june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7

Al-Qa`ida in : Lessons in Ninawa Province warning that “until region within 19 miles of . By now, we have not been engaged…because January 2008, this figure had dropped from the Security we are the ones who control the hour to to around 25%. Iraq’s capital witnessed Operation start the initiative and we will choose a decline from 1,259 reported incidents the time for retaliation or engagement.”5 in January 2007 to 425 incidents a year By Michael Knights The communiqué suggested that AQI later.7 elements had dispersed before the 10- the demise of al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI)1 day security push began and that the Sunni Arab areas north of the capital has been heralded on a number of vast majority of arrests had fallen on now contain a far larger share of violent occasions during the past five years, the Iraqi population of Mosul instead of incidents than Baghdad, Babil and only to witness the movement adapt to AQI/ISI leaders. Anbar. Yet, the most stubborn holdout survive by shifting to new safe havens. has been Ninawa, where incidents Following the conclusion of the latest The true picture lies somewhere actually increased from 463 per month phase of Operation Za’ir al-Assad fi between these two images. The only in January 2007 to 685 per month Sawlat al-Haqq (Lion’s Roar in Rightful way to get closer to an accurate in January 2008 and later to an all- Assault), or the Mosul security plan, the assessment is to get into the weeds of time high of 747 incidents in February subject of al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s fortunes is the Mosul security operation and to 2008.8 once again in the headlines. The 10-day blend street-level tactical data with the push by security forces into insurgent overarching strategic context of AQI’s Within the north, the city of Mosul has neighborhoods between May 10-20, nationwide reverses and growing Iraqi consistently been an area of strength 2008, witnessed very low levels of government sensitivity to the Sunni for takfiri9 and Islamist-nationalist violence, with the number of recorded Arab community’s needs. This article resistance groups in Iraq. Mosul is home incidents dropping by 85%.2 As the draws on a database of 5,984 geo-located to a high proportion of the Saddam-era result of leadership targeting and the incidents reported in Ninawa Province Iraqi officer corps, and the post-war loss of safe havens, Multinational Force from April 2007 to April 2008, itself looting of a number of major Ammunition Iraq (MNF-I) spokesman Rear Admiral a sub-set of a data set of more than Supply Points in and around the city Patrick Driscoll characterized AQI and 100,000 geo-located incidents recorded left the metropolitan area seeded with other insurgent groups in Mosul as across the whole of Iraq during the last thousands of tons of munitions. Mosul being “off-balance and on the run.”3 18 months.6 Geospatial intelligence was also a major center of Saddam’s is then combined with MNF-I, Iraqi “Return to Faith” campaign in the Conversely, there is also a degree of and open source media reportage plus 1990s, and the city’s position astride caution based on AQI’s proven tendency direct commentary from embedded roads headed toward Turkey and to relocate, lay low and reemerge in reporters in Iraq. As always, the key made it a transshipment point for takfiri a new area months later. A late May to understanding a terrorist group is to groups moving through Iraq during video recording released by the al- look closely at its actions. that decade, including Abu Mus`ab Furqan Institute for Media Production, al-Zarqawi’s people-moving networks the media production unit most closely Mosul’s Importance and the Ansar al-Islam movement. associated with the Islamic State of The center of gravity for the Sunni Arab Since 2003, the direct connection to Iraq or ISI umbrella movement,4 saw resistance has been inexorably shifting Syria via and means a spokesman claiming to represent ISI northwards during the past year. that Mosul is a key hub in the northern Southern and western AQI operating “rat-line” bringing foreign volunteers 1 AQI has become a catch-all phrase used to describe any areas have been seriously constrained into Iraq via the al-Rabi’a area, which is Sunni Arab diehard militant who has not integrated into by counter-insurgency approaches and arguably the only fully functional line the Awakening (sahwa) movements or their associated the surge of forces developed by MNF-I. still processing significant numbers of 10 police auxiliary units, the so-called “Sons of Iraq.” For According to Olive Group’s databases, foreign volunteers. the purposes of this article, however, AQI refers to the Anbar Province saw reported incidents terrorist group that has been allied with and subordinate drop from 976 in January 2007 to As the capital of Ninawa Province, to al-Qa`ida since 2004. It is led by Abu Ayyub al-Masri 158 in January 2008. Babil, likewise, some consider Mosul as a new center of (an Egyptian also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir). witnessed a drop from 544 monthly gravity for Sunnis in Iraq, with Sunni 2 This information was from a statement made by then incidents in January 2007 to 180 one representing approximately half Multinational Division North (MND-N) commander Ma- year later. Baghdad is no longer the jor General Mark Hertling. epicenter of the insurgency; in pre-surge 7 These figures were derived from Olive Group’s data- 3 Gerry J. Gilmore, “Al-Qaida in Iraq Is On the Run, March 2007, MNF-I estimated that 80% base. Officials Say,” American Forces Press Service, May 27, of the violence in Iraq occurred in the 8 Ibid. 2008. 9 The term takfiri in this article refers to Sunni insurgent 4 Since the inception of the ISI umbrella movement in Oc- 5 Bushra Juhi, “Militant Group Warns of Mosul Retalia- groups that justify violence against some Muslims and tober 2006, there have been strong indications that AQI tion,” , May 27, 2008. all non-Muslims because their religious beliefs are not is the dominant force within the ISI, which is notionally 6 The database is maintained by private security com- compatible with the group. Takfiri groups in Iraq include led by Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi (also known pany Olive Group and represents information gained al-Qa`ida in Iraq and its affiliates, plus Ansar al-Sunna/ as Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi), an Iraqi spokesman that the through more than 1,800 days of consecutive on-the- Ansar al-Islam. U.S. government claims is a fictional figure designed to ground operations in Iraq. For more details, please con- 10 Personal interview, U.S. military intelligence officer, give the movement an Iraqi face. tact [email protected]. May 2008. june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 of its 1.4 million residents, the balance local Sunni Arab community and fewer have a higher proportion of Sunni comprising approximately 500,000 attempts to impose Shari`a codes or take Arabs. In western Mosul, AQI and and 200,000 Turkmen (Shi`a over leadership of communities from other movements used the relative and Sunni), Assyrian Christians and local . Individual neighborhoods thinness of MNF-I presence in 2007 other groups. The ethnic tension caused bear the graffiti of multiple movements, to attempt to drive out non-Sunnis by this diversity has worked in the including the and from their neighborhoods, particularly favor of takfiri groups because it has the Reform and Jihad Front (the Islamic Christians and Shebaks, a community constrained the development of sahwa of Shi`a Kurds. In eastern Mosul and and Sons of Iraq movements, at least in the government district west of the until recently. Kurdish-dominated Iraqi “Within the north, the city , AQI and other groups tend to Army forces garrison most areas, and of Mosul has consistently launch three to five suicide Vehicle- Sunni fears of “reverse-” Borne Improvised Explosive Device (ethnic cleansing) by Kurdish forces been an area of strength (VBIED) attacks per month against have proven particularly beneficial to for takfiri and Islamist- provincial government, security forces takfiri elements all along the multi-ethnic and particularly Kurdish political party swathe bordering the Kurdistan Regional nationalist resistance offices.12 Government zone. Furthermore, Mosul groups in Iraq.” and its environs have seen a very sparse Takfiri groups became major players in level of garrisoning by MNF-I troops organized crime in western Mosul. In since early 2004, with large tracts of addition to the usual AQI fundraising the city ceded to the insurgency for 12- Army in Iraq front movement). A activities such as ransoming kidnapped 18 months at a time.11 complex mesh of affiliations means that people and reselling hijacked fuels Mosul’s muhalla (blocks), nahiya (sub- (gasoline, cooking gas and diesel) and “Routine” AQI Activity in Mosul districts) and qada’a (districts) are often consumer goods, AQI has become It is worth examining the types of shared between Ba`athist, Islamist- involved in considerably more activity undertaken by AQI and similar nationalist and takfiri groups. There is complicated criminal endeavors in movements in Ninawa Province during considerable blurring between cells, and Mosul. These schemes involve extorting the last 12 months. Mosul sits at the the most important feature connecting hundreds of thousands of dollars from center of a number of conflict zones; to individual attacks to specific groups is larger businesses ranging from soft the west are Tal Afar and Sinjar, large financial sponsorship of the action. drink manufacturers to cell phone towns strung along the takfiri “rat-line” companies by levying up to 20% of the to Syria, as well as rural staging posts Until preparation for the current value of contracts as protection money. that fan out from the main road into the security operation began, offensive Cell phone towers have been destroyed desert along the border. To the south, military activities sponsored by when vendors failed to pay sufficient a range of rural farming communities manpower-lite funding heavy groups bribes to takfiri elements. In real estate, along the Tigris River is a crossroads such as AQI mainly focused on the Main AQI insurgents stole 26 ledgers that for takfiri elements moving up and Supply Routes running through Mosul. contained the deeds to almost $90 down the river and interacting with On the west bank, military traffic on million worth of property and then other important AQI operating areas Highway 1—the trucking road running resold them.13 such as ; the Jazira desert areas along the Tigris River all the way to al- around Lake Tharthar and stretching Rabi’a—has been a consistent target of AQI Defensive Operations to the Syria border; the Saddam-era roadside Improvised Explosive Device Many of the terrorist attacks in Mosul “presidential security triangle” cities (IED) crews. On the eastern side, in 2007 were aimed at preventing the and towns in Salah al-Din province; links Turkey to the Tigris establishment of government institutions and the Hamrin mountain “switch-line” River Valley cities and later Baghdad in insurgent neighborhoods, typically (linking Hawija to Tuz Khurmatu and and has also consistently been attacked involving the murder of individual the Diyala River Valley). by IED crews. With MNF-I units policemen or personnel, relatively thin on the ground in 2007, as well as the destruction of vehicle AQI plays a major role in seeking sponsoring paid-for IED attacks on checkpoints or recruiting stations. As to maintain Mosul as a lawless strategic road systems remains the best with most violent activity undertaken environment in which such movements way of predictably acquiring targets by takfiri groups, intimidation is the can operate freely. According to MNF-I and a means by which AQI/ISI and mechanism. This effort was kicked up and Iraqi military intelligence officers other movements can “keep the flame of a notch when it became clear that the in Mosul, AQI and other takfiri groups resistance alight.” Iraqi government was planning a major behave differently in Mosul than they have in areas such as Anbar in the past; Takfiri groups operate in somewhat 12 These figures were derived from Olive Group’s data- specifically, there has been notably less different ways in western Mosul and base. animus between takfiri elements and the eastern Mosul. Western Mosul is old 13 This information was according to Lieutenant Colonel Arab Mosul and even though the city’s Eric Welsh, a U.S. Army battalion commander in Mosul. 11 See the March 2003 coverage provided by indepen- ethnic and sectarian communities For more details on the criminalization of AQI, see Mi- dent embedded journalist Bill Roggio at The Long War are densely interwoven in almost all chael Knights, “Endangered Species - Al-Qaeda in Iraq Journal, available at www.longwarjournal.com. districts, the west is considered to Adapts to Survive,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 2008. june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 security operation in Mosul. Leadership disruption probably also cannot be controlled indefinitely and played a role in the muted response. AQI/ that city streets cannot be held against It was the response of local takfiri and ISI in Mosul had been under intensive Iraqi forces. Islamist-nationalist insurgent groups attacks for months. According to MNF-I to these actions that caused the spike spokesmen, the number of senior AQI This is particularly true in Mosul, of 747 reported incidents in Ninawa leaders killed or captured in the months where the multiethnic neighborhoods Province in March 2008. A range of of October to December 2007 topped are difficult to operate in once security vehicle checkpoints were attacked 130, including individuals from almost forces have established a permanent with suicide vest bombs. Large suicide all levels of the organization, such as presence and can collect tip-offs from VBIED were employed to physically regional amirs; facilitators involved in the public. The government of Prime shatter new Combat Outposts. On transporting leaders, foreign fighters or Minister Nuri al-Maliki has backed the March 23, for instance, Combat Outpost cash; and specialist cells involved in the current Mosul operation with a range of Inman in western Mosul was breached development and employment of suicide political concessions designed to swing by a suicide truck bomb loaded with car bombs and roadside IEDs.17 In early the bulk of the Sunni Arab population in an estimated 5,000-10,000 pounds 2008, another 30 leadership targets Mosul away from the insurgency. Senior of homemade explosives. The dump were killed or captured in Mosul alone, truck, armored against small-arms fire, including eastern Mosul amir Ibrahim detonated mid-point in the facility, Ahmad `Umar al-Sabawi, northeastern “Once the government killing 13 Iraqi soldiers, wounding 42 Mosul amir Ayyad Jassim Muhammad operation began, however, and leaving a crater 15 feet deep and `Ali, and southeastern Mosul amir Abu 25 feet wide. Four other VBIEDs in Yasir al-Sa`udi. Halfway through the Mosul’s takfiri groups went the 2,000-5,000 pound range were May 10-20 operation, a further 200 Tier largely passive, resulting used or discovered in Mosul in March 1 and Tier 2 AQI/ISI commanders were alone. Insurgents likewise breached the captured.18 On May 20, MNF-I reported in a reduction of reported Riyadh Line—the berms built around that the purported overall AQI amir of incidents by 85%.” Mosul—with explosives on a number of Mosul, `Abd al-Khaliq Awad Ismail al- occasions, sometimes seeding the gaps Sabawi, had been captured with his son with IEDs to kill repair crews. On the in . eve of the Mosul security operation, Kurdish figures have been removed Iraqi Army troops foiled a suicide The State of AQI/ISI from the provincial council, the Ninawa VBIED attack against the 2nd Iraqi Army The location of `Abd al-Khaliq al- Operations Center and the 2nd Iraqi Division headquarters at the Ninawa Sabawi’s detention is an important Army Division and have been replaced Oprawi hotel.14 pointer that AQI/ISI leadership had with Sunni Arabs from Mosul families. already left Mosul by the time the Provincial elections in November Once the government operation began, operation was underway or were should further strengthen Sunni Arab however, Mosul’s takfiri groups went largely based in outlying rural villages influence in provincial governance. largely passive, resulting in a reduction to begin with. Indicators of migration to Sahwa and Sons of Iraq movements of reported incidents by 85%.15 A tight a predominately rural-based movement are being established, and fast-track curfew and driving ban and the berming have been visible for some time. AQI/ judicial proceedings are increasing the of the city had an immediate effect on ISI no longer stands and fights to pace at which Sunni males are released the ability of takfiri groups to deploy control urban terrain, although the from government detention. Perhaps car bombs, underlining the value movement certainly tried to prevent most importantly to the military families of mobility to such cells. Almost no some neighborhoods from being of Sunni Arab Mosul, there is genuine suicide vest operations were launched penetrated by government forces in the anticipation that military age males will either, potentially pointing to a more run-up to the Mosul operation. Whereas again be able to take up their traditional general lack of available personnel for the downscaling of local coalition force profession of service in locally-raised martyrdom operations. Although 125 levels and AQI resurgence historically Iraqi Army units.19 In other words, roadside IEDs were defused and 1.5 tons followed security operations, the “Iraqi General ’ surge strategy of C4 and TNT were recovered during the surge” means Iraqi Army neighborhood has finally returned to Mosul where May 10-20 period, roadside IED crews presence is more permanent. AQI/ISI the general initially tried many of its were also largely ineffective in blunting are learning that urban populations components during his tenure there in the Iraqi security operation, with a 2003-2004. 16 notable lack of effective attacks. 17 Figures conglomerated from U.S. Department of De- fense briefings on al-Qa`ida in Iraq leadership targeting. The Petraeus strategy and the Iraqi 18 “Security Improves in Iraq’s Ninevah Province, surge have made AQI/ISI leery of major 14 The attacker drove a Volkswagen Passat, a common General Says,” American Forces Press Service, May 22, population centers. It is not in such a brand of car used by the Ba`athist regime to reward mili- 2008. According to Ma. Gen. Mark Hertling, Tier 1 oper- tary service. atives are operational leaders who finance operations or 19 Personal interviews, Mosul-based U.S. and Iraqi 15 “Operation ‘Lion’s Roar’ Reduces Insurgent Attacks provide ideological guidance. Tier 2 operatives are “bat- military intelligence officials, May 2008. There are also in Mosul,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 22, 2008. talion commanders” commanding groups of 5-30 fight- a number of useful Mosul bloggers who report on local 16 “125 Bombs Defused in Mosul,” Voices of Iraq, May 22, ers. Hertling described Tier 2 operatives as “the ones that views, such as “A Star from Mosul” at www.astarfrom- 2008. put up IEDs, VBIEDs, sniper cells.” mosul.blogspot.com. june 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 7 movement’s nature to fight in an entirely international jihadists falling back into clandestine nature, and they tend to their more typical role of bankrolling seek operational spaces that they can native elements of insurgent operations control, if only for short periods of time. to keep the flame of resistance alight. AQI would rather be a big fish in a small According to this scenario, increasingly pond; the alternative—a small fish in a Iraqi- and foreign-led takfiri groups big pond, classic urban terrorism—is would use criminal fundraising to increasingly difficult to execute. finance insurgent operations long after any popular base for resistance had Constant relocation is one of the factors eroded, with money greasing the wheels driving AQI/ISI to decentralize and of the “professional resistance”—those dissolve into the broader pool of Iraqi- Sunni Arab IED cells undertaking paid- led insurgent movements. Centralized for attacks throughout the Saddam-era control of funding is one of the defining “presidential security triangle” formed characteristics of AQI/ISI and a key by Beyji, Baghdad and . source of influence for the foreign leadership cadre of the movement. Major General Mark Hertling and The criminalization of the movement his Iraqi counterparts are confident combined with MNF-I attacks on that about half of the paid-for Tier 3 leadership and funding have loosened elements of AQI—known as the “pipe the ties between the foreign amirs and swingers”—could be detached from their Iraqi foot soldiers, the latter of terrorism by political and economic which are often attracted by financial engagement.22 With the extension of inducements. the Petraeus doctrine to Mosul, the less committed insurgents are finally being The picture that emerges is that of boiled away to reveal the skeleton of the an organization that is moving away “professional resistance.” In Mosul, as from centralized control by a national in the rest of Sunni Iraq, reducing this amir, underlined by the reduction of hardcore cadre and making the next the reward offered for AQI/ISI leader major step-charge in improved security Abu Ayyub al-Masri.20 Indeed, there may take far longer than the year-long are strong signs that the al-Qa`ida “surge.” leadership in Pakistan has deliberately sent seasoned fighters to bolster the Dr. Michael Knights is Vice President of foreign fighter element in the hope of Strategic Analysis and Assessments at maintaining some measure of control Olive Group, a private security provider over the organization; on March 2, with almost 1,900 days of consecutive 2008, Rear Admiral Gregory Smith operations in Iraq, and is also a research noted that Abu Yasir al-Sa`udi and fellow at the Washington Institute for Near Hamdan al-Hajji, two Saudi amirs, were East Policy. Dr. Knights has been writing drawn from the Afghanistan-Pakistan about internal security in Iraq since 1998 conflict zone to Mosul in November and is the author of three books and the 2007 by AQI commander Abu Ayyub al- editor of one anthology on Saddam-era Masri.21 Foreigners stand out, however, and post-war Iraq. making imported leaders vulnerable to coalition attacks; Abu Yasir al-Sa`udi and Hamdan al-Hajji, for example, were killed on February 27.

The “Iraqification” of AQI Combined with a reduced flow of foreign volunteers, decentralization could see other Iraqi-led movements such as Ansar al-Sunna/Ansar al-Islam eclipsing AQI/ ISI. It is not hard to imagine a declining role for the foreign elements of AQI, with

20 Lennox Samuels, “Al Qaeda Nostra,” Newsweek, May 21, 2008. 21 See statement from Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, 22 This information is according to Maj. Gen. Mark Director of Communications, Deputy Spokesman, Multi- Hertling, speaking at a Department of Defense news National Force Iraq, March 2, 2008. briefing in Iraq on June 9, 2008.