Applying NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis to Canadian Arctic Defence and Security 2020

Home , Lady Franklin Point, Rae River, Ungava Bay

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Applying NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis to Canadian Arctic Defence and Security 2020

FOREW0RD

FOREWORD

This report by the North American and Arc- policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged. This pol- tic Defence and Security Group (NAADSN) icy recognizes the need to enhance the applies NATO’s Strategic Foresight Analy- CAF’s presence in the region over the sis (SFA) 2017 Report, created to support long term by setting out the capability NATO leadership’s visualization of the investments that will give our armed future security environment, to Canada’s forces the mobility, reach, and foot- Arctic security environment in its interna- print required to project force across the tional, regional, and domestic contexts. region in ways that further our national Highlighting the rapid rate of change, interests. To be strong at home, we seek complexity, uncertainty, and interconnect- to defend the North and work with our edness, it reinforces the need for creative Arctic partners to plan and coordinate and systematic thinking so that the Cana- operations to enable defence, safety and dian Armed Forces (CAF) can anticipate security in this austere environment. potential threats to Canada and Canadian interests, act proactively to emerging chal- This report, like the 2017 NATO SFA lenges, and adapt with decisive military Report that inspires it, is not intended to capability across the spectrum of opera- predict the future but to suggest poten- tions to defend Canada, protect Canadian tial trajectories for several trends and interests and values, and contribute to highlight their implications for the Cana- global stability. dian Defence Team, its partners, and its allies. Not everyone will agree with all The Arctic, integral to Canada and an ave- of the observations, suggestions, and nue of approach to North America, neces- potentialities suggested in this docu- sitates defence across all domains enabled ment, but offering them in a transpar- by partnerships. The CAF must be pre- ent format is useful to invite deeper pared to counter hostile foreign state and reflection, discussion, and debate. By non-state actors, or respond anywhere in providing a foundation upon which our vast area of responsibility (AOR) if help to contemplate potential futures, this is requested, whether intervention for report seeks to propel future deliber- disaster relief, support in critical incidents ations beyond general descriptions of or for search and rescue in the region. well-documented trends and instead to encourage more coordinated strategies As the area’s strategic importance grows, to anticipate and respond to potential the Government of Canada continues to risks, seize opportunities, and develop increase its Arctic and northern footprint an appropriate mix of capabilities to in support of defence safety and security. respond to rapidly changing global and This effort is anchored in Canada’s defence Arctic environments.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Contents FOREWORD I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V INTRODUCTION IX

0.1 AIM IX 0.2 CONCEPT IX 0.3 OBJECTIVES XI 0.4 METHODOLOGY XI 0.5 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT XII 0.6 TERMINOLOGY XVIII 0.7 STRUCTURE XVIII CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FUTURE 1

1.1 GLOBAL CONTEXT: STRONG, SECURE, ENGAGED 2 1.2 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC: TOWARDS A WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH 5 1.3 COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY 8 1.4 CONFLUENCE AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS 11 POLITICAL 15

2.1 SHIFTS IN GEOSTRATEGIC POWER 17 2.2 USE OF POWER POLITICS 19 2.3 DEVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE AND RECONCILIATION WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 23 2.4 NON-ARCTIC STATE AND NON-STATE ACTOR INFLUENCE IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 26 2.5 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 31 2.6 PUBLIC DISCONTENT/DISAFFECTION AND POLARIZATION 34 ENVIRONMENT 39

3.1 ENVIRONMENT 41 3.2 NATURAL DISASTERS 47 3.3 HUMAN-MADE DISASTERS 50 ECONOMICS AND RESOURCES 53

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 4.1 ARCTIC SHIPPING 54 4.2 RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 56 4.5 FISHERIES 62 HUMAN 65

5.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 67 5.2 SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND URBANIZATION 69 5.3 INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS 71 5.4 SOCIAL AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES 73 5.5 HUMAN NETWORKS AND INCREASING FRACTURED OR POLARIZED SOCIETY 76 TECHNOLOGY 81

6.1 RATE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENT 81 6.2 UNMANNED AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS (UAS) 84 6.3 THE DEPENDENCEY ON INDUSTRY TO PROVIDE TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ARCTIC 85 6.4 TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 86 6.5 TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 88 6.6 OVER-RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 89 CONCLUSIONS 93 ENDNOTES 95 APPENDIX A: ARCTIC THEMES, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS 97 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 104 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 114 IMAGE CREDITS 114

iii

2020 REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This NAADSN activity adopts in October 2020. Although COVID-19 the NATO Strategic Foresight Analy- constraints forced changes to planned sis (SFA) 2017 model to help frame a engagement activities and delayed conceptual model that anticipates and the release of the report, the process conveys an understanding of the future demonstrated the response capabilities Canadian Arctic security environment, of NAADSN to anticipate and identify and to assess the applicability of its emerging risks and threats to Canada findings to Canadian Arctic defence and analyze these risks. and security policy. Our goal is to assist the Defence Team, the Government of 3. Canada’s defence policy, Strong, Canada more generally, and academic Secure, Engaged, highlights three key stakeholders in testing assumptions, security trends that will continue to focusing future lines of research effort, shape events: the evolving balance of and developing coordinated strategies power, the changing nature of conflict, to anticipate and respond to potential and the rapid evolution of technol- risks, as well as taking advantage of ogy. These trends have a direct bear- opportunities that arise from a coming when contemplating future Arctic plex security environment out to 2035. security environments, vulnerabilities, and requirements. Like the 2017 NATO 2. This project succeeded in SFA, this report visualizes a future Arc- achieving the main objectives of tic security environment characterized NAADSN’s Understanding the Future by a rapid rate of change, complexity, Arctic Security Environment assess- uncertainty and interconnectedness. ment project, leveraging the exper- Most of the drivers and implications tise of the network team (members, identified in this report highlight “soft” postdoctoral and graduate fellows, security and safety challenges in the and student associates) in the draft- Arctic rather than “hard” military kinetic ing and review phases. A draft ver- threats to the Arctic, thus confirming sion was circulated to academic and the line of reasoning that has become government experts for feedback well entrenched in Canadian defence during the Advancing Collaboration planning over the last decade. in Canada-U.S. Arctic Regional Security (ACCUSARS) workshop, co-hosted with 4. This report retains the structure the Arctic Domain Awareness Center of the NATO SFA by organizing ideas (ADAC) in September 2020, and at a around main political, social, techno- series of small NAADSN virtual events logical, economic, and environmental

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT trends. While this proved relevant to assessing 7. Environment. Environmental and Arctic defence and security futures, partici- ecological changes in the Canadian Arc- pants in the project (both authors and review- tic are being driven predominantly by cli- ers of drafts) noted the limitations of a siloed mate change, which exacerbates emerging approach that can conceal the cross-cutting regional challenges. The likelihood and prev- nature of drivers and themes. Future work will alence of natural disasters is expected to further articulate the interaction of trends, increase, straining the capacities of all levels identify instability situations, and clarify impli- of government. Furthermore, the Canadian cations for defence and security practitioners. Arctic is at significant risk of human-made disasters that pose serious prospective chal- 5. Political. The resurgence of great lenges for Northerners and federal and terri- power competition, and particularly dynamics torial governments. related to Chinese and Russian interests and activities, poses new or renewed risks related 8. Economics and Resources. Ship- to strategic delivery systems passing through ping activity in and through the Canadian Arc- or over the Arctic to reach targets outside of tic is increasing in volume, and there are signs the region. It may also bring new threats to of future interest by foreign. If shipping in the or in the region, although these are likely to region becomes more economical, resources take non-kinetic forms. In a complex security will represent a more attractive develop- environment characterized by trans-regional, ment opportunity. Canada will require for- multi-domain, and multi-functional threats, eign partners and significant private sector Canada will continue to work with its allies to investment to address its Arctic infrastructure understand the broader effects of the return deficit, which raises concerns about foreign of major power competition to the interna actors‘ influence. Before COVID-19, tourism tional system and to regions like the Arctic, was on the rise throughout the circumpolar and what this means for Canadian defence world, ranging from large-scale cruise ships, relationships and partnerships. Canada’s full to sport fishing and hunting, to adventure contribution to continental defence efforts and eco expeditions, to cultural tourism. This to detect, deter, and defend against threats is likely to resume after a vaccine is widely in all domains to be determined, but its Arc- available, and an expanding tourism industry tic will inevitably factor heavily. Furthermore, increases the risk of human-made disasters Canada’s cooperation with other Arctic states and amplifies search and rescue and emer- and partners is likely to reflect more direct gency response requirements. Canada’s Arctic involvement of Northern territorial and Indig- and Northern Policy Framework also highlights enous governments and organizations. the idea of a conservation economy, which the federal government is slowly growing 6. A growing interest in Arctic affairs by in the Canadian Arctic in collaboration with non-Arctic state and non-state actors has sig- Northern Indigenous stakeholders. It is uncer- nificant implications for the evolving Arctic tain how climate change will impact the Arc- security environment. Regional governance tic’s fisheries over the next two decades, but systems will face pressures from heightened this has implications for food security, the international interest and strategic competi- enforcement of regulations, and political and tion, and the international legal regime will jurisdictional challenges. play a pivotal role in guiding state-to-state relations. Adversarial actors may also foment 9. Human. There is uneven popula- or amplify political polarization through social tion growth across Canada’s North, and this media and the spreading of disinformation or is expected to continue over the next fifteen “fake news,” which can undermine political years. Differences in population distributions and social cohesion. are likely to continue to strain resources, and youth disenfranchisement could worsen vi

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT health indicators, increase political instability, 11. In most analyses of the region, climate and lead to out-migration. The populations change and technological advancements of many smaller settlements are expected point to an increasingly accessible Arctic. to decline over the next two decades, while While sections of this report highlight how urban centres are expected to grow. Deficits limited infrastructure and geophysical con- in critical infrastructure keep communities ditions continue to constrain certain activi- isolated, inhibit the delivery of health and ties during certain times of the year (and will social services, and limit economic opportu- do so into the future), the global demand for nities. Northern and Indigenous communities resources, desire for efficient shipping routes, are particularly susceptible and vulnerable to tourism, and geostrategic position of the Cir- emerging health threats, and limitations or cumpolar North portend enhanced interest in interruptions to an already strained food sup- the region. Accordingly, strategic forecasters ply chain pose acute risks for Northern com- must situate the Canadian Arctic in global, munities. Furthermore, climate change poses regional, and domestic contexts to anticipate a growing threat to the health of Northern new challenges, promote effective adapta- populations. The amplification of socio-eco- tions to changing circumstances, and identify nomic, cultural, and political divisions may how the CAF should be trained and equipped become an unstable fault line as human to act decisively with effective military capa- networks in the Canadian Arctic continue to bility in concert with its allies. This includes evolve. Fractures in Northern Canadian soci- not just kinetic operations, but also being eties and between the North and South may prepared to respond effectively to safety and undermine existing governance systems, and security challenges such as search and res- while polarization between Canadians is likely cue and natural or human-created disasters. to erode social cohesion it is unlikely to pro- As this report demonstrates, anticipating and duce major societal disruption. addressing twenty-first century challenges requires a whole-of-society approach: coor- 10. Technology. Technology is expected to be a force multiplier and the single best dinated action that leverages the broad and predictor of deterrence in the future. Com- deep expertise and capacity of both the mod- munication challenges, gaps in situational ern state and civil society. awareness, and cyber threats will need to be 12. By encouraging experts to contem- addressed. plate a long-term perspective of the future Choke points for improvements in the Arctic Canadian Arctic security environment, we from a technological perspective are almost hope that the information consolidated in this wholly dependent on industry to see the report - and the future discussions stimulated cost-benefit of hours of research and produc- by it - contribute to the development of coor- tion. Technological development will have dinated strategies that mitigate potential risks positive and negative implications for the Arc- and seize opportunities arising in a dynamic, tic environment and must be considered in complex region. Furthermore, by comple- partnership with Northern stakeholders and menting a forthcoming NATO Regional Per- rightsholders. Advancements in technology spective Report on the Arctic and High North can also help to address Northern social and which identifies trends across the Circumpo- economic challenges and reduce regional lar North as a whole, this Canadian-centred disparities. Conversely, an increasing depen- report can serve as a foundation for com- dency on technology to conduct certain parison to discern common challenges and operations has led to an assumption that tech- opportunities facing Canada and its allies. nology can solve most problems, which could lead to inadequate government responses to social problems or create new vulnerabilities.

vii

2020 REPORT

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER The aim of the Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) The Arctic region represents an risk or threat levels. It is also designed 2017 Report is to important international crossroads to test the capabilities of NAADSN as a identify trends where issues of climate change, research network that can effectively that will shape the international trade, and global secu- and efficiently parcel out discrete work future strategic rity meet…. Arctic states have long packages to small teams, consolidate context and derive cooperated on economic, environ- findings, and produce timely, relevant implications for the mental, and safety issues, particu- results to Defence Team stakeholders. larly through the Arctic Council, the Alliance out to 2035 premier body for cooperation in and beyond. The SFA the region. All Arctic states have an 0.2 CONCEPT does not attempt to enduring interest in continuing this The MINDS Policy Challenges for 2020- predict the future, productive collaboration…. This rise 21 highlight how Canada’s defence pol- for the future is in [commercial, research, and tour- icy “values the ability to anticipate new neither predictable ism] activity will also bring increased challenges in order to better prepare nor predetermined. safety and security demands related for, and respond to, threats to Canadian It provides an to search and rescue and natural or defence and security.” By anticipating iterative assessment [humanitarian] disasters to which emerging threats and challenges, and of trends and their Canada must be ready to respond. better understanding the defence and Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017) implications to security environment, the Defence understand and Team can provide timely and relevant visualize the nature 0.1 AIM information to decision-makers, thus “allowing the Government to identify of the dynamic and The purpose of this NAADSN activity is and understand emerging issues, complex security to analyse and apply the NATO Strategic events and crises in the global security environment. Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2017 findings to environment, and to respond appropri- NATO SFA 2017 determine their applicability to Canadian ately and effectively.” Report, 11 Arctic defence and security policy and Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE), Cana- to help frame a conceptual model that da’s 2017 defence policy, emphasizes anticipates and conveys an understanding how trends in global economic devel- of the future Arctic security environment. opment are shifting the relative power This will assist NAADSN and the Defence of states from the West to the East and Team in creating indicators of changing

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT how major power competition has returned to the international system. “The Arctic is also becoming more relevant to the international community,” the white paper observes. With climate change “opening new access” to the region, “Arctic and non-Arctic states alike are looking to benefit from the potential economic opportunities associated with new resource development and transportation “Together the territories repre- routes.” Rather than promoting a narrative of inherent competition or impending conflict, sent a vast geographic area en- however, the narrative points out that “Arctic compassing 3.9 million square states have long cooperated on economic, kilometers. This accounts for environmental, and safety issues, particularly nearly 40% of Canada’s landmass through the Arctic Council, the premier body for cooperation in the region. All Arctic states and comprises a large part of the have an enduring interest in continuing this longest coastline in the world, productive collaboration.” This last sentence with tremendous untapped eco- suggests that Russia (described elsewhere in nomic opportunities including the policy document as a state “willing to test the international security environment” that unparalleled natural resource had reintroduced “a degree of major power development potential. The ter- competition”) does not inherently threaten ritories’ geographic expanse also Arctic stability given its vested interests in the region. Accordingly, the drivers of Arc- represent centuries of Indige- tic change cited in SSE emphasize the rise nous history, Canada’s northern of security and safety challenges in the Arc- identity and actual sovereign- tic rather than conventional defence threats ty in the Arctic, both at home to the Arctic, thus confirming the line of reasoning that has become well entrenched in and on the international stage.” defence planning over the last decade. Fur- thermore, it also highlights how international - Pan-Territorial Vision and Prin- threats may pass through the Arctic to reach ciples for Sustainable Develop- targets outside of the region. ment (2017) Are these assumptions correct? What do we anticipate being the emerging defence and security risks or threats in, to, and through the Canadian Arctic in the short-, medium- and long-term? We use NATO’s Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report as a baseline to address these general questions. This NATO report visualizes a future security environment characterized by a rapid rate of change, complexity, uncertainty and interconnectedness, offering military advice and informing alliance and national defence planning processes that are based on assessments of the long-term future. The x report highlights that:

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • polarization within and between SFA trends and Arctic defence and security states, power politics, and compe- implications across the various scales tition between major powers have (global, regional, national). Contributors increased the potential for instability were asked to identify key indicators that • state and non-state actors using might suggest changing risk or threat hybrid and cyber tools to impact levels in the defence and security domains. the security environment in the grey Where possible, the teams were also asked zone under the threshold of conflict to indicate potential time horizons. • other transnational challenges such as organized crime, climate change, and economic instability might fur- 0.3 OBJECTIVES ther deepen the uncertainty, dis- The objectives of NAADSN’s Understand- order and complexity that is now ing the Future Arctic Security Environment called the “new normal” assessment project were to: Rather than conducting a full strategic fore- • Plan and execute a collective sight exercise from the proverbial ground research project by leveraging up, I proposed that NAADSN members test the expertise of the network team the applicability of the SFA to the Canadian (members, postdoctoral and gradu- Arctic. Building upon a presentation that I ate fellows, and student associates). gave to the Arctic Security Working Group • Test the response capabilities of (ASWG) in Yellowknife, Northwest Territo- NAADSN to anticipate and identify ries, in November 2019, teams were asked emerging risks and threats to Can- to specifically analyze themes and trends ada, provide robust analysis of these across various levels of analysis: risks, and disseminate findings in a • Grand strategic threats to the inter- timely, concise, and conceptually national system with an Arctic nexus coherent way to the Defence Team. (thus best considered by start- • Produce a report on the applica- ing with general strategic analysis bility of NATO SFA trends to Arctic and then discerning if Arctic-spe- defence and security futures, with cific responses are required outside a goal of helping to develop coor- of broader defence and security dinated strategies to anticipate and postures) respond to potential risks, as well as • Circumpolar threats applying to the taking advantage of opportunities entire Arctic region (NATO) that arise from a rapidly changing, • Continental Arctic threats (eg. North complex security environment. American Arctic / NORAD; Euro- pean Arctic / NATO; Eurasian Arctic 0.4 METHODOLOGY / Russia) • Domestic Arctic threats (Canada) Small teams analyzed one theme described Although there is overlap between these in the 2017 NATO SFA (political, human, levels, we hoped that an attentiveness technology, economics/resources, and to the various scales may help to reduce environment) in detail. They then assessed analytical imprecision and conceptual the Arctic defence and security implica- sloppiness in this exercise. tions of their theme. Some teams chose to meet in person, while others convened by Teams were asked to produce a short teleconference or videoconference. Each narrative (akin to, and in some cases based team or a designated author then submit- upon, the NATO SFA theme chapters) ted a series of narrative paragraphs, akin to describing relationships between NATO the chapters in the SFA Report, describing xi

2020 REPORT the relationships between the trends and judgement, academic expertise and defence and security implications. Each of outcomes of workshops, and are not these draft documents was circulated to intended to be prescriptive or neces- elicit input, suggest other considerations sarily linked to any specific capability. or implications, and offer critiques. This final report offers a consolidation of the various recommendations. 0.5 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT Like the NATO SFA, this effort is “designed As an Arctic State with forty percent of its to be a regularly updated, collaborative landmass north of 60° latitude and 162,000 and transparent effort, which encour- km of Arctic coastline, Canada’s interest ages meaningful discourse and an open in the region is obvious. Its emphasis on exchange of ideas” that seeks to identify the human dimensions of the Arctic, and “a range of defence and security impli- particularly those related to the northern cations based upon current recognized Indigenous peoples, also reflect national trends likely to shape events in the fore- realities. Canada’s three northern territories seeable future out to 2035 and beyond.” are home to over 126,000 people, more It is not intended to be predictive, but to than half of whom are Aboriginal (Inuit, identify particular trends that might influ- First Nations, or Métis). Social indicators in ence future events and have implications Canada’s Indigenous North are abysmal, for Canada. As the NATO report explained: reflecting the challenges of providing social services and infrastructure to small, The SFA does not imply a particular isolated settlements spread out over a vast or specified future. This report pro- area. Northern Indigenous peoples face vides a balanced view of the future, many challenges associated with rapid describing challenges, but also iden- changes to their homelands, including tifying potential opportunities. It threats to language and culture, erosion is based on analysis of the past to of traditional support networks, poorer help the Alliance understand today health than the rest of Canadians, and as well as visualize the future, estab- changes to traditional diet and communal lishing a bridge between the two, food practices. These challenges represent thereby enabling NATO to adapt, Canada’s most acute Arctic imperative. ensuring it remains fit for purpose. The trends and implications iden- Canadian governments have recognized tified in this report are not simply and grappled with the challenge of important short-term events and balancing the needs of Northern Canadians issues of today; they are projected with economic development and to have relevance for the next two environmental protection for fifty years. decades, describing the future secu- Under Conservative Prime Minister Stephen rity environment. They are perti- Harper (2006-15), the balance seemed nent worldwide, to developed and to tip in favour of resource development developing regions and nations. The and hard-line messaging about defending implications are derived from trend sovereignty. A more careful reading reveals analysis using professional military that the federal government’s sovereignty- security rhetoric became more nuanced over time, reflecting an attempt The Defence Team uses the following planning horizons: to balance messaging that Horizon 1 – short term (1-5 years) – 2020-25 promised to “defend” Canada’s Arctic sovereignty (intended Horizon 2 – medium term (6-15 Years) – 2026-35 primarily for domestic audiences) xii Horizon 3 – long term (16-30 years) – 2036-50

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ANTICIPATING emerging threats and challenges is fundamental to Canada’s security. The Defence team will improve its ability to provide timely information to decision-makers, allowing the Government to identify and understand emerging events and crises, respond appropriately, and minimize the destructive effects of prolonged conflict. – DND,Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017)

xiii

2020 REPORT xiv

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT xv

2020 REPORT with a growing awareness that the most government’s Arctic and Northern Policy likely challenges were “soft” security- and Framework (ANPF), released in September safety- related issues that required “whole 2019, indicates a concerted emphasis on of government” responses.1 environmental conservation and improving the socio-cultural health of Northern Although the election of Justin Trudeau’s Indigenous peoples. The decision to link Liberal party in October 2015 represented the domestic and international dimen- a significant departure from the political sions of Canada’s Arctic and Northern strat- previous government’s approach, the main egy in a single policy framework reaffirms substantive elements of Canada’s Arctic the inter-connectivity between national, policy (which have remained remarkably regional, and global dynamics. consistent since the 1970s) have not fun- damentally changed. A domestic focus SSE confirms that the Arctic remains an on Indigenous rights, conservation, and area of particular interest and focus for the health and resiliency of Northern Canada’s Defence Team. The policy high- communities has been complemented lights the region’s cultural and economic by a renewed commitment to global cli- importance to Canada as well as its state mate change mitigation and the benefits of rapid environmental, economic, and of co-developing policy with Northern social change. While this change presents stakeholders and rightsholders. Through opportunities, it has also spawned new bilateral statements with President Barack defence, safety, and security, challenges. To Obama in 2016, Prime Minister Trudeau meet those challenges and “succeed in an offered a model for Arctic leadership that unpredictable and complex security envi- placed a clear priority on Indigenous and ronment,” SSE committed the country to “soft security” issues and abandoned the an ambitious program of naval construc- classic sovereignty-focused messaging tion, capacity enhancements, and tech- of his predecessor. Similarly, the federal nological upgrades to improve situational

CLIMATE CHANGE, COMBINED WITH ADVANCEMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY, IS LEADING TO AN INCREASINGLY ACCESSIBLE ARCTIC. A DECADE AGO, FEW STATES OR FIRMS HAD THE ABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE ARCTIC. TODAY, STATE AND COMMERCIAL ACTORS FROM AROUND THE WORLD SEEK TO SHARE IN THE LONGER TERM BENEFITS OF AN ACCESSIBLE ARCTIC – STRONG, SECURE, ENGAGED, 67

xvi

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT awareness, communications, and the abil- evolution of technology globally over the ity of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) last decade, National Defence recognizes to operate across the Arctic. How can and the need for new approaches to anticipate should the CAF work with partners to and confront threats and challenges in the address long-term challenges in the Cana- years ahead. To remain effective in a highly dian Arctic, including those posed by rapid dynamic, complex global and regional climate and environmental change? How environment, policymakers and planners should Canada prepare to meet shifting must develop mechanisms to continuously power dynamics associated with increased test their assessments, ideas, and assump- “militarization,” Chinese interest and activ- tions to ensure that they do not become ity, and Russian actions in the region? limiting or outdated. This logic underpins Should the Arctic be a region where Can- Strong, Secure, Engaged, which commits ada engages with ‘partners’ considered the CAF to: adversaries in other venues? Should Can- ada focus on threats in, to, or through the ANTICIPATE and better understand Arctic? How much attention and resources potential threats to Canada and Can- should NORAD and NATO dedicate to the adian interests so as to enhance our region, and what role should they play to ability to identify, prevent or prepare best serve the interests of Canada and its for, and respond to a wide range of allies? Beyond the military domain, what contingencies; emerging defence and security threats ADAPT proactively to emerging might Canada face in and to its Arctic over challenges by harnessing new tech- the next two decades? nologies, fostering a resilient work- The safety, security, and defence chap- force, and leveraging innovation, ter of the 2019 Arctic and Northern Policy knowledge, and new ways of doing Framework (ANPF) lays out the Govern- business ment of Canada’s objectives to ensure a ACT with decisive military capability safe, secure, and well-defended Arctic and across the spectrum of operations North through to 2030. “While Canada sees to defend Canada, protect Canadian no immediate threat in the Arctic and the interests and values, and contribute North, as the region’s physical environ- to global stability. ment changes, the circumpolar North is becoming an area of strategic international Major power competition, challenges to importance, with both Arctic and non-Arc- an increasingly fragile international order, tic states expressing a variety of economic and global shock wrought by the COVID- and military interests in the region,” the 19 pandemic invite reflections on what policy framework emphasizes. “As the Arc- assumptions in SSE should be revisited tic becomes more accessible, these states to ensure that the CAF is prepared and are poised to conduct research, transit capable of meeting Canada’s defence needs through, and engage in more trade in the now and into the future. As recent events region. Given the growing international in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya have revealed, interest and competition in the Arctic, con- state adversaries are taking actions tinued security and defence of Canada’s “below the threshold” of conventional Arctic requires effective safety and secu- kinetic warfare that could escalate into rity frameworks, national defence, and conventional, high-intensity war unless deterrence.” Canada and its allies discern proportionate ways to defend against and deter such Given the evolving balance of power, practices. The post-Cold War liberal changing nature of conflict, and rapid international system appears increasingly xvii

2020 REPORT vulnerable to stresses emanating from 0.6 TERMINOLOGY both within increasingly polarized liberal democratic states and from autocratic As per the NATO SFA 2017 report, we adopt regimes issuing explicit critiques of U.S. the following definitions: hegemony and Western worldviews. The THEME. A collection of similar or NATO SFA 2017 report observes that: related trends. The world is transforming in multi- TREND. A discernible pattern or a ple, yet connected, areas at an expo- specified direction of change. nential rate. Driven mostly by rapid changes in technology, the world IMPLICATION. A significant effect is becoming more interconnected. on the defence and security of one or As people communicate within and more NATO Nations that results from across national boundaries more one or more particular trends. than ever before, the events and decisions in one region influence the lives 0.7 STRUCTURE of others across the rest of world. Age- ing populations, with their attendant We have deliberately mirrored the structure health and pension costs, are gradu- of the NATO SFA 2017 report. The first ally straining social welfare systems chapter filters the general characteristics that are already stressed with mount- of the future suggested in that earlier ing public debt in both developed report through a Canadian lens, providing and developing economies. The an overview of what recent Canadian global power shift continues toward policy documents highlight as some core multi-polarity. While an information assumptions and drivers. The subsequent society is evolving globally and eco- chapters apply the principal themes nomic globalization is intensifying, framed in the SFA Report, seek to discern nationalist reactions and anti-global- main trends of Arctic change, and derive ization sentiments are also growing. potential defence and security implications Additionally, the effects of climate for Canada. We have re-ordered the change are more evident and per- chapters, which appear as follows: vasive than ever before. While these a. Political: Includes the re-distri- developments increase uncertainty bution of geostrategic power, and complexity, they present chal- challenges to governance, non- lenges to the capacity of individual state actor influence in domestic states to manage a mounting set of and international affairs, power interconnected problems. politics, public discontent and Accordingly, contemplating strategic disaffection, interconnected- futures in Canada’s Arctic requires ness, and polycentrism. attentiveness to global, circumpolar b. Environment: Includes climate regional, continental, and domestic drivers change, climate adaptation - across multiple themes and domains – and mitigation measures, water that could affect the CAF’s mission to make and food stresses, and natural Canada strong at home, secure in North and human-made disasters. America, and engaged in the world to promote peace and stability. xviii

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT c. Economics/Resources: Includes globalization of financial resources, geopolitical dimension of resources (rare earth elements, water, food, and energy), asymmetric change in defence expendi- tures, and increased global inequality. d. Human: Includes asymmetric demographic change, increasing urbanization, fractured and/or polarized societies, gender norms and relations, and increasingly connected human networks. e. Technology: Includes rate of technology advancement, access to technology, global network development, domi- nance of the commercial sector in technological development, and dependence on certain technologies.

xix

2020 REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE NATO 2017 SFA REPORT (EXCERPTS) 1. The Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2. The SFA is the initial phase of the 2017 Report … provides a wide-ranging ongoing Long-Term Military Transformation shared understanding of the future secu- (LTMT) efforts at Allied Command Transfor- rity environment. The SFA describes the mation (ACT) and sets the intellectual foun- future NATO expects to unfold to 2035 and dation for a follow-on report, the Framework beyond, depicted as political, social, tech- for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO). The nological, economic, and environmental FFAO looks into the interaction of trends, trends. Where trends may move in diverging identifies instability situations then devel- directions, an alternative view is provided to ops military implications. Together, the SFA maintain utmost objectivity. and FFAO are designed to improve the Alli- ance’s long-term perspective of the future security environment to support and inform the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), as well as other NATO and national processes that require an assessment of the long- term future.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 3. The confluence of several political, public discontent and increasing challenges to social, technological, economic, and envi- governance. ronmental trends is redefining the global a. The redistribution of economic and military security context. Some trends driven by power, most notably towards Asia, contin- technological innovation may offer oppor- ues to contribute to the relative decline of tunities to address global problems. But the West. The predominance of NATO and the confluence of trends has also created the West is likely to be increasingly chal- complexity, disorder and uncertainty that lenged by emerging and resurgent powers. are now called the new normal. Western b. Non-state actors, benign and malign alike, countries and institutions, such as NATO are expected to exert greater influence and the EU, can benefit from the informa- over national governments and interna- tion provided in the document to develop tional institutions. coordinated strategies in order to respond c. Power politics and competition between to potential risks, and take advantage of major powers may intensify, increasing opportunities that arise from this new the likelihood of confrontation and con- normal. flict in the future, thus highlighting the 4. Political. Fundamental changes importance of commitment to collective in the international security environ- defence. ment, driven by power transitions among d. Alternative global governance institu- states from West to East and power dif- tions, championed by emerging and resur- fusions from governments to non-state gent powers, are likely to challenge the actors worldwide, have created strategic existing international organization as they shocks resulting in increasing instabil- seek a voice in decision-making structures. ity within the post-Cold War world order. e. Public discontent has led to increasing These shocks have contributed to greater polarization between political and social groups, further eroding trust in governments and traditional institutions.

xxi

2020 REPORT 5. Human. Social trends that expose divergent ethical and will most profoundly shape the legal interpretations. future are asymmetric demographic b. Individuals, state actors and change, rapid urbanization and non-state actors have greater increasingly polarized societies. opportunity to exploit readily a. In societies with an ageing popu- available technologies in an lation, the demand on resources innovative and potentially dis- for medical and social welfare ruptive manner. will grow, nations’ ability to allo- c. The scale and speed of global cate necessary funds for defence networks allow individuals and and security will be increasingly groups immediate access to strained and changes in demog- information and knowledge raphy may limit recruitment for but may also enable the dis- security forces. semination of false or mislead- b. In developing countries, high ing information. Additionally, fertility rates lead to youth data will increasingly become a bulges resulting in unemploy- strategic resource. ment and insufficient edu- d. Commercial innovation has cation opportunities for the outpaced traditional defence young that will foster per- Research and Development ceived disenfranchisement and (R&D). Reductions in defence may lead to social unrest. budgets have led to over-re- c. Rapid urbanization might lead liance on commercially avail- to resource scarcity and chal- able solutions, the loss of lenge the distribution of avail- defence-focused R&D skills and able resources. may increase security risks. d. Fractured and polarized soci- e. Operational effectiveness has eties and growing intercon- become overly dependent nected human networks are on advanced technology and likely to present unprece- civilian infrastructure without dented opportunities and chal- redundant systems. Techno- lenges in the next two decades. logical advancements will continue to open new domains of 6. Technology. Technology will warfighting such as cyber and continue to shape the social, cultural, space. and economic fabrics of our societies at all levels. New and emerg- 7. Economics/Resources. Glo- ing technologies offer enormous balization has opened markets and opportunities, but also present new intensified economic integration, vulnerabilities and challenges as the while increasing the influence of world pivots towards digitalization. developing countries and straining natural resources. The advent of a. The increasing rate of technol- emerging markets has also shifted ogy advancement will challenge jobs to countries and regions with acquisition management pro- cheap labour and eroded the eco- cesses and the interoperability nomic base for the working middle between nations and institu- class in Western countries, fuelling tions. New technologies, such social inequality. as offensive cyber, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems a. An increasingly intercon- and human enhancement, are nected global financial system not yet widely accepted and will is more vulnerable to attacks xxii by both state and non-state

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT actors. Through the exploitation of decentralized networks, financial origins and transac- tions supporting terrorism and organized crime will become less visible and traceable. b. The demand for resources will increase with population and economic growth particularly in developing countries. c. Access to and control over natural resources will play an increasing role in power politics. d. Increased inequality is a cat- alyst for migration and can have second-order effects such as fractured and conflictual societies, violent extremism, nationalism, isolationism, and protectionism. e. The existing burden on national economies will grow due to the rise in competing demands for provide humanitarian assis- limited resources. tance and relief with increasing 8. Environment. Environmen- frequency. tal issues are dominated by cli- 9. The SFA is a collaborative effort mate change and its far- reaching drawing on expertise and resources and cross-cutting impacts. Climate from NATO and partner nations, change may also lead to increas- international organizations, think ing incidences of natural disasters. tanks, industry and academia to The demand for natural resources is identify trends and implications that increasing. Water and food security are likely to shape the future secu- are growing concerns along with rity environment. The SFA is built losses to biodiversity. These stresses upon analysis of commonalities and on eco-system services may reduce differences in trends while focusing resilience on the future challenges, opportuni- a. Changes to the climate will ties and other relevant implications impose stresses on current facing the Alliance. (See Appendix B ways of life, on individuals’ abil- of this NAADSN report for the list of ity to subsist and on govern- trends and implications produced in ments’ abilities to keep pace and the SFA.) provide for the needs of their 10. NATO will remain the key populations. security alliance for the Euro-Atlan- b. Natural disasters will have an tic region for the foreseeable future. increasing impact, particularly Accordingly, it behoves NATO to fur- in those areas unaccustomed ther explore and prepare for these to such events. possibilities, to best posture for a c. Governments and international dynamic future and to effectively institutions will be expected to meet its core tasks. xxiii

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER ONE

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FUTURE P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

The NATO SFA observes that, “for the Unresolved boundary disputes. New past two decades, the world has been investments in military capabilities to experiencing a period of significant “defend” sovereignty. Arctic defence changes in political, social, economic and security have emerged as a core and environmental areas substantially topic in international and domestic influenced by exponential developments circles over the past decade, spawn- in technology.” This produces a different ing persistent debates about the global security context marked by whether the region’s future is likely complexity, disorder and uncertainty. to continue along cooperative lines Readers are encouraged to look to that or transform into unbridled compe- document for general discussions of the tition and conflict…. These frame- current period of transition marked by the works are very significant in shaping rising influence of developing countries expectations for the Government of and alternative international organization Canada and for the Canadian Armed led by rising powers; an exponential rate Forces more specifically.1 of change in an increasingly complex international system; growing polarization, In most analyses on the region, climate regionalization, and fragmentation, as well change and technological advancements as globalization and interconnectedness; point to an increasingly accessible Arctic. and the proliferation of disruptive While geophysical conditions continue to technologies and the potential for strategic constrain certain activities during certain shocks. times of the year (and will so into the future), the global demand for resources, desire for Although the Arctic is a region in which efficient shipping routes, and geostrate- academics and politicians have often her- gic position of the circumpolar north por- alded as an “exceptional” space of inter- tend enhanced interest in the region. In national cooperation since the end of the imagining the future for Canada, the Arc- Cold War, it is increasingly acknowledged tic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF) as an area of competition as well. As I sum- suggests that “climate change and tech- marized in 2014: nology are making the Arctic more accessible,” with diminishing sea ice “open[ing] Climate change. Newly accessible shipping routes … [and] putting the rich resources. New maritime routes.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT wealth of northern natural resources within from these concerns, and we must be part reach. Increased commercial and tourism of the solution – a force for security, stability, interests also bring increased safety and prosperity and social justice in the world.” security challenges that include search and Furthermore, “climate change threatens to rescue and human-created disasters.” This disrupt the lives and livelihoods of millions echoes assumption articulated in Canada’s around the world. It also presents us with an 2017 defence policy, which emphasizes urgent call to innovate, to foster collective that “new actors are pursuing economic action, to work hand-in-hand with like- and military activities, some of which may minded partners around the world to meet pose a threat to Canadian security and this threat and defeat it, rather than stand sovereignty.” To address risk and meet passively by.” emerging threats, Strong, Secure, Engaged Within this broader context, SSE highlights recognizes that working cooperatively three key security trends that will continue with allies and partners will be essential in to shape events: the evolving balance of a complex security environment. power, the changing nature of conflict, Drawing excerpts from broader Canadian and the rapid evolution of technology. and Allied policy statements, this chap- All of these trends have direct and ter frames some general characteristics of indirect application when contemplating the future related to defence and security and imagining future Arctic security issues and threats facing DND/CAF from a environments, vulnerabilities, and forecasting perspective. Individual chap- requirements. The ANPF emphasizes that: ters provide more robust context and elab- oration of implications on specific themes The international order is not static; and issues introduced in this general it evolves over time to address overview. new opportunities and challenges. The Arctic and the North is in a period of rapid change that is the 1.1 GLOBAL CONTEXT: STRONG, SECURE, product of both climate change ENGAGED and changing geopolitical trends. As such, international rules and Canada has a long-standing, institutions will need to evolve to honourable tradition of robust address the new challenges and engagement in support of global opportunities facing the region. As stability, peace and prosperity. We are it has done in the past, Canada will uniquely positioned now to further bolster its international leadership this role. Arguably, our engagement at this critical time, in partnership has never been more necessary, or with Northerners and Indigenous valued by our international allies and peoples, to ensure that the evolving partners. international order is shaped in a Canada’s defence policy notes that manner that protects and promotes economic inequality is on the rise globally, Canadian interests and values. with an attendant rise in instability and For nearly a century, Canada has invested violent extremism. Mass migration, in building and sustaining an international radicalization and hateful ideologies, weak system that reflects its values and interests, or undemocratic governance, and political carving out a functional role as a “middle polarization stress individual countries, power” to promote peace and prosperity regions, alliances, and the international around the world. The balance of power system as a whole. Strong, Secure, Engaged is shifting, however, the re-emergence of 2 emphasizes that “Canada is not immune

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT major power competition threatens to has turned to oil, gas and minerals, fish- undermine or strain the established inter- eries, shipping and Arctic governance. In national order and rules-based system. Chi- turn, this has generated debates amongst na’s rise as an economic superpower and Arctic states about non-Arctic states’ inten- its aspirations to have a global role propor- tions and their receptiveness to welcoming tionate to its economic weight, population, Asian countries in particular “into the Arctic and self-perception as the Middle King- cold.”2 dom. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s In a complex security environment char- recent declaration that liberalism is “obso- acterized by trans-regional, multi-domain, lete” affirms that the former superpower and multi-functional threats, Canada will has deviated from its early post-Cold War continue to work with its allies to under- path and its revisionist behaviour in Geor- stand the broader effects of the return of gia, Ukraine, and Syria are examples of its major power competition to the interna- willingness to test the international secu- tional system and to regions like the Arctic, rity environment. Consequently, Canada’s and what this means for Canadian defence role is less obvious in the emerging mul- relationships and partnerships. Emerg- tipolar world, which challenges the West- ing threats to North America, across all ern-designed security system, than it was domains, must be situated in the context in the bipolar Cold War order or the unipo- of continental defence and the longstand- lar moment that followed it. This creates ing Canada-US defence partnership exem- more space for emerging state and non- plified by the North American Aerospace state actors to exercise influence, including Defence Command (NORAD). This bina- in the Arctic. tional command has proven effective in The growing realization of the dispro- deterring, detecting, and defending North portionate impact of climate change on America’s approaches since the 1950s, the circumpolar region, and concomitant and it remains “the cornerstone of Cana- social, economic and environmental con- da’s defence relationship with the US, and sequences for the rest of the world, also provides both countries with greater con- command global attention. Canada’s ANPF tinental security than could be achieved notes that “the Canadian North is warming individually.” NORAD commander General at about 3 times the global average rate, Terrence O’Shaugnessy told the Senate which is affecting the land, biodiversity, Strategic Forces Subcommittee in April cultures and traditions.” This rapid change 2019 that “the six decades of NORAD’s is “having far-reaching effects on the lives unmatched experience and shared history and well-being of northerners, threaten- are proving more vital than ever as we face ing food security and the transportation the most complex security environment of essential goods and endangering the in generations,” and that “this unique and stability and functioning of delicate eco- longstanding command serves as both systems and critical infrastructure.” There is a formidable deterrent to our adversar- extensive Canadian interest in how these ies and a clear symbol of the unbreakable changes affect Northern peoples and the bond between the United States and Can- environment that sustains them at local ada.” Resurgent major power competition and domestic scales, as well as the impli- and advances in weapons technology pose cations of rising international interest in new threats to continental security, how- the region. Although non-Arctic observ- ever, which require NORAD to modern- ers have traditionally confined their polar ize and evolve to meet current and future interest to scientific research and environ- threats. Both SSE and the ANPF under- mental issues, over the past decade signif- score the importance of NORAD modern- icant international interest and attention ization efforts, the integration of layered 3

2020 REPORT IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA OF A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • The global security environment transcends national borders, requiring Can- ada to help promote peace and stability abroad in order to maintain security at home. • In a global security environment defined by complexity and unpredictability, Canada requires an agile, well-educated, flexible, diverse, and combat-ready military capable of conducting a wide range of operations at home and internationally. • The interrelated nature of global security challenges puts a premium on deep knowledge and understanding. Using a range of analytical tools, Can- ada must develop sophisticated awareness of the information and operating environment and the human dimension of conflict to better predict and respond to crises. • To keep pace, Canada must develop advanced space and cyber capabilities, and expand cutting-edge research and development. • Canada must continue to be a responsible partner that adds value to traditional alliances, including NORAD, NATO, and the Five-Eyes community. • Canada must balance these fundamental relationships with the need to engage with emerging powers, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. • Canada must address the threat stemming from terrorism and the actions of violent extremist organizations, including in ungoverned spaces. • Recognizing the devastating effects of climate change, Canada must bolster its ability to respond to severe weather events and other natural disasters, both at home and abroad. • Acknowledging rising international interest in the Arctic, Canada must enhance its ability to operate in the North and work closely with allies and partners. • Canada and the United States must work closely together on NORAD Mod- ernization in order to defend North America.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT sensor and defeat systems, and improving associated with a more accessible Arc- the CAF’s reach and mobility in the Arctic tic require a greater presence of security within this alliance construct. organizations, strengthened emergency management, effective military capabil- Strategic forecasters must situate the ity, and improved situational awareness. Canadian Arctic in global, regional, and Meeting these demands necessitates a domestic contexts to anticipate new chal- collaborative approach among all levels lenges, promote effective adaptations to of government, as well as with Northern- changing circumstances, and identify how ers, including Indigenous peoples, and in the CAF should be trained and equipped cooperation with the private sector where to act decisively with effective military relevant to ensure that the region can pros- capability in concert with its allies. Cana- per and that it continues to be a zone of da’s Defence Investment Plan 2018 notes peace and cooperation. that “Canada has an agile, multi-purpose, combat-ready military that is operated by Canada’s defence and security policies and highly-trained, well-equipped, and profes- practices must also fit within its broader sional personnel.” It also emphasizes how, national strategy for the Canadian Arctic “given the uncertainty and complexity of and the Circumpolar North. The ANPF pro- the global security environment, now and motes “a shared vision of the future where into the future,” it must continue to build northern and Arctic people are thriving, and refine “a flexible and versatile Force strong and safe.” Priorities include actions that can take informed, decisive action to to: accomplish the Government’s objectives is • nurture healthy families and essential to the military’s operational effec- communities tiveness and long-term success.” • invest in the energy, transportation and communications infrastructure 1.2 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC: TOWARDS A that northern and Arctic govern- WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH ments, economies and communities need ‘Nothing about us, without us’ is the • create jobs, foster innovation and essential principle that weaves fed- grow Arctic and northern economies eral, territorial, provincial and Indig- • support science, knowledge and enous institutions and interests research that is meaningful for com- together for mutual success. munities and for decision-making Canada’s Arctic and Northern • face the effects of climate change Policy Framework (2019) and support healthy ecosystems in the Arctic and North Anticipating and addressing twenty-first • ensure that Canada and our north- century challenges requires coordinated ern and Arctic residents are safe, action rather than siloed thinking in order secure and well-defended to leverage the broad and deep exper- • restore Canada’s place as an interna- tise of the modern state and civil society. tional Arctic leader In the defence and security realm, SSE • advance reconciliation and improve emphasizes that meeting “enormous col- relationships between Indigenous lective challenges requires coordinated and non-Indigenous peoples action across the whole-of-government Consistent with a whole-of-society – military capabilities working hand in approach, SSE emphasizes the importance hand with diplomacy and development.” of “exploiting defence innovation by ensur- Taken together, the opportunities, chal- ing that the Defence Team can tap into lenges, increased competition, and risks 5

2020 REPORT creativity and expertise available outside critical infrastructure services, and work- of government” and leverage the research, ing as efficiently and effectively as possi- development, and “ground-breaking con- ble to deliver results. It also means being cepts generated by academics, universities, a responsible steward of the environment and the private sector.” These efforts can by reducing the environmental footprint of help to identify and meet the challenges National Defence, minimizing the impact associated with emerging domains, con- of its activities on the natural environment, ceptualize multi- and all-domain threats and managing resources responsibly.” ANPF Goal 7: The Canadian Arctic and North across the spectrum of operations, and and its people are safe, secure and well-de- In a Canadian Arctic context, a key chal- the need to analyze and fuse intelligence fended. Objectives: lenge will involve co-developing practical and other data at “speed of relevance.” The 1. Strengthen Canada’s coopera- implementation plans that meet the needs Defence Investment Plan 2018 also high- tion and collaboration with domestic of DND/CAF, our allies, and of Northern lights the importance of modernizing and and international partners on safety, Canadians, in light of accelerating rates of “streamlining the procurement process, security and defence issues change “in many aspects of human society adopting innovative ways of delivering 2. Enhance Canada’s military presence as well as prevent and respond Arctic and Northern Policy Framework vision: “Strong, self-reliant people and communities working to safety and security incidents in the together for a vibrant, prosperous and sustainable Arctic and northern region at home and abroad, Arctic and the North while expressing Canada’s enduring Arctic sovereignty.” 3. Strengthen Canada’s domain awareness, surveillance and control capabilities in the Arctic and the North 4. Enforce Canada’s legislative and regulatory frameworks that govern transportation, border integrity and environmental protection in the Arctic and the North 5. Increase the whole-of-society emergency management capabilities in Arctic and northern communities 6. Support community safety through effective and culturally-appropriate crime prevention initiatives and policing services

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT critical infrastructure services, and work- [that are] expected to continue increasing complex- ing as efficiently and effectively as possi- ity and uncertainty while creating concurrent oppor- ble to deliver results. It also means being tunities and risks.” As the NATO SFA notes, disruptive a responsible steward of the environment technologies, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine by reducing the environmental footprint of learning, biotechnology, and autonomous systems National Defence, minimizing the impact “could be considered as game changers that might of its activities on the natural environment, help humanity solve problems at a global level,” but and managing resources responsibly.” they also create disruption and introduce new chal- ANPF Goal 7: The Canadian Arctic and North lenges at all levels. Furthermore, new technologies and its people are safe, secure and well-de- In a Canadian Arctic context, a key chal- and their application in layered offensive and defen- fended. Objectives: lenge will involve co-developing practical sive systems also give rise to moral, ethical, and legal 1. Strengthen Canada’s coopera- implementation plans that meet the needs issues that are likely to play out in debates about tion and collaboration with domestic of DND/CAF, our allies, and of Northern Arctic defence and security as well as more gener- and international partners on safety, Canadians, in light of accelerating rates of alized ones. General O’Shaughessy told the U.S. Sen- security and defence issues change “in many aspects of human society ate Armed Services Committee in February 2020 2. Enhance Canada’s military pres- that “geographic barriers that kept our homeland ence as well as prevent and respond beyond the reach of most conventional threats” no to safety and security incidents in the longer offer protection and “the Arctic is no longer Arctic and the North a fortress wall … [but an avenue] of approach for advanced conventional weapons and the platforms 3. Strengthen Canada’s domain that carry them.” What does this mean for Northern awareness, surveillance and control policies predicated on the idea of the Arctic as a capabilities in the Arctic and the North “distinct” homeland that is inherently conceived of 4. Enforce Canada’s legislative and as a material place rather than a threat vector? How regulatory frameworks that govern do measures to address strategic threats to North transportation, border integrity and America passing through the Canadian Arctic relate environmental protection in the Arctic to threats to the region or in the region? and the North Northern Canadian economic futures are also tied 5. Increase the whole-of-society to global drivers in terms of supply and demand emergency management capabilities for non-renewable resources, maritime (in)acces- in Arctic and northern communities sibility, and climate change. The intrinsic dilemma 6. Support community safety or contradiction between Arctic state support for through effective and culturally-ap- the exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources propriate crime prevention initiatives (given the direct economic benefits of doing so) and policing services and the desire to mitigate global climate change (with its clear effects on the Arctic) is likely to persist. The implications of heightened regional activity on core socio-economic areas such as population demographics, gross domestic product, urbanization, energy options, transportation, and communications remain sources of both optimism in some circles and concern in others. The Inuit Circumpolar Council’s A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sov- ereignty in the Arctic (2015) notes that “as states increasingly focus on the Arctic and its resources, and as climate change continues to create easier access to the Arctic, Inuit inclusion as active partners is central to all national and international deliberations on Arctic sovereignty and related questions, 7

2020 REPORT such as who owns the Arctic, who has the increase the divergence of national inter- right to traverse the Arctic, who has the ests and fuel greater differences in the per- right to develop the Arctic, and who will be ception of risks and threats.” responsible for the social and environmen- Complexity and uncertainty are also defin- tal impacts increasingly facing the Arctic.” It ing features of Canada’s Arctic, reflecting also insists that states must ensure sustain- unique political, socio-economic, demo- able economic development that increases graphic, geographic, and physiographic standards of living for Inuit, and that they considerations. The ANPF notes that “the “deflect sudden and far-reaching demo- qualities that make the Canadian Arctic graphic shifts that would overwhelm and and North such a special place, its size, cli- marginalize indigenous peoples where we mate, and small but vibrant and resilient are rooted and have endured.” populations, also pose unique security challenges, making it difficult to main- 1.3 COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY tain situational awareness and respond to emergencies or military threats when While the Canadian Arctic has his- and where they occur.” Climate change torically been — and continues to compounds these challenges, reshaping be — a region of stability and peace, the regional environment and, in some growing competition and increased contexts and seasons, facilitating greater access brings safety and security access to an increasingly “broad range of challenges to which Canada must be actors and interests” (both Canadian and ready to respond. international). Accordingly, – ANPF (2019) To protect the safety and security The NATO SFA notes that “the growing of people in the region and safe- number of stakeholders combined with the guard the ability to defend the Cana- interconnected nature of the international dian Arctic and North, and North system, the exponential rate of change and America now and into the future, a the confluence of trends has continued multi-faceted and holistic approach to increase the potential for disorder and is required. The complexity of the uncertainty in every aspect of world affairs.” regional security environment places The Arctic is far from immune to these a premium on collaboration amongst changes. In an increasingly complex (rather all levels of government, Indigenous than complicated) environment, “there are peoples and local communities, as too many interactions to comprehend all well as with trusted international the possible outcomes, increasing the risk partners…. of surprise or even failure.” Accordingly, Canadians must look to more comprehen- Given the high proportion of Indigenous sive approaches that accept and incorpo- people (Inuit, First Nations and Métis) rate complexity and uncertainty in world in Canada’s Arctic population, as well as affairs as a pervasive reality. Doing so will Ottawa’s acute political focus on improv- require projections that anticipate future ing Indigenous-Crown relations and pro- trends which are not simple extensions of moting reconciliation, the region enjoys a previous curves but reflect several “trajec- much higher political profile than simple tories of potential outcomes, which in turn population statistics and parliamentary will require leadership to utilize a more representation numbers might suggest. comprehensive, flexible and adaptive deci- As the Arctic Human Development Report sion-making system.” The NATO document (2015) notes, Indigenous peoples’ also suggests that “complexity is likely to “efforts to secure self-determination and 8

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Annex: Principles for the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework The principles below were developed to provide as Gender-Based Analysis Plus to assess continuing guidance on implementation of the potential impacts on diverse groups of framework. people • Decisions about the Arctic and the North • The framework will respect a distinc- will be made in partnership with and with tions-based approach to ensure that the participation of northerners, to reflect the unique rights, interests and circum- the rights, needs and perspectives of stances of Inuit, Arctic and northern northerners First Nations and Métis are acknowl- • The rights and jurisdictions of Cana- edged, affirmed and implemented da’s federal, territorial, provincial Indige- • The Government of Canada rec- nous and municipal governments will be ognizes Inuit, First Nations, and respected Métis as the Indigenous peo- • Development should be sustainable and ples of Canada, consisting of holistic, integrating social, cultural, eco- distinct, rights-bearing com- nomic and environmental considerations munities with their own histo- • Ongoing reconciliation with Indigenous ries, including with the Crown peoples, using the work of the Truth and • The work of forming renewed Reconciliation Commission as a starting relationships based on the point, is foundational to success recognition of rights, respect, • As climate change is a lived reality in the co-operation and partnership region, initiatives will take into account must reflect the unique interests, its various impacts, including its impact priorities and circumstances of each on Indigenous northerners, who continue people to rely on the land and wildlife for their • Every sector of society, from culture, traditional economy, and food the private sector to uni- security versities and colleges, • Policy and programming will reflect a the not-for-profit sec- commitment to diversity and equality, and tor, community-based to the employment of analytical tools such organizations and individual Cana- dians, has an important part to play in building a strong Canadian Arctic and North.

2020 REPORT self-government are influencing Arctic governance in ways that will have a profound impact on the region and its inhabitants in the years to come.” Countless reports highlight longstanding inequalities in transportation, energy, communications, employment, community infrastructure, health, and education that continue to disadvantage Northerners compared to other Canadians. Furthermore, poor socio-economic and health indicators also point to significant gaps between North- ern Canadian jurisdictions and their southern counterparts. Population density, poor econ- Hybrid Warfare is a military strategy omies of scale, high costs, and myriad other that employs political warfare and factors often limit the applicability or utility blends conventional warfare, irreg- of conventional economic models to Arctic ular warfare and cyber warfare with contexts. other influencing methods. Hybrid Exogenous variables also complicate the warfare can be a tactical subset of Canadian Arctic security landscape. As non- grey-zone conflict deployed under state actors and non-Arctic state actors seek certain conditions and in varying greater influence on Arctic affairs, the Govern- degrees. (DND website) ment of Canada may face direct and indirect challenges to its legitimacy and credibility. The Government of Canada may also be pre- sented with opportunities for constructive engagement and co-operation that could strenghten its Arctic position. Furthermore, increasing polarization, regionalization, and fragmentation within North American society could deepen distrust in conventional politics and politicians, exposing vulnerabilities that are susceptible to outside influence and can be exploited to disrupt the social fabric and sow seeds of disunity. A declining sense of fate control, lingering anxieties about sovereignty, and concerns about an increasingly complex future could also prove sources of greater uncertainty and social and political division. In an increasingly globalized information and social media environment, adversaries are likely to use disinformation and misinformation strategies to influence Canadian opinion, undermine sources of strength, and complicate decision making. The NATO SFA also notes that “although socio-economic, political and environmental changes will continue to cre- 10 ate uncertainty at individual, organizational,

UNDERSTANDING2020 THE REPORT FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT local, regional and global levels, new methods and tools, in particular big data, technological literacy and AI, have the potential to provide new ways of managing uncertainty and complexity. This will require a shift from an organizational culture that takes an incremental approach, has stove-piped working practices and waits for greater clarity, to one that has Close Engagement: Land Power in an Age a more collaborative approach that supports of Uncertainty (2019) summarizes that bold and innovative decisions.” Current dis- conflict over the next 10 to 15 years will cussions about the future of North American take place in the context of the following defence and security architecture, included trends: new “ecosystem” approaches to integrating • increasingly rapid technological layered defences, anticipate a future where change; NORAD might achieve all domain awareness • an increase in the number of from the seabed to outer space and have the actors willing and able to use ability to fuse the data from these sensors organized force to achieve their into a common operating picture that deci- objectives; sion-makers can use to defend against adver- • an ever more pervasive global- sarial actions.3 ized information and social media environment; 1.4 CONFLUENCE AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS • increasing resource shortages and population movements In a globalized world, many of the driven by climate change; issues facing Canada, including in • rising economic inequality; the Arctic and the North, cannot be • weapons systems with radically addressed effectively through domestic increased lethality; action alone. A whole-of-government • greater power and reach of trans- effort that leverages both domestic national organized crime; and international policy levers is • democratization of advanced therefore required. For example, weaponry; economic growth in Canada’s Arctic • greater proliferation of evolved and North can be facilitated through hybrid threats; infrastructure investments that increase • increased likelihood of great access to world markets, along with power / regional power conflict, trade commissioner services to help whether directly or by proxy, businesses based in the region access including an increased risk of international markets and attract and nuclear conflict; and retain foreign direct investment that • more rapid emergence and esca- benefits Northerners and respects lation of conflicts. Canada’s national interest. – ANPF (2019)

The Arctic is inextricably tied to the rest of Canada, to North America, and to the international system as a whole. This interconnectedness brings opportunities for communities, governance, and economic 11

2020 REPORT development, and also poses complex, degraded or austere environment. multifaceted challenges. The Canadian The NATO SFA notes that “confluence refers Army’s capstone future land operating to the interactions and intersection of dif- concept, Close Engagement: Land Power ferent trends causing a multiplication of in an Age of Uncertainty (2019), highlights the effects, the outcomes of which may how “globalization, social connectivity, cli- be very challenging to predict but should mate change, and empowered non-state be considered nonetheless.” Technological actors are working to blur the distinc- advances that bring together people can tion between homeland and overseas also have sweeping (and sometimes highly threats.” The complex, dynamic, volatile, disruptive) political, socio-economic, cul- and uncertain future operating environ- tural, and environmental implications. New ment, where the risk of miscalculation and connections between people within and escalation is acute, requires comprehen- across national boundaries can produce sive approaches that can draw upon all greater empathy and cohesion, but they of the levers of national power, including also provide pathways for groups harbour- military power. Accordingly, it emphasizes ing grievances and radical ideas to recruit that the Canadian Army needs to foster and mobilize members and can threaten a culture and tools to interoperate with traditional forms of cultural expression, joint, interagency, and multinational part- social organization, and political control. ners; embrace adaptability and agility; and Furthermore, technology is an enabler for establish robust networks while retain- innovation, education, improved health ing the ability to operate effectively in a

ANTICIPATING emerging threats and challenges is fundamental to Canada’s security. The Defence team will improve its ability to provide timely information to decision-makers, allowing the Government to identify and understand emerging events and crises, respond appropriately, and minimize the destructive effects of prolonged conflict. – SSE 2017

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT outcomes, and positive social change, but or can be a scenario that strategists have can also exacerbate gaps between people contemplated but transpires much earlier with access to advanced technology and than expected. In an Arctic context, exam- training and people without such access. ples could be the complete collapse of the Greenland ice sheet, a nuclear disaster, a These confluence of these factors, and terrorist attack on critical infrastructure, many others, changes the nature of con- or the immediate closure of other strate- flict. The SSE highlights the increasing gic straits around the world that force risky prevalence of “coordinated hostile activi- transits of Northern sea routes on a mas- ties across all spheres of state power (i.e., sive scale. diplomatic, economic, information, military) that are deliberately crafted to fall Other problems have long-term conse- below the traditional threshold of armed quences but the temporal or geographi- conflict.” This “grey zone” encompasses a cal horizon over which they unfold make broader and opaquer spectrum of threats it difficult to secure support for specific than established policy and legal frame- initiatives to counter them or resources to works were designed to address, and are address them, given competing priorities. difficult to identify, attribute, categorize, Climate change is the most obvious – and, and counter. “The linkages between dis- arguably, the most existential – exam- parate spheres of activity are also difficult ple facing humanity as a whole. While the to understand and can mask broader stra- overwhelming preponderance of evidence tegic objectives,” the defence policy notes. proves that climate change will have dev- “Below threshold tactics and hybrid war- astating, long-term effects on the planet, fare also introduce questions regarding the it is difficult to discern specific “tipping appropriate distribution of responsibilities points” that will cause a major disruption to respond across government, including in non-linear, complex systems. Similarly, DND/CAF’s role when defence equities are disruptive technologies, the growing role threatened through non-military spheres.” of non-state actors and super-empowered individuals in domestic and international Adversaries are discerning new opportuni- affairs, and violent extremism simmer- ties to attack Canada’s vulnerabilities and ing in unexpected sectors of society all contest our narratives at all levels, “wea- require careful monitoring to ensure that ponizing” information operations to sow responses do not undermine innovation or confusion and discord, creating ambiguity the democratic values that animate Cana- about intent, and preserving deniability. dian society. Continuous horizon-scanning These activities are difficult to deter, detect, and ongoing (re)assessment of political, and attribute, and calibrated responses environmental, economic, societal, and must be appropriate and proportionate, technological trends are important to balancing the risk of escalation and the fail- provide credible, advance warning of dis- ure to deter future malicious activity. ruptive changes in a complex, uncertain, The NATO SFA also anticipates that “the and potentially volatile future security confluence of trends, compounded with environment. uncertainty, is more likely to create strategic shocks and problems of great magni- tude.” These strategic shocks (sometimes referred to as “black swan” events) can emanate from “a rapid, unanticipated, less predictable event, such as the 9/11 attacks,” 13

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL

LEAD AUTHOR: P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER; WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY JUSTIN BARNES, ALDO CHIRCOP, RYAN DEAN, SUZANNE LALONDE, AND ANDREAS ØSTHAGEN Broadening international awareness and how Canada continues to leverage exist- acceptance of the heightened impacts of ing multilateral organizations – such as the global climate change in the Arctic, most Arctic Council, Arctic Economic Council, poignantly depicted in the accelerated United Nations Commission on the Limits melting of the polar ice cap, have gener- of the Continental Shelf, International Mar- ated sweeping debates about present and itime Organization (IMO), the North Atlan- future security and safety challenges and tic Treaty Organization (NATO), Arctic Coast threats in the region. Visions of increas- Guard Forum, and the Arctic “5+5” dialogue ingly accessible natural resources and nav- on Central Arctic Ocean fisheries – to pro- igable polar passages connecting Asian, mote its interests in the circumpolar world. European, and North American markets These multilateral tools have proven resil- have resurrected age-old ideas about the ient even with the downturn in relations region as a resource and maritime fron- between the West and Russia since 2014, tier—as well as concomitant insecurities with complex interdependence sustaining about the geopolitical and geostrategic regional cooperation on search and rescue, impacts of growing global attentiveness transboundary fisheries, extended conti- to the region’s possibilities. Accordingly, nental shelves, navigation, a mandatory debates about whether the region’s future polar code, and science. is likely to follow a cooperative trend or spi- Defence cooperation, however, has felt the ral into military competition and even con- direct effects of resurgent major power flict rage on. competition internationally – perhaps inev- Scholars have well established how a itably, given that five of the Arctic Council’s robust array of rules, norms and institutions eight members are NATO members. The guide international interactions in the cir- alliance’s role in “Arctic” defence and secu- cumpolar north. This rules-based order not rity has been contested over last decade, only advances Canada’s national interests with Canada typically opposing appeals but its global ones as well, offering oppor- by countries like Norway to have NATO tunities to shape international agendas on assume a more explicit Arctic role because climate change, contaminants, and other this would unnecessarily antagonize Rus- environmental threats with a global scope sia (or at least play into Putin’s hands by that have a disproportionate impact on the appearing to validate his suggestion of Arctic. Furthermore, it is well documented Western aggressive intentions against

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Russia’s Arctic), draw non-Arctic European discussions, it still lingers in news media states more directly into Arctic affairs writ and public perceptions, and “purveyors of large, and or amplifying the misconception polar peril” continue to point to the Arctic that Arctic regional dynamics are likely to interests of Russia, a rising China, and the precipitate conflict between Arctic states. United States, as cause for Canadian alarm. Others have pushed for stronger NATO Other commentators argue that there is involvement to meet a heightened Rus- no military threat to the Arctic and that sian military threat, stand up to Russian defence resources should instead be intimidation, and show strong deterrent. directed to dealing with human and envi- Since the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, West- ronmental security issues associated with ern concerns about Russian intentions and climate change and the region as an Indig- behaviour on the international stage have enous peoples’ homeland. reinforced a popular image of that country as the wild card in the Arctic strategic A third school of thought argues that, while equation and reignited questions about strategic deterrence continues to have an regional security. Arctic dimension (and that this is best con- ceptualized at an international rather than The Canadian debate on Arctic security a regional level of analysis), Canada is not reveals various schools of thought and likely to face conventional military threats divergent threat assessments. Propo- in or to its Arctic region in the next decade. nents of the “sovereignty on thinning ice” Instead, members of this school suggest school suggest that Arctic sovereignty, that Canada should focus on building Arctic maritime disputes, and/or questions of military capabilities within an integrated, resource ownership will serve as catalysts “whole of government” framework, largely for regional conflict. They associate the directed towards supporting domestic need for military activities demonstrating safety and “soft” security missions that rep- effective control over Canadian territory resent the most likely incidents to occur in and internal waters with the preserva- the Canadian Arctic. It should also invest in tion or enhancement of the international sensors and capabilities in the Arctic that legal basis for Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. can contribute to broader defence of North This thinking underpinned the “use it or America missions, but these should not lose it” messaging that dominated during be misconstrued as capabilities needed Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s first because the Canadian Arctic itself is spe- years in office in the mid-2000s. Although cifically threatened by foreign adversaries this idea no longer dominates academic and vulnerable to attack.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 2.1 SHIFTS IN GEOSTRATEGIC POWER debate about Russia’s apparent “revisionist position” towards what it views as a West- Canada’s defence policy acknowledges ern-dominated international system – and that “a degree of major power competition the implications for the Arctic. Some com- has returned to the international system.” mentators cast this as a new “cold war” The United States remains the world’s only between Russia and the West, a “resump- “superpower,” but China has emerged as a tion of great-power rivalry,” and a “return “rising economic power with an increasing of geopolitics,” while others decry these ability to project influence globally” and frames as outmoded or alarmist. Accord- “Russia has proven its willingness to test the ingly, debates persist about the pace and international security environment.” More form of Russia’s military and security pos- broadly, Strong, Secure, Engaged observes ture in the region, with some experts see- how “trends in global economic devel- ing it as a dramatic build-up portending opment are shifting the relative power of Russian aggression, and others suggesting states…, creating a more diffuse environ- that its military modernization program ment in which an increasing number of represents reasonable defensive measures state and non-state actors exercise influ- aimed at protecting Russia’s economic ence.” While this shift brings benefits (such and sovereign interests in its Arctic and as the alleviation of poverty, democratiza- at addressing security and safety threats tion, and empowerment), it “has also been (such as search and rescue, safe navigation, accompanied by weak governance and and responding to natural and humanitar- increasing uncertainty.” As an extension of ian emergencies). these broader shifts and heightened global competition, the actions of a resurgent The NATO SFA Report highlights that “the power (Russia) and the increasing pres- redistribution of economic and military ence of extra-regional powers (including power, most notably towards Asia, contin- China) are likely to influence perceptions of ues to contribute to the relative decline of the strategic balance in the Arctic. We con- the West.” General Western concerns about tend that changing power dynamics in the the rise of Asia, and particularly China’s Arctic are unlikely to derive from disputes use of hard and soft power to reshape the over regional disputes over boundary dis- geostrategic power balance globally, has putes, resources, or regional governance in extended to the Arctic. China’s desire to the next fifteen years, and instead will be access strategic resources located in the a reflection of broader international forces Arctic, the pivotal importance of maritime and dynamics. Although the evolving bal- commerce to Asia-Pacific economies, and ance of power may undermine global China’s peculiar interpretations of interna- peace and security, we also highlight that tional laws and treaties all make the grow- this is not necessarily a zero-sum game in ing polar interests of this self-proclaimed terms of Arctic regional stability. “near-Arctic state” both significant and, in some circles, disconcerting. While careful to acknowledge Russia’s rights and interests as an Arctic state, Can- IMPLICATIONS ada’s defence policy notes that country’s a. Challenges to the rule-based role in the resurgence of major power order in the Arctic. Canada is a competition globally and concomitant responsible international player implications for peace and security. Rus- committed to upholding univer- sian aggression in annexing Crimea and sal liberal values, contributing to fomenting the war in Eastern Ukraine, as peace building, and working with well as its military intervention in the Syr- allies and partners to address secu- ian civil war, has sparked international rity challenges and build resiliency. 17

2020 REPORT Some other countries, however, are and control of the Canadian Arctic testing the international security will be complemented by close col- environment and challenging the laboration with select Arctic part- rules-based order. Canada cannot ners, including the United States, assume that the Arctic is inherently Norway and Denmark, to increase immune to such challenges, most surveillance and monitoring of the likely in an indirect way. broader Arctic region.” b. Increased requirement for coop- c. Challenges to NORAD: The United eration with other actors. Strong, States is pressuring Canada and Secure, Engaged affirms the com- its other allies to assume a greater patibility between Canada exercis- share of the overall defense bur- ing sovereignty and collaborating den. SSE commitments to renew with international partners. “Can- the North Warning System (NWS) ada remains committed to exercis- and modernize elements of NORAD ing the full extent of its sovereignty flow from Canada’s longstanding in Canada’s North, and will con- bilateral defence arrangements tinue to carefully monitor mili- with the US to jointly monitor tary activities in the region and and control the air and maritime conduct defence operations and approaches to the continent. exercises as required,” the policy New commitments, however, will explains. Concurrently, “Canada’s require creative thinking and new 18 renewed focus on the surveillance approaches about infrastructure,

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT surveillance and detection, inter- 2.2 USE OF POWER POLITICS ception capabilities, and command and control relationships. Further- Canadian political scientist Rob Huebert more, despite sharing common recently argued that “a New Arctic Stra- security interests and concerns in tegic Triangle Environment (or NASTE) is the North, Canadian and American forming, in which the core strategic inter- academic and “think tank” experts ests of Russia, China and United States are tend to operate in distinct spheres, now converging at the top of the world.” often limiting the exchange of He suggests that this new “great game” is knowledge and the sharing of best not about conflict over the Arctic but rather practices and new ideas. occurring through the Arctic. “This does not d. Challenges to NATO: Canada is make the threat any less dangerous,” he working with its NATO allies to suggests, “but it does make it more com- re-examine conventional deter- plicated.” With tensions growing between rence. The statement in SSE that Russia and the West, and China’s relation- “NATO has also increased its atten- ships evolving with both the West and tion to Russia’s ability to project Russia, Huebert asserts that “the primary force from its Arctic territory into security requirements of the three most the North Atlantic, and its poten- powerful states are now overlapping in the tial to challenge NATO’s collective Arctic region, producing new challenges defence posture” marks a mea- and threats.” sured shift in Canada’s official posi- Huebert finds support in US Northern tion. Despite Canada’s reticence to Command/NORAD Commander General have NATO adopt an explicit Arc- Terrence O’Shaughnessy’s statement to tic role over the past decade, the the Senate Armed Services subcommittee inclusion of this reference – as well on readiness in March 2020, which insists as the commitment to “support the that “the threats facing the United States strengthening of situational aware- and Canada are real and significant,” and ness and information sharing in that “the Arctic is no longer a fortress wall, the Arctic, including with NATO” – and our oceans are no longer protective indicates a newfound openness to moats; they are now avenues of approach multilateral engagement on “hard for advanced conventional weapons and security” in the Arctic with our the platforms that carry them.” Instead, European allies. NATO is the corner- O’Shaugnessy describes the Arctic as “the stone of both Danish and Norwe- new frontline of our homeland defense as gian defence and security policy, it provides our adversaries with a direct which also opens opportunities avenue of approach to the homeland and for enhanced bilateral relation- is representative of the changing strategic ships. How this newfound interest environment in our area of responsibility.” in NATO’s Arctic posture interacts Blending images of “more consistently nav- with Canada’s longstanding prefer- igable waters, mounting demand for natu- ence to partner bilaterally with the ral resources, and Russia’s military buildup US on North American continental in the region” with Russia’s ability to field defence remains to be clarified in “advanced, long-range cruise missiles - to the next decade. include land attack missiles capable of striking the United States and Canada from Russian territory,” O’Shaugnessy concludes that “Russia has left us with no choice but to improve our homeland defense 19

2020 REPORT capability and capacity. In the meantime, North America is through the Arctic.” In light China has taken a number of incremen- of advanced technologies and capabilities tal steps toward expanding its own Arctic that adversaries can use to strike from mul- presence.” As a solution, he emphasizes the tiple directions, the binational command importance of advanced sensors that can has turned its focus to “all-domain” aware- “detect, track, and discriminate advanced ness, improved command and control, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hyper- and enhancing targeting capabilities that sonics, and small unmanned aerial sys- can allow decision-makers to respond “at tems at the full ranges from which they are the speed of relevance.” Canada has com- employed,” as well as “detect and track the mitted to modernize the North Warning platforms - aircraft, ships, and submarines System (NWS) and to include the air and - that carry those weapons.” Evoking the maritime approaches to North America in phrase that “the Homeland is not a sanc- any effort to modernize the overall system, tuary,” he emphasizes the need for “new and is developing new space-based sys- defeat mechanisms for advance threat systems to track threats, improve situational tems - to include the advanced cruise mis- awareness, and improve communica- siles capable of striking the homeland from tions globally – and with specific applica- launch boxes in the Arctic.” tion throughout the Arctic region. The full Talk of the need to “harden the shield” to extent of its contribution to continental project a credible deterrent against conven- defence effort to detect, deter, and defend tional and below-the-threshold attacks on against or defeat threats from all domains North America anticipates new approaches remain to be determined, but its Arctic that will incorporate Arctic sensors and sys- will inevitably factor heavily given that the tems in a layered “ecosystem” of sensors, polar region remains the fastest avenue fusion functions, and defeat mechanisms. of approach to North America for various Strong, Secure, Engaged explains that “the delivery systems emanating from major re-emergence of major power competi- power competitors. tion has reminded Canada and its allies of In the “state competition” section that the importance of deterrence.” At its core, immediately precedes the discussion deterrence is about discouraging a poten- about “a changing Arctic,” SSE observes tial adversary from doing something harm- that “NATO Allies and other like-minded ful before they do it. Accordingly, a credible states have been re-examining how to military deterrent serves as a diplomatic deter a wide spectrum of challenges to tool which, in concert with dialogue, can the international order by maintaining help to prevent conflict. While deterrence advanced conventional military capabil- theory has traditionally focused on conven- ities that could be used in the event of a tional and nuclear capabilities, the concept conflict with a ‘near-peer.’” Accordingly, is also relevant in the space, cyber, infor- debates about NATO’s role in the Arctic are mation, and cognitive domains – although inextricably linked to broader discussions the means to achieve it remain less clear in about the alliance. these domains. Implications: NORAD plays a central role in the protection of North American security and has a. Increased potential of “spillover” always been closely associated with Arc- from confrontation and competi- tic defences. As political scientist Andrea tion elsewhere. Although recent Charron observes, “its crest includes a scholarship seeks to explain the broad sword facing due north, suggesting lack of direct spillover from the war that the avenue of potential attack against in Ukraine in 2014 and from ensu- 20 ing Western sanctions into general

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Arctic relations (although it has law, leading to coercion and other affected some specific ones), legit- actions that could spillover into the imate concerns linger that Russia’s Arctic or see China use the circum- “increasingly confrontational, rule polar region as a theatre for diver- breaking and assertive” behaviour sionary activities. will eventually manifest in the b. Growing requirement for new Arctic. As the prospect of Western forms of robust and credible economic cooperation fades and deterrence. Recent events in companies cut ties with Russian Ukraine, Syria, and other parts of partners, the motivations to retain the world reinforce the ongoing the rules-based approach to the importance of territory and the circumpolar region may fray. In this traditional roles of deterrence and scenario, Canada could be faced defence, with a particular focus on with an increasingly aggressive collective defence. Future conflicts, Russia, willing to use its growing however, could range from hybrid Arctic military might to challenge wars, to selective military opera- the rules secure its objectives in the tions by major powers, to precise circumpolar world. Furthermore, long-range strikes using conven- aggressive Chinese activities in tional weapons, to the use of small the South China Sea might under- mobile units in special operations mine the ability of states to peace- to disrupt communications. Can- fully manage and resolve disputes ada and its allies will have to deter- in accordance with international mine how best they can deter

2020 REPORT enemy attacks with specific, limited more strident measures that upset objectives that adversaries seek to established relationships and chal- achieve using select elements of lenge alliance cohesion. Accord- power across all domains. The Arc- ingly, Canada will need to strike a tic cannot be excluded from these balance between national and col- deliberations. lective efforts to strengthen Arctic c. Deterrence by punishment still defence and security. Furthermore, has its place. Changes in nuclear it will have to assure that over-in- strategy and the modernization of flated or misplaced fears about mil- nuclear and conventional forces by itary threats to and in the Arctic do major and regional powers, have not become strategic distractions significant implications for strate- that divert Canada’s attention and gic stability. NORAD officials’ recent defence resources from elsewhere, emphasis on the need to defeat any thus opening other windows of delivery systems or threats travel- opportunity for adversaries. ling through the Arctic (deterrence e. Discerning Russia’s Arctic think- by denial), in all domains, could ing. North American analysts must destabilize the deterrence-by-pun- deliberately consider Russia’s Arc- ishment regime that has safe- tic interests, motivations, and fears guarded North America against through more systematic and cul- a nuclear or conventional mili- turally-attuned lenses, avoiding tary attack since the early Cold the temptation to simply import War. It could also divert unnec- assumptions about that country’s essary resources from domains revisionist designs elsewhere into where defeating threats may be their assessments of the interna- essential (e.g. cyber) and to deter tional Arctic. They must also bal- below-threshold tactics and hybrid ance Russian claims that dual-use warfare in the “grey zone.” Messag- Arctic infrastructure is inherently ing associated with NORAD mod- defensive with potential offensive ernization over the next decade uses and implications for broader should be carefully situated in deterrence. Furthermore, Russia deterrence logic and clearly com- is likely to become increasingly municated to not unintentionally dependent economically upon escalate tensions with adversaries Arctic resources and politically reli- or invite strategic miscalculations. ant on its imagined ‘besiegement’ d. Nationalism and divergent risk by the West over the next decade. and threat perception. Resur- Managing polar relationships gent nationalism worldwide, requires multilateral and bilateral expressed in forms like the “Amer- engagement that reflects nuanced ica First” and BREXIT movements, understandings of defence and for- changes national risk and threat eign policies, as well as the history, assessments. This, in turn, may economic drivers, and national cul- drive some of Canada’s key allies to tures which contribute (sometimes look inwards. On the other hand, imperceptibly) to policy. divergent perceptions of Arctic f. Discerning China’s Arctic think- risks and threats could cause Can- ing. Chinese declarations that it ada’s NATO Allies to shuffle their is a “near Arctic state” and that it defence priorities, either pivoting aspires to become a “great polar 22 away from the Arctic or adopting power” indicate that the country

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT has strategic interests in the Arctic self-government agreements, which are – but it does not inherently mean modern forms of treaty-making, are con- that it will seek to achieve them sidered key components of this process. through revisionist behaviour or Over the past half century, the settlement military force, or that the region of land claims and the devolution of gov- really represents a core “strate- ernance has also seen the federal govern- gic direction” for China. Instead, ment transfer much responsibility for land its aspirations and possible and renewable resource management in behaviours must be considered the Canadian Arctic to territorial and Indig- as part of a larger global game in enous governments and organizations. which the Arctic represents a minor The process remains incomplete, however, – but potentially important - piece. and Indigenous leaders frequently highlight uneven implementation of land claim 2.3 DEVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE AND commitments and other government RECONCILIATION WITH INDIGENOUS promises. Furthermore, Northern leaders express concern about a lack of capacity to PEOPLES manage myriad issues (both existing and Reconciliation in the North is also linked anticipated) associated with rapid regional with political evolution, including the change, much of it driven or compounded devolution of governance and self-de- by climate change. termination. The negotiation and full The northern devolution process has implementation of land claims and been underway since the early 1970s,

2020 REPORT highlighted by the creation of Nunavut enhancements, and infrastructure have in 1999 and agreements on land and brought decision-making over land and resource management with the govern- territories closer to Northern communities. ment of Yukon and the Northwest Territo- Indigenous leadership and participation ries. “When combined with the signing of within co-management structures have modern treaties across much of the North created regulatory regimes that consider and the expansion of Aboriginal self-gov- Indigenous knowledge and scientific evi- ernment, devolution is an integral part of dence to make decisions on wildlife man- an extensive process of regional empow- agement, land use, and environmental erment and local control,” scholars Ken protection. These collaborative arrange- Coates and Greg Poelzer explain. “The pro- ments will continue to evolve through cess has been surprisingly smooth and to 2035, deepening linkages between without controversy, despite the complex rightsholders. financial, human resource, and other issues Respect for and reconciliation with Indige- that have to be addressed when trans- nous peoples lies at the heart of the federal ferring authority to another jurisdiction. government’s agenda, and reconciliation Problems remain, however, particularly is likely to be long-term process given in terms of capacity of northern govern- the deep history and ongoing legacies of ments to absorb the rapid transitions, dis- colonialism in the region. “It is time for a agreements about the appropriate levels renewed, nation-to-nation relationship of funding for devolved responsibilities, with Indigenous Peoples, based on recog- and the complex challenges of delivering nition of rights, respect, co-operation, and government services in the Far North.” partnership,” Prime Minister Justin Trudeau Over the last three decades, co-man- instructed to each of his Cabinet minis- agement structures that share jurisdic- ters after taking office in 2015. Accord- tion over lands and resources, harvesting ingly, Canada places the highest priority rights, environmental management, parks on ensuring that its domestic and interna- and conservation areas, social and cultural tional activities in the Arctic acknowledge,

“Canada’s Arctic and Northern governments and communities are at the heart of security in the region. Partnership, cooperation and shared leadership are essential to promoting security in this diverse, complex and expansive area. Working in partnership with trusted international allies and all levels of government, including Indigenous communities, organizations and governments, Canada will continue to protect the safety and security of the people in the Arctic and the North, now and into the future.” - ANPF Safety, Security, and Defence chapter (2019)

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT protect, and promote Indigenous peoples’ federal, territorial, provincial and Indige- rights—and Canada insists that other Arc- nous institutions and interests together for tic stakeholders do the same. mutual success” offers important guidance for what Arctic and northern people, and In May 2016, Canada officially lifted the their institutions, municipalities, organiza- qualifications to its endorsement of the tions and governments will expect in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights coming decades. It also resonates in an era of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), affirming of reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. its strong commitment to welcome “Indig- enous peoples into the co-production of Implementing reconciliation is a complex policy and joint priority-setting.” The ANPF process which includes recognition of Can- commits Canada to “honour, uphold, and ada’s colonial legacy for Indigenous peo- implement the rights of Arctic and north- ples and the intergenerational impacts of ern Indigenous peoples, including those attempts at assimilation and other destruc- outlined in historic and modern treaties tive practices; the acknowledgement of and in the United Nations Declaration on and respect for Indigenous rights and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” Obli- self-determination; and supporting Indige- gations of UNDRIP include the need for nous peoples’ efforts to reclaim their iden- free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) by tity, language, culture, and nationhood. In Indigenous peoples before projects can 2015, Prime Minister Trudeau accepted the take place on lands which they inhabit or Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final have a claim. UNDRIP offers guidance on report and its “94 Calls to Action” on behalf cooperative relationships with Indigenous of Canada and committed his government peoples to states, the United Nations, and to implement the recommendations. other international organizations based In the future, Canada’s cooperation with on the principles of equality, partnership, other Arctic states and partners is likely to good faith, and mutual respect. Canada’s reflect more direct involvement of North- implementation of UNDRIP remains a work ern territorial and Indigenous governments in progress, and bringing all of its domestic and organizations. For example, pursuant and international practices into workable to its efforts to promote sustainable marine alignment with the declaration (some pro- spatial management of shared ocean areas, visions of which are subject to radically dif- Canada has committed to play an “active ferent interpretations, such as FPIC) is likely role in supporting the development of a to remain so over the fifteen years. pan-Arctic network of marine protected The Government of Canada’s dedicated areas at the Arctic Council and to partner efforts to engage Northerners (particu- with Indigenous peoples to recognize and larly Indigenous peoples) as co-creators manage culturally and environmentally of an Arctic and Northern policy vision significant areas and pursue additional that seeks to reflect their lived realities conservation measures, including those led and desires has confirmed a people-cen- through Indigenous management authori- tric strategy that places human and envi- ties.” Establishing transboundary marine ronmental security at the forefront.1 The protected areas, such as the one covering clear focus on Indigenous consultation and North Water Polynya in northern Baffin Bay leadership in policy-making also resulted between Nunavut and Greenland that the in a protracted policy-development pro- Pikialasorsuaq Commission recommended cess that cannot serve as a workable model in 2017, will entail partnerships with Inuit to discern more immediate policy needs. communities and organizations, territorial Nevertheless, adopting the ANPF idea of and foreign governments, and the Inuit Cir- “Nothing about us [Northerners], without cumpolar Council. 25 us” as an “essential principle that weaves

2020 REPORT Implications: groups.” Continuing and enhanc- a. The roles and influence of Indige- ing these forms of collaboration are nous peoples in the development likely to yield important dividends. of domestic and international d. An increasing focus on Indig- policy are likely to expand over enous distinctiveness will con- the next fifteen years. Accord- tinue to promote Indigenous ingly, Canada’s declared intent to rights and self-determination and play a leadership role in circum- produce new Crown-Indigenous polar affairs is likely to become relationships through collabora- even further invested in advancing tive processes (such as negotia- domestic priorities related to social tion, facilitation, and mediation) as and economic development, envi- well as litigation. Heightened frus- ronmental protection, scientific trations with governments’ inabili- and traditional Indigenous knowl- ties to address core human needs edge, and diversity. The extent to in a timely manner are also likely which this involvement carries into to erode political cohesion, with the defence and national security the potential to inhibit prog- realm remains to be determined. ress towards achieving improved b. Indigenous and territorial gov- socio-economic outcomes. Per- ernments will expect to play key sistent “we/they” messaging may roles in the co-management of also increasingly divide Canadi- all Arctic activities and decisions. ans and lead to political friction For example, Inuit leaders consider or alienation over the next fifteen Inuit Nunangat - the Arctic waters, years. ice, and land above the treeline – to be their homeland, and assert their 2.4 NON-ARCTIC STATE AND NON-STATE Indigenous rights to be involved ACTOR INFLUENCE IN DOMESTIC AND in every decision relating to it. Pre- INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS sumably this includes foreign and defence affairs. The safety, security, and defence chapter of c. Reconciliation is a process in the ANPF notes that a growing interest in which all Canadian institutions Arctic affairs by non-Arctic state and non- are expected to engage. Grow- state actors has significant implications for ing awareness and concern about the evolving Arctic security environment. the impacts of colonial legacies “Easier access to the Arctic may contribute in the Arctic will colour expecta- to greater foreign presence in Canadian tions about future relationships Arctic waterways,” requiring that Canadian between Northern peoples and remain vigilant in enforcing its sovereignty governments, including the mil- over its waters and ensuring that activities itary. During the consultations in the region do not pose security or safety leading to the ANPF, Northern par- risks to Canada and to Canadians. The pol- ticipants highlighted the Canadian icy framework also emphasizes that: Rangers as an important and culturally-appropriate form of com- Canada’s Arctic and natural resources munity-based military presence are attracting interest from for- in the North, and also “expressed eign states and enterprises. Foreign appreciation for the way in which investment, research, and science the Canadian Armed Forces consult have the potential to improve the 26 local communities and Indigenous lives of Northerners. However, some

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT of these investments and related are expressing commercial, scientific, and economic activities could seek to military interest in the region – and bal- advance interests that may be in ancing new economic opportunities with opposition to those of Canada. Rec- impacts that activities have on Northern- ognizing that economic growth ers, Arctic ecosystems, and defence and and investment in the Arctic sup- security – remain central international con- ports good jobs, healthy people and siderations to any Arctic policy. strong communities, there are also Narratives of China’s rising interests as a security risks associated with these “near-Arctic state” and its future designs for investments that could impact the the region are regular features in the bur- well-being of Northerners. Canada geoning literature on Arctic security and will continue to balance needed eco- governance over the last decade. Many nomic development while ensuring of these Arctic narratives cast suspicion that security in the Arctic and the at China, based on concern that the Asian North is maintained. power will seek to undermine the sover- Discerning ways to proactively engage eignty of Arctic states and co-opt regional non-Arctic states and non-state actors that governance mechanisms to facilitate access to resources and new sea routes to

The Canadian Rangers, a sub-component of the CAF Reserves in isolated northern and coastal communities, are widely celebrated as a military organization that has balanced both the needs of local communities and the federal government, and has contributed to the revitalization of cultural and traditional practices in Northern communities. The Rangers provide an important outlet for Northern Indigenous peoples who wish to serve in the defence of their country without having to leave their communities. Ranger activities allow members of Indigenous communities to practice and share traditional skills, such as living off the land, not only with people from outside their cultures but also inter-generationally within them. By celebrating traditional knowledge and skills, as well as encouraging and enabling community members to go out on the land and share their knowledge and expertise, the Rangers can play an important role in supporting the retention or expansion of core cultural competencies. In turn, the Ranger concept is inherently rooted in the idea that the unique knowledge of Northern Indigenous peoples can make an important contribution to effective military operations. It is this partnership, rooted in mutual learning and sharing, that has made the Rangers a long-term success on the local and national scale.

2020 REPORT fuel and connect its growing global empire. sources, including Asian investors, holds Other scholars have laid out the conditions the potential to increase the relative pros- under which China might play a construc- perity of Arctic regions within Arctic states tive role in circumpolar affairs and Cana- like Canada. As a source of investment cap- dian Arctic development. Positive relations ital to advance resource development proj- are inherently predicated on China respect- ects, China would have to respect the rule ing Canadian sovereignty as an Arctic state of law, Canadian regulations, and the rights and, in terms of the maritime domain, as an of Northern Canadians (particularly Indige- Arctic coastal state with extensive historic nous peoples). internal waters as well as sovereign rights Non-state actors include benign and to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and non-benign entities from Non-Governmen- extended continental shelf. This is consis- tal Organizations (NGOs), Multinational tent with international law, which China Corporations (MNCs), advocacy networks, promises to respect in its 2018 Arctic policy. transnational activists, super-empowered China’s growing interest in polar scientific or rogue individuals, and terrorist and crim- research can contribute to enhanced inter- inal organizations. As the NATO SFA notes, national understanding of Arctic dynamics, these actors exercise significant economic, particularly in the natural sciences. Height- political, or social power and influence at ened but appropriate Chinese involvement national and at international levels. In the in Arctic governance, with due respect for future, non-state actors “are expected to Arctic states, can also bolster regional sta- exert greater influence over national gov- bility. Foreign investments from non-Arctic ernments and international institutions and their role is likely to expand,” heightening the “complexity of addressing issues such as cor- ruption, social and economic inequality and effectiveness of state institutions.” Although Canada’s Northern economy remains disproportionately reliant on the public sector, the private sector is an essential driver of economic growth and prosperity, and business interests and priorities must be considered in contemplating Arctic futures. Furthermore, NGOs will continue to exert pressure and wield influence on local and regional issues, demand- ing government and corporate transparency, promoting environmental and social justice and human rights, and seeking to sway public opinion through direct and indirect action, including social media. 28 The ANPF explains that Canada

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT will “consider establishing Arctic dialogues actors’ roles in possible Arctic with key non-Arctic states and actors, futures should not just fixate where practical, to discuss issues of mutual on material gains in the region interest, … prioritize[ing] cooperation with but also considerations related to non-Arctic states and actors whose val- broader international reputation ues and scientific, environmental and/or and possible moves to distract Arc- economic interests align with the priori- tic states such as Canada. “Playing ties of Canada’s Arctic and Northern peo- by the rules” and exemplifying “Arc- ples as well as Canada’s national security tic civility” can build political capi- interests.” It also emphasizes cooperation tal to invest in other regions of the with “non-Arctic states who uphold Arctic globe that are of greater strategic and Northern values and interests, such importance. Furthermore, foreign as sustainable harvesting of Arctic wildlife behaviour should be analyzed for and the Indigenous right to self-determi- the diversionary value that it may nation.” What mechanisms government hold in a global context, rather decision-makers will use to make these than as tools for power projec- assessments, and how they will respond tion designed to secure narrow, to state and non-state actors that do not regional gains in the Arctic itself. conform to Canadian expectations or are c. Opportunities for closer coop- deemed security risks, remains to be seen. eration with non-Arctic state actors. This includes non-Arctic IMPLICATIONS state allies and partners in multi- a. Growing complexity due to lateral contexts such as NATO and non-Arctic state and non-state regional fora such as the Arctic actors articulating and assert- Council, as well as bilateral cooper- ing interests in the Canadian ation to advance shared scientific, Arctic and circumpolar regions. environmental, and/or economic The huge diversity of actors that interests. These collaborative fall within this category creates efforts are likely to generate new a complex environment where it legal instruments to support sus- is difficult to comprehend each tainable development, heighten player’s role in domestic and inter- awareness of Indigenous peoples’ national affairs, whether their rights and interests, and draw underlying motivations are sin- non-Arctic states into Arctic “ways cere and resonate with Canadian of thinking.” On the other hand, sci- values, and their interactions with ence and resource development other actors. Furthermore, the line projects can serve as vectors for between state and non-state actors non-Arctic state influence activities is unclear or blurred in some cases. that are not aligned with Canadian Canada and its allies will need to interests or can serve to “normalize” carefully discern what non-Arctic a presence that may have unantici- state behaviours are supportive or pated, long-term repercussions. benign, and which signal revision- d. Growing worries about the pres- ist or disruptive intent or possible ence and influence of non-Arctic outcomes, and potential risks or State-Owned or State-Controlled threats they pose to Canadian and Enterprises in the region. Largely alliance interests. state-owned or -controlled corpo- b. Analytical frameworks designed rations such as Russia’s Gazprom to anticipate non-Arctic state or China’s National Petroleum 29

2020 REPORT Corporation may not share the same incentives and goals as their private counterparts, and they may act as proxies extending the political objectives of their countries. Roger Robinson Jr.’s “Long Con” narrative posits that China’s Arc- tic strategy is “based on a term of “SHIPPING THROUGH ARCTIC WATERS IS EXPECTED art used in the confidence racket TO INCREASE, PRESENTING RISKS TO THE FRAG- – the “long con” – wherein it is ILE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRONMENT IF NOT MAN- making a sizeable investment of AGED CAREFULLY. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS capital, time, and energy over an THEREFORE ESSENTIAL FOR MANAGING THESE RISKS extended period to build a false WHILE PROTECTING COMPETITIVENESS, GIVEN THE sense of trust and achieve a more GLOBAL NATURE OF SHIPPING.” – ANPF (2019) valuable “score” at the end of the scheme.” When China sees that it has an advantage, it will turn “the dial to its hard strategy.” Robinson argues that China’s “true intention is to position itself to influence heavily, if not outright control,” Arctic energy and fishing, as well as to shape “the rules and political arrangements governing the use of strategic waterways now gradually opening due to melting ice” for its benefit. For example, investing in a mining site could secure a footprint at a strategic location adjacent a shipping route or allow for the construction of infrastructure to gather intelligence. e. Opportunities for closer cooperation with non-state actors in the Arctic. A “whole-of-society” approach to comprehensive Arctic security, as espoused in the ANPF, reflects the value of engaging con- structively with benign non-state actors. Better leveraging the capacities and expertise of NGOs and the private sector, for example, can enhance the effectiveness and effi- ciency of emergency responses. On the other hand, the actions of malign non-state actors (such as terrorist organizations, criminal organizations, and traffickers) have 30 to potential to disrupt domestic

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT and international affairs and underwater noise abatement require- undermine Arctic security. ments. Furthermore, it could work to ensure that subsequent negotiations 2.5 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND correct the almost complete lack of consultation with indigenous and THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME coastal communities that marked the Since 1996, Canada has consistently previous IMO process. Other inter- referred to the Arctic Council as the national bodies, like the Arctic Coast leading body for regional coopera- Guard Forum launched in 2015, offer tion in the region. Preserving this role important venues for Arctic states to is a Canadian priority. While there is advance practical maritime coopera- no need or appetite for wholesale tion at the operational level, exempli- “reform” of the Arctic Council, Canada fying how differences in other parts of should continue to support general the world do not preclude collabora- efforts to enhance its work, particu- tion on essential missions. “With Russia’s growing drive toward increas- larly through its working groups and Despite the prevalence of misconcep- ing its domination in task forces, as well as resources to tions about the northern polar region the Arctic and with enhance the capacity of Permanent as a “last frontier” without any gov- Moscow seeing Can- Participants (PPs). Ongoing Arctic erning rules, the Arctic Ocean is sub- ada as one of its chief Council research on climate change, ject to a clear and widely-accepted adversaries in this pur- sustainable resource and ecosystem international legal regime. With 168 suit, Ottawa should be management, biodiversity, education, state parties, the United Nations Con- ready for a new surge of and connectivity also factor heav- vention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 active measures levelled ily into Canada’s international and (UNCLOS) is regarded by the interna- against Canada in the domestic priorities. tional community as the constitution near future.” – Sergey for the world’s oceans. Of the Arctic As climate change heightens inter- Sukhankin, The Western 5 states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, national commercial interest and Alliance in the Face of Russian Federation, United States), activity in the Arctic, Canadians have the Russian (Dis)Infor- only the United States is not party, raised important questions about mation Machine: Where but it considers much of the conven- maritime environmental protection Does Canada Stand? tion to be customary international and response, safe regional transpor- (2019) tation, and search and rescue. Canada law binding on all states. When senior spearheaded efforts to create a man- ministers of the Arctic 5 states met datory Polar Code through the IMO in 2008 in Ilulissat, Greenland (Kalaa- (which entered into force on 1 Jan- lit Nunaat), they committed to the uary 2017) that covers the full range law of the sea framework to ensure of design, construction, equipment, “the orderly settlement of any pos- operational, training, search and res- sible overlapping claims” and to dis- cue, and environmental protection miss ideas that the Arctic needed new matters relevant to ships operating comprehensive international legal in polar waters. Over the next fifteen regime. UNCLOS does not remove all years, Canada may play a leading role conceivable stressors, however, and in addressing some of the conten- competing claims and counterclaims tious issues deliberately left out of the to the legal status of straits, overlap- current polar code, such as the use of ping continental shelf claims and heavy fuel oil and its impact on short unsettled maritime boundaries, and lived climate forcers like black car- regulation of polar shipping are likely bon, mandatory invasive species pro- to continue to raise concern. tections, greywater restrictions, and 31

2020 REPORT Canada maintains its position on the legal the consent of the Government of Canada,” status of the archipelagic waters enclosed but added the caveat that nothing in the by straight baselines (which includes much agreement affected either state’s position of the Northwest Passage) as internal on the law of the sea in this area. This “agree waters and subject to a historic title and to disagree” arrangement remains intact, falling within its sovereignty. The United although some commentators worry States counterclaims that the passage is whether this bilateral approach will be sus- subject to the right of international nav- tainable as international interest grows in igation, including the regime of transit Arctic shipping routes. passage through straits used for interna- The adoption of the International Code for tional navigation and has protested man- Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) datory reporting. In 1988, Canada and the by the International Maritime Organization United States entered into an agreement (IMO) in 2014/15 provides an international on Arctic cooperation in which the United standard for maritime safety and pollu- States pledged that “all navigation by U.S. tion prevention for ships navigating Arctic icebreakers within waters claimed by Can- waters. The Polar Code has been domesti- ada to be internal will be undertaken with cated or referentially incorpo- rated by all Arctic 5 states, and Canada and the Russian Feder- ation have retained some prior unilateral rules and procedures to protect domestic interests. Furthermore, article 234 of UNCLOS provides coastal states bordering ice-covered areas with a unique legislative and enforcement jurisdiction for pollution prevention within the EEZ not enjoyed by any other marine region. States using this power may raise environmental standards for ships without prior resort to the IMO, but must do so in a non-discriminatory manner and on the best available scientific evidence. UNCLOS provides rules and procedures for continental shelf claims through the Com- mission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a scientific and technical review body for extended continental shelf submissions (i.e., extending beyond the 200-nautical mile limit) that provides rec- 32 ommendations on the outer

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT limits proposed by submitting states. To actors seek a greater role in circum- date all Arctic 5 states have conducted sci- polar decision-making systems, entific research to support claims and, with they may seek to create alternative the exception of the United States, have structures to increase their leverage made partial submissions to the CLCS. and/or ensure that their concerns Following a submission for the Northwest and/or agendas are addressed. The Atlantic continental shelf in 2013, Canada creation of the Arctic Circle assem- made a submission with respect to the bly as an alternative platform for Arctic in 2019. The extended continental Iceland, China, Alaska, and other shelf claim process has been largely coop- actors who perceived their voices erative to date. This is particularly interest- to be marginalized in Arctic Council ing given the substantial overlaps among and “Arctic-Five” coastal state meet- the Arctic states’ submissions made to the ings is a case in point. While new CLCS and the expectation of several future governance bodies or mechanisms maritime boundaries (including between can supplement and complement states located at the opposite ends of the existing channels, they can also Arctic), but reflects cooperative marine sci- compete for legitimacy and seek to entific research and data exchange, con- usurp existing structures currently sultations among the affected states prior dominated by the Arctic states. to submission, expressions of non-objec- b. Increased requirement for part- tion to submissions being entertained by nership and inclusive gover- the CLCS, common understanding that nance. Although Canada and the the CLCS recommendations to a state were other Arctic states might prefer without prejudice to other states, and the to manage northern circumpolar CLCS recommendations would be without affairs as a closed club, interna- prejudice to the future delimitation of con- tional cooperation is increasingly tinental shelf boundaries. necessary at various levels to address Arctic issues such as cli- Although Arctic sovereignty disputes mate change, fisheries beyond attracted significant political and media national jurisdictions, organized attention a decade ago, there is now gen- crime, safe shipping in interna- eral consensus that they are well-managed tional waters, space and cyber- and unlikely to generate conflict in the next space, and biodiversity. fifteen years. The low-level dispute over the c. Projecting stability beyond the sovereignty of Hans Island remains unre- Arctic region. While commenta- solved – largely because the practical stakes tors frequently refer to the danger in doing so are very low. A more substan- of heightened strategic competi- tial and longstanding dispute concerns the tion or conflict “spilling over” into maritime boundary between Canada and the Arctic, stable circumpolar gov- the United States in the Beaufort Sea, but ernance and security could have a neither country seems in a hurry to resolve positive “spill over” effect on other it given the lengthy process of defining the international relationships. This was outer limits of the extended continental part of the original intent of creat- shelves in the region. ing the Arctic Council to “socialize” IMPLICATIONS post-Soviet Russia into Western liberal internationalist norms. a. Challenges to existing regional d. Upholding the Law of the Sea. governance structures. As At this time there appears to be lit- non-Arctic states, sub-national Arc- tle to no danger that the Arctic 5 tic governments, and non-state 33

2020 REPORT states will lose faith in the conven- Russia and our respective Arctic tional and customary Law of the and Northern communities as they Sea, because they are all net ben- struggle to adapt to and thrive eficiaries. Other major maritime in rapidly changing conditions.” powers, such as China, benefit from Domestically, Canada is likely to international navigation rights In introduce low-impact corridors to Arctic waters. The adoption of the concentrate infrastructure and ser- Polar Code has promoted a sub- vices in Canadian Arctic waters. stantial degree of harmonization f. Resolving Maritime Boundaries. of the national regimes for naviga- None of the Arctic 5 states appears tion, although departures are also in a rush to resolve outstanding visible and ostensibly justifiable in maritime boundaries in the Cen- part under Article 234 of UNCLOS. tral Arctic Ocean. CLCS consider- More of a concern for Canada and ation of extended continental shelf the Russian Federation is the possi- submissions is a lengthy process. bility that the United States might There does not appear to be any extend its Freedom of Naviga- tension with respect to continental tion (FONOP) Program into Arctic shelf submissions owing to good waters. While the intention of the levels of communication, cooper- United States would be to affirm ation, and common understand- its view on international navigation ing on the rules and procedures. rights in the Northwest Passage and Following completion of the CLCS Northeast Passage, it could serve to procedures, the process of nego- harden the disputes over the legal tiating extended continental shelf status of the waters concerned. boundaries where they overlap Given past Canadian nationalis- is expected to occur. This process tic reactions to the Manhattan could lead to friction but, more (1969/70) and Polar Sea (1985) voy- likely, may produce outcomes that ages, a FONOP would likely have a affirm a message of mutual respect, negative impact on bilateral Can- stability, and rule of law in the Cir- ada-US relations which could dis- cumpolar Arctic. If friction were rupt progress on core initiatives to occur, it is likely that the source such as North American defence would be the lengthy time period modernization. and significant resources required e. Safe Shipping and Search and to resolve overlaps, rather than the Rescue (SAR). Despite their unilat- overlaps themselves. eral requirements for mandatory reporting and some deviations 2.6 PUBLIC DISCONTENT/DISAFFECTION from IMO safety and pollution pre- AND POLARIZATION vention standards, both Canada and the Russian Federation are NATO’s 2017 SFA posits that political dis- investing in infrastructure to pro- content arises when citizens perceive that mote safe and environmentally-re- government mandates fail to address polit- sponsible shipping. This is one area ical impasses. Such impasses range from where Canada is likely to restart chronic economic crisis to persistent unem- a bilateral dialogue with Russia, ployment to inefficient social and wel- given what the ANPF describes fare systems. Governments that are seen as “common interests, priorities to successfully mitigate these impasses 34 and challenges faced by Canada, earn or retain credibility, while those that

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT are perceived as failing to address them The NATO SFA notes international actors lose credibility. This is tied to an increas- can harness and amplify political polar- ingly polarized news media that amplifies ization through social media and the societal divisions. The Canadian Security spreading of disinformation or ‘fake news.’ Intelligence Service (CSIS) observes how This can undermine political and social politically disaffected Canadians are cohesion. Canada’s ANPF notes that as increasingly turning to social media as economic development prospects and alternative news sources, believing gov- perceptions of regional “accessibility” ernments and traditional media sources draw more attention to the region, foreign as untrustworthy. Accordingly, “indepen- actors have more incentive to engage in dent actors use social media and special- subversive behaviour. CSIS notes that both ised web sites to strategically reinforce and Russia and China have “developed sophis- spread messages compatible with their ticated information doctrines as part of own.” These messages tend to be “anti-glo- their strategy to… advance foreign-policy balist, with a nationalist and anti-immigra- objectives.” Their goals range from short- tion rhetoric that attracts elements of both term economic advantage to undermining the left and right.” the political legitimacy of Canadian institutions over the long-term. When citizens perceive that their governments are failing to overcome political IMPLICATIONS impasses, this can erode the credibility or a. Widening North/South political legitimacy of the institutions upon which fault lines. Increasing polarization the established political system is founded. and political disaffection could SSE notes that this can drive Canadians to renew perennial strains between view alternative organizations – empow- the territories and the federal gov- ered by social media – “as more legitimate ernment. Issues include territo- than the state.” rial control over public lands and 35

2020 REPORT resource revenues, resentment governments that serves a diverse about high federal transfer pay- population. Furthermore, the inde- ments to the territories, and allega- pendence movement in Green- tions of governments shirking their land could influence Inuit political responsibilities to each other and discourse in the Eastern Canadian to Canadian citizens. Arctic. While the emergence of a b. Frustrations about the Non-Re- similar independence movement newable Resource Economy. in Inuit Nunangat is unlikely in the Although non-renewable resource next fifteen years, voices calling for development is a key tenet of the greater autonomy (and potentially Pan-Territorial Vision For Sustain- supported by foreign interests) able Development, the political pri- could undermine political cohe- oritization of the economy over the sion in the Canadian North. environment could lead to height- d. Russia as the disaffected Arc- ened political tension and confron- tic State. Russia is the non-liberal tation. Similarly, greater friction democratic nation amongst the between economic regulations Arctic states. Growing NATO atten- and co-management boards could tion to the Arctic and North Atlantic bring increasing polarization. in response to Russia’s revisionist c. Competing Visions of Nunavut actions elsewhere in the world has and Inuit Nunangat. Increas- led Moscow to express its discon- ing frustration amongst some tent and invigorate popular con- Inuit leaders with the territo- cerns about NATO encirclement rial public government in Iqaluit and aggression. Russia could use has prompted some calls for the Arctic security as a wedge issue to entrenchment of Inuit Nunangat undermine and divide NATO mem- as a distinct political jurisdiction bers, also placing regional gover- delivering services within Canada. nance norms and mechanisms in The perceived failure of Nunavut jeopardy. could undermine the credibility of the federal state rooted in public

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT A SA D www V 140° 130° 120° A 110° 100° 90° 80° .c 70° O 60° 50° 40° CHINA C H I N A W B a Z CHINE W o la Ural'sk GEORGIA Vasy l T t N C H I N E T y m W ugan 's Irty yu ou h n KAZAKHSTAN s m IE o h e st GÉORG Nap . y n as C a ' N P iseyskiy Yartsev A Y od -Yen o u ka Severo g ym m a l K I N T Y N a T a n a d i m e ob av N e m a n S o d i k h sk o M n A l's a ts at en s b a k a e s U - v y D y a ri k f o a y e n - a o r od a D mo ' b U r O y u h r R B S a a ra tre n T r a S

o a z s I g l v h b' ' s U r b a ev k v av b ' a V p a y an T oy l o a . T it sk m V A y o i t

p h k u o e c u iy l r a a vs n da i g

K o B h n ra o k S m gu V a k h Nizh . s sk A g s a y ë nev Cy la 50° iy t s re nd ny Ar ka artov rt a pa ra D s A s I s u y or ray k M ye d o nu r o m T g uy Muto egio A vs n o a or a d EY n d -A N ele F Tu k Vo -D o v P ykit D /ra N lg n o a Ba iz a a N e y h S n s n / n - a t - n u Ta i V a v r ai k n f g y o ra o K s O ya g E d t tr ' a un i A g a n Su N E S il o p h o e u s S l 'm l ka-C l rgu fte o kh V l S o e o ul e n Strel s e t yu s' ra o a R s m h k hë e Y ga va r n tki r u m c n K il n P a a s N o C g u i ro s a rbo y k K s sh sk to e C e T m h h c o Y R v v m a i a h y P o ym nt a e e a u P y ra L - S / K M / L a ha Verkhn y n im eimbatsk am si sk N ys P C U k sh n Y P e a e S u l' L i li e e y of z r K s r I n z ar o a o m zh a a l A y o v m vo ' e K n v B m vo O s o k ay v a v Se o K oy sk Oz s z Vereshchagino iz e a A Nizh el n k nya B V ' r - ya Le dk v o sk P r hr Me ov n k in da ngu N ol Iv ez Ch k z

45° h s n m arig Tu ska oya un de K So n e s' A a b i K z n T d ëk In r's oc l' ra li Ak rm et d' i l l y k O T k i

u l a A O ny k h sn a a o o P n z n

Y a ta E a Noginsk tya o Y ov m m z e o

h lm b y i s n T D r N r e s a k s A 's h k z a ' k ura k a e K a m l a T K o S v r R o u i yy ye e ' s C b p S y r n a r s k d o a ir P O g y h o t t t M m m z e in o m i e s n y r R v P o u hu y m e o S k b 55° h 'k a r m S c gr b' a o z s v o a e Kostino d eb a - r e v e Lk S y h r m n o li e a o c a etta o y Y s n r v r sk a T o Kh ye la a ro et u d b K V z Ta a K o r o p rk N I s U u i o- a O h y V o m G v T a Sa y M G r A i r le a k n p - ur T v a a - a ni A u e v y K r o v a kh u L l n - i D n Turukh an Pe o y N ir O D rk - na ansk ch K o P ora v p la N N a k G e N ern G o i h s L Ur Sev ay z K v ba engo a B a a vg h e a lu ur Kure y d er S k n y d y Vilyu yka y e o o i g U y ' z s t y m r A a N o O o l a S b v 'v a o o N ta o d o h ovy ry a y r k C y y P O i Ur N p Oz e ' V i N M Y ng ad a E oy y o O b y Mako m V m n k a e vskoy a e l O l o '

n h s y W D r n k y r a c a I a u n u u a h l y y k Y z 50° n y l B M i i M d t y e a k a s v h i y k s y l e e a Ny a o g s Igar s d S R n g n D ka B y l r a T d v i A A i h ’ I y u l d k o a s r k o v r r k e E o a r K a l li e e s l ’ h h it ty la a v r

h k y a N s s i Dy V u h a y s a v o o k a s B k h l k s L y v y y k y K m a Z n n m o il A k a Taz o y o a S i S t a i r V y Khantays y ovs a K -P r d la l k A k e koye a kiy B M a u E a o l' a o yy r S uz S ec Il T rë s g g n O K a h y V e ' P h l O e c u Vdkhr ek i n h d L m k a h h o E a N O N d R a S s uy K y r i a A U r N a t y e d a s Y m a h M y u l t ' k e o n I k a k i a a m r k a y V k b L L G r st m 's O Y a o v K o l -M S ta në I by N ra a o o vo ol o ga A ' a e u tn a P D K o d u t l P t K s h y Sala Oz otapovo T TA N an A 1 ro ec la n v R o al - O a ZO g 8 d P k U a Z ts rga VSK G ov i 9 n ho s a to K R z y U 5 a v h A Keta IY y R y r U I s m o P m k s c a O or a a a h o p T ey T R a v P t U e R K N L ess P U A h OL t E a a s U m a t r inde yu Y O N k OST O Y u n T Noril'sk ya k RO z h a G A g V g A a Y u z r h A 678 m o V ar 'y Iz I e ' V U T L 1 ss y to ro s h l o C r P D t o n v K i udinka Me a ro o K m k m amen' ye Kh U s la S s U r g ra K a s a k s O n Ă V

h n a i Go Oz l'm i a N A o a g l G e n r M ry V I U ik y an i K Oz uba r S sk U a B YI IŞ O a S o Lama Y V s Y H k ° l d S U u o E k K C D ' ' t st'- r sa t s 5 y l m u Pyasin Port k U '- n t E n a o a u T K a i a a t y ta ra o d L u k 5 S a G r o s b d Y D ech i s g y r O l B k A B a P l' l o he O s a N S m a l R e ' E P A a l r s A n n k Karaul K I Y K a a n o o oy shc e ga u në a ey y v k V k li v M L M b l s t i e a i d o T h M l n m ur o in Z O i a Y a Y U S b ani ya f o a s n r G K K y hr l' ts y a a Na a a O S o R e y

y T pa R a k y n

m lko P t P S s s in y O n

o Y P vo s O K m odok n m V h I L i o a K e P O U k L U I s V le H g a O Y a v M c ka L U S a O t o k da y S Volochan O S T y S e m tan d h a T R k R T D v S w O e n N a a d a O V O a R o o k K R i s V U O N p ly p h a l G s V K a a e i o a h A K a n a t'- h r r ah a b O y a a e ts k K a a Ag Gyd Y A u Ka y 'y m h M Y an M r p a y ' k r H g ta ska A b a G u n h C y z a e A K o a O a u d p PO L M b y - P i d M O u B y V y a r M n s ë P k U o d G s r S D H R re n ta M uba Be A k a z ts S kh e u a r I e ug u t e Go A l m a a e K u a h l'chi Y M u y y k kh s v K K D a e Y h d a y s a n m ur O i e N e e a y U r - n t a l Z R E e ska N r k Za i ya N m P i S P k z k e a Okh E s T M o a e s p M a A s h b t r a ota V l e Gub U ch n s y e R y Y r s i a e ine a d v A n o n P ga y B s V g G r y 65° o t ts i n e É ki A a u sk T a g a s i A e a a Y n r V e n g z Z ya tan y ba ay ob ya o g vn W V e C i a U ha z a m e M a s t D l ° l' K z Lab P O e P l y L R i b E O R I o v e y V 0 d n e M y r T h M M U a k o a d s o at' E S K ov s 6 s li P ig h l L Iz h v O a e m k n T e a ' k y B K O U c s e i a k n Ku o e l iy S ay y ë a v L h E e n y o k d IN S n n t i k ' P i o

i O o z l lo o e e s sy v s h e r M

v h l noy a ya na P liv rs C e Soya d k z ye y V go a U a k O a Po ryb r P ro ta M k h M na k o h o s ro o o v y r h a pi vo y M P ro o ë s r z r d o n tr o a iv e a dz dy h gay No Po e Vo o omorskiy s l' e e e o p y s N ar R 'v V y U U k m Dik yë iy r y P G h v n z v d e ' t a L In la A so la k e s N a e a o d s S s y y y R n v rs e k I y e O z a

R y a a roliv u g O P o hov s A ya a k n khnya a Y P b a a S o L y olk u h s Bala M K a a y N k n tr S S V o R a a a a T Y v a r S y A o a A s a e vi e ' L D -K t b ha T M hik n h g P r vo z n a l’s a Men's K e a k e ' o O e e n o z r s A s r v B y e b A a n et ud l'm É

y E a i V a u O k h I g d l V G n n y t O M G ay s r T o y a R ny A O k ve or C u B a k n c y Z S T h G R v ns ba o a g rb u h h O k N Pyas T o i u a P g e e A y a T a B r insk v y t a z y U e A iy Z S n y o ' e

sk Yan y o uo le i L V aliv O o D G p h e P O a s n Ue O R U r o z - a m r tak ta k P M L e oy t s t y h lu O o k d k il s M G a o kh s R a P n v k n p re u y p O u k u ik r y C V s o d a v B A b r B v g y Y l o e hs a n O B ë d renk h h o K S le a d m u n r h ë M r M oz v g v a y e y o n m z er o o u in a e s L l ki N y B S m r e e ad r k a n e z a k r r Ya -O rs iv a a N e z L e s D a i n n o u e ' a l t y y o z P v A e P a l y t b a T Z y o n E P r s a s a Z i O g O a S O m o K n U n a o z k A I U B O I V liv k N A r h el y s g N I K a y a h e a P r A Z n a m - z e V u N O e i y n y o B V o I N an n u ' S K ÉO r sa ik O M lu n O IL G s T a I y a a t R k v K y a o T V P d ' N s er E O k A a rd s M y e m N e O d N s i - P o a V v h s y lo A T y y a r D u H T t N o o y a L A D O y a U i y gy M y k ’y Y h o e E k S ° C T i y h u n B s L U o o a g k L a o N a N r k ' u as st I s d z o i M k t H y N K L n v a 5 a nd k M Y n G h in m ar un al e 7 b o G i a a ë T y o u n m T a i h o o K 6 d g b y Y n rski e n e e G T I K B A U z M e ir a I e iv iy a my r t y b y 0 a O K u c v H ka u K l l k Tay Zali t a y r u L L u T b S h S O a s R y v M e ° K G V o A o o R E B E e G K V Z ir idd o v G M l I b m e M A O y z o le e - O i liv ndo u l f N O p r a m nn y r YK S Za rfu C Z u M s f E y u k P y ' o O y M M a S s e O I P o A k ak B r M Fusa o Y l 3 h h u y r M l e in I T N N A S a y N s a a B V t B i v N S r I r 0 c O a o v y K S W w h y k e s g h e y y i o - A A ó M G t r o 0 a P a u g M r S es E Z k N y y m z G e s u M n o ' v f E A U . S ra K t 3 g M o N t i G R S T a A a A G a k a y h Tr o y a L V r d I I T D A K n Y S n y s ev C y o O O a N R I FÉ s ' s S l y W h h Y o K S i l O a e y R y n o p lya c h e G s v K m F O L i P o m h R i E R K z d a k ryy ya Ze a u r u S T a i T D k C a va m a S E

E M - u n a n y y N No s o F n S I ' a s a M S n S s e E S V F o a v Y i er o e

t t a n h ta oy r o n O z n i l U n h i n l a D K O y h h v o M y er li R O s s K k K k e a k U O z e n N a P y a h h - iv y o i n N k r u h l L I z U y s z C z B c Za S o p P l N h H I n k i o sh K N O r k o a d LL IA ód

K o H y v h a u u i eya R u e s T A S Ł c M i O u N h dd us k o P z v n T S a o c t T s r B c a v s o U . N l F i h o a m V t n al k s v o a i d R D s o Z r o D r a o i l p l m R s a l o Y a M P ya G y o a o e a FE l r Nu v a y L K a d s a c Z a a k k ez v u ė N o L i i er G u N i A h o s c l T a h e K I ip K a v O n a n h D b o s l i a R a v ne K l a E t a T e c ch M a nes a a k a n K - a a y ve s a jän N W h a Z in n G K E Y k r Y h a a l a äi I t h n y y y in Kl ' M k a a P S k k k a l e a y vy rb M j L d N M a r m a s d a a a u c b i o e M u r s T B h o P K y n t ch s r n K E g y i o s N G M a A k h ga V o k a H o / in v B c o e e b h o

r i p m o Z g s Kr S M V M iz ik i m s K t D po k lin O a o n e n t n o n M o g s a h Z a o r l y l h i g M M o a o E a K L E v m z a M a l i r u H a y g o a n r N ö j e e l e k v o a a S O o K Y in k Z d i G y a a m e a e ng ã O k s o h v r z p v m v l A a a s t l a K v K S h u i e v a e u la a e a ie i y P K y l k l e B O A H ' g a A L y T l v z M he il n z l S M o dr i it re p o ' C V h o e v o a o i a e a l K o iv y i r r p z s m i a o O ° M ol a y z K an I ä o k V a r Pr k z Ke zc l o o m i L luj E am sk s r a z e s j s g - h v S I o u ń o 0 Z 0 ' T g t l a i ' a a v iv r O a d w l l k D A t v k O a a d y la 5 O a a T e k t 7 Z ulo o a i G B c T i T m a y m d i o 7 e s m i k N N rv Se r A k a t p ' l - e v ä u W P a k 's v j l i i 4 h u d k h a l l o iki s rk c U a o y o a K l e o e t o i e e y K Z A ä u t c a Y s k a y a Y i T l n g In a ednyy s i a d d h M g N qu S h o k M k v a p a I y i s i u POLUOSTROV u e g k s a v Y n r B t a e s a v m n d s S o I e ä L ań l S i ir h v t t H ij al n nE S h u s k a Y y k r e o C l oz m k o l v c B y a s g a a t M A m u vi P a B u L i e Kly a B e r i n n T o o p a 7 Y O ä P n o k r b y a p l n R P l' F K N j r k e i h u l vi a o k u e n r p h L t o 5 V KAMCHATKA a h o l V a p s e k ä a v Me g k r i k j t P g l e z K G u a v ° O a i i h o o La b e P r l a u a y y r N L k I i

a y h u n O C m b i P i a te m r k d a a z y n t i n s e ri h i d O u i h R r e o Ke K o v M G C T a P g s m P Z e m n i

c G m A t j a O G a r T e e ok r r o F i k N D k i H N Kork v o a z r r lo u a m s M od S v A ø f i V m s s o i o l d j K a e o a K t n l i I v i y I i d a o k v s r o I ä n n Va LM a i o a n l r n a y r B V r y a o O i A K a n n d a k v T a H D P t m h Z o l k a s Q r n K U g n a h a e ij i a R Gulf o Å C c f s k i ä r d B c i P a r ic r n n r oth a O t n G y v a o ni tr T h s O h S a v K i In S i a s S a m e v k n Ö en in a y y k L z s li e jo ri e k ec i u h a a T U i v t o s a v ar cz t o y A i a r U a l l å Kv Kalmarsund z y S s h n o e c l i P l K a O O M r i K ä å k n Y G s i n e u e G c S o i rd k rn L å ft olf ie - K e n i G G o o u o de Bot r G r n T e e r m ' u n ’ j l y u T b F h a s it el a n ma y O t e u P a a h t P k l re l a P B O v a R R a o A o en S a la Ka B i z b N k l r g d U ö s s o O B 's g a r i å p ä e K y r a e O v ha u B jo k e p M ng o R S n M f e U ya o n E i b U a V ' o o a a u t n m Gäv p r / O r a n n le ö RK l P n S z l b n o n o e e U bukt rk n MA ’ V n a d n e r N M g a ë i o n ) E e v d n E r n o K v Y s u T l o h (D R z K E n M r n s r r h s r B e a e å N A i z i e A n l r g o EM i ä e s o h G u ° e T k v te n N N l e ö i A n o B o a eya T x n v n l ä s p lm D LI l v l O R Alaz t rd e l r G ä ö R i s O y G 5 kiy en i ä a V k a s e i E l a es t o l v n s E v ki a tich a a d N rd l v ä H s Li g B k s nn n m y y 7 rc n o n l d a Z ik a A i e y fj e a ä ä e n t M i i o m a M n e a k u te s b t S n e y v n d en t O l C k n a s d e k f r k r K e l o a o t k u n o r e a s u t o a m lm a n h o La p j v u k i e jä v G A a r uvu p f a lli k l n v H u o r g a a lt o ä L o l l I y C n J P e l'p y ŋ k t A i G n Z y a k r o e sa rd l e e v ä V r k e l o ä A v K O a sk a a r o A o a k l n br tter mö M l iy o l V å N t r v lu a re n al A i G e y S B u S ä l Fa Ö M N v c l a D O u y U N N K na o a a M t e D R b ' h u n ä S K Za a e t n ir s g A h y e t K S e pin Y ’ e A a a s m l ö d k A c o o t nk ta oc l y e B B i i y y t K f v a Jö s ost A S A S v o r h r l alm N R a o e V S I p e y S U d H IN N r e s N v i ä n HA Ko r k m ja N M K e z ’ k n l g E Yu O l v s m Si or B zhn M K z e s S a x I b KØ y a g y A N r or O o r u n H W in e f S a n s D f A N a er el O n n o t a O et n n H r b R S yu B C ri en v F n Vä ngø R K e y l a e i l E A s A 8 h E e ls Y A y k N M y E B ke p n v He G A v u e T n y i jø p l v E il A zh y iv 0 d o ng D l rås ic e l r L ä o o h n n jo a E l B ik ek N ro ° f n N ä i y o n ks æ nd a l G ly y P Ø Kv u V m e rs d a g t o C s S ste n r d bor y Kam h h k o Ö sjö e r öte M r t bæl v en a s er m B ø to te G at e sk ' sk a s S s s teg e oy n l iy om U ä t or a e i k r Ö V Ka St O n o K A T ve lyut k h Am É vik anno k z s È or v B b r H sk a M S a iy a n O rc N D e

o st h r E ns rg l e e

y rovn ik I Od Hambu a u o n

P y ye i de renen L T N n fjor ana a G ns A L Z A ° nd odø i R m LO rse aliv b 0 A B Mo lå OS Ho y i (N V G Oslofjorden en y 8 ORW es a Brem K l M C A AY tf øen Mjøs alborg ARK L O a Bo S / N jo osj mer S A ENM lyu O Bili l's M OR rd M am D tor M bi ho G E V leh k M skiy no y B BA rik ÈG en Lil a ARK Olyuto OL aran - U a R E t E sos N g EM Shi rskiy YUTORS R ov E r te ) am a e AN rsho PO KIY N k N ik re n N heim n r D v Ridge LUOSTR o e k T s t le rond g r rg D OV Y Y D S e s ku T a sbje nds orsa eropo r e ns a yjø O e k E Blåva le S l n S l P B tr lg eø n N B hirshov A A ua L e dg sise n uk n ch o E A t O E ann e H au h O N R IN A e låm isen R g K a R PO t B art and G V . a Sv å ns ora Led d KYTT i S nn O L Kristia yanaya Mar y YK c L d sfo n W Attu S kov r' M g S A g e n 2562 m o ustf n jord sfjorde a o Ko o e I on orf dheim R A y n n S K N a St Tro a es LAND a t m B Y tr esn ETHER k a V d N a v O Bu O s A ru Lin N kh t g N ta b S N Us n s a N ata a t' o ve SI li C u N o È S i ha u S 8 S A d BA y un P B nsun YS- I a g Y ti a ro 5 ris PA G l a iv I N K P n A N G e P A n h o n A l vek PO N ° ye GI e L b E n e L r rde o B C uk E E A N ea W lsfjo E S I hta k o y R da f D M I g s r ez S N n O Rom j h h en o N d n el V S o r

O eva U Pev agskiy E opp L urg Stavange

e s t f M M ys k n I sb nd r Nizk E to m s nt esu j T iy a f Ål d S o ° P onn New 713 den jo Bare o M

N f 1 en DA r e t r n R Ozero Bela LA B es o rd Bok fjorde AMSTE y Mukh 5 I A V j n d na Kras a omor d v N ef e e N n A U oye noye 8 R a jd n nna e a rd H i E onn i hlfo S rfjo au a f W a Sto Bergen g V N ård Holted n esu A g

A T s a n n T B E e G R S Å g i STADLANDE d l n uba No e ik l'de E r w a G L G WRAN i o onni L a m N Folgef y d d P und Khaty a S AIN les rka a y Ta PL L -Å O nyu a el' g Ny N VØ rjøkulen r re ym A D IA een ardange A r v t e EG ostedalsbr H ' g R J a e e IN o ORW I a M IN N PL N R y P E SS G l MA r BA A P ' a KARO B s o TE L Zaliv P V A a h AU AT Y BA n PLAIN EA P Meynypil'gyno Onemen A I S S l DUMSHAF VØ nadyr' M c PLAINE IN e s U E Billing P S R sa e IN WRANGEL O R Ugol'nyye Kopi t B IN HAF G S e a a i MS h e L DU r t A d PLAINE N o v g E S S E G

Laguna Anadyrskiy C S IBE g A u n E A I RI

K o N A a C e

Lim R V Keyngypil’g an m O x E yn L R O

M Zapadnyy E R P k t g M A v T E LA M Navarin i e H A IN A k Beringovskiy u l V C K e r d u N o r d n A N M e o O U P M Guba Gavriila e r R LA R N N o r v è g e t K IN O l AI M e r d e a Mys Barykova m P E E V U PL y H SE S e a C S N A d Mys Shmidta G Sovetskaya U S IB S E A E D n A R D d f K RI ORE O s a 1096 m o R A S e B B LON s F R i d g e D o g D ys Egvekinot r E v R D o E NE N liv Kresta I r M Za T e r n A A s N i ul'tin y L s N nadyrskiy I e a l o P L D n A e l d N V Ushakovskoy S e e E N N a n I a d M r E A l ye A e M A e e A n p n u R L L a g Lerwick k e r Zaliv e s É o G P N i Rattra ENGLAND t r y H a n v G M ead I t E M Leeds r r p R B e r i n g r e M s e E d r e a a e n i e R d M i n m m e s o l a g r a n G o J Bir o e T l l H d d o Aberdeen r b J E h e n s N e S N r e e I o e a e Y y n a Bukhta T S K I Vankarem s A r Kir I U K O M l L kwall H C N y U e d C r s P u S e a H s t Manche dera e ster Rud karem UK v o u r c D F una Van C 16 r p Lag H d o a E P I 0 r n o i dinburg S 2 C j r Du h E L * i r r ndee ( A LAIN L s a n f IN P S s t V F M 1 YE e a h E a ga m e rin L o p Live Be E J f d l rpool M 9 r e L A D p P u g l a ELF L EN e ub A W e ya G SH 8 I m u d A hinska HI N M s r d o O V uc C E i u n S T R Koly UK C V s C E s e O H H Y r L U C 1 E g A B P O U EL I e G o Inve dak KC ND o u g rness n Z U E J B - HI M r i NIT p N E I o or r D 2 E dka KI IN n s e p N il’gyn A i p n p GD p 0 L r Neskyn a P a l Gl Laguna S e 8 o r a SCOTLA asgow 1 K n J C Wrath ND i o an M deniya k c h 5 ° d (N ay WALE niya Provi h u 0 HI PLATE s ORW en more P a Provide C CHUKC AU T ° 5 M AY/ ors R Fort W ) a a P t NO D le illia s ukh 8 n R m s B k S V J id o ørkap ÈGE) an g T ROY p e h iy j c e p M e e AUM otsk ino r E- k l a U hu p i A d M N C a n a I M Ch h F CHU a oye c EAU KCHI v r y i v T K o No u k PLA D e S nc h l e o Z n torno h A D m w C I p c a j ay L a r H o n f s e T tiy e n m i órs i en KC r r hav t Bel avr M HU h e ar n t fast a ll y L B u Atk be nski C C r F k t l e d Gam higm E jo æ e ec M s r c M a n M Zaliv OR d k p a C N e r i O E-F a S a (D nc RTHER AT p F ENM h N va PL K ARK Upright len zhnë l e n E DANE / IRE C e e M L B U M D e R d e IC S ARK) AND DUB E

n y LAN I LIN

N e e I I d r PLAIN i a D R E Malin D i e O n IND t PL Hd W d O H M g ORT R 2 d v T A r é N g PL T E r E D AU e 0 o S R t A r 0 u n T O o E M N o D A A E F WIN 7 AU i ORTH g D B j R t Strait ope PLAINE N n L A Ja IC E A t e e y L L E F g C ince of Wa Poin Pt H urn l t F LA A - t r l d e s R e b O F n s P . N i hea C s e Lis * le m r D - D t p . u h ou pe C e O D W I r S o n e N R B d H a N E s e ér I e d h F p A A LA as I B in d T c L ND t g n a e L ta P heas in h m s p s CE E uk ort hw a p c t s I N u rt n IC m o A h a A e o d A e N N a a a l B I o k R ap ale i k J r IF L C C r No Dors 8 r H s G a S AND e rth b o S S a E nc wind Ridge I n z k A pe 0 h e j M t S I m M ° n k Co P W n r ° c F a k ar u i s a V 0 m e a e d l i r n t e n ct s F f H n S l or 8 m r on l e o u p u d a o ia r t tu ó N a N n l l e ø F r es ey C t n c F a u i ka n C l aus u b y I j r S o od Ic I A m o n or t i Þ ps R c i d h r r c is ta C e A e e c s ti Se ðu C l L s e s l y r C n r m fj ði an z L C S C i r s ör sf c D C L e he j r ð jö ohi t h d o e O Ra ur rðu M P is C t c u r e t e C t A c r . o f e o h l S s a m oatak g o f e t K o r rh Vo O f o N ri A v al g öf p nzo N D w A e M e t e n na a R K n lin r l n t fj Au om A k i k D y W r ör s R W ta a n D o s ðu tu C E a W ra É A o kulsá r rh me S o F A B y t G Jö á or y N t l M i i F n Ba k No pe P M es s t K q w j r u ho t ilne r r H ö e n C N I F t a ú l H op ka od e A ce d 'Cl a an le q e sa l öf o a o e D S F e r r r v u n C H l G u D A h p A í A b w t o k y e o n A Peterse e d li G a m k B a tz w rr n I lf i C t B a B o o N C c n e S d r a d e n t nu tr ton A K r B C A Sh t Ic si I Ina L a t Ye e In o a l p V ll S or U B in u lver l l a ha N NS o to f l ck B a a Ak I tna A n q n I P et l S u C j de n N e B l H ig r ök E en ak E Serson a a K l ey H u M li on P R Ice S H n uf ri E va ll C in m Sound t hel si v jör nna rw o ird m rby i le f as i ðu L 2 da (UN o t E v n a a s r 1 ls IT C C B D ik I E N Philli B tt D S A 19 hnú ED e p e m N k K C w s e m E t a s I A I m i a N k R IN n B le l K a n 16 g u O G r A r t i n e e 26 d é a r Y D ush A I ik S L 2001 r fj D AU OM k D é ö M / P k F a Ma e ol aw o ea e t rð I E-U g st el D u P r g r S u N R la a b d A C B ea n r S I) il y S L ourn rb N k H V P a u e Ba e a o a O

B h B B P K g of in ig R i h e D at L sj a t B ka nta nb k th A hild B c e i r á A ök C s e k i ud r G r t angaj u la ou D A l m l A K na N u m n * e a N l U M C n p S C C A ts nn N to k Tho c H B A e N r i t mas he d ök ú lö D o R p t H n n C ll N y Ik e ubbard N r ° ul a du E L a lk A QUTTINIRPAAQ u l fl L D a a a 5 ó ó R tan B k i s R ku t u H R n V OC A L e C e d 7 í B e p C 7 ns F p k O kl k d s F D H KAL la O e d tto a o A a sh ke 5 e O d rn C n R s l U e a B e F C a L N as he T L ° B n e M K m t u K P i i n k e PL w e o ken r n ý A

k B v S r kok Y u k o C is N M Fd a c Í dal AT a s O ei S I s L e e u n r gh v H a s K y o r e nd j D a l t n d z f ö E L m B r l a I I e m jö k c d a H i Pt v H a e C r i l rð ul AU f i a r s T l O n o ss l r p io n Sermers r u L n o l d s i uaq a r angj A

se r e G F s B k s C o S r y C s R K (H O w R r eel a s umb

U m ne ly y a e oldt he r ök T a a r f u R h d o ñ g r c ul B n o H a B e Gl k E S T n e o B g o etscher) s e l PL p n Y i A k w G u S a a t K a v e urek n a K A e E A i e O AT

im s ch N y e l d e f J e a a o a M F K l ð l

n s C S üller N a a C n A U Pa t B B n R h A a v L N EAU

h e B I p d D í V l s u F e d c G a k

ls ig a u e e ac e e N a ÍK E a B G C h Ice Cap o A r C x

F k i k o e B C se C P n L f a a a P a M n S a R l gi v r h B hanene K A E j fl R R OC y a h a o o o e d L C ll ar n -IC ö ói e H f B t T K yu n u e e o i D yk I o d e k o r o c a s ja KALL nk ol s u o M h y a AN r A D a i P p e L n C C a n B C P r r k D d S C o c GREEN E ð es A t M k d t T G B B m A ld a l N q RIS u á ak M 0 e n M ur y IC T L ogi e 32 d ra P IV a D r E E T ut 2 re 'C y rin u IS N L O A / B a li ce r s C A A m R n s A L N er et A A R m L s t ian s GL E N n e e S ll e 7 o B G t he IC l n l t o S C e a c us U s c u - D k H D M I d n a t i l K 0 e a a q i s N rt skokwim R m d St f M a t r LA u K A l Steacie o u o K E ) ° a r s a rs ) EN B P l A y W e e D A m Ba r e RE E E E ant d a d ll l G A a s y e r

M C o t h l U U n l Ice Cap f g S

a g R C a f s s d Chr A a F é in d e G e t h s o N n I B l i S Q N e n l t d i i N i i v F I t e M ey k S o D a t y S 1994 f n r e l r ) a e e e P O R a P n a D e D G r n a e t n r d É S m * c n n B c S a t n h K e k G in e S c c r a M t r n u q K A n e d d M n s S i a E a r d I a t a U e g g i i a H a T 'A T a a r n E n le a h e g r a R t s A l M s B a i or u k k T D E il t T Q G N t r P N a e L V P e o P al T P h S S n y bot p A k E ic kn I c in M e u v B a D N i rlin f p f am Haz a In N K N E t e if C lli tr m t i m N n A T -U rc b r e u M w ait orwegian n s I A M l Q I o a I S A G P o itz Str NE inso le n o N lm n N T am m ri u F tr BJO R Mak u e E of a m a n ld S M h e H S g S ia (U A y F h m c Ba PEN Inlet B /T t L U char in Il T le l C 0 b e C y th ik S L N v I k e K É in e t 5 e a i uf a ni L B K 7 r A W Be tt Qimusseriar t q A u M r lc m i su ig e L c 2 e lf M 1984 he S P ik aq A s a Ch M B re ro t r C iv i Lak t m v d t i han s N u s B E 4 t ' n is L D t M 19 a e n e C v G A 6 ( s P a q / a T n o C A L a k d le l * nson S Innaangane q v S A n s u e y u e Bay Ma a æ Ø p i S e k h nn ydkap u r a t ek N n Y r G RINNE S ield s b A K t IN n S IVVAVIK a L L f r K i k ba rt e Ice Cap Ice lo Is R t a K r o 1 n y l r D N L k i F 9 S u k R N ha Fa 8 PEN K in A A e ’ is A R 1 t iord g I th S 1973 r e F R S Sh am VUNTUTFir e t Gris M n L U

e Y i à G a li K i a r W L A ko ay sk itn P nz 2 a Gul ( N K N A

f o on f e i u Lidd s B k us R rc e 0 i o n e La E D i S u 1 t l J d

k N i e p k 0 AULAVIK DU l West y E a l k P A * A y v 65° in ) E ND i d A D N S ook Inlet c y N A u n u n n (

U tr C a e ir e ac y C IN S han Fd S o n L o a S s B n r C R U g ot M B a K LA C C ti S °

i d r t e P h n t t k K B o r i l e n t na o m O P e lle a 1962 v 5 S l y n n a q Q Ke a ta ld n e l ie tt am n Devo rn a 6 a T n A y T l S i P o l s y C æ q v r LA e e n s I p e n r I a C p o e A U ag ik D o in l u y T B e Ca a U n b e la ld S r ti r l o a S h Ic a i e m EN N o n c n o in K h a R B Is r i S o K I h K m n k e lh B e a m s A k H N c r u a w c s s ch e Pt * n m ia E n A At s a l i sag R n m a P J n F g s Pas v A od t A o M u D o e Y n u a il T K o C a r T o r Ha es Str l Pt i U h i I rm t u R C p r f Wal Pee t Melville Sound Re POLAR CONTINENTAL f s k q a B er H n M k r bo e o T iscoun solute L f d ob a d ti e R t e B c V SHELF PROGRAM (PCSP) / r M r t l R o u in un a o k v a hi U al c y iv ay r r u E B j a ti w W G n P A a P Ric niq PROGRAMME DU PLATEAU N e F J r a Se n h k Eskimo k L / ha / q e iv le A e l I t A k In r CONTINENTAL POLAIRE (PPCP) N d a t t É A G r av n Lakes u a PR d C 1947 Ba A ol n a Ik r C s i u k m h IN ol rrow C H rpo n s e e o k v ay ra C lin S ive st e a s it g T nc i E H trait L r i N ri N n k B u i so nd C u i l u P am H C k AL n ter Sou ath mm u g n li n I a Lancas B a l il in BE W * ter n u I n a W d L y d l B z k l a P RT n C Clarence N Wa i U n q K Sd m n l C a e e G o s E f i e ld T T e b Walker N at rd a f gi k p A B I B t y i a s ank n to NS a ufo t v i I i V ii r ay n U y M Om a e y ut a p s v P g m d r l u a C f R F B n L ann B ng B u i O E e A e C n n u Q i r e r o Kangiryuaqtih y n qu u ' I s a

o e e h y y k / M B o ia e in C t r m M t u N u

a p l t e o In C Ba ay a le a É N a B n p v c L y t y Arctic I q t n U o

v i h P G t r d a r o o D nl D y n d on u f O a C I l l q P u e T i A S d C a c u M e q l r R u i a s C o w l ar K O a ivik I j t r e a N n is n t u C U R t l a D g r Nan iu Inle ta Q D i s a q 60° s u f n J e a d r C U E t T on f e a a o M k g P l i G N l N t u u

n i u N o m G q s R r k E e e a s e

h S l C n C y d a r O a d a S c r l EN SIRMILIK h i Q A s p

T u e D c a a É P e R B a k s e O u d u p

e E w B

k TUKTUT a q t N k n A B A l a A o e A r B e c q r c i / k a l I C d a q k R n l R F k e O

s S B P y BRODEU u i o s P A K F g n L t s l to g I

k NOGAIT U e b a s I r NS u t t a e e o i C i ENI aq ib a ik u n N T n

r H P P rn p a s n e c G

A l a P n e r u a a s a e t H

v e o A A h aq a g a K p o G n B i g S M l P n p

A e l b N u q H o n o t N

r l r e a q t a o z r i t t

y a o t K a

E d n e

N C y il d r D WO Sd C S n PENINSULA ng w r

l i u e

C t ta a e

e o L o a L n k e K s

r r H o l LA N g n r H k L

e r p o C e

s o o d S r Scor v C

I w esby i u

n P T a e n e Y s h n A s c p E O y i R S u

a k i a i N N Ba l G e o l s t e n IN y t lyd r l g S

i c y S C e r

n r C n R a U ankrai u p L r W a e e t Lo m C g U A ol n A F St rottesley Berlinguet R D D B d l g

9 S R v C f KLUANE a R R M 5 u il Inl f t n l Icy B 9 r rm le U W et Ber In er é u 5 w as nie t a i a K M i L n Si hb r B a m T P o a E m u K i a v a io p rn o B y t s K

M D s c k s BO a nr v i e k e e n on L OTHIA f r e r S

G a s h s O N G R by ne H O a 1904 s t L L A o r r e Ba teen s C o i

A k r a rm e S y Pasley S Ice s

P U u a t B B Ca s Ya c n N a L t r W In p e i ku d e W C Albert P o m

tat B N ti i n a B R elli elly J Ho t a o n l W k e ng ard Pt P o y

H l i t dw B a E l T n g e a v on E * NINSUL a q

C a y e K e m A t B a A A Fury a q Y i B K l G Sm r u r C 1831 h nd Hecl ju B S

A a n Y ls ith A g B r e C a S r o

' I e a r rm lu K t s M i tr ta ts ts b k N W k ru S a a n d i å

C u s y d a tu se R rg iq a t i h d E n o k n S H k n * a i h s I F N e Dease Arm s r F D ta I J a d C te St C ia ss Lord e C Englefield Q rc e r a ik a T u r l' l or rn ease r am r t N e r M r ry t E n o N T Gr O a o D bri o M E M e a e ir N ea D na CANADIAN HIGHdg ARCTIC t ayor B P y F w H c u t é u c tio e B c D k ed k B t li B l r n ay i D B r n e O i t e į s Gulf GUYAQ RESEARCH STATION (CHARS) / S Taloyo R C i u i o O a a n LLINN V Ere t ak lik I r u k F l a C R n R r e II bus r loo A e D i b

Z K STATION DE RECHERCHE DU CANADA Ig t N s M R AUYUITTUQ t l th a S o C B man B xe a I E T s C Chap d m I e rc s NÁÁTS'IHCH'OH rm M o DANS L'EXTRÊME-ARCTIQUE (SRCEA) Penny E S a er a r e R A cT q h Ice r h a u S r R I ith a p r ac C e g m Is o s a e t

v t B a n

k i O Ke is p u arry all CU p e i A t t ap l E G M

Q T S A O C s v A h nn l ittee H BE x ls v a q Nun E S a s i R e T rm e u u Comm RL E a a u a

T iy Q A t n N i

g T r r Tar In ay D W u s E N î A H C B s a t C S l u e Pelly

w a m et PEN C i t s t r H U e G SIMPSON IN a r i a o j S G a g E H en oa Ha a C y SULA e v q a i i ven Colville Bay Ba s u t I N k

p u M o i U y s n U R s e la in h m au r m iu rt l N

t i u a

e n d Gulf ry a n c e N M g EN ar l t h P P t o c i s R W A c ma r l m r e M rm Vic kt Bo ADELA y e A a q o e r a Kil ok wes Pt IDE Kugaaruk Ba q a a n

E r B T r R uh LE ay g e P Q A e T R iq MELVIL B B n re Q q a H s E tuq rner irtu a a N O o

o J li P EN Tave gn H su n A I n o u A S ide R Chantrey Pa or e E n n t N Burns B g

U a

a l R T th I C n i I T nl

h e S N I A T N U O M n a urs et H um n

a h t In a ling b a idg Eirik

N O l y ULA il e l u E R È I T Ô C a e NS tt C N W t e PENI e r A n r N s T N ke la R C i La n

n g I n d S le C C ilso S i o W e o ale S T y R ntw U U C o x un it T L oy R F d O k ake to Frankli N iv V Lyon n a r A E Ga E n e A io I 50° NAHANNI R m r in id Eirik ors St F è Lak In Dom k av A i S t R e t n C ua D n W v ì Naujaa i j D g a I l a s ma ad St t e e R B Bow n B Am C o T s r F

N L on el on or u W R er l B C eg L t S v D e I A iv H el C T re r R a i e kw T Repulse Garnet B ALL n am e a k S m y in hP k p e p U eè O UKKUSIKSALIK Ba F er A PE r I t e h e so W tì Back rchest UL NIN s G te Deas L n M ha R ro C Do NS SU iu ha r D iard R tĿ z NI kbak UIT LA el T C s e a I en nie B PE Chor t AL rn B b kine R B as c N E S Fin Inle IQ Co ld N ur Sti e N B N Wager t XE ie L a k e S r F g L h J e hc O FO us N R a i an e n G ho Bay r k a n an S r k R A F am Cy Channel e r i R z la e ℓ o kh id-Ocean I F B iv M i v a A x ar Fr tic M Chen N d t o n A e D d a a or ut r ar e G e L Y D e t M bish t Atl l Nort A T L t t i r n se e s hw W i e e a a EL - C or B MET r Ba we est a k u D A y h A r rd E nd e LO O r h ape INC ort a tlan L a R No W ve o C s OG ti n I s la A D K U Ri a ok NITA N e c M c r e N S n o P id g S l c r t I Cr et EN -O A e a m a F E l t n s l IN S c v d t h E e ora r P es In SU d ea T l T e h C rro e N t LA n n l H r Fo es s S Bake r Te l air iru la L o r r La m bou F m d r C L ut t P T ke Har Kim ea r ak ro o Pt H A e v c L orse Hu n o o K O id Ch l outh BE L Seah dson tto e C Ha en Ba es e S Str a d d E tc L F y c Łu n ker ter Bay B PEN ai H h o R e ts Du L fie D W e t a a i O r i el o ba ld iv Pt T E D k t O ve k'e l wnt In a s t son D N r r W MONTAGNES a ey é n i a S R F r e r le l e L tr y o M t x n t M a o La e t o N it E b b r o e r L r F h ke B d y a a n w e ROCKY t o v R 'Hudso le a N r T i n e a ss n a B e r t R C Evans Str nc hid W C e c rt U ls e e R r aq va C L L e o v S s ndall e ke u d F t I n i olu Ke h embro on suj A C A P N E R l t r C P ti iq es T O ss M a i s ep g ri Na ew A on Chesterfield Inlet i t Dec an op B u R v S K TORNGAT MOUNTAINS u n A ss C Low F jivik C H aq ds E U p ce iy - B u y e Ra Ivu In Bay aqt MONTS-TORNGATan R N d e T an B mp a nkin Inlet gluk luit Qu Isl d O rt e s ti H Su Sal n k F R D r rr h N W R I on uq ve va E L a ew A R nit a Se ch A e ce H il I WOOD BUFFALO ank vir ian a - az lis T Ra C in In u D B N B N N M

K el to A in Fo or P ay ek E D i C t L b b on l U G ti o n a o rt ett thampt B g A W m n N k w Sm W In C Sou a a V

e H R n k B ne v S N A a Ô ig ith h ovi ay ga I MOUNTAINS N a a K E

I H t h i z le P n D v

A I Le a C uk U -

T o E e s A ROCHEUSES v B r L

N L Q ve F K D e tone E gi B ie T r s L n

A a F l ox a ettle ik e U a Ba A S I o K liv K a - ke rt U A La ws Aku d S rnaud av q ait L B

È M S ke F on e I N A g ua p A R a t E or In r N n jj la A c J R t C è É 'U lu ig B

R k o La h i P d ua K R D L ip v e s O e h C d A i q C

n C n rê e la Paix ew rviat r gi A R E F z è h t y o R n D ie e M e an nd i luk Ka O

t B -d v a u i p

N w an R -L Nu Th Au R Q y n ac elti l R a Ch ue nd in n ewi irnituq q aq a O g e E L L Fo L aza Puv iuja jju R y c ar e t ot D Fa c Cla ak B nd ake a y ituk as uu iv a . Sou n u sa a ir a ir L e A lac du River n B vungn T k K i ik B c l L w vi e R e ac t k u d s o Po B a è le v er ot s e h L L H A o R r n o t ak M A a a i a r C on w P t b ke a V s i e a d k a g nd te a e r ha as c A k v N pe ak w .

R e a b c Riviè G s o i s t M e T a a R re K N è o M o l k c s og le K R H r h n O P c i al U l r k g

R e s a v B uc D' i e alu h G ri O a u C F A e k R s a c o a lu e à g i w O r C oga h t e t b r K F Ko s r c e U G R M o la a a B r iv a a x R G tu C r e C a e c c E B a l s N n r Ka h u i n l P d F y t W h a v a e N a oN ra e o ol l - r i o

C P ir rt A las è e P K i M t a e B r T o s i o o u ri e H c n ill r e r n g N E W F O n n U r o n F ig W M S ill z e N t l T rG c h a u R La eal Ri ch rch iè è e e a D a e e r b r Cr W L c e ve ak l

A P r u H Y c D a r e o r h ju v É é L

a o a ra e sc ay e lla Bro u Inuk i C c A r i s s c R C M N r A eg s r m a L to he h d e F ie - n L t R x a n D

e V L a C C G a y a es ra ke T U u n r s l r lle Sl se is R S adoule a A I y a r Lak n e i F v v A e o r a C N y R e s Q è

N C i l i T E R n N d R

r ew L a L S l H u v p E - D o F a i d' i N h

a a S c L K M h B a i e ac R is E U t

r s l s oc B A L E n

E a h ro c c V a S e c N A

n ve a e A he I r a E r t t

s T l

L b T u to u d - S a O l

e a in E

S B B o i L

ke a C A h M o - r d y T h H R C lw le h - A t ein l l c W a E deer Nasta E a ir Va a r L

i A R poka m o A B R ll B W La S v y d y u ia / uff A ke South re er pp a h B m T N alo C ern è WAPUSK aq U es a a B C R s ar h N Indi vi am miuj ille R Hn se lon R La h row u an Ri atn U Q rv oo l b A ke e s rc L T à ffe a G F Sa A J h S C Lac he C - Ki Ja AS A i out Lyn luaq u Sc nc D D nba sp PE Île-à- ll hend n aniki l'Ea la

er R tl la-Crosse Rei Lak South I S laire u B O F s a C nd e ndia C d R O ke old eer n Lake ille Churchill

l L t s L P Le e v s R P ak chewan ak in af Ra alein n 'S A e oSaskat e eho pids n P e la B ie a er R N CI N f use Sa etite rivière d B tl d H

FI a F R L R nd Split o c n

C n C E EL a R iv y Lake ls a A a O R a r D K o e Pu i L ’ r G J

IM M IS n r kat Ne e tu o i a a L ge B aw lso s d T

m G h ON AND ay agan n N goo Lra s L rt n a b S o D AC No TO St H l pm /a

e ES IER a N anl ouse Gillam F R n ha L

R R e ever W A r G y Fort S k a V E M d M i u y V O L p t - O EL UN AC iss ra r a d i s N

S i a i c C - F T I a o l T E ju s

V D OK R n Th uj vo pi E l A A O a R I V K RE U E B R omp R Ku er a N a R R

C a a VE MO l son Sham s i n R F R r E n L N L PR attawa ta leine é n R O E TE T T c m ST T- a lo IN n nriet la Ba R a a M N d o O C e re de C R s O o lo KE B t yd A E C H Grande riviè e i S O n d

R GULF ISLANDS u o C A t m S LB o s d C v O M a C E R - n I v p NF le in a R Flin s e Pt ria iè G S r i

A er O s F st D Flo l y O Wabuk Ma s r n RO G W o e s E n a I

D k R e a G H P e

E r k e O N T A

S a R l U l n IN H l u

ÎL nag r a C D E u e r A E R q

S v N e h

- YO i t c LB o G m R r s U L an H c ER k m GO N a

E a c A L O T anu u A t

F ak h Peaw t L G n E N a b K a I

e OO B e - Rivaière HIP -M N k

i T a w P r n i C E o U nR D a r E R n e - N n in O d A L o A ff a c c xford H on n s N e E r K Y K e R ouse s a A IP e A a is r e G H B el n lbe an Cross Rad G IN RC r o d n c L M o S r w ake r 'A e w t . he n L n o N g n B or c atc er Winisk R oau DÉ or B N k n a t o a th Sas . a v s L C E e C D ttl c w e s U w a e o a S i r n l fo he ib e oi E N g e rd r c Th sas v a a t e i R r R O N r d a P h e S y e Sask as C s R L

y R é ouagan E I S r Norw R c IE U T e d ay Hou Sach ay ani P Q E a u se igo Lake es B ji M T- I E) tt Koo R S Jam ind rt S M C É D le i Lake Wem o T N R R v St T P E T C te e heresa ib s e l- s A ol L nay i iv Sa Kitchenuhmaykoos Île nc e e R u v r s A S m ak e n ka Winnip Island L t- re n u (F e t e P n T T b e r a oon g oint ep w nt a sq r S S A ia w t La re Ch Ba e R apiska N t u Ca -U T R tchewan h L iver Attaw ain LO f S La bo uSx E a R c ac Sandy Lake Weagamo astm n Lac ni RIL o t- t S NaD N sk t w Webequie t E mai si FO lf in Dé tra LA S a a L a ast stas u a tro iIGtH - ak Wi L k s E i G S it H S I S k e W nnipe ake e Rivière M u de N RE S s in g s Jam d CO R O So a nip i e T a E W uth S ego Bai é e RE b-oT N D A sis p an p lf B ES tO F S T L R chew s o E T ET ’ p ER e L La a ashe t a AP AU R A o TO th D c W K - n G G C H -B k L N b in w ie e S P S A a AK ri iefe nip a u r R DE CA on a M M ne ES D dg nb egos a h B ea u U- t l ES e M ake is tt lbany anis m a ce D re em É E W LAC edi r Yor A Fort A skag Co L n B R ATE S- cin kton Wa t- e e R RT e n r p IQ IC ON H w Ca

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER THREE

ENVIRONMENT

LEAD AUTHORS: JUSTIN BARNES, JACKSON BELLAMY, WILFRID GREAVES, AND P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

Climate change, combined with change has the potential for unforeseen advancements in technology, is and dangerous consequences, with one leading to an increasingly accessible recent projection (Steffen et al., 2018) pre- Arctic. A decade ago, few states or dicting that a business as usual approach firms had the ability to operate in the to GHG emissions will exceed the planetary Arctic. Today, state and commercial thresholds which maintain our familiar and actors from around the world seek stable climatic conditions. to share in the longer term benefits Climate change is occurring rapidly in the of an accessible Arctic. Over time, Arctic and will continue for the foreseeable this interest is expected to gener- future, even if Paris targets are met. Science ate a corresponding rise in commer- shows that the Arctic is warming at a faster cial interest, research and tourism in rate than the rest of the globe, with cur- and around Canada’s northern ter- rent and future implications for the region. ritory. This rise in activity will also While climate change may open new bring increased safety and security opportunities for increased access and demands related to search and res- economic activity in the Arctic, changing cue and natural or man-made disas- environmental and ecological conditions ters to which Canada must be ready also pose serious challenges, especially to respond. for Indigenous populations that rely on a Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017) mixed subsistence-wage economy. Environmental and ecological changes in The U.S.-Canada Joint Statement on Envi- the Canadian Arctic are being driven pre- ronment, Climate Change, and Arctic dominantly by climate change: a globally Leadership of March 2016 articulated “a important issue that requires a global solu- common vision of a prosperous and sus- tion. Countries recently entered into the tainable North American economy, and Paris Agreement in an attempt to mitigate the opportunities afforded by advancing climate change and limit warming to 2°C clean growth.” Both countries also prom- above pre-industrial levels (ideally 1.5°C) by ised to “continue to respect and promote reducing their greenhouse gas emissions the rights of Indigenous peoples in all cli- (GHG) which are the main driver of climate mate change decision making.” Prime Min- change. Unchecked or unmitigated climate ister Justin Trudeau and President Barack

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Obama’s Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement as enabling economic activity and facili- that December directed concrete actions tating certain forms of access for military to ensure “a strong, sustainable and via- activities. Accordingly, the ANPF empha- ble Arctic economy and ecosystem, with sizes “the need for transformative invest- low-impact shipping, science based man- ments in infrastructure, rather than a agement of marine resources, and free remedial approach that only perpetuates a from the risks of offshore oil and gas activ- state of crisis.” While the framework notes ity,” that would “set the stage for deeper how “partnering with communities and partnerships with other Arctic nations, investing in regional infrastructure will including through the Arctic Council.” solidify Canada’s regional presence while exercising its sovereignty,” adapting exist- While the Trump administration has ing and new infrastructure to withstand changed the course of the U.S. (includ- changing environmental conditions will be ing outright denial of climate change), expensive and difficult, compounded by these joint statements continue to reflect uncertainty about the timing, forms, and Canada’s priorities and various commit- full spectrum of climate change impacts. ments reiterated in the ANPF and other policy statements. Moreover, the incom- During the engagement process leading ing Biden Administration has called cli- up to the ANPF, Northern stakeholders mate change a threat to national security and rightsholders raised critical ques- and highlighted climate policy in its tran- tions about environmental protection sition planning, suggesting a likely return and response, safe regional transporta- to pre-2017 cooperation on Arctic climate tion, and search and rescue capabilities in change. Security threats in the region will the context of a rapidly changing climate. be compounded by the effects of climate To respond effectively to these emerging change and the disproportionate impact it challenges, they called for a whole-of-gov- will have on Indigenous populations in the ernment approach to safety, security, and region. Northerners are already experienc- defence that would include a heightened ing more extreme weather events, such as CAF and Canadian Coast Guard presence in intense storms, wildfires, and floods, which the region. This presence not only responds threaten their lives and property. Other to environmental challenges, it may also climate change effects, including increas- entail a larger environmental footprint in ingly unpredictable weather patterns, the region. thawing permafrost, and changing sea ice The DND/CAF code of environmental stew- conditions, threaten food security, inhibit ardship requires that the military “integrate transportation and travel, endanger eco- environmental concerns with other rele- systems, and impede traditional practices vant concerns including those from opera- and ways of life. tions, finance, safety, health and economic Climate change also exacerbates emerg- development in decision-making,” and that ing challenges with respect to critical infra- it “meet or exceed the letter and spirit of all structure. Existing infrastructure deficits federal laws.” SSE’s emphasis on “greening in the Canadian North – from housing, to defence” and on advancing government broadband access, to energy supply, to commitments to be a responsible environ- ports, airports, and roads – are linked to mental steward resonate with the United poor health and social outcomes and lim- Nations 2030 Sustainable Development ited economic possibilities. For example, Goals, which call upon governments to take transportation infrastructure connects urgent action to combat climate change Northern communities to each other and and its impacts, and to protect, restore and 40 to goods and services in the south, as well promote sustainable use of maritime and

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT terrestrial ecosystems. Accordingly, Cana- dians will increasingly expect that military activities in the Arctic reflect and support Canada’s expressed intent to play a leadership role on the global stage when it comes to addressing climate change, contaminants, and other environmental challenges that have disproportionate impacts on and in the Arctic.

3.1 ENVIRONMENT The ANPF notes that “the current lack of baseline data poses major challenges to evidence-based decision-making. The responsible use of data can help cultivate a better understanding of the ‘big picture’ of environmental issues, contributing to the development of informed, data-driven policy and decisions that can help Arctic and northern communities build resiliency in the face of climate change.” Accordingly, as we gain more knowledge and are better able to understand climate change in the Arctic and globally, climate modelling and predictions will become more accurate. The global impacts of climate change are readily discernable through general trends in sea ice loss, permafrost melt, and warming temperatures. The impacts of climate change on the Arctic are also highly regionalized, and the impacts of phenomenon such as relative sea level rise (a combination of the effects of actual sea-level rise and isostatic rebound) and wildfires are not experienced equally in all regions. That stated, the accelerated rate at which climate change is occurring in the Arctic is causing rapid and significant environmental and ecosystem changes across the region. The extent and thickness of sea-ice is decreasing in the Arctic Ocean. Glaciers and ice caps are also melting, contributing to sea level rise, as does thermal expansion owing to warming temperatures. Thawing permafrost is causing major changes to the landscape and threatens the integrity of 41

2020 REPORT infrastructure. Species ranges are shifting particularly in the western Canadian Arc- in response to warming, creating new eco- tic. In the eastern Canadian Arctic, isostatic systems, and pest and diseases (zoonotic) rebound is lifting the land more rapidly are being introduced to areas where they than sea level is rising, resulting in an over- were previously not found. all reduction in sea level. Where relative sea level is falling, coastal infrastructure Ongoing climate change is resulting in the may become less accessible and chan- reduction in the thickness and extent of nels and harbours shallower, necessitating sea ice, with scientists projecting an ice- the use of ships with shallower draughts free summer in the Central Arctic Ocean and lighter loads. More open water will as soon as 2035. Given that sea ice is an mean increased frequency and intensity of important habitat feature for marine eco- storms which combined with sea level rise systems upon which many Arctic marine will cause larger storm surges and more species rely, changes from an ice-covered severe flooding and erosion of coastal habitat to an open water habitat for lon- areas. ger parts of the year are highly significant. Warming trends also result in a northward Permafrost is thawing in response to warm- shift in the ranges of more southerly marine ing temperatures, and projected warming species northwards into Arctic waters that trends suggest that permafrost will be lost they previously did not inhabit. Further- in half of the areas where it currently exists more, sea ice is critical for Inuit to hunt and in the Canadian Arctic. In this case, regional move between islands. Similarly, seasonal differences in permafrost thawing and deg- travel over lake and river ice will be limited radation also correlate with regional differ- by later freeze-up, earlier break-up and ences in warming surface air temperature reduced thickness. and ground temperature, with ice-rich permafrost most vulnerable to thawing Melting icecaps and glaciers are contribut- and degradation. Permafrost thawing ing to sea level rise in the Arctic and glob- and degradation on the landscape causes ally. Rising sea-levels will threaten low-lying slumping, erosion, settling, and collapse, communities and coastal infrastructure, with obvious implications for current and

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT future infrastructure projects. Landscape changes may also alter surface and groundwater flows and distribution. In some cases, this may result in the draining or creation of wetlands and lakes or the rerouting of rivers. All of these dynamics directly affect the operating environment. Biodiversity in terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems also show a strong response to warming, with species ranges shifting and new ecosystems emerging as a result. Species that are more nar- rowly adapted to colder Arctic conditions will be less abundant and more limited in their distribu- conducted on land, at sea, and in the air. tion, whereas more southerly adapted species will expand to higher latitudes. Ter- Improving resilience to climate change restrial vegetation will show a strong and through investments in infrastructure and rapid response to warming, particularly in equipment will be essential in the com- species limited by temperature gradients ing decades. Permafrost degradation is (rather than those limited by other fac- damaging older (legacy) infrastructure tors like latitude or light regimes, which and causing it to fail in some cases. Simply may not change). The treeline will advance trying to repair and replace failing infra- northwards and replace between 11 and structure will not adequately address the 50% of all Arctic tundra, with implications Arctic infrastructure deficit nor build the for infrastructure and operations. necessary capacity for increased human presence in the region. Adding to this Conservation, including the establish- complexity, adaptation measures must be ment of protected areas and the co-man- assessed regionally due to the differential agement of resources, is a key priority in ways in which climate change is impacting the ANPF, and Canadian governments are different parts of the Canadian Arctic. likely to undertake additional measures to protect species that are important for sub- Inequalities between Arctic inhabitants, sistence and conservation tourism, such as particularly Indigenous populations, caribou and polar bears. Certain activities and the rest of Canadians persist. These or projects may conflict with conservation inequalities, the rapid and pronounced objectives, and the vulnerability of certain effects of climate change on the Arctic, species to human activities may constrain and the reliance on changing ecosystems the location of infrastructure or when for subsistence make Arctic peoples par- and where operations and activities are ticularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Socioeconomic inequalities 43

2020 REPORT Although the warming of the Arctic and the North offers economic opportunities, which would bring much needed socio-economic development, employment and infrastructure investments that are acutely lacking in the region, higher levels of activity could bring the potential for damage to unique ecosystems and may also increase the risks associated with increased movement of people and goods, the pursuit of interests by foreign state and non-state actors in Canada’s Arctic and northern territory, and human-induced disasters. It is not difficult to imagine, for example, how a naturally-occurring or human-induced disaster in the Arctic Archipelago would place tremendous strain on the capacities of all levels of government, as well as on local communities, to support affected people and minimize the damage to affected wildlife, infrastructure, and ecosystems. - Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: Safety, Security, and Defence chapter (September 2019)

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT between Arctic residents and other Cana- environment, compounding the impacts dians means that residents have a reduced of climate change. The fast-growing Indig- capacity to adapt to change and that they enous population in the Arctic, concen- may not be able to fully benefit from oppor- trated in settlements (and increasingly in tunities associated with climate change. urban hubs), will put more pressure on Although the transition to more efficient species which are hunted for subsistence and renewable energy technologies is most which are already stressed by the impacts often associated with mitigating climate of climate change and increasing activity. change through reducing GHG emissions, Economic activities, such as non-renew- these technologies can also be applied in able resource extraction, also have signifi- the Arctic to make communities more resil- cant environmental impacts that can have ient to climate change. Many communities a deleterious effect on human and ecosys- in the Canadian Arctic rely solely on diesel tem health. generators for heat and electricity. While Implications emissions from these generators do not contribute significantly to global climate a. The Arctic will become increas- change, they do have more localized envi- ingly accessible to a range of ronmental impacts and the transportation activities. Although hype about of diesel to these communities also poses a the so-called “scramble for Arc- significant risk to the environment through tic resources” has proven wildly fuel spills. Furthermore, the impacts of cli- over-inflated over the last fifteen mate change are making transporting die- years, climate change is expected sel to these communities more challenging to open the Arctic to a widening and expensive. Renewable technologies range of economic activities in the may heighten community resilience to cli- mining, oil and gas extraction, fish- mate change, and more efficient generat- ing, and tourism sectors. Both Arc- ing technologies can reduce local adverse tic and non-Arctic states express environmental impacts associated with a growing interest in the region. conventional diesel generation. The mili- There will be a need to increase tary and other security practitioners would capacity to respond to a variety also benefit from more efficient, abundant, of needs and incidents to support and reliable energy sources in the region. activity in the region. There will also be increased military use and Population growth and increasing human access to the Arctic region. Extend- activity due to climate change places ing sovereignty and security to the increased pressure and stress on the sen- Arctic and environmental protec- sitive Arctic environment and ecosystems. tion will continue to be priorities in Longstanding concerns about the fate of a changing Arctic. global contaminants in the Arctic and the b. There will be both challenges implications for human health are likely and opportunities associated to continue and grow as climate change with climate change in the Arc- introduces new contaminants into the tic. Arctic warming is likely to food web. Furthermore, growing human mean increased access to Arctic activity in the region will likely increase the resources. Critical infrastructure will incidence of contamination and pollution, be necessary to support economic particularly in the marine environment if activity in the Arctic and adapt to Arctic waters see a dramatic increase in traf- climate change. Infrastructure con- fic. Population growth in the Arctic will put struction and maintenance will increasing stress on ecosystems and the be challenged by environmental 45

2020 REPORT factors such as thawing permafrost to suffer the adverse effects of cli- and changing sea levels. DND/CAF mate change in the region. Indig- will be expected to construct and enous populations which rely on maintain its share of infrastructure subsidence hunting are especially in the Arctic, some of which will be vulnerable to ecosystem change. dual use. Across the Arctic, meet- Investments in the region which ing the needs of Arctic communi- increase adaptability and resilience ties under changing environmental to climate change and improve conditions with existing transpor- environmental security will reduce tation infrastructure is increasingly the risk that the population of the challenging. Alternatives will have Arctic will suffer the adverse effects to be explored. Changing ecosys- of climate change. tems are a challenge for both Indig- d. Addressing climate change and enous subsistence economies and environmental issues in the Arc- ecotourism. Conservation of spe- tic could be a source of stability cies in the face of climate change in the region. Climate change is will be a significant challenge. having a disproportionate impact c. Inequalities between the Arctic and the rest of Canada are compounded by the effects of climate change. There are significant inequalities between the Arctic and the rest of Canada. The government of Canada has recently committed to addressing these inequalities in the ANPF. Populations with low levels of socioeconomic development are more likely to suffer the adverse effects of climate change. Consid- ering the inequalities that currently exist between the Arctic and the rest of Canadians and the rapid rate at which climate change is occurring in the Arctic, the population of the Arctic is at an increased risk

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT on the Arctic. The Arctic is warming wildlife, infrastructure, and ecosystems at more than twice the rate of the (ANPF). As shown by previous natural rest of the world and will continue disasters in the North, some regional or ter- to warm for the foreseeable future ritorial governments would likely require despite efforts to mitigate climate assistance to respond to a severe natural change. Growing international disasters. collaboration to address climate Emergency risks are most common at the change and environmental issues local level, with effects of natural disasters in the Arctic could be a source of differing throughout the region. The most stability in international Arctic rela- prominent risks in Yukon and the North- tions. The willingness of countries west Territories are forest fires and flooding. to engage in international rela- In Nunavut, extreme weather emergencies tions to address important envi- including storms and blizzards are high. ronmental issues in the Arctic is exemplified by the success of the The likelihood and prevalence of natural Arctic Council. Climate and envi- disasters is expected to increase partly due ronmental change will be at the to escalations in the severity and preva- forefront as this region warms and lence of severe weather events; changes becomes of increasing geopolitical to storm seasons and storm strengths due significance. to lengthening periods of open water; e. Geoengineering and Runaway and cumulative effects of climate change Climate Change. Some commen- impacts including permafrost melt, land- tators suggest that global geoen- slides, flooding, wildfires, storm surges gineering solutions which remove and coastal erosion. Since 1918, there have carbon dioxide from the atmo- been 34 incidents across the territories sphere or block solar radiation may that have qualified as natural disasters by be needed to stabilize the climate Public Safety Canada, costing an estimated in the future if we do not take effec- $94,503,620 and resulting in 4545 evacu- tive action to mitigate it. However, ees over 14 events. these technologies also carry with them significant risks of dangerous unfore- Natural Disasters seen consequences. The Event Group Event Type Occurrence effects of either runaway climate change or geoen- Meteorological Flood 18 gineering (or both) would Hydrological Wildfire 6 have enormous geopolitical implications globally and in Cold Event 3 the Arctic. Storm Surge 1

3.2 NATURAL DISASTERS Storms and Severe 1 Thunderstorms A naturally-occurring disaster in the Canadian Arctic would place Biological Epidemic 3 tremendous strain on the capac- Pandemic 1 ities of all levels of government, as well as on local communities, Geological Earthquake 1 to support affected people and minimize the damage to affected Total 34 47

2020 REPORT Of the 34 disasters tracked over the 102- Threats from a natural disaster are ampli- year period, 20 disasters (or 58.8% of total) fied by a lack of infrastructure, outdated have occurred in the past 32 years. Climate or fragile infrastructure, and generally low change, along with people’s increasing response capabilities to repair or replace exposure and vulnerability, is expected to damaged infrastructure. Thawing of ice- magnify the impact of natural disasters as rich permafrost and increased coastal extreme weather events become increas- erosion also threaten coastal settlements, ingly frequent and intense in the coming risking damage to already deficient infra- decades. structure, including road networks used for travel and transport, and for access to Natural disasters are likely to have differ- traditional food sources. The rise of severe ing effects throughout the Arctic. There weather events coupled with accelerated are regional geography and population landscape changes is making it difficult density differences across the North which to actively adapt and prepare for poten- influence the vulnerability and resilience of tial natural disasters. Additionally, the communities to natural disasters. Regions high costs of adapting current infrastruc- in the Canadian Arctic will be able to cope ture and building new infrastructure has with natural disasters differently based on proven to be a significant barrier. their location, remoteness, infrastructure, and reliance on supply networks. The remoteness of most communities in the region leave infrastructure and assets exposed. A severe natural disaster would be disruptive for remote communities as a heavy reliance on critical infrastructure and networks for supplies, energy, healthcare, and food exists. A natural disaster which interrupts or threatens the availability of country foods, which are integral to food security in communities outside of urban centres, through increased barriers or contamination, would require outside assistance. A natural disaster which impacts the region’s already limited communica- 48 tion infrastructure

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT and transportation infrastructure would be better understood, including be harmful for disaster response during disturbances to supply and dis- an emergency. Communication infrastruc- tribution systems of food, water, ture is inconsistent across the North, and and key resources. Changes to should the system be compromised or the social-economic environment overwhelmed by a natural disaster or over- of the North, including possible loading during an emergency response, increases in tourism and shipping, there could be a breakdown in emergency pose additional vulnerabilities for response to a natural disaster. Responding emergency management policies to a natural disaster would be challenged to address. by limited mobility and transportation in c. Infrastructure deficits need to the region: less than 1% of Canada’s two- be addressed. Infrastructure defi- lane roads are located in the territories, cits in the North have the poten- 0.2% of Canada’s rail lines, numerous com- tial to curtail effective emergency munities that can only be accessed by air response and management. Crit- with 10 fly-in communities in the North- ical infrastructure requirements west Territories, one in Yukon, and all 25 will increasingly need to consider communities in Nunavut. A serious natural a changing demography and envi- disaster could force displacement or tem- ronment to ensure continued pro- porary relocation, putting increased pres- vision of essential services and sure on existing infrastructure. capabilities. Specifically, robust critical infrastructure is required in The region has a history of biological nat- order to support communications, ural disasters (as defined by Public Safety emergency management and mili- Canada), including previous instances of tary capabilities, and safe transpor- epidemic and pandemic diseases. COVID- tation in the region. 19 poses a serious threat to northern d. Increased need for situational communities and the already strained awareness. Meteorological mon- healthcare network in the North. Should itoring and communications will a community become seriously impacted become increasingly important by this disease, responding to the outbreak for natural disaster mitigation and would be challenging. response. Monitoring capabilities Implications of ice conditions and icebergs will need to be augmented to sup- a. Increased requirement for port the increased marine traffic humanitarian support. As natural through Northern waterways and disasters become more frequent to proactively limit emergency cooperation between military, gov- management response requests ernmental, and non-governmental through cohesive mitigation bodies will be required. Trust will and prevention efforts. Canada’s be needed between civilian and involvement in and obligations for military entities to ensure effective aeronautical and maritime search strategic coordination and plan- and rescue in the Arctic highlights ning during the execution of disas- the continued importance of inter- ter response operations. national cooperation and Canada’s b. Increased requirement to ability to comprehensively respond improve resilience. Civil and to incidents. military vulnerabilities to environmental, climate, and natural disaster-relate disturbances must 49

2020 REPORT 3.3 HUMAN-MADE DISASTERS disaster, in that resources and capabilities for emergency response in the region are In addition to natural disasters, the limited and would be inadequate to deal Canadian Arctic is at significant risk of with any sizeable accident. It would likely human-made disasters that pose serious take days for sufficient marine and aerial prospective challenges for Northerners assets to be deployed from the Atlantic and to federal and territorial governments. and Pacific coasts and southern Canada to The rapid pace of warming and environ- the North. Akin to the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil mental change in the Arctic have enabled spill in Alaska, a major accident in the High an increase in activities such as shipping, Arctic would be devastating to marine life destinational tourism, and natural resource and ecosystems in the region. extraction. While providing some benefits to northern economies, such activities To that end, a major focus of Arctic gov- involve increased risks, include the possi- ernance in the last decade has been on bility of a nautical disaster, air accident, or enhancing transnational cooperation on major mine tailings or oil spill, either on issues such as search and rescue (SAR) and land or offshore. The risks of such an event marine oil pollution preparedness and to the delicate Arctic ecosystem – along- response, each of which have been the side more quotidian concerns such as ship- subject of new multilateral agreements board pollutants, wastewater dumping, negotiated under the auspices of the Arc- and invasive species transported in bal- tic Council to improve collaboration, infor- last water and on vessels’ hulls – have long mation sharing, and technical cooperation concerned Canadian officials. Canada first between Arctic militaries, coast guards, and enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Preven- other responding agencies. The joint Cana- tion Act in 1970 so that vessels entering the da-US moratorium on new Arctic offshore Northwest Passage would be required to oil and gas drilling, announced in 2016 and abide by regulations to limit pollution in likely to be supported by the incoming Canada’s northern waters. Biden Administration, also points to efforts to eliminate the possibility of an oil spill by The ability of Canadian governments to prohibiting underlying practices such as oil respond to a human-made environmental and gas drilling that carry serious environ- disaster in the Arctic would be hampered in mental risks. similar ways as their response to a natural Industrialized resource extraction, significant increases in marine traffic, and human activities such as road and highway construction and growth of settlements and urban areas are inherently damaging or disruptive to the natural environment. Particularly in delicate Arctic ecosystems, decision makers must balance other objectives with conservation and environmental protection. Environmental changes that make certain activities increasingly possible or economically viable in the Arctic also make those activities riskier, whether from physical instability of buildings and infrastructure due to thawing permafrost, greater exposure to more frequent extreme weather events, or the navigability 50

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT of “ice-free” Arctic waters heightening the Sea Ice and the Northwest Passage: More or Less risks of maritime accidents. Accessible? Implications The Northwest Passage example illustrates the complex relationship between pollution, environmental change, a. Ongoing need for transnational and the emergence of new Arctic security issues. Although cooperation and multilateral the dispute over the legal status of the NWP is a long- governance. The predicted increase standing issue between Canada and the United States, in maritime and economic activities the urgency to resolve the issue has been minimal. in the Arctic makes strengthening and deepening sub-national and In response to the 1969 Manhattan voyage, the federal international cooperation between government passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Preven- Arctic governments and stakehold- tion Act (AWPPA) which regulated ships within 100 nau- ers essential to enforce regulations tical miles (now extended to 200 n.m.) of Canada’s Arctic and minimize risk. coastline and established a new legal standard later incor- b. Necessary trade-offs between porated into the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. environmental protection and The 1985 Polar Sea voyage led to the signing of the 1988 economic development. As cli- Canada-US Arctic Cooperation Agreement, wherein both mate change and local envi- countries agree to disagree over their legal claims while ronmental conditions worsen, cooperating on practical use of these waters. With thick policymakers will have to make sea ice inhibiting access to these waters, this arrangement difficult decisions when consider- has proven sufficient. ing incompatible environmental and economic goals. Some pro- Owing to climate change, Arctic sea ice has declined by posals, particularly around large- approximately 50% over the last forty years. This is pre- scale resource extraction projects, dicted to result in ice-free Arctic summers as soon as will likely prove untenable without 2035, which generates some predications that the NWP causing severe and irremediable will become a major conduit for transit shipping between environmental and social harm. Asia and Europe. The actual data about sea ice melt, com- c. Emergency preparedness and bined with unusual weather patterns, produce high lev- disaster response resources els of uncertainty about ice conditions and navigability must be increased. Governments in the NWP. Far from being ice-free, floating ice that has and stakeholders across all lev- broken from larger ice packs gets trapped in the relatively els must increase their prepared- narrower passages of the Arctic Archipelago, impeding ness for disaster mitigation and passage and producing unpredictable conditions. Accord- response, and local emergency ingly, large increases in annual volumes of trans-Arctic management resources enhanced shipping in North America (predicted by some commen- so that Northern communities are tators over the past fifteen years) have not materialized. less reliant on resources deployed Conversely, the loss of multi-year sea ice in the High Arc- from elsewhere. tic, increasingly variable weather, and the damage to d. Remote monitoring and surveil- critical infrastructure such as roads and airstrips due to lance capabilities are needed. coastal erosion and permafrost thawing may serve to As with naturally-occurring disas- reduce accessibility to many isolated Arctic communi- ters, some human-made disasters ties. Inuit have traditionally travelled across ice and water can be prevented or mitigated as well as land, and greater constraints on their ability to through effective and comprehen- do so safely may result in less accessibility for many Arc- sive remote monitoring and sur- tic residents. Thus, contrary to expectations that climate veillance of Arctic lands and waters. change is increasing access to the Arctic, in some contexts Such tools will be critical to enable it can have the effect of further isolating Northeners from responsible economic develop- service centres located further south and inhibiting their ment without compromising envi- mobility within the Arctic. ronmental safety. 51

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER FOUR

ECONOMICS AND RESOURCES

LEAD AUTHORS: ADAM LAJEUNESSE, PETER KIKKERT, ADAM MACDONALD, ALDO CHIRCOP, BRIAN BOW

Over the past several decades the Arctic development and shipping activity. has undergone a dramatic physical change. This increase in shipping and development Sea-ice loss caused by climate change has activity, along with the arrival of main- accelerated, gradually stripping away the stream Arctic tourism, has led to new and ice which has long limited shipping and expanded safety and security challenges resource development – particularly in the for the Government of Canada centred North American Arctic. The year 2019 saw around search and rescue (SAR), surveil- a September ice minimum tied with 2007 lance, aid to the civilian power, regula- and 2016 for second lowest in the satel- tory enforcement, and new constabulary lite record. The 2010 decade, as a whole, duties. New national security challenges witnessed consistently low and steadily are also expected to accompany foreign declining ice thickness and concentration. investment as state-owned companies This trend has opened the Northwest Pas- from countries like China increase their sage and the waters of the circumpolar investments in the region. North to an unprecedented extent and the result has been a significant increase The receding sea-ice and warming waters in shipping activity and growing interest in of the region may also encourage new fish- resource development. ing activity, both within Canada’s EEZ and the Arctic Basin, possibly leading to future The circumpolar economy, valued at political challenges as Arctic and non-Arc- roughly $450 billion, is undergoing large- tic states establish fisheries regulations scale but uneven growth because of sig- and agreements stretching across different nificant environmental change, new jurisdictions. technologies, and growing interest from those inside and outside the region. The Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy variation in economic development across Framework (2019) highlights the need for the Arctic is owned in part to differences in “strong, sustainable, diversified, and inclu- climatic conditions, demographic dynam- sive local and regional economies,” par- ics, levels of industrialization, as well as ticularly through increased Indigenous Arctic states’ priorities. The Canadian North ownership and participation, the reduc- has seen growing but still limited invest- tion of income inequality, the optimization ment, while the Russian and Scandinavian of resource development, economic diver- Arctics are sites of large-scale resource sification (including land-based, traditional

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT economic activities), and the enhance- France, the Cayman Islands, and Norway. ment of trade and investment opportuni- These were cargo ships carrying pulp and ties. The framework also highlights the idea carbon anodes to China, private cutters, of a “conservation economy” (which makes and large cruise ships. This kind of ship- conservation an important part of local ping will likely increase as mining opera- economies) that the federal government tions expand in the Canadian North and is slowly growing in the Arctic in collabora- the need to import supplies and export tion with northern Indigenous stakehold- product rises. Cruise activity is also on an ers. How will the government approach upward trajectory, with growing interest in the debate between those who want to polar destinations leading to widespread heavily regulate resource development construction of polar vessels, purpose and those who believe regulations are build for the Arctic and Antarctic. strangling the northern economy - a conflict that the framework explicitly acknowl- Foreign government activity in Canadian edges? The consultations that led to the Arctic waters has been minimal, however ANPF highlighted “co-management of there are signs of future interest. While renewable resources … as a venue for col- American icebreaker operations in the laborative management that can help inte- Northwest Passage are covered by the grate different viewpoints,” but it remains 1988 Canada-US Arctic Cooperation Agree- to be seen how this will work in practice. ment, statements by the US Navy in recent years indicate a new interest in deploying warships into the Arctic – perhaps even 4.1 ARCTIC SHIPPING as a challenge to Canada’s legal position. In 2018, China sent its icebreaker Xue Long Shipping activity in and through the Cana- through the Northwest Passage on short dian Arctic has seen a steady increase in notice, leading Canada to alter its clearance volume over the past three decades, with a processes. China has recently completed rapid acceleration becoming clear in 2015. a second icebreaker and has announced Most of the new shipping activity is centred plans for a third, nuclear-powered vessel. on fishing, cargo, and tanker craft. There This fleet would give China the capabil- has also been a dramatic increase in cruise ity to access areas of the Canadian Arctic activity, with three large ships traversing which the Canadian Coast Guard cannot. the Northwest Passage between 2017 and 2019. In Canadian waters this activity has China’s declaration to help develop “polar largely been destinational, with ships trav- silk roads” for mutual benefit appears to be elling to and from Canadian destinations, an attempt at tethering the region’s devel- rather than using the Northwest Passage opment to its larger Belt and Road Initiative as a route between the Atlantic and Pacific. (BRI), a bilaterally based economic strategy This limited use is largely due to the route’s designed to reconfigure and develop trade shallow waters, poor hydrographic sur- networks and infrastructure throughout veying, and unpredictable ice-conditions. Eurasia, largely through Chinese invest- The 2019 shipping season, for instance, ment. The United States is vocal in its dis- saw 24 transits while 2018 saw only two – approval over Chinese investment in the the result of considerable variation in ice Arctic, specifically over concerns that this coverage.1 is motivated by strategic and military considerations. Other Arctic States are mon- Of the ships entering Canadian Arctic itoring the nature, motives, and impacts waters, an increasing percentage are for- of Chinese investment on Arctic domestic eign vessels. The 2019 season included and regional politics, including possible transits from Belgium, the Netherlands, Slo- support to military goals and capabilities. 54 vakia, Bahamas, the United States, Malta,

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IMPLICATIONS Passage. That country’s 2019 Arc- a. Interest in the legal status of the tic policy guidelines were more cir- Arctic waters has increased as cumspect on the matter – backing the Arctic ice has receded. Since away from any outright challenge at least 1969 the United States has to Canadian sovereignty. China’s challenged Canada’s legal posi- 2019 Arctic policy statement was tion that the Canadian sections of similarly ambiguous, highlighting the Northwest Passage in its Arctic the importance of Arctic shipping Archipelago constitute historical routes without decisively weighing internal waters. This position was in on their legal status. As the sea- reiterated in the U.S. Arctic poli- ice continues to melt, and more cies of 2009 and 2013, and most states show an interest in asserting recently by Secretary of State Mike perceived transit shipping rights Pompeo in May 2019. The Commis- through the Northwest Passage, sion of the European Parliament these legal disputes may take on adopted a similar position in 2008, heightened salience. strongly implying its disagreement b. Increased shipping activity will with Canadian ownership – if not require improved situational outright challenging it. In 2013, awareness. This new capability will Germany released a national Arctic come in the form of improved sen- policy statement calling for inter- sors and satellite reconnaissance, national regulation of Arctic sea- which reflects the priorities for lay- lanes and freedom of navigation ered sensor systems articulated by in the Arctic Ocean. According to Canada and the United States in the Germans, these international terms of North American defence sea-lanes included the Northwest modernization.

2020 REPORT c. Improved situational aware- opportunity. Nunavut currently has four ness will have to be paired with active mines while the Northwest Terri- new platforms and resources. tories has three. Despite the increase in If shipping in the Northwest Pas- interest and activity over the last decade, sage continues to increase, so to mining development remains rela- will the state’s need for a presence tively subdued and the large percentage to enforce Canadian law and juris- increases in investment are taken from a diction, and to respond to disas- low starting point and limited to a hand- ters and accidents. Large cruise ful of major projects. This slow pace stems ships offer a particular challenge, from the extremely high costs of northern and an accident involving such a operations and the limited transport and ship would require immediate and energy infrastructure in the region. large-scale response. Difficult logistics and high costs are the principal drags on northern investment; 4.2 RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT however, industry specific limitations have If Arctic shipping becomes more eco- also contributed to the slow growth. The nomical, Canadian Arctic resources will collapse of oil prices over the past sev- represent a more attractive development eral years, as well as the Canadian ban on

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT offshore oil and gas drilling in 2016, have This makes China by far the largest foreign effectively ended hydrocarbon exploration operator of vessels along Russia’s NSR, and in the Canadian North for the time being. COSCO aims to become a major partner in This is unlikely to continue in perpetuity, the transport of LNG on the route. presuming that global demand for hydro- IMPLICATIONS carbon energy sources will rebound and lead to resurgent prices at some point in a. Increased Chinese shipping and the future. investment in the Arctic continues to generate concern. While By contrast, the Russian and Eurasian Arc- no explicit security threat has been tic has seen more dramatic economic tied to Chinese activity in the Arc- development, with an emphasis on oil and tic, U.S. defence policy ties China’s gas and resource extraction. Much of this presence to surreptitious efforts activity, particularly in the offshore area, to “support a strengthened, future slowed in the wake of the Russian invasion Chinese military presence in the of Ukraine as Western sanctions removed Arctic Ocean, potentially including Russian access to vital partnerships with deployment of submarines to the American and European oil companies. region.” Consequently, they have sought invest- b. Chinese investment into Arctic ment and access to technologies from else- projects could produce danger- where, particularly China. ous levels of foreign influence. All Arctic States face a dearth of develop- Given the limited economic activity ment capital. It is estimated that $1 tril- across much of Northern Canada, lion will be needed over the next two and the low levels of investment decades to fund over 900 projects across from Canadian sources, Chinese the circumpolar region. This has created investment in resource or infra- an opportunity for Chinese state-owned structure projects is an appealing companies and banks to finance much of prospect for Northerners. Such this activity, primarily in Russia and Green- investment could, however, pro- land. China’s Arctic investments from 2005- vide a Chinese state-owned com- 2017 have been roughly $1.4 trillion and pany with undue influence over largely dedicated to Russian hydrocarbon the lives and prosperity of entire projects.2 The $27 billion Yamal gas proj- regions, and even entire Canadian ect, for instance, was financed through a territories. partnership with the Chinese state-owned Despite concerns over Chinese influ- oil and gas company CNPC and the Silk ence, most experts agree that Canada will Road Fund. Concern over Chinese invest- require foreign partners and significant ment in North America is growing, leading private sector investment in addressing its American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo Arctic infrastructure deficit – specifically its to openly denounce Beijing’s Arctic invest- dearth of ports, overland transportation ments in his May 2019 speech. routes, and telecommunications. The chal- Chinese shipping activity in the Arctic may lenge will be to attract investment but also increase in parallel with its investments. to create appropriate systems and mea- Both commercial Chinese shipping as well sures to manage them to ensure they do as state icebreaker activity is expected to not undermine national security or broader increase. The Chinese shipping COSCO is Canadian security relations with key allies. increasing its activity along the Northern Sea Route while are part-owners and operate nine out of fifteen Arc7 LNG carriers. 57

2020 REPORT 4.3 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC AS THE anticipated to continue. By 2022, at least RESOURCE: TOURISM 28 new expedition ships designed for polar conditions are expected to come into ser- Tourism is on the rise throughout the cir- vice, adding to the 80 already in opera- cumpolar world, ranging from large-scale tion. Several of these will meet Polar Class cruise ships, to sport fishing and hunt- requirements, and the operators construct- ing, to adventure and eco expeditions, to ing these expedition vessels are offering cultural tourism. As climate change and trips to more remote places, deeper in the reduced transportation costs increase the Arctic. For example, Ponant announced accessibility of the Arctic, the number of plans to dispatch Le Commandant Charcot cruise and tour operators involved in the on the first non-nuclear powered voyage region grows, and marketing campaigns to the North Pole in 2021. If demand con- sell the public on the “last chance” oppor- tinues to rise, the cruise industry may also tunity to see the polar environment before consider consistently employing larger it disappears, experts anticipate that this ships in the region to boost profits. While multi-billion dollar industry will continue cruise ship traffic in the Canadian Arctic is to expand. The massive tourist boom expe- much less than in the European Arctic and rienced by Iceland over the last decade is in the waters off Greenland, it has experi- also driving tourists to look for other, less enced a 70% increase in expedition cruise crowded Arctic destinations, including tourism over the last decade – although Greenland and Svalbard. In light of these severe and unpredictable ice conditions trends, Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy have led to route and voyage cancellations. Framework identified tourism as one of the While the media tends to focus on cruise key pillars of northern development mov- tourism, there has also been a signif- ing forward. icant increase in cultural, adventure, Conventional and expedition cruises to and eco-tourism in the Arctic – every- the Arctic have increased dramatically thing from sport fishing and hunting, over the last two decades – a trend that is to hiking, dog-sledding, and ski trips, to

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT bird-watching, camping, and Northern improved situational awareness, Lights tours. A wide array of these kinds of interdepartmental cooperation, activities are offered in the Canadian North training and exercises, and the – many by local companies. Independently use of community-based assets owned and operated pleasure craft, gen- as force multipliers. Increased SAR erally sailboats and motor yachts, are also cases from small-vessel tourism carrying tourists into the waters of Cana- and adventure tourism should also da’s Arctic Archipelago. These vessels rep- be anticipated. resent the fastest growing shipping sector b. An expanding tourism indus- in Nunavut, with a 400% increase over the try calls for strong communi- last decade. ty-based SAR and emergency response assets. Through the There are indications that heightened tour- Oceans Protection Plan, the Cana- ism is starting to generate greater infra- dian Coast Guard is currently structure investment around the Arctic. expanding the Coast Guard Aux- Airport renovations are currently under- iliary in the Arctic, is applying the way in Nuuk and Ilulissat to attract nonstop Indigenous Community Boat Pilot international flights from North America Program to northern communi- and Europe. The deep water port currently ties, and has established an inshore under construction in Iqaluit and the port rescue boat station at Rankin Inlet. proposed for Nome, Alaska, have also been These community-based assets tied, in part, to the expansion of cruise have already been used to respond tourism. to incidents involving small-ves- Please note that, although this section was sel tourism and their importance written before COVID-19 pandemic travel will grow with increased human restrictions led to the cancellation of the activity in the region. Future invest- 2020 summer cruise tourism season in the ments in initiatives along these Canadian Arctic, we anticipate that cruise lines, which seek to address safety tourism will resume following the discov- concerns and build local capacity, ery of a vaccine. are likely. c. Cruise tourism increases the IMPLICATIONS risk of environmental pollu- a. An expanding tourism indus- tion, calling for increased local try increases the risk of human- and regional environmental made disasters and amplifies response capabilities. Commu- SAR requirements. In the last three nity members have been vocal decades, several marine incidents about their concerns over the envi- involving cruise ships in Canada’s ronmental pollution that could Arctic waters could have escalated result from a cruise ship running into Mass Rescue Operations. Two aground in the Arctic. Currently, notable examples include MV Clip- limited fuel and oil spill response per Adventurer (2010) and Akade- capabilities exist in the North, mak- mik Ioffe (2018), both of which ran ing response to such an incident aground in Nunavut’s Kitikmeot even more difficult. Region. In both situations good sea d. An expanding tourism indus- and weather conditions prevailed, try and small vessel tourism which allowed passengers to be raise a wide range of regula- successfully offloaded. The pos- tory, safety, and security issues. sibility of future MROs demands Increased tourist activity in the 59

2020 REPORT North produce challenges to Cana- Search and Rescue Agreement (for- da’s regulations, increased criminal mally the Agreement on Coopera- activity, ranging from illegal immi- tion on Aeronautical and Maritime gration and human trafficking to Search and Rescue in the Arctic) bootlegging, and a range of safety is an international treaty con- issues, from outbreaks of disease cluded among the member states on cruise ships to missing passen- of the Arctic Council that coordi- gers. It is particularly difficult to reg- nates international search and res- ulate and monitor pleasure craft, cue coverage and response in the which community members have region, establishes the areas of reported for breaking environ- responsibility for each state, and mental regulations, illegal hunting, ensures that states will aid one stealing archaeological artefacts, another in situations that demand and selling alcohol in dry commu- cooperation and collaboration. nities. Canadian agencies will have Pursuant to this agreement, Can- to ensure that the legislative and ada is likely to continue to engage regulatory frameworks that govern with Arctic partners through the transport are followed in the North, Arctic Council’s Emergency Preven- preserve the integrity of Canada’s tion, Preparedness, and Response Northern borders, and bolster the (EPPR) Working Group and the clearance process of pleasure craft Arctic Coast Guard Forum, as well looking to operate in Canada’s Arc- as bi-national and regional SAR tic waters. exercises. e. An expanding tourism industry g. As the world’s largest source of demands close interdepart outbound tourism, China is likely mental cooperation, partner- to dominate Arctic tourism. This ship with Northern communities, had led to pushback in several and relationships with private Arctic states – for instance, local industry. To effectively regulate opposition to the plans of Chinese increased human activity in the entrepreneur Huang Nubo’s plans region and address the array of to build luxury resorts in remote safety and security implications parts of Iceland and Svalbard led this creates, federal and territorial to the rejection of these projects. departments will have to adopt a Given China’s complex relationship whole-of-government approach, with several Arctic states, China’s engage with Northerners, and work role in Arctic tourism will continue with private industry. In the case of to raise security concerns, partic- an emergency, such as a Mass Res- ularly as China is now among the cue Operation, these partners will top three source countries for tour- have to work together. Govern- ists to the North and the number of ment agencies will need to work Chinese tourists is likely to grow in with private industry to establish the future. how industry assets and infrastructure can be used to address the 4.4 THE CONSERVATION ECONOMY challenges created by increased Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Frame- tourism. work highlights the idea of a conservation f. Arctic tourism highlights Cana- economy (which makes conservation an da’s international commitments important part of local economies) that 60 and responsibilities. The Arctic the federal government is slowly growing

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT in the Canadian Arctic in collaboration Imanga National Marine Conservation with northern Indigenous stakeholders. Area (Lancaster Sound). The Qikiqtani Inuit The Qikiqtani Inuit Association’s vision for Association, with the support of Parks Can- a conservation economy entails “economic ada and the Government of Nunavut, has wealth derived from local natural resources established a Guardians program to mon- in a way that respects and preserves Inuit itor and manage the protected area. (An Qaujimajatuqangit, meets local needs Inuit Guardians program has also been and restores rather than depletes natural established for the Wrecks of HMS Erebus resources and social capital.” Within such a and HMS Terror National Historic Site near system, Indigenous peoples assume roles Gjoa Haven, Nunavut.) The federal gov- and responsibilities in “environmental and ernment has also provided $76.5 million wildlife monitoring; vessel management; toward building community harbours in emergency preparedness and response, Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay to support the search and rescue and tourism.” Support developing conservation economy in the for a conservation economy should also region. Other initiatives, like the Inuit-led include the development of local marine Nunavut Inuit Marine Monitoring Program and community infrastructure. Mary Simon which collects information on shipping suggests that a conservation economy activities, environmental conditions, and “will support communities and individuals wildlife, are likely models for future initia- in regaining land-based life skills, recon- tives led by Northerners that embody the nect with their cultural traditions, collect ANPF vision of strong partnerships. indigenous knowledge, and have the confidence that there will always be ‘places IMPLICATIONS that are theirs.’” a. Enhanced situational awareness, marine monitoring, and emer- The most explicit application of the con- gency response capabilities. servation economy in the Canadian Arc- Given Northern residents’ knowl- tic has come with the creation of the edge of the land and presence in 109,000-square-kilometre Tallurutiup potential high traffic areas, as well 61

2020 REPORT as the political commitment to lengthen fishing seasons, and open new improve Indigenous-Crown rela- fishing grounds. The arrival of Atlantic tions, the Government of Canada mackerel in Greenland is a prime exam- is likely to increasing partner with ple of the possibilities – between 2011 Indigenous organizations and com- and 2014 it moved from 0% to 23% of the munities to fund and support com- island’s fisheries exports.3 On the other munity-based program to improve hand, climate change could also dimin- situational awareness and bolster ish species due to new predators, invasive the on-the-ground intelligence species, and other changes to the marine available to federal and territorial environment, including increased ocean agencies responsible for safety and acidity. Cost of travel to remote areas in the security portfolios. These groups High Arctic might also outweigh the possi- also represent potential assets for ble revenues from a catch.4 emergency response. Currently, the Canadian Arctic has had little exposure to large-scale commercial fisher- 4.5 FISHERIES ies, although certain projections have fore- cast that climate change might increase the It is uncertain how climate change will number of commercially valuable species impact Arctic fisheries over the next two in the region. The Government of Nunavut decades. Changing environmental condi- has listed commercial fisheries as a vital pil- tions could lead to fortuitous conditions lar of its economic development plan. Fish- for some fish stocks, cause commercially ing operations are expanding for turbot, valuable species to shift to higher latitudes, Arctic char, and northern shrimp (at this

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT point mostly in Baffin Bay, Davis Strait, and and monitoring in partnership with Hudson Bay and Strait), and other commu- Northern community members. nities such as Gjoa Haven, Taloyoak, Cape b. Illegal fishing. Monitoring ille- Dorset, and Qikitarjuaq are establishing gal or “dark fishing” activities will test fisheries. require effective situational awareness and surveillance as Canada’s Several international and domestic ini- Arctic waters and adjacent parts of tiatives have set moratoriums on fishing the Arctic Ocean become increas- activities in parts of the Arctic Ocean. In ing accessible. 2014, for instance, the Inuvialuit Regional c. The political and jurisdictional Corporation, the Inuvialuit Game Coun- challenges of fisheries expan- cil, the Fisheries Joint Management Com- sion. The potential expansion of mittee, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada commercial fishing activity in Can- agreed that, while small-scale communi- ada’s EEZ and in the Central Arc- ty-based fisheries should be encouraged tic when the current moratorium in the Beaufort Sea, large-scale offshore expires could lead to political chal- operations should be barred. The agree- lenges and jurisdictional issues as ment prevents the start of commercial new regulations and agreements fisheries in over 831,000 square kilometres are developed between Arctic and of the Canadian Beaufort. On the interna- non-Arctic states. Countries with tional level, a December 2017 agreement large and efficient fishing fleets, (signed in October 2018) between Canada, such as Japan and China, are likely Russia, the United States, Greenland, Nor- to seek a major role in the devel- way, China, South Korea, Iceland, Japan opment of Arctic fisheries, height- and the European Union set a moratorium ening the jurisdictional complexity on commercial fishing in the Central Arctic involved in regulating regional fish- and launched a joint program of scientific ing activities. research in the region to ascertain the sustainability of a fishery. The agreement takes a “proactive and precautionary approach” to future fishing activities in the area and provides a framework for the establishment of conservation and management measures and the participation of Arctic Indigenous peoples. IMPLICATIONS a. Food security in Inuit Nunangat. “RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: RESPONSIBLE, SUSTAINABLE The prospective expansion and RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND JOB CREATION IS THE COR- sustainability of Arctic fisheries are NERSTONE OF THE TERRITORIAL ECONOMIES. INDIGENOUS a direct concern to the 53 coastal OWNERSHIP, INVESTMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN THE communities of Inuit Nunangat RESOURCE INDUSTRY ARE KEY TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS SEC- for which community-based fish- TOR. RESOURCE PROJECTS PROVIDE EDUCATION, TRAINING eries provide an important source AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN COMMUNITIES AS of country foods. New commer- WELL AS DIRECT INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATION IN SUPPLY AND cial opportunities associated with SERVICES BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT.” fisheries are likely to generate significant domestic and interna- - PAN-TERRITORIAL VISION AND PRINCIPLES tional interest, thus amplifying the FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2017) importance of scientific research 63

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER FIVE

HUMAN LEAD AUTHORS: JUSTIN BARNES AND P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

Strong, self-reliant people and com- by the move away from traditional munities working together for a subsistence hunting and gathering vibrant, prosperous and sustainable and societal changes brought on Arctic and northern region at home by modernization have resulted in and abroad, while expressing Cana- an increase in prevalence of chronic da’s enduring Arctic sovereignty. diseases such as diabetes, hyper- – Arctic and Northern Policy Framework tension, obesity and cardiovascular (ANPF) Vision (2019) diseases. In addition, child abuse, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, domes- The rapid pace of change in the Arctic tic violence, suicide, unintentional presents new challenges to the health and injury are also associated with rapid wellbeing of residents across the circum- cultural change, as well as loss of cul- polar world. As a 2010 Circumpolar Health tural identity and self-esteem. Survey observed: The report notes that improvements in Living conditions are changing transportation infrastructure and commu- from an economy based on subsis- nications technologies (such as the inter- tence hunting and gathering to a net and telemedicine), which are linked to cash-based economy. Across the cir- globalization, connected previously iso- cumpolar north there is increasing lated communities to larger urban centres. activity towards sustainable devel- Increased connectivity has also introduced opment via local resource develop- new vulnerabilities to infectious diseases ment and widening involvement in (such as influenza, acute respiratory infec- the global economy. The influence tions, and antibiotic-resistant pathogens) of such changes on the physical which might be imported into the Arctic by health of Arctic residents on the one visitors to the region. Furthermore, trans- hand have been positive, resulting boundary environmental contaminants in improved housing conditions, a which originate in mid-latitude industrial more stable supply of food, increased and agricultural regions of the world con- access to more western goods, and tinue to migrate to the Arctic via atmo- decreases in morbidity and mortal- spheric, river and ocean transport. Their ity from infectious diseases. How- subsequent bio-magnification in Arctic ever, changes in lifestyle brought on

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT food webs and appearance in subsistence foods pose great concerns to Northern- ers. Furthermore, climate change is intro- “WHO WE ARE AND WHERE WE LIVE: THE TOTAL ducing new economic and health threats POPULATION OF THE TERRITORIES IS CURRENTLY to Arctic communities, with the most vul- SOME 113,000 PERSONS, WHICH IS ABOUT 1% OF nerable people likely to be those following CANADA’S POPULATION, LIVING IN 75 REMOTE a traditional lifestyle close to the land in AND RURAL COMMUNITIES. THE TERRITORIES remote communities. Direct health-related ARE HOME TO A VAST AND RICH DIVERSITY OF impacts might include more injuries, hypo- CULTURES AND LANGUAGES, WITH INDIGE- thermia, and frostbite related to travel, NOUS PEOPLES MAKING UP 86 PERCENT OF THE unpredictable ice and weather conditions, and heat stress in summer. Changes in POPULATION OF NUNAVUT, 50 PERCENT IN THE access to safe drinking water and to coun- NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AND 25 PERCENT IN try foods due to shifting migration pat- THE YUKON.” - Pan-Territorial Vision and Princi- terns of species also raise concern amongst ples for Sustainable Development (2017) Northerners. Canada’s Arctic is experiencing all of these dynamics. In framing her 2017 report proposing a new Shared Arctic Leadership Model, Inuit leader Mary Simon highlighted that the Canadian Arctic continues “to exhibit among the worst national social indicators for basic wellness” and that, despite “all the hard-earned tools of empowerment, … many individuals and families do not feel empowered and healthy.” Many statistics bear out her observation about poor living standards. For example: • 50% of Inuit households do not have acceptable housing, and the incidence of core housing need in the NWT is the second highest in Canada (with almost one in five households reporting the need for adequate, accessible and affordable housing). • There is almost a ten percent gap between NWT residents and other Canadians about their perceived physical and mental health, with Indigenous populations reporting significantly poorer health and mental health. • In 2019, Nunavut had the highest unemployment rate in Canada (13.4%), with Yukon the lowest at 3.6%. • High rates of alcoholism, sexual and physical abuse including domestic 66 violence, criminal incarceration, and

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT suicide. from 44,469 in 2016 to 46,026 in 2035. Nun- • In 2016, the tuberculosis rate avut had the highest rate of population amongst Inuit was over 290x higher growth in all of Canada from 2001 - 2017, than that of the Canadian-born and it is expected to remain the highest non-Indigenous population. in the territories and grow by 31% from • As a 2017 study by the Conference 37,667 in 2017 to 48,042 in 2035.1 Board of Canada on “How Canada Diverse populations of Inuit, First Nation, Performs” observed, Canada’s north- and Métis citizens in Canada’s northern ter- ern territories generally fall behind ritories and provincial norths also give the the Canadian average on measures regions distinct characteristics. According of equity (eg. poverty, income dis- to 2016 census data, Indigenous peoples tribution, gender and racial wage represent 23.3% of the Yukon’s population, gaps) and social cohesion (eg. unem- 50.7% of NWT, 85.9% of Nunavut, 91.4% of ployment rate, homicides, suicides). Nunavik, and 90.2% of Nunatsiavut. Given these challenges, it is not surpris- ing that the federal government adopted Opportunities and challenges also stem “strong Arctic and northern people and from the North’s comparatively youthful communities” as a central theme for its population compared to the rest of Can- co-developed Arctic and Northern Policy ada. In Nunavut, for example, the median Framework. Although the overall popu- age is just over 26 (compared to just over lation of Canada’s northern territories is 40 in Canada as a whole). Providing oppor- small compared to the northern popula- tunities for education, employment, and tions in other Arctic states, it includes sub- competitive wages in a comparatively stantial Indigenous populations that face underdeveloped region dominated by pub- distinct historical, cultural, and socio-eco- lic sector employment is likely to remain a nomic challenges. First Nation, Métis, and significant challenge for governments. Inuit populations in Northern Canada are Education and skill development will con- culturally diverse, but also share demo- tinue to pose significant challenges in the graphic features that distinguish them North. Many reports identify early child- from non-Indigenous populations. Long- hood education, improvements in ele- standing inequalities generate political mentary, secondary and post-secondary pressure for Northerners to receive com- education, and access to higher education parable services, opportunities, and standards of living Cultural Identity as those enjoyed by other Canadians. Aboriginal First Métis Inuk Non- Identity Nations Aboriginal Yukon 5.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 23.3 19.1 2.9 0.6 76.7 Northwest 50.7 32.1 8.2 9.9 49.3 There is uneven population Territories growth across Canada’s North, and this is expected to con- Nunavut 85.9 0.5 0.5 84.7 14.1 tinue over the next fifteen Nunavik years. In 2016, the popula- 91.4 1.0 0.2 90.0 8.6 tion of Yukon was 37,860 and Nunatsiavut 92.0 1.0 1.4 89.4 8.2 is projected to grow by 19.5% to reach 45,230 in 2030. The Labrador 8.9 5.5 1.5 1.4 91.1 Northwest Territories is projected to grow by only 3.5%, 67

2020 REPORT “Youth across the Arctic understand that education is a portal to opportunity. They aspire to a quality education equivalent to other Canadians: an education that also reaffirms the central role of their culture and Indigenous languages in their identity as Canadians. A new Arctic Policy Framework, if it is to sep- arate itself from many previous documents on the future of the Arctic, must speak to these young voices in this era of reconciliation.” – Mary Simon, A New Shared Arctic Lead- ership Model (2017)

as essential preconditions to improve mean that comparatively small North- socio-economic and health indicators. The ern colleges and universities are unlikely significant disparity in education levels to compete with the breadth and depth between the North and the rest of Canada of academic and professional programs (e.g. 34% of Inuit in Inuit Nunangat aged 25 available at well-established Southern to 64 have a high school diploma compared institutions. to 86% of Canadians in the same group) continues to limit opportunities for North- Implications erners. Furthermore, persistent differences a. Differences in population dis- between Indigenous and non-Indigenous tributions continue to strain education rates (e.g. 74% of Northwest Ter- resources. Providing the same or ritories non-Indigenous residents aged 25 similar levels of services across the to 64 years old had a postsecondary certifi- North has proven to be challeng- cate, diploma or degree, compared to 43% ing for governments, and this is of Indigenous peoples) expose ongoing expected to continue. The diverse divisions within the Northern population. population of the North also have differing needs, values, and priori- Persistent economic, social, and gender ties which require a situation-based inequalities, limited employment oppor- approach, rather than blanket poli- tunities, and environmental concerns cies which cover the entire North. could drive potential out-migration from b. Youth disenfranchisement could the Canadian North over the next two worsen health indicators, decades. As Northerners look to other parts increase political instability, and of Canada for education and employment lead to out-migration. Northern opportunities, the North could continue young people’s frustration with to experience a “brain drain” with which it under-education and lack of train- has struggled for decades. Ongoing efforts ing opportunities, unemployment by the Territories to expand post-second- and underemployment, and disen- ary education options for Northerners in franchisement could lead to insta- the region are likely to help curb some of bility if their realities and needs are 68 this out-migration, but economies of scale

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT not acknowledged or met. Addi- Yellowknife, and Iqaluit contain tionally, migration of educated the largest concentrations of youth out of the North is likely to population and have the highest continue because of a comparative percentages of non-Indigenous lack of diversity in employment residents, the highest levels of opportunities in the Arctic. education, and their economies c. Conflict could arise due to - dif are primarily dedicated to provid- fering political, economic, and ing services to their surrounding environmental interests within areas; the Inuit, Métis and First Nations 2. isolated and/or remote commu- communities and between Indig- nities are primarily Indigenous, enous groups and the federal have the highest percentages of government. Differing employ- overcrowded housing, highest ment opportunities and prospects unemployment rates, and lowest “Canada sees a across the north, including factors levels of formal education; and future in which the involved with land claim nego- 3. communities established for people of the Arc- tiations and impact and benefit the resource-extraction indus- tic and North are agreements, could increase friction try have, over time, been estab- between groups over priorities and lished as company towns to full participants desired futures, thus eroding politi- support resource extraction in Canadian soci- cal and social cohesion. activities. These communities are ety, with access to in decline, however, as fly-in/fly- the same services, 5.2 SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND out work camps have become opportunities and URBANIZATION increasingly popular and as exist- standards of living ing resource-dependent commu- as those enjoyed Over the last century, scholar Marlene Laru- nities gradually converge with by other Canadi- 2 elle observes that three primary drivers led Indigenous communities. ans. This ambition to waves of settlement and urbanization in Half of the world’s population is now urban- will require greater the Circumpolar Arctic: 1) industrial activi- ized and the United Nations predicts that effort, focus, trust ties; 2) the militarization of the Arctic; and by 2050, 85.9% of the developed world and and collaboration 3) the development of regional adminis- 64.1% of the developing world will live in amongst partners.” trative centres. The first driver, large-scale cities. About two-thirds of the global Arctic industrial activities (including fishing, for- population lives in urban conditions, and Arctic and Northern estry, energy, and mineral extraction) led Indigenous peoples are progressively mov- Policy Framework to the establishment of small cities and ing from smaller to larger settlements for (2019) towns across the Canadian North. The con- educational and job opportunities and for struction of military infrastructure during amenities which smaller settlements lack. the Cold War (particularly the DEW Line) Canada’s North is following this trend, with played a significant role in drawing many most of the territorial populations in Yukon Inuit into coastal settlements in the 1950s and NWT concentrated in their capital cit- and 1960s. Since that time, access to social ies (70% in Whitehorse and 50% in Yellow- services, public jobs, and other enticements knife), while 78% of Nunavummiut live in and inducements have drawn Northerners the 24 communities outside of Nunavut’s increasingly into urban centres. capital city of Iqaluit. Canadian scholars Chris Southcott and The populations of many smaller settle- Valoree Walker categorize three main types ments are expected to decline over the next of communities in the Canadian North: two decades, leading to questions about 1. urban centres such as Whitehorse, their viability and further out-migration. 69

2020 REPORT Whitehorse is expected to grow to 78.5% of Yukon’s population by 2030, and Yel- lowknife’s share of NWT’s population is expected to increase to 52.3% by 2030. Unlike the other territories, Nunavut has a deliberate policy of diffusing public sector jobs to smaller communities outside the “In addition to the recognition of rights and inno- capital of Iqaluit, which has only 21% of the vative forms of governance and collaboration, territory’s population. Thus, while Iqaluit is expected to grow, Nunavut’s population reconciliation in Canada’s Arctic and north means distribution is projected to remain similar closing the socio-economic gaps that exist between up to 2035. Arctic and northern Indigenous peoples and other Canadians. Canada will work with Indigenous gov- Implications ernments and organizations, territories, provinces a. Urbanization and changing set- and other partners to close these gaps.” - Arctic and tlement patterns could change Northern Policy Framework (2019) the distribution of services. As urban centres grow and smaller remote settlements shrink, the distribution of services to smaller communities could become increasingly expensive and difficult. Officials at national and regional levels need to be aware of centralizing and urbanizing trends and anticipate their effects on services. Furthermore, questions remain about the economic role of large settlements in supporting diversified economic growth in Northern regions. b. Rapid urbanization and resource scarcity could exacerbate pressures on already strained and expensive food networks in the North. As more people move into urban centres, urban Northerners may rely less on country foods and become increasingly dependent on other food networks. Interrup- tions to food networks, the high costs of food, and an increase in the consumption of processed foods could lead to increased food insecurity and other health issues. c. Urbanization could lead to the concentration of illicit activities and vulnerabilities. More con- 70 centrated criminal activities could

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT necessitate a greater role for the sector investment and is often justified in RCMP, as well as other defence terms of regional economic development. and intelligence partners. Further- Frequently cited infrastructure needs more, settlements and urban cen- include broadband connectivity, housing, tres which rely heavily on outside energy infrastructure, improved charting networks are vulnerable to natural and mapping, port facilities, better airport and environmental disasters from facilities, and all-season roads to access human activities (e.g. cruise ships, communities and mineral resources. The resource extraction) and from deterioration of existing community and impacts of climate change on com- transportation infrastructure, which is munities and infrastructure. vulnerable to thawing permafrost and extreme weather events, further com- 5.3 INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS pounds the issue. The Conference Board of Canada explains Implications that deficits in critical infrastructure keep communities isolated, inhibit the deliv- a. Poor community infrastruc- ery of health and social services, and limit ture limits northern develop- economic opportunities. For example, ment and inhibits the delivery of limited broadband access in Nunavut and essential services such as health NWT restrict their citizens’ ability to par- care and education. Commu- ticipate in the digital economy or to take nity infrastructure, along with air advantage of e-learning opportunities. and ground transport and energy “Given that new workplace skills, such as infrastructure, is needed to attract problem-solving in technology-rich envi- investment and facilitate business development in order to grow the ronments, depend on access to adequate computing infrastructure and connectiv- Arctic economy and raise the stan- ity,” the report notes, “many remote North- dard of living for Arctic residents. ern and Indigenous communities continue Discerning new models to entice to be at an economic disadvantage.” these investments should be a priority over the next fifteen years. The ANPF echoes many Canadian studies b. Strategic investments in North- that highlight the need for “transformative ern telecommunications infra- investments” in Arctic and Northern infrastructure are likely to support structure, “rather than a remedial approach improved education outcomes, that only perpetuates a state of crisis.” open economic opportunities, For example, the Territorial governments’ stimulate Northern-based innova- Pan-Territorial Vision for Sustainable Devel- tion and technology, and improve opment conceptualizes large-scale infra- the well-being of Northern Cana- structure investments as foundational to dians (particularly those living in creating economic opportunity and pros- physically isolated communities) perity for communities. In turn, the ANPF over the next decade. This form of highlights how communities and organiza- connectivity may also have signifi- tions desire “partnerships and opportuni- cant effects on identities and social ties to play an active and constructive role cohesion (discussed below). in infrastructure investments through … c. Addressing Arctic infrastructure financial partnership, as well as the devel- gaps invites investments in “dual- opment of business capacity and skills.” use” capabilities that enhance Accordingly, federal investment in north- defence and security as well as ern infrastructure seeks to leverage private social and economic applications. 71

2020 REPORT Social and Economic Inequity in Inuit Nunangat Many Inuit face social and economic inequities that impact our health and wellbeing Inuit Nunangat All Canadians

52% of Inuit in Inuit Nunangat 9% of all Canadians live in live in crowded homes*1 crowded homes*1

34% of Inuit aged 25 to 64 in 86% of all Canadians aged 25 to Inuit Nunangat have earned a high 64 have earned a high school diploma1 school diploma1

70% of Inuit households 8% of all households in Nunavut are food insecure 2 in Canada are food insecure 3

$23,485 The median $92,011 The median before before tax individual income for Inuit tax individual income for non-Indigenous in Inuit Nunangat 1 people in Inuit Nunangat 1

30 The number of physicians per 119The number of physicians 100,000 population in Nunavut 4 per 100,000 population in Urban Health Authorities 4

47.5% of Inuit in Inuit 60.2% of all Canadians Nunangat are employed1 are employed1 72.4 years 82.9 years The projected life expectancy The projected life expectancy for for Inuit in Canada† 5 non-Indigenous people in Canada5

12.3 The infant mortality rate 4.4 The non-indigenous infant 6 IMR 6 per 1,000 for Inuit infants in Canada. mortality rate per 1,000 for Canada.

* Should not be compared with crowding data for previous years. Based on the suitability definition (whether the dwelling has enough bedrooms for the size and composition of the household). The previous figure was based on the number of persons per room definition. † Should not be compared with previous life expectancy data. The figure is a national 2017 projection of life expectancy for Inuit. Previous figures were for 2004-2008 for all residents of Inuit Nunangat, including non-Inuit.

1 Statistics Canada, 2016 Census. (crowded homes: 98-400-X2016163; high school diploma 98-400-X2016265; income: unpublished custom table provided to ITK; employment: 98-400-X2016266) 2 Grace M. Egeland, Inuit Health Survey 2007-2008: Nunavut (Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue, QC: Centre for Indigenous Peoples’ Nutrition and Environment, May 2010), 12. 3 Shirin Roshanafshar and Emma Hawkins. Health at a Glance: Food Insecurity in Canada (Ottawa, ON: Statistics Canada, March 25, 2015). 4 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Supply, Distribution and Migration of Physicians in Canada, 2014 (Ottawa, ON: Canadian Institute for Health Information, September 2015). 5 Custom table based on Statistics Canada’s Projections of the Aboriginal Population and Households in Canada, 2011 to 2036. 6 Sheppard et al 2017. “Birth outcomes among First Nations, Inuit and Metis populations.” Health Reports Vol. 28. No. 11 72

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

79 www.itk.ca 3 Social and Economic Inequity in Inuit Nunangat Many Inuit face social and economic inequities that impact our health and wellbeing Clean, affordable energy options, with access to the same services, improved transportation links, opportunities and standards of liv- Inuit Nunangat All Canadians and robust telecommunications ing as those enjoyed by other Cana- are examples of shared priority dians” (emphasis added). Given 52% of Inuit in Inuit Nunangat 9% of all Canadians live in areas. This should encourage new existing gaps, this is an outcome live in crowded homes*1 crowded homes*1 approaches to create and leverage that the Government of Canada will innovative technologies and mod- be hard pressed to realize over the ernized systems. next fifteen years – and, even with 34% of Inuit aged 25 to 64 in 86% of all Canadians aged 25 to Inuit Nunangat have earned a high 64 have earned a high school diploma1 d. Competition for high-cost invest- promised investments, the inability school diploma1 ments in infrastructure could also to deliver on this strong commit- divide Northerners. While pub- ment is likely to continue to feed dis- lic and Indigenous governments illusionment with governments and of Inuit households of all households 70% 8% in the Canadian North, and myr- weaken social cohesion. in Nunavut are food insecure 2 in Canada are food insecure 3 iad lobbying organizations, agree Poor socio-economic health indi- on the need for infrastructure, cators reflect deeply entrenched The median The median before there is no consensus on how to $23,485 $92,011 problems and legacies of coloniza- before tax individual income for Inuit tax individual income for non-Indigenous queue specific priorities and where tion. The residential school system, in Inuit Nunangat 1 people in Inuit Nunangat 1 investments should focus. The relocation programs, and the rejec- Pan-Territorial Vision for Sustain- tion of Indigenous consultation able Development suggests that 30 The number of physicians per 119The number of physicians over resource extraction have had 4 “these types of investment oppor- 100,000 population in Nunavut per 100,000 population in damaging effects on mental and 4 tunities are not about dividing the Urban Health Authorities physical health, language, culture, pie, but working in true partner- education, and Indigenous knowl- ship, to make a better economic of Inuit in Inuit of all Canadians edge. High rates of substance abuse 47.5% 60.2% pie that will achieve a broader, Nunangat are employed1 are employed1 and suicide in Indigenous popu- deeper and sustained prosperity lations have been linked to inter- across all regions and territories.” generational trauma caused by the 72.4 years 82.9 years While this common vision of long- impacts of colonialism. Concerns The projected life expectancy The projected life expectancy for term payoff is inspiring, it does not 5 5 about the erosion of Indigenous for Inuit in Canada† non-Indigenous people in Canada preclude competition for scarce languages and cultures also factor resources (with potential implica- heavily into Northern Indigenous tions for political and social cohe- 12.3 The infant mortality rate 4.4 The non-indigenous infant peoples’ future-oriented strategies, 6 IMR 6 sion) over the next fifteen years. per 1,000 for Inuit infants in Canada. mortality rate per 1,000 for Canada. which request government support for cultural revitalization efforts. Vio- * Should not be compared with crowding data for previous years. Based on the suitability definition (whether the 5.4 SOCIAL AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES lence against Indigenous women dwelling has enough bedrooms for the size and composition of the household). The previous figure was based on the The ANPF boldly states that “the Govern- and girls also remains a significant number of persons per room definition. problem, with Indigenous women † Should not be compared with previous life expectancy data. The figure is a national 2017 projection of life expectancy ment of Canada and its partners will close having a much higher likelihood of for Inuit. Previous figures were for 2004-2008 for all residents of Inuit Nunangat, including non-Inuit. the gaps and divides that exist between this region, particularly in relation to its a violent death than non-Indige- 1 Statistics Canada, 2016 Census. (crowded homes: 98-400-X2016163; high school diploma 98-400-X2016265; income: Indigenous peoples, and the rest of the nous women, according to statistics unpublished custom table provided to ITK; employment: 98-400-X2016266) cited in the 2019 final report of the 2 Grace M. Egeland, Inuit Health Survey 2007-2008: Nunavut (Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue, QC: Centre for Indigenous Peoples’ country. The clear and ambitious goals and objectives of this framework point the way National Inquiry into Missing and Nutrition and Environment, May 2010), 12. Murdered Indigenous Women and 3 Shirin Roshanafshar and Emma Hawkins. Health at a Glance: Food Insecurity in Canada (Ottawa, ON: Statistics Canada, to a vibrant, sustainable and prosperous March 25, 2015). future.” It also promises that “in our shared Girls. 4 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Supply, Distribution and Migration of Physicians in Canada, 2014 (Ottawa, ON: future, Canada’s Arctic and North will no The delivery of healthcare services Canadian Institute for Health Information, September 2015). longer be pushed to the margins of the 5 Custom table based on Statistics Canada’s Projections of the Aboriginal Population and Households in Canada, 2011 is challenging in the Arctic, produc- to 2036. national community,” and that “its people ing disproportionate health chal- will be full participants in Canadian society, 6 Sheppard et al 2017. “Birth outcomes among First Nations, Inuit and Metis populations.” Health Reports Vol. 28. No. 11 lenges for residents of the region. 73

2020 REPORT

79 www.itk.ca 3 Additional hurdles for healthcare delivery years, compared to 82.9 years for Canada’s in the North include a lack of infrastruc- non-Indigenous population). ture and trained professionals; small, often High rates of food insecurity in the Arctic isolated populations spread out over vast are exacerbated by climate change and distances; and the need to deliver services environmental contamination. The three in culturally-appropriate ways. Hospitals highest levels of household food insecurity and specialized health services are often in Canada in 2017-2018 were in Nunavut not available locally and many people are (57% of households), Northwest Territories forced to fly from their home communities (21% of households), and Yukon (16.9% of to access specialized care in regional or households). Housing challenges in the southern Canadian hubs. Improved medi- North, including a lack of quality housing cal technologies, communications (which and overcrowding, are associated with high support tele-health and other forms of rates of communicable disease such as remote delivery), pharmaceuticals, and tuberculosis. In Inuit Nunangat, for exam- treatment options are expected to improve ple, 52% of Inuit live in crowded homes, the delivery of some services over the next compared to 9% of Canadians overall. fifteen years but are unlikely to overcome the full range of obstacles that lead to dif- The Conference Board of Canada also ferentials in services between northern reports that costs of living and rates of and southern Canada. poverty in the Territorial North are among the highest in the country. Although aver- Reports also highlight the severity of men- age incomes in the territorial appear to be tal health challenges in Northern com- high, these numbers do not factor in sig- munities compared to those in the rest nificantly higher costs of living and goods of Canada, coupled with a lack of mental compared to southern Canada. It also health facilities and services at the commu- conceals the striking difference in income nity level. The high rate of suicide among distribution between Indigenous and Indigenous peoples (particularly amongst non-Indigenous people in the territories, youth) is a source of significant concern. which affects related measures of social For example, the ANPF reports that the cohesion, including crime rates and life sat- rate of self-injury hospitalizations in Labra- isfaction. The Board cites the Organisation dor is 231 per 100,000, which is three times for Economic Co-operation and Develop- the Canadian average. Addressing men- ment’s observation that “the more unequal tal health is a prerequisite for addressing a society is, the more difficult it is to move other social challenges and for building up the social ladder, simply because chil- strong people and communities. dren have a greater gap to make up.” Comparatively poor health outcomes in Despite relatively high unemployment, Canada’s North are complicated by social crime rates, and poverty compared with determinants such as poor food security, the Canadian average, the Conference overcrowded housing, high unemploy- Board of Canada reports that the territo- ment, and low formal education levels. ries measure high in life satisfaction scores. Shorter life expectancy (which is often Nunavut’s rating of 8.15 places it above the considered a fundamental indicator of a Canadian average (7.98), which is partly population’s overall health and wellness) in explained by the role of networks of family the North reveals gaps in a range of health and other kinship ties that provide stabil- factors including access to health care, ity, share food, and contribute to a sense of nutrition, living conditions and lifestyle. belonging. Accordingly, culturally-specific Life expectancy in the North is notably measures of social cohesion are particularly lower than that of the rest of Canada (e.g. relevant in remote Northern Indigenous 74 life expectancy for Inuit in Canada is 72.4

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT communities, including the proportion of the population that participates in traditional activities such as hunting, fishing, trapping, and arts and crafts. Nunavut has the highest rate of Indigenous participation in traditional activities in Canada, and the Indigenous populations in both Yukon and the N.W.T. had higher rates of participation in traditional activities than the national average. Participation in these types of activities is encouraged by land- based education programs, as well as the Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Ranger program. Implications: a. Northern and Indigenous communities are particularly susceptible and vulnerable to emerging health threats. In a region with already limited resources and strained healthcare networks, responding to emerging threats such as pandemics will require more resources per capita than South- ern populations. The resource-intensity associated with delivering services to small, dispersed populations compounds the challenges of addressing social determinants of health and improving quality of life. b. Limitations or interruptions to an already strained food supply chain pose acute risks for Northern communities. Com- munities that rely on limited food distribution networks are vulnerable to a serious interruption and require outside assistance. While various Northern strategies call for increased “food sovereignty” which innovative solutions such as community greenhouses may help to support, the combination of climate change and growing populations concentrated in specific areas are likely to increase pressures on flora and fauna proximate to communities and heighten (rather than 75

2020 REPORT reduce) dependence on supply 5.5 HUMAN NETWORKS AND INCREASING chains that bring in food from out- FRACTURED OR POLARIZED SOCIETY side of the region over the next fifteen years. The NATO SFA explains that polarization can c. Climate change poses a growing “originate from the differences in a wide threat to the health of North- variety of areas from political (ideological, ern populations. Climate change populist/mainstream) and social (ethnic, impacts on Arctic ecosystems, tra- religious, racial, gender, urban/rural, young/ ditional food sources, and infra- old, educated/uneducated) to economic structure will cause various issues (rich/poor, employed/unemployed, etc.). for Northern communities in the The common denominator is the differing short, medium, and long term. Per- and possibly diverging interests of individ- mafrost melt and coastal erosion uals.” The heightened empowerment of will continue to change the land- individuals, diffusion of information sources, scape of the North, affect infra- and interest group politics that seek advan- structure, and alter transportation tage for specific segments rather than for patterns. A changing climate and society as a whole can be progressive forces environment also impact migra- as well as sources of dangerous division that tion patterns for Arctic fauna upon can fracture social cohesion and foment which Northerners rely, which extremism. could reduce food security in some regions. For communities which The broader phenomenon of political polar- rely on shipments of food, health ization in North America and the broader products, and other supplies, an world has been introduced in previous increasingly unpredictable climate chapters. By contrast, Canada’s self-image could prevent or limit the use of ice as a tolerant, open society that embraces roads or waterways for the trans- human and viewpoint diversity is an import- portation of needed goods. ant source of strength. The NATO SFA notes d. High disparities in income, for- that “authoritarian societies/countries may mal education, and incarcera- try to hide these unpleasant fractures and tion rates between Indigenous appear to be more stable, but they may and non-Indigenous Canadians shatter rather quickly; whereas democratic living in the North are likely to societies, because of greater transparency, persist. Longstanding structural seem to be more fragile, but are in fact more factors make these disparities dif- resilient due their openness to discuss and ficult, if not impossible, to over- address challenges/differences.” Using this come in the short-term. Managing logic, Canada is likely to remain a highly expectations will be difficult. Fur- resilient and cohesive society in the next fif- thermore, the gendered dimen- teen years. sions of these challenges require That stated, a growing awareness and deliberate focus. Despite a prolif- amplification of socio-economic, cultural, eration of new formal and informal and political divisions that help to explain institutions and groups claiming the differential social and health outcomes to offer solutions to persistent between Indigenous and non-Indigenous gaps and problems, officials will be Canadians, if left unaddressed, may become increasingly pressed to discern and an unstable fault line in the future. The polit- reinforce best practices on how to ical emphasis on reconciliation with Indig- improve the social and economic enous peoples which involves apologizing 76 well-being of Northerners. for past wrongs committed against them,

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT addressing current deficits, and co-defining can also create new threat vectors which a shared, prosperous future seeks to avoid allow malicious actors (often acting under this outcome. Along similar lines, distinctions false pretences) to influence and undermine between Northern and Southern Canadians – social and democratic systems. and who has the right to speak about North- ern issues – have the potential to marginalize Implications: key stakeholders and rightsholders who could a. Human networks in the Canadian otherwise offer solutions and support to Arctic are evolving. While images address core challenges. of Indigenous peoples wearing traditional clothing and using tra- Connections and interactions within and ditional tools are important repre- between communities as well as with the sentations of identities and cultural rest of Canada and the world are chang- resilience, they should be comple- ing through influences of the cyber domain, mented by images depicting North- industry, social media, education, and glo- erners as avid users of Facebook and balization. These linkages are also reshaping other social media, advanced tech- definitions of spaces, places, and connec- nologies, and blending traditional tions, producing new forms of interaction and and Western scientific knowledge. social identities that may not conform to pre- While the adoption of global social vious geographical or ethnic determinants. media applications may promote The ongoing expansion of human networks the erosion of place-specific forms

2020 REPORT 78

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT of human interaction, social media groups increasingly susceptible to tools (such as the Instagram feed external influence and pressures of Inuktitut Ilinniaqta paired with seeking to exploit or create frac- Inuktut vocabulary) can led to a tures in Canadian society. cultural and “linguistic renaissance.” d. Polarization between Cana- b. The emergence of Arctic/North- dians is likely to erode social ern identities and Indigeneity as cohesion, but is unlikely to pro- assets. The Arctic Human Develop- duce major societal disruption. ment Report II notes that “culture, Hardening partisan political alle- especially Indigenous culture in giances, peaceful direct action by the North, has increasingly become protesters against pipeline proj- a resource, both in the sense of a ects, and assertions of Indigenous commodity and in the sense of a sovereignty can be read as forms tool that makes external recogni- of dissatisfaction and sources of tion easier.” This may introduce new disruption, but they can also been advantages to living in the North, seen as legitimate expressions of bolster cultural resilience, and democratic freedoms. Widespread entrench distinct Arctic/Northern acceptance of the conventional identities. The growing recogni- rule of law in Canada is unlikely to tion of the importance of local and diminish in the next fifteen years, Indigenous knowledge in many despite recent media amplifica- aspects of Arctic life (including its tion of “defund police” and other applications in education, science/ anti-government movements. ways of knowing, and governance) e. Understanding the needs of is likely to continue in the next fif- youth and elderly persons. The teen years. Arctic Human Development Report II c. Fractures in Northern Canadian and many Northern Canadian societies and between the North reports highlight the need to bet- and South may undermine trust and ter understand the socio-cultural, legitimacy in existing governance economic, and political roles that systems, alienate segments of the these segments of the North- population, and lessen political ern population current play and participation through established could play in the future. The ANPF democratic channels. Furthermore, includes promises to include youth viewpoint diversity on issues such more deliberately in devising pub- as resource development, conser- lic policy and foreign policies that vation, and political representation are reflective of their aspirations are likely to foment polarization and ambitions of Arctic youth, but amongst Arctic regions and groups mechanisms to do so remain to be and societies. This may make defined.

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER SIX

TECHNOLOGY LEAD AUTHORS: ANDREA CHARRON, LAURA CONRAD, ROMAN ELLIS, NICHOLAS GLESBY, NANCY TEEPLE, AND ROB HUEBERT.

A new decade means a new generation of Arctic, especially within Canada’s Arctic; technological advancements. Public and the Arctic environment could both benefit private innovations have led to rapid soci- from and be further harmed by technol- etal changes (such as the uptake of smart- ogy; and dependency on industry to pro- phones), affected various industries via vide technological solutions for the Arctic automation and, in some cases, influenced will be greater than elsewhere in the world. geographical landscapes via the extraction Unmanned Autonomous Systems (UAS) of needed resources (such as the open pit are becoming increasingly relevant for tantalite mines) or by innovation (such as defence and security considerations, but the dyke systems of the Netherlands). also for social purposes as well. Techno- logical advancements bring both solutions The advancement and increased usage of and vulnerabilities, making cyber defence technology will continue to shape soci- an increasingly important consideration ety in the Canadian Arctic. Technologi- in enhancing security and privacy. Accord- cal advancements are being harnessed ingly, this chapter considers the technolog- to address northern and Arctic issues. ical trends that have direct relevance in the In Canada’s Arctic, however, the federal Arctic to Canada and its allies. government expects less technological development given the current lack of infrastructure and small population as well 6.1 RATE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY as increased challenges associated with ADVANCEMENT operating in harsh climates and the dis- tance from larger centres where backup Interoperability among allies could present systems, parts and skilled personnel are challenges given disproportionate rates more likely to reside. This lack of critical of technological development. The North infrastructure will slow implementation American Arctic, however, is currently of new and useful technologies as they defended jointly by Canada and the United emerge. States via the binational North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) In the coming decades, it is expected and dozens of bilateral Canada-US arrange- that the Arctic will be challenged spe- ments. In theory, interoperability is not a cifically by uneven rates of technologi- particular challenge for Canada and the US. cal advancements across and within the Upgrading old technology and the rate of

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT advancement of new capabilities, however, vulnerability. Offensive cyber operations is an issue. The United States and Canada against networked ground-to-aerial-to are laggards in terms of defence capabili- space systems could result in communica- ties measured by year-round access and tion and system failures and are potential projection of power when compared to threats. Both militaries desire data fusion the other Arctic states, except Iceland. The capabilities, data analytics, AI, machine North American Arctic has not required a learning and edge computing to outpace year-round, persistent presence in the form new threats. Neither military has these of large military installations and standing capabilities at a fully-integrated and suffi- armies because of factors assumed to make ciently mature state to use them in deci- the Arctic a less likely direct target of attack. sion-making, especially with respect to the The Arctic has been, and is still thought to Arctic. be, however, an avenue of approach, likely For needed technological advances to be via the air/aerospace domain. realized, cable or satellite-based high-band- For both the United States and Canada, width internet access is needed and gaps despite the different sizes and capabilities in other local infrastructure, including cell of the two militaries, keeping pace with towers and access to cell phones and com- new technology has been a problem of pri- puters, must be filled to enable significant ority and budgets. Today’s defence chal- technological advancement. For example, lenges do not require bigger bases or more states using Unmanned Autonomous Sys- personnel. Rather, technology is expected tems in the Arctic without connectivity to be a force multiplier and the single best options are only able to accumulate infor- predictor of deterrence in the future. mation and not distribute it. Canada’s new RADARSAT Constellation is expected to In order to deter and defeat potential generate vital data, but there are concerns threats in the Arctic, detection is key. The the data generated and analyzed cannot discrepancy between the Arctic and south- be pushed from the south and received in ern Canada in terms of surveillance and the Arctic in a timely and readable format. situational awareness is the biggest technological gap that exists from a defence Despite these identified needs, Canada’s perspective. The North Warning System Arctic is likely to experience less techno- (NWS) is increasingly obsolete and new logical development than other jurisdic- technologies, including space-based, tions owing to its lack of infrastructure, ground-based and maritime-based parts, small population, and challenges associ- are needed to augment current NWS sys- ated with operating in harsh climates and tems. Thus, both the Canadian and Amer- in areas without large cities where backup ican militaries, as well as NATO, are calling systems, parts and skilled personnel are for sensors that can detect, distract and more likely to reside. discriminate targets and have robust sens- While sensors may be the current priority ing capabilities in all domains. From the of the U.S. military, Canada requires more most sophisticated hypersonic weapons, basic systems, such as fast and reliable to small Unmanned Autonomous Systems telecommunications that will benefit both (UAS), new sensors must be able discern local residents as well as national agen- the most sophisticated as well as simple cies. Therefore, we anticipate that dual-use threats and keep pace with the new high- technology, whenever possible, will have speed decision-making tempo “at the the greatest impact in the Canadian North. speed of relevance.” The rise in alarmism in response to devel- Technological advancement makes data opments in advanced weapons technology 82 a force multiplier as well as a particular

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT by strategic competitors that pose security threats to North America and the Arc- tic region must be tempered with the low risk of conflict. Accidents, incidents, and miscalculation are more likely to result from miscommunication and misperception, and be compounded by uncertainty and mistrust. Thus, technological gaps in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) must be filled in the short-term (over the next 5-10 years) in order to provide adequate situational awareness of the region to avoid misperceiving foreign activity in the region. Implications: a. Compatibility issues and difficulties in communicating between alliance members regarding the Arctic could arise if southern areas have more advanced technology compared to the Arctic. b. Gaps in situational awareness places challenges on interoperability between militaries, via ISR gaps, which could prevent critical data from being effectively communi- cated or transmitted to relevant security and defence partners in the future. c. Near to long-term modernization of ISR capabilities – radars, sensors, satellites, and other networked systems – need to be protected from cyber operations intended to degrade, disrupt, and destroy data collection, analysis, information sharing, and communications. Due to these vulnerabilities, redundancy and older systems and processes not prone to exploitation by adversaries will also be needed (e.g. paper maps). d. The cyber threat against networked systems may involve adversaries using cyber capabilities to steal information and/or eavesdrop to gain knowledge of plans, operations, and positions of CAF 83

2020 REPORT and defence partners’ assets in the the transporation of any technolo- region. These challenges impact gy-related projects and this cannot the effectiveness of interoperability come at the expense of helping among the branches of the CAF and local inhabitants with the cost of with its defence allies, in addition living generally, such as with the to other government department, transporation of footstuffs.1 partners, and local governments and agencies involved in Arctic 6.2 UNMANNED AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS exercises and operations. (UAS) e. Diplomacy may be needed to de-escalate tensions resulting UAS are a low-cost technology that can from the advancement of capa- easily be used for a wide variety of func- bilities which enhance knowledge tions, including natural disaster response, of the region. Gaps in ISR could also environmental monitoring, search and lead to increased misperception of rescue, agriculture, or as intentional or foreign activity in region and could unintentional weapons. UAS are systems lead to an escalation of crises oth- which have the capability to undertake erwise avoidable. a predetermined or prescribed task with f. Local residents near ground- little to no human intervention. This tech- based systems (or any systesms nology is available to state and non-state for that matter) must be involved actors, including individuals, which leads in planning to ensure that Indig- to security concerns regarding the risk of enous-Crown agreements are not individuals using UAS for nefarious pur- violated. Given the cost of shipping poses. Militaries (including the CAF) have any equipment to the Arctic, the deployed UAS in the Arctic for various government will need to subsidize purposes. The Government of Canada is expanding its uptake of UAS in other areas as well, with Transport Canada and Environment and Climate Change Canada releasing tenders for a variety of UAS applications in the North. While the North Warning System’s (NWS) effectiveness has been declining as men- tioned, situational awareness and monitoring of UAS has increasingly become an issue in the Canadian Arctic. UAS provide a potential opportunity to amplify a reimag- ined NWS that will be a system of systems with space-based, ground-based and maritime-based parts. Additionally, the NWS currently does not have the acuity or capability, for example, to detect UAS flying at lower speeds and lower altitudes, nor for other vehicles flying at higher speeds and altitudes. Greater use of UAS in search and rescue scenarios may bring needed lifesaving equip- 84 ment to communities and individuals in

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT distress while providing safety experts with d. UAS activity could potentially valuable information on the condition of interfere with aviation and dis- the injured, the terrain and the like, which rupt local wildlife. Evidence may save precious time prior to SAR techs includes a change in mating and being deployed. UAS are also providing migration patterns which have sec- opportunities for enhanced environmen- ond-order impacts on controlling tal monitoring and remediation, ecosys- animal populations in areas, in tem management, and monitoring climate addition to changing the locations change impacts which could have signifi- and times of year for the hunting cant social benefits as well. traditions of northern peoples. The impact on wildlife has become an Implications: issue of public concern after a video a. An increase in UAS use could went viral in 2018 which depicted lead to greater surveillance a cub struggling to climb a snow capabilities for states in the wall. Alternatively, if used correctly, air/near space, land, and mari- UAS may help us better study and time domains. This surveillance understand wildlife. role adds to existing situational awareness capabilities, provided 6.3 THE DEPENDENCEY ON INDUSTRY TO by aviation, satellite imagery, and PROVIDE TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS sensors, potentially filling a gap in detecting unusual phenomena in TO THE ARCTIC the region, including foreign intru- All technological improvements are highly sions, changing environmental dependent on industry to develop, install, conditions, and situations requir- maintain and replace the technology. ing an emergency response. Choke points for improvements in the Arc- b. UAS require a means to transmit tic from a technological perspective are data to operators at the speed almost wholly dependent on industry to of relevance. Transmissions of see the cost-benefit of hours of research large packets of data of both a and production. Whereas the military used classified and unclassified nature to be on the leading edge of technology are vulnerable to exploitation and that was later adapted to civilian use, it is manipulation. As the usage of this now the other way around. technology in the North increases, so too does the demand for infra- The development of 5G wireless capa- structure to support its benefits bilities has resulted in a worldwide com- and regulations to manage its mercial technology race amongst China’s usage. Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia. c. Given that communities north of With Five Eyes states mulling over con- the tree line are more visible from tracts in domestic legislatures, the Gov- the air, considerations must be ernment of Canada must coordinate with made in balancing security and its international partners to ensure proper privacy in the Canadian North. interoperability with data distribution, UAS are vulnerable to exploitation while trusting the secureness and stabil- and manipulation and these sys- ity of the network. That such an important tems could be used by adversar- capability is wholly in the hands of industry ies or governments in ways that is an important consideration. violate the privacy of northern At the national level, interoperability communities. between different manufacturers of these 85

2020 REPORT services must be regulated in order to cre- achieve with higher prices imposed ate a private sector equilibrium in pric- by monopolies. ing and connectivity. Without private and public cooperation, there will be vastly dif- 6.4 TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT ferent levels of access to capabilities creating the potential for mass confusion and Technology development will have a vari- under-preparedness in unforeseen emer- ety of positive and negative implications for gency circumstances. the environment in the Arctic. Technologi- cal advancements could be used to more Not only is it expensive to ship goods to the effectively respond to an oil spill or remove Arctic, but those expenses soar when one harmful plastics from the Ocean. Recent company has full control over pricing. Sim- advancements in energy technology are ilar concerns may be drawn from a tech- providing options for more renewable or nological development perspective. Due efficient sources of energy. Although these to the high cost of entry to develop in the technologies are not exclusive to the Arc- North, one may only find a few wealthy cor- tic, the rate of climate change in the Arctic porations with the means to begin invest- demands immediate solutions. Any tech- ing. Individuals should be aware of the nology that can reduce the Canadian Arc- negative ramifications of private monop- tic’s dependency on diesel as a main fuel olies in the region. Public/private partner- source would aid the health of residents ships may help dilute the concentration of and the environment. industry monopolies and encourage more local participation in decision-making. Technology can also some negative environmental impacts. Technology can result Implications: in more toxic waste and new generations a. Militaries are highly dependent of technology often last for a limited time on industries for technological before they become obsolete or parts mal- advancement, which can often function. While programs do exist to recycle come with unknown foreign back- e-waste, they are limited across the Arctic. ing and investors – knowing the Older technology is more likely to end up “customers’ customers” matters. in landfills or burned, which is extremely b. 5G networks creates a prob- harmful to the environment. From legions lem with Five Eyes intelligence of abandoned oil drums to leftover waste sharing relationship regard- from the soon-to-be obsolete North Warn- ing the security and stability of ing System, waste management of old networks. Cyber vulnerabilities, and outdated technology is an important especially espionage, disruption, consideration. attacks are relevant in the Arctic as Technology has aided ice scientists’ under- communication technology infra- standing of the life-cycle of ice in the Arc- structure advances. tic. LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) is c. Industry monopolies could have a remote sensing method that uses light in notable negative implications in the form of a pulsed laser to measure vari- the North. Monopolies may chal- able distances and can be used to measure lenge interoperability between the thickness of ice. This means, however, service companies needed for that more UAS are used and more air traf- both strategic and societal pur- fic control will be needed. For example, the poses. Access to emerging tech- air and maritime space around the Cana- nologies elsewhere in the country dian High Arctic Research Centre (CHARS) and affordable living may become located in Cambridge Bay would be an area 86 more difficult to maintain and

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT in which to concentrate traffic control sys- c. Environmental degradation and tems and monitoring. climate change are both issues of significant importance to com- Implications: munities in the Arctic. With grow- a. With advancements in technol- ing interest in resource extraction ogy, a growing obligation exists to and tourism, any technology that identify and utilize technologies can make travel more efficient will which decrease pollutants and also help to connect communities emissions, that can be applied more reliably while polluting less. to environmental cleanups, and d. Negative impacts of technology can lead to cleaner oceans and in the Arctic, including technolo- waterways. gies that use fossil fuels and pro- b. Technologies that increase duce C02 emissions or toxic waste understanding of the age and resulting from inadequate disposal thickness of sea ice in the region of obsolete or malfunctioning have an immense ecological technology, would have negative impact, but also raises important effects on the Arctic environment strategic questions for the region. and its communities. Identifying overlap between strategic and societal challenges could increase uptake in new technologies with applications in both realms.

2020 REPORT 6.5 TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY Individual access to technology has significantly increased globally. In the Arctic At the regional level, the cost of living in however, the availability of technology has the Canadian Arctic is much higher com- been less consistent. Many individuals liv- pared to their southern counterparts ing in the Arctic still do not have access to despite existing government subsidies. broadband internet. Those that do have Food, housing, energy, and health costs access pay high prices for it and service is can reach exorbitant levels because of dis- often very slow.3 It is the goal of the current tance and shipping costs. Advancements government in Canada to increase technol- in technology, including geodesic dome ogy acquisition in the Arctic over the com- greenhouses and better asphalt, concrete, ing years. and new composite materials, can help to address some of these important social Implications: challenges. a. With research and development also comes large private commer- Access to affordable, healthy food options cial interests and vast amounts is essential to the prosperity of any soci- of financial capital. Without regu- ety, and is an important building-block for latory assistance or public develop- modernization of the North that can be ment, Canadians living in the Arctic aided by technology. At the regional level, could fall prey to unaffordable and advancements in technology can lead unsustainable pricing models lead- to greater food security via better greening to poor qualities of life. house technology, hydroponic systems b. Benefits of technology to north- and even future possibilities from cloning, ern individuals include improved which could lower the cost of food and dis- communications, faster trans- tance travelled. Greenhouses developed mission of data, and increase in from recycled sea containers and powered regional, national, and global by renewable energy resources, such as engagement for northern peoples. solar panels and wind turbines, like those c. An increase in access to tech- in Gjoa Haven, Nunavut, could improve the nology could in turn lead to an quality of life and have employment bene- increase in the ability of individ- fits for Arctic populations.2 uals to participate in criminal The Canadian Arctic is sparsely populated activity, such as buying and sell- and has a shortage of health experts. There ing on the dark web and in black is also a lack of medical training institutions markets. The dark web will pose in the Arctic. Mobile clinics and diagnostic challenges for law enforcement services are an alternative to be explored. working to prevent individuals or With the development and implementa- groups from facilitating criminal tion of high-speed broadband and satellite activity online. As internet usage internet, quicker access to medical advice increases in the Arctic, individuals via tele-health and telerobotic surgery will increasingly be able to access could become more accessible. Providing the dark web or be influenced by some manner of accessible medical treat- misinformation and disinformation ment is imperative for inhabitants in order campaigns. to receive diagnoses, and referrals. Access d. Increased access to technology to prescriptions and access to more sophis- could lead to a greater ability to ticated diagnostic equipment, however, is connect individuals in times of not likely to be solved until there is suffi- crisis or emergency, allow for more cient numbers of inhabitants. training and education opportu- 88 nities, and greater understandings

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT of differences. More consistent As reliance on technology continues to connections with people living in increase, the Government of Canada must the Arctic provides opportunities begin to prepare for adversarial targeting for better representation in gov- of key industries and equipment. A focus ernment decision-making and on strategic cyber-warfare defences should improved delivery of social services be considered. In Canada and other NATO to the region. states, a general investment in cyber warfare defences will be key to creating new 6.6 OVER-RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY security assurances as the nature of global SOLUTIONS warfare changes and evolves. Over-reliance on new technology could An increasing dependency on technology create vulnerabilities in the Arctic. Thus, as to conduct certain operations has led to the NATO Strategic Foresight Assessment an assumption that technology can solve highlights, relearning “old skills” that are most problems. In the context of the Arc- “less vulnerable” in cases of emergency can tic, this assumption could lead to inad- increase resilience. By working with Inuit equate government responses to social communities and the Canadian Rangers, problems that exist in the Arctic. Address- integrating traditional knowledge into the ing high suicide rates and the prominence military lexicon can instill the CAF and OGD of substance abuse in the Arctic requires a with knowledge of how to operate in the multi-dimensional approach as these are Arctic without being solely reliant on tech- issues that technology cannot solve alone. nologies which may not always be avail- The world is rapidly digitizing and advanc- able. The uniqueness of Canada’s Arctic, ing in technological capabilities. With this with less infrastructure and larger indige- comes the concern of over-reliance on nous populations compared to other Arctic these services. As technology advance- states, allows for new training opportuni- ments begin to reshape every sector of ties within the alliance for surviving and society - power grids, wireless telecommu- operating in the North without southern nications, agriculture, government, military technologies. - ensuring the protection of this imperative Similar to the global level, exposing indi- equipment is key. Protective assurances viduals to indigenous and Inuit cultures will will provide stability, continuity of ser- help break down longstanding mispercep- vices, and reliability in cases of unforeseen tions of the North. Adapting to Indigenous 89 emergencies. strategies of navigation and survival in the

2020 REPORT Arctic may serve as a research opportunity c. Some issues cannot be solved by to overcome many technological vulnera- technology – social problems may bilities elsewhere in Canada and abroad, continue regardless of technolo- pulling Canada away from technological gies deployed and there could be dependencies. negative impacts on populations that might see no government Implications: follow-up. a. The assumption that technol- d. Involving Indigenous peoples and ogy can solve large scale social integrating traditional know- problems could lead to a lack of ledge in Arctic operations with development in the Arctic. At the allies is a reminder to the world national level this could lead to a that the Arctic is not a desolate false sense of having solved social wasteland, but rather the home- problems or assuming that nothing land to rich indigenous cultures. else can be done to address them. At both the regional and national At the regional level this could levels, greater cooperation with lead to resentment of the southern Indigenous peoples as partners regions and increased isolation. It will increase relations with the fed- could also result in the presence of eral government. By using tradi- technology that no one knows how tional knowledge in conjunction to use due to never being trained in with scientific knowledge, Indig- such areas. enous peoples will not only feel b. Over-reliance on networked sys- more respected by the Canadian tems linking society creates vul- government but may be more will- nerabilities in key industries and ing togrant the Canadian Armed equipment to disruption by acci- Forces and NATO allies with access dents or individuals. to their homelands.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Related MINDS Policy Challenges MINDS Policy Challenges for 2020-2021 investing in the right capabilities? Are reflect policy challenges for the Department there other capabilities that would of National Defence and the Canadian support Canada’s objectives in the Armed Forces (DND/CAF) and are the result Arctic? of consultations with senior leadership • Are our policies and strategies com- across the Defence Team. These challenges patible with other Arctic partners? represent key issues areas where DND/CAF How does Canada work with allies could benefit from external expertise to and partners who may have a dif- challenge or complement their thinking. ferent interpretation of the level of One challenge area is to better understand risk associated with activities in the how Canada can work with both Arctic and non-military realm? non-Arctic partners to identify and address • What is the realistic scope of responsi- risks in the Arctic, including those in the non- bility the Defence Team can assume in military realm. the Arctic, particularly given existing • Beyond the military domain, what resources? What additional resources threats exist in the Arctic? What are the might be required to meet current foreign economic and military inter- and future expectations? ests in Canada’s North? • How could climate change alter future • DND/CAF works closely with partners defence requirements in the North (e.g. government, other Canadian and how could DND/CAF address cli- partners, other Arctic countries, NATO, matic changes in the region? non-Arctic partners) in the Arctic. How • What other infrastructure does Can- can these relationships be more effec- ada need in the Arctic? How can CAF tive at delivering benefits and services? and other government departments • What is/will be the role of land, sea, leverage each other’s capabilities to air, and/or special operations forces in achieve a holistic presence and situa- demonstrating Canadian sovereignty tional awareness in the North? and exercising deterrence against • Canada has recently released the Arc- activities undermining Canadian inter- tic and Northern Policy Framework ests in the North? How do we operate (ANPF) to help focus and guide Gov- in this environment to achieve these ernment of Canada engagement in effects? the North. How does this framework • Through SSE, Canada has committed compare to similar Arctic strategic to acquiring various technologies to frameworks of Arctic and near-Arctic increase its reach and mobility in the states? Arctic. Given the changing nature of • How does Canada’s involvement with the threats in the region, including US, Five Eyes, and NATO affect other those non-military in nature, are we cooperative relationships in Arctic?

2020 REPORT

CONCLLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

New interpretive frameworks are region, we see the opposite. Commen- essential in order to respond effec- tators often draw a false correlation by tively to changes occurring in the conflating Arctic issues (those threats region. Until these frameworks have emerging in and from the region itself) been established, it may be difficult with strategic issues that may have an to understand what is happening Arctic dimension but are best framed at in the Arctic, and provide options the international rather than regional on how best to respond to crisis or level. Doing so may create the very mis- emerging threats to Canadian secu- conceptions that build mistrust and rity or sovereignty. sow the seeds of conflict. Dialogue and – Canadian Forces Arctic Inte- deterrence are compatible in a complex grating Concept (2010) Arctic region that features both competition and cooperation. This report sought to apply the NATO Stra- tegic Foresight Analysis (SFA) to a Canadian Accelerating environmental change, Arctic context. Academics associated with surging international interest, tech- the North American and Arctic Defence nological and social change, and the and Security Network (NAADSN) were emergence of all-domain threats have asked to identify key trends and implica- direct and indirect implications for tions that may shape the future security Canadian defence and security. So do environment in the region. This product internal dynamics within the Canadian does not purport to predict the future as North, which present both opportuni- much as to offer visualizations of possible ties and challenges for policymakers future challenges, opportunities, and rele- and practitioners. Recent efforts by vant implications for Canada and its allies the Government of Canada to co-cre- in a dynamic region that represents “an ating policies with Northerners, and important international crossroads where particularly Indigenous peoples, por- issues of climate change, international tend a future guided by a philosophy of trade, and global security meet.” “nothing about us without us.” Charting a future path also requires attentive- Canada has committed to assert interna- ness to evolving international realities, tional leadership to ensure that the Arctic where other states’ and actors’ priorities remains a region characterized by peace, and interests are not always synony- stability, and low tension where states can mous with Canada’s. Furthermore, as exercise their sovereign rights and respon- the global order continues to shift, Can- sibilities. Strategic competition outside of ada must remain attuned to the rising the Circumpolar Arctic is likely to continue power and influence of non-Arctic state to complicate relations within it, but our and non-state actors that are reshaping assessments suggest that this does not Arctic affairs – and blurring the bound- preclude cooperation where this serves aries between what is safety, security, Canada’s national and regional interests. and defence and what is trade, invest- Despite ideas from the Trump adminis- ment, development, economic, social, tration that the Arctic is a conflict-ridden and foreign policy.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 94

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ENDNOTES INTRODUCTION 1 See P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “‘Use It or Lose It,’ History, and the Fourth Surge,” in Canada and Arctic Sovereignty and Security: Historical Perspectives, ed. Lackenbauer (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2011), 423-36; Lackenbauer, “After- word,” in Franklyn Griffiths, Rob Huebert, and Lackenbauer, Canada and the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security and Steward- ship (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2011), 227-32; Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, eds., Canada’s Northern Strategy under the Harper Conservatives: Key Speeches and Documents on Sovereignty, Security, and Governance, 2006-15, Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (DCASS) No. 6 (Calgary and Waterloo: Centre for Military, Strategic and Security Studies/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism/Arctic Institute of North America, 2016); and Lackenbauer, “From ‘Defending Sovereignty’ to Comprehensive Security in a Whole of Government Framework: Government Narratives of Arctic Sovereignty and Security in the Harper Era,” in Understanding Sovereignty and Security in the Circumpolar Arctic, ed. Wilfrid Greaves and Lackenbauer (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2021). On this era, see also Petra Dolata, “A New Canada in the Arctic? Arctic Policies under Harper,” Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies : Revue interdisciplinaire des études canadiennes en France 78 (2015): 131-154; Klaus Dodds, “We Are a Northern Country: Stephen Harper and the Canadian Arctic,” Polar Record 47/4 (2011): 371–4; and Philippe Genest and Frederic Lasserre, “Souveraineté, sécurité, identité: éléments-clés du discours du gouvernement canadien sur l’Arctique,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 21/1 (2015): 64-84. CHAPTER ONE 1 P. Whitney Lackenbauer to Standing Committee on National Defence, 2nd Session, 41st Parliament, 9 December 2014. 2 See, for example, P.E. Solli, E. Wilson Rowe, and W. Yennie Lindgren, “Coming into the Cold: Asia’s Arctic Interests,” Polar Geog- raphy, 36/4 (2013): 253-270; Kimie Hara and Ken Coates, eds., East Asia-Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Pol- itics (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2014); and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, James Manicom, and Frédéric Lasserre, China’s Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2018). 3 See, for example, Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy and Peter M. Fesler, “Hardening the Shield: A Credible Deterrent & Capable Defense for North America” (Washington: Canada Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 2020). CHAPTER TWO 1 The process leading to the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework was a “whole of government” initiative led by Crown-In- digenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC) that involved unprecedented policy-making collaboration across 33 federal departments, as well as partnerships with Northerners and other stakeholders, featuring new approaches to deep and meaningful consultation. “The days of writing up policy papers and shopping them around town for comments are gone,” director general of Northern strategic policy Wayne Walsh explained. “We were tasked with the development of a policy framework and vision from Northerners and for Northerners.” Quoted in P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, “An Important International Crossroads”: Implementing Canada’s Arctic Priorities in Strong, Secure, Engaged (Toronto: Centre for National Security Studies, Canadian Forces College, 2018), 11. CHAPTER FOUR 1 R.K. Headland et. al. “Transits of the Northwest Passage of the 2019 Navigation Season,” Scott Polar Institute (December 2019). See also Jackie Dawson et. al., “Temporal and Spatial Patterns of Ship Traffic in the Canadian Arctic from 1990 to 2015,” Arctic 71/1 (March 2018): 19; and Whitney Lackenbauer and Adam Lajeunesse, “On Uncertain Ice: The Future of Arctic Shipping and the Northwest Passage”, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute / University of Calgary School for Pulblic Policy Paper (December 2014), 3-4. 2 Mark E. Rosen and Cara B. Thuringer. “Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment: An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security,” Center for Naval Analyses (November 2017). 3 T. Jansen, S. Post, T. Kristiansen, G. Oskarsson, J. Boje, B. Mackenzie, M. Broberg, and H. Siegstad, “Ocean warming expands habitat of a rich natural resource and benefits a national economy,” Ecological Applications 26 (2016): 2021–32; and Jimena

2020 REPORT Alvarez, Dmitry Yumashev, and Gail Whiteman, “A framework for assessing the economic impacts of Arctic change,” Ambio 49 (2020): 407-18. 4 E. Sala, J. Mayorga, C. Costello, D. Kroodsma, M.L.D. Palomares, D. Pauly, U. Rashid Sumaila, D. Zeller, “The economics of fishing the high seas,” Science Advances 4 (2018): 1-14; and T.I. Van Pelt, H.P. Huntington, O.V. Romanenko, F.J. Mueter, “The missing middle: central Arctic Ocean gaps in fishery research and science coordination,” Marine Policy 85 (2017): 79-86. CHAPTER FIVE 1 Timothy Heleniak, “The future of the Arctic populations,” Polar Geography (2020), DOI: 10.1080/1088937X.2019.1707316. 2 Chris Southcott and Valoree Walker, “A Portrait of the Social Economy of Northern Canada,” in Northern Communities Working Together: The Social Economy of Canada‘s North, ed. Christ Southcott (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015). CONCLUSIONS 1 Arctic Council Task Force on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic, Report: Improving Connectivity in the Arctic (Tromso: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2019).

2 Jill Macyshon and Jonathan Forani, “‘Anything is possible’: Nunavut greenhouses bring food, jobs to tundra,” CTV News, 28 January 2020. 3 See Qiniq, “Internet Designed for Nunavut,” accessed 10 January 2020, and “Internet Plans,” BellMTS, accessed 10 January 2020.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT APPENDIX A: ARCTIC THEMES, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS TRENDS IMPLICATIONS 2.1 SHIFTS IN GEOSTRATEGIC POWER a. Challenges to the rule-based order in the The resurgence of major power competition glob- Arctic ally has implications for peace and security, and b. Increased requirement for cooperation general Western concerns about the rise of Asia also with other actors extend to the Arctic. c. Challenges to NORAD d. Challenges to NATO 2.2 USE OF POWER POLITICS a. Increased potential of “spillover” from con- Canada’s full contribution to continental defence frontation and competition elsewhere. efforts to detect, deter, and defend against or defeat b. Growing requirement for new forms of threats from all domains remain to be determined, robust and credible deterrence. but its Arctic will inevitably factor heavily. c. Deterrence by punishment still has its place. d. Nationalism and divergent risk and threat perception. e. Discerning Russia’s Arctic thinking. f. Discerning China’s Arctic thinking 2.3 DEVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE AND RECON- a. The roles and influence of Indigenous peo- CILIATION WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ples in the development of domestic and Canada’s cooperation with other Arctic states and international policy are likely to expand partners is likely to reflect more direct involvement over the next fifteen years. of Northern territorial and Indigenous governments b. Indigenous and territorial governments will and organizations. expect to play key roles in the co-management of all Arctic activities and decisions. c. Reconciliation is a process in which all Cana- dian institutions are expected to engage. d. An increasing focus on Indigenous distinctiveness. POLITICAL 2.4 NON-ARCTIC STATE AND NON-STATE ACTOR a. Growing complexity due to non-Arctic INFLUENCE IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL state and non-state actors articulating and AFFAIRS asserting interests in the Canadian Arctic and circumpolar regions. A growing interest in Arctic affairs by non-Arctic b. Analytical frameworks designed to state and non-state actors has significant implica- anticipate non-Arctic state actors’ tions for the evolving Arctic security environment. roles in possible Arctic futures should not just fixate on material gains in the region. c. Opportunities for closer cooperation with non-Arctic state actors. d. Growing worries about the presence and influence of non-Arctic State- Owned or State-Controlled Enterprises in the region. e. Opportunities for closer cooperation with non-state actors in the Arctic.

2020 REPORT TRENDS IMPLICATIONS 2.5 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNA- a. Challenges to existing regional governance TIONAL LEGAL REGIME structures. b. Increased requirement for partnership and Regional governance systems will face pressures inclusive governance. from heightened international interest and strategic c. Projecting stability beyond the Arctic competition, and the international legal regime will region. play a pivotal role in guiding state-to-state relations. d. Upholding the Law of the Sea. e. Safe Shipping and Search and Rescue (SAR). f. Resolving Maritime Boundaries.

2.6 PUBLIC DISCONTENT/DISAFFECTION AND a. Widening North/South political fault lines. POLARIZATION b. Frustrations about the Non-Renewable

POLITICAL Resource Economy. Nefarious actors can harness and amplify political c. Competing Visions of Nunavut and Inuit polarization through social media and the spread- Nunangat. ing of disinformation or ‘fake news,’ which can d. Russia as the disaffected Arctic State. undermine political and social cohesion 3.1 CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE a. The Arctic will become increasingly accessible to a range of activities Environmental and ecological changes in the Cana- b. There will be both challenges and oppor- dian Arctic are being driven predominantly by cli- tunities associated with climate change in mate change, which exacerbates emerging regional the Arctic challenges. c. Inequalities between the Arctic and the rest of Canada are compounded by the effects of climate change d. Addressing climate change and environmental issues in the Arctic could be a source of stability in the region e. Geoengineering and Runaway Climate Change 3.2 NATURAL DISASTERS a. Increased requirement for humanitarian support. The likelihood and prevalence of natural disasters is b. Increased requirement to improve expected to increase, straining the capacities of all resilience. levels of government. c. Infrastructure deficits need to be addressed. d. Increased need for situational awareness

ENVIRONMENT 3.3 HUMAN-MADE DISASTERS a. Ongoing need for transnational cooperation and multilateral governance. The Canadian Arctic is at significant risk of human- b. Necessary trade-offs between environmen- made disasters that pose serious prospective chal- tal protection and economic development. lenges for Northerners and to federal and territorial c. Emergency preparedness and disaster governments. response resources must be increased. d. Remote monitoring and surveillance capabilities are needed

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TRENDS IMPLICATIONS 4.1 ARCTIC SHIPPING a. Interest in the legal status of the Arctic waters has increased as the Arctic ice has Shipping activity in and through the Canadian Arc- receded. tic has see a steady increase in volume, centred on b. Increased shipping activity will require fishing, cargo, and tanker craft, and there are signs improved situational awareness. of future interest by foreign interests. c. Improved situational awareness will have to be paired with new platforms and resources. 4.2 RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT a. Increased Chinese shipping and investment in the Arctic continues to generate If Arctic shipping becomes more economical, Cana- concern. dian Arctic resources will represent a more attrac- b. Chinese investment into Arctic projects tive development opportunity. could produce dangerous levels of foreign influence. c. Canada will require foreign partners and significant private sector investment in addressing its Arctic infrastructure deficit. 4.3 TOURISM a. An expanding tourism industry increases the risk of human-made disasters and Tourism is on the rise throughout the circumpo- amplifies SAR requirements. lar world, ranging from large-scale cruise ships, to b. An expanding tourism industry calls for sport fishing and hunting, to adventure and eco strong community-based SAR and emer- expeditions, to cultural tourism. gency response assets. c. Cruise tourism increases the risk of environmental pollution, calling for increased local and regional environmental response capabilities. d. An expanding tourism industry and small vessel tourism raise a wide range of regulatory, safety, and security issues. e. An expanding tourism industry demands close interdepartmental cooperation, partnership with Northern communities, and relationships with private industry. f. Arctic tourism highlights Canada’s international commitments and responsibilities. ECONOMICS AND RESOURCES RESOURCES AND ECONOMICS g. As the world’s largest source of outbound tourism, China is likely to dominate Arctic tourism. 4.4 THE CONSERVATION ECONOMY a. Enhanced situational awareness, marine monitoring, and emergency response Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework capabilities. highlights the idea of a conservation economy (which makes conservation an important part of local economies) that the federal government is slowly growing in the Canadian Arctic in collaboration with northern Indigenous stakeholders.

2020 REPORT TRENDS IMPLICATIONS ECONOMICS 4.5 FISHERIES a. Food security in Inuit Nunangat. AND b. Illegal fishing. It is uncertain how climate change will impact the c. The political and jurisdictional challenges RESOURCES Arctic’s fisheries over the next two decades. of fisheries expansion 5.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE a. Differences in population distributions continue to strain resources. There is uneven population growth across Canada’s b. Youth disenfranchisement could worsen North, and this is expected to continue over the health indicators, increase political instabil- next fifteen years. ity, and lead to out-migration. c. Conflict could arise due to differing political, economic, and environmental interests 5.2 SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND URBANIZATION a. Urbanization and changing settlement patterns could change the distribution of The populations of many smaller settlements are services. expected to decline over the next two decades, b. Rapid urbanization and resource scarcity while urban centres are expected to grow. could exacerbate pressures on already strained and expensive food networks in the North. c. Urbanization could lead to the concentration of illicit activities and vulnerabilities. 5.3 INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS a. Poor community infrastructure limits northern development and inhibits the Deficits in critical infrastructure keep communities delivery of essential services. isolated, inhibit the delivery of health and social ser- b. Strategic investments in Northern telecom- vices, and limit economic opportunities. munications infrastructure. c. Addressing Arctic infrastructure gaps invites HUMAN investments in “dual-use” capabilities. d. Competition for high-cost investments in infrastructure.

5.4 SOCIAL AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES a. Northern and Indigenous communities are particularly susceptible and vulnerable to The Government of Canada and its partners have emerging health threats. committed to close the gaps and divides that exist b. Limitations or interruptions to an already between this region, particularly in relation to its strained food supply chain pose acute risks Indigenous peoples, and the rest of the country. for Northern communities. c. Climate change poses a growing threat to the health of Northern populations. d. High disparities in income, formal education, and incarceration rates between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians living in the North are likely to persist.

100

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TRENDS IMPLICATIONS 5.5 HUMAN NETWORKS AND INCREASING FRAC- a. Human networks in the Canadian Arctic are TURED OR POLARIZED SOCIETY evolving. b. The emergence of Arctic/Northern identi- The amplification of socio-economic, cultural, and ties and Indigeneity as assets. political divisions may become an unstable fault c. Fractures in Northern Canadian societies line. and between the North and South may undermine trust and legitimacy in existing governance systems. d. Polarization between Canadians is likely

HUMAN to erode social cohesion, but is unlikely to produce major societal disruption. e. Understanding the needs of youth and elderly persons. 6.1 RATE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ADVANCE- a. Compatibility issues and difficulties in com- MENT municating between alliance members. b. Gaps in situational awareness places Technology is expected to be a force multiplier and challenges on interoperability between the single best predictor of deterrence in the future. militaries. c. Near- to long-term modernization of ISR capabilities need to be protected from cyber operations. d. Adversaries may use cyber capabilities to steal information and/or eavesdrop. e. Diplomacy may be needed to de-escalate tensions. f. Local residents proximate to any systems must be involved in planning. 6.2 UNMANNED AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS (UAS) a. An increase in UAS use could lead to greater surveillance capabilities for states in the air/ UAS are a low-cost technology that can easily be near space, land, and maritime domains. used for a wide variety of functions. b. UAS require a means to transmit data to operators at the speed of relevance.

TECHNOLOGY c. Considerations must be made in balancing security and privacy in the Canadian North. UAS are vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation and these systems could be used by adversaries or governments in ways that violate the privacy of northern communities. d. UAS activity could potentially interfere with aviation and disrupt local wildlife.

101

2020 REPORT TRENDS IMPLICATIONS 6.3 THE DEPENDENCEY ON INDUSTRY TO PRO- a. Militaries are highly dependent on VIDE TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE industries for technological advance- ARCTIC ment, which can often come with unknown foreign backing and Choke points for improvements in the Arc- investors. tic from a technological perspective are b. 5G networks creates a problem with almost wholly dependent on industry to see the Five Eyes intelligence sharing the cost-benefit of hours of research and relationship. production. c. Industry monopolies could have notable negative implications in the North 6.4 TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT a. A growing obligation exists to identify and utilize technologies which Technology development will have posi- decrease pollutants and emissions, can tive and negative implications for the Arctic be applied to environmental cleanups, environment. and can lead to cleaner oceans and waterways. b. Technologies that increase understanding of the age and thickness of sea ice raise important strategic questions. c. Technology that can make travel more efficient will help to connect communities while reducing pollution. d. Negative impacts of technology in the Arctic on the Arctic environment and its communities.

TECHNOLOGY 6.5 TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY a. Without regulatory assistance or public development, Canadians living in the Advancements in technology can help to Arctic could fall prey to unaffordable address some of these important social chal- and unsustainable pricing models lead- lenges and reduce regional disparities. ing to poor qualities of life. b. Benefits of technology to northern individuals include improved communications, faster transmission of data, and increased engagement. c. An increase in access to technology could in turn lead to an increase in the ability of individuals to participate in criminal activity. d. Increased access to technology could lead to a greater ability to connect individuals in times of crisis or emergency.

102

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TRENDS IMPLICATIONS 6.6 OVER-RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY a. The assumption that technology can solve SOLUTIONS large scale social problems could lead to a lack of development in the Arctic. An increasing dependency on technology to con- b. Over-reliance on networked systems link- duct certain operations has led to an assumption ing society creates vulnerabilities. that technology can solve most problems, which c. Negative impacts on populations when could lead to inadequate government responses to technology does not produce solutions social problems or create new vulnerabilities. promised by government. d. Involving Indigenous peoples and integrating traditional knowledge in Arctic operations. TECHNOLOGY

103

2020 REPORT SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abele, Frances, Thomas Courchene, Leslie Seidle, and France St-Hilaire, eds. Northern Exposure: Peoples, Powers and Prospects for Canada’s North. Ottawa: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2009. Abou-Abssi, Erin. “A New Way to Track Arctic Vessels.” Ottawa: Oceans North. Alvarez, Jimena, Dmitry Yumashev, and Gail Whiteman, “A framework for assessing the economic impacts of Arctic change,” Ambio 49 (2020): 407-418. Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). Impacts of a Warming Arctic: ACIA Overview Report. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Arctic Council Task Force on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic. Report: Improving Connectivity in the Arctic. Arctic Council Secretariat. 2019. Babin, Julie and Frédéric Lasserre. “Asian states at the Arctic Council: perceptions in Western States.” Polar Geography 42/3 (2019): 145-159. Bankes, Nigel, and Maria Madalena das Neves. “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Arctic Ocean.” In The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics, eds. Ken Coates and Carin Holroyd, 375-391. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2020. Barclay, Jill, Jayde Lavoie, Carly MacArthur, and Maria Nallim. The Impacts of Climate Change on North American Defence and Security. NAADSN Policy Primer (25 September 2020). Bartenstein, Kristin, and Suzanne Lalonde. “Shipping in the Canadian and Russian Arctic: Domestice Legal Responses to the Polar Code.” In Arctic Shipping: Climate Change, Commercial Traffic and Port Development, eds. F. Lasserre and O. Faury, 137-56. London: Routledge, 2020. Bellamy, Jackson. “Alternative Energy in the Canadian North.” NAADSN Policy Primer (13 August 2020). Berbrick, Walter and Rebecca Pincus. “10 Big Ideas to ‘Up America’s Game in the Arctic’,” The Diplomat, 22 September 2018. Berkman, Paul, and Alexander Vylegzhanin, eds. Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Berkman, Paul Arthur, and Oran Young. “Governance and environmental change in the Arctic Ocean.” Science 324, no. 5925 (2009): 339-340. Bielawski, Ellen. “Inuit indigenous knowledge and science in the Arctic.” Human ecology and climate change: People and resources in the far north (1995): 219-228. Borgerson, Scott G. “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming.” Foreign Affairs 87/2 (2008): 63-77. Bouchard, Christina. “Arctic Highways as Critical Infrastructure.” NAADSN Policy Primer (19 August 2020). Byers, Michael. “Cold, Dark, and Dangerous: International Cooperation in the Arctic and space.” Polar Record 55/1 (2019): 32-47. Byers, Michael. “Crises and International Cooperation: An Arctic Case Study.” International Relations 31/4 (2017): 375-402. Byers, Michael. International Law and the Arctic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Byers, Michael, and Nicole Covey. “Arctic SAR and the ‘security dilemma.’” International Journal 74/4 (2019): 499-517. Byers, Michael and Suzanne Lalonde. “Who controls the Northwest Passage?” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42 (2009): 1133-1210. Canada, “Government of Canada announces contract awards aimed at improving space-based earth observation capabilities” (December 14, 2018). Canada. Arctic and Northern Policy Framework. Ottawa: Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, 2019. Canada. Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future. Ottawa: Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 2009. Canada. Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy. Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2010. Carter, Natalie, Jackie Dawson, J. Knopp, J. Joyce, M. Weber, Z. Kochanowicz and O. Mussells. Arctic Corridors and Northern Voices: Governing marine transportation in the Canadian Arctic (Cambridge Bay, Nunavut community report). Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2018. 104

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Carter, Natalie, Jackie Dawson, J. Joyce, A. Ogilvie. Arctic Corridors and Northern Voices: Governing marine transportation in the Canadian Arctic (Gjoa Haven, Nunavut community report). Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2017. Charles Duxbury, “The 5 most important races for the Arctic,” Politico, 1 January 2020. Charron, Andrea. “Canada, the Arctic, and NORAD: Status Quo or New Ball Game?” International Journal 70:2 (2015): 215-231. Charron, Andrea. “Canada, the United States and Arctic Security,” in Canada’s Arctic Agenda: Into the Vortex, ed. John Higgin- botham and Jennifer Spence, 93-102. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019. Charron, Andrea, Troy Bouffard and James Fergusson. “A Tale of Two Russias,” in Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World, ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Suzanne Lalonde, 61-74. Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2019. Charron, Andrea and James Fergusson. “Out of Sight, Out of mind NORAD vis-à-vis CANUS Politics” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (2019): 2-15. Charron, Andrea, Jim Fergusson, Joseph Jockel, Chris Sands, and Joel Sokolsky. NORAD: Beyond Modernization. Winnipeg: Cen- tre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, 2019. Charron, Andrea, Joël Plouffe, and Stéphane Roussel.“Russian National Interests and the Arctic: Foreign Policy Implications for Canada.” In Canadian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World, eds. Christopher Kirkey and Michael Hawes, 55-75. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Chater, Andrew. “Change and Continuity Among the Priorities of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants.” In Leadership for the North, edited by Douglas Nord, 149-166. New York: Spring Nature, 2019. Chater, Andrew. “An Examination of the Framing of Climate Change by the Government of Canada, 2006-2016.” Canadian Jour- nal of Communication 43/4 (2018): 583-600. Chater, Andrew. “An Explanation for the Growing Institutional Capacity of the Arctic Council.” Northern Review, 48 (2018): 51-80. Chater, Andrew. “Security Governance Between Canada and Greenland.” In The North American Arctic: New Trends in Regional Security, edited by Heather Nicol and Dwayne Menezes, 188-199. London, United Kingdom: University College London Press, 2019. Chater, Andrew, Wilfred Greaves and Leah Sarson. “Assessing Security Governance in the Arctic.” In Routledge Handbook of Arc- tic Security, edited by Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Jessica M. Shadian and Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, 43-56. Abigdon, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2020. Cherpako, Danielle. “What is Russia Doing in the Arctic? Documenting Russian Military Actions in the North between 2014 – 2020.” NAADSN Policy Primer (7 August 2020). Cheung, William, Gabriel Reygondeau, and Thomas Frölicher. “Large benefits to marine fisheries of meeting the 1.5°C global warming target,” Science 354/6319 (2016): 1591-94. Chircop, Aldo. “Canada and the Polar Code: Balancing Unilateralism and Multilateralism in the Regulation of Arctic Shipping.” Revue Belge de droit international 51 (2018): 380-404. Chircop, Aldo. “The Polar Code and the Arctic Marine Environment: Assessing the Regulation of the Environmental Risks of Shipping.” Journal of International Marine and Coastal Law (2020): 533-569. Chircop, Aldo, Ivan Bunik, Moira McConnell, and Kristoffer Svendsen. “Course Convergence? Comparative Perspectives on the Governance of Navigation and Shipping in Canadian and Russian Arctic Waters.” Ocean Yearbook Online 28/1 (2014): 291-327. Chircop, Aldo, F. Goerlandt, C. Aporta and R. Pelot, eds. Governance of Arctic Shipping: Rethinking Risk, the Human Dimension and Regulation. New York: Springer Polar Science, 2020. Coates, Ken, Whitney Lackenbauer, William Morrison, and Greg Poelzer. Arctic Front: Defending Canada’s Interests in the Far North. Toronto: Thomas Allen, 2008. Csenkey, Kristen and Bruno Perron. “Cyber Capacity Building in the Canadian Arctic and the North.” NAADSN Strategic Perspec- tives (October 2020). Dawson, Jackie, Larissa Pizzolato, Stephen Howell, and Luke Copeland. “Temporal and Spatial Patterns of Ship Traffic in the Canadian Arctic from 1990 to 2015,” Arctic 71/1 (2018): 15-26. Dean, Ryan, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. “Canada and Geostrategy: From C.P. Stacey to Twenty-First Century Arctic Threat Assessment.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 20:1 (2019): 33-96. 105

2020 REPORT Dean, Ryan, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. “China’s Arctic Gambit? Contemplating Possible Scenarios.” NAADSN Strategic Per- spectives (April 2020). Dean, Ryan, P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Adam Lajeunesse. Canadian Arctic Defence and Security Policy: An Overview of Key Doc- uments, 1970-2012. Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (DCASS) No. 1. Calgary and Waterloo: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, 2014. Dolata, Petra. “A New Canada in the Arctic? Arctic Policies under Harper.” Revue Etudes Canadiennes 78 (2015): 131-154. Doyon, Jean-François, Frédéric Lasserre, Pauline Pic, Pierre-Louis Têtu, Mélanie Fournier, Linyan Huang, and Leah Beveridge. « Perceptions et stratégies de l’industrie maritime de vrac relativement à l’ouverture des passages arctiques. » Géotransports 8 (2017): 5-22. Edgar, Courtney. “Nunavut government strikes new tourism partnerships,” Nunatsiaq News, 18 April 2019. English, John. Ice and Water: Politics, Peoples, and the Arctic Council. Toronto: Allen Lane, 2013. Exner-Pirot, Heather. “Canada’s Arctic Council Chairmanship (2013–2015): A Post-Mortem.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 22/1 (2016): 84-96. Exner-Pirot, Heather, and Rob Huebert. “Arctic Security: The Canadian Context.” In Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security, eds. Gunhild Hoogensen Gjorv, Marc Lanteigne and Horatio Sam Aggrey, 140-51. Oxon: Routledge, 2020. Eyre, Kenneth. Custos Borealis: The Military in the Canadian North, ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer. Peterborough: North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, 2020. Fisheries and Oceans Canada. International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (2018). Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Departmental Plan 2019-20. Gavrilov, Viatcheslav. “Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean: Present State and Possible Legal Solutions.” In A Bridge over Troubled Waters: Dispute Resolution in the Law of International Watercourses and the Law of the Sea, eds. Helene Fabri, Erik Franckx, Marco Benatar, and Tamal Meshel, 416-444. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2020. Gill, Alan and David Sevingy. “Sustainable Northern Development: The Case for a Northern Development Bank.” Waterloo: Cen- tre for International Governance Innovation Papers Series, 27 January 2015. Global Affairs Canada. Canadian“ Arctic Capabilities by Sector – Canada.” Gosnel, Rachel. “What Will the Future Hold for Arctic Economics?” Centre for International Maritime Security Papers, 3 July 2018. Government of Nunavut, Department of Economic Development and Transportation. Annual Tourism Report, 2018-2019. Government of Yukon. “2018 another record year for Yukon tourism.” Grant, Shelagh. Polar Imperative. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010. Greaves, Wilfrid. “Arctic Break Up: Climate Change, Geopolitics, and the Fragmenting Arctic Security Region.” In Redefining Arctic Security: Arctic Yearbook 2019, eds. Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot, and Justin Barnes, 1-17. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, 2019. Greaves, Wilfrid. “Arctic (in)Security and Indigenous Peoples: Comparing Inuit in Canada and Sámi in Norway.” Security Dialogue 47/6 (2016): 461-480. Greaves, Wilfrid. “Cities and Human Security in a Warming Arctic.” In Climate Change and Security: Searching for a Paradigm Shift, eds. Lassi Heininen and Heather Exner-Pirot, 61-89. London: Palgrave, 2020. Greaves, Wilfrid. “Indigenous Peoples.” In Handbook on Arctic Security, eds. Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv and Horatio Sam-Aggrey, 363-376. London: Routledge, 2020. Greaves, Wilfrid. “What a Biden presidency means for climate change and Canada,” Policy Options (10 November 2020). https:// policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/november-2020/what-a-biden-presidency-means-for-climate-change-and-canada/ Greaves, Wilfrid and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, eds. Breaking Through: Understanding Sovereignty and Security in the Circumpolar Arctic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2021. Griffiths, Franklyn. “The Shipping News: Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty Not on Thinning Ice.” International Journal 58/2 (2003): 257-282.

106

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Griffiths, Franklyn, Rob Huebert, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer.Canada and the Changing Arctic. Sovereignty, Security and Steward- ship. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2011. Gritsenko, Daria. “Vodka on Ice? Unveiling Russian Media Perceptions of the Arctic.” Energy Research & Social Science 16 (2016): 8–12. Headland, R.K., et. al. “Transits of the Northwest Passage to the End of the 2019 Navigation Season,” Scott Polar Institute InfoS- heets (17 March 2020). Heininen, Lassi, Karen Everett, Barbora Padrtova, and Anni Reissell. Arctic Policies and Strategies—Analysis, Synthesis, and Trends. Laxenburg: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2020. Henderson, James Youngblood. Indigenous Diplomacy and the Rights of Peoples: Achieving UN Recognition. Winnipeg: Purich, 2016. Hønneland, Geir. Russia and the Arctic: Environment, Identity and Foreign Policy. New York: IB Tauris, 2015. Huebert, Rob. “Arctic Security, Global Challenges in the Arctic Region.” In Global Challenges in the Arctic Region: Sovereignty, Envi- ronment and Geopolitical Balance, eds. Elena Conde and Sara Iglesias Sanchez, 364-84. Oxon: Routledge, 2017. Huebert, Rob. “Canada and NATO in the Arctic: Responding to Russia?” In Canada’s Arctic Agenda: Into the Vortex, eds. John Hig- ginbotham and Jennifer Spence, 85-92. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019. Huebert, Rob. “Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage.” Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research 2/4 (2001): 86-94. Huebert, Rob. “A New Cold War in the Arctic?! The old one never ended!” In Redefining Arctic Security: Arctic Yearbook 2019, eds. Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot, and Justin Barnes. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, 2019. Huebert, Rob. “Mahan and Understanding the Future of Naval Competition in the Arctic Ocean, Canadian Naval Review 14/3 (2019):10-15. Huebert, Rob. “The Melting Ice and the Transforming Arctic Ocean.” Ocean Yearbook 31 (2017): 57-79. Huebert, Rob. “The Shipping News Part II: How Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty is on Thinning Ice.” International Journal 58/3 (2003): 295-308. Huebert, Rob, Heather Exner-Pirot, Adam Lajeunesse, and Jay Gulledge. Climate Change and International Security: The Arctic as Bellwether. Arlington: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012. Humpert, Malte. “COSCO continues to step up its operations in the Arctic,” High North News, 13 June 2019. Humpert, Malte. “French Cruise Ship Set to Travel to North Pole in 2021,” High North News, 22 May 2019. Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada. “High-Speed Access for All: Canada’s Connectivity Strategy.” Press release, 16 July 2019. Jansen, Teunis, Søren Post, Trond Kristiansen, Gudmundur Oskarsson, Jesper Boje, Brian MacKenzie, Mala Broberg, and Helle Siegstad. “Ocean warming expands habitat of a rich natural resource and benefits a national economy.” Ecological Applications 26 (2016): 2021–2032. Johnson, Margaret, Jackie Dawson, and Emma Stewart. “Marine Tourism in Nunavut: Issues and Opportunities for Economic Development in Arctic Canada,” in Perspectives in Rural Tourism Geographies, eds. R. Koster and D. Carson, 115-136. Cham: Springer, 2015. Kikkert, Peter. “Rising Above the Rhetoric: Northern Voices and the Strengthening of Canada’s Capacity to Maintain a Stable Cir- cumpolar World.” Northern Review 33 (2011): 29-45. Kikkert, Peter, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. “The Militarization of the Arctic to 1990.” In The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics, eds. Ken Coates and Carin Holroyd, 487-506. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Kikkert, Peter, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. “A Better Road Map Needed for Arctic and Northern Policy Framework,” Policy Options (17 September 2019). Kikkert, Peter, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. “Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: A Roadmap for the Future?” in Arc- tic Yearbook 2019, eds. Lassi Heininen and Heather Exner-Pirot: 332-39. Kikkert, Peter, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. Using Civil-Military Operations to “Expand and Deepen” Relationships with Northern Communities: Examples from Alaska and Australia. NAADSN Special Reports (July 2020).

107

2020 REPORT Kikkert, Peter, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and Angulalik Pedersen. Kitikmeot Roundtable on Search and Rescue – General Report and Findings. Report from a workshop hosted at the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) in Cambridge Bay, Nun- avut, 31 January – 1 February 2020. Klimenko, Ekaterina. Russia’s Evolving Arctic Strategy: Drivers, Challenges and New Opportunities. SIPRI Policy Paper 42. Stock- holm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014. Konyshev, Valery, and Alexander Sergunin. “The Changing Role of Military Power in the Arctic.” In The GlobalArctic Handbook, eds. Matthias Finger and Lassi Heininen, 171-195. Cham: Springer, 2019. Kraska, James, ed. Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Kraska, James. “International Security and International Law in the Northwest Passage.” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42 (2009): 1109-1132. Krueger, Hanna. “Arctic tourism is potential threat to environment as ice melts,” NBC News, 11 January 2018. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Arctic Defence and Security: Transitioning to the Trudeau Government.” In Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens, ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol. Antigonish: Mulroney Institute on Government, 2017. 308-340. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Canada & Russia: Toward an Arctic Agenda,” Global Brief (Summer/Fall 2016): 21-25 Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. The Canadian Rangers: A Living History. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “‘Global Arctic Leadership’ in an Era of Cooperation and Competition,” in Canada’s Arctic Agenda: Into the Vortex, ed. John Higginbotham and Jennifer Spence, 67-73. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Mirror Images? Canada, Russia, and the Circumpolar World.” International Journal 65:4 (2010): 879-97. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “The North’s Canadian Rangers,” in Strengthening the Canadian Armed Forces through Diversity and Inclusion, eds. Alistair Edgar, Rupinder Mangat, and Bessma Momani, 67-86. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Polar Race or Polar Saga? Canada and the Circumpolar World.” In Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change ed. James Kraska. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 218-43. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Why Fear Russia in the Arctic? Contemplating Scenarios as an Exercise in Assumption-Testing and ‘Red Teaming.’” NAADSN Strategic Perspectives (May 2020). Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Ryan Dean, eds. Canada’s Northern Strategy under the Harper Conservatives: Key Speeches and Doc- uments on Sovereignty, Security, and Governance, 2006-15. Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (DCASS) No. 6. Calgary and Waterloo: Centre for Military, Strategic and Security Studies/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism/Arctic Institute of North America, 2016. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, Ryan Dean, and Rob Huebert, eds. (Re)Conceptualizing Arctic Security: Selected Articles from the Jour- nal of Military and Security Studies. Calgary: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, 2017. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Rob Huebert, “Premier Partners: Canada, the United States and Arctic Security.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20:3 (2014): 320-33. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Peter Kikkert. “The Canadian Rangers and COVID-19.” NAADSN Policy Brief (June 2020). Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Peter Kikkert. Measuring the Success of the Canadian Rangers. Peterborough: NAADSN, 2020. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Suzanne Lalonde, eds. Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World. Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2019. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Suzanne Lalonde. “Canada, Sovereignty, and ‘Disputed’ Arctic Boundaries: Myths, Misconcep- tions, and Legal Realities.” In The Networked North: Borders and Borderlands in the Canadian Arctic Region, ed. Heather Nicol and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. Waterloo: Borders in Globalization/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism. 2017. 95-113. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, Suzanne Lalonde, and Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon. Canada and the Maritime Arctic: Boundaries, Shelves, and Waters. Peterborough: North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, 2020. https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/CanadaMaritimeArctic-PWL-SL-ERD-2020.pdf Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, Adam Lajeunesse, Frédéric Lasserre, and James Manicom. China’s Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2018.

108

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Adam Lajeunesse. “On Uncertain Ice: The Future of Arctic Shipping and the Northwest Passage.” Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute and School for the Public Policy Paper (December 2014). Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Adam Lajeunesse. “The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Building Appropriate Capabilities.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 16:4 (2016): 7-66. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Heather Nicol, eds. Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens. Antigonish: Mulroney Institute for Government, 2017. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, Heather Nicol, and Wilfrid Greaves, eds. One Arctic: The Arctic Council and Circumpolar Governance. Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 2017. Lajeunesse, Adam. Lock, Stock, and Icebergs: The Evolution of Canada’s Arctic Maritime Sovereignty. Vancouver: University of Brit- ish Columbia Press, 2016. Lajeunesse, Adam. “Arctic Geopolitics and Security from the Canadian Perspective.” In Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic, ed. Joachim Weber. Cham: Springer, 2020. Lajeunesse, Adam, and Rob Huebert, “Preparing for the Next Arctic Sovereignty Crisis: The Northwest Passage in the Age of Donald Trump.” International Journal 74/2 (2019): 226-239. Lajeunesse, Adam, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, eds. Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Operations, 1945-2015: Historical and Con- temporary Lessons Learned. Fredericton: Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society, 2017. Lajeunesse, Adam, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. “China’s Mining Interests in the North American Arctic.” In Governing the North American Arctic: Lessons from the Past, Prospects for the Future, eds. Dawn Berry and Halbert Jones, 74-99. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017. Lajeunesse, Adam, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. “Defence Policy in the Canadian Arctic: From Jean Chrétien to Justin Trudeau,” in Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice, eds. Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 365-82. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Lalonde, “Canadian Arctic Maritime Sovereignty During the Trudeau Years.” In Canada’s Arctic Agenda: Into the Vortex, ed. John Higginbotham and Jennifer Spence, 75-82. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019. Lalonde, Suzanne. “Increased Traffic Through Canadian Arctic Waters: Canada’s State of Readiness.” Revue Juridique Themis 38 (2004): 49-124. Lalonde, Suzanne. “La frontière maritime dans l’archipel arctique : un garde-fou essentiel pour le Canada,” Annuaire français de droit international 53 (2007): 609-639. Lalonde and C. Schofield, “Rising Seas and Retreating Coasts: Implications for the Arctic.”International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2020): 468-97. Lalonde, Suzanne, and Ted L. McDorman, eds. International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean: Essays in Honor of Donat Pha- rand. Leiden: Brill, 2015. Lam, Vicky, William Cheung, and Rashid Sumaila. “Marine capture fisheries in the Arctic: Winners or losers under climate change and ocean acidification?” Fish and Fisheries 17/2 (2014): 335-357. Landriault, Mathieu, ed. L’année arctique 2019 . Montréal : Observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l’arctique (OPSA), 2019. Landriault, Mathieu. Media, Security and Sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic: From the Manhattan to the Crystal Serenity. New York: Routledge, 2019. Landriault, Mathieu. “Public Opinion on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security.” Arctic 69/2 (2016): 160-168. Landriault, Mathieu. La Sécurité Arctique 2000-2010 : Une décennie turbulente? Peterborough: North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, 2020. Landriault, Mathieu, Andrew Chater, Elana Wilson Rowe and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. Governing Complexity in the Arctic Region. Abingdon, United Kingdom: Routledge Press, 2020. Landriault, Mathieu, and Paul Minard. “Does Standing Up for Sovereignty Pay Off Politically? Arctic Military Announcements and Governing Party Support in Canada from 2006 to 2014.” International Journal 71/1 (2016): 41-61. Laruelle, Marlene. Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North. London: ME Sharpe, 2013. Lasserre, Frédéric. « Arctique : le passage du Nord-Ouest sous tension. » Politique étrangère (2017) : 141-153.

109

2020 REPORT Lasserre, Frédéric. « Géopolitique du passage du Nord-Ouest. Une perspective de relations internationales. » Relations internationales 170 (2017): 107-124. Lasserre, Frédéric, ed. Passages et mers arctiques: Géopolitique d’une région en mutation. Québec : Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2010. Lasserre, Frédéric. « Le retour du mythe des passages arctiques : quel trafic maritime dans l’Arctique au XXIe siècle? » Nordiques 37 (2019): 9-24. Lasserre, Frédéric, Leah Beveridge, Michelle Fournier, Pierre-Louis Têtu, and Linyan Huang. “Polar Seaways? Maritime Trans- port in the Arctic: An Analysis of Shipowners’ Intentions II,” Journal of Transport Geography 57(2016):105-114. Lasserre, Frédéric, Jérôme Le Roy, and Richard Garon. “Is there an Arms Race in the Arctic?” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 14:3–4 (2012): 1-56. Lasserre, Frédéric, and Stéphane Roussel. « La question du passage du Nord-Ouest: un enjeu réellement stratégique entre Canada et Etats-Unis? » Paix et Sécurité Européenne et Internationale 4 (2016) : 1-30. Lasserre, Frédéric, and Pierre-Louis Têtu. “Russian Air Patrols in the Arctic : Are Long-Range Bomber Patrols a Challenge to Canadian Security and Sovereignty?” Arctic Yearbook 2016: 305–27. Lemelin, Raynald, Jackie Dawson, Emma Stewart, Patrick Maher, and Michael Lueck. “Last-chance tourism: The boom, doom, and gloom of visiting vanishing destinations.” Current Issues in Tourism 13 (2019): 477–493. Levinson-King, Robin. “Huawei Heats up the Battle for Internet in Canada’s North.” BBC News, 9 September 2019. Loukacheva, Natalia. The Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland and Nunavut. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Luedi, Jeremy. “Chinese tourists flock to Canada’s Far North.” True North, Far East, 8 August 2019. Macyshon, Jill and Jonathan Forani. “‘Anything is possible’: Nunavut greenhouses bring food, jobs to tundra.” CTV News, Jan- uary 28th, 2020. McDorman, Ted. “The Northwest Passage: International Law, Politics and Cooperation.” In Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea, eds. Myron Nordquist, Tomas Heidar, and John Norton Moore, 227-50. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010. McDorman, Ted. “Old Issues and New Developments Respecting International Navigational Rights and Obligations in Arctic Waters,” In The Belt and Road Initiative and the Law of the Sea, ed. Keyuan Zou, 41-55. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2020. McDorman, Ted. “Regulation of Foreign Commercial Vessel Navigation in Canadian Waters: Issues of International Law.” In Reg- ulation on Navigation of Foreign Vessels, eds. Ted McDorman, Keyuan Zou, and Seokwoo Lee, 165-179. Brill Nijhoff, 2019. McDorman, Ted. Salt Water Neighbours: International Ocean Law Relations between the United States and Canada. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. McRae, Donald. “Arctic Sovereignty: What is at Stake?” Behind the Headlines 64/1 (2007): 1-23. Pompeo, Michael. “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus,” Speech to the Arctic Council (Rovaniemi, Finland), 6 May 2019. National Snow & Ice Data Centre, “That’s a Wrap: A Look Back at 2019 and the Past Decade.” 7 January 2020. Nickels, Scot, ed. Nilliajut: Inuit Perspectives on Security, Patriotism and Sovereignty. Ottawa: Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2013. Nicol, Heather. “The Evolving North American Arctic Security Context: Can Security Be Traditional?” In The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics, eds. Ken Coates and Carin Holroyd, 455-472. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Nicol, Heather. “Rescaling Borders of Investment: The Arctic Council and the Economic Development Policies.” Journal of Bor- derlands Studies 33/2 (2018): 225-238. Nicol, Heather, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, eds. The Networked North: Borders and Borderlands in the Canadian Arctic Region. Waterloo: Borders in Globalization/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, 2017. Nicol, Heather, Adam Lajeunesse, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and Karen Everett. “Regional Border Security Management in the Territorial North,” in The North American Arctic: Themes in Regional Security, ed. Dwayne Menezes and Heather Nicol. London: University College London Press, 2019. 134-54. Nikel, David. “Achieving the Impossible: Growing Food in the High Arctic.” Forbes, 13 April 2019.

110

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Oceans North. “Fisheries.” Østhagen, Andreas. Coast Guards and Ocean Politics in the Arctic. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Østhagen, Andreas. “High North, Low Politics—Maritime Cooperation with Russia in the Arctic.” Arctic Review 7/1 (2016): 83-100. Østhagen, Andreas. “Maritime boundary disputes: What are they and why do they matter?” Marine Policy 120 (2020): 104-118. Østhagen, Andreas. The New Geopolitics of the Arctic: Russia, China, and the EU. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2019. Østhagen, Andreas, Gregory Levi Sharp, and Paal Sigurd Hilde. “At Opposite Poles: Canada’s and Norway’s Approaches to Secu- rity in the Arctic.” Polar Journal 8/1 (2018): 163-181. Parks Canada, Nunavut Field Unit. “Project Description: HMS Erebus and HMS Terror Inuit Guardian Program (Wrecks of HMS Erebus and HMS Terror NHS).” 28 May 2018. Peter Sherwin and Thomas Bishop. “The Trillion-Dollar Reasons for an Arctic Infrastructure Standard,” The Polar Connection, 2019. Pharand, Donat. “Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit,” Ocean Development and International Law 38/1&2 (2007): 3-69. Pharand, Donat. Canada’s Arctic Waters in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1988. Pic, Pauline and Frédéric Lasserre. “What is ‘Arctic’ about ‘Arctic security’?” Arctic Yearbook 2019. Poirier, Nathalie. “A GBA+ Analysis of the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework – Safety, Security, and Defence Chapter.” NAADSN Policy Brief (August 2020). Qikiqtani Inuit Association. Arctic Bay Nauttiqsuqtiit, 2018-2019 Annual Report. Qikiqtani Inuit Association. QIA’s Response to “Stronger Together: An Arctic and Northern Policy Framework for Canada.” Supple- mentary document provided to Special Senate Committee on the Arctic, January 2019. “Qikiqtani Inuit seek more support for guardians of Nunavut’s new marine conservation area.” Nunatsiaq News, 17 June 2019. Qiniq. “Internet Designed for Nunavut.” Quinn, Ellis. “Inuit association gets $900,000 to monitor marine protected area in Arctic Canada,” Eye on the Arctic, 19 July 2018. Quinn, Ellis. “Tourism numbers in Canada’s Northwest Territories up 7 per cent,” Eye on the Arctic, 8 November 2019. Raspotnik, Andreas, and Andreas Østhagen. “How much is the fish? When foreign policy meets fishing interests in the EU’s Arc- tic endeavour.” International Relations (2020): 1-18. Regehr, Ernie. Deterrence, Arms Control, and Cooperative Security: Selected Writings on Arctic Security. Ren, Carina and Daniela Chimirri, “Arctic Tourism – More than an Industry?“ The Arctic Institute, 3 April 2018. Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. Breaking the Ice: Canada, Sovereignty, and the Arctic Extended Continental Shelf. St. Catharines: Dun- durn, 2017. Riedlinger, Dyanna, and Fikret Berkes. “Contributions of traditional knowledge to understanding climate change in the Cana- dian Arctic.” Polar Record 37/203 (2001): 315-328. Roberts, Kari. “Jets, Flags, and a New Cold War? Demystifying Russia’s Arctic Intentions.” International Journal 65/4 (2010): 957-976. Roberts, Kari. “Understanding Putin: The Politics of Identity and Geopolitics in Russian Foreign Policy Discourse,” International Journal 72/1 (2017): 28-55. Roberts, Kari. “Why Russia Will Play by the Rules in the Arctic.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 21/2 (2015): 112–28. Rosen, Mark, and Cara Thuringer. “Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment: An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security.” Center for Naval Analyses, November 2017. Rothwell, Donald R. The Polar Region and the Development of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Sala, Enric, Juan Mayorga, Christopher Costello, et al. “The Economics of Fishing the High Seas.” Science Advances 4 (2018): 1-14. Schlanger, Zoë. “Climate change is luring cruise ships to sail risky Arctic passages,” Quartz, 1 August 2019. Sergunin, Alexander, and Valery Konyshev. Russia in the Arctic: Hard or Soft Power? New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. 111

2020 REPORT Shadian, Jessica. The Politics of Arctic Sovereignty: Oil, Ice, and Inuit Governance. New York: Routledge, 2014. Sharman, Jon. “‘A Great Power Play is Shaping Up’: China’s Military Using Scientific Research to Push into Arctic, Danish intelligence Report Says.” The Independent. 19 November 2019. Simon, Mary. Interim Report on the Shared Arctic Leadership Model. Ottawa: Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, 2016. Simon, Mary. “Inuit and the Canadian Arctic: Sovereignty Begins at Home.” Journal of Canadian Studies 43/2 (2009): 250-60. Special Senate Committee on the Arctic. Northern Lights: A Wake-Up Call for the Future of Canada. Ottawa: Senate of Canada, 2019. Stephen, Kathrin. “Societal Impacts of a Rapidly Changing Arctic.” Current Climate Change Reports 4 (2018): 223-237. Stuhl, Andrew. Unfreezing the Arctic: Science, Colonialism, and the Transformation of Inuit Lands. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016. Tai, Travis, Nadja Steiner, Carie Hoover, William, Cheunga, Rashid. “Evaluating present and future potential of arctic fisheries in Canada.” Marine Policy 108 (2019): 1-11. Teeple, Nancy. “U.S. Arctic Policy: Threats, Actors, and Outcomes.” NAADSN Policy Brief (3 April 2020). Têtu, Pierre-Louis and Frédéric Lasserre. « Projets d’investissements miniers chinois dans l’Arctique. » Recherches sociogra- phiques 58/2 (2017) : 415–446. Têtu, Pierre-Louis and Frédéric Lasserre. “Chinese investment in Greenland’s mining industry: Toward a new framework for foreign direct investment.” Extractive Industries and Societies 4/3 (2017): 661-671. Têtu, Pierre-Louis and Frédéric Lasserre. « Géographie de l’approvisionnement chinois en minerai de nickel : le Grand Nord québécois est-il un territoire prioritaire pour les entreprises chinoises? » Annales de Géographie 714 (2017): 216-243. Tømmerbakke, Siri Gulliksen. “Norwegian Foreign Intelligence Services: China and Russia the Biggest Threats Against Norway,” High North News, 10 February 2020. Transport Canada. “Drones in the Canadian Arctic.” 12 December 2020. Tranter, Emma. “QIA announces fees for tourism operators accessing Inuit-owned land.” Nunatsiaq News, 11 October 2019. United States Committee on the Marine Transportation System. A Ten-Year Projection of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region, 2020-2030. Washington: CMTS, September 2019. United States Coast Guard. Arctic Strategy. Washington: USCG, 2019. United States Navy. Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030. Washington: Navy Task Force Climate Change, 2014. United States Navy. Strategic Outlook for the Arctic. Washington: Chief of Naval Operations, January 2019. United States. White House. “National Strategy for the Arctic Region.” 10 May 2013. United States. White House. Presidential Directives NSPD-66/HSPD-25, “The Arctic Region.” 9 January 2009 Van Pelt, T.I., H.P. Huntington, O.V. Romanenko, and F.J. Mueter. “The missing middle: central Arctic Ocean gaps in fishery research and science coordination.” Marine Policy 85 (2017): 79-86. VanderZwaag, David. “Governance of the Arctic Ocean Beyond National Jurisdiction: Cooperative Currents, Restless Sea,” in Ocean Law Debates, eds. Harry Scheiber, Nilufer Oral, and Moon-Sang Kwon, 401-418. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2018. VanderZwaag, David. “Governance of Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean: Cooperative Currents, Foggy Future” in Governing Marine Living Resources in the Polar Regions, ed. Nengye Liu, Cassandra M Brooks and Tianbao Qin, 92-108. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 2019. VanderZwaag, David. “Edging Towards Principled Ocean Governance: Law of the Sea and Beyond” in The Future of Ocean Gov- ernance and Training: Essays in Honour of Elisabeth Mann Borgese (1918-2002), 117-127. Leiden: Brill, 2018. Vermillion, Stephanie. “Why It’s About to Become Much Easier to Reach Greenland,” AFAR, 2 February 2020. Vullierme, Magali. “Questions soulevées par les impacts de la crise de la COVID-19 sur les Rangers et sur les communautés du Nunavik.” NAADSN Policy Brief (June 2020). Wilson Rowe, Elana, and Helge Blakkisrud. “A New Kind of Arctic Power? Russia’s Policy Discourses and Diplomatic Practices in the Circumpolar North.” Geopolitics 19/1 (2014): 66–85. 112

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Wilson Rowe, Elana. Arctic Governance: Power in Cross-Border Cooperation. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018. Wilson, Gary, and Heather Smith. “The Inuit Circumpolar Council in an era of global and local change.” International Journal 66/4 (2011): 909-921. Wilson, Gary. “Inuit Diplomacy in the Circumpolar North.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 13/3 (2007): 65-80. Young, Oran. “The Arctic Council at Twenty: How to Remain Effective in a Rapidly Changing Environment.”University of Califor- nia Irvine Law Review 6 (2016): 99-119.

113

2020 REPORT ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, we would like to thank the support of the Mobilizing Insights in National Defence and Security (MINDS) program of the Canadian Department of National Defence which provides core funding for the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) from 2019-2022. Lead author Whitney Lacken- bauer would also like to thank the Canada Research Chair program and Trent University for enabling his research activities. This Canadian strategic foresight analysis report was inspired by the NATO Transformation Strategic Foresight Anal- ysis (SFA) Team’s work, and particularly the SFA Regional Perspective Workshop on the “Arctic and the High North” convened in Oslo in September 2019. We offer our particular thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Adam Rutherford, GBR Royal Marines, an analyst with the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, for his support and encouragement. We are grateful to the participants in NAADSN virtual events held in October 2020 to solicit feedback on the draft report. These conversations not only strengthened the report, they also portend future discussions and debates about the themes and implications included herein. Thanks to Dr. Shannon Nash, the NAADSN network manager, for organizing these events, and to Jill Barclay for her notes as rapporteur. Finally, our special thanks to Jennifer Arthur-Lackenbauer for designing and laying out this publication under extraordinary time constraints, and to Corah Hodgson for her careful proofread of the report.

IMAGE CREDITS

Baffin Fisheries Coalition: 62 Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency (CANNOR): xiv, xv Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC): 6, 23 Department of Fisheries and Oceans: 42 Department of National Defence: xiii, xvi, xix, xx-xxi, xxiii, 4, 14, 16, 27, 28, 35, 38, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 52, 58, 66, 68, 75, 77, 80, 83, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami: 36, 72 Library of Parliament: 18, 32 Natural Resources Canada: 37 NORAD: 21, 84 Oceans North: 56 Parks Canada: 61 Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group, Arctic Council: 55 P. Whitney Lackenbauer: cover, ii, iii, iv, xxiv, 9, 10, 12, 24, 30, 64, 70, 78, 94 Qikiqtani Inuit Association: 73

114

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT