a long history of maritime operations. (Photo by Maj Cesar H. Santiago.) conducted clandestine landings to gain

38 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 and maintain key maritime terrain. On MARSOF can operate without acquisition additions, MARSOF could Guadalcanal, the Raiders defended the straining or stressing conventional sup- integrate with the Navy’s networked sys- famous Henderson Airfield at the Battle ply chains, which further contributes to tems such as the Aegis combat system to of the Bloody Ridge. The airfield would their ability to maintain a low profile. provide integrated air defense and over go on to support naval operations across MARSOF are uniquely capable of self- the horizon targeting support to naval the theater. This is a perfect example of sustaining off the local economy and forces.16 This capability would pro- how gaining and maintaining control of have been practicing this concept for vide the JFC and JFMCC a landbased key littoral terrain directly contributed the past ten years in austere locations node to integrate into the naval scheme to successes in the overall maritime cam- across the globe to include U.S. Cen- of maneuver. With a combination of paign. The same principle still applies tral Command, U.S. Africa Command, sensors, unmanned aerial, surface and to how SOF supports a larger campaign and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The underwater vehicles, weapons such as today. logistics capability that is organic to ASCMs and defensive fires platforms, Presently, MARSOF are flexible, a Marine Special Operations Com- MARSOF could directly contribute to tailored, and scaled to meet unique pany (MSOC) is robust and has been sea denial while at the same time provid- mission requirements starting with a proven effective time and again. This ing a “land-based anti-access umbrella,” base unit of Critical Skills Operators capability is the definition of what the thus providing shelter and facilitating (CSOs). Special Operations Capa- EABO handbook refers to as a “forage access for friendly naval forces.17 bilities Specialists (SOCS) and special force” that can reduce the stress and equipment are then added as needed strain on traditional supply chains.11 MARSOF as a Connector based on mission analysis and needs of Through a mixture of contracting, host The first pillar of MARSOC’s vi- each supported commander. MARSOC nation infrastructure, and reach back sion for the future is that MARSOF currently has SOF formations of all sizes to both conventional and SOF logistics will serve as a connector between SOF, with unique, tailored enabler packages chains, combined with a Marine culture conventional, coalition, partner, and deployed across the globe. of “improvise, adapt and overcome,” interagency equities. In other words, MARSOF logisticians are well adapted MARSOF is the “ideal integrator and MARSOC support to EABO to provide support to forces dispersed synchronizer of U.S. global capabilities MARSOC can support EABO al- across a theater.12 with USSOF and partner nation ac- most immediately. The Marine Corps’ As the EABO concept suggests, gain- tions.”18 MARSOC is currently capable concept of EABO is intended to counter ing access and operating freely in an of serving as this connector, primarily adversary attempts to deny U.S. regional adversary’s WEZ and A2/AD bubble by organizing and deploying O-4, O-5, access through forward-force posture before and during conflict requires an and O-6 level SOF headquarters to syn- and mitigation of enemy long-range operationally mobile integrated mari- chronize efforts and conduct Phase 0 weapons that would otherwise destroy time defense in-depth and the ability through Phase III operations—precisely major friendly bases.5 This concept is to enable operational fires to target ad- what it has been doing for the past ten particularly relevant given the Com- versarial naval and aviation platforms.13 years. mandant’s concern over the rise of MARSOF’s ability to conduct both of MARSOC is uniquely trained and “Mature Precision Strike Regime” ad- these requirements with the flexibil- organized to seamlessly integrate into versaries with long-range precision strike ity of mind required for SOF success the joint force. They can immediately capabilities.6 Further, this concept relies demonstrates that they are the spear- deploy a skeleton O-5 or O-6 headquar- on a low-signature and difficult to tar- head of inside naval forces in support ters and source a fully trained and capa- get dispersed force that is operationally of EABO.14 Through clandestine or ble MSOC as a supporting command.19 relevant inside an adversary’s WEZ.7 In low signature infiltration and inser- This force could facilitate shaping in other words, littoral warfare requires an tion methods—such as commercial or Phase 0 and build long-term relation- asymmetric force that can survive and private indigenous vessels, parachute ships necessary for SOF operations. conduct fire and maneuver through lit- operations with airborne containerized This headquarters would serve as the toral seas within the adversary’s WEZ.8 delivery system drops of equipment, and synchronizer of USSOF efforts and in- Marine SOF are tailor-made for this subsurface operations—MARSOF can tegrate other equities while maintaining mission as the Commandant already gain access to contested terrain and es- the ability to serve as a crisis response alluded to with his discussion of “recent tablish small footprint infrastructure to headquarters should it be needed. The experiences by our own highly distrib- support naval operations. By utilizing headquarters could be sourced to full utable ground units operating in an clandestine networks and sensitive ac- strength at the beginning of Phase I and adversary’s WEZ, including our own tivities, MARSOF could establish mo- continue through the duration of the SOF.”9 They thrive in austere, politi- bile missile sites enabled by lightweight conflict. Additionally, MARSOC can cally sensitive, and denied environments vehicles and containerized missile sys- source a Special Operations Forces Liai- and can operate either unilaterally or tems for both offensive and defensive son Element to MEFs and subordinate multilaterally with combined joint and fires in support of naval operations.15 units such as MEUs. Currently, the Spe- partner forces or interagency players.10 Further, with a few minor training and cial Operations Forces Liaison Element

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 39 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF) is sourced from across USSOCOM, but erations. Consider the Falklands Islands vide multiple platforms to collect from. it should solely come from MARSOC conflict of 1982 where the British SAS MARSOF is capable of multiple types because of the shared culture between conducted reconnaissance of potential of special reconnaissance as a core ac- Raiders and conventional Marine units. amphibious landing zones during Op- tivity by technical methods, surrogate Once Phase 0 infrastructure is es- eration SUTTON.22 MARSOF can con- employment, or traditional unilateral tablished and forces are dispersed and duct this same type of operational level conventional reconnaissance through conducting EABO, MARSOF can special reconnaissance and direct action clandestine infiltration into denied or serve as a connector between other unilaterally, partnered, or through a sur- contested terrain. MARSOF is cur- naval forces by providing eyes, ears, rogate.23 rently equipped and proficient with and supporting fires. Marine Special unmanned aerial systems and could Operations Teams, or even partial ele- MARSOF Supports the JFC with Mul- easily adapt to employ unmanned un- ments thereof, could be networked into tiple Capabilities across Warfighting derwater and surface systems that could the Navy’s Aegis system via mobile, Functions be launched from EABO platforms to low-signature, landbased platforms to MARSOC is already providing the gather information on enemy forces and provide defensive protection to U.S. JFC more bang for the buck with scal- terrain for decisions at the operational warships as well as offensive fires from able task organized forces operating level. Finally, MARSOF are organized ASCMs. MARSOF’s small footprint, across the globe. Additionally, MAR- and proficient with organic all-source ability to operate in austere, sensitive SOF is directly responsible for main- intelligence analysis capabilities that can environments, and mature force make taining proficiency in the following fuse organically collected and shared them the ideal force to undertake this SOF core activities: direct action, spe- intelligence with operations while lever- mission. Additionally, MARSOF could cial reconnaissance, counterterrorism, aging the full weight of the intelligence utilize the concept of networking with foreign internal defense, security force community at the tactical edge. Aegis to control maritime terrain as an assistance, counterinsurgency, support Fires: MARSOF are organized with inside naval force. Networking with to counter weapons of mass destruc- joint terminal attack controllers and can Aegis would integrate MARSOF into tion, and support to unconventional call for fires from any available asset. chokepoint control operations and na- warfare.24 MARSOF can leverage these The Commandant has stated that he val blockades of enemy shipping, thus skills and apply them across the war- wants the conventional Marine Corps directly facilitating containment of fighting functions. to divest of traditional tubed artillery enemy forces.20 MARSOF can gain access to de- nied or sensitive terrain through part- ner forces. Once relationships and Networking with Aegis would integrate MARSOF into surrogate networks are established in chokepoint control operations and naval blockades of Phase 0, MARSOF could provide an advantage similar to that in the World enemy shipping thus directly facilitating containment War II Battle of Leyte Gulf. In that of enemy forces. example, guerilla forces throughout the Philippines provided critical reporting on Japanese ship movements and order of battle.21 MARSOF units of today Command and Control: MARSOC is in favor of long-range assets and land- can build surrogate networks to do the organized, trained, equipped, and ca- based anti-ship cruise missiles such as same. Further, MARSOF trained and pable of providing O-4, O-5, and O-6 Tomahawks to facilitate sea denial and advised partner forces can contribute level SOF headquarters to integrate and sea control.25 With minor training and to the overall campaign objectives by synchronize U.S., coalition, partner, logistics adjustments, MARSOF could providing limited offensive operations and interagency assets in support of easily become proficient in the deploy- against an adversary in line with JFC the JFC’s mission. ment and employment of this capability and U.S. interests. Intelligence: MARSOF provides at the lowest level. In addition to integrating into block- organic multi-disciplined intelligence Maneuver: MARSOF can support ade and chokepoint control operations, operators with emphasis on human and the maneuver of larger naval forces MARSOF can serve as a connector be- signals intelligence collection to sup- through multiple means. During Phase tween naval forces by supporting am- port operations from Phases 0 through 0, MARSOF can conduct strategic phibious operations in Phases I through III. By employing these assets in Phase shaping and reconnaissance opera- III. The fruits gained in Phase 0 from 0, the supported commander gains tions, such as human network and in- operational preparation of the environ- established networks and infrastruc- frastructure development. Additionally, ment through relationships and sensi- ture that will pay dividends in future they can gain access through security tive activity infrastructure development conflicts. Employing MARSOF in force assistance, foreign internal de- would directly support amphibious op- dispersed EABO operations will pro- fense, counterinsurgency, and ongo-

40 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 ing counter-terrorism operations with balance and diversity and punches far porting amphibious operations; and partners in the region. During Phases above its weight class which provides satisfying USSOCOM’s requirement I through III, MARSOF could support the JFC a disproportional gain for a to support the JFC in a maritime con- naval maneuver with offensive and de- minor investment. All activities con- flict. At a minimum, MARSOC should fensive fires; special reconnaissance of ducted by MARSOF are synthesized be established as the advanced force key physical, human, and cyber terrain; by the SOF headquarters to maximize to conduct these missions until con- employment of unmanned systems; effects against an adversary and help ventional Marine units are organized, partner force advise, assist, accompany, mitigate their A2/AD bubble. Perhaps trained, and equipped to conduct them and enable (A3E) operations; direct most importantly, MARSOF can do unilaterally. The Commandant has action raids; sabotage of enemy infra- all of this with a small footprint in a stated that part of the requirement for structure; and vessel boarding, search, denied, austere environment. achieving his vision is that he wants and seizure. “smarter grunts” and a more educated Logistics: While MARSOF are not Counter Argument force; he has raised the GT score re- currently able to move large amounts Critics of employing MARSOF as lit- quirements for infantrymen.28 MAR- of equipment and supplies organi- toral SOF would argue that MARSOF SOC already has a regiment’s worth of cally, they can support the JFC’s lo- is not the right force for achieving the highly trained and intelligent CSOs. gistics preparation of the battlefield Commandant’s vision of reintegration The required GT scores for CSOs are by establishing contracts and network with the Navy in a maritime campaign higher than the requirements for in- infrastructure as advanced forces in because the Commandant has already fantrymen. preparation for a larger campaign. begun to re-structure the general- Additionally, CSOs undergo a rigor- Such contracts could include land use purpose Marine Corps forces for this ous selection process that screens candi- agreements for basing solutions and exact mission.27 Although MARSOF dates for integrity, effective intelligence, commercial and private vessel leasing originates from conventional Marine physical ability, adaptability, initiative, in support of clandestine and low sig- units and is supported with equipment, determination, dependability, team- nature infiltration and insertion. maintenance, administrative functions, work, interpersonal skill, and stress tol- Force Protection: As part of a net- and funding from the Service, they erance.29 These are the exact attributes worked Aegis-like system with organic work primarily for USSOCOM. As a that make Marine Raiders ideal for the sensors and fires, MARSOF could pro- result, MARSOC units typically have challenges of littoral warfare. Finally, vide force protection to friendly net- no direct command relationship with MARSOF is generated out of the con- worked ships in the littoral theater. A the MEF. The Commandant’s vision ventional Marine Corps. Every Raider MARSOF element deployed to key ter- clearly indicates that he wants conven- spends a tour in the conventional forces rain such as a chokepoint inside an ad- tional Marine units to conduct the types before applying to become a CSO.30 versary’s WEZ could easily be equipped of missions and support to a larger naval MARSOC leads the way in SOF and with air and missile defense systems that and maritime conflict in the littorals conventional force integration, interop- could provide protection to ships from as discussed in the above paragraphs. erability, and interdependence (I3) by landbased platforms when networked Other than a brief discussion of how being the first to source personnel for to the Aegis system. to provide personnel support, MAR- the SOFLE program and frequently Information: MARSOF can support SOC is not mentioned in any of the transitioning Marines back and forth the JFC through organic information planning documents published by the between MARSOC and conventional operations nested with higher head- Marine Corps as either a supporting Marine units. Examples include SOCS quarters lines of effort and organic of- or supported element in great power with multiple tours in MARSOC and fensive and defensive cyber operations. competition. conventional units and some Special Although these capabilities are in their Operations Officers (SOOs) such as nascent stages, MARSOC already has Rebuttal a current MEU commander. Recruit- touchpoints with conventional units MARSOF is the right force for lit- ing from conventional Marine units such as Marine Corps Forces, Cyber- toral warfare because it meets all the combined with personnel rotating space Command (MARFORCYBER), Commandant’s criteria for the force between MARSOC and conventional and the Marine Corps Information Op- of the future and is ready now. With units further promotes I3 and results erations Center (MCIOC). just a few minor adjustments to train- in Raiders with Marine Corps DNA According to joint maritime opera- ing and acquisitions, MARSOC can who understand Marine Corps culture, tions expert, Professor Milan Vego of support integration with naval forces speak Marine Corps language, and by the Naval War College, a key element of by conducting strategic shaping and extension speak Navy language. They sea control is a balanced composition of reconnaissance operations in Phase 0; are the ideal warriors to fulfill the Com- naval forces. Indeed, diversity in naval establishing footholds and supporting mandant’s vision of integrating Marines combat arms is required for successful EABO; acting as a connector between with the Navy in support of maritime littoral warfare.26 As previously noted, SOF, Marine Corps, Navy, coalition, campaigns. MARSOF provides this cross domain partner, and interagency equities; sup-

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 41 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF)

Conclusion and Recommendations integration during the return to great 17. James Lacey, “The ‘Dumbest Concept Ever’ Employing MARSOF in the littorals power competition. Just Might Win Wars,” War on the Rocks, (July to serve as an inside naval force in sup- 2019), available at https://warontherocks.com. port of a greater maritime campaign promotes symbiosis between the Ma- Notes 18. Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, MARSOF 2030, rine Corps, Navy, and USSOCOM. It 1. Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030, (Stone Bay, NC: March 2018). achieves the Commandant’s vision of (Washington, DC: March 2020); and Gen Da- reintegrating Marine Corps and naval vid H. Berger, “The Case for Change,” Marine 19. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JTF forces and supports USSOCOM’s re- Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: June 2020). C2 and Organization, Second Edition; Insights quirement to support the JFC with SOF and Best Practices Focus Paper, (Washington, in great power competition. MARSOC 2. Gen David H. Berger, Commandant’s Plan- DC: 2020). was born out of the legacy of World War ning Guidance, (Washington, DC: 2019). II Marine Raiders who fully understood 20. Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea 3. U.S. Congress, Title 10, U.S. Code, (Wash- Control, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016). and integrated into the needs of the ington, DC: 1956). naval forces in the littorals. MARSOC, 21. Douglas N. Hime, “The Leyte Gulf Case with the concurrence of USSOCOM, 4. Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Spe- Study,” (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press should support the Marine Corps’ cial Operations Command, MARSOF 2030, 2013). integration with the Navy by having (Stone Bay, NC: March 2018). MARSOF focus on the INDOPA- 22. Douglas N. Hime, “The 1982 Falklands- COM area of responsibility as a priority. 5. Headquarters Marine Corps, Expeditionary Malvinas Case Study,” (Newport, RI: Naval MARSOC should acquire and become Advanced Base Operations Handbook, (Wash- War College Press, 2010). proficient with the tactical equipment ington, DC: June 2018). 23. MCWP 3-05. and sensors such as unmanned aerial, 6. “The Case for Change.” surface, and underwater systems as well 24. Ibid. as ASCMs and defensive platforms that 7. Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations will enhance its ability to conduct stra- Handbook. 25. Joseph Trevithick, “Marines to Radically tegic shaping and reconnaissance while Remodel Force, Cutting Tanks, Howitzers in also providing offensive and defensive 8. Jake Yeager, “Expeditionary Advanced Mari- Favor of Drones, Missiles,” The Drive, (March fires from maritime terrain. MARSOC time Operations: How the Marine Corps Can 2020), available at https://www.thedrive.com; should continue to develop and validate Avoid Becoming A Second Land Army in the and 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance. this type of new equipment for eventual Pacific,” War on the Rocks, (December 2019), employment in the conventional Ma- available at https://warontherocks.com. 26. Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea rine Corps. Further, MARSOC should Control, (New York: Routledge, 2016). 9. “The Case for Change.” network into the Navy’s Aegis system and future generations of that capability 27. 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance; and 10. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCWP 3-05, Force Design 2030. to supplement the protection of naval Marine Corps Special Operations, (Washington, maneuver in the littorals. MARSOC DC: April 2018). 28. Gina Harkins, “Smarter Marines: Comman- should continue deploying forces to the dant Wants Better Test Scores From Grunts and Pacific and explore new partnerships 11. Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations New Enlistees,” Military.com, (March 2020), that will facilitate access in places such Handbook. available at https://www.military.com; and 38th as the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Commandant’s Planning Guidance. Malaysia, and Indonesia. Finally, Spe- 12. MCWP 3-05. cial Operations Command, Pacific in 29. MCWP 3-05 conjunction with MARSOC, should 13. Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations Handbook. establish a Marine O-5 Special Opera- 30. Ibid. tions Task Force headquarters in the 14. Colin Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes on Des- Pacific area of responsibility to begin perate Ventures: When Do Special Operations building Phase 0 relationships and in- Succeed?,” Parameters, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army frastructure necessary to support future War College, Spring 1999). operations. Due to historical ties, deeply em- 15. T.X. Hammes, “Building a Marine Corps bedded Marine culture, flexible force for Every Contingency, Clime, and Place,” War design and cross domain capabilities, on the Rocks, (April 2020), available at https:// MARSOF are clearly the force of choice warontherocks.com. for today’s maritime special operations 16. Department of the Navy, “Aegis Weapon in the littorals and can easily achieve the System,” Fact File, (January Commandant’s vision of Navy-Marine 2019), available at https://www.navy.mil.

42 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 China’s Quest to Maximize Status and Sovereignty in the South China Sea China’s strategic goals by MSgt Marc Arrington

ir Walter Raleigh once wrote, “For whosoever commands the >MSgt Arrington is the Chief Instructor at the Marine Forces Special Operations sea commands the trade; who- Command Instructor Qualification Course at the Marine Raider Training Center. He soever commands the trade of is a Critical Skills Operator and recent graduate of the Joint Special Operations Sthe world commands the riches of the Master of Arts Program specializing in the intellectual history of Mao Zedong world, and consequently the world it- and China’s grand strategy. He has deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Indo- self.”1 China’s creation of human-made Pacific region. islands and naval military expansion in the South China Sea (SCS) are allowing it to command the vi- and speaks of China’s intention tal maritime trade routes. These to displace the United States’ geo- efforts are part of an attempt to political advantage in the region. develop hegemony in the region, Trump goes on to speak of China’s and they come at the expense of military and naval expansion, chal- the international community and lenging the international order and in defiance of international mari- encroaching on the sovereignty of time law. its neighbors.4 The SCS dispute is at the fore- China’s naval expansion is of front of international relations since strategic security concern to the 2010. The dispute is a significant region and international order, security challenge for the United but one must empathize from a States and the international com- Chinese perspective in order to un- munity as a whole. The U.S. Con- derstand and exploit the reasoning gress’s Committee on Foreign Af- behind the expansion. In order to fairs stated in 2016, “the territorial do this, one must know China’s disputes in the South China Sea historical disgrace caused by for- might represent the most signifi- eign imperial powers. Also, what cant long-term security challenge in historical claims does China have our shared jurisdiction.”2 President to the SCS? What are the goals of Obama’s National Security Strate- China in the SCS and what is the gy in 2010 spoke of the importance effect on international security if of China’s influence on the region China can obtain hegemony over and the need to deepen the United the SCS? States’ influence to counter Chi- na’s economic presence.3 President China’s Humiliation during the Trump’s National Security Strategy Map 1. China’s dashed-line map from notes verbales of Opium Wars in 2016 mentions China 32 times 2009. (Map provided by author.) China’s first humiliation by an

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 43 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF)

imperial power was at the hand of the China for economic gains.11 In 1942, hood, as Miller explains, has two goals British Navy during the Opium Wars of one member of the court, Wei Yuan, regarding post-imperial international 1839–1842. The British were bringing developed the “Plans for Maritime De- relations: the first is to maximize ter- in opium from India and trading it for fense.”12 Yuang, in an address to the ritorial sovereignty and the second to Chinese silver in mainland ports when Chinese court, stated, maximize status.16 the Qing court attempted to eradicate Today the British barbarians not only China’s victimhood as a result of the trade in 1839.5 The Qing emperor have occupied Hong Kong and accu- the naval defeats during the Opium then ordered the seizure of British trade mulated a great deal of wealth as well as Wars correlates via goals of victim- ships. The British retaliated against the a proud face among other barbarians, hood to the current naval expansion seizure of their trading vessels by de- but have also opened ports and cut in the SCS. China’s objective for their ploying armed frigates. These British down the various charges so to grant military build-up in the SCS is to maxi- Navy frigates attacked port cities and favor to other barbarians. We must mize status internationally. The SCS is sailed upriver, destroying several histori- use barbarians against barbarians. Use a crucial sea lane utilized regionally and cal landmarks—including the Summer France and the United States to build internationally. China’s ability to alter Palace of the Qing emperor. The frigates ships. It is proper to use them to learn or disrupt the sea lane gives the nation then sailed, undamaged, upriver to port their superior techniques in order to a higher status internationally, satisfy- cities on the southern part of China’s control them.13 ing one goal of post-imperial ideology. mainland.6 The British frigates’ ability From the shame of the Opium Wars, China’s claim to the SCS islands and to travel upriver and against wind eas- the Chinese developed a plan to take sea lanes shows a strict concept of the ily overwhelmed China’s rudimentary the naval technological expertise from sovereignty of its borders, the second defenses. the imperial powers and use it to protect goal of victimhood.17 Because of the naval defeat, the Qing the sovereignty of China. Therefore, one Therefore, through the lens of a PII, government was forced to negotiate can ascertain the Opium Wars caused a one can see how the historical trauma several embarrassing treaties with the transformative historical event that led and the transformative historical event British. The two treaties resulting from China to prioritize naval power for the of the Opium Wars are leading contem- the Opium Wars are the Nanjing and Bogue Treaties.7 These treaties forced the Qing government to relinquish the …the Opium Wars caused a transformative histori- territorial rights of Hong Kong to the British, establish five treaty ports for cal event that led China to prioritize naval power for British trade, a policy of extraterrito- the security of ports and the mainland. One can infer riality for British nationals residing in the treaty ports, and pay a monetary the historical context starting with the Opium Wars indemnity of six million for British suf- correlates to China’s contemporary naval expansion fering.8 The policy of extraterritorial- ity was perhaps the most demeaning in the SCS. of all the concessions because of the encroachment on Chinese sovereignty. The policy dictated that British nation- als operating in treaty ports were sub- security of ports and the mainland. One porary China to secure its port cities by ject to British laws not Chinese. The can infer the historical context start- maximizing sovereignty through naval dishonor of the Qing government at ing with the Opium Wars correlates to expansion in the SCS. Chan supports the hands of the British Navy taught China’s contemporary naval expansion this claim in the following: “Beijing the Chinese the importance of naval in the SCS. aspires to recover from China’s past hu- power. miliations and restore its standing as a Miller describes the trauma of the China’s Goal of Maximizing Sover- great power. Such an aspiration would Opium Wars as a transformative his- eignty and Status necessarily suggest questioning and even torical event for the Chinese people and The Opium Wars and the subsequent seeking to alter the status quo.”18 The government.9 China suffered from de- 100 years of humiliation caused China status quo for China has been one of feat at the hands of the British as well to identify as a victim of imperial pow- subordination to imperial powers’ na- as the French, leading to what is known ers. Miller discusses how imperialized val strength. Hence, to alter the status as the one hundred years of humilia- nations suffer from post-imperial ideol- quo, China must create a strong navy tion.10 Members of the Qing Celestial ogy (PII).14 Miller explains that impe- with a significant submarine capability Court learned from the defeat at the rialized nations suffer from a mentality to expand its influence in the SCS to hands of the imperial powers. The Ce- of victimhood that becomes a part of protect and expand China’s sovereignty. lestial Court concluded that the goals of their national identity and thus affects Associating borders and territorial the European invaders were to exploit their international outlook.15 Victim- possessions with maximizing sovereign-

44 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 ty correlates to PII and goals of victim- I am concerned we have few direct op- of dollars’ worth of hydrocarbon fuels hood. The Nine-Dash Line is a line of tions to counter this type of escalation resting beneath the SCS.26 The claim nine dashes crudely drawn after World if China chooses to pursue it. China’s over those natural resources is a matter War II on a 1947 map of China’s east- network of airstrips, radars, missile of international law. Unfortunately, sev- ern border, the Nine-Dash Line encom- batteries constructed across the South eral countries in the SCS are within the passed the Spratly of Nansha (“South China Sea while the rest of the world 200-mile EEZ of the SCS, including In- Sand Islands” in Chinese) in the SCS.19 watched, may prove a capacity—ex- donesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and China uses the Nine-Dash Line as a his- cuse me—may provide a capacity to Vietnam.27 Hydrocarbon fuels are the torical justification for its claim over the enforce China’s will over the South lifeblood of nations and allow militaries 24 SCS and utilizes nationalist sentiments China Sea. to function. China seeks to lay claim for naval expansion in the SCS against The naval build-up in the SCS has to the natural resources in the SCS to international law.20 China must possess placed China in a higher status inter- further legitimize its government and the Spratly Islands encompassed by the nationally. Military might may not maximize sovereignty and status.28 If Nine-Dash Line to gratify its need to make right, but it causes the interna- China can extract the natural resources maximize sovereignty. Lee explains that “territorial possession is essential in the materialization and meaningful grati- If China sought to alter the international status quo, it fication of sovereignty.”21 The Chinese government looks at the SCS’s islands could then restrict the international community’s uti- encompassed by the Nine-Dash Line as lization of the shipping lanes through the SCS. sovereign territory. The naval expansion provides the means to maximize sover- eignty over the islands against the status quo and international law. Also, China tional community to take notice of in the SCS, it will also limit its depen- looks at international law as a tool of China’s military prowess, for better or dence on imported oil—yet another step imperial countries and tends to attempt for worse increasing China’s interna- in maximizing independence from out- to negotiate territorial conflicts without tional status.25 side nations.29 subjugation to international law.22 The Another aspect of China’s expansion Currently, the United Nations has naval expansion provides the military in the SCS is the issue of control over rejected China’s claim to the natural force required to alter the status quo and the vast natural resources within the resources as well as China’s claim over reclaim China’s historical claim via the Nine-Dash Line and the 200-mile Eco- many of the small islands encompassed Nine-Dash Line. nomic Exclusionary Zone (EEZ). There in the Nine-Dash Line and the 200- China also seeks to maximize inter- are estimated billions, if not trillions, mile EEZ. Recently, the United Nations national status through naval expan- rejected China’s claim over the Mischief sion in the SCS. As the quote from Sir Reef, siding with the Filipino claim over Walter Read suggests, command of the reef.30 It is still unknown if China the sea and its riches leads to the com- will continue to rebuke the United Na- mand of the world itself. The SCS is tions’ ruling in favor of the Filipinos. one of the world’s most utilized and Looking through a PII perspective, vital maritime shipping lanes. Over China does not perceive the United half of the world’s oil tankers traverse Nations as a governing authority over the SCS annually, making it a security China’s claims in the SCS. China’s PII concern for regional and international perceives outside governing authorities states.23 China’s naval expansion in the and international laws as maintaining SCS provides the military might needed the status quo and thus detrimental to to secure the shipping lanes. If China China’s sovereignty and status. sought to alter the international status Many nations, including the United quo, it could then restrict the interna- States, claim China is seeking to become tional community’s utilization of the a hegemonic power in the region and shipping lanes through the SCS. The perhaps the globe. The Trump Ad- naval expansion and possible repercus- ministration, in the National Security sions on international maritime trade Strategy of 2017, and the Congressio- maximize China’s status internationally. nal Foreign Relations Committee have This possible threat was at the forefront both stated that China seeks to become of Congress’s hearing on the SCS in Map 2. China’s (Kuomintang) 11-dash line a hegemonic power at the expense of 2016. Colin Willett, then deputy as- map of 1947 entitled “Map of South China Sea the international community. Viewed sistant secretary of state, stated, Islands.” (Map provided by author.) through a PII perspective, however,

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 45 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF)

China’s actions in the SCS do not neces- rial powers abused Chinese sovereignty. 18. Steve Chan, China’s Troubled Waters: Mari- sarily support the claim China seeks to The past imperial transgressions shape time Disputes in Theoretical Perspective, (Cam- become a hegemonic power.31 Through- China’s contemporary actions and will bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). out the imperialization of China, start- affect how China treats the internation- ing with the Opium Wars, China was al community in the future.34 Under- 19. Ibid. attacked and exploited by imperial standing China’s past through a PII powers via seaports and waterways. perspective provides another means for 20. Ibid. Therefore, the United States Executive U.S. policy makers to analyze China’s 21. Wei-chin Lee, “Taiwan, the South China Sea and Legislative branches’ assessment of intentions for naval expansion in the Dispute, and the 2016 Arbitration Decision,” China’s intentions in the SCS does not SCS. Journal of Chinese Political Science, (New York, empathize with China’s past imperial NY: Springer, 2017). trauma. China seeks to claim the SCS to strengthen sovereignty and status Notes 22. China’s Troubled Waters. internationally for its security. China 1. David Rosenberg and Christopher Chung, does seek to alter the status quo, but “Maritime Security in the South China Sea: 23. “Maritime Security in the South China Sea.” that does not mean China seeks to rule Coordinating Coastal and User State Priorities,” over the region. The status quo, from Ocean Development & International Law, (Mil- 24. China Sea Maritime Disputes. ton Park, UK: Taylor & Francis, January 2008). a Chinese perspective, is superpowers 25. Ibid. preying on China.32 Therefore, from a Post-Imperial Ideology perspective, 2. U.S. Congress, Joint Hearing before the Sub- committee on Seapower and Projection Forces of 26. “Maritime Security in the South China Sea.” China’s actions in the SCS do seek to the Committee on Armed Services Meeting Jointly alter the status quo—meaning China is with Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the 27. Ibid. no longer preyed upon by foreign pow- Committee on Foreign Affairs on 7 July, China ers from the sea.33 Sea Maritime Disputes, (Washington, DC: July 28. Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, 2017). Seeking Security in an Insecure World, 2nd ed., Conclusion (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., China’s naval expansion into the SCS 3. The White House, National Security Strategy, 2012). (Washington, DC: 2010). is a substantial security concern for the 29. “Maritime Security in the South China Sea.” international community. The SCS’s 4. Ibid. maritime shipping lanes are a vital ar- 30. Sigfrido Burgos Caceres, China’s Strate- tery for oil shipping and international 5. Henry Kissinger, On China, (New York, NY: gic Interests in the South China Sea: Power and trade. China’s regional neighbors and The Penguin Press, 2011). Resources, (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013). the United States perceive China as a threat. The United States’ Congress and 6. Ibid. 31. Hegemonic power: State which seeks to rule President fear China’s historic rise and over a region or globally. claim China seeks hegemony over the 7. Ibid. region at the expense of the interna- 32. Steve Chan, China’s Troubled Waters: Mari- tional committee. Through a PII per- 8. Ibid. time Disputes in Theoretical Perspective, (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). spective, however, one can come to a 9. Manjari C. Miller, Wronged by Empire: Stud- different conclusion regarding China’s 33. Ibid. intentions in the SCS. ies in Asian Security, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013). China does seek to alter the interna- 34. Ibid. tional status quo. China does seek to 10. Ibid. maximize status and sovereignty. These are all logical reasons for China’s naval 11. On China. expansion in the SCS. Seen through a PII perspective, however, maximiz- 12. Ibid. ing status and sovereignty and altering the status quo do not necessarily mean 13. Ibid. China is seeking to become a hegemonic power with regional and global domi- 14. Wronged by Empire. nance. China’s naval expansion in the SCS is to secure China from outside 15. Ibid. threats—the same threats that forced 16. Ibid. China to sign treaties surrendering claim to Hong Kong. The treaties also 17. Ibid. established treaty ports where impe-

46 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 Artificial Intelligence in the Future Operating Environment Why every Marine needs to understand emerging technologies in the era of great power competition by GySgt David Nass

hat is Artificial Intel- and global connectivity, will inevita- ligence (AI)? >GySgt Nass is currently serving as bly increase the speed of technologi- W “Frontier technolo- an Instructor at the Marine Raider cal disruption across every segment of gies,” which generally Training Center at Camp Lejeune, NC. both government and private industry. includes AI, bio-technology, quantum This includes those industries once con- computing, 5G, and next generation trolled exclusively by governments and hardware, will drastically affect the is a self-driving car from Tesla, which their militaries. Recent advancements future Marine Corps. It is important will use AI to constantly scan the data include: to focus on AI because, in many ways, of millions of previously driven miles • A flight simulation AI program cre- it is the glue among all these emerging and situations to make the right deci- ated on a $35 Raspberry Pi computer technologies. The DOD defines AI as sion when presented with a red light, now routinely beats the world’s best “the ability of machines to perform tasks pedestrian, or erratic human driver.2 human pilots.3 that normally require human technol- Exponential growth of AI technolo- • Numerous companies manufacture ogy—whether digitally or as the smart gies and applications, coupled with rap- earbuds that allow for near realtime software behind autonomous physical idly falling costs of computing power language translation. One set with the systems.”1 While the ideas for AI date back as far as 1956, AI has seen signifi- cant advances in the last fifteen years. Underpinned by immense advances in computer processing power (reference Moore’s Law), AI uses algorithms and high-speed computing to analyze and process large amounts of data in order to recognize patterns, draw conclusions, make a prediction, or take an action. A basic example may help to differentiate between AI’s current capabilities and theoretical capabilities. Currently, a computer can be “trained” to recognize a tank in an image or video by feeding it thousands of pictures of tanks. By “learning” the visual cues of a tank, the computer is then able to identify A high-speed computer, programmed with the right algorithm, can “learn” to recognize a any tank in a new picture the com- picture of a tank or fighting vehicle but requires vast amounts of imagery (data) to “learn” puter has not seen. A second example from. (Photo by Cpl Justin Updegraff.)

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 47 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF)

ability to translate over 40 languages can be purchased on Amazon for a cost of just over $200.4 • In the summer of 2019, Chinese company DJI unveiled the Manifold 2 hardware adapter for its drone lines that enables a user to fly the drone autonomously, analyze motions, and utilize computer vision to identify objects in the screen—all for a cost of $1,300.5

Friendly Use of AI The Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 identifies, “the individual/force element which shoots first has a decisive advantage.”7 While AI will eventually affect every area of the military, every Marine should view AI as a means to become more efficient and lethal. Using AI to gain efficiency will give Marines Effective artificial intelligence and machine learning require humans to write code and up- more time to conduct the tasks in each load data. (Photo by Cpl Brandon Martinez.) MOS that require the most focus, have the highest risk, or lead to an overall graphic display of heart rate, sleep lev- these technologies is to understand reduced cognitive load. Higher lethality els, and nutrition. Service members are what our adversaries may be doing to will ensure we have a clear understand- prompted to eat or take a supplement to us. The same technologies we are devel- ing of the battlefield and are able to maintain peak focus and performance oping are also being developed by great strike first where needed. while fatigued.8 power competitors. In 2018, China re- We ask more of a Marine today than Artificial intelligence will also make leased its “Next Generational Artificial at any point in the past. Much of this us more lethal by improving the find, fix, Intelligence Development Plan,” with is because of the increase in technol- finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate the stated objective of achieving world- ogy, communications, and complexity process. leading AI theories, technologies, and of our systems and processes. By taking • Autonomous image recognition applications by 2030.9 Viewed from a detailed look at each of our MOS, from a satellite, aircraft, or ground a solely friendly capability lens, Ma- we could identify activities that are the sensor will decrease the time to iden- rines only need to understand the AI most time intensive and focus AI on tify, recognize, and confirm an en- technologies in their specific MOS. If these areas to become more efficient. emy element, allowing our future long viewed from the lens of the adversary, • Using AI-driven predictive main- range precision fires to have first strike however, every Marine, either deployed tenance on our aircraft and vehicles, lethal effects. or in garrison, must understand the full we could identify when a small main- • Across a broad spectrum of mission scope of adversary capabilities. tenance task should be conducted or sets where Marines are conducting ir- In addition to discussing the need parts stockpiled in advance to prevent regular warfare, language processing to strike first,Force Design 2030 also a long-duration deadline. and artificial intelligence can scrape identified that forces “able to operate • Autonomous drones, vehicles, and social media and local news sources inside an adversary’s long-range preci- ships could move supplies and equip- to sense local sentiment for or against sion fire weapons engagement zone are ment quicker than manned platforms, U.S. initiatives, identify malign actors, more operationally relevant.”10 While reducing risk for our Marines and de- and geo-locate potential targets. forward deployed in an EABO, Ma- creasing the time needed to resupply • AI-enabled information operations rines unaware of the imagery intelli- our front line troops. can create and disseminate messag- gence capabilities of our adversaries • Autonomous human performance ing to a wide audience in numerous may park a vehicle or forget to camou- software and wearable solutions could languages. flage supplies that allow our adversaries identify sleep, nutrition, and activity to quickly identify a forward Marine patterns that lead to peak cognitive Adversary Use of AI position. In the worst case scenario, performance and prevent injuries. In While AI and emerging technologies this allows the enemy to strike first, his book Ghost Fleet, P.W. Singer envi- as a whole will make Marines more using any number of current or future sions a future where service members efficient and lethal, one of the biggest long-range weapons systems. In a non- wear “vis glasses,” giving them a holo- reasons every Marine must understand kinetic situation, the enemy now knows

48 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 where we are operating and is able to How will these developments shape mission for an AI technology, senior move additional intelligence assets to rules of engagement and information leaders will know what questions to monitor and identify our activities operations? Moreover, will our Marines ask to ensure the technology is used without us knowing. be able to recognize both the hardware appropriately. Both China and Russia are exporting and software of an AI system that will Education of our small unit leaders digital surveillance technologies. China exist in everyday life and could be uti- must be a continuum throughout their is at the forefront of facial identifica- lized, hacked, or compromised by our careers. As technology becomes more tion and has been using it internally adversaries? and more complex, spiral learning will for many years. Now, they are export- be critical to ensure that our Marines ing their facial recognition hardware Two Recommendations for the Future and small unit leaders comprehend with AI software to countries around Train and Educate the Force. Train- and master future technologies. Just the world.11 These technologies will ing and educating the force on how AI like our senior leaders, our small unit be used by our adversaries to moni- and other emerging technologies work leaders must also be educated on the tor or identify our activity abroad. A must be included in everything from ethical implications of using AI systems Marine Raider who posts a picture on entry level schools to pre-deployment or autonomous weapons as well as un- Facebook and then travels to southwest certification exercises. This training derstanding how or where AI systems Asia or central Africa could be easily and education should allow Marines may fail or provide unreliable informa- identified, allowing our adversaries to to master friendly technology, teach tion. Our small unit leaders must also identify a MARSOC footprint in an partner nation technology, and un- understand their role in educating the otherwise unknown country or region. derstanding any adversary technology force as a whole so that every Marine The same digital social media and open capability our Marines will encounter understands how their small actions source scraping tools we can use to our on a MEU, deployment, contingency could be detected by our enemy or used advantage will be used against both mission, or during an EABO. against us in the future. our garrison and deployed Marines to Our middle- to upper-level leaders Lastly, our training must also imitate identify locations, pictures, associates, must understand both the opportuni- our future operating environment. Just capabilities, and vulnerabilities. ties and threats of AI and other frontier as a degraded communications environ- technologies. Since many leaders did ment has become a standard element of Partner and Host Nation Use of AI not have these technologies earlier in training, we must implement the other The third focus area is partner and host nation use of AI. As Marines de- ploy forward, we are almost always in As our Marines prepare and train to operate inside a combined or partnered environment, working closely with allies, coalition the weapons engagement zone of our enemies in an members, or training a local national partner nation force. As AI technolo- EABO setting, they should face an adversary appropri- gies advance and become increasingly ate for those likely deployments. affordable, our allies and partners will be using them on a daily basis. As the world’s premiere fighting force, our allies and partners expect us to be ex- their careers, they may be reluctant to types of technologies our adversaries perts in intelligence, technology, and accept or employ them on the modern may have. As our Marines prepare and warfighting. To advise and assist these battlefield. Middle- to upper-level lead- train to operate inside the weapons en- partner forces, we must understand ers should not hesitate to schedule and gagement zone of our enemies in an the technological environment we are attend executive AI courses or confer- EABO setting, they should face an working in. If a partner force is using ences. These courses and conferences adversary appropriate for those likely an AI technology and we do not know will allow commanders and senior deployments. Marines should be chal- the capabilities, they may use it in a enlisted leaders to drill down on AI lenged in an environment where the manner that compromises a mission, and data science into the many sub- enemy may have the ability to conduct creating added risk to our force. categories of AI including computer the find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and Not only will the partnered or al- vision, machine and deep learning, and disseminate process faster than we can, lied militaries we work with have these natural language processing. They will where the enemy can quickly control the technologies but so too will the host na- also educate commanders on the criti- narrative through information, where tion infrastructure we operate in. How cal aspects of AI ethics, AI limitations, the local population or host nation will our most junior Marines react to and potential for error. This knowledge forces are using advanced technologies, sharing the roadway with a self-driving will help our leaders make important and where Marines are challenged by car or encountering a medical or store decisions for their command. When autonomous enemy and partner nation delivery robot while on a foot patrol? subordinate leaders are seeking per- systems—forcing them to make appro-

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 49 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF)

Notes 1. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy, (Washington, DC: 2018).

2. Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the New World Order, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018).

3. Nicholas Ernest, David Carroll, Corey Schumacher, Matthew Clark, Kelly Cohen, and Gene Lee, “Genetic Fuzzy based AI for Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle Control in Simulated Air Combat Missions,” Journal of Defense Management, (Hyderabad: Omics International, 2016).

4. Information regarding WT2 Language Translator Device is available at https://www. amazon.com.

What level of access to our information systems can we share with allies and partner nation 5. Information on Manifold 2 is available at forces? (Photo by Cpl Brandon Martinez.) https://www.dji.com.

priate decisions. Future training at the power of deep learning to bear on real- 6. Thomas Malone, Superminds: The Surpris- lowest levels should include: world industries.”12 In order to truly ing Power of People and Computers Thinking • Robust red cells with the experience find the technologies that give our force Together, (New York, NY: Little, Brown and and expertise to incorporate near peer the most lethality and most efficiency, Co, 2018). competitor technologies into adver- we must create a culture of innovation, sary’s capabilities. encouraging our small unit leaders to 7. Headquarters Marine Corps, Force Design • Host nation forces equipped with become “AI entrepreneurs” and develop 2030, (Washington, DC: March 2020). advanced technologies such as drones, bottom up AI uses and initiatives. 8. P.W. Singer, Ghost Fleet, (Boston, MA: autonomous vehicles, or social media In 2008, MCO 3900.17 was signed, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015). scraping computer applications. defining the Marine Corps Urgent • Electronic and visual signals man- Needs Process (UNS) and formaliz- 9. Graham Webster, Rogier Creemers, Paul Tri- agement. Require units to fly drones ing an avenue for the warfighter to fill olo, and Elsa Kania, “China’s ‘New Generation over their field formations to provide an urgent capability gap.13 The UNS Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’,” New small unit leaders with the knowl- was used countless times by our war- America, (August 2017), available at https:// edge of how easily their force could fighters to get the right technology and www.newamerica.org. be recognized by adversary space or equipment for their mission. Continu- unmanned aerial systems. ing this agility and flexibility into the 10. Ibid. • A robust identify management pro- AI age, we must create and encourage 11. Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole, “Ex- gram. Educate every Marine on how Marines to brainstorm and design ideas porting Digital Authoritarianism: The Russian their online presence could be used for our force to use future technologies and Chinese Models. Foreign Policy at Brook- against them for facial recognition, to improve our efficiency and lethal- ings Institution,” Brookings, (August 2019), predictive analysis of likely decisions, ity. These ideas may not fill a critical available at https://www.brookings.edu. or identifying individual preferences gap like the UNS but instead provide for intelligence targeting. an opportunity and enable the Marine 12. Ibid. Corps to connect the ground operator Ground-Up Innovation. In his 2017 to academia or industry expert, result- 13. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCO 3900.17, work AI Superpowers: China, Silicon ing in a better Marine Corps tomorrow. (Washington, DC: October 2008). Valley, and the New World Order, author These initiatives, in addition to current and technologist Kai-Fu Lee asserts that MARSOC, Marine Corps, DOD, and most AI breakthroughs will not come United States Government programs out of computer science labs or tech will help us educate the force, develop firms but from “down-to-earth, profit- future agile and innovative leaders, and hungry entrepreneurs teaming up with maintain the competitive advantage AI experts to bring the transformative against any adversary.

50 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 Irregular Warfare Then and now by Maj David Pummell

powers from 1945 to 1990. The critical >Maj Pummell is a retired Explosive facets of competition are the whole of Irregular Warfare: A Ordnance Disposal Officer who spent government approach and appreciation violent struggle among the majority of his career supporting of the competition calculus that under- Force Reconnaissance and Special stands the threshold of risk and redlines state and non-state ac- Operations units. As a civilian, he for escalation to avoid a transition to tors for legitimacy and currently serves as a MARSOC Strat- conflict. (See Figure 1.) egist. IW has been conducted under many influence over the rele- titles; the shortlist includes small wars, vant population(s). Also counter insurgency, guerilla warfare, 1 bookends of peace and war. Joint Doc- unconventional warfare, asymmetric called IW. trine Note 1-19 (JDN 1-19) “Competi- warfare, and operations in the grey zone. tion Continuum” was released in June This lexicon can initially be confusing, 2019 and describes the range of coop- but once we understand the hierarchy hat is Irregular Warfare eration, adversarial competition below of IW, the terms present common func- (IW)? Initially framing armed conflict, and then armed conflict. tions and approaches. They may best fit W IW doctrinally may Competition below armed conflict will as individual operations and activities help develop a logi- take various forms but tends to occur under the overarching term of IW. (See cal answer on how the Marine Corps over an extended period. A couple of Figure 2 on next page.) can best support the National Defense the more famous competition periods A summary of the Irregular Warfare Strategy through an IW approach. The earned titles such as The Great Game, Annex to the National Defense Strategy cornerstone Joint Publication, JP-1 Doc- the period in the mid-1800s played was released in October 2020. IW is a trine for the Armed Forces of the United out in Central Asia between Victorian persistent reality requiring the appli- States, describes warfare in two purest England and Tsarist Russia. A modern cation of valued resources from across forms: traditional and irregular. Tra- version, titled The Cold War, was a pe- the U.S. Government. IW can be suc- ditional warfare is defined as a violent riod of competition between the Soviet cessful when those resources are applied struggle between nation-states or coali- Bloc countries and the U.S.-led Western well in advance to shape and influence. tions and alliances of nation states. Regional partners are influenced, This has been the preeminent form allies are supported, and relation- of warfare since the mid-1600s, ships developed and sustained well which evolved from the central before any indication and warning German region east of the Rhine of crisis or conflict. This takes years River—described as Westphalia. done properly; it would be preferred Napoleon Bonaparte matured this to have up to a decade to influence form of warfare with his Prussia and shape a region to best support campaigns. IW earned the title competition and reduce an adver- to highlight its non-Westphalian sary’s desire to expand their agenda. context. The strategic point of IW The central idea of the Irregu- is to gain or maintain control or lar Warfare Annex is to implement influence over, and the support of, a core competency for both con- a relevant population. ventional and special operations The National Defense Strategy forces, sustaining the ability to im- (NDS) released in 2018 places pose costs and create dilemmas for emphasis on great power compe- our adversaries.2 tition. Competition is not clearly Our Nation’s enemies, adver- defined. In the conflict continuum, Figure 1. Front cover The Great Game authored by Peter saries, and competitors apply con- competition is placed between the Hopkirk. (Figure provided by author.) stant pressure through competition

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 51 IDEAS & ISSUES (SPECIAL OPERATIONS /MARSOF)

    enced British force. Francis Marion was   a Continental Army offi cer operating in the South Carolina region using guerilla tactics against the British. Not commit- ting his force to frontal attacks, Francis Marion wore down the larger British force with a campaign of surprise at-    tacks, ambushes, and raids before then    withdrawing into the South Carolina swamplands. His force was able to sus-

  tain the pressure against the British by   subsisting off the land and cooperating

 with the local population by earning  their trust. A British colonel who was  repeatedly unsuccessful against Marion Francis’s Irregular Force referred to him as the “Swamp Fox.”                           All Marines are at least passingly      familiar with the Barbary Pirates and the Marine Corps’ participation during Figure 2. JP 3-05 Special Operations irregular approaches in competition. (Figure provided by that campaign. The Barbary Wars were author.) a series of confl icts in the late 1800s to early 1900s involving the United States across the world. Both state and non- add a deeper understanding and value against the Barbary States, specifi cally state actors use IW in the various forms to the formula for success. Since many Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli in North to achieve their objectives. The United examples took place during the “analog Africa. The First Barbary War was States must engage in competition as a age,” how would those same scenarios conducted from 1801–1805; this was form of IW and change the calculus mainly a naval war where the United and desire for the adversary to expand States fought to secure free trade, navi- and infl uence. gation, and security of the seas. (See One of the critical elements of Figure 3.) winning in competition is the devel- It was during the First Barbary War opment and sustainment of strong Lt Presley O’Bannon and a handful of alliances and partnerships. Empow- Marines recruited and trained a mer- ering regional partners and creating cenary army that marched 521 miles a synergy between allies builds an through the African desert from Al- enduring strategic approach to apply exandria, Egypt, to Derna, Tripoli, power against the adversary. to achieve a decisive victory against a A thorough understanding of the much greater force in the defense. contemporary operating environment The Second Barbary War took place illuminates the opportunities and de- in 1815; this war was against the re- fi nes the risk formula of risk to mis- gional pirates who impeded freedom sion, force, and politics. Applying the of the seas and demanded tribute strategic approach in competition to Figure 3. 1805 Battle of Derna. (Credit: U.S. Marine Corps payments for passing shipping. The History Division.) seize on the opportunities while man- United States and allied European aging risk will keep the effort from countries countered the pirates with escalating into confl ict by crossing an play out today in the “digital age” across superior ships, cutting-edge nautical unacceptable threshold. all domains that present both new oppor- technology, and weaponry of the period. The challenge of maintaining a ca- tunities and risk. Looking at a few his- Therefore, it could be said that the pable IW force is the requirement not to torical and international examples then campaigns of the Swamp Fox and the neglect or degrade the capability to con- narrowing the scope to United States. Barbary Wars, specifi cally the Battle duct traditional warfare with the rapid IW involvement will illuminate those of Derna, help set a baseline for IW. strike options needed to win. To com- trends of success and key mistakes that The common elements of a small, well- prehend the requirements of IW today, exhaust limited and precious resources. trained, and equipped force, departing it is important to understand the history During the American Revolution- from traditional warfare, partnered with and diversity of IW. History will not ary War (1775–1783), the Continental an indigenous force as a force-multi- provide the solution for today, but it will Army was pitched against the experi- plier operating in austere conditions

52 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 involving asymmetric such as the Malayan techniques are found Emergency, where the across the majority of IW operations and ac- IW case studies. Ele- tivities were conducted ments and variations of in a maritime environ- these conditions remain ment.3 (See Figure 4.) present in the IW spec- The United States trum today and how we was involved in Nica- analyze the elements of ragua for over twenty IW in the multi-domain years (1909–1933). To environment. achieve the objectives, Starting in 1889 the United States syn- lasting until 1902, the chronized several lines Second Boer War was of effort for the strate- an irregular war in its gic approach. The es- purest form; it lasted tablishment of neutral thirteen years, pitch- zones was designed to ing a guerilla force, protect American lives the Boers, against the Figure 4. River patrol with the indigenous raft in Malaya circa the 1950s. (Credit: and property while the standing British Army. Special Air Service Regimental Association.) conduct of security op- “Boers,” the Afrikaans erations separated and term for farmers, used raiding tactics were interned into 46 camps without disarmed the various political combat- in plain clothes then blended back into the appropriate level of medical care ants. The endstate was a successful elec- the local population. This is also the or nutrition, and disease was rampant. tion process resulting in free elections in origin of the term commando, describ- The Boer War ended by Treaty 1928 and 1932. The Marines simulta- ing the Boer militia force. The Dutch in May of 1902. The British learned neously trained and organized the Ni- East India Company instituted “Com- that the only terrain they controlled caraguan military while conducting a mando Law” in the early settlement was the terrain they physically occu- counterinsurgency campaign targeting period, requiring the Boers to equip pied, so adopting the tactics of denial, the key combatants such as Augusto C. themselves with horses and firearms to persistent pressure, and containment Sandino. (See Figure 5.) defend the settlements. Thus, groups of brought the Boers to the peace table. A One of the elements to success in mounted militia were organized into British win came at a tremendous cost Nicaragua was the “whole of govern- “commando” units. During the Second to both sides. The British used the les- ment approach” by the United States in Boer War, commandos numbered in the sons learned from the Boer War in their applying both military and diplomatic range of 25,000 and used the tactics of following involvement in irregular wars power. The military approach was to marksmanship, tracking, camouflage, and concealment against a British force of over 450,000 conventional soldiers. Lord Kitchener, initially Chief of Staff and then Commander of the Brit- ish Expeditionary Force, applied a series of tactics against the Boers designed to break their will by restricting their free- dom of movement and ability to blend into the supportive local population. To restrict the movement, Kitchener constructed over 8,000 blockhouses, usually within line of sight of each oth- er, combined with the employment of barbed-wire fences and mounted patrols across the Transvaal. Supporting the blockhouse strategy, Kitchener attempt- ed to further remove local support from the Boers by creating internment camps for the local population—also described as concentration camps. Under horrid conditions, large amounts of civilians Figure 5. Marines in Nicaragua capture Sandino’s colors. (Credit: Marine Corps History Division.)

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 53 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF) secure the key terrain while relentlessly dependent action. This effort was filled conducting modern IW in a fast-paced pursuing the agitators to deny them ac- with both success and failure. The part- multi-domain environment. Depicting cess to the local population, a key source nered concept was similarly repeated in IW in the current operating environ- of support. Afghanistan with the various Afghan ment is informed by a review of the A significant factor of the Nicaragua Militia and local police groups; based Small Wars Manual, and a study of the Campaign was the use of the Marine upon lessons learned from Vietnam, the adversarial approach of both China and Brigades’ organic airpower for combat effort was considerably more successful, Russia. and logistic support. The aviation sup- but there is still debate on the enduring The Marine Corps’ role in the series port provided direct casualty evacua- effect. (See Figure 6.) of small wars in the early years of the tion, assault support, logistic support, In 2004, the Honorable James Webb, 20th century placed the Marine Corps and close air support.4 Based upon the former Senator of , visited the in a position to be well suited for IW lessons learned from the campaign, the Marine forces in Afghanistan. Sena- based upon its expeditionary nature and Marine Corps more than doubled its tor Webb, a former Marine Corps of- connection with naval power. Lessons small wars formal instruction from 9 ficer, received the Navy Cross during from operations spanning from 1890 to hours in 1925 to 94 hours in 1935— the . After completing a 1930 in central and South America in a reinforcing the value of the lessons that few days of battlefield circulation in Af- series of documents were published on contributed to the Small Wars Manual ghanistan, he concluded his trip with the small wars culminating in 1940 with later published in 1940. an assessment stating that you could the release of the Small Wars Manual. The Marine Corps approach to Viet- remove the names of the tribes and The classic Small Wars Manual re- nam was complex. It sought to contain villages in Helmand province and the mains relevant and educates the force the fluid insurgency where the center counterinsurgency problem set would on the subject, combined with threat of gravity was again the population. almost be an identical problem set to analysis of an adversary and compre- The combination of large conventional that of Vietnam. hension of the contemporary operating operations gave the focused counterin- To give the historical examples environment an IW mission concept surgency efforts and distributed smaller highlighted in this article the justice can be developed for that specific envi- forces time and space to organize and they deserve, deeper, individual study ronment and threat with clearly defined establish rapport with the population. is required. They do illuminate the efforts and endstate. In 1967, the United States established consistent trends in IW over decades In 1995, two Chinese People’s Lib- the Civil Operations and Revolution- that set the stage for the discussion of eration Army colonels authored a book ary Development Support (CORDS). titled “Unrestricted Warfare.” Colonels CORDS facilitated the specific mili- Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui fol- tary organization as part of the whole lowed the tenants of Sun Tzu and the of government approach. CORDS was “Art of War” and devised an approach a pioneering effort to unify the military to support China’s goal of being the with other components of the govern- global superpower by 2049.5 Their ment. Numerous programs existed intent is to win without fighting, a within the architecture of CORDS de- “War without gunsmoke.” This is ac- signed to defeat the insurgency such as complished through a series of strategic the Provisional Reconnaissance Units. efforts that fall below the threshold One that has gained notoriety is the of conflict for the United States. The PHEONIX program. It is important to Chinese types of warfare are catego- use accurate references when research- rized into the three mutually support- ing PHEONIX; based upon some of ing warfare’s: economic warfare, the the unclassified information available, use of international loans and financial both fiction and nonfiction PHEONIX manipulation to gain influence and has developed somewhat of a contro- achieve strategic goals; network war- versial history. PHEONIX was not an fare, the manipulation of all forms of assassination program as described in media; and lawfare, designed to ma- some documents. U.S. advisors assisted nipulate international law, norms, Vietnamese partners in finding, fixing, policies targeting the abroad audience. and finishing key influencers of the in- These types of warfare operationalized surgent networks. The finishing was through the Chinese “One Belt One often kinetic, but finishing solutions Road” initiative provide the global also included imprisonment. The chal- expansion for strategic investments. lenge of the program was the distributed Figure 6. Capt Andrew Finlayson with members This is executed by a “Port, Park, City” elements across Vietnam working with of a provisional reconnaissance unit (1969). plan to invest in a nation of interest by partner forces that would often take in- (Credit: Col Andrew Finlayson, USMC[Ret].) financing and building a port, then a

54 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 park to support the port population, a series of articles laying out his views on The larger overt military operation is which in time expands into a city. The Russian security concerns and the future then conducted to achieve the endstate.8 city evolves into a sequential plan of operating environment. Shortly after Gerasimov’s view of the operating en- “Safe City, Smart City,” connecting publishing the doctrine, the Little Green vironment is that the United States is the city to the Chinese digital enter- Men showed up in Crimea in 2014 to a strategic threat to Russia. This is a prises through Chinese owned security support the Russian sponsored insur- second style of modern IW. cameras systems and communication rection of Ukraine. Defined as “Hybrid Through a formula of historical networks. This is a template of ad- Warfare,” using a blend of traditional study, lessons learned (in some cases versarial competition. What can the and IW, Russia is strengthening their relearned), and threat assessments, a United States do to change the adver- posture in both the near and far abroad concept for applying the Marine Corps sarial competition calculus below the regions. The Gerasimov Doctrine uses power in competition and conflict is threshold of conflict? This is one style military power detached from the gov- framed. Meeting the vision of the Com- of modern Irregular Warfare.6 ernment; the traditional term would mandant’s Planning Guidance, a mari- The Russian approach to great power be mercenary, but the employment is time IW approach provides an adapt- is different from the Chinese; it could be more complex and operates in the “Gray able capability to apply toward great described as less methodical and imple- Zone.” The use of Russian special opera- power competition, crisis response, and mented on a shorter turn in the competi- tions and intelligence operatives to apply conflict. A maritime IW force shap- tion continuum. It has become a phrase an adaptive approach sets in motion a ing and influencing the littoral region among strategists regarding Russia: now proven design for regime change. coordinated with the larger naval force “When the little Green Men show up, The use of covert and clandestine means securing the sea space connected across you have failed in the competition.” The justifies response on the world stage the all-domain environment depicts a Little Green Men and the Russian IW for the sequential use of overt military force modernization concept that meets approach tie directly to the Gerasimov power. The sterile uniformed military the requirements of the National De- Doctrine.7 The Russian Chief of the presence removes an immediate affilia- fense Strategy and supporting Irregular General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, drafted tion to a government-sanctioned action. Warfare Annex. This type of strategic

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 55 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF)

proach would support the National De- fense Requirements across the range of '( )* cooperation, competition, and conflict  ( *&  '      in the maritime regions. *           The history and concepts illustrate )   *()               the diversity of irregular warfare and         implications in a maritime environment.    *) The diversity of operations range from    # countering small insurgent elements to *  '   nation-state adversaries in great power    '   $  *'!      competition. There is not a single so- ' '   %   '(    lution to “can” and place on the shelf "  "  to execute when needed, but there are  )* elements “common to all” for a sound irregular warfare approach. Moderniz-       ing the force to operate and win in the            contemplator operating environment will result in an irregular warfare model

! &   integrating all domains.

Notes Figure 7. RAND, maritime irregular warfare venn diagram. (Credit: RAND Corporation.) 1. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Joint Publica- projection provides the approach needed bassies and rotational MAGTF deploy- tion 1, Joint Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the to connect with key allies and partners ments providing the combat power to United States, (Washington, DC: March 2013). that can influence an adversary’s risk support National Defense Requirements calculus and desire to expand in the through regional demonstrations, inter- 2. Department of Defense, Summary Of The critical regions. (See Figure 7.) national exercises, and other amphibi- Irregular Warfare Annex To The National Defense The Maritime IW capability ensures ous operations in the modern operating Strategy 2020, (Washington, DC: 2020). all areas from land to sea are protected; environment. This approach creates a 3. Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Boer War 1899– the maritime region that often creates a sustainable multi-faceted capability that 1902, (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2003). gap and opportunity for the adversary reaches out to the joint, interagency, and will then deny freedom of movement in multi-national partners. 4. Col Steven S. Evans, U.S. Marines and Ir- the maritime regions. The primary tasks Distribution of the MAGTF across regular Warfare 1898–2007, (Quantico VA: of the Maritime IW force are to connect the region is executed through the Ma- Marine Corps University Press, 2008). to the larger naval force patrolling the rine Corps Concepts Littoral Operations open seaways, increase the capability in a Contested Environment and Expe- 5. Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred Year Mara- and capacity of ally and partner mari- ditionary Advanced Base Operations. thon, China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America time operations, and deny freedom of The Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) As The Global Superpower, (New York, NY: St. movement to the adversary or insurgent would capitalize upon the regional net- Martin, 2016). that rely upon the maritime region for works developed by MARSOC. The 6. Robert Bunker, China’s Securing, Shaping, logistic and operational movements. MARSOC elements would be in a posi- and Exploitation of Strategic Spaces: Gray Zone Historical maritime IW operations tion to assist with the reception, staging, Response to Counter Shi Strategies, (Bloomington, include but are not limited to foreign onward movement, and integration of IN: Xlibris, 2019) internal defense, counterinsurgency, un- the MLR elements and fulfill informa- conventional warfare, counter-piracy, tion requirements as the elements de- 7. Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov and counter-narcotics. ploy. MARSOC would then provide Right,” Military Review, (Fort Leavenworth, The Marine Corps is in the position indications, warnings, and intelligence KS: Army University Press, January–Febru- to develop and sustain regional maritime updates as the adversary monitors the ary 2016). partners and allies through multiple MLR movements and reacts to the 8. U.S. Army Special Operations Command, lines of effort executed simultaneously. changes in the regional force posture. Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Developing a maritime overarching ap- Liaison officers or elements would Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013–2014, proach that connects MARSOC for- then work directly with the regional (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations ward elements with their networks that U.S. government agencies to complete Command, 2016). have been developed over years, the U.S. the “whole of government” approach Marine Corps Security Guard Detach- further expanding the maritime net- ments globally postured at the U.S. Em- work and capability. This layered ap-

56 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 We Are Not Inventory Talent management for next-generation warfare by LtCol Gregory DeMarco

ur newest Commandant cor- rectly diagnosed our talent >LtCol DeMarco is currently the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 at Marine Corps Forces management system as out- Korea. He has previously commanded Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron-2, O 1 flew the EA-6B Prowler in Iraq and Afghanistan, is a Foreign Area Officer, and a dated, making it difficult for our Corps to retain the best Marines former enlisted artilleryman. In additional to several staff billets, LtCol DeMarco necessary to confront our battlefield has served with the 1st, 2d, and 3d MarDivs, as well as with the 1st and 2d MAWs. peers. This should worry because, as our previous Commandant said, “There’s a than a six-digit alphanumeric code: a geant billet). The administrators and war coming.”2 As Marines, we are ex- two-digit rank and four-digit MOS. monitors balance thousands of compet- pected to adapt to and overcome our According to the 38th Commandant’s ing requirements in their never-ending enemy; however, we have unnecessarily Planning Guidance, shell game called the orders-writing pro- put ourselves into a manpower box of Our manpower system was designed cess and demonstrate on a daily basis our own making—a box that our enemy in the industrial era to produce mass, the flexible-problem-solving-mission- will happily exploit—and that we will not quality. We assumed that quantity accomplishment approach we expect of pay for with the lives of our Marines if of personnel was the most important Marines. Still, the system still operates we do not solve it. Luckily, while many element of the system, and that work- primarily on the premise that each of us marketplace tools and incentives along ers (Marines) are all essentially inter- are a six-digit number—nothing more, with Congressional actions can help us changeable.3 nothing less. solve these problems, there is one legal, These six-digit numbers are very easy As my six-digit number changed simple, and cheap solution available to for our headquarters to work with, make since my enlistment in 1991 (eventu- us right now that we can implement assignments, or track. Nearly every as- ally making it to an E4-0811), I have immediately and that is completely un- signment, either on the unit table of seen assignments with 1st, 2d, and 3d der our control. Words mean things, organization, as an individual augment, MarDivs, along with my flying tours in and the words we use should be cho- or report, derives from manning docu- the MAWs. All the while, to the institu- sen deliberately. Year after year, I have ments or rosters that track some status tion, I have always been inventory—a faithfully attended enlisted and officer of a series of these six-digit numbers. cog in the Marine Corps’ machine. It manpower briefs and understand the many reasons why we see manpower gaps in our units. Yet, in each brief I … we are little more than a six-digit alphanumeric have wondered, “Are our words the root of some of our behavior and manpower code: a two-digit rank and four-digit MOS. problems?” If we are all just inventory, why should we not expect behavior problems? If we are simple replaceable Occasionally, additional attributes has never been the institution that kept cogs and widgets, should we expect to are added (e.g., “Post-Command,” or me wearing green and coming to work; retain our top talent? What difference “German Speaker”), which narrows the the jokes about the Marine Corps you will it make if we change the words available pool of candidates. Similarly, hear today were common back then too. we use? at times, sourcing rules occasionally Instead, it was the people. The Marines Most of us, regardless of how many permit the “one-up, one-down” rule, I have worked with—the honest and PowerPoint slides we have consumed meaning that the billet can be filled by a less honest, the moral and morally chal- about the value of the individual Ma- Marine whose rank is either one higher lenged, the hard working and the ones rine, understand deep down that Ma- or one lower than the requirement (e.g., who taught me everywhere they like to rines take care of Marines. However, a staff sergeant, gunnery sergeant, or a hide on board a ship—they have been within our institution, we are little more master sergeant can fill a gunnery ser- the reason I stayed in the Corps, and it

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 57 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF) is likely the same with most of us who have been around for a while. To them, I have never been inventory. I have been around long enough to understand that the institution will never love you, and we should not expect it to. However, when we—publicly or privately—refer to our Marines as “inventory,” what effect does it have downstream when attempting to retain the most talented? I posit that the best do not want to be treated as inventory, no matter the finan- cial bonus tied to a contract. Addition- ally, we should not forget that Marines are smart—simply removing the word inventory from a few public briefs while retaining the concept behind a firewall will fail. Certainly, the material will get out, but regardless, the Marines will sniff it out; one constant throughout each generation of Marine I have met is they Are Marines simply “inventory,” the output of industrial-age mass production, or something recognize hypocrisy when they see it. more? (Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class David Cox.) If we are only inventory, negative incentives (non-judicial punishments reconfiguring our computer programs, may prove much easier to retain top tal- or courts martial, for example) might reports, manning documents, and inter- ent and to “not accept mediocrity within prevent someone from taking illegal faces with the joint community. While the force.”4 If we call our Marines pro- actions. However, if you want me to noble goals, I realize that these may re- fessionals, we should not thoughtlessly be my best, to believe in slogans such quire costly solutions. treat them like widgets. There are many as “honor, courage, commitment,” or Nevertheless, it is time for a thorough aspects to our manpower and talent- even “to be a professional,” what does overhaul of our language, and this is management systems that stand to be it say when the Corps calls me an in- freely available to us right now. First, reviewed, but I suggest we start with terchangeable six-digit component? As develop consistent language originating the cheap, simple, and legal one—our a squadron commander, if I state that from the Commandant that emphasizes language—to help our institution I need three more E3/E4 0111s, I tele- the value of the Marine. Next, purge achieve our Commandant’s vision of, graph that I do not care about their all briefs and references to terminol- “Demanding superior performance and quality—they are all interchangeable. ogy such as inventory, purchased billets, enforcing high standards.”5 How much more damaging is it for the pipelines, and the like. Finally, charge Service to say that we “purchased your all commanders to implement these billet” or that we need to increase the changes throughout our commands. Notes “production” of 75xx’s (aviators going Changing our language, while free, will 1. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s through the “pipeline”)? No one wants prove quite difficult unfortunately—en- Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: 2019). to think of themselves to have been pur- trenched habits die hard. Nevertheless, chased as an item on the shelf nor a overtime, our language will change to 2. Quoted in Amy B. Wang, “Top General product in the factory pipeline. I do reflect the will of our leadership. As Tells Marines to Be Prepared For a Big Fight,” not subscribe to the school that thinks an additional measure, we should take Washington Post, (December 2017), available at everyone is special by any means, but I advantage of a Secretary of Defense fel- https://www.washingtonpost.com. prefer to think of myself as human and lowship or two and study how human 3. 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance. not a widget (at least since SeniorDril- resources tackles this problem in private lInstructorStaffSergeantPilakowski—it industry and at major universities. Our 4. Ibid. was all one word back then—graduated problem is not unique to us: they both me from recruit to Marine). recruit and seek to retain top talent just 5. Ibid. Certainly, our manpower model like we do, they constantly try to in- needs a method to forecast recruitment crease employee (or student) buy-in (or or to target incentives and, therefore, spirit), and they develop their employees will always require reliable statistics. or have students in a study track. However, the greatest difficulty resides We are not inventory—we are Ma- in making adjustments to our systems in rines. If we start from this premise, it

58 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 SOF and the ARG/MEU Achieving asymmetric advantage by Maj Michael Stevens

Through the gray zone, hostile actors exploit the relative sanctity of under-gov- “A BHAG—big hairy audacious goal, is a huge and erned spaces across physical, virtual, in- daunting goal … it is clear, compelling, and unifying terstellar, and cognitive domains. These 1 competitive spaces can be contested and … a change-the-industry style goal.” denied realms, where freedom of ac- Measure What Matters tion and influence is adroitly usurped —John Doerr in through a combination of ambiguity, obfuscation, and a complex use of mul- tiple elements of national power—all he strength of an institu- of which downplay a possible kinetic 6 tion can be measured by >Maj Stevens has ten years of spe- response. This helps to restrain the its willingness to question cial operations experience and holds United States and its partners, as such long-standing practices and an advanced degree in international a response becomes more alarming in Tapproaches. The 2019 Commandant’s environments with already heightened policy from George Washington Uni- Planning Guidance and Force Design versity. political risk, thus hastening the pos- 2030 are doing this, considering how sibility of miscalculation. Further, the the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/ erosion of our technological superiority MEU is signaled out for long overdue is necessary to evolve the ARG/MEU’s contributes, as competitors can contest change.2 Furthermore, a requirement capabilities to achieve advantage in the our actions across all domains. With for the MEU to successfully compete gray zone, thus rebuilding the forma- such factors increasing, the gray-zone and achieve asymmetric advantage in tion’s relevance. The rationale follows actions of adversaries and competitors the gray zone is noted—a key aspect and includes necessary changes for the will continue, as these and other actions in its transformation.3 Amplifying ARG/MEU as well as areas of collabo- impose costs (notably sowing internal this change, recent discussion from ration—all to strengthen the forma- dissent) outside of combat that have a the Commandant in the Marine Corps tion’s value proposition to its Services stronger effect on the United States and Gazette highlighted the criticality of and the Nation. Such analysis entails achieve their policy objectives. persistent, relevant competition in the the entire formation, with a primary Within U.S. Indo-Pacific Command gray zone for the Service.4 However, the focus on the MEU as the more flexible (USINDO-PACOM), this is evident knowledge, expertise, and partnerships element toward change. through Chinese aggression across mul- to effectively compete in the gray zone tiple domains. China uses military and do not exist across the FMF. A Changed Environment paramilitary forces to subvert alliance The 2018 National Defense Strategy U.S. traditional military responses cohesion, erode societal resilience, and and National Military Strategy pro- have proven ineffective to address gray undermine our Nation’s position on vide foundational guidance for U.S. zone tactics. Our adversaries and com- key issues through actions in the gray special operations forces (USSOF) to petitors note the limitations of U.S. zone.7 Particularly, China’s disinforma- enable the DOD to address particular military power and understand our tion campaigns, its actions to contest a challenges of great power competition policy basis to employ military forces. nation’s sovereignty through ambiguous (GPC) and achieve competitive advan- U.S. military responses to aggression maritime altercations, building physi- tage below armed conflict. Through primarily consist of physical deterrence, cal terrain, and utilization of political USSOF’s ability to create outsized ef- strike delivery, and the sale of weapons warfare to implant coercive means of fects, it generates options in compe- to partners,5 yet none of these compel Chinese influence across its regional tition that garner the United States a adversaries and competitors to deviate neighbors—all are gray zone tactics position of strength. A more complete, from their malicious actions in the gray China successfully executes through collaborative partnership with USSOF zone. non-traditional use of force.8 Yet, none

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of these tactics are challengeable by the but on denying this capability from be- exploring why SOF is necessary to the ARG/MEU. ing employed.10 From its developments formation’s growth. As witnessed over the last several in precision weapons to low-intensity The ARG/MEU executes a reactive years, provocative activities in the gray tactics in the gray zone, these means operational approach, maintaining its zone can rapidly emerge, signaling a are highly successful in neutralizing a readiness to respond as required. But need for credible contact layer forces U.S. naval response. A new approach the very character of this relationship to contest subversive actions while also is necessary to compete. inhibits the formation’s functionality managing a complex situation before U.S. Special Operations Command to address modern gray-zone tactics. it turns into a geopolitical crisis.9 The (USSOCOM) is in the midst of an or- As adversaries and competitors foment complexity of the gray zone is unpre- ganizational shift toward GPC, with disorder through non-attributable gray dictable in its escalation spikes, yet this a large focus on enabling competition zone tactics—such as proxy warfare, does not spell opportunity for most below armed conflict. USSOF are ex- disinformation campaigns, and support blunt and surge forces, as their focus tensively investing in irregular warfare to extremist activities—the ability to resides on armed conflict—ill-prepared as the capability to challenge the gray challenge these actions demands per- for asymmetric engagement. This is the zone tactics of our adversaries and sistency, expertise, and relevance. To dilemma of the gray zone; it requires a competitors.11 To maximize USSOF’s do this, USSOF applies a preemptive responsive force with the ingenuity to small footprint and collective punch as approach that shapes and influences en- contest asymmetric actions while also a joint force enabler, a closer partnership vironments to avert conflict and man- possessing the lethality, technicality, with SOF can enable the ARG/MEU to age escalation at all levels of warfare. and persistency to manage escalation compete now in the gray zone. USSOF Known as an indirect approach, this and deter aggression. This is the crisis are the predominant element to achieve method aims to address instability via response capability necessary for the effects prior to the initiation of major partner actions by, with, and through modern era, which requires clear-eyed conflict, as SOF can illuminate, deter, local forces, aided by a deep understand- recognition across the Service. and deny the actions and hostile intent ing of regional and cultural dynamics.12 of adversaries and competitors through This method strengthens regional alli- Transformational Change their wide range of statutory capabilities ances, reduces financial commitments The ARG/MEU is predicated on na- across all domains. through savings in persistency, and pro- val power projection, with the ability to vides U.S. policy makers greater deci- rapidly deploy crisis response-oriented SOF–ARG/MEU in the gray zone sion space while avoiding the political forces to quell escalation or respond The ARG/MEU requires modern- sensitivities of deploying U.S. forces en accordingly to combat operations ization to compete in the gray zone. masse. amongst its capabilities. Yet, China Multiple areas to achieve closer SOF– Of note, a means of partnership focuses not on matching such power ARG/MEU collaboration are to follow, does exist through the USSOCOM projection within USINDO-PACOM with a focus on asymmetric capability, Special Operations Forces Liaison Element (SOFLE) program with the ARG/MEU. The program has aided closer SOF–ARG/MEU integration and interoperability through greater responsiveness to combatant command campaign activities, a requirement that dates to its 2014 inception. Yet, the SOFLE program cannot be the means to evolve the ARG/MEU to counter coercive gray-zone tactics. Aside from limits in availability, the SOFLE suffers capability disparities because it lacks consistency in its application of SOF understanding toward gray-zone tactics.

Maritime Gray-Zone Actions USINDO-PACOM’s expansive mar- Figure 1. Terms in graphic are: JFLCC—Joint Force Landing Component Commander; JFMCC— itime domain presents a region where Joint Force Maritime Component Commander; SR—Special Reconnaissance; DA—Direct Action; IO—Information Operations; PNF—Partner Nation Forces; and HN—Host Nation. For the ARG/MEU is likely to encounter further understanding of terms, reference Joint Publications (JP) 3-31 Joint Land Operations Chinese gray-zone tactics. If a hypothet- (JFLCC term), JP 3-32 Joint Maritime Operations (JFMCC term), JP 3-05 Special Operations ical situation emerges where ambigu- (SR, DA, as well as PE and BPC terms), and JP 3-13 Information Operations. (Graphic courtesy of ous Chinese forces challenge a regional author.) neighbor with a rudimentary yet veiled

60 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 littoral blockade, setting the way for an the situation warrants delicate response exercise restrains ARG/MEU influence; infiltration of irregular forces under a options. SOF use its increased access here, the ability to counter and impose false narrative of legitimacy, would the and resources to further illuminate the costs in this long game are of most sig- ARG/MEU be capable of providing the environment, leverage its relationships nificance. The MEU’s isolation at-sea, necessary response? While the merits of to enable a partner response because of albeit with short term disembarkments this and other factors can be debated, political sensitivity, or impose multi- such as this, deny the formation the the political sensitivity surrounding the domain or transregional costs through ability to truly shape their operating issue will impact the ARG/MEU’s abil- irregular means. Furthermore, SOF’s environments and domains. This largely ity to respond. As the formation is built ability to discredit illegitimate narra- nullifies their high-demand, low-density toward a combat orientation, its size, tives is bolstered by its expansive target resources the necessary time to assess, speed, and capabilities challenge the development, indigenous expertise, and characterize, and influence environ- ARG/MEU’s engagement. The ARG/ adaptive in realtime processes that en- ments. MEU’s capacity and brute strength are able widespread flexibility and sweeping One of USSOF’s key attributes is self-limiting factors in the gray zone; a support across the U.S. National Com- mastery of the human domain. The finesse, precise, lethal force with a dis- mand Authority. ability to gain cognitive influence across creet application is necessary for asym- this domain requires a persistent pres- metric actions. Chinese Political Warfare ence with access and placement, enabled Through USSOF’s low-visibility Another hypothetical situation by extensive human-terrain expertise. actions and capabilities, it conducts ir- could be this: a host of Chinese politi- USSOF expends extensive resources regular warfare as it prepares environ- cal warfare actions are occurring across building resistance networks to coun- ments and deters aggression to support an USINDO-PACOM country that is ter gray-zone disinformation and deter a Geographic Combatant Command’s the location for an ARG/MEU security hostilities through its multinational (GCC) objectives. USSOF’s access and cooperation exercise. Chinese actions partnerships, which strengthen partner placement to conduct preparation of the across political, economic, diplomatic, resiliency and national resolve to chal- lenge Chinese political warfare. Further, SOF takes irregular actions to impose costs and create dilemmas on Chinese One of USSOF’s key attributes is mastery of the human coercive behavior as required. SOF’s domain. The ability to gain cognitive influence across efforts contribute to eroding competitor willpower to intervene, making these this domain requires a persistent presence with ac- actions imprudent and unwise for its cess and placement … sponsors. BHAG: Big Hairy Audacious Goal A bolder, new approach is offered. environment, build partner capacity, informational, and cultural spheres are This model positions the ARG/MEU and execute asymmetric options—to gaining momentum; in particular, a for greater effectiveness, modernizing to include but not limited to surrogate use, range of Chinese security forces are ac- meet the demands of gray zone activi- sabotage, and other actions to degrade tive within the country. Chinese forces ties and asymmetric warfare. It requires and disrupt the projection of national span from defense industry engagement adaptive thinking, a preference of non- power—impose unique costs and place to a maritime, land, air, and cyber do- conformity over institutionalization, dilemmas upon adversaries and com- main presence that includes actions and a prominent focus on the success petitors to enable a competitive advan- with coastal mariners, infrastructure of the joint force. tage for the United States. This array and development sectors, and civil avia- The ARG/MEU adjusts its naval of activities provides greater options for tion. This hypothetical nation is seeing expeditionary readiness posture, thus U.S. policy makers but also is skillfully degrees of both witting and unwitting becoming a more adaptive, networked, executed to sustain actions below armed capitulation to Chinese influence across and distributed force. Through greater conflict—right in the gray zone. its society.13 persistence and increased forward distri- Through its global support networks The ARG/MEU is representative of bution, select ARG/MEU forces operate and partnerships, SOF are well posi- the U.S. strategic action and commit- in prioritized areas where the formation tioned to respond. SOF maintain an ar- ment to the hypothetical nation, with supports gray zone activity. Such for- ray of multi-purpose, low-visibility mar- the capacity to serve as an illustrious ward distribution occurs jointly with itime vessels that operate across various example of U.S. inspiration. Despite USSOF in a unified partnership as an sea surfaces. Here, such platforms are the ARG/MEU’s shining example to enhanced force conducting asymmet- not to facilitate kinetic actions; rather, its host nation partners, the formation ric activities in the gray zone. In this they sense and understand the environ- is ill-suited to counter Chinese politi- capacity, SOF aid the ARG/MEU in ment, since the political sensitivity of cal warfare. The duration of the brief gaining positions of global advantage

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 61 Ideas & Issues (specIal OperatIOns/MarsOF)

much earlier, in all domains, to gain ment and creates options that maximize operation, build partner capacity oppor- dominance in the decision cycle. initiative through responsive and adap- tunities, and modernize crisis response The MEU and USSOF can jointly tive means, all while exercising author- means. develop capability that is purpose built ity over dynamic operations that span to characterize and influence networks domains and levels of war. Through a Setting the Conditions and environments, deter modern aggres- joint, integrated command structure, To harness SOF’s utilization of sion, and maximize strengths toward the ARG/MEU is bolstered through asymmetric warfare, the ARG/MEU greater responsiveness. Through this requires greater flexibility from both its model, the MEU leverages SOF’s global Navy and Marine Forces (NAVFOR/ network, an optimized nexus that in- ... the ARG/MEU is bol- MARFOR) higher headquarters. This creases access, resources, and relevancy dual-prong means of naval command to a common cause.14 Such a means stered through SOF’s has complicated the ARG/MEU–SOF enables SOF to influence the strategic global access ... relationship through its lack of SOF un- landscape for operation approval and derstanding and convoluted bureaucra- amplify whole-of-government assistance cy—a hindrance to SOF–ARG/MEU across the national power sphere. Ad- interoperability. Through greater col- ditionally, this forward distribution SOF’s global access, information ad- laboration between the theater special requires non-traditional deployment vantage, and ability to drive targeting operations command (TSOC) and the lengths and frequency, supportive of enabled by its increased authorities and NAVFOR/MARFOR, SOF and the dynamic force employment and forward permissions. This leads to a more joint, ARG/MEU can more effectively ad- force maneuver in the 2018 NDS.15 interoperable force achieving asymmet- dress gray zone activity. Timely staff When required by the GCC, distrib- ric effects for the GCC through greater planning can support the development uted ARG/MEU forces can re-aggregate unified action, and is supportive of joint of an integrated operational approach either at sea or another expeditionary all-domain C2. that channels the capabilities of USSOF location. Further analysis of the organic MEU and the ARG/MEU to contest gray zone Yet for this to succeed, a change to capability is also required to maximize actions. This level of staff coordination the ARG/MEU’s command and control effects achieved. A prioritization is to be requires substantial joint planning to (C2) structure is necessary. The forma- on scalable, precise, and complementary develop the ends, ways, and means to tion’s current approach to C2 focuses on forces that tangibly contribute to achiev- achieve effects for the GCC, as gray delivering massed combat power ashore, ing advantage in the gray zone. USSOF zone activities can take significant time while another unit commands ARG/ would enable specific SOF integration to plan operations, receive approvals, MEU forces during an operation. The and interoperability training with the and execute—emphasizing the impor- gray zone’s complex nature requires a ARG/MEU to occur prior to deploy- tance of a closer partnership between well-honed, all-domain C2 capability ment, establishing relationships with the TSOC and NAVFOR/MARFOR that firmly understands the environ- forces that will share forward areas of commands. Service- and theater-level exercises serve as a great way to strengthen this operational-level relationship. With the Services focused on readiness towards near-peer combat operations, the level and type of naval exercises have intensi- fied. However, many of these exercises are largely focused on major combat operations, missing the pivotal phases of shape and deter—where gray zone activity is at its peak. Failure to em- phasize these phases may result in the naval Services missing this key area to strengthen joint lethality via gray zone actions. SOF are an able and willing partner, with resources at every SOF service component and TSOC to build Figure 2. Figure depicts one possible example of an ARG/MEU–USSOF partnership. Terms SOF understanding through exercises. are: CE—Command Element; USASOC—U.S. Army Special Operations Command; AFSOC— Air Force Special Operations Command; MARSOC—Marine Forces Special Operations Concepts also require greater analysis Command; NSW—Naval Special Warfare Command; ISR—Intelligence, Surveillance, and to enable SOF–ARG/MEU interoper- Reconnaissance; MSOC—Marine Special Operations Company; LNOs—Liaison Officers; able actions in the gray zone. As ex- IRC—Information Related Capabilities; and EW—Electronic Warfare. (Graphic courtesy of author.) peditionary advance base operations

62 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 (EABO) unfurl in concept and execu- zone. Multiple areas of cooperation ex- intensity conflicts to enable sponsor plausible tion, the access and understanding of ist for the ARG/MEU–SOF team to deniability and neutralize effects of Western USSOF’s operations are critical in sup- counter and combat malign behavior powers and coalitions. porting EABO. This is where USSOF’s across the gray zone, to include bold indirect approach is instrumental, as the ways that strengthen joint lethality. As 8. Ibid. Babbage defines political warfare as “diverse operations to influence, persuade, and relationships that SOF build are vital our adversaries and competitors have coerce nation states, organizations, and indi- to the success and survival of EABO learned to effectively sterilize the might viduals to operate in accord with one’s strategic platforms. Contrary to some ideas on of our military strength, adaption in interests without employing kinetic force.” the topic, it will not be EABO Marines our competitive approaches is necessary foraging for food and supplies on deso- to deter, contain, and neutralize these 9. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 late islands; rather, it will likely be the actions below armed conflict. Yet, the National Defense Strategy of the United States relationships that USSOF maintains willpower for daunting change must be of America: Sharpening the American Military’s with its partners to enable and set the resolute and ready to confront whatever Competitive Edge, (Washington, DC: 2018). conditions for EABO success. Through obstacles lie ahead as the Service cannot The contact layer is a layer of the NDS’s global non-traditional support means, aided build readiness for the gray zone alone. operating model. by SOF’s low-visibility actions, EABO 10. David Ignatius, “Think We Have Military platforms can receive sustainment, Notes Primacy Over China? Think Again,” Washing- timely intelligence, mobility support, ton Post, (May 2020), available at https://www. and improvements in survivability 1. John Doerr, Measure What Matters: How washingtonpost.com. necessary for their success across the Google, Bono, and the Gates Foundation Rock conflict continuum. the World with OKRs, (New York, NY: Portfolio 11. Important to note the unclassified Irregu- Penguin, 2018). lar Warfare Annex (2020) to the NDS, as it Final Thoughts distinctly states a requirement for the Services The Services have interpreted GPC 2. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s and the joint force to institutionalize IW as a as a return to major combat operations. Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: 2019); core competency. and Gen David H. Berger, , As strategic value in military strength Force Design 2030 (Washington, DC: 2020). 12. The indirect approach is USSOF’s method certainly exists, it does not equate to for working with partner forces through many relevance for all forces. The ARG/MEU 3. Force Design 2030. It is noted that some mili- of its statutory capabilities, to include unconven- remains a force fixated on readiness to- tary theorists debate the use and existence of tional warfare, foreign internal defense, and se- ward higher end combat operations, a the terms gray zone, asymmetric warfare, and curity force assistance. This approach empowers posture that largely nullifies its utility similar others. It is not beneficial to entertain SOF partners at multiple levels, strengthening in the gray zone. The complexities of such dialogue here, as extensive literature ex- their resilience and capacity to lead in a conflict the gray zone demand forces with per- ists on these and other terms, as they are now or prolonged struggle while USSOF remain in sistency, can shape all-domains, and widely accepted amongst DOD senior leaders. an advisory role. are competitively focused below armed 4. Gen David H. Berger, “The Case for Change: 13. “Winning without Fighting.” Babbage notes conflict to impose a wider variety of Meeting the Principle Challenges Facing the costs and manage escalation. While multiple areas that Chinese political warfare Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: influence is felt across a nation. crisis escalation is unpredictable, this June 2020). modern era requires more innovative 14. The Global SOF network is the ability of approaches to respond to aggression; 5. Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: USSOF to create and sustain shared conscious- size and strength alone have proven an America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of ness across an interconnected web of global SOF ineffective deterrence toward asym- U.S. Primacy, (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus operators, teammates, and partners, imbued metric actions in the gray zone. China’s and Giroux, 2018). with empowered execution to maximize ef- cunning actions and non-attributable forts towards an issue. Gen McChrystal’s book, manner within the gray zone will con- 6. Adam L. Silverman, “Getting to the Left of Teams of Teams-New Rules of Engagement for a tinue in part as long as the United States Boom in 21st Century Warfare,” The Cipher Complex World, is an excellent source of fur- Brief, (July 2020), available at https://www. ther detail. presents traditional military responses thecipherbrief.com. as deterrence. 15. National Defense Strategy. Our Nation needs forces that are 7. Ross Babbage, “Winning Without Fighting: globally integrated, can provide all- Chinese and Russian Political Warfare Cam- domain solutions across the conflict paigns and How the West Can Prevail: Volume continuum, and enable a competitive I,” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and advantage in support of joint forces. Budgetary Assessments, 2019). Babbage’s piece Together, with its spirit, resources, discusses the concept of political warfare and and expeditionary prowess, the ARG/ its utilization to undermine traditional means MEU can harness USSOF’s asymmet- of Western power and achieve political objec- ric capabilities to compete in the gray tives. Other similar approaches are unrestricted warfare and use of proxy forces to wage low

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2020 LtGen Barnard E. “Mick” Trainor Military Writing Award: Winner Sleeper Cell Logistics Sustaining new warfighting concepts by Capt Michael Sweeney

ean Westley paused for a moment to study his features in the bath- >Capt Sweeney commissioned in May 2011. He is a Logistics Officer currently S room mirror. If only his Marine assigned to Marine Wing Support Squadron 172 and his current billet is Company buddies back home could see him Commander, Headquarters and Service Company. His previous tours include 1st now. He displayed none of the clean-cut Maintenance Battalion, Officer Candidates School, and Expeditionary Warfare disciplined characteristics instilled upon School. him by his instructors at Officer Candi- date School. As he finished getting ready for the day, the reminiscing quickly led to a memory trail of how he arrived in his small South Landian apartment. It was almost five years earlier, and he was just finishing Logistics Officers Course. He had orders to an infantry unit on the East Coast and was busy finding a place to live and contemplating how to make a good first impression at his new unit when he was called into the commanding officer’s office. Not knowing what to expect, he was surprised to find another senior officer there who had never addressed the class before. The new officer introduced himself as Col Scott. True to his serious manner, Col Scott did not waste any time explaining why he was there. Col Scott: “Lt Westley, as you are aware, for the past twenty years, the Corps has fo- cused on and excelled in providing combat service support in desert countries against Distributed operations require more than simply moving the “iron mountain” of supplies. an enemy who proved capable but ulti- (Photo by LCpl Keenan Zelazoski.) mately could not match our fire power. However, a year ago several key members When activated, we provide the MAGTF Col Scott: “We are Sleeper CELL.” of the logistics community hypothesized with an initial supply of critical gear.” The future fight will be different that our logistical doctrine and methods 2ndLt Westley: “I don’t understand. On than the one fought for the past twenty have become dependent on air superior- what doctrine are these caches based?” years. It will require the Marine Corps ity and are not suited for a peer-to-peer Col Scott: “We’ve developed our own op- to exercise its amphibious and expedi- conflict. To fix this, we have started a erating system that is entirely independent tionary nature. All six warfighting func- specialized logistical unit. Taking les- from all Marine Corps doctrine. This op- tions will need to improve and adapt to sons learned from the Viet Minh during erating system allows us to cut through red support new warfighting concepts. Lo- the First Indochina War, this new unit tape and utilize unconventional logistical gistics will require changing more than was developed to drastically increase the methods.” just the physical location of the “iron flexibility and redundancy in our supply 2ndLt Westley, looking visibly confused: mountain.” Instead, the new form of lo- chain. We operate a series of semi-covert “I’m sorry sir, but I still don’t know who gistics will require innovative solutions caches hidden inside engagement areas. you are.” to increase redundancy and flexibility

64 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 in the supply chain while decreasing the mark was Mr. Smith. He was raised in a of locations, but an important one all the targetability and physical footprint of poor farming village but was motivated to same. South Landia was located in the supply lines. This can be accomplished make more of himself. He started a fab- Western Hemisphere and was officially by dispersing the iron mountain across rication shop, and it slowly grew, thanks part of INDOPACOM’s Area of Opera- a series of unconventional and semi- in part to the money and influence the tions. Once a war-torn country dominated covert caches. United States gave him for the support. by communist tendencies, South Landia As Westley ate his breakfast, he con- In addition to language training, West- had become a vibrant democracy in stark tinued reminiscing on his life changing ley also received specialized training to contradiction to its neighbor to the north. encounter with Col Scott. ensure his success as a CELL. This train- While South Landian citizens enjoy all Col Scott: “A Sleeper CELL spot has ing included traditional military train- the freedoms expected of a 21st century opened up, and I’m offering it to you. ing like SERE school and combat hunter democracy, North Landia is a commu- Yes or no?” courses, but he also attended craftsman nist country controlled by an increasingly 2ndLt Westley: “I’m in.” and trade courses. He was trained on basic unstable dictatorship. A majority of its Col Scott: “Good, pack your stuff. You’re mechanics, fuel storage and additization, citizens live below the poverty line and going back to school.” explosives handling, and commercial pur- do not have access to running water or Westley skipped his Logistics Officers chasing. This training was all focused on electricity. A nuclear program in its in- Course graduation and moved into tem- making him a self-sufficient, adaptable, fancy has made North Landia a country porary housing near Washington, DC, and survivable asset. of interest, though, and has made the alli- the next day. He would spend the next The First Indochina War’s outcome ance between the United States and South ten months at Defense Language Institute was heavily influenced by each side’s Landia even more important. learning a language by day and being logistical plan. The terrain and cli- Just then, Westley arrived at his “day indoctrinated into Sleeper CELL by night. mate of Indochina did not favor large job.” The U.S. Government had decided As a member, Westley would be considered scale military operations. Character- that hiding in plain site was the best his own Cache, Expeditionary Logistics ized by steep mountains, dense forest, way to conceal each CELL, so Westley Location, or CELL. Each CELL was high temperatures, high humidity, and was officially the floor manager of a small strategically placed in a certain region of little infrastructure, everything about fabrication shop. The shop was a large the world, chosen by its vicinity to certain Indochina seemed to hamper logistical warehouse with offices and heavy machin- geopolitical hotspots. Once in location, operations.1 At this point in history, ery surrounded by a large fenced-in yard CELLs would blend into society, posing as the French logistical organization was with scrap metal on one end, a small fleet students or young adults seeking work op- a combination of a doctrine and gear of trucks on the other, and some sheds in portunities while discreetly overseeing the developed in both world wars, relying between. The company fabricated small stockpiling of supplies. It was on location in part on a World War I-era centralized parts for car manufacturers. It shipped that the independent command and con- system that could support from the rear parts all around the world so there was a trol nature of this specialized unit excelled. through protected lines of communica- steady stream of trucks coming and going, Unlike traditional Marine Corps logistics tion and in part on a World War II-era providing perfect cover for the CELL’s true operations, CELLs were free to develop a mobile, unit-oriented support system.2 operations. While Westley was never given storage and distribution system that best The Viet Minh, meanwhile, developed a details on the other CELLs for security suited their location. These systems were highly unconventional and more mobile reasons, he knew that each had a simi- not beholden to the cumbersome DOD approach to the logistical problem. They lar set up. Each was centered around a supply chain. Instead, CELLs were free utilized every transportation means business that provided an availability to to buy local commercial products and en- available to them, relied on captured certain resources. For example, during his couraged to utilize local distribution net- supplies or locally sourced material, training, Westley was told of one CELL works to develop their stockpiles, sending and stored supplies in numerous, well- that worked with local fishermen. This reports back to Col Scott in Washington dispersed caches hidden along several CELL was reportedly able to mobilize each month on the supplies that they had different routes.3 In the end, the Viet over 25 local fishing vessels to deliver goods available. Col Scott updated the priority Minh’s ability to adapt to the physical and equipment to various local ports with lists as necessary and the CELLs would and operational environment despite a significantly less suspicion than any mili- adjust their caches accordingly, creating technological disadvantage allowed it tary vessel, perfectly concealing Marine a fluid and evolving stockpile dependent to defeat a more developed and con- Corps logistical movements and drastically on the concerns of Washington’s policy ventional power. reducing targetability. makers. The noise from the street snapped Westley spent his morning preparing The main thing all CELLs had in Westley back to reality. As he walked the monthly report he owed Col Scott back common was their mark. Each mark his usual route through the metropolis in Washington. He was proud of the plan was an individual who was picked out toward the outskirts of the city, he was he had put together over the past five years. by a certain intelligence agency based on reminded of how much South Landia had The plan all revolved around a major the mark’s ability to help influence the become home to him over the past five road that connected the city Westley lived locals and procure certain items. Westley’s years. The country was not his first choice in and a seaport utilized by fishers and

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border, making multiple stops en route along the trail to pick up whatever sup- plies they needed. The Viet Minh resupply routes were a set of roads, paths, trails, and camps that would eventually become the Ho Chi Minh Trail. To transport supplies, the Viet Minh utilized the “porter sys- tem.” In 1949, the Viet Minh leadership mobilized the civilian population by making military service mandatory for three months every year. A porter would use a bicycle with no pedals or chains to push 50 pounds of supplies roughly 15 miles every day. Porters typically moved at night to avoid detection. Legs of the journey became well established and a porter would typically find a facility at the end of a travel leg where they could cook and keep concealed.7 Sustaining new operating concepts will require creative problem solving and every available Westley finished reviewing his monthly means of distribution. (Photo by LCpl Claudia Palacios.) report. It looked like a standard account- ing document filled with assets and liabili- medium size commercial vessels. This road fresh produce and drinkable water. Sheds ties. He logged on to a secure web-based then turned north and led to the border and warehouses would hide fuel blad- storage site and dropped it into a folder, between North and South Landia only ders specifically designed to fit on Mr. hidden among years of tax forms and ac- six miles later. Westley referred to this Smith’s trucks, and they could be filled counting documents. Col Scott then had road and its subsidiaries simply as “the and moved within hours. Once an initial access to it at any time and from any- trail.” Along the trail Westley utilized fight subsided and follow-on actions were where. Before logging off and doing fab- Mr. Smith’s existing buildings plus local necessary, Westley could tap into a list rication work to keep up his appearance, vendors with whom he had cultivated of contacts around the country for fresh Westley browsed a neighborhood trading relationships. In total, Westley had over supplies. Although they were not located site and clicked through the wanted ads. 22 locations along the trail that provided on the trail and thus could take longer to His heart skipped a beat as he read one redundancy and flexibility to his plan. procure, the supply chain was still signifi- simply titled “helping hands.” His floor Each stop was marked on a tourist map cantly faster and cheaper than shipping manager duties would have to wait—his that he sent back to Col Scott with a code from the States. sleeper CELL had just been activated. name assigned to each stop. Ground force The Viet Minh needed a way to safe- commanders could simply be told to go to guard supplies from French air attacks. “Arby’s” to find a food stockpile or “Shell” In order to accomplish this, the Viet Notes to locate fuel. Locations were dispersed, Minh leadership ordered the creation 1. Charles Shrader, A War of Logistics: Parachutes so if one became compromised, the others of several small arsenals and workshops and Porters in Indochina, 1945–1954, (Lexing- were still operable. Supplies were then dispersed around Viet Minh-controlled ton, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2015). classified into categories of perishable and territory. These ranged from small, non-perishable. Westley had slowly built a highly mobile units to larger captured 2. Ibid. stockpile of non-perishable items according French facilities.4 They also developed to Col Scott’s instructions. Inside most effective alert systems that allowed sup- 3. Ibid. of Mr. Smith’s buildings, he had hidden plies to be evacuated in a short period of 4. Ibid. various small arms ammunition cleverly time.5 In order to support the army on disguised in ordinary shipping boxes. the move, small rice caches were hidden 5. Ibid. These boxes were sealed to protect against along the trail.6 humidity and had a shelf life of close to Westley’s transportation plan was a 6. Ibid. a decade and were numerous enough to simple one: the small fleet of trucks that keep a battalion fighting for ten days. For Mr. Smith owned would be put to use 7. Ibid. perishable items, Westley could leverage hauling larger supplies, but most supplies the contacts he had made to create a rapid would be hand carried. Infantry battal- 8. Ibid. and flexible response. When given the or- ions could offload at the pier in the middle der, trusted local vendors would provide of the night and walk the six miles to the

66 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 2020 LtGen Barnard E. “Mick” Trainor Military Writing Award: Honorable Mention A Letter Home from a Marine in the Future Inside Experimental MAGTF 2022–2023 by LtCol Neal K. McCarthy

ey dad, It feels good to finally be >LtCol McCarthy retired from the USMCR after over 30 years. He served over ten writing a long letter to you years of various periods of active duty. His primary MOS was Communications/ instead of the monthly “I’m Data with a secondary of Information Operations. HOK but cannot talk about it” postcards. They warned us we would not be able to communicate back home for several “Stand In” zone between a vulnerable So, we (3d & 4th Platoon) use three months (and I warned you and mom). ship and a hostile enemy with anti- boats that are connected to each other We’re winding down and heading ship missiles, leveraging an “Internet with six Marines. The first boat is home. Considering that you were a Ma- of Things” (IoT) approach with tools your typical Zodiac boat. (They are rine for over 30 years, I figured you and technologies that are both “afford- all Zodiac boats with interchangeable would want to know what the future able and plentiful.” We will leverage our components.) The second boat has a of the Marine Corps is going to look global network for extensive reach back giant flexible fuel bladder (~150 gallons) like. So, where do I start? support for such things as intelligence, and a motor. The third boat is inter- Day one: this Marine Corps one-star planning, fires, drone operations, and esting. So, in order to maneuver from steps up to the podium. His name was cyber security—all dedicated to our over 100 miles out, we need comms. Gen Mark Hashimoto, and for the next MAGTF without the extensive foot- But we also do not want to put out twelve months, he is the Command- print normally required on ships.” this massive electromagnetic signature, ing General of Experimental MAGTF We then spent the next two months and I guess they just cannot buy every 2022–2023—or “XMAGTF-22/23” at Camp Pendleton doing individual boat a satcom phone. The third boat for short. training: basic infantry skills, these new also has a 150-gallon fuel bladder and a The general opened: “Let me tell you man-portable French missiles, drone small almost watertight generator that about our MAGTF and the challenges operations, and rubber boat operations. powers a 50-pound drone. The drone we have ahead. We’ll be testing and They took us out surfing every other is tethered to the boat by a detachable possibly executing (real world) three morning—something about “find- cable that feeds it electricity. It hovers missions: protecting the fleet, amphibi- ing peace with the ocean.” (Not a bad about 300 feet up and has all kinds of ous assault, and the long-range amphibi- idea since we basically lived on these stuff. So, at 300 feet up, it supposedly ous raid. Everything we do will be at little rubber boats in the middle of the has line-of-sight for about 20 miles and a range of 100 miles or greater. The ocean.) Every other weekend was liberty can cover something like 1,200 square raid may travel up to 1000 miles. We in San Diego. miles. This drone has everything: com- will attempt a number of new concepts We embarked on the USS Portland ms and “repeater” capability, optics, a for the Marine Corps as per the Com- (LPD), and for the following two and laser range finder, an electromagnetic mandant’s Planning Guidance of 2020: a half months, we made five two-week detector (full spectrum: radio com- mass without concentration, not just trips back and forth between Pendleton ms, missile/ship radar, etc.), IR, and of forces, but also fires, mobility, and and Hawaii working on unit tactics. obviously a GPS. All of our comms/ surveillance. We will do so in the hostile Enjoyed three “96”s in Waikiki. navigations devices are internetworked.

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So, when this drone finds another think they work for Harriers or Ospreys, container ships near Indonesia (more drone—as well as a ship, airplane, or but I could be wrong. pirate attacks than Somalia). We de- any other “node”—we are all plugged We have portable missiles. They are ploy fifteen 3-boat teams, 7 AAV’s with into each other. It also “talks” to all of manufactured by some French com- pushers, and 3 pontoons with pushers our tactical comms that we carry, and pany. We travel with three variants. (1 each for the 2 Cobras, and 1 with the our comms repeat for each other also. They all work with our one Missile HIMARS truck) to create a mobile 100- Everybody is connected to everybody. Delivery Console (MDC). It sits on mile radius “bubble” around the USS The third boat also has this 150-pound your shoulder, and you screw whatever Portland. We are on the move—7x24. underwater tube thing. It is heavy, but missile you want to shoot into the back Every four days, we would come in for once it is in the water, it sort of floats of it. It weighs about 20 pounds without fuel and two days of hot showers and (sinks slowly). We at first thought it a missile. It is also the laser designa- real food. One day, we intercepted some was just a big sonar array; however, it tor. We carry two 150-pound missiles; pirates. But because the drones have turns out to be a torpedo that can listen. three 20-pound, short and fat; and one such a long range (surveillance)—120 This also communicates via the drone 20-pound, long and narrow. Now, the miles out—we were able to determine that is connected to the network. All key here is that these are not just for which little island they came from. So, of this is accessible by anybody on the our use. What I mean is, obviously I the Indonesian navy decides to do some network. This third boat is completely can point one of these at a target that I law enforcement actions; and instead, self-contained. These boats are meant want to destroy and shoot it (it is called their frigate gets blown up by two anti- to be detached and “daisy chained” “Local Mode”). But the key difference is ship missiles. They were ten miles off about every 30 miles so now we have that since MDC’s are all networked, we the coast of the island. Rumor has it this “link” back to the mother ship (or are also a distributed weapons delivery that it sank in less than five minutes. to anybody with a high-volume satellite platform for someone else. They call Everyone on board perished. uplink). It also provides a “passage” for it the “Command Execution” mode. Well, now all bets are off. We are all the follow-on activity. People and The MDC tells us where to point and tasked with taking the island the next things can navigate by it and drones to squeeze the trigger and hold it when day. It is about fifteen square miles, sup- charge on them—all tracked on the we are ready to fire. We have no idea posedly uninhabited, and we have been “network” and all interconnected. where it is going or if it is even going given the green light from the Indone- On the other hand, 1st and 2d pla- to fire. sian Navy to do whatever is necessary. toon were assigned to AAV’s. They The 150-pound rockets have a 5-mile The White House (Trump) authorizes have one Zodiac with two motors range and a payload of 35 pounds. military action in support of a friendly called a “pusher” connected behind The fat/short 20-pound rockets have nation—just like ordering pizza. them. It has a reinforced frame and a a 10-pound payload and a range of just So, the USS Portland is 120 miles off 150-gallon fuel bladder and another under a mile. The skinny/long missile the coast. As we disembark, we “daisy boat with a fuel bladder in tow. It can is for anti-air (anti-missile). chain” boats as we go providing a real- almost double the AAV’s speed and We also have dozens of drones, flying time link between the Portland (and extends its range to about 150 miles. independently in support of operations, SIPR) and the island. Drones are flying The “pushers” typically disconnect with operators spread throughout the all over the place. 1st and 2d platoon and loiter three to five miles from the MAGTF. They can fly 30 mph for up are in eight AAVs, while 3d and 4th beach. Everything has GPS enabled to 2 hours. Each squad has a drone con- platoon are split between twelve boat comms, which makes it easy to find troller. The Company Commander’s teams. Two Cobras are at 3 to 4-mile in the middle of the ocean. AAV has four drone operators inside. standoff range, and a 6-pack of HI- The MAGTF also has these portable The next echelon is in a hardened MAR’s on a pontoon are 80 miles off pontoons that they use for the Helos HUMMWV. Drone operators on the the coast. About four miles miles out, and the HIMARS. They are 5 feet by USS Portland can support the assault everyone dumps their secondary rubber 5 feet, and you lock them together to and/or execute fleet protection. We also boats (with fuel tanks) and gets “na- become 30 feet by 30 feet. They can have reach back drone support in CO- tive.” Time to prep the beach: twenty float a HIMARS truck or a Cobra he- NUS. Every fuel bladder has a drone 150-pound rockets within the company, licopter. A little floating island in the pad for recharging. There are also spare 4 on each of the 2 Cobras, and 6 HI- middle of nowhere. They use two of batteries that we can just swap out. The MARS; 34 rockets all hit targets on the same boats that the AAV’s use, and AAV’s have a drone pad on them. There the island at roughly the same time fly- they can push this pontoon setup for is a whole strategy for employing them ing in from everywhere. Explosion are almost 200 miles at a max speed of 20 for ISR as well as fire support. They erupting all over the place. The AAV’s mph. The helicopters just do not have traverse the “Daisy Chain” to get from immediately go ashore and the assault the range to fly from the LPD to the ship to shore, charging along the way. begins. Our job (3d and 4th platoon) shore and still be useful; thus, they live So, six months into this, we are do- is to continue to provide fire support on these pontoons. Again, all with GPS, ing yet another “real-world” screening and reinforcements as needed. The HI- comms and interconnected. I do not mission for the USS Portland and some MARS loaded up its second “six-pack”

68 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 of missiles and fi red in support as well. journey through “pirate” territory. Just ley of synchronized rockets worked Then the LCU drops off our one M1A1 some small local transport fi lled with as planned. Each boat team fi red two tank, and it joins the assault. Within shipping containers. 150-pound rockets. They were coming about twenty minutes, we fi red off our We executed a very simple plan suc- in low and from four different loca- remaining rockets and went ashore to cessfully. At 120 miles out from the ob- tions targeting the anti-missile systems. join the fray. It took 4 hours to secure jective, the LCU partially lowered its The HIMARS were right behind them. the island with 30 prisoners. We lost ramp and disembarked the pontoons. Twelve of the fourteen rockets were suc- two Marines to hostile fi re and two Once they were all assembled, the push- cessful. After some quick BDA from the wounded because of stupidity. Once er boats were disembarked. Then the drones, the second volley, fi ve minutes the Indonesian Navy took over, we HIMARS truck was driven onto the later, of another fourteen rockets was disappeared. pontoons, strapped down, and “pushed” “icing on the cake.” The island was Two days later, we get word that one to 80 miles out from the island. The ablaze with exploding munitions and of the prisoners provided very detailed four boat teams “daisy chained” the en- fuel. We bugged out. We reversed the info about another island that is the tire length from the LCU to the island. process and were back to being a small major supplier of weapons and missiles. We had drones doing ISR 25 miles in container ship heading on its way. Five The island was 600 miles toward China every direction from the “Daisy Chain.” uneventful days later, we were back on and had also been associated with Chi- We had 7x24 reach back support and the Portland. nese “pirate” proxies. were getting realtime intel support dur- After a very long shower, a good Apparently, we were the only game ing the entire operation. Everything on meal, and ten hours of exceptional sleep, in town. I was on the raid team. The the island lined up with the intel we I wrote you this letter. See you in about raid package involves the LCU carry- had. So, we took up our distributed fi r- fi v e w e e k s . ing additional fuel containers and sup- ing positions (three miles apart) and plies, which greatly extends its range. waited for “Command Mode” to take Give my love to mom, It carried a hardened HUMMWV over. “Reach back” was managing all Kevin with the drone operators and a high- the targeting and fi res. The fi rst vol- speed satellite uplink to SIPR that works anywhere on the planet. The LCU also carried the HIMARS truck with a second six-pack of rockets, nine pontoons and two “pusher” boats to LEFTOVER BALANCE ON YOUR GIFT CARDS? move it, and a combination forklift/ crane to handle the cargo. In addition, Donate those leftover dollars and cents to the Marine four of our (three-boat) teams would Corps Association Foundation, and instead of sitting tie up to the sides of the LCU. But here in your wallet unused, your gift cards will support is where things got brilliant. You are programs for Today’s Marines. familiar with scaffolding they use to paint buildings? They created a kit that was attached topside of the LCU. They then applied these very lightweight but extremely real looking panels that made the LCU look like a small cargo boat with ten 40-foot shipping containers (fi ve across with two rows front to back) and an operational structure to the rear. The façade was big enough to cover the LCU, its cargo, and the six rubber boats tethered to each side. The façade was constructed to allow the rubber boats to slide in and out of the rear. The front opened so the ramp could be lowered. Also, the panels over the HIMARS could be opened to al- low it to fi re missiles. Finally, the sides CHARITYGIFTCERTIFICATES.ORG/GCE collapse inward to enable the LCU to easily traverse the width of the LPD well deck. We were armed to the teeth and on our way for a 4-day/800-mile

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 69 Ideas & Issues (2020 TraInor MIlITary WrITIng aWard) Out With the New, In With the Old How to ensure the success of distributed operations in the Indo-Pacific by GySgt Blake Gratton

s a globally relevant military power, China continues to >GySgt Gratton currently serves as an Irregular Warfare Instructor at the Marine A evolve at a pace greater than Raider Training Center, Camp Lejeune, NC. Previously, he deployed to Jordan and the United States due in large Lebanon conducting both Aviation Foreign Internal Defense as well as squad- and part to its commitment to strengthen company-level operations with host nation forces. its expansion, security, and authority in the Indo-Pacific. The transition of Chinese military strategy from People’s mitment to its allies and partners and and bolster its partners for their ability War concepts, involving protracted ir- continuing to develop new relationships to counter coercion. regular warfare, demonstrates China’s in the Indo-Pacific region. Aligned with In line with the focus to strengthen evolution from maintain a landbased fo- National Security Strategy, the National the allies and partners, the Navy’s De- cus to leveraging a strategy that centers Defense Strategy (NDS) outlines that a sign for Maintaining Maritime Superi- on mobile maritime force moderniza- long-term strategic competition with ority 2.0 calls out, within the fourth tion. This military force moderniza- China will become the new normal for lines of effort (LOE), to expand and tion enables China to increase its ter- the United States. The 2018 NDS recog- strengthen our Navy partners is the first ritorial claims and influence through nizes the need for the joint force to sus- and top priority to integrate with the Ma- its maritime strategy on neighboring tainably deter aggression from threats in rine Corps. This LOE also recognizes Indo-Pacific countries. key regions globally and to maintain a the need to “build on existing maritime The United States has recognized favorable regional balance in the Indo- intelligence and logistics partnerships with China’s political, economic, military, Pacific region.2 The DOD’s objectives allied nations, and expand relationships and geographical increase in power. The identify that the United States must with partner nations to broaden and United States, however, is not currently defend its allies from military aggression strengthen global maritime awareness poised to successfully combat China’s growing military and geographical sphere of control within the irregular warfare spectrum because of the lack of proactive or significant action to address the influence concerning non-military instruments of national power. Concern for maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region is more prevalent than ever as China continues to grow its influence on its neighbors. Recognizing this threat, the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy contex- tualizes the fourth pillar of the U.S. strategy through a regional lens and highlights the geopolitical and econom- ic importance of the Indo-Pacific.1 The fourth pillar of U.S. strategy is particu- larly important as it acknowledges the Influencing the narrative in the Indo-Pacific region is a critical element of security coopera- importance of maintaining U.S. com- tion. (Photo by Cpl Danny Gonzalez.)

70 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 and access.”3 As echoed throughout each Indo-Pacific region. Any expectation security. The current disposition of U.S. layer of the strategy, maintaining allied for Marine Corps units to conduct dis- naval forces is limited by its landbased relationships and expanding partner- tributed operations (DO) or combined partnerships. The United States is con- ships is the linchpin of success in the arms at the squad level inside of China’s fined to its historical allies, namely the U.S. strategy centered on littoral opera- threat ring is highly dependent on the Republic of Korea and Japan. Although tions. The Navy and Marine Corps have United States’ ability to foster and main- the current U.S. allies are strategic in yet to couple their operations with the tain new relationships. location, they only represent a small current published strategy. Integral in executing DO, the con- fraction of the required area of influence The United States’ success in future cept of Littoral Operations in a Con- the United States must support—fur- conflict in the Indo-Pacific will be con- tested Environment (LOCE) identifies ther complicating the strategic posi- tingent on its ability to gain influence the need for landbased operations to tion of the United States and its allies. over the region’s relevant populations. support the two segments that comprise The reality is that the United States Current Marine Corps strategy pri- the littoral environment. Aside from is floundering in its ability to expand oritizes projection of power over the the seaward segment, the landward and maintain relevant relationships in need for non-kinetic involvement with portion is defined as “the area inland the Indo-Pacific. A protracted conflict those relevant populations. The Marine from the shore that can be supported between the United States—or its al- Corps’ over-emphasis on quantitative and defended directly from the sea.”5 lies—and China will be unsuccessful results has led to exponentially increased The LOCE acknowledges the littoral based on current geographic and human technology costs and lowered the value disposition in the Indo-Pacific region. of deployment rotations with lower As an example, China’s economic touch engagement. Although more dif- The United States’ suc- expansion in the Philippines through ficult to quantify, the benefit of utilizing its One Belt One Road initiative high- elements of the Marine Corps as a tool cess in future conflict in lights the need for the United States for relationship building is dispropor- the Indo-Pacific will be to evaluate its plans to maintain rel- tionally more valuable than what can evance or a decisive advantage beyond be perceived as a superficial projection contingent on its ability solely a military partnership. Since the of power for the future of a more secure to gain influence… situation in the Philippines degraded America. Population-centric warfare has significantly in the 1990s, the United been and will continue to be the most States has slowly rekindled its military crucial element of America’s capability partnership. In support of the current to win wars, especially those that lie battlespace is a blended environment U.S. naval campaign, having the abil- below the threshold of armed conflict. extending hundreds of miles inland and ity to exert maximum pressure on the The Marine Corps’ paradigm shift seaward. The LOCE concept provides Spratly Island chain and the conduct from the conflict in the Middle East a framework for the Marine Corps to of LOCE coupled with Expeditionary to the Indo-Pacific is geographically begin shaping its objectives and out- Advanced Base Operations (EABO) op- aligned but lacks appropriate force ap- line its future force disposition to work erations from the Philippines is crucial propriation to conduct population-cen- in an irregular capacity. This capacity to U.S. strategic success. Additionally, tric irregular warfare. Joint Publication should largely focus on security coop- the U.S Navy’s Stand in Forces and the I, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the eration to achieve its long-term goals bulk of conceptual framework designed United States, defines irregular warfare of building U.S. allies and increasing around a proximity layered offense is as: regional influence. The linchpin of a heavily dependent on security cooper- The form of warfare characterized as a future conflict in the Indo-Pacific lies ation with landmasses inside China’s violent struggle among state and non- squarely on geographically relevant ar- threat ring. The 2,000 inhabited islands state actors for legitimacy and influ- eas most threatening to China’s freedom that comprise the Philippines provide ence over the relevant population(s). of movement and influence. a fitting staging ground to forge the This form is labeled as irregular in or- In pursuit of U.S. National Security Navy’s Stand in Forces concept and der to highlight its non-Westphalian objectives, the Cooperative Strategy for stage for future EABO. context. The strategic point of IW is to 21st Century Seapower recognizes not The United States must evaluate the gain or maintain control or influence only the criticality of naval power but amount of force being applied by each over, and the support of, a relevant also the need for expanding the U.S. instrument of national power in order population.4 network of allies and maintaining its to forge the necessary relationships that While operating from the littorals, as current relationships.6 Maritime envi- will support future conflict. The sole part of an integrated naval strategy, ronments now contested by state and use of military forces to gain leverage the Marine Corps must proportionally non-state actors have created a space in- and build relationships is a foot in the employ its forces in irregular warfare fluenced by those capable of anti-access/ door, but utilizing a holistic approach environments, focusing on strategic area denial (A2/AD) that threaten the will set conditions for any expectation relationships and partnerships in the United States and its partner’s maritime of future DO in the region. Title 10 of

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 71 Ideas & Issues (2020 TraInor MIlITary WrITIng aWard) the U.S. Code outlines Marine Corps force disposition in the Indo-Pacific is the Marine Corps to maintain C2 across responsibilities to provide required land highly contingent on the United States’ the seven warfighting functions, the sig- operations essential to the support of ability to operate from the sea. China’s nificant advantage the Marine Corps a naval campaign. Similar to the U.S. most recent A2/AD weaponry is capable must train to and expect is the ability Navy’s concept of composite warfare, of quickly limiting the maritime free- for small unit leaders to execute their small unit leaders within Marine Forces dom of movement the United States commander’s intent and their ability (MARFOR) must be challenged and presently experiences. The requirement to use sound judgment and decision- entrusted to conduct operations within of maintaining relationships with U.S. making skills in absence of continuous a decentralized command and control allies in Japan and the Republic of communication. (C2) framework within irregular en- Korea would provide staging areas for There are three core recommenda- vironments surrounding the Indo-Pa- U.S. forces but place those countries tions to ensure the success of future U.S. cific.7 The future Marine Corps must at extreme risk of Chinese aggression. military operations in the Indo-Pacific prepare to decisively distribute its forces, Countries that the United States has region. These recommendations are operating below the threshold of con- a presence in but is lacking in its re- not meant to be consecutive but rather flict in both landbased and seabased quired level of relationships would be treated separately. environments. questionable to top-level leadership if The current constrained use of the they would support U.S. efforts during a First Recommendation MEU and deployed MAGTFs during time of conflict. The Navy and Marine Begin implementation of introducing littoral operations in the Indo-Pacif- Corps concepts of Stand in Operations, irregular warfare education in respect ic hinders the potential to develop, LOCE, DO, and EABO are all con- to littoral operations in the Indo-Pacific strengthen, and sustain the U.S. security tingent on the ability to port and stage into Navy and Marine Corps schools relationships. To meet the expectation from landbased areas. such as: Officer Candidate School, Re- defined in the Marine Corps LOCE There is a significant risk not only to cruit Training, and Grade-based Profes- to conduct EABO, the Marine Corps C2 but also the integrity of information sional Military Education. must first have the ability to perform networks the moment the United States the landbased operations within sover- conducts warfare with a peer-to-peer Methods for Implementation eign territorial boundaries. The future adversary in the Indo-Pacific. Clear During the current MARFOR re-de- Marine Corps must first utilize forward- and direct guidance on the strategic sign, apply lessons learned from Marine deployed MARFORs in an irregular purpose of Marine Corps DO down Forces Special Operations Command capacity to build and strengthen U.S. to the lowest level must be understood (MARFORSOC) during the creation alliances with strategic partners in the by Marine leaders during conflict. The and implementation of irregular warfare Indo-Pacific. Conducting landbased empowerment of small unit leaders with focused units. Distill and apply lessons irregular warfare is an integral com- this understanding will maintain the learned from MARFORSOC small unit ponent to degrade and deny China’s continuity between the Marine Corps leaders during their past fifteen years of maritime influence and aggression while and the Navy under the concept of com- experience conducting irregular warfare still maintaining the required lethality posite warfare. Although DO expects operations around the world. Develop expected of our force in a littoral envi- ronment. The security cooperation and expan- sion of U.S. relationships in the Indo- Pacific region must progress past current alliances and focus on regional partners inside of China’s weapons engagement zone. The cooperation of the Marine Corps with the Navy in support of their naval campaign provides the ability to greatly affect the littoral battlespace the Navy plans to affect. This increased cooperation will provide threatening proximity and assist in the degradation of China’s A2/AD capability should conflict erupt. The Marine Corps must begin to employ its forces in the Indo- Pacific in maintainable and sustainable quantities in an unconditional capacity. Further complicating the United U.S security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region must expand to partners inside China’s States’ strategic position, current U.S. weapons engagement zone. (Photo by Cpl Danny Gonzalez.)

72 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 subordinate commanders to drive op- erations for future relationship building, partnership, and training plans in the Indo-Pacific. Unit commanders must understand the importance of popula- tion centric warfare and how it is crucial to the United States’ ability to operate at or below the threshold of conflict.

Measure of Effectiveness The development and implementa- tion of policy changes to the U.S. naval campaign will allow Marine Corps and Navy units to plan for and conduct se- curity cooperation and irregular warfare throughout the Indo-Pacific. Timely China’s strategy is shifting from a landbased focus to mobile maritime modernization. (Photo implementation will allow unit com- by Defense Connect Australia.) manders to immediately plan for and begin training for their missions. Un- and implement irregular warfare cen- ence at the small unit leader level. Air timely implementation will negatively tric education coupled with LOCE into Naval Gunfire Liaison Company cur- affect commanders and lead to their Marine Corps Officer Corps, staff non- rently is tasked to serve in the capacity Marines and Sailors mission failure. commissioned officers, and entry level to support maneuver units with fire sup- The ability of Marine Corps Staff to schools. port that are adjacent to the MAGTF. develop and implement changes will Employing these units, collaborate and enable subordinate training commands Measure of Effectiveness develop the necessary arms progression and units to prepare for and conduct Change within the Marine Corps training pipeline to utilize existing Ma- security cooperation and irregular war- can happen in two ways: it can be di- rine Corps schools to the maximum fare. rected or sweep across the entirety of amount possible to train units to be the Marine Corps. The introduction of capable of DO at the squad level. irregular warfare education in respect Notes to littoral operations in the Indo-Pacific Measure of Effectiveness 1. President of the United States of America, into Marine Corps schools will provide Updated doctrine, table of organi- National Security Strategy, (Washington, DC: directed change to the Marine Corps zation, and table of equipment will be 2017). and explain that transformation is oc- required. Staff planners will be required curring. Fostering and maintaining re- to fully understand how DO can be 2. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National lationships and new partnerships will implemented into strategy and policy. Defense Strategy of The United States of America, serve as effectiveness criteria for the suc- The Marine Corps’ ability to educate (Washington, DC: 2018). cess of commanders and their units to and subsequently execute combined 3. Chief of Naval Operations, A Design for Main- conduct operations in irregular warfare arms operations at the squad level will taining Maritime Security 2.0, (Washington, environments. serve as the measure of effectiveness. DC: Department of the Navy, 2018).

Second Recommendation Third Recommendation 4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doc- Implement DO into doctrine and Begin development and implement trine for the Armed Forces of the United States provide a means for a limited combined policy changes to ensure the U.S. naval (Joint Publication 1), (Washington, DC: 2017). arms capability at the squad level. campaign plan allows Marine Corps and Navy forces to conduct security 5. Department of the Navy, Littoral Operations Methods for Implementation cooperation and irregular warfare in a Contested Environment, (Washington, DC: Task the Marine Corps Combat De- throughout the Indo-Pacific. 2017). velopment Command and the Combat 6. Secretary of the Navy, A Cooperative Strategy Development and Integration to devel- Methods for Implementation for 21st Century Seapower, (Washington, DC: op the operating concept to utilize DO Staff Planners develop the policy 2015). at the squad level. MARFORSOC and plans and changes to the U.S. Navy Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company Campaign Plan and submit to Joint 7. U.S. Congress, Title 10. U.S. Code, (Wash- serve as examples of the capabilities that Chiefs of Staff for approval. Combat- ington, DC: 1956). small unit leadership can apply to the ant commanders develop and finalize battlefield with combined arms experi- their commander’s intent and issue to

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 73 Ideas & Issues (2020 TraInor MIlITary WrITIng aWard) Between a Rocket and a Hard Place MCDP 1, Warfighting, and Force Design 2030 by Dr. Heather Venable & LtCol Nate Lauterbach

n seeking to put the Vietnam War in the past, CMC Leonard F. Chapman Jr. stated, “We got >Dr. Venable has written How the Few Became the Proud: The Making of the I Marine Corps’ Mythos, 1874–1918 and is a non-resident fellow at Marine Corps defeated and thrown out, the best University’s Krulak Center. thing we can do is forget about it.”1 In the continuing cycle of the Marine >>LtCol Lauterbach is the Plans Officer for 2d MAW. He is an Aviation C2 Officer Corps seesawing between a land-focus and a graduate of the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting. and a sea-focus, he then advocated pur- suing increased ties to the Navy. His successor, CMC Robert E. Cushman Jr., similarly stressed the importance of areas. First, the Corps attached signifi- myriad complexities, including the hu- “redirecting our attention seaward and cant importance, understandably, to man element, Clausewitz fundamental- re-emphasizing our partnership with the pursuing technology that compliment- ly offers a land-centric view of warfare. Navy.”2 Over the next two decades, as ed its acceptance of maneuver warfare. As naval officer J.C. Wylie—who him- Marines prepared for potential conven- The light armored vehicle, for example, self sought to develop a broad theory tional conflict with the Soviet Union, represented a kind of “compromise of of war—makes clear, soldiers generally they increasingly refined and centered sorts” between “mechanizers and infan- espouse a kind of continental approach their ideas about warfare on the concept try-philes.”4 This solution epitomized to warfare shaped primarily by the land of maneuver warfare—as epitomized by the Corps’ deliberate rejection of the domain’s natural emphasis on terrain.7 the publication of MCDP 1, Warfight- Army’s embrace of heavily-armored And, historically, Marines have been ing, in 1989. tanks.5 But these debates tended to soldiers, albeit soldiers of the sea. reaffirm the Corps’ land-centric lean- This mentality makes an early ap- Origins of and Problems with a ings in the first place, just in a different pearance in MCDP 1, which begins Land-Centric MCDP 1 direction than the Army. with two quotes from Clausewitz and Even today, MCDP 1 continues to be Second, the Corps derived much of Liddell Hart regarding the complexity heralded as a unique blend of theory and its theoretical underpinning for maneu- of war and the importance of properly doctrine that makes it perhaps the most ver warfare from John Boyd. Although stressing the human will. But then important, foundational text of any mil- Boyd gained his operational experi- Warfightingcites A.A. Vandegrift’s idea itary institution. However, there is an ence flying aircraft for the Air Force, that important flaw that must be addressed he subsequently determined through [p]ositions are seldom lost because they in a subsequent rewrite to adhere to Gen his historical studies that a “blitz/guer- have been destroyed, but almost invari- Al Gray’s admonition that MCDP 1 is a rilla style of war” offered the greatest ably because the leader has decided in living, breathing document.3 Somewhat likelihood of victory.6 Thus, his land- his own mind that the position cannot ironically, given the Marine Corps’ de- centric theory of victory mirrored and be held.8 termination to reconnect with its naval reinforced the kinds of technological Vandegrift’s idea certainly exemplifies roots after the Vietnam War, MCDP 1 debates that animated the Corps at this ideas about maneuver warfare in its is too land-centric. Indeed, it is difficult time. emphasis on changing the opponent’s to reconcile its emphasis on maneuver Finally, from the larger perspective “mind” rather than “destroy[ing]” warfare with naval warfare. of its theoretical focus, MCDP 1 derives something. But this idea of holding In some ways, MCDP 1’s focus on its inspiration from one of the most re- territory does not translate seamlessly land warfare can be understood in light spected of all war theorists: Carl von to the naval domain. of the direction the Corps took after Clausewitz. Yet, for all his profound Furthermore, MCDP 1 describes lev- Vietnam, as seen in three particular insights into the nature of war and its els of Marine organization from division

74 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 to fire team with constant references to so far as to conclude that there is “really thinkers into MCDP 1, including the “battlefields,” a term rarely used in the no such thing as attrition warfare” as no need to support a cumulative strategy context of naval warfare.9 MCDP 1 like- “book” or “theorist” advocates for it. In in addition to a sequential one.21 In- wise enjoins Marines to be skilled first his opinion, attrition is not even a real deed, such an approach compliments and foremost in “military art,” an idea concept but, rather, a “bin for ineffective the EABO concept, which seeks to “dis- that easily could be rephrased as naval tactics and leadership styles.”18 tribute lethality by providing landbased art, yet it is not.10 Indeed, it is not until By contrast, Hughes argues that the options for increasing the number of more than halfway through MCDP 1 indirect approach, or maneuver warfare, sensors and shooters beyond the up- that one reads at last of Marines needing is irrelevant to naval warfare because it per limit imposed by the quantity of to be “skilled” in relation to the “water.”11 is inherently “hard fought and destruc- seagoing platforms available” in order Other examples of the land-centric tive.”19 Hughes insists that the “pre- to support the Navy.22 nature of MCDP 1 are evident in how it dominance of attrition over maneuver Currently, though, advocates of repeatedly characterizes the battlefield. is a theme so basic that it runs through” the concept tend to view the concept Warfighting describes “formations on his book. primarily from the lens of maneuver the battlefield,” explaining how in the It is also important to note how warfare. At least one former Marine, past they tended to consist of “linear MCDP 1 defines attritional warfare as for example, insists that this concept is formations and uninterrupted linear focused on the “cumulative destruction workable if one can “make it difficult for fronts.” Such language transports the of the enemy’s material assets,” which the other actor to maneuver.”23 Another reader to a largely ground-centric con- it largely rejects given its preference for author goes so far as to claim that the flict such as World War I.12 maneuver.20 This notion of cumulative Corps’ “very existence rests upon the By contrast, prominent naval thinker warfare, however, receives key emphasis axiom that the sea is maneuver space.”24 and retired Capt Wayne Hughes argues in RADMJC Wylie’s theory. But, by its nature, naval warfare func- that naval warfare is deeply nonlinear in nature.13 Retired naval officer Roger Barnett echoes him, stating that it is MCDP 1 highly problematic to “carry over whole- defines attritional warfare as focused on the sale in the realm of the sea” ideas that “cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material as- “govern” land warfare.14 But Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are the theorists that ani- sets” ... mate MCDP 1, not Mahan or Corbett or even Wylie, who attempted to blend the various domain-based theories into a “general” theory.15 Clausewitz and Wylie divides warfare into two cat- tions in opposition to key elements of Sun Tzu merit their places in MCDP egories: cumulative and sequential. Se- maneuver warfare, which advocates not 1, but they must make room for naval quential anticipates a progression across attacking enemy strength but weakness. theory, too. the land or sea, such as the Pacific cam- This emphasis on maneuver warfare paigns in World War II. Yet, this is only needs to be better reconciled with the Attrition vs Maneuver in Naval War- one portion of naval warfare, which is thinking of naval warfare experts. fare also fundamentally cumulative in that Two other issues should be considered This land-centric emphasis carries it seeks to destroy or attrite an enemy’s in light of possible updates to MCDP over into how MCDP 1 places warfare platforms. While he argues cumulative 1. EABO further places significant em- along a “spectrum of attrition and ma- strategies are not decisive on their own, phasis on pursuing long-range precision neuver.” Technically, MCDP 1 allows Wylie also insists that the “strength of fires to attack ships.25 In this light, it is for elements of attrition and maneuver, the cumulative strategy has meant the important to examine the goal of de- although debates between both camps difference between success or failure struction in maneuver warfare, which divisively fractured this spectrum. of the sequential.” Thus, two of the ultimately centers on hastening the “en- The word “attrition” became a stand- Navy’s most prominent naval thinkers emy’s systemic disruption.”26 MCDP 1 in for a host of issues, such as tensions challenge the contention that officers explains that maneuver ultimately seeks over centralized control, as manifested should not advocate for attrition. a kind of shortcut around the enemy in a series of letters published in the by aiming to “eliminate a key element Marine Corps Gazette known as the At- The Marine Corps’ Pursuit of Expe- which incapacitates the enemy systemi- tritionist Letters from 2010 to 2013.16 ditionary Advanced Base Operations cally.”27 At this point, the Marine Corps Similarly, attrition has become almost a (EABO) in the Context of MCDP 1 sounds a lot like the Air Force, which at bad word in the DOD writ large. While If the Marine Corps intends to pre- times has sought to use strategic attack JP 3-0, Joint Operations, defines “ma- pare for future warfighting in order to to paralyze the system as a whole—as neuver,” it omits “attrition” from its support the Navy, it only makes sense epitomized by the thinking of John glossary.17 One Marine author even goes that it incorporate the ideas of key naval Warden.28

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 75 Ideas & Issues (2020 TraInor MIlITary WrITIng aWard)

Second, the “seat of purpose” contin- from infantry toward long-range preci- 15. MCDP 1; and Military Strategy. ues to be on the land.29 In emphasizing sion fires. In order to continue pursuing ship killing, most discussion of EABO innovative ideas, the Corps must revisit 16. See, for example, “Attritionist Letter No. occurs at the tactical level of war. But its foundational theory and doctrine. It 12,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: this is problematic because there is more is time that MCDP 1 gets its sea legs, April 2011). to air or naval or any other employ- becoming not only a theory of warfare 17. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0 Joint Operations, ment of military force beyond simple but a theory of naval warfare. Only then (Washington, DC: October 2018). targeting. The larger question is how can the Marine Corps step off in confi- successful targeting turns into strate- dence to ensure it has properly aligned 18. B.A. Friedman, “Maneuver Warfare: A De- gic effect, which so often only achieves itself to support the Navy. fense,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: decisiveness in relation to actions on December 2014). the ground. Airpower, for example, is most decisive when it “enables friendly Notes 19. Fleet Tactics. ground power to seize, hold, and ex- 1. Quoted in Ian Brown, A New Conception ploit.”30 But the Corps, by stepping into of War: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and Ma- 20. MCDP 1. the role of a long-range artillery force, neuver Warfare, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps could be setting itself up to pursue a University Press, 2018). 21. Fleet Tactics. kind of proverbial whack-a-mole game 2. Ibid. 22. Headquarters Marine Corps, EABO, (Wash- of naval targeting. ington, DC: 2018); and Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Wash- Conclusion 3. Gen Alfred M. Gray, “Preface,” in Head- quarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting, ington, DC: 2019). While the implicit homage that (Washington, DC: 1997). MCDP 1 pays to Clausewitz makes 23. Quoted in Shawn Snow, “State of the Marine it timeless in many ways, it also pro- 4. A New Conception of War. Corps: Inside the State of the Marine Corps: vides one explanation for why it is so Inside the Corps’ Warplans to sink ships,” Ma- land centric. The Corps will struggle 5. Ibid. rine Corps Times, (September 2019), available at to prepare for future warfare as long as https://www.marinecorpstimes.com. 6. Ibid. its foundational theories of victory and 24. Jake Yeager, “Expeditionary Advanced Mari- its key doctrine are removed from the time Operations: How the Marine Corps Can realities of naval warfare, as expressed 7. Joseph C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A Gen- eral Theory of Power Control, (Annapolis, MD: Avoid Becoming a Second Land Army in the by experts like J.C. Wylie and Wayne Naval Institute Press, 2014; reprint, Rutgers Pacific,” War on the Rocks, (December 2019), Hughes. University Press, 1967). available at https://warontherocks.com. The reappraisal of MCDP 1 thus necessitates revisiting the spectrum of 8. MCDP 1. 25. Shawn Snow, ”The Corps Wants Sink- maneuver and attrition to consider how Shipping Missiles So Marines Can Strike Ships the balance between the two accords 9. Ibid. Similarly, see an example of a “forest” on from the Shore,” Marine Corps Times, (February with the realities of naval warfare. Simi- 93 but not an analogous water-based example. 2019), available at https://www.marinecorp- larly, the emphasis of maneuver warfare Also see 95 with its example of supporting an stimes.com. infantry breakthrough and preventing the op- in paralyzing an enemy should be con- 26. MCDP 1. sidered in light of the somewhat limited ponent from using roads to reinforce. capabilities of long-range precision fires, 10. Ibid. 27. Ibid. at least as currently envisioned, to affect such a paralysis. 11. Ibid. Also see 54 for its “unique amphibious 28. Col John Warden, ”The Enemy as a Sys- Meanwhile, the Corps runs the risk capability.” There is also mention of amphibi- tem,” Airpower Journal, (Maxwell AFB, AL: of pursuing a single path that undercuts ous operations on 96 in the context of a wide Air University Press, Spring 1995). its traditional role as a flexible force in range of possible uses of the Corps. The word readiness. In the late nineteenth cen- “amphibious” is in fact used only four times. 29. Fleet Tactics. tury, Capt Henry Cochrane creatively 12. Ibid. 30. Colin Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect, tried to make a case for the Corps’ main (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, mission to be a kind of “naval artil- 2012). lery.” But he conceded the problems 13. Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal with this idea, admitting it could not Combat, 2nd ed., (Annapolis, MD: Naval In- stitute Press). 31. Heather Venable, How the Few Became the place the Corps in a position where its Proud: Crafting the Marine Corps’ Mystique, 31 “value would never be questioned.” 14. Roger Barnett, Navy Strategic Culture: Why 1874–1918, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute The Corps has begun discarding key the Navy Thinks Differently, (Annapolis, MD: Press, 2019). capabilities that shape its trajectory of Naval Institute Press, 2009). the last several decades, moving away

76 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 2030 Joint Forcible Entry Operations Maintaining a legitimate capability with future Force Design by Capt Daniel L. McGurkin & 1stLt Jack W. Hanly

nti-access area-denial (A2/ AD) weapons proliferation. >Capt McGurkin is an 0203 Ground Intelligence Officer. He has served as an in- telligence officer forward within Operation INHERENT RESOLVE and as the Deputy The need to operate inside A Intelligence Officer for Task Force Southwest in Helmand/Nimroz Provinces, of an adversary’s weapons Afghanistan, under Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL. He is currently attending the engagement zone. Our Corps’ out- National Intelligence University as a fellow in the Junior Officer Strategic Intel- dated force structure and the necessity ligence Program. of positioning a legitimate deterrent in accordance with the 2017 National Secu- >>1stLt Hanly is an 0302 Infantry Officer. He has served as a Rifle Platoon Com- rity Strategy and 2018 National Defense mander in support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE. He is currently serving as a Strategy (NDS). Our Commandant’s Combined Anti-Armor Team Platoon Commander 3/4 Mar and will be deploying guidance is explicit: the Marine Corps in support of the 31st MEU. will adapt and fulfill its role in the na- val force by executing distributed mari- time operations (DMO).1 DMO will in the South China Sea and “will be against an A2/AD armed “Grenada- manifest in small, highly trained, and poorly structured to fight the kind of like” adversary than U.S. troops wad- technologically-enabled teams spread campaigns that it had to fight in Korea, ing ashore in Russia or China. This throughout the contested littoral en- Vietnam, and Iraq.”4 While proponents article looks to dispel fears of throw- vironment. These units will be armed of the Commandant’s Planning Guid- ing the baby out with the bathwater with far-reaching anti-ship and anti- ance (CPG) and Force Design 2030 and provides a potential way in which air weapons, posing a legitimate threat refute this and have shown how the the envisioned 2030 structure can still to the adversary while maintaining a new look can be applied to the “Big 5” execute JFEO at the tactical and op- small enough footprint to be hard to erational level. This updated version of target. This vision is leading the Ma- JFEO sees the Marine Corps filling its rine Corps to a divestment of all things The Commandant him- refined, naval-centric role as the Com- heavy or slow, a move that has some mandant intends. Though imperfect, questioning the quick-pivot from the self has said he does this modified operational design can traditional Joint Forcible Entry Opera- serve as a launch-point for discussion tions (JFEO) mission the force fills. Re- not believe “JFEO are of how the future Corps maintains a gardless, change is coming, and current irrelevant or an opera- legitimate JFEO option for the nation. joint doctrine and operational design is (See Figure 1 on following page.) insufficient for the execution of JFEO tional anachronism.” It is necessary to first examine the given the Corps’ impending changes. current operational design of JFEO. JP The Commandant himself has said 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, he does not believe “JFEO are irrelevant (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and outlines the templated phasing and or an operational anachronism.”2 This insurgents/terrorists), history indicates subphasing in Figure 1.6 To be fair, view is prescient; it takes little imagina- JFEO of the future may be executed in the publication offers the disclaimer tion to envision a future need to seize countries and areas not at the top of the that “the forcible entry operation com- and hold lodgments against armed op- nation’s adversarial list.5 The relatively mander may establish additional phases position as doctrine defines the term.3 low cost of A2/AD technology gives that fit the forcible entry CONOPS.”7 But critics have been quick to point out states that wish to maintain a plausible We primarily take issue with the com- the new force design may make JFEO deterrent to international intervention position of the assault phase. The cur- impossible. Some argue that the Corps an attractive option. It is now more re- rent and future operating environment, is hyper-focused on Chinese aggression alistic to envision JFEO taking place where A2/AD technology is prolific,

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 77 Ideas & Issues (2020 TraInor MIlITary WrITIng aWard) requires a heavier focus on overcoming tastic analysis. He asserts that swarm- inherently lends itself toward these en- these weapons. JP 3-18’s consideration ing occurs when several units conduct ablers. The complimentary relationship of the A2/AD threat is barely surface a convergent attack on a target from described in Force Design 2030 between deep. Of the 104 pages comprising the multiple axes.10 Edwards identifies that the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) publication, one paragraph is alone ded- swarms succeed in a non-linear fight; and the MEU will lend itself to swarm- icated to “Overcoming A2/AD Threat that is, one where “units move and fight ing. Employment of both will resemble Capabilities.”8 The publication’s men- in multiple directions, are widely sepa- swarm tactics at different stages when tion of this critical condition is almost rated, and are capable of supporting specifically executing JFEO. (See Figure entirely focused on naval mine coun- each other by concentrating mass or 2 on following page.) termeasures, traditional obstacle belts, fires.”11 Anyone familiar with future Contrast the current JFEO model and improvised explosive devices. Only force design concepts should see scream- (Figure 1) with the authors’ recom- as an afterthought does it offer that A2/ ing similarities for how leaders envision mended alteration (Figure 2). We can AD technology will put deployed forces the Corps operating in a modern fight. see that Phase I prescribes preparation “at risk at greater ranges” and that rear Likewise, he sees three primary enablers and deployment and need not be altered area units may be “increasingly ... tar- of swarm units: elusiveness (increases much. The CPG’s vision and expedi- geted.” It closes with a two-sentence survivability and thus likelihood of tionary advanced base operating model nod to today’s threat to JFEO: mission accomplishment), standoff ca- establishes this key foothold as a prod- Some enemies will possess limited pability (ability to inflict damage and uct of regular force deployment. The numbers of these capabilities, but receive less in return), and situational 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) others will deploy fully integrated and awareness (vital to avoiding fratricide laid forth a layered approach to the na- layered advanced A2/AD systems that and maintaining unity of effort). DMO tion’s security: the contact layer, des- may be guided by a single C2 system and employed in mutual support so that, to defeat one capability, an at- Current Operational Design for tacker must expose himself to others. Forcible Entry Operations For example, maritime forces and (Source: JP 3-18 Joint Forcible Entry Operations) capabilities may be required in the littoral to support operations inland while defending against threats from • Phase I: Preparation and Deployment shore-based defenses, coastal subma- • Planning rines, and small attack craft.9 • Movement Defeating “fully integrated and • Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment layered advanced A2/AD systems” is • Transition to Assault arguably the most necessary condition of • Insertion of SOF modern JFEO. The joint force cannot • Phase II: Assault accept this threat’s treatment as an af- • Initial Assaults terthought in operational design. Now • Initial Entry Forces is the time to calcify the requirement in • Reinforcing Entry Forces doctrine. Doing so will also allow the • Overcoming A2AD Threat Capabilities Corps to explain how it still fills the • Main Assault JFEO role when executing distributed • Transition to Stabilizing the Lodgment operations and expeditionary advanced • Phase III: Stabilization of the Lodgment basing. • Securing Lodgment • Organizing the Lodgment Swarms and the 2030 JFEO Model • Expanding Lodgment Any discussion of distributed opera- • Transition to Follow-on Forces tions will inevitably pique one’s interest • Phase IV: Introduction of Follow-on Forces in swarming or “Swarm Theory.” In- • Ground Offensive or Other Operations by Maritime Pre-Positioning ferior forces, using swarms, have his- Force or other rapidly deployable force torically seen success on the battlefield • Follow-on Force Preparation for Subsequent Operations against superior and heavily armed mili- • Phase V: Termination or Transition Operations tary forces (Lashkar-E-Taiba, Somali • Achievement of Operation or Campaign Objectives tactics during the “Blackhawk Down” • Achievement of Operational Objectives (Limited JFEO objective in battle for Mogadishu, and Chechnyan larger campaign) tactics are all great examples). Sean J. A. Edwards’ dissertation, titled “Swarming and the Future of Warfare,” is a fan- Figure 1. Current JFEO operational design. (Figure provided by author.)

78 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 ignated to sense and initiate potential conflict; the blunt layer, to serve as the        initial counterpunch; the surge layer,     or flow/deployment of forces into the conflict zone; and homeland layer, fo-  334645 6 5  3  cused on defense of the actual contigu-  5  ous United States.12 We can reasonably  5  346455645  45  455   assume future JFEO will initiate in the  455 contact layer, where Marines will ide-  3   ally already stand within the adversary’s  345 55!5 $ $#$# A2/AD zone or could rapidly deploy    65   !%#

$   !5 #$ # thereto. Given this, the issues of where  455 454 or how to insert and establish staging    4 "5#3454$  %$#   %4   645 " areas, forward area rearming or refuel-  455!54 454 } ing points, and sensors able to collect at        54& 45 range are largely solved by the MLR in  " 454 44  4 $ $# the operation’s initial stages. These units  455' " (5   %$# ! also serve to liaise and insert SOF or  3' "55(5  %# #$ %% "  contribute to Joint Intelligence Prepara-   4 (5  }  4 " (5  tion of the Operational Environment.  4 65#  55 45 After all, that is their prescribed role  4555 5)*554 $$ $  $#$#  as contact layer forces: to sense trouble  3+45 555 5)*554 #$ and initiate the response. In short, the  5 5)*554 655(5  }  ,!,  6 #!*'4$5 Corps’ deployment of expeditionary  -6 (5  advanced bases solves many of the tra-  45 . 544645'46 6 5' 54 ditional problems inherent to prepara- #   5 5)*5543464554 '/ 645 tion and deployment.  3+455445645 With eyes focused on the A2/AD   5645546 '0  threat, we transition to Phase II: As-   5645 '0 1(5'0  4 46 2 sault. As mentioned in the opening, this is the area of current JFEO operational Figure 2. (Figure provided by author.) design in dire need of reexamination. Modern JFEO design requires five sub- enemy an immediate dilemma in that connaissance efforts are a vapor swarm phases for Phase II: Provocation and he must assume the assets are as they say because they are launched and recovered Reconnaissance; A2/AD Neutraliza- and appropriately engage them as they from stand-in forces already distributed tion/Precision Strike; Harassment and approach. Second, we seek to capitalize in the contact layer. This swarm serves Delaying Operations; Main Assault; on this unmasking and find critical A2/ to confuse and overwhelm the enemy, and Transition to Stabilizing the Lodg- AD assets by employing a myriad of forcing him to ultimately employ A2/ ment. sensors. For example, F-35s could fly AD assets to little or no avail. Provocation and Reconnaissance: The offset from aforementioned unmanned A2/AD Neutralization/Precision purpose of this phase is threefold. In aircraft and ground/seabased systems Strike: Having identified the enemy’s the modern precision strike environ- could collect from a standoff. Third, immediate A2/AD assets, the friendly ment, combatants can only expect to we seek to land our initial entry forces force now moves to target them with a fire one salvo before critical long-range in the form of amphibious reconnais- deliberate, concerted, precision strike. fires assets become immediately sense- sance units. These small teams serve Platforms executing this strike can reside able and targetable. Thus, we first seek both their historical role of shore/hin- in the contact (e.g. MLR + HIMARS), to provoke the enemy into “unmasking” terland reconnaissance and contribute blunt (e.g. MEU/Naval Force + Cruise his precision strike/A2/AD assets. This to the volume of deception activity by Missiles), or even surge/homeland layers is accomplished by using a high volume deploying similar, smaller unmanned (e.g. offensive cyber capabilities). The of unmanned air- and sea-borne vehicles systems with large signatures close-in. endstate is the elimination of A2/AD presenting electromagnetic signatures The sum of these efforts constitutes a assets that hinder the landing/insertion of much larger and more critical assets. “vapor swarm” with which the enemy of reinforcing entry forces (REF). For example, relatively cheap Group must cope. A “vapor” swarm arrives on Harassment and Delay: This subphase 3 UAS could present the signature of the battlefield in an already dispersed hinges on the employment of the REF. a flight of F18s or CH-53s, or small manner (vice a “cloud” swarm, that Per JP 3-18, REF are “more heavily unmanned surface vessels could pres- arrives as one formation and then dis- equipped than initial entry forces in ent L-Class shipping. This presents the perses).13 Both the provocation and re- order to increase the fire support, pro-

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 79 Ideas & Issues (2020 TraInor MIlITary WrITIng aWard) tection, maneuver, or other required Practically, this includes establishing MLR and MEU forces re-embark. The capabilities to support initial opera- defensive positions in and around se- operational flexibility provided by re- tions.”14 Operating under the MLR/ cured APODs and SPODs while re- embarking MLR and MEU forces once MEU force design the REF are the purposing available facilities in prepa- follow-on forces arrive gives the JFC individual platoons found within the ration for follow-on forces. During nearly unlimited operational flexibility MLR aboard fast, oceangoing craft. this transition, it may be prudent to in the littoral. They now stand ready to Reinforced with organic precision fires, continue employing the initial entry assist in sea-control operations as forces mobility assets, and a myriad of enablers forces and REF to destroy and disrupt flow into the battlespace or execute across the warfighting functions, these deeper enemy precision strike capabili- JFEO elsewhere. units land and immediately begin en- ties, maintaining a robust buffer for the gaging and harassing the enemy. Acting, securing and organization of lodgment. The Point of Greatest Friction: Com- too, as a swarm, their main purpose Of note, we deliberately eliminate the manding and Controlling the Force is to delay enemy counteraction and role of “expanding lodgment” within Command and Control (C2) of any keep him engaged across multiple fronts this phase of JFEO as it pertains to the distributed force is a challenge. Often while slowly attriting him with inherent MLR/MEU. Under Force Design 2030, it is a point of failure. Swarms, like robust combat capability. By delaying asking the Marine Corps to expand or the manner we see ourselves operating the adversary’s counteraction, the REF seize anything beyond initial APODs above, are especially difficult to C2. Ex- sets conditions for the main assault to and SPODs is potentially unrealistic as perts in such operations have identified take place. we shed traditional heavy and armored effective features of swarm C2. First, Main Assault: The main assault force enablers. Any expansion of lodgment the basic unit must be small enough so (MAF) comes from the blunt layer. It will need to be left to other specialty as to be able to physically control it.16 is the initial “punch” that delivers a se- units arriving from the surge layer as With the company-sized element serv- vere blow, disabling and disorienting the part of the follow-on force. ing as the unit of employment and the enemy until surge forces can arrive to deal an uppercut. In Force Design 2030, the MEU fills the role of the MAF. The The speed with which JFEO will take place given MEU discharges the battalion landing team, who comes ashore via air, sea, modern technology and a distributed force will neces- or undersea means. It is vital that this movement, too, be distributed. Though sitate a rapidly deployable follow-on “fire brigade …” the initial Precision Strike effort is likely to take a severe toll, it is unrealistic to think all enemy A2/AD forces will be As the joint force moves to Phase IV platoon serving as the unit of action, our eliminated. Thus, the MAF will need (Introduction of Follow-on Forces), the Force Design 2030 ensures this. Second, to come ashore as a vapor swarm be- role of the MLR/MEU is largely com- swarms mitigate friction by dividing fore converging on objectives. These plete. Any follow-on forces will need to the battlespace into sectors and subsec- objectives are likely to be aerial ports come from the surge layer, as the Corps tors, which is easily achievable when of debarkation (APODs) or seaports of will lack the immediate combat pow- designing future JFEO.17 We envision a debarkation (SPODs) as they will best er necessary to advance any further. platoon or company being given an op- enable follow-on force flow from the These forces exist to accomplish the erating box or subordinate AO. Third, surge layer. Seizure of this critical in- ultimate objectives of the Joint Forc- the network organization is “multi- frastructure will serve as the “uppercut” ible Entry and their introduction pro- hub.” This means that the force oper- and allow the joint force to transition vides the joint force commander with ates without a single overall leader in to stabilizing lodgment. increased flexibility to meet them.15 execution and thus must share common Transition to Stabilizing the Lodg- The speed with which JFEO will take principles and goals in order to achieve ment: Seizure of this infrastructure place given modern technology and operational coherence, a concept that means the force is ready to prepare the a distributed force will necessitate a rhymes with decentralized execution space for follow-on forces and transi- rapidly deployable follow-on “fire as the Corps currently strives for.18 tion to Phase III: Stabilization of the brigade,” able to provide the combat This leads to the most important (and Lodgment. power required to accomplish the ul- likely familiar) feature of C2-ing dis- Transitioning to Phase III, it is pre- timate joint force objective, continue tributed operations: decentralized C2 scient to avoid mission creep for the offensive operations, or transition to and mission-type orders. Purists take Corps. The role of the Marine Corps stability operations. Critically, follow- this to mean initial tasking and broad (MLR and MEU) now focuses on two on forces relieve MLR and MEU forces lateral limits with minimal guidance in primary goals: securing lodgment with ashore, taking from them the neces- execution. The Corps must refine this MAF forces and organizing lodgment sary tasks of securing and organizing understanding of decentralized C2 in for the transition to follow-on forces. the initial lodgment. Once relieved, order to execute future JFEO.

80 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 Executing a highly kinetic and com- sign, will enable shared understanding, 2. Commandant’s Planning Guidance. plex operation like distributed JFEO let unit commanders dynamically up- will require extreme levels of prepara- date intent, and refine initiative-based 3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Forcible Entry Op- tion. Two efforts will enable coordinated actions of distributed units. erations, (Washington, DC: June 2018). execution despite high decentralization. But perhaps the best step the Corps 4. Mark F. Cancian, “The Marine Corps Radi- First, MLRs and MEUs will need to can take toward executing effective cal Shift Toward China,” Center for Strategic and dedicate a large amount of time to the decentralized operations is putting the International Studies, (March 2020), available at development of detailed contingency right Marine in the right job. Out- https://www.csis.org; and William Lind, “Did plans. This will require MLR and MEU lined in the CPG is the need for an the Marine Corps Just Commit Suicide?,” Tra- staffs to work together closely in devel- increase/revamp in formal education. ditional Right, (April 2020), available at https:// opment of these plans, likely over great This change along with retention of key www.traditionalright.com. physical distance using virtual telecon- personnel is essential for DMO. DMO’s ference technology. This coordination combination with modern weaponry 5. T.X. Hammes, “Building a Marine Corps is especially critical among contact layer and communications equipment pres- for Every Contingency, Clime, and Place,” War on the Rocks, (April 2020), available at https:// units where the “flash to bang” of low- ents the Corps with the most rapidly warontherocks.com. intensity operations to armed conflict kinetic battlefield ever known to man. may be nearly immediate. After these A very specific type of warrior will thrive 6. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. plans are developed, they need to be in such a place—one versed in threats wargamed—not just by operational and capabilities, electronic warfare, 7. Ibid. commanders but with tactical unit lead- EM-spectrum operations, naval inte- ers as well. Detailed wargames drive out gration, and tactics ranging from litto- 8. Ibid. likely friction points and more impor- ral to multi-domain environments. We tantly let tactical commanders see how must make ourselves extensively trained, 9. Ibid. their peers will react at each junction. educated, and self-studied. Only criti- 10. Sean J.A. Edwards, “Swarming and the Executing these wargames will be ex- cal thinkers who regularly exercise Future of War,” (dissertation, Pardee Rand acerbated as commanders are pre-dis- such skills will understand how their Graduate School, 2005). tributed across the AOR. A virtual or commander’s intent nests within the digital solution will be compulsory. Corps’ inherently strategic mission. This 11. Ibid. Decentralizing to this level will also understanding at the junior officer and make maintenance of an up-to-date staff non-commissioned officer level will 12. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National common operational picture in execu- ultimately save the day and accomplish Defense Strategy of the United States, (Washing- tion extremely difficult. Lack of this ac- the mission when friction abounds. ton, DC: January 2018). (LtCol Scott Cuomo curate vision tends to make commanders provided the more colloquial definition of the less relevant the more removed or higher Conclusion layers used here in his 4 October 2019 interview they are in the chain of command, even The requirement for JFEO will re- on the Professional Military Education podcast; episode titled “Not Yet Openly at War, But as they make far-reaching decisions. main even as the Marine Corps sheds Still Mostly at Peace: An Interview with LtCol Army LTC Trent J. Lythgoe correctly and shuffles capabilities. If anything, Scott Cuomo.”) refutes a hyper-decentralized command the proliferation of A2/AD weapons to structure partially for this reason: developing and unpredictable nations 13. “Swarming and the Future of War.” as disorder increases, reality diverges makes such an operation more likely from the shared visualization. The and deadly as the traditional technologi- 14. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. implicit synchronization of other- cal overmatch enjoyed by the United wise disconnected actions erodes and States erodes. The Corps’ impending 15. Ibid. eventually ceases. Unless commanders design can execute JFEO of the future and subordinates periodically refresh but only by modifying existing un- 16. “Swarming and the Future of War.” their shared understanding, they will derstandings of such operations. The 17. Ibid. eventually cease to be on the same search for answers must happen now. 19 conceptual page. This time of transition raises difficult 18. Ibid. He argues for an iterative approach in questions of how the Corps will still execution that uses a repeating cycle of answer every call of the nation and re- 19. Trent J. Lythgoe, “Beyond Auftragstaktik: synchronization (implementing con- main Semper Fidelis. The Case Against Hyper-Decentralized Com- trol), dissemination (communication mand,” Joint Force Quarterly, (Washington, DC: of intent/orders), initiative (subordinate NDU Press, January 2020). decentralized execution), and reporting Notes 20. Ibid. (subordinates feed higher the results of 1. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s the action).20 This cycle, when overlaid Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: July temporally or within an operation’s de- 2019).

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 81 Ideas & Issues (2020 TraInor MIlITary WrITIng aWard) Expeditionary Data Supplying vital information to the kill-chain in the South China Sea by Capts Eugene Yang & Chris Adsit

s the Marine Corps prepares for conflict with China, a >Capt Yang is an Infantry Officer currently serving as a Defensive Cyber Operations major challenge it will face Officer at Defense Information Systems Agency, Fort Meade, MD. He previously is the ability to maintain data deployed with 2/8 Mar as a weapons platoon commander to Okinawa, Japan. He flowA between a distributed network of holds the additional MOS of 8846 Data Systems Specialist and 8243 Northeast forward deployed units. In the early Asia Foreign Area Officer. phases of combat operations in the Pa- cific, China will effectively challenge >>Capt Adsit is an Infantry Officer currently serving as a Project Officer for anti- U.S. dominance in air, space, and the armor systems at Marine Corps Systems Command. information environment.1 China has specifically developed its warfighting for maritime conflict.5 Section 3 of the its ability to create a far-reaching net- assets to defeat existing U.S. informa- China Communist Party 2015 white work that enables our networked war- tion capabilities. As the Marine Corps paper on China’s Military Strategy ex- fare concept.10 In addition to the E-2D, redesigns for future conflict in the Pa- pands on this shift in mindset for how satellite communications are relied on cific, it must consider the extent of its they will conduct an active defense that to integrate the warfighter across a large reliance on data availability. To address prioritizes information warfare.6 These battlespace. Marines can employ the Chinese information related capabilities informationized warfare units seek to new seven billion dollar Mobile User while transitioning to new operational disrupt our information related capa- Objective System (MUOS) and its five concepts, the Marine Corps needs to bilities and delay our achievement of satellite constellation to transmit data, develop a mesh communications net- air superiority and limit our offensive voice, and video from virtually any- work of unmanned vehicles to meet the operations. Transmitting data will be a where at speeds comparable to modern challenge of maintaining data flow in friction-filled struggle against an enemy smartphones.11 While an important ca- an expeditionary environment. whose bid for success is their informa- pability in our C2 infrastructure, satel- tion warfare capability. lite communications have limitations Chinese Informationized Warfare Our current warfighting doctrine and are vulnerable to enemy attack.12 Threatens Existing Data Platforms for fighting at sea relies on a few highly An enemy that is able to successfully Chinese anti-air and electronic at- capable, but vulnerable, platforms to disrupt our existing C2 platforms across tack capability have been growing for pass tactical data over the horizon to a battlespace of hundreds of nautical two decades and is designed to exploit subordinate units. Naval forces have re- miles will render our expeditionary pre- American reliance on networked strike lied on the capabilities provided by few cision strike units effectively useless. platforms that have operated unchal- exquisite and expensive platforms, such With our current warfighting concept lenged in recent conflicts.2 Chinese as the E-2 Hawkeye and its subsequent supporting the dispersed operations re- emphasis on this new method of “infor- variations since 1964 to link distributed lying on a few highly valuable assets, mationized warfare”3 can be observed units when they are operating over the our network and information capabil- in the military parade celebrating the horizon.7 While starting as the airborne ity is critically vulnerable to Chinese 70th anniversary of the People’s Re- command and control (C2) platform attack. public of China. The People’s Libera- and functioning as the “eyes of the tion Army presented four information- fleet,” the most recent variation, the A Data-Reliant Future Force ized warfare commands, each led by a E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, has added With this Chinese development of major general, displaying an array of capabilities that provide increased situa- capabilities to defeat our existing op- electronic warfare, radar, strike, and tional awareness in the littoral regions.8 erational concepts, the Marine Corps communications equipment.4 China The Hawkeye’s highly trained 5-man is changing in order to meet its require- has explicitly stated in their national crew and $199 million cost (compared ments to the National Defense Strat- security strategy that in order to com- to an F-35 cost of $110 million) make egy (NDS). The Center for Strategic pete in the new environment of warfare, it a high payoff target that is difficult and Budgetary Assessments concept their top priorities are to dominate the to replace.9 This platform is critical for for implementing a “Maritime Pres- information environment and prepare its detecting and tracking sensors and sure” strategy in the Pacific identifies

82 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 opportunities for distributed Marine that are difficult to target by enemy ing a communications contingency plan expeditionary operations.13 The central long-range precision fires systems,19 for the Marine Corps, the “No Comm concept is the idea of an “Inside-Out would require distributed units with Plan,” we must reassess whether this is Defense,” which describes a network precise, lethal capabilities that reach far- still a feasible idea applied to EABO in of sensors and shooters that can stymie ther than current assets at the maneuver a littoral environment. At present, when Chinese aggression prior to the arrival unit level. Gen Eric Smith, the head of a maneuver unit closes with the enemy, of friendly follow-on forces.14 Marine Marine Corps Combat Development loss of communications is overcome by forces in the Pacific would find them- Command, describes the future ma- subordinates exercising initiative while selves in a distributed fight spanning neuver unit of the littoral combat team operating within the commander’s in- hundreds of nautical miles competing employing tent. The challenge of maneuvering in for air control and information domi- multiple platoon-reinforced-size ex- the littoral environment forces us to nance. The success of follow-on “out- peditionary advance base (EAB) sites rethink how we approach communica- side-in” forces depends on the ability that can host and enable a variety of tions. In operations with dispersed units for “inside-out” forces to penetrate the missions such as long-range anti-ship that require forward sensors to identify Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/ fires, forward arming and refueling targets beyond line-of-sight, loss of com- AD) umbrella and gain a foothold in of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, munications eliminates combat power. the air, on sea, and in the information and reconnaissance (ISR) of key mari- The robust sensor and shooter network, environment. time terrain, and air-defense and early supported by numerous EABs and naval In order to provide these inside forc- warning.20 platforms, could quickly be rendered es, the Commandant has directed the While the concepts that will under- ineffective by enemy countermeasures Marine Corps to prepare for expedition- gird EABO mission sets are still under- if we are unable to develop a more sur- ary advanced base operations (EABO) going experimentation and wargaming, vivable information capability. and redesign the force.15 This emphasis some initial outputs and key capabili- on EABO and the need for the Marine ties are known.21 Our existing organic Unmanned Vehicles Delivering Expe- Corps to adapt is driven by changes to infantry battalions’ weapons range and ditionary Data some of the fundamental assumptions area of influence are not adequate. The Inside forces will require communi- that we as a force make when planning. CPG defines this extensively, as do the cations networks to project power from Namely, as Gen Berger has stated, Force Design Phase 1 and 2 outputs. distributed islands when conducting The Navy and Marine Corps must A “Rise of Mature Precision Strike EABO. While we currently have the confront the reality that presumptive Regime” is one of the items identified means to launch precision strikes via sea control is no longer assured for the by the CMC that necessitated a new direct communication between sensor United States—we will compete for Force Design.22 The technology exists in and shooter,26 the better alternative is it ... per our amphibious doctrine-sea precision strike to increase the infantry to create a resilient mesh network that control and air superiority are prereq- company range by ten to twenty fold, expands coverage and allows firing data uisites to success.16 with ground base precision strike mu- to quickly traverse and reach multiple This change in enemy capability is nitions.23 Development of HIMARS- distributed firing agencies. Not only driving the development of forward de- based anti-ship missile batteries and does this give forward sensors more ployed inside forces to meet the strategic their increase in size across the force lethality via access to additional firing objective, but the enabling operational will provide Marine commanders the assets through a network of ad hoc C2 and tactical concepts are still in devel- ability to strike enemy assets at long platforms, but it also gives those for- opment.17 range and with lethal effects.24 De- ward sensors more freedom to maneu- The EABO handbook outlines mis- velopments in long-range unmanned ver. Rather than our current assets, this sion sets that will require new capabili- surface vessels (LRUSV) will increase can be accomplished with a network ties and concepts to employ. “Naval ex- the ability of units to conduct seabased of attritable unmanned vehicles. As peditionary forces secure forward bases reconnaissance and strike at distances the Commandant’s Planning Guidance to advance and distribute joint sensors, of hundreds of miles.25 These platforms states, “We must continue to seek the shooters and sustainment capabilities,”18 and technologies, utilized by small units affordable and plentiful at the expense requires the Marine Corps not just to across floating barges, small islands, or of the exquisite and few when conceiv- look at how it secures advance terrain from naval platforms, will allow the ing of the future amphibious portion of but also how it will support the force Marine Corps to deny the enemy large the fleet.”27 A backbone of unmanned with distributed assets for observation areas of sea and terrain. vehicles can form a data highway that and targeting as well as with sustain- While much of the emphasis of the undergirds our future operating con- ment capabilities. The mission of, force development is placed on these cept. Lend resiliency to the joint force by new lethal capabilities, the force requires The concept of using unmanned proliferating mobile land-based anti- a paradigm shift to ensure it develops aircraft systems to function as C2 ship cruise missiles, anti-air missiles, the supporting technologies to ensure platforms has gone through multiple anti-ballistic, and [ballistic missiles] success of these capabilities. Consider- iterations.28 Marine innovators have

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 83 Ideas & Issues (2020 TraInor MIlITary WrITIng aWard)

explored applying former Secretary of directly support the DARPA concept form of achieving the same networked Defense Jim Mattis’ “Guardian Angel” of “Mosaic Warfare”35 that seeks to functionality. force protection policy with the capa- overwhelm the enemy through a mul- Gaining and maintaining BLOS bilities of MQ-9 Reapers to function as titude of cost-effective platforms that communication will be crucial for the centralized hubs of communication in can sense and strike. The distributed success of our inside forces in the face of support of infantry battalions in urban and resilient communication network a Chinese attack. Using UAVs to ensure terrain.29 During testimony before the that UAVs provide could allow the data flow between our integrated forces House Appropriations Committee in Mosaic Warfare idea that “everything adds another layer of redundancy to April of 2019, then-Commandant of that has a sensor could be connected to this critical requirement. In the event of the Marine Corps, Gen Neller, stated everything that can make a decision, existing air and space C2 assets denied the highest priority for modernizing and then to anything that can take an by the enemy, UAVs can allow Marine the MAGTF was conducting C2 in a action.”36 This type of risk-worthy in- inside forces to degrade the Chinese degraded environment and specifically frastructure backbone can redundantly anti-access/aerial denial (A2/AD) um- investing in a Fused Integrated Naval connect dispersed units with IP-based brella. An array of UAVs devoted to C2 Network.30 These concepts lay the data exchange. This essentially creates operations can provide this network on foundation for a modern force having an airborne Internet across the First Is- command and ensure that local C2 loss the deployable means to create an ad land Chain analogous to a tug line in will not equate to complete loss of long- hoc C2 network in a degraded com- range precision strike and the ability munications environment. for commanders to communicate with The MQ-9 Reaper Block 5 is an ideal subordinate units. intermediate candidate to provide these A backbone of un- mobile ad hoc networks given its long manned vehicles can Conclusion loiter time, onboard communications Dr. James Lacey at the Marine Corps suite, and relatively inexpensive flya- form a data highway ... War College initially rejected the idea way cost of $28 million.31 The recent of EABO.37 He saw it as a step back- Barrett Asymmetric Digital Datalink wards to a strategy reminiscent of the Computer and Beyond Line-of-Sight Japanese in the Second World War, with (BLOS) installation kit upgrades in- a linear ambush. This robust network their focus on developing island bases in crease the bandwidth and data output of unmanned and distributed platforms order to control and influence maritime that grow the platform outside of its could also leverage existing investments space. Now an advocate for the concept current priorities of strike and ISR.32 the Marine Corps is exploring in un- of EABO, he draws differences between The Marine Corps requested 3 MQ-9 manned surface vehicles. The LRUSV the Japanese strategy and that which Reapers in the fiscal year 2020 budget, as both an ISR and strike platform can the Marine Corps seeks to implement. acquiring its first large group-5 drone.33 act as another relay in this network. He states, The C2 capabilities this platform brings It also provides opportunities to serve most crucially, the Japanese had a very to the MAGTF can be crucial building as hard-to-kill relay nodes for BLOS limited capacity to reach out from their blocks for future airborne networks. An- control of UAVs in the event of satel- island bases and strike fleets at sea […] other unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) lite degradation or denial. A network Instead of a mutually supporting joint to consider is the Air Force’s EQ-4B of dispersed, attritable UAVs and USVs force, Japanese land and naval forces Battlefield Airborne Communications ensures that our communications infra- were fighting two separate wars.38 Node variation of the Global Hawk, structure will survive first contact with The EAB without the communication which is tailor made to serve as a C2 the enemy’s informationized warfare network to utilize its advanced strike node to connect warfighters on the bat- doctrine. assets and leverage the network of sen- tlefield, but its expensive flyaway cost of We must continue to move past the sors and shooters will be condemned $131 million might not be conducive model of communications that connects to the same fate. There is aggressive ac- for scaling.34 two end users directly and consider the tion being taken to develop the lethal Utilizing a Fused Integrated Naval resilient networks we need to deliver capabilities to support EABO, but the Network in the context of EABO must expeditionary data. This squadron of same emphasis needs to be placed on emphasize the coordination of dispersed unmanned vehicles would function as developing resilient networking capac- UAVs united into a larger network. In- a deployable data network across hun- ity that can withstand the attacks that stead of a Reaper overhead primarily dreds of nautical miles to ensure no the enemy will launch on our existing functioning as a network hub with total loss of situational awareness and exquisite communication platforms. multiple touch points to the maneu- tactical data flow. While such a net- Without the ability to deliver expedi- ver element below, we should deploy work is unlikely to dethrone the E-2D tionary data, we risk our operational multiple Reapers conducting rear area as the premier naval aviation platform advantage over the enemy and the suc- operations as airborne network routers. for coordinating assets over the hori- cess of our future strategy. This unmanned vehicle network could zon, it is a cost-efficient, disaggregated

84 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 15. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s 29. Scott Cuomo, “Secretary Mattis’ ‘Guard- Notes Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: July ian Angel’ And How Marine Corps Aviation 2019). Can Get Back On Target,” War On The Rocks, 1. Ian Williams, “More Than Missiles: China (July 2017), available at https://warontherocks. Previews its New Way of War,” Center for Stra- 16. Gen David H. Berger, “Remarks at the com; and Ben Brewster, “Lady Gaga’s Air Force tegic & International Studies, (October 2019), MCAF Ground Dinner,” Marine Corps Asso- and the Grunt-Angel For Marines: An Infantry available at https://www.csis.org. ciation, (November 2019), available at https:// Officer’s Unlikely Exploration,”War On The mca-marines.org. Rocks, (July 2017), available at https://waron- 2. Ibid; and Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and therocks.com. Robert Work, “Meeting the Anti-Access and Area- 17. Megan Eckstein,“CMC Berger Wants to Denial Challenge,” (Washington, DC: Center Retool Kit for Leaner, Lethal Marine Corps,” 30. House Appropriations Committee Subcom- for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003). United States Naval Institute, (December 2019), mittee on Defense, “State of General Robert available at https://news.usni.org. B. Neller Commandant of the Marine Corps 3. Staff, Countering Enemy “Informationized Before The House Appropriations Commit- Operations” in War and Peace, (Washington, 18. Art Corbett, “Expeditionary Advanced tee Subcommittee on Defense Concering the DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary As- Base Operations Handbook,” Marine Corps Posture of the United States Marine Corps,” sessments, 2013). Association, (June 2018), available at https:// (Washington, DC: April 2019). mca-marines.org. 4. China Central Television, available at https:// 31. Air Combat Command, “MQ-9 Reaper,” youtu.be. 19. Ibid. United States Air Force, (September 2015), available at https://www.af.mil; and “Defense 5. The State Council Information Office of the 20. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Testing Regi- Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Weapons People’s Republic of China, Xinhua News, (May ment at Heart of Emerging Island-Hopping Programs.” 2015), available at http://www.xinhuanet.com. Future,” United States Naval Insitute, (June 2020), available at https://news.usni.org. 32. Jeff Reinke, “A Changing of the Drone 6. Ibid. Guard,” Thomas, (January 2018), available at 21. Ibid. https://www.thomasnet.com. 7. Naval Air Systems Command, “E-2 Hawkeye Early Warning and Control Aircraft,” United 22. Gen David H. Berger, Force Design 2030, 33. Shawn Snow, “The Corps Seeks Reaper States Navy Fact File, (January 2018), available (Washington, DC: June 2020). Drones in Budget Request, but Will Only Add at https://www.navy.mil. 100 Marines in 2020,” Marine Corps Times, 23. Matthew Beinart, “Marines Seeking Indus- (March 2019), available at https://www. 8. Ibid. try Input on Mounted Organic Precision Fires marinecorpstimes.com. Capability Ahead of FY20 Prototype Award,” 9. Staff, “Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Defense Daily, (February 2019), available at 34. Staff, “Northrop Grumman Delivers Selected Weapons Programs,” (Washington, https://www.defensedaily.com. BACN-Equipped Global Hawk to Air Force,” DC: United States Government Accountability Northrop Grumman, (July 2018), availble at Office, 2013). 24. David B. Larter, “Here’s the U.S. Marine https://news.northropgrumman.com. Darnell Corps’ Plan for Sinking Chinese Ships with T. Cannady, “EQ-4 Global Hawk Controlled 10. “E-2 Hawkeye Early Warning and Control Drone Missile Launcher,” Defense News, (Feb- ‘Beyond Line of Sight’,” United States Air Force, Aircraft.” ruary 2020), available at https://www.defense- (February 2019), available at https://www. news.com. af.mil. “Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of 11. Ben Werner, “MUOS Passes Final Tests Be- Selected Weapons Programs.” fore Full Operational Capability Declaration,” 25. “CMC Berger Wants to Retool Kit for United States Naval Institute News, (October Leaner, Lethal Marine Corps.” 35. Staff, “DARPA Tiles Together a Vision of 2019), available at https://news.usni.org. Na- Mosaic Warfare,” Defense Advanced Research than Strout, “Marines Give the First Reaction 26. Shawn Snow, “Marines Connect F-35 Jet Projects Agency, (n.d.), available at https://www. To New Satellite Terminals,” C4ISRNet, (June to HIMARS Rocket Shot for First Time,” Ma- darpa.mil. 2019), available at https://www.c4isrnet.com. rine Corps Times, (October 2018), available at https://www.marinecorpstimes.com. 36. Ibid. 12. John Grady, “Experts Warn House Panel of U.S. Satellite Network Vulnerabilities,” United 27. 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance. 37. Jim Lacey, “The ‘Dumbest Concept Ever’ States Naval Institute News, (March 2017), avail- Just Might Win Wars,” War on the Rocks, (July able at https://news.usni.org. 28. Scott Cuomo, Jeff Cummings, Olivia Ga- 2019), available at https://warontherocks.com. rard, and Noah Spataro, “Open Your Eyes And 13. Thomas G. Mahnken, Travis Sharp, BIlly See The 21st Century MAGTF,” War On The 38. Ibid. Fabian, and Peter Kouretsos, “Tightening the Rocks, (September 2017), available at https:// Chain: Implementing a Strategy of Maritime warontherocks.com; and Scott Cuomo, Olivia Pressure in the Western Pacific,”Center for Stra- Garard, Noah Spataro, and Jeff Cummings, tegic and Budgetary Assessments, (May 2019), “How the Marines Will Help the U.S. Navy available at https://csbaonline.org. and America’s Allies Win the Great Indo- of 2025,” War On The Rocks, (September 14. Ibid. 2018), available at https://warontherocks.com.

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 85 Ideas & Issues (LearnIng) Analog Combat Put down your mobile devices, turn off your laptops, go outside, and train by Capt Jamar Alexander

o much of who we are as Ma- The Expeditionary Energy Office is rines has become entangled in >Capt Alexander is a Logistics Of- making progress engineering and pro- the digital age. Nearly every ficer currently serving as the S-4 moting ways to conserve and quantify aspect of our warfighting func- Officer for MTACS-28, MACG-28. energy consumption. Before troops Stions has become tied to a digital plat- make it to the battlefield, there must form and it has changed the focus and be a strong consideration for analog face of warfare for our organization. restraint and redirection of how much training events that contribute to the Visit any Marine Corps organization we depend on technology and where responsible use of energy resources. Put- and notice how many Marines are on substitution can be placed. This may ting more emphasis on analog training smartphones, tablets, or laptops. Our result in redundant training in record will contribute greatly to the amount embrace of digital products has made management but will ensure a perish- of battlefield energy consumed, result- us ostensibly proficient, robust, and ca- able skill is preserved. ing in lowered signature footprints and pable of long-range actions. This over logistical requirements, which would reliance on technology will be a critical Energy Consumption meet the demand of the Commandants vulnerability in a fight with a near-peer If more units were to consider analog Planning Guidance. This would also adversary. This article discusses how means of tracking vehicle and person- aide in our effort in finding a solution analog training reduces energy con- nel movements, this would drastically to commanding and controlling in a sumption, contributes to interactions contribute to the lowered amount of en- degraded or contested environment. between human beings, and ultimately ergy consumed as well as the signature influences how we train and how we footprint units provide. Accordingly, Human Interaction will fight. Because of this, the Marine “Energy can no longer be glossed over Every unit should have a contingency Corps must revive analog methods of during system developments, operation- plan to execute when unannounced operating in order to stay proficient in al planning, and mission execution.”1 white space presents itself. Analog irregular warfare and analog training Marines must be trained not only to training provides Marines analytical methods. maintain their analog skills but under- skills that could be honed during mis- Everything from our movement of stand the cost of energy consumption. sion rehearsal events such as Leader- vehicles and personnel to correspon- dence is tracked via electronic means. This is done to expedite information processing as well as unilaterally track progress. Some of these procedures have aided in advancing us as a military force. At the same time, it has hindered us into thinking that we need and depend on these systems to function. Unfortu- nately, these systems not only raise our electronic signature but consume large quantities of energy that is often quite limited in forward operating areas. For the majority of the FMF, the absence of electronic media is perfectly acceptable. It is understood that it is not possible to disconnect completely from technology because of the competing interest of the adversary for the technological advan- Analog training methods can help sustain proficiency in all environments. (Photo by WO Bobby tage. However, there needs to be some Yarbrough.)

86 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 training should be focused on winning in combat in the most challenging con- ditions and operating environments ... Marines must be comfortable operat- ing in all potential environments.5 As an organization, we need to take a look at what analog systems and train- ing standards made us successful in not only yesterday’s battle but tomorrow’s war; thus, when the opportunity pres- ents itself, we are more than prepared to operate outside of the confines of the digital domain. There should be an analog standard in every warfight- ing function that Marines are more than comfortable employing at a mo- ment’s notice. Analog training at the company level on a quarterly or mini- mum annual basis would bridge the gap Land navigation without GPS assistance is a type of analog training. (Photo by LCpl Ursula Smith.) between yesterday’s staff noncommis- sioned officer wisdom and tomorrow’s youth. The Battle Skills Test (BST) is ship Decision Making Events. This field Research conducted a study on 500 an excellent opportunity for that staff also contributes to building esprit de American students and concluded that noncommissioned officers wisdom to corps and camaraderie among unit 38 percent were unable to spend more be showered on the future leaders of personnel. Analog training could be than ten minutes without some form the Marine Corps. For many decades, plotting a point on a map, exercising a of technology. More than 70 percent the BST has existed in various forms, land navigation course, familiarly with preferred using computers and tablets adapting over the years with the main crew served weapons, immediate ac- for note taking and presentations. After intent to sustain designated individual, tion procedures, understanding fields 24 hours without technology, volunteers non-occupational common skills across of fire, and just refining those common displayed similar symptoms as a smoker the Marine Corps. In December 2017, core skills of being a basic rifleman. trying to quit.3 Analog training provides MAR ADMIN 693/17 announced the Analog training could also be focused that link of human interaction that we implementation of the revised BST pro- towards the 5,000–8,000 level Train- need to get back to as an organization. gram. Across the Marine Corps, units ing and Readiness (T&R) standard as Without it, we stand a chance of extir- have strategized different means to ac- Marines practice mission tactics coupled pating the ability to operate in irregular complish this training. Many units have with a valid commander’s intent, absent warfare in a contested environment. taken to the field for a week at a time in communication to higher. As stated in order to meet the mission. This com- the Marine Corps Operating Concept, mon core training is not designated for “This increased unit of force can be an There should be an an- certain periods but should be done often intangible factor in the exploitation of throughout a Marines career. The in- a critical vulnerability in irregular war- alog standard in every novation of technology has taken away fare.”2 This training can and should be warfighting function ... from brilliance in the basics with analog conducted at the company level, which training being center focus. Out of the will involve more hands-on training be- review of 178 sustainable tasks, only tween platoon leadership. This provides 27 of them do not require any form of small unit leadership the opportunity to Analog Training Events digital media to conduct.6 develop other small unit leaders through Most of human history has been leader-led training. The act of develop- fought in what is known as, “three in- Analog Training Translated into Com- ing small unit leaders through leader- dispensable hardware elements.”4 This bat Readiness led training can develop into a routine consisted of soldiers, their weapons, Analog training needs not only to be discipline that will have tremendous and battlespace. Since we have relied incorporated but enforced into train- rewards. heavily on digital equipment creating ing standards and managed through In order to make this a reality, people a standard, failure to sustain a stan- Defense Readiness Reporting System need to be made aware of how much we dard has created another standard. The (DRRS). This item can be a require- depend on technology and the pitfall Commandant mentions in his planning ment during a units Commanding of over reliance on technology. Wake- guidance that, General’s Readiness Inspection or Field

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 87 Ideas & Issues (LearnIng)

Supply Maintenance Analysis Office operation without access while not conscious of the fully burdened cost inspection, which checks to ensure a completely breaking the system in the of the energy we consume, Marines are unit’s supply, maintenance, mainte- long term. One technique that could be doing their part to reduce consumption nance management procedures, and employed is using long-range radios to on and off the battlefield. The Com- overall equipment accountabilities are relay maintenance parts ordering. A unit mandant has stated that we should be being properly recorded. DRRS allows that is forward deployed requests a part focused on winning in combat in the the commandant to see the readiness replacement but does not have NIPR most challenging conditions as well level of a unit. One problem with the capability. The requesting unit could as ensuring Marines are comfortable Marine Corps is that we use percent- draft a nine-line consisting of the part/ operating in the most austere environ- ages in DRRS to define readiness, and vehicle type with relevant information ments. Analog training is that conduit many of the actions we perform in this to the supporting unit. That support- that needs to be embraced so Marines area appear to check those boxes instead ing unit then fills the order request and stay proficient in the basics but agile on of focusing on how to effectively train coordinates through the supported unit the battlefield. Wherever the next fight Marines. The ability to employ analog to have the item shipped out. Doing this takes us, in the event the lights go out on skills should rest in a Marines’ head and gives that Marine the opportunity to the internet, it will not be the reason we heart. Since they do, those skills should train with the radio, practice drafting stop bringing to be bear combat power be scored appropriately and documented and receiving a nine-line, conduct mul- on the enemy. As a Service, I argue we through a unit’s report card. tiple quality checks on the part being are better off in the analog realm than When we speak in terms of the ordered, as well as that human inter- some of our sister Services, though the “blocking and tackling” of warfight- action piece. Overall, this benefits the requirement to sharpen those skills and ing and planning, there are certainly Marine over a myriad of analog training become leaner in our energy consump- some identifiable skills that require an standards that can be sustained. tion is certainly something that we need analog approach and proficiency. Since to take a more consistent, quantifiable so many of our platforms rely on the Conclusion approach toward. internet, the absence of NIPR capability In closing, warfare in the future may often presents a critical vulnerability not involve weapons of the past (spears, to our organization. If the enemy can rifles, troops) or battlefields. Rather, the Notes shut down NIPR in a contested envi- battlefield may be fought in cyberspace. 1. Robert A. Davila, “Threats Defeated through ronment, where will that leave us as an With information being entered as the Doctrine,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, organization? Specifically, GCSS-MC seventh function of warfare, more em- VA: October 2019). was not designed to be able to function phasis is being placed on how we fight offline. The trick becomes in establish- from a digital perspective. However, our 2. Headquarters Marine Corps, The Marine ing enduring tactics, techniques, and analog skills should never be glossed Corps Operating Concept, (Washington, DC: procedures that allow for sustained over or forgotten about. Being more 2018). 3. William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

4. Robert Drews, The End of the Bronze Age: Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe CA. 1200 B.C., (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1993).

5. Gen David H. Berger, 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, (Washington, DC: 2019).

6. Headquarters Marine Corps, MARADMIN 690 /17, (Washington, DC: December 2017).

Crew-served weapons proficiency and cross training are ideally suited to analog training. (Photo by LCpl Natalie Greenwood.)

88 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 Articulating Doctrine to Junior Marines Communicate warfighting to the warfighters by Capt James Whitcher

he foreword of MCDP 1 as- serts that the doctrine must >Capt Whitcher is a Firepower Control Team Leader for 6th ANGLICO in the reserve Tchange, “Military doctrine component. As a junior enlisted sailor, he completed one deployment to the Pa- cannot be allowed to stag- cific aboard the USSGeorge Washington, one deployment aboard the USS Kitty nate.”1 President John F. Kennedy once Hawk, and one deployment aboard the USS Cowpens. He possess a Doctorate said, “the more our knowledge expands, Degree in Physical Therapy and currently practices in this field. This article was the greater our ignorance unfolds.”2 submitted in part of a course requirement for “Beyond Boyd: Maneuver Warfare Disciplines in the science, technology, Theory and Practice in the 21st Century.” engineering, and mathematics update their textbooks yearly. New anatomy fare, and “clarify and refine important with writing that fails to capture atten- books are written frequently to update maneuver warfare concepts such as tion. It is not that warfighting or war is the understanding of anatomy—once commander’s intent, main effort and boring; it is that the U.S. Government thought a dead man’s field. Anatomy critical vulnerability.”4 The breadth of does not do a good job at articulating should reveal no new findings—the hu- this article cannot address the first two information. man body is not growing new struc- goals, and the third goal is challeng- A quick poll of a platoon of Marines tures; however, the scientists synthesize ing. Is the commander’s intent, main in my company yields that two to five new revelations, updating the existing effort, and critical vulnerability at the percent of Marines have read MCDP 1 body of evidence. “If we cease to refine, epicenter of maneuver warfare? It may cover-to-cover. If Marines are not read- expand and improve our profession, we be the lowest denominator for maneuver ing this publication, what is the purpose risk becoming outdated, stagnant and warfare, but it is not articulated well to of revising it? Sage leaders can bicker all defeated.”3 The underlying principles meet the needs of the junior Marines. day about which content should be in- cluded in a revision. If few Marines are reading the current version of MCDP If few Marines are reading the current version of 1, a revision will not matter. The most junior Marines are going to be doing the MCDP 1, a revision will not matter. The most junior warfighting; therefore, it should be an appealing read at the entry level. Junior Marines are going to be doing the warfighting; there- Marines need to have a complete under- fore, it should be an appealing read at the entry level. standing of decentralized control and other essential components of maneuver warfare. A disconnect arises when of- ficers assume that the enlisted men are of warfare or human competition will The U.S. Government is generally familiar with the doctrine. never change, but our synthesis and the inept at writing and capturing atten- Consider the following excerpt from manner in which we articulate the ideas tion of the reader, “The Pentagon and MCDP 1 pertaining to commanders of warfighting should be updated. throughout the Services, the misuse intent: The purpose of this article is not a and abuse of language obscures major Subordinate commanders must make diatribe against MCDP 1 but rather to defense issues, alienates non-defense decisions on their own initiative, based cover a possible paradigm shift in the experts and suffocates ideas.”5 MCDP on their understanding of their senior’s way critical warfighting concepts are 1 lacks to capture the attention of the intent, rather than passing informa- articulated to the most junior warfight- readers. Fewer than expected Marines tion up the chain of command and ers. MCDP 1 has three goals: describe have read the current edition cover to waiting for the decision to be passed the nature of warfare, the styles of war- cover. Why? MCDP 1 suffocates ideas down. Further, a competent subordi-

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 89 Ideas & Issues (LearnIng)

will be etched into their mind for an example of being at a decision point and carrying out the commander’s intent. An analogy with a simple picture of a leader operating at the molecular level will ingrain the understanding to the junior Marines. Ted Williams wrote a book in 1970 on The Science of Hitting. Ted has what he calls a “happy zone.” (See Figure 2.) Ted was a successful hitter because he committed to pitches that increased his chances of getting a hit. Low and out- side was his critical vulnerability. Pitch- ers often threw in his vulnerable zone. But if Ted was ahead in the count, he did not swing. If the count was 0-2, Ted would be forced to swing at the pitch, placing him at a much higher likeli- Figure 1. (Figure provided by author.) hood of getting out. When pitching to Ted Williams, it is best to get ahead in nate commander who is at the point The excerpt from MCDP 1 and the the count and throw pitches low and of decision will naturally better appre- football analogy convey the same in- outside—forcing him to commit to his ciate the true situation than a senior formation. The difference is that one vulnerability. If the pitcher is behind in commander some distance removed.6 is unremarkable to the audience. The the count, he is forced to enter Ted’s This information is fine, but it does not other is more memorable. This analogy strong zone—a place no pitcher would enthrall the reader. Consider ever want to be. Future MCDP the following: 1 revisions should include Ted Miami Florida, 1986, the Williams “happy zone” depic- Broncos are competing tion as it is simply corollary to against the Browns for the the CG/CV discussion.8 AFC championship. Quar- The future of warfighting terback John Elway has will be decided at the mo- just driven his team to the lecular level. Junior Marines, Browns’ 5 yard line. 39 sec- the “strategic corporal,” will onds left. Third down and make tactical decisions that goal to go. Elway moves have strategic ramifications.9 under center. He notices Junior leaders operating at the cornerback covering the tactical level must have a wide receiver Mark Jackson clear understanding of doc- is canted to the outside. El- trine. The doctrine does not way quickly calls an audible need to be dumbed down to for Jackson to slant inside. the lowest denominator, but it Hut. Jackson takes two steps does need to be articulated in and cuts hard inside—he has a manner that engrains itself a step on his opponent. The right side of the offensive line at the fire team level. is collapsing around Elway. Doctrine is formulated Elway cocks back and fires and propagated at the highest the football. It hits Jackson level. The disconnect is that in the chest. Touchdown. El- the leadership in the Marine way has taken the initiative Corps is not the best at cap- to call an audible within the turing the attention of the coach’s intent. Elway was at “strategic corporals.” Few lead- the decision point and best ers are promoted within our served to make the decision ranks based off their creative … etc.7(See Figure 1.) writing skills. Future revisions Figure 2. (Figure provided by author.) should include analogies like

90 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 I described and then some. Great sto- 7. National Football League, “AFC Champion- Notes ship,” (Sporting competition, Miami Orange ries should be included like the Trojan Bowl, Miami, FL, January 1986). Horse with the concept of deception, 1. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1, War- the “happy zone” and hitting, and fi g h t i n g , (Washington DC: 1997). 8. Ted Williams and John Underwood, The stories of heroes. Marines can readily Science of Hitting, (New York, NY: Simon & identify the acts of Marines like John 2. John F. Kennedy, “We Choose to Go to the Schuster, 1986) Basilone but have little cognizance of Moon,” (speech, Rice University, Houston, TX, the concept of shaping actions. Junior September 1962). 9. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1-0, Marines need stories and pictures. Operations, (Washington DC: 2011). 3. . In closing, MCDP 1 should encap- MCDP 1 sulate the essence of maneuver warfare. 4. Ibid. Second, the doctrinal ideologies should be translated into content that appeals 5. Kate Bateman, “War on (Buzz) Words,” to the audience and makes them want to Proceeding, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute read it—rendering the junior enlisted to Press, 2008). become complicit in their own demise of consuming the doctrine. 6. MCDP 1.

MajGen Harold W. Chase Prize Essay Contest Boldness earns rewardsÉ

The annual MajGen Harold W. Chase Prize Essay Contest invites articles that challenge conventional wisdom by proposing change to a current Marine Corps directive, policy, custom, or practice. To qualify, entries must propose and argue for a new and better way of “doing business” in the Marine Corps. Authors must have strength in their convictions and be prepared for criticism from those who would defend the status quo. That is why the prizes are called Boldness and Daring Awards. Prizes include $3,000 and an engraved plaque for fi rst place, $1,500 and an engraved plaque for second place, and $500 for honorable mention. All entries are eligible for publication.

* Instructions * The contest is open to all Marines on active duty and to members of the Marine Corps Reserve. Electronically submit- ted entries are preferred. Attach the entry as a fi le and send to [email protected]. A cover page should be included, identifying the manuscript as a Chase Prize Essay Contest entry and including the title of the essay and the author’s name. Repeat the title on the fi rst page, but the author’s name should not appear anywhere but on the cover page. Manuscripts are accepted, but please include a disk in Microsoft Word format with the manuscript. The Gazette Editorial Advisory Panel will judge the contest and notify all entrants as to the outcome shortly thereafter. Multiple entries are allowed; however, only one entry will receive an award. Be bold and daring!

This contest is sponsored by: Deadline: 30 April Send to: [email protected] Mail entries to: Marine Corps Gazette, Box 1775, Quantico, VA 22134

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 91 MANEUVERIST PAPERS

Learning from the Germans Part II: The Future

Maneuverist Paper No. 5 by Marinus

n the last three decades of the 20th century, the study the pages of the Marine Corps Gazette and few, if any, copies of German military history, and in particular, the read- found their way onto the shelves of the libraries of Marine Iing of the memoirs of German general offi cers of World Corps bases.1 A few Marines may have run across the reviews War II, allowed Marines of that era to imagine what of Tiger Jack published in Armor magazine and Parameters: maneuver warfare might look like. In the 21st century, a The Journal of the U.S. Army War College. Of these, those substantial change in the supply of relevant resources raises who were especially adept at chasing down books might have the question of whether Marines intent upon improving their ordered a copy, whether from a full-service bookseller or understanding of maneuver warfare should look for other directly from the publisher. However, only those who were examples to emulate, experiences to evaluate, and traditions able to spend several days in the reading room of the National to contemplate. Archives, the archives of Syracuse University, or the library of In 1979, the Old Army Press, a small publisher specializing the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College would in the history of the American West, printed 2,000 cloth- have been able to delve more deeply into the way John Shirley bound copies of a book called Tiger Jack. Written by Hanson Wood commanded the 4th Armored Division. W. Baldwin, who had won a Pulitzer Prize for his work as a Today, dozens of copies of Tiger Jack can be found for sale war correspondent in the Pacifi c during World War II, this on the websites of dealers in second-hand books. Better yet, book told the tale of MG John S. Wood, a U.S. Army offi cer Marines who wish to learn more about MG Wood and the who, in the course of the last year of World War II, led the way he handled his division can fi nd dozens of additional 4th Armored Division in a distinctly maneuverist manner. works on the website of the Combined Arms Research Library (British military historian B.H. Liddell Hart once referred at Fort Leavenworth. These include monographs that recon- to Wood as “the Rommel of the American armored forces.”) struct particular engagements; after-action reports submitted Arriving, as it did, during the of the maneuver by the commanders of subordinate, adjacent, and supporting warfare movement, Tiger Jack should have been of consider- units; and accounts that describe the operational context of able interest to Marines. Notwithstanding the long and happy the decisions made by MG Wood. A broader internet search relationship between Mr. Baldwin and the professional journal will turn up additional resources on the operations of the 4th of the Marine Corps, no mention of the book appeared in Armored Division during the last year of World War II. These

German tactics and operational art formed much of the foundation for maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps. (Photo by LCpl Angel Serna.)

92 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 include four complete histories, three partial histories, three position to not only recognize this gross mischaracterization documentary fi lms, two histories of subordinate units, and but learn about the troubled relationship between the two a table-top wargame—as well as a module for a computer- offi cers. (General Beck, who had resigned in protest from the based wargame. German Army in 1938, had been one of the leaders of the After feasting on these resources, Marines still hungry for failed attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler. In the aftermath of case studies in the effective application of maneuver war- this event, which took place on 20 July 1944, Gen Guderian fare can easily fi nd much material about Japanese, Israeli, took aggressive measures to ensure the loyalty of German French, Finnish, British, and American battles, campaigns, military offi cers to the National Socialist regime.)2 and leaders. Thus, for example, a Marine interested in the A more nuanced case for frequent recourse to the well- “bicycle blitzkrieg” conducted by the Japanese forces led by spring of German military history rests upon the continuous, LtGen Tomoyuki Yamashita in Malaya in 1942, will, in the consistent, and increasingly central role played by many of course of a short internet search, fi nd enough in the way of the fundamental precepts of maneuver warfare in German papers, podcasts, low-cost wargames, and readily available military culture. That is, while there were many instances books to permit an in-depth, multi-sided exploration of that where German military professionals violated one or more campaign. (Readers contemplating such a project may want of these tenets, a deep appreciation for such things as the to start with the seventeen-episode series of audio programs inherently chaotic nature of war and the importance of a about the Malayan Campaign produced by the Principles of rapid decision cycle permeated the way that German soldiers War podcast.) fought, thought, and taught for more than a hundred years. The existence of this cornucopia of concepts to contem- Thus, while the American, British, and French practitioners plate, examples to explore, and paragons to imitate raises of maneuver warfare often waged war in ways that put them the question of whether maneuver-minded Marines of the Information Age need bother at all with the study of German military history. At the very least, those seeking to encourage Marines to devote their precious professional development There is no doubt that, during both time to the exploration of the German military tradition world wars, members of the German will not only have to produce persuasive arguments in favor of this choice but will have to deal with a pair of powerful armed forces, acting in their offi cial objections. capacities, violated laws of war that The simplest argument in favor of the continued study of the German tradition of maneuver warfare stems from the were then in force in a large number same wealth of sources and resources that enables the study of of ways. alternative models. In the years between 1979 and 2019, more than two thousand English-language books about various aspects of the German military experience were published. The same period saw the printing of hundreds of board wargames at odds with the cultures of the forces in which they served, and the creation of dozens of computer games that attempted German maneuverists could reasonably assume that they to replicate, in various ways, the tactical and operational were cooperating with superiors, subordinates, and peers characteristics of German forces. The existence of this body who shared their beliefs and biases. Because of this, Marines of work makes possible the detailed reconstruction of a wide attempting to imagine a force in which the practice of ma- variety of campaigns, battles, and engagements. At the same neuver warfare is the norm will fi nd more positive examples time, it facilitates the placement of such events in the broader of such organizational orthodoxy in the annals of German context of strategy, politics, and culture. military history than in the tales of mavericks, eccentrics, The availability of so much material about the German and doctrinal apostates.3 military tradition greatly reduces dependence upon the mem- A more powerful justifi cation for the retention of the link oirs of general offi cers that loomed so large in the early days between maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps and the of the maneuver warfare movement within the Marine Corps. German military tradition begins, paradoxically, with the Most of these suffered from the sort of defects so often seen two most common arguments offered by the opponents of in the genre of autobiography. That is, they were self-serving that enterprise. The fi rst reminds us of the large number of accounts that minimized mistakes made by the authors, war crimes committed by members of the German armed omitted information that would have been embarrassing, forces during those confl icts. The second rests fi rmly upon and placed the blame for fi ascos on third parties. The worst the incontrovertible fact that Germany lost both world wars. offender in this regard was Panzer Leader, in which Heinz There is no doubt that, during both world wars, members Guderian took far too much credit for the creation of German of the German armed forces, acting in their offi cial capacities, armored forces in the 1930s and, in doing so, painted the violated laws of war that were then in force in a large number man most responsible for that development, Ludwig Beck, of ways. These crimes included the invasion of neutral coun- as a hidebound reactionary. Thanks, however, to the work tries, the aerial bombardment of cities, the sinking of civilian of English-speaking historians, present-day Marines are in a ships, and the collective punishment of civilians. (Outrages

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 93 MANEUVERIST PAPERS

World War should prevent us from making use of the Ameri- can, British, and Soviet experience of that confl ict. Similarly, if connection to a reprehensible regime prevents a military tradition, institution, or personality from offering anything of value to present-day Marines, then we may study neither Soviet military theory nor the campaigns of the Red Army, let alone the memoirs of Georgi Zhukov. What is true for the question of war crimes also applies to the issue of ultimate defeat. If we limit ourselves to the study of the winners of various wars, then we deprive ourselves of the lessons that we might learn from the study of the achieve- ments of Hannibal, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Robert E. Lee—let alone the strategic contests that we ourselves have lost. What is worse, a one-sided study of history leads easily to the false assumption that everything done by the victors contributed to their eventual triumph and every act on the part of the losers drove another nail into their collective cof- fi n. In other words, it replaces attempts to make sense of the complex interplay of multiple forces with the unthinking embrace of all things, whether help or hindrance, associated with the side that achieved strategic success. Done well, the study of German military history necessarily produces a great deal of discomfort. Even if a Marine begins with a quest to learn about techniques, tactics, or campaign- ing, he cannot spend much time with the relevant sources The actions of the Nazis are indefensible, but the study of German without being reminded of fatal mistakes made in the realms military tradition was indispensable to the development of Warfi ght- of strategy, policy, and morality. Indeed, it is this “elephant ing. (Photo: National Archives.) in the room” that makes the study of the German military tradition so valuable to Marines of the 21st century. In the course of helping us learn the nuts-and-bolts of maneuver of the last types usually took place in the course of attempts warfare, it draws our attention towards the higher arts of war. to enforce one of the central tenets of the law of war of that era: the rule that civilians may not, under any circumstances, participate in combat.) In the Second World War, moreover, Notes German soldiers, sailors, and airmen served a regime that 1. Hanson W. Baldwin (1903–1991) had already written sixteen books engaged in the persecution of political dissidents, the mal- on subjects related to national defense and was well known to well-read treatment of prisoners of war, and a gargantuan, frequently Marines of the middle years of the last century. Between 1937 and 1980, murderous, campaign of ethnic cleansing. authors of articles published in the Marine Corps Gazette mentioned him As horrible as they were, the war crimes committed by 79 separate times. German servicemen in the course of the world wars were far from unique. The armed forces of the victors of the Second 2. For a sympathetic biography of Ludwig Beck, see Nicholas Reynolds, Treason Was No Crime, (London, UK: Kimber, 1976). For an account of World War invaded neutral countries, bombarded cities from the development of the German armored forces in the interwar period the air, sunk civilian ships, maltreated prisoners of war, and that gives considerable credit to Gen Beck, see Bruce Gudmundsson, On engaged in the collective punishment of civilian communi- Armor, (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2005.) ties. In addition to these things, they conducted campaigns of mass rape, looting, and indiscriminate murder against 3. The publicists for the memoirs of German generals published in the civilians they were obliged to protect. In addition to this, English-speaking world in the 1950s, chief of whom was Basil Henry Lid- they ensured the survival and, indeed, enabled the expansion dell Hart, took pains to present the authors of such works as nonconformist of the communist regime of the Soviet Union, the crimes of visionaries at odds with their superiors. This view, however, had less to which surpassed in quality, and greatly exceeded in quantity, do with German military culture than with the predilections of those those of National Socialist Germany. promoters and the prejudices of the readers they were trying to reach. The war crimes of the armed forces of the alliance that For a short treatment of this phenomenon, see Bruce I. Gudmundsson, review of Guderian: Panzer General, (Revised Edition, 2003) by Ken- won the Second World War does not, in any way, excuse neth Macksey, War in History, Volume 12 Number 4, (October 2005), those of their German counterpart. They do, however, pres- pp. 474–476. For a more extensive exploration, see, among others, John ent serious students of the art of war with a conundrum. If Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell German violations of the laws of war prevent us from study- University Press, 1988). ing German military history, then the war crimes committed by members of the Allied armed forces during the Second

94 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 INTRODUCTORY MUSKET & SABER QUICK PLAY WARGAMES AMERICAN REVOLUTION BATTLES First Saratoga: Burgoyne’s Gambit, 19 Sept 1777 ALL GAMES UNDER $20 EACH Germantown: Washington Strikes, 4 Oct 1777 NAPOLEONIC BATTLES The Mini Game Series from Decision Games provides a Saalfeld: 10 October 1806 variety of introductory games designed to be played in about an hour. The eras covered are: Ancient, 19th century, 19TH CENTURY BATTLES WWI, WWII, Modern, and Sci-Fi. Each game includes an Molino Del Rey: Gateway to Mexico City, 8 Sept 1847 11×17 inch map sheet, 40 counters, and a rules sheet. AMERICAN CIVIL WAR Some titles also include 18 mini cards. The series takes Chantilly: Jackson’s Missed Opportunity, 1 Sept 1862 only minutes to learn and once one game is played, players can immediately play other scenarios with the Salem Church: East of Chancellorsville, 3–4 May 1863 same standard rules. Some games come with cards that Mansfield: Crisis in the Pine Barrens, 8 April 1864 drive the action with various commands and events. Wilson's Creek: Opening Round in the West, 10 Aug 1861 COLD WAR BLITZ Suez '56: Anglo-French Intervention Khe Sanh '68: Marines Under Siege SCI-FI Ceres: Operation Stolen Base Phobos Rising: Insurgency on Mars HAND OF DESTINY Khyber Rifles: Britannia in Afghanistan Custer’s Final Campaign: 7th Cavalry at Little Bighorn Lettow-Vorbeck: East Africa 1914–18 Khartoum: Sudan, 1883–1885 ANCIENT WARS Caesar’s War: The Conquest of Gaul, 58–52 BC Belisarius's War: Roman Reconquest of Africa, AD 533–534 Hawaii, 1795: Kamehameha’s War of Unification Campaigns of Montrose: A Year of Living Dangerously, 1644–45 AIR WARS Eagle Day: The Battle of Britain Cactus Air Force: Air War Over the Solomons MiG Alley: Air War Over Korea, 1951 Red Eagles: Air War Over the Kuban Peninsula, 1943 COMMANDO/RAIDER Congo Merc: The Congo, 1964 Border War: Angola Raiders Long Range Desert Group: Special Operations SPECIAL OFFER FOR MARINES: Against Rommel, 1941–42 DECISIONGAMES.COM/WPSITE/MCAF Merrill's Marauders: Commandos in Burma, 1943–44 Viking: Scourge of the North Rogers’ Rangers: America’s First Commandos Lawrence of Arabia: The Arab Revolt 1917–18 Heroes of Telemark: Commando Raids in Norway, 1942–43 OBSERVATION POST Urban Warfare Training Center

by Capt Michael A. Hanson

he Marine Corps currently operates two dedicated such as mechanical and explosive breaching. Previously, upon venues that specialize in preparing Marines for completion of the lane training events, the Exfor battalion Tcombat in a specifi c operational environment. These applied all of these lessons learned in a blank-fi re battalion are the Mountain Warfare Training Center in Cali- clear of a portion of Range 220 against a dedicated opposing fornia and the Jungle Warfare Training Center in Okinawa. force. This FEX was based on Operation PHANTOM FURY, Both were borne out of the painful experiences of Korea and the iconic battle in the Iraq War when Marines stormed the Vietnam, and they seek to prepare Marines to operate and insurgent stronghold of Fallujah. In January 2019, the Urban succeed in these challenging environments without having to FEX was replaced by the force-on-force exercise. Finally, the relearn the harsh lessons of those wars. However, does such a urban program at ITX culminates with a company live fi re venue exist for one of the most challenging and unforgiving clear of Range 230, where Marines use explosives to breach operational settings that Marines are likely to deploy to: the doors and engage targets as little as fi ve meters away. Alto- complex environment of a large city? Interestingly, a decade gether, it is a very effective and important training package after many of the hard lessons learned in the sprawling urban compressed into a period of about fi ve non-consecutive days jungles of Iraq, the Marine Corps does not operate a training with easily recognizable tangible benefi ts. venue solely dedicated to urban warfare. The Marine Corps does possess a superb setting for such at the Urban Warfare Training Center in Twentynine Palms, CA, but this refers specifi cally to the Range 220 MOUT facility rather than a ... one of the most common, and most dedicated urban warfare training center with an instructor valid, after action points of ITX is that cadre that specializes in tactics, techniques, and procedures unique to combat in a city. there are too many events and not Currently, the closest thing to this in the Marine Corps is enough time to complete them. There the Urban Section with the Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group (TTECG). These “Coyotes” split their time is also a school of thought within between supporting urban events and events on the con- the greater Marine Corps that TTECG ventional side of Integrated Training Exercise (ITX), such as Ranges 410A, 400, Fire Support Coordination Exercise, should only focus on conventional live the Air Assault Course, Mechanized Assault Course, and the Regimental Assault Course. In addition to all of these events fi re ... (and others), the Coyotes at TTECG operate a very effective and enlightening urban warfare program unlike anything else in the Marine Corps. However, one of the most common, and most valid, after This training package begins with range walks for com- action points of ITX is that there are too many events and manders and staffs and classroom instruction for platoon not enough time to complete them. There is also a school and squad leaders on topics such as infantry patrolling, tank/ of thought within the greater Marine Corps that TTECG infantry integration, urban assault/clearing, IEDs, sUAS, and should only focus on conventional live fi re, as in the days tunnel clearing. Next, the Exercise Force (EXFOR) Marines of Combined Arms Exercise. It was this thinking that led apply this material in three days of squad- and platoon-level TTECG to drop the urban program after the conclusion lane training that focuses on all of these topics and others, of the Enhanced MOJAVE VIPER exercises—only to bring it back about two years later. This was after much of the in- stitutional knowledge left the control group, causing a long >Capt Hanson reported to Tactical Training Exercise Control Group at Twentynine Palms, CA, in October 2017. He is cur- and strenuous effort to rebuild the program and regain that rently assigned as an Infantry Instructor and was promoted wisdom. TTECG has worked very hard to redevelop the to his current rank in June of 2018. urban program essentially from scratch and has succeeded in the last six years in rebuilding a solid program, but once

96 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 again, talk has returned of eliminating the urban program excellence and epicenter of wisdom in a certain operational at ITX in favor of other events. The other events at ITX are environment. fantastic, therefore, it is time to create a separate Service The value of an UWTC with a dedicated training cadre Level Training Exercise Venue—the Urban Warfare Training is apparent for all to see. Sadly, only a decade after Marine Center (UWTC). units concluded combat operations in what was predominantly Though this may sound like a daunting task, it would an urban war in Iraq, the profi ciency of Marines in military actually be quite simple to institute. Much of the exercise operations in urban terrain is woefully inadequate. In fact, it design and knowledge of events already exists at TTECG, is disheartening after all of the blood that was shed and tough so most of the core material for such a training venue could lessons learned. Despite this, the Marine Corps continues simply be transferred. The UWTC could just take the ex- to operate only an interim solution with the addition of an isting urban events from ITX and learn from the Coyotes urban program to an organization that previously focused how to execute them. Many benefi ts would come from this solely on live fi re events in open terrain. As evidence of how reorganization. First, TTECG would have more time to important this program is, when it was last disbanded, it was focus on the conventional live fi re events that it is famous quickly resurrected. Further evidence can be found in ITX for. Secondly, the UWTC cadre would be able to take the after-action reports where units often cite the growth they urban program developed by TTECG even further and add achieved in urban events and ask for more urban training. more events to its own training schedule, such as company- The time has come to establish a service-level training level lanes and the legacy battalion Urban FEX. Thirdly, venue that focuses solely on preparing units for combat in the units coming through both control groups would benefi t large cities. Perhaps if the Marine Corps had done this after by being able to focus more acutely on the type of events Hue City, then Fallujah and Ramadi would not have cost so featured by each control group. Lastly, the Marine Corps much in blood. would benefi t by having another SLTE producing center of

Call For Papers Prizes Winning Essay in Each Category Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps Association & Foundation • Cash award and plaque provided by the are pleased to announce a call for papers for the annual President’s Marine Corps Association & Foundation Lecture Series essay contest. This year’s lecture series is entitled “Great • Publication in Leatherneck, Marine Corps Power Competition,” and the associated essay contest challenges Gazette, or Marine Corps History participants to consider how leaders might respond to the security • Recognized at a Marine Corps University challenges posed by the reemergence of great power competition. Lecture Series Event Two Honorable Mentions in Each Category with a cash award provided by the Marine Essay Topic Corps Association & Foundation.

How might the tenets of Maneuver Warfare Contest Categories and Eligibility inform the Nation’s approach in responding to the Active Duty and Reserve E5 & Below Active Duty and Reserve E6 & Above reemergence of great power competition? Active Duty and Reserve O3 & Below Active Duty and Reserve O4 & Above

Essays should be at least 1500 but no more than 3000 words in length. Essays are due by 12 February 2021 and must be submitted via email to Ms. Angela Anderson, Director, Marine Corps University Press at angela.anderson@usmcu. edu. Winners will be announced in April 2021.

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 97 Books Twilight of the Gods

reviewed by Col Eric L. Chase, USMCR(Ret)

he final volume of Ian W. Toll’s Pacific War trilogy, >Col Chase, an attorney in private Twilight of the Gods: War in practice in New Jersey, served as T an Infantry Platoon Commander in the Western Pacific, 1944– will captivate military history Vietnam, and retired from the Ma- 1945, rine Corps Reserve in 1998 after experts, World War II aficionados, more than 30 years of active and and those who savor brilliantly spun reserve service. His father, the late TWILIGHT OF THE GODS: War war histories. The completed trilogy MajGen Harold W. Chase, served places Toll as the most authoritative, in the Western Pacific, 1944– as a first lieutenant on , 1945. By Ian Toll. New York, NY: accessible, and thoroughly readable where he was twice wounded. historian of what was, chiefly, Amer- W.W. Norton & Company, 2020. ica’s war with Japan. In scope, time- ISBN: 978-0393080650, 926 pp. frame, and style, it compares with and Nagasaki (6 and 9 August 1945) Pulitzer winner Rick Atkinson’s The and the formal surrender aboard the Liberation Trilog y —three volumes USS Missouri on 2 September 1945. spanning the war from North Africa Worth the wait, Toll’s trilogy now not about to surrender in 1944, even to the Mediterranean and Europe. must rank first on any professional though U.S. airpower, naval strength, Toll’s opening note in Twilight reading list for the Pacific War as a manpower, and other advantages had explains how this concluding effort whole. advanced so far beyond enemy capa- extended far beyond his expectation bilities that any Japanese ship sent after completion of the second vol- to sea without air coverage became a ume: The Conquering Tide: War in The main action spans suicide mission. The advent of new the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944 (2015), American bombers (especially the which followed his first volume, Pa- mid-1944 to the sud- B-29 as of June 1944) and new fight- cific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, ers, limitless recruits and hundreds of 1941–1942 (2011). Twice delayed by den, abrupt end with war vessels, along with a deteriorated access to ever-expanding new research the dropping of atomic Japanese capability to wage war as- and detail, he says, sured American primacy on land, in [t]he war got very large in late 1944 bombs ... the air, and at sea throughout the final and 1945 … and I found that I could year of conflict in the Pacific. Add- not do justice to the story without giv- ing to Japan’s woes were the German ing it the additional time and space it Despite the horrific destruction surrender in May 1945 and the Soviet seemed to need. wrought by the sudden attack on Pearl commitment to turn its guns against Actually, readers may yearn for more Harbor on 7 December 1941, Ameri- Japan. coverage of land and sea battles, but ca’s industrial and military might left Toll adroitly navigates through Toll’s mission was not to supersede the little doubt about the eventual out- complex issues and events, and he many exhaustive histories of specific come. Beyond the blow to the Pacific writes with clarity, precision, and pas- engagements. fleet that day, however, there followed sion. Battle scenes will leave readers Although it is the longest of the more initial setbacks for the United breathless. From chapter to chapter, three volumes, Twilight spans fewer States. Gradually though, America’s the narrative moves mostly chronolog- months than either of the first two. early confidence was borne out. By ically from place to place, including The main action spans mid-1944 to mid-1944, Allied victory was just a not only land and sea combat arenas the sudden, abrupt end with the drop- question of time—albeit a painful and in the Pacific but also American and ping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima bloody time. The Japanese were still Japanese home venues and perspec-

98 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 Books

tives. The shifting focus often zeroes MacArthur presided over the South- ern island of Luzon? Would [Admiral] in upon individual actors, broad war west Pacific Area from his Australian Ernest King win his case for seizing strategies and narrow tactics of the headquarters after his February 1942 Formosa? Should the Americans land belligerents, mistakes made, and suc- rescue from besieged Corregidor, while on the coast of mainland China—and cesses achieved—always at an exact- Nimitz ran the Pacific Fleet from his if so, would that lead to a wider di- ing pace and at a steep price of men, Pearl Harbor headquarters and later rect involvement of U.S. forces in the ships, and aircraft. from Guam. These two 4-then-5-star Sino-Japanese war? More broadly, what Well-painted vignettes of home- officers offer stark contrasts in style, was to be the endgame against Japan? fronts in the United States and Japan leadership, personality, and strategic Could Japan be persuaded to accept help illustrate how and why each side thinking. They could not have been terms of surrender prior to a bloody made its grand strategy choices. Be- more dissimilar. invasion? What role might Hirohito, the Showa emperor, play in the war’s fore the period covered by Twilight, Fierce internal debates, occasion- final act? These were complicated Japan’s war had already foundered ally vicious, over operational strategy and immensely important decisions, into hopelessness. Nevertheless, its sometimes led to Washington’s inter- and they could not be postponed in- leaders habitually lied to warfighting vention. Even then, bitterness could definitely. Nor could the presidential personnel, to the public, and to each simmer—especially when MacArthur election calendar be moved; come hell other about invented victories and fu- ture prospects. A compliant, govern- ment-controlled media followed suit and fed a constant flow of fiction to With the suffocating nature of fighting in the tropics, the citizenry. Japan’s imperial military the author’s compelling descriptions personify end- leadership persisted beyond reason, and its people endured hardship and less danger, terror, and dread amidst a backdrop of to the point of senselessness. heat, rain, and disease. American decision makers, includ- ing President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his military and civilian advisors, heatedly debated overall strategies and did not get his way. From the begin- or high water, the voters would go to priorities—amongst themselves and ning, MacArthur emerges as a man of the polls on the first Tuesday in No- with their theater commanders. In both towering ability and accomplish- vember. Inevitably, the big strategic Twilight’s first chapter, Toll describes ment, and as a self-absorbed, dishonest issues looming in the Pacific would be the “July 1944 summit in Hawaii,” self-promoter. His historical connec- decided in a political season—and they attended by Roosevelt, MacArthur, tion with the Philippines clouded and would be viewed through the prism of drove his judgment. His father had politics, by contemporaries at the time Admiral Chester Nimitz, and the flag and by historians ever since. officers who were the president’s chief been Governor General of the Phil- war advisors in Washington. ippines, and MacArthur followed in As in the first two volumes cover- Throughout the conference, op- his father’s footsteps when he became ing 1941 to mid-1944, Toll details in tions both big and small seemed almost Field Marshal of the Philippine Army. Twilight American preparations for unlimited, and decisions frequently Before coming off his retirement from and anticipation of the many naval were arbitrary. America’s military and the Army and back to a command engagements and island battles that civilian leaders sometimes differed assignment, he accepted a payment fill the narrative from mid-1944 to mightily in America’s prosecution of of $500,000 from the Philippine the end. Among others, these include the Pacific War. In particular, GEN government—a present day equiva- Leyte Gulf and Leyte (the island), Douglas MacArthur obsessed over his lent of $8 million. When Dwight D. Luzon, Manila, Formosa, Peleliu, Iwo promised “return” to the Philippines, Eisenhower, who had worked under Jima, and Okinawa. In the “island and he vigorously pressed his points of MacArthur, was also offered a (lesser) hopping” strategy, many islands were view—dismissing contrary opinions payment, he refused it. “bypassed,” leaving Japanese occupi- and those who proffered them. For all Twilight’s long prologue introduc- ers to fester without any fight. the years of World War II, he steamed es some of the most pressing politi- On land and at sea, Toll rivets read- about the “Europe First” policy em- cal and military tensions of the final ers with powerful combat scenes. With braced by Roosevelt and made his re- months of World War II in the Pacific. the suffocating nature of fighting in sentment known to Washington. Toll establishes: the tropics, the author’s compelling Unlike Europe, where GEN Fundamental questions of grand descriptions personify endless danger, Dwight D. Eisenhower became the strategy remained unresolved in the terror, and dread amidst a backdrop of Supreme Allied Commander, the Pa- Pacific. Would MacArthur be given heat, rain, and disease. Hand-to-hand cific War’s American split military the green light to liberate all of the combat, including bayonet and knife leadership sowed command discord. Philippines, including the main north- fighting, became nightly apprehen-

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 99 Books

sions and occurrences as Japanese in- and operations as its hopes for any support of the Okinawa campaign (26 filtrated Marines’ lines or threatened positive end fell apart. After the Battle March–2 July 1945), the kamikaze to do so. The amphibious operations of Midway, 4–7 June 1942, almost no threat was front and center, night and and island warfare that shaped the one saw any likelihood of a Japanese day, with no abatement in the reality fates of Marines and their Japanese victory. Nevertheless, although often of the danger to American men and foes were especially fierce, challeng- at each other’s throats, the Imperial ships. ing, and dangerous. Toll’s portrayal Army and Navy fought on with grit, For naval personnel at sea and for of Marines on Peleliu explains why determination, and feigned optimism. combatants ashore, Okinawa exacted so many Pacific war combatants suf- Suicide missions became prominent in the highest casualty rate of all the is- fered from mental fatigue, a precursor the war’s last year. Toll wrestles with lands. The civilian population, too, of what is now diagnosed as post-trau- the question of how a nation could was devastated. As with Peleliu and matic stress disorder (PTSD): justify continued bloodletting in such Iwo Jima, Japanese commands were Marines who had fought on multiple hopeless circumstances—sacrificing now more adept at defending and kill- Pacific island battlefields agreed that thousands of young lives, with no ing than they had been in the earlier Peleliu was the worst. The pitiless prospect of a favorable outcome. He ra- era of suicidal, wasteful bonsai charges equatorial sun beat down on a lifeless tionalizes the kamikaze spirit, as wild and defenses against amphibious forc- moonscape of ivory-colored coral rock, and sacrificial as it was, as follows: es as they landed. Well-entrenched and temperatures routinely surpassed For the nine remaining months of war units, underground and in caves, im- 110 degrees. After three days on the to come, this was to be Japan’s guid- posed significant prices in blood from line, the men looked like wraiths: ing strategic vision: to display to the Marines and soldiers for every yard of lips blistered, hair matted, coral dust Americans the full force and fury of island gained. The time to pacify Iwo caked on unshaven faces. Sweat ran their Yamato spirit. A nation willing Jima and then Okinawa took consid- into their eyes, which already ached to turn its young men into guided mis- erably longer than any U.S. planners from the glare of the sun. The acrid siles was a nation that would fight to foresaw. smell and biting taste of cordite stung the last man, woman, and child—and Japanese planning left no doubt: their noses and throats. Their hands a nation willing to fight on such terms Had there been post-Okinawan U.S. were raw and abraded from crawling could not be conquered. If the Japa- invasions into the Japanese homeland, on the rocks. No one could escape nese raised the stakes high enough, the kamikaze missions were to become the all-pervading stench of putrefying Americans would flinch. Their leaders, primary weapons in Japanese strategic bodies, rotting rations, and their own beholden to American voters, lacked thinking. By then, its offensive com- excrement. Clouds of large greenish- the stomach to fight to the point of bat operations and options were vir- blue flies fed off the unburied dead and civilizational annihilation. Perhaps the tually nil. While American industry tormented the living. Sudden torrential Pacific War was already lost; in pri- rainstorms came in the late afternoon, provided endless firepower in aircraft, vate councils, among themselves, the warships and manpower, Japan’s fight- and sometimes at night. There was no junta’s leaders were increasingly willing escape from the relentless artillery and to admit it. But there was a difference ing capability had disintegrated across mortar barrages. Even among those between defeat and surrender, between the spectrum. who were not directly injured by the losing an overseas empire and seeing Thus, as American commanders blasts, the accumulating concussions the homeland overrun by a barbarian prepared for the presumed inevitable sapped their strength and spirit. At army. The man-guided missiles were landings on Japan’s mainland, casu- times the roar and thud of artillery never a realistic bid for victory, but alty estimates for friendly forces were continued from dusk to dawn, making rather a talisman to ward off the hor- horrific. Planning forecasts of civilian it difficult to get a wink of sleep— ror of total defeat. Even if the official and enemy casualties were in the mil- but a man who was exhausted enough propaganda would not yet admit it, the lions. The Japanese continued a stated could sleep even under the muzzles battle for the sacred islands of Japan policy of self-destructive bravado, say- of a 155mm howitzer, which made a had already begun, and the kamikazes ing they would rather sacrifice tens sound … “commensurate to having a were its first line of defense. of millions of their people than sur- subway tunnel running between your Thousands of inexperienced Japa- render. The Pacific War, it appeared, ears.” When the guns paused, the ma- nese pilots trained briefly for one-way would perhaps continue into 1946, rines could hear wounded and dying suicide missions to crash into Ameri- 1947, or even beyond. Japanese crying out in the night. Often can ships. Most fliers never made it to Seen in these perspectives, new they cried out for their mothers, as did their target, but those that did took President Harry S. Truman’s deci- dying men of all races. huge tolls. Kamikaze missions sank sion to deliver the first atomic bomb More than most retrospectives on or disabled numerous ships and killed on 6 August 1945 was not surprising. the Pacific War, Twilight focuses on thousands of Sailors. Nor was the The development and making of the the Japanese kamikaze phenomenon, tactic limited to airplanes. Boats and weapon (the Manhattan Project) was which expanded in 1945 into a central individual divers targeted warships as a highly secretive years-long venture, strategic theme in Japan’s planning well. For American naval vessels in and even President Truman knew lit-

100 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 Books

tle about it before Roosevelt’s passing and Admiral William “Bull” Halsey, monstrably faulty decisions of both on 12 April 1945. Truman anguished characterizing both men, in spite of MacArthur and Halsey would have over the casualty counts on Iwo and their formidable strengths, as vain, compelled their relief. In MacArthur’s Okinawa. He faced a realistic prospect shallow, self-absorbed, and egocen- case, such a fate did await him in 1951 of 1,000,000 U.S. casualties in taking tric—sometimes to the detriment of during the Korean War, long after and occupying mainland Japan. their missions and the men they led. World War II, when Truman relieved In 1945, hundreds of U.S. Army MacArthur was a “confabulator,” him for insubordination. Air Force bombing runs using con- says Toll, and he marshalls proof of Twilight is a worthy and commend- ventional bombs against Japanese cit- the general’s habitual dishonesty and able finish to Toll’s magisterial three ies had exacted, through fire storms, self-promotion. Both MacArthur and volume Pacific War treatise. He draws a toll in people and mostly wooden Halsey ascended to five-star rank in plentifully from Samuel Eliott Morri- structures that greatly exceeded the December 1944, along with the other son’s incomparable 15-volume History monumental destruction and num- six to reach that rank in World War II of the United States’ Naval Operations bers of deaths (mostly civilian) caused (Gens George Marshall, Eisenhower, in World War II. Morrison’s classic by the atomic bombs dropped on Hi- and, Henry “Hap” Arnold, and Admi- work, however, is a hard slog, not just because of its length but also because of a scope that spans across the Atlan- Every American war college and every university tic to North Africa, the Mediterra- nean, and Europe. Moreover, decades leadership program should include Toll’s Pacific War after the publication of Morrison’s trilogy as an indispensable platform to illustrate and final volumes, innumerable new facts have come to light, and Toll’s render- instill the need for, and advantage of, humility and ing is fully as fresh as it is authorita- perspective in high leadership. tive. Pacific War sources abound, and Toll is generous in appropriately weav- ing a few citations from others into the narrative along with his own graceful roshima and Nagasaki. As Toll relates rals William D. Leahy, Ernest King, and captivating writing. For example, in the waning pages of Twilight, there and Chester Nimitz). GEN Omar in sections covering Peleliu and Oki- was significant Japanese military op- Bradley received his fifth star years nawa, he quotes liberally from Marine position to surrendering after the Hi- later in 1950. Eugene Sledge’s classic With the Old roshima devastation. Such resistance In volume I, Toll had already de- Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa. continued even after the Nagasaki scribed briefly the disastrous lack of Twilight serves as a compendium of detonation three days later. preparation and response by MacAr- lessons in leadership—especially for For many wearing the Japanese thur’s forces at Clark Field in the Phil- military leadership but also for other uniform at the highest levels, death ippines where, mere hours after the endeavors. MacArthur and Halsey was infinitely preferable to the humili- 7 December 1941 air attack on Pearl were certainly men of proven talent, ating dishonor of capitulation. It took Harbor, the Japanese nearly wiped out personal courage, and strategic sense. an unprecedented intervention by a huge parked U.S. air contingent. In Yet, in innumerable instances, their Emperor Hirohito to overcome the re- Twilight, Toll revisits that catastrophe personal failings dominated them, sistance against yielding to the Allied and seems convinced that MacArthur unleashing unnecessary and untold demands for unconditional surrender could, and should, have been relieved harm. Every American war college delineated in the Potsdam Declaration at that time. “Although the truth and every university leadership pro- of 26 July 1945. Even after Hiroshito’s would not come out until years later, gram should include Toll’s Pacific War announcement on 15 August, some MacArthur’s conduct on the first day trilogy as an indispensable platform to holdouts tried to resist the surrender of the war had been at least as cul- illustrate and instill the need for, and decision. The only “concession” was to pable as that of [Admiral Husband advantage of, humility and perspec- allow the Imperial house to survive. E.] Kimmel and [General Walter C.] tive in high leadership. More so than in volumes I and II, Short,” who were in command posi- throughout Twilight, Toll renders his tions on Pearl Harbor on 7 December own opinions on tactics and strategy, 1941. Both Kimmel and Short were and especially on the conduct of op- “reduced in rank, forced to retire, erational leaders. He assesses personal and run through a gauntlet of nine and leadership fallibilities of major largely redundant investigations.” Toll commanders of both American and establishes a running theme, suggest- Japanese forces. Most prominently, ing that, but for their hugely popular however, he lambastes MacArthur public personas, the flaws and de-

Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 101 BOOKS

For Further Reading

THE IWO ALAMO. By J. John Poole. Emerald Isle, NC: Posterity Press, 2020. ISBN: 978-0-9638695-0-0, 320 pp.

reviewed by LtCol K.A. Knowles, USMC(Ret)

Your CO has been conducting a PME series that has focused on battles during World War II. Your unit has studied Guadalca- nal, Bougainville, Tinian, and Saipan, among others. Today, you were given the next battle to be studied. The CO has also indi- cated that a professor from a local college, whose fi eld of study is World War II, will be presenting a short lecture to set the stage for the PME discussion. The battle to be studied is Iwo Jima. What is the fi rst image that entered your mind when the PME topic was announced? Invariably, that image for Marines is the fl ag raising on Mount Suribachi. All other actions during that battle fade as that snapshot event dominates our thoughts; an event that happened on the fi fth day of a battle that lasted for 36 days. H. John Poole, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel, provides the reader with an in-depth and detailed analysis of this battle. His stated purpose is to challenge the reader to “try to imagine how current GIs would fare at the Iwo Jima of 1945.” The author begins by giving us a detailed description of the Japanese defensive preparations. From the natural beach obstacle—loose volcanic sand—that made rapid movement slow and tedious to the ex- tensive excavation and development of strong point positions built around a central pillbox, LtCol Poole gives the reader an appreciation of how the Japanese intended to defend Iwo. His study of this battle in- cludes an analysis of who the enemy was, the enemy’s dedication to his cause and willingness to fi ght regardless of circumstances. From the maps that show U.S. estimates of the situation and defensive line locations to the cut away drawings that provide the reader an idea of the extensive array of tunnels and underground support system utilized by Japanese forces during the battle, the reader will gain a better understanding of the enemy faced by the U.S. landing force. Throughout his writings, the author has demonstrated his ardent advocacy and support for the well- trained individual infantryman, small unit tactics, and the initiative demonstrated by junior Marines and NCO leadership. This book is no different. As Marines, we are familiar with the names of Harold Schrier, Ira Hayes, and Michael Strank. In The Iwo Alamo, we are introduced to the names of other Marines whose bravery under fi re may not be as familiar to us, such as Merritt Savage, Conrad Shaker, or Tony Stein and their heroic actions during the fi rst day of the battle. This was a battle that lasted 36 days, and Marines like Ray Wilson Jr., Franklin Sigler, and Frank Palmer clearly demonstrated that “uncommon valor was a com- mon virtue.” I recommend this book to Marines for the detailed descriptions provided of how a future enemy might prepare defensive positions and how important it will be to understand the enemy we are facing. If there is one drawback to the book, it needs to be re-edited before going into a second publishing.

102 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • January 2021 Bait

reviewed by Col Andrew R. Finlayson

his book is one of those rare historical narratives that ex- >Col Finlayson served as an infan- Tplains in rich detail a battle try officer with 32 months of combat that was little understood or experience during the Vietnam War reported on at the time it was fought and has written two books about but was of strategic importance and that experience and many articles heroic dimension. It is the story of the on military subjects—to include courageous defense of an isolated U.S. several award-winning articles special forces camp called Kham Duc and monographs. in 1968 at the height of the Vietnam War. The authors of this book are both Vietnam War veterans, and one gin between the United States and was a key participant of the battle and the North Vietnamese in Paris. Seek- BAIT: The Battle of Kham Duc. in a position to observe the deadly en- ing to strengthen their negotiating By James McLeroy. Philadel- counter from beginning to end. James position by achieving a decisive mili- phia, PA: Casemate Publishers, McLeroy’s firsthand recollections add tary victory over the Americans, the 2019. keen insights into many aspects of North Vietnamese decided to follow ISBN: 978-1612008127, 272 pp. the battle that have been missing in the play book they had used at Dien previous accounts. Both authors have Bien Phu in 1954 and at Khe Sanh thoroughly researched the battle us- during Tet in early 1968 by seeking to ing American and North Vietnam- attack and destroy an isolated outpost. attackers—thus the title of the book ese documents along with numerous BAIT. interviews with the men who fought Of note to Marines, in a prelimi- this battle. The result is a book that ... the North Vietnam- nary attack on an outpost near Kham explains in great detail the American Duc at a place called Ngok Tavak, two and North Vietnamese strategies that ese decided to follow Marines in an attached artillery pla- produced the battle, its conduct, and the play book they had toon received the Navy Cross for their its aftermath. heroism in fighting off that attack. Because the Battle of Kham Duc used at Dien Bien Phu McLeroy and Sanders explain in was fought at a time when press in- in 1954 and at Khe Sanh vivid detail the preparations for the terest was focused on events in other battle by both antagonists, to include regions of South Vietnam, the he- during Tet in early 1968 extensive analysis of the training and roic stand at Kham Duc was given equipment each side had and the re- a cursory treatment by American by seeking to attack spective orders of battle. They also journalists, and the nonfactual ver- and destroy an isolated provide excellent and never seen be- sion of the battle propagated by sub- fore photos of the camp, as well as sequent historians has become part outpost. detailed graphics showing the orga- of the conventional narrative about nization of the camp’s defenses. Their this battle. The authors prove quite hour by harrowing hour of the defense conclusively that, contrary to press of the camp is riveting and graphic in reports at the time, the battle was They chose the special forces camp a prose style that is both easy to read not a victory for the communists but at Kham Duc for their target since and descriptive. actually an American tactical success it offered many advantages to them. This is a book that will appeal to and achieved the strategic objectives GEN Westmoreland was forewarned both the military professional and the established by the senior American of the attack and apparently intended public, but its greatest value will be to military leadership. to use the camp as bait so as to lure historians who seek the truth about The Battle of Kham Duc took the North Vietnamese into a trap us- this largely misunderstood battle of place in early May of 1968 at a time ing overwhelming air power to inflict the Vietnam War. when negotiations were about to be- heavy casualties on the communist

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