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(NI) to the Commission (12 February 2004) Subject C 84 E/380 Official Journal of the European Union EN 3.4.2004 (2004/C 84 E/0442) WRITTEN QUESTION E-0372/04 by Olivier Dupuis (NI) to the Commission (12 February 2004) Subject: Interrogation of the editor Alexander Podrabinek Interfax and Lenta.ru reported on 27 January that Alexander Podrabinek, a Soviet dissident and former political prisoner, currently editor-in-chief of the press agency Prima Human Rights Information, had received a summons from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) to appear at Moscow’s Lefortovo Prison to answer questions. According to Mr Podrabinek, who is also editor-in-chief of the newspaper Express Chronica, this summons is probably connected to the FSB’s seizure in December of 4 376 copies of the book ‘FSB Blows Up Russia’, written by Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer and an associate of the self-exiled businessman, Boris Berezovsky, and the historian Yuri Felshtinsky (see also RFE/RL Newsline, 30 December 2003). The book claims that the FSB were behind a series of bombings of flats that killed more than 300 people in 1999 and served as a pretext to resume military attacks on Chechnya. According to Mr Podrabinek, the Prima agency had bought copies of the book, which had been printed in Latvia and seized on their way to Moscow to be sold in bookshops. What information does the Commission have about this latest example of the Russian authorities’ repression of the freedom of expression and opinion? What initiatives is it planning to prevent the Russian authorities from taking decisions that are harmful to Mr Podrabinek and media freedom? What is the Commission’s opinion of the increasingly widespread monitoring by the FSB at all levels of Russian society and institutions? In the light of the systematic violations of the freedom of information, the press and opinion, which have characterised Russian life for the last three or four years, does the Commission not believe that it should reconsider its support programmes for the Russian media? Answer given by Mr Patten on behalf of the Commission (16 March 2004) The Commission is aware of recent events involving Mr Podrabinek, whose Prima-news website was set up with the help of a grant under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Micro- project Facility. Not only in this specific case, but also in relation to media freedom more generally, the Commission is closely following developments in Russia. In this regard, the Commission recalls the public declaration of concern on media freedom issued by the EU in July 2003. In view of recent developments, the Commission considers it all the more important to support the development of an independent and pluralistic media in Russia. In its recent Communication on relations with Russia (1), the Commission underlined the need for the EU to hold an open and frank dialogue, in order to insist that Russia respect the values to which it is committed as a member of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe, such as respect for human rights and media freedom. These issues are frequently raised in the political dialogue which the EU holds with the Russian authorities. The Commission’s activity is not limited to political dialogue. Under the EIDHR 2004 call for proposals, for example, freedom of the media has been identified as one of the thematic priorities. The Commission intends to target a number of activities, including support to enhance freedom of expression and independent media, in particular at the regional level; strengthening professionalism and ethics in Russian journalism; strengthening the legal and institutional framework for the protection of press freedom; empowering journalists to take actions in defence of their rights; improving the quality of management of the media, aiming at ensuring financial viability, tax law compliance, and ultimately de facto independence; supporting local community independent media and improving the quality and coverage of human rights issues in the media. (1) COM(2004) 106 final..
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