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Geophysical Methods to Detect Tunnelling at a Geological Repository Site Applicability in Safeguards

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Geophysical Methods to Detect Tunnelling at a Geological Repository Site Applicability in Safeguards #2008207/ APRIL 2021 Geophysical methods to detect tunnelling at a geological repository site Applicability in safeguards Heikkinen Eero (AFRY) Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report #2008207 Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation Heikkinen Eero (AFRY) April 6, 2021 Contents ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 PREFAFE ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 3 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................ 5 1.1 Nuclear safeguards to geological disposal ........................................................................................................ 5 1.2 Monitoring for long term nuclear safety ........................................................................................................... 9 1.3 Active geophysical surveys .................................................................................................................................. 10 1.4 Olkiluoto spent nuclear fuel repository .......................................................................................................... 13 2 Possibilities to detect an undeclared activity ........................................................................................................ 16 2.1 General ......................................................................................................................................................................... 16 2.2 Previous methodological considerations ....................................................................................................... 18 2.3 Capability of geophysical methods in safeguards ....................................................................................... 27 2.4 Places and timing of geophysical measurements for safeguards ......................................................... 29 3 Experiences from hard rock geophysical surveys ............................................................................................... 33 3.1 Ground penetrating radar and drillhole radar ............................................................................................ 33 3.1.1 GPR and drillhole radar surveys for Posiva and SKB ...................................................................... 38 3.1.2 Other types of environment and new GPR development .............................................................. 51 3.2 Seismic investigations ............................................................................................................................................ 53 3.2.1 Seismic surveys for Posiva and SKB ....................................................................................................... 58 3.2.2 Development in seismic survey techniques ........................................................................................ 77 3.3 Electrical measurements ...................................................................................................................................... 81 3.3.1 Electrical surveys carried out in Olkiluoto and in Äspö ................................................................. 84 4 Discussion .......................................................................................................................................................................... 105 5 Summary ............................................................................................................................................................................ 114 6 References ......................................................................................................................................................................... 118 Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report #2008207 1 (128) Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation Heikkinen Eero (AFRY) April 6, 2021 ABSTRACT Generating power with nuclear energy accumulates radioactive spent nuclear fuel, anticipated not to be diversified into any unknown purposes. Nuclear safeguards include bookkeeping of nuclear fuel inventories, frequent checking, and monitoring to confirm nuclear non-proliferation. Permanent isolation of radionuclides from biosphere by disposal challenges established practices, as opportunities for monitoring of individual fuel assemblies ceases. Different concepts for treatment and geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel exist. Spent nuclear fuel disposal facility is under construction in Olkiluoto in Southwest Finland. Posiva Oy has carried out multidisciplinary bedrock characterization of crystalline bedrock for siting and design of the facility. Site description involved compilation of geological models from investigations at surface level, from drillholes and from underground rock characterization facility ONKALO. Research focused on long term safety case (performance) of engineered and natural barriers in purpose to minimize risks of radionuclide release. Nuclear safeguards include several concepts. Containment and surveillance (C/S) are tracking presence of nuclear fuel through manufacturing, energy generation, cooling, transfer, and encapsulation. Continuity of knowledge (CoK) ensures traceability and non-diversion. Design information provided by the operator to the state and European Commission (Euratom), and further to IAEA describes spent nuclear fuel handling in the facility. Design information verification (DIV) using timely or unannounced inspections, provide credible assurance on absence of any ongoing undeclared activities within the disposal facility. Safeguards by design provide information applicable for the planning of safeguards measures, e.g., surveillance during operation of disposal facility. Probability of detection of an attempt to any undeclared intrusion into the repository containment needs to be high. Detection of such preparations after site closure would require long term monitoring or repeated geophysical measurements within or at proximity of the repository. Bedrock imaging (remote sensing, geophysical surveys) would serve for verifying declarations where applicable, or for characterization of surrounding rock mass to detect undeclared activities. ASTOR working group has considered ground penetrating radar (GPR) for DIV in underground constructed premises during operation. Seismic reflection survey and electrical or electromagnetic imaging may also apply. This report summarizes geophysical methods used in Olkiluoto, and some recent development, from which findings could be applied also for nuclear safeguards. In this report the geophysical source fields, involved physical properties, range of detection, resolution, survey geometries, and timing of measurements are reviewed for different survey methods. Useful interpretation of geophysical data may rely on comparison of results to declared repository layout, since independent understanding of the results may not be successful. Monitoring provided by an operator may enable alarm and localization of an undeclared activity in a cost-effective manner until closure of the site. Direct detection of constructed spaces, though possible, might require repeated effort, have difficulties to provide spatial coverage, and involve false positive alarms still requiring further inspection. Key words: spent nuclear fuel, disposal, nuclear safeguards, non-proliferation, containment, surveillance, design information verification, geophysical survey. Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report #2008207 2 (128) Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation Heikkinen Eero (AFRY) April 6, 2021 Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Report #2008207 3 (128) Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation Heikkinen Eero (AFRY) April 6, 2021 PREFAFE Detailed site investigations are needed to demonstrate the suitability of the site to be selected for a geological repository to dispose of spent nuclear fuel. The hydraulic impermeability of the hosting geological formation surrounding the repository is essential for the safety case. The impermeability may be jeopardized by inhomogeneities in the rock mass and in case of igneous rock by fractured zones with may have long extensions. While developing the site-specific geological repository for spent nuclear fuel, the performance of rock mass and engineered systems as containment and isolation barriers are to be considered during planning, design, construction, operating and closing of the repository. The designers and rock engineering of a repository need site characterization data from different geophysical surveys, pilot drillholes ahead of tunnel front with related geophysical, geological, and hydrogeological investigations, and monitoring. Geophysical methods have developed and focused on the site-specific scientific and technical needs. Their role in safeguards have been under discussion during the development of IAEA safeguards approaches for geological disposal to detect undeclared activities. Geophysical methods have been proposed as design information verification measures as the rock engineering needs the understanding of the host geology and its impermeability. The exploratory works can provide sets of safeguards-relevant information, but
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