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Al-Qa`Ida in Iraq: Lessons from the Mosul Security Operation

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Al-Qa`Ida in Iraq: Lessons from the Mosul Security Operation JUNE 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 7 Al-Qa`ida in Iraq: Lessons in Ninawa Province warning that “until region within 19 miles of Baghdad. By now, we have not been engaged…because January 2008, this figure had dropped from the Mosul Security we are the ones who control the hour to to around 25%. Iraq’s capital witnessed Operation start the initiative and we will choose a decline from 1,259 reported incidents the time for retaliation or engagement.”5 in January 2007 to 425 incidents a year By Michael Knights The communiqué suggested that AQI later.7 elements had dispersed before the 10- the demise of al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI)1 day security push began and that the Sunni Arab areas north of the capital has been heralded on a number of vast majority of arrests had fallen on now contain a far larger share of violent occasions during the past five years, the Iraqi population of Mosul instead of incidents than Baghdad, Babil and only to witness the movement adapt to AQI/ISI leaders. Anbar. Yet, the most stubborn holdout survive by shifting to new safe havens. has been Ninawa, where incidents Following the conclusion of the latest The true picture lies somewhere actually increased from 463 per month phase of Operation Za’ir al-Assad fi between these two images. The only in January 2007 to 685 per month Sawlat al-Haqq (Lion’s Roar in Rightful way to get closer to an accurate in January 2008 and later to an all- Assault), or the Mosul security plan, the assessment is to get into the weeds of time high of 747 incidents in February subject of al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s fortunes is the Mosul security operation and to 2008.8 once again in the headlines. The 10-day blend street-level tactical data with the push by security forces into insurgent overarching strategic context of AQI’s Within the north, the city of Mosul has neighborhoods between May 10-20, nationwide reverses and growing Iraqi consistently been an area of strength 2008, witnessed very low levels of government sensitivity to the Sunni for takfiri9 and Islamist-nationalist violence, with the number of recorded Arab community’s needs. This article resistance groups in Iraq. Mosul is home incidents dropping by 85%.2 As the draws on a database of 5,984 geo-located to a high proportion of the Saddam-era result of leadership targeting and the incidents reported in Ninawa Province Iraqi officer corps, and the post-war loss of safe havens, Multinational Force from April 2007 to April 2008, itself looting of a number of major Ammunition Iraq (MNF-I) spokesman Rear Admiral a sub-set of a data set of more than Supply Points in and around the city Patrick Driscoll characterized AQI and 100,000 geo-located incidents recorded left the metropolitan area seeded with other insurgent groups in Mosul as across the whole of Iraq during the last thousands of tons of munitions. Mosul being “off-balance and on the run.”3 18 months.6 Geospatial intelligence was also a major center of Saddam’s is then combined with MNF-I, Iraqi “Return to Faith” campaign in the Conversely, there is also a degree of and open source media reportage plus 1990s, and the city’s position astride caution based on AQI’s proven tendency direct commentary from embedded roads headed toward Turkey and Syria to relocate, lay low and reemerge in reporters in Iraq. As always, the key made it a transshipment point for takfiri a new area months later. A late May to understanding a terrorist group is to groups moving through Iraq during video recording released by the al- look closely at its actions. that decade, including Abu Mus`ab Furqan Institute for Media Production, al-Zarqawi’s people-moving networks the media production unit most closely Mosul’s Importance and the Ansar al-Islam movement. associated with the Islamic State of The center of gravity for the Sunni Arab Since 2003, the direct connection to Iraq or ISI umbrella movement,4 saw resistance has been inexorably shifting Syria via Tal Afar and Sinjar means a spokesman claiming to represent ISI northwards during the past year. that Mosul is a key hub in the northern Southern and western AQI operating “rat-line” bringing foreign volunteers 1 AQI has become a catch-all phrase used to describe any areas have been seriously constrained into Iraq via the al-Rabi’a area, which is Sunni Arab diehard militant who has not integrated into by counter-insurgency approaches and arguably the only fully functional line the Awakening (sahwa) movements or their associated the surge of forces developed by MNF-I. still processing significant numbers of 10 police auxiliary units, the so-called “Sons of Iraq.” For According to Olive Group’s databases, foreign volunteers. the purposes of this article, however, AQI refers to the Anbar Province saw reported incidents terrorist group that has been allied with and subordinate drop from 976 in January 2007 to As the capital of Ninawa Province, to al-Qa`ida since 2004. It is led by Abu Ayyub al-Masri 158 in January 2008. Babil, likewise, some consider Mosul as a new center of (an Egyptian also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir). witnessed a drop from 544 monthly gravity for Sunnis in Iraq, with Sunni 2 This information was from a statement made by then incidents in January 2007 to 180 one Arabs representing approximately half Multinational Division North (MND-N) commander Ma- year later. Baghdad is no longer the jor General Mark Hertling. epicenter of the insurgency; in pre-surge 7 These figures were derived from Olive Group’s data- 3 Gerry J. Gilmore, “Al-Qaida in Iraq Is On the Run, March 2007, MNF-I estimated that 80% base. Officials Say,” American Forces Press Service, May 27, of the violence in Iraq occurred in the 8 Ibid. 2008. 9 The term takfiri in this article refers to Sunni insurgent 4 Since the inception of the ISI umbrella movement in Oc- 5 Bushra Juhi, “Militant Group Warns of Mosul Retalia- groups that justify violence against some Muslims and tober 2006, there have been strong indications that AQI tion,” Associated Press, May 27, 2008. all non-Muslims because their religious beliefs are not is the dominant force within the ISI, which is notionally 6 The database is maintained by private security com- compatible with the group. Takfiri groups in Iraq include led by Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi (also known pany Olive Group and represents information gained al-Qa`ida in Iraq and its affiliates, plus Ansar al-Sunna/ as Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi), an Iraqi spokesman that the through more than 1,800 days of consecutive on-the- Ansar al-Islam. U.S. government claims is a fictional figure designed to ground operations in Iraq. For more details, please con- 10 Personal interview, U.S. military intelligence officer, give the movement an Iraqi face. tact [email protected]. May 2008. JUNE 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 7 of its 1.4 million residents, the balance local Sunni Arab community and fewer have a higher proportion of Sunni comprising approximately 500,000 attempts to impose Shari`a codes or take Arabs. In western Mosul, AQI and Kurds and 200,000 Turkmen (Shi`a over leadership of communities from other movements used the relative and Sunni), Assyrian Christians and local Iraqis. Individual neighborhoods thinness of MNF-I presence in 2007 other groups. The ethnic tension caused bear the graffiti of multiple movements, to attempt to drive out non-Sunnis by this diversity has worked in the including the Islamic State of Iraq and from their neighborhoods, particularly favor of takfiri groups because it has the Reform and Jihad Front (the Islamic Christians and Shebaks, a community constrained the development of sahwa of Shi`a Kurds. In eastern Mosul and and Sons of Iraq movements, at least in the government district west of the until recently. Kurdish-dominated Iraqi “Within the north, the city Tigris, AQI and other groups tend to Army forces garrison most areas, and of Mosul has consistently launch three to five suicide Vehicle- Sunni fears of “reverse-Arabization” Borne Improvised Explosive Device (ethnic cleansing) by Kurdish forces been an area of strength (VBIED) attacks per month against have proven particularly beneficial to for takfiri and Islamist- provincial government, security forces takfiri elements all along the multi-ethnic and particularly Kurdish political party swathe bordering the Kurdistan Regional nationalist resistance offices.12 Government zone. Furthermore, Mosul groups in Iraq.” and its environs have seen a very sparse Takfiri groups became major players in level of garrisoning by MNF-I troops organized crime in western Mosul. In since early 2004, with large tracts of addition to the usual AQI fundraising the city ceded to the insurgency for 12- Army in Iraq front movement). A activities such as ransoming kidnapped 18 months at a time.11 complex mesh of affiliations means that people and reselling hijacked fuels Mosul’s muhalla (blocks), nahiya (sub- (gasoline, cooking gas and diesel) and “Routine” AQI Activity in Mosul districts) and qada’a (districts) are often consumer goods, AQI has become It is worth examining the types of shared between Ba`athist, Islamist- involved in considerably more activity undertaken by AQI and similar nationalist and takfiri groups. There is complicated criminal endeavors in movements in Ninawa Province during considerable blurring between cells, and Mosul. These schemes involve extorting the last 12 months. Mosul sits at the the most important feature connecting hundreds of thousands of dollars from center of a number of conflict zones; to individual attacks to specific groups is larger businesses ranging from soft the west are Tal Afar and Sinjar, large financial sponsorship of the action.
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