School of Humanities & Social Sciences

SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES

DIPLOMACY IN THE CONGO CONFLICT:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFORTS FROM 2001-2018

MUNGA ANNABEL WANGUI

633498

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF A MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT USIU-AFRICA

SUMMER 2019

Declaration by the student This research study is my original work and has not been presented to any other examination body. No part of this research should be reproduced without my consent or that of the United States International University- Africa (USIU-A).

Signature ______Date___/____/ Munga Annabel Wangui

Student Identification No. 633498

This research has been submitted for defence with my approval as a graduate school supervisor at USIU-A.

Signature ______Date ___/____/

Mr. Leonard Maumo

(Supervisor)

Signature ______Date ___/____/

Prof. Martin C. Njoroge

Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences

Signature ______Date ___/____/

Amb. Ruthie Rono

Deputy Vice Chancellor, Academic Affairs

Dedication I dedicate this work to all those who genuinely seek a peaceful and prosperous Africa, both in academia and policy. I also dedicate it to who have suffered continuously in the face of crisis in Congo and Africa as a whole yet still hope for a brighter future. We shall overcome.

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Acknowledgments I am most grateful to God for enabling me to start and complete this task. I am also indebted to my precious parents, Peter and Nellie Munga for their patience and encouragement through the process.

Thank you so much Wycliffe Abok for guiding me through the research journey. I appreciate my larger group of friends who have cheered me on days I would have given up- I am eternally grateful to Winnie Musau, Juliet Mwende, Fancy Kirui, Maryanne

Mumbi, Loice Meyo, Joseph Riak, Grace Muchiri, Mark Kolo and the entire Activate team. You have all come through in such beautiful, diverse ways to make the process so much easier.

Lastly, I am so grateful to my professors who walked with me in different phases of the research, most especially Mr. Leonard Maumo who patiently yet thoroughly walked with me through every stage. God bless you mighty.

Table of Contents Declaration by the student ...... ii Dedication ...... iii Acknowledgments...... iv List of Figures ...... viii List of Tables ...... ix Abbreviations ...... x Abstract ...... xii CHAPTER ONE ...... 1 1.0 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.1 Background of the Study ...... 1 1.1.1 Succession of Leadership after colonialism ...... 5 1.2 Problem Statement ...... 6 1.3 Objectives of the Study ...... 7 1.4 Research Questions ...... 7 1.5 Purpose of the Study ...... 7 1.6 Significance of the Study ...... 8 1.7 Scope of the Study ...... 8 1.8 Organization of Study ...... 8 1.9 Chapter Summary ...... 9 CHAPTER TWO ...... 10 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 10 2.1 Introduction ...... 10 2.1.1 Causes of Conflict in Congo ...... 12 2.2 The Role of International Organizations to resolve the Congo conflict ...... 29 2.3 The United Nations ...... 31 2.4 The African Union ...... 35 2.5 Role played by neighbouring countries to fuel or resolve conflict ...... 38 2.5.1 Neighbouring countries as a source of continued instability in Congo ...... 40 2.6 Role of religious institutions in the Congo war ...... 45 2.6.1 The Role of the Church in the Congo Conflict ...... 48 2.8 The role of SADC in the Congo Crisis ...... 51 2.9 Chapter Summary ...... 55

CHAPTER THREE ...... 56 3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ...... 56 3.1 Introduction ...... 56 3.2 Research Design...... 56 3.3 Data Collection ...... 57 3.4 Data Analysis and Presentation...... 58 3.5 Chapter Summary ...... 58 CHAPTER FOUR ...... 59 4.0 DATA ANALYSIS ...... 59 4.1 Introduction ...... 59 4.2 The AU-led 2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue ...... 59 4.2.1 Outcomes of the 2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue ...... 62 4.2.2 Follow-up work and Commitments: Political Agreement on Consensual Management (PACMT) ...... 64 4.3 The SADC-led 2013 Regional Pact for Peace and Security Negotiations ...... 66 4.3.1 Outcomes of the 2013 Regional Peace and Security Pact ...... 68 4.3.2 Follow-up and Commitments to the Framework ...... 74 4.4 The church-led 2017 CENCO mediation ...... 75 Table 4.3 Role of International Organizations in the resolution of the Congo Crisis ...... 80 4.6 Chapter Summary ...... 81 CHAPTER FIVE ...... 82 5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 82 5.1 Summary ...... 82 5.2 Conclusions ...... 85 5.2.1 The AU-led 2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue ...... 85 5.2.2 The SADC-led 2013 Regional Pact for Peace and Security mediation efforts ...... 88 5.2.3 The CENCO mediations ...... 89 5.4 Recommendations ...... 92 References ...... 97 Appendix ...... 109

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List of Figures Figure 2.1: The map of Congo and neighbouring countries

Figure 4.2: The map of Congo highlighting its mineral resources

Figure 4.3: Reactions to the Inter Congolese Dialogue

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List of Tables Table 4.1: The Role of Neighbouring countries in the Congo conflict

Table 4.2: Role of International Organizations in the resolution of the Congo Crisis

Abbreviations

ADF Allied Democratic Forces

AFDL Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire

AU African Union

CENCO National Episcopal Conference of Congo (English)

CENI National Independent Electoral Commission (English)

CNDP National Congress for the Defence of the People (English)

CSOs Civil Society Organizations

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

DDR Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration

EU European Union

FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (English)

FDC Forum for Democratic Change

FDD Forces for the Defence of Democracy

FIB Force Intervention Brigade

FNL National Liberation Forces

FLDR Liberation of Rwanda (English)

GDP Gross Domestic Product

ICD Inter Congolese Dialogue

ICG International Crisis Group

ICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

IMF International Monetary Aid

IOF International Organization of the Francophonie

ISDSC Interstate Defence and Security Committee

LRA Lord Resistance Army x

M23 March 23 Movement

MLC Movement for the Liberation of Congo

MONUC United States Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (English)

OAU Organization of African Unity

PACMT Political Agreement on Consensual Management

PPRD People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy

RECs Regional Economic Communities

RCD-G Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (English)

RCD-K Rally for Congolese Democracy-Kisangani

RCD-ML Rally for Congolese Democracy (English)

REWC Regional Early Warning Centre

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNSC United Nations Security Council

SADC Southern Africa Development Community

SSR Security Sector Reform

Abstract

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has nearly 86 million inhabitants as per the March 2019 United Nations estimates. About 40% of the population reside in urban areas. With its 80 million hectares of arable land and over 1,100 minerals and precious metals, the DRC has the potential to become one of the richest countries on the continent and a driver of African growth but it has sustained political turmoil since independence. There have been several diplomatic efforts towards the resolution of this conflict yet none has succeeded to end the conflict. The main objective of this research is to find why conflict has out-lived these efforts. The study used the qualitative research design hence mostly relied on secondary data from books, journals, reports, public records as well as few primary data sources such as official conference documents. The research mainly used Barbara F. Walter’s theory on Settling Civil Wars and governance Theory, which seeks to investigate why some civil wars end in successfully implemented peace settlements while others continue for decades. It also uses North and Wallis & Weingast’s theory of New Conceptual Framework for Recorded Human History, which explains the frequent eruptions of violence in the nation states and the reasons why development policies fail in states. The selected diplomatic efforts by the African Union, SADC and the Catholic Church have focused on addressing the looming problem by bringing different communities together and enforcing ceasefires but have overlooked factors that caused, catalysed and prolonged the conflict from the onset. This study’s main finding is that poor governance is both the root and result of the Congo conflict. The finding therefore led to the recommendation that any diplomatic effort geared towards finding lasting solutions for the conflict in Congo must confront this fact as well as other historical causes of the conflict.

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

With over 6 million deaths recorded since 1998, the Congo conflict, particularly in the

Eastern region of the country, has often been described as a tragedy. Bearing the years, the government has neither controlled nor substantially governed the region; the Congo conflict remains a concern not just for Africa but also for the international community.

Congo, having a population of over 85 million people ranks third most populated country in Africa after Nigeria and Ethiopia. As the study will illustrate, the vast country’s populace has suffered insurmountable problems ranging from death, maiming, and displacement, sexual violence to poor governance and abject poverty from the 1990s and before. Primarily, these problems emanated from the state’s collapse and a sequence of local, national, regional and international conflicts. While the common academic tendency has been to focus on mineral resources as the source of instability in Congo,

Autesserre highlights that the perspective has far-reaching effects that actually prevent international and local actors from developing a comprehensive solution to the country’s conflicts. He additionally highlights that this perspective portrays conflict resolution as impossible (Autessere, 2012).

Foreign advocacy efforts focused on conflict minerals seem to have made life far more difficult for many Congolese while failing to stop the violence they purport to address.

This can be illustrated by the failure of the Kimberley Process (an initiative to stop conflict diamonds from accessing the legal trade in a bid to end mass violence and 1 conflict in many mineral rich regions of the world) to end conflict apparently spurred by mineral resources. Based on the process, it is reasonable to conclude that indeed good intentions and the belief that attacking the perceived economic roots of conflict can be largely ineffective as a tool for peace attainment (Reuters, 2011). Eichstaedt however, opines that indeed, the Congolese conflict has been fuelled by exploitation of natural resources and power struggles. He describes it as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises and the deadliest war ever documented in Africa. Over the past years, the forces of at least six African countries and numerous non-state armed groups have been involved in peace missions in DRC. Unlike the purported aim however, both foreign and domestic parties to the conflict have committed gross violations of international human rights and the humanitarian law, including widespread abuses against Congolese women and children. In addition, Eichstaedt posits that the decades of poor governance and the general insecurity in the Great Lakes Region contributes highly to the DRC conflict crisis

(Eichstaedt, 2011).

Additionally, Eichstaedt affirms that the wide range of high value mineral resources in

Congo have also accounted for its geo-strategic importance in the Great Lakes Region and beyond. This has led to continued conflict due to the national interests of the neighbouring countries. Uganda and Rwanda have particularly been accused of propagating violence in order to destabilize the Congolese government in order to ease illegal exploration, exploitation and mass acquisition of minerals. They have also been accused of supporting rebel groups such as the March 23 Movement (M23) to maintain constant unrest within The DRC to meet the same ends. He points out that contrary to expectation, attempts at conflict resolution have increased smuggling and led armed

2 groups to seek other sources of revenue (Eichstaedt, 2011). According to Acemoglu and

Robinson in their book on why nations fail, the current condition in Congo is a continuation of its colonial situation where the colonial administration failed to create basic economic incentives to make the society prosperous such as provision of basic rights and protection of property rights (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013).

In support of this view, Hochschild affirms indeed that Congo’s history is marred with violence. He informs that the country’s long period of exploitation and ‘benevolent’ colonization to ‘civilize’ the savage’ led to one of the greatest mass killings and suffering in human history. He terms the enslavement of locals during the colonization period in

Congo as the “vilest scramble for lot that disfigured the history of human conscience”

(Hochschild, 1999). Furthermore, he informs that King Leopold II believed that forced labour was the only means to civilize the allegedly lazy and corrupt population hence its legalization in 1891. Forced labour was used to acquire the required supply of ivory and rubber to Belgium agents. Local people in large numbers were forced from their villages to work in plantations for seven years. Failure to meet their quotas of production resulted to torture such as the amputation of limbs, merciless beating and often, murder. Similarly,

Leslie points out that the peak of the bloodshed and killings took place between 1810 and

1910 (Leslie, 1993). Both writers agree that King Leopold’s brutal activities led to the death of ten million locals through murder, disease, exhaustion and starvation. This period of pre-independent Congo was also rife with uprisings caused by the lack of political outlet, high taxation, impoverished masses and an over-rich ruling class

(UNESCO, 1985). Despite the international outcry to stop the abuse of human rights that forced Leopold to hand over Congo to the Belgium government in 1908, the violence did

3 not cease. The Belgian government continued to exploit the land and its people through economic exploitation, political oppression and cultural oppression. The country was administered as a mineral extraction centre and its traditional kingdoms were repressed using local chiefs to exploit the population through taxation and forced labour on public projects.

According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2013), “cultural oppression is the negation and, where possible, the destruction of the cultural values and institutions of an enslaved or politically dominated people.” The Belgian system utilized cultural oppression to maintain control of the Congo. The cycle of oppressive leadership continued even after

Congo’s independence in 1960 through the dictatorship of Joseph Désiré Mobutu who took over power in 1965 after ousting President Kasa-vubu. President Mobutu adopted the same territorial administration system the Belgians used during colonization. He maintained the regions, sub-regions, and zones then further divided the state into eight regions whose representatives he used as instruments of control and mineral extraction.

Corruption and mismanagement of public funds hindered state development throughout his leadership. Mobutu’s three-decade reign overburdened Congo with debt and corruption. Leslie illustrates that despite Congo’s deterioration of education, health and infrastructure, the government spent 57% of the national budget on defence and the presidency from 1985 to 1988 (Leslie, 1993). Evidently, understanding the colonial process and the dictatorship of Mobutu is necessary to explain some of the hidden causes of the underdevelopment of Congo and the structural violence.

Gaynor’s (2016) article on structural violence defines it as “the systemic ways in which social structures harm or disadvantage individuals.” It is often subtle and invisible hence

4 no specific person can be held accountable. In Congo, direct violence led to structural violence in form of poverty, lack of infrastructure and corruption. Structural violence then led to the country’s series of occasional outbreaks of civil war. Gaynor holds that the scramble of profit from extracting coltan and other high value mineral resources by

Congolese rebel factions as well as some neighbouring countries such as Rwanda,

Uganda and other regional actors drives the civil war.

1.1.1 Succession of Leadership after colonialism

While in office, President Mobutu Sese Seko posed as an ally of the West whose goal was to contain communism in Africa in the Cold War era. This relationship bolstered his dictatorial regime from the 1960s to 1997 when Laurent Kabila overthrew him through a rebel group backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Soon after declaring himself president,

Kabila reintroduced the flag and the currency unit originally adopted at independence. He additionally banned political parties and began to allocate both power and resources to himself (Jakubowski, 2015).

As expected, Kabila's support base, Rwanda and Uganda had a huge stake in the new president’s leadership. Together with Congolese rebel groups, Burundian troops,

Rwandese and Ugandan troops occupied the entire eastern half of the country. The

Congolese government controlled the other half through the support of Zimbabwean,

Angolan and Namibian troops and to a lesser extent, Chad and Sudanese troops. This arrangement was short lived however as Kabila fell out with Rwanda and Uganda when he appeared to support perpetrators of the recently concluded genocide in Rwanda. Since then, the DRC has suffered armed conflict said to have precisely started in August 1998

(Mufamadi, 2010). 5

1.2 Problem Statement

An International Red Cross Report (2017) highlights the death and displacement of millions in DRC from 1997-2016. It estimates over 6 million lives to have been lost because of the wars in this period alone. Despite the popularity of peace interventions by the international community, these vices combined with massive sexual violence incidences, have persistently remained commonplace in the vast country. Likewise,

Soderlund argues that the Congolese crisis is one sustained by the “fecklessness of the government and the less than stellar performance of the UN Peace Keepers” (Soderlund et al, 2013).

Some of the diplomatic efforts by regional, continental and international bodies include the 2002 national dialogue between Kabila and both the armed and unarmed rebel groups, dubbed the Inter Congolese Dialogue (ICD), The 2013 Regional Pact for Peace and

Security mediation facilitated by SADC and the 2017 CENCO Mediation efforts by the

Catholic Church among others. These efforts have not borne the much-needed peace in

DRC. More accurately, Soderlund points out that these efforts have neither sustainably stopped rebel advances nor protected civilians (Soderlund et al, 2013). This research focused on multilateral diplomatic engagements aimed at eventual conflict resolution in

DRC from 2001 to 2018 when Joseph Kabila was in power. The research used this period to understand the conflict from another leader’s era, which was supposedly untainted by colonial rivalries. It sought to find the reasons for the failure of these efforts in hope that assessing the failures would be a ground to lasting peace solutions for Congo.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

• To assess the AU-led 2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue and its failures in the

attainment of lasting peace in DRC

• To assess the SADC-led 2013 Regional Pact for Peace and Security mediation

efforts and analyse its inability to bring lasting peace in Congo

• To analyse the church-led 2017 CENCO mediation, its achievements and

challenges

1.4 Research Questions

• Why did the Inter-Congolese Dialogue fail to achieve lasting peace in DRC?

• What challenges rendered the SADC-led Regional Pact for Peace and Security

mediation efforts fruitless in terms of achieving lasting peace for Congo?

• Which challenges did the CENCO mediation face in a bid to attain lasting peace

for Congo?

1.5 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to highlight the causes of continued conflict in Congo and analyse factors that have led to the failure of diplomatic efforts aimed at conflict resolution in DRC. It analysed multilateral diplomatic initiatives in the pursuit of peace in

Congo. The study included initiatives by the African Union (AU), Southern Africa

Development Community (SADC) and The Catholic church. Additionally, it sought to find the reasons for the failure of these efforts in hope that assessing the failures will lead to sustainable peace solutions for Congo.

1.6 Significance of the Study

The study’s goal is to contribute to the understanding of the intricate challenges facing

Congo’s diplomatic peace efforts. In this light, it highlights the challenges therein and inspires new and improved strategies by stakeholders to attain lasting peace in Congo. It will be useful for neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda in relation to their engagement with the DRC. Moreover, the study hopes to inform international organizations such as UN, AU and SADC as well conflict consultancy firms of the loopholes in the quest for peace and probably inspire better engagement. The research hopes the findings will not only serve to restore peace in Congo but also impart other peace efforts in the Great Lakes Region and Africa as a whole.

1.7 Scope of the Study

Though numerous diplomatic efforts have been made to solve the Congo conflict, this research focused on preventive diplomacy initiatives by the African Union, Southern

Africa Development Community (SADC) and the church between 2001 and 2018.

1.8 Organization of Study

The first chapter introduces the research study and outlines the study’s research problem, objectives, purpose and significance. It highlights the scope of the study having given a background of the topic. The second chapter of the research covers literature review. It covers theories related to the topic of study and discusses different scholarly arguments on every outlined objective. In the third chapter, the research discusses the methodology details of the study such as where the study was conducted, when and how it was carried

8 out. This includes the research design, data collection methods, data analysis methods and the format of data presentation as well as the ethical considerations in the research.

Chapter four of the research focuses on data analysis and presentation. It involves data collection through the methods outlined in Chapter 3 and proceeds to analyse and present the findings on each study objective. Lastly, the fifth chapter summarizes the entire study and forms the findings, which are hoped to offer viable recommendations towards fruitful diplomatic engagements to offer lasting peace in the DRC.

1.9 Chapter Summary

This chapter provides details of the motivation for this research. In addition to the problem statement, the chapter highlights objectives of the research and the study’s significance. Finally, the chapter outlines the envisaged arrangement of the entire research project indicated.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Though the concept of diplomacy has existed over centuries, new challenges and opportunities have caused nations to develop sophisticated diplomatic structures in international relations. The practice of diplomacy, as Roberts highlights, is “the application of intelligence and tact to conduct official relations with dependent territories and between governments of independent states, sometimes extending to their relations with dependent territories and international institutions” (Roberts, 2011). Though more advanced currently; he also adds that the etymology of diplomacy can be traced back to ancient Greece where princes offered official documents referred to as ‘diplomas’ to signify the authority to represent them bestowed of the bearer of the document.

Like many International Relations scholars; Roberts affirms that diplomacy is indeed the best means created by civilization to prevent global politics from being governed by force alone. Diplomacy was in the past practiced by emissaries sent out by their governments to open negotiations in international relations. The terminology “diplomat” referred to an orator who set out to deliver the emperor’s views, threats or proposals. It was however, later transformed, as Roberts informs, by the Byzantine emperor to refer to a trained observer and negotiator attempting to interpret and negotiate for what he deemed closest to his master’s interests (Roberts & Satow, 2017). This; according to the aforementioned writer, defines the modern diplomat as was adopted by the West and eventually most nations of the world. 10

In most cases, diplomacy is divided into either track-one diplomacy or track-two diplomacy. While track-one diplomacy involves high profile politicians from all conflict parties and is often referred to as state-led or official diplomacy, track-two diplomacy is often low-level and non-governmental. It involves high-ranking individuals who are not considered politicians. Such individuals could be top-business people, or generally highly influential people in society. The later form of diplomacy has gained popularity in the last few decades as institutions have increasingly adopted the concept of “peace ambassadors” who are influential but not politicians. These forms of diplomacy nonetheless perform many similar functions such as promoting collaboration among states, promoting state interests and resolving conflicts. This research focused on diplomacy, track one and two as a tool to resolve conflict.

Despite the academic debate on whether diplomacy is better than force as a tool for conflict resolution; Lemmon (2014) asserts that none of the two can work independently.

Diplomacy like other means of conflict resolution has its flaws such as the requirement for concessions and the long duration it may take but it is in many ways more preferable than war. As in the case with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Oslo Accord, which was a diplomatic strategy aimed at peace in the Middle East can arguably be termed a successful mission. Likewise, the resolution of peace between India and Pakistan and the eventual peace in East Timor, Iraq, the Balkans and South Africa illustrates that indeed diplomacy can be a successful means to peaceful conflict resolution. Banai, in his article on diplomacy, asserts that diplomatic intervention is warranted by contingencies and unforeseen consequences arising from deeds by certain individuals or groups (Banai,

2013).

This section analyses the available literature and theories in a bid to assess the reasons for diplomacy’s failure to achieve sustainable peace for Congo. Consequently, various actors and their roles in conflict resolution will be discussed.

2.1.1 Causes of Conflict in Congo Due to its natural resources and rich soil for agricultural farming and pastoralism, the

Democratic Republic of Congo is an attractive country to many including refugees who fled from the neighbouring countries. It is additionally attractive to other groups of people such as the Hutus who fled from the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Due to lack of permanent ownership through title deeds and little government regulation, however, these resources have been a major source of conflict. Insurgents from Rwanda, Uganda,

Burundi and Congo worsen the competition for resources as they also depend on them for their survival. The insurgents exploit these mineral resources at will and hide in the vast forests of Congo. More recently, the situation has further been complicated by other countries such as China demonstrating keen interest in these minerals. Many believe that these mineral resources are the driving force for instability in Congo (Autesserre, 2012).

It is not only the insurgents from these neighbouring countries that are interested in minerals, but also the various governments and huge electronic companies in countries such as the aforementioned China. There is an ever-increasing demand for minerals such as coltan tantalum, which is used essentially in the manufacturing of electronic capacitors for mobile phones and a number of electronic devices. The only way the interested parties can acquire these minerals is through sponsoring armed groups to ensure a continued conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. There has been a series of reports recently showing systematic illegal logging activities and irregular conduct on a

12 huge scale by transnational logging corporations (Jacob & J. U.-U, 2017). This further confounds the already dire situation in Congo. The numerous active and passive actors as well as the visible and invisible actors within the country make the situation difficult for the DRC government to handle by itself. Pickles (2016), points out a specific incident of the Chinese Kun Hou mining company which made up to $25, 000 a month in 2015. The company traded money and arms with armed groups in exchange for access to the mines they dominate. The company further used the armed groups to work collaboratively with the local administration to tax local miners illegally at the gold-rich Shabunda territory located in eastern DRC.

Consequently, the DRC government has lost huge sums of money that might have contributed to the development of the country. The example of the Chinese company is an ordinary demonstration that these interested groups will stop at nothing to obtain these valuable minerals cheaply. Finally, despite the Congolese army-FARDC, being proportionally small in relation to the insurgent activities in Congo, the lack of infrastructure hampers its operational capability. The lack of a good road network, for instance and well established lines of communication choke the efforts to effectively fight the insurgents and subsequently exert control over sovereign territory.

The majority of the vast territory is under-developed. The insurgents can easily disappear into the vast forests of the DRC after committing atrocities. This to large extent explains why insurgent groups emanating within the region such as the LRA and the FNL remain elusive despite their brutality. It also explains the difficulties in capturing their leaders such as Joseph Kony and Laurent Nkunda (Khadiagala, 2017).

The geopolitics of Congo adds another dynamic to the conflict. The country’s location and vastness causes it to have many neighbours. On the mineral rich eastern side alone,

DRC borders three countries. While vast Congo is already rife with rebel groups against the government, the surrounding countries have many such groups as well. These groups fighting their governments perpetrate the insecurity and instability in the Great Lake

Region and most especially Congo as they camp in the country’s vast forests. Some of these rebel groups include The Lord’s Resistance Army which has its origins in Uganda,

Rwanda’s Liberation of Rwanda (FLDR), Burundi’s Forces of National Liberation (FNL) and the March 23 Movement (M23) which has its roots in Congo. Beside the rebel groups, the conflict in Congo involves diverse participants from of state actors, non-state actors and stakeholders with diverse goals, interests, capabilities, alliances and opponents

(Turner 2010).

Malnutrition, short life expectancy, low literacy levels and high rates of infant mortality characterize the living conditions of many in sub-Saharan Africa, and Congo particularly.

With inadequate shelter, lack of health care and hygiene, high unemployment rates, hunger and famine mainly due to escalated local conflict, Congo remains one of the poorest countries in the world for decades. Turner (2016) warns that the upward trend of conflict will continue as long as structural violence continues in Congo. He notes that corruption and unequal access to power and resources largely contribute to the systemic ways that harm citizens. Consequently, factors such as poverty, impunity lack of mobility, weak infrastructure and discrimination contribute to conflict.

2.1.1.1 Governance as a source of conflict While Hochschild (1999), and Rodney (2012) illustrated that pre-independent Congo was rife with violence, slavery and political oppression; Eichstaedt (2016), affirmed that this system of leadership was carried out without much change even after independence.

Mobutu’s thirty-two-year reign for instance marred Congo with indebtedness as he amassed wealth at the expense of the country. Both the colonial era and Mobutu era left

Congo economically and structurally weak with crippled development prospects. To date,

Congo is one of the poorest countries in the world, due to numerous factors that will be highlighted.

After Mobutu’s reign, Laurent Kabila took over Congo but with no better strategies as corruption continued to taint the country’s leadership. The growing desperation among the populace played a crucial role in propagating violence in Congo. Allegedly, it is believed to be a main reason why communities conflicted with each other and later evolved to much more pronounced regional conflicts. Although President Mobutu had started a system where political leaders would be distributed across the country to different regions as opposed to representing their regions of birth, the eventual reversal of the policy led political leaders and government officials to manipulate their ethnic groups or ‘strong holds’ in order to further their political and economic interests. Unfortunately, the scourge of corruption was also deeply rooted in the judicial system hence court cases were handled subjectively instead of impartially, as expected. Nzongola-Ntajala, (2002) informs that judicial deputies would manipulate communal conflicts in order to take bribes instead of offering justice. Over time, communities lost trust in the courts and took to seeking justice themselves. Consequently, a myriad of communal conflicts led to violet turmoil across the country. 15

The importance of Congo’s history of violence cannot be downplayed as a factor to understanding the current state of Congo. It provides background information to help understand the events that took place in different periods in Congo to give a clear breakdown of how conflict escalated and has persisted for decades. Notably, the historical context of Congo set the cycle of violence in the country. According to

Nzongola-Ntajala (2013), the conflict periods in Congo dating from King Leopold’s era to the Belgium administration and down to Mobutu’s era until in the present conflict and instability in Congo result from the decay of the state, due to corruption, oppression, structural violence, and the inability of the leadership to develop the nation. To illustrate the inability or lack of goodwill by the leadership of Congo to protect its citizens,

Khadiagala (2017) points out that Congo experienced one of the ‘worst conflicts in the

21st century. Additionally, he informs that an estimate of five million people died thus making it the world’s deadliest conflict since the Second World War. Like Turner (2010), he affirms that corruption, by influential personalities and in large scale government offices streaming down to smaller government offices has gravitated conflict along with other complex factors have greatly crippled the current development of the Congolese government and the advancement of the living conditions of the Congolese people.

Furthermore, the trends have perpetuated the cycle of violence created in the colonial and

Mobutu era. Understanding the Congo war and its historic background as well as its gradual build up is therefore essential to understanding key factors that have sustained the conflict. Clearly, chronic bad leadership and governance have contributed to continuous conflict in Congo and the surrounding countries by extension. In analysing the different factors at play in the Congolese conflict, authors such as Turner (2010), point out that

16 these factors are either common to the countries in the Great Lakes Region or specific to certain countries, but affected the others. Furthermore, most of these factors have a historical connotation cutting across the region- a legacy of the colonial masters.

Soderlund et al (2013), notes in fact, that there are widespread common features among the countries in the region. The governments in question are characterized by bribery, discrimination, inequality, marginalization and imbalanced distribution of national resources. He points of that the elite share resources among themselves while the majority of the population wallow in abject poverty. This uneven distribution of resources therefore is one of the causes of conflict.

Similarly, Boulden (2013) asserts that corruption is prevalent in all forms among the

Great Lakes Region governments at almost every level of governance. He points out that the presidents in this region are usually ineffective as he too lacks moral authority because of engaging in the vice. Likewise, he asserts that government officials practice corruption like it was part of their culture and a norm. Additionally, the institutions mandated to curb corruption are either unwilling or unable to hold those in office accountable. Consequently, the build-up results in various types of conflict among the elite, different factions, communities and eventually wide spread conflicts. Evidently, the instability in the region and DRC in particular mainly emanates from the forms of governance in this region. It is deeply rooted and resolving it requires concerted efforts from all stakeholders.

The formation of different insurgent groups is therefore largely attributed to the decision of frustrated citizens to fight these governments, which hang onto power and violate the rule of law. Among the key findings of this study is that the international community and

17 the Congolese government’s peace-building efforts have failed to promote a lasting peace in Congo because the peace-builders downplayed local struggles, not realizing that much of the instability in Congo is a result of proxy fighting enabled by local disputes.

2.1.1.2 Historical Suppression of good leaders Congo and the Great Lakes Region In the quest to investigate the genesis of poor leadership as a source of conflict, the research found that this too is a common trend among four of the Great Lakes Region

States-Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Historians such as Hoschild (1999) and

Rodney (2012) hold that history strongly shapes the destiny of a country or region. In this light, they both opine that the brutal means by which the colonial administration treated promising leaders has been the same manner these governments have suppressed good leaders hence discouraging many from seeking positions to serve their nations. Rodney

(2012) highlights for instance that throughout the region, the 1960s was characterized by the killing of individuals who exhibited good leadership traits. He illustrates the point by highlighting the systemic killings of King Mutara III Rudahigwa of Rwanda, the Prime

Minister of Congo, Patrice Lumumba and Prince Louis Rwagasore of Burundi between

1959 and 1961. He further affirms that this was a common phenomenon aimed at destroying any credible leadership capable of facilitating development thus these countries lacked focused, determined, accountable, transparent and selfless leadership even after gaining self-rule. Rodney (2012) consequently argues that this was the first factor at play in the fragile situation within the DRC and the Great Lakes Region in general. He however, does not excuse these countries from their responsibility to change their narrative. He asserts that the colonial period was temporary so these countries should have groomed credible leaders to rule them over time and find lasting solutions to their problems. Notably, like other conflicts in the region, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 18 had lasting effects on peace and stability in Congo and the region at large. It was a catalyst for armed conflict in Congo among other destructive ripple effects in the countries nearby.

With some of these countries still in conflict or leadership crisis, the road to recovery has been very problematic. The ripple effects of conflict in this region have rendered Congo and the region unstable and incapable of solving the crisis for over twenty years. King

Leopold’s legacy of constant violence and human rights violations remains firmly rooted in Congo hence the ever-growing number of internally displaced persons and refugees since independence. Though Mathys (2017) highlights that the eastern Congo alone had

1.5 million displaced persons by 2010, he also states that the scourge is not unique to

Congo in the region. He informs that Rwanda was in fact ‘born’ in a refugee crisis in

1962 and has since had a large number of persons displaced both internally and externally.

Likewise, Khadiagala (2017) argues that Uganda is also affected by this phenomenon as it has had its fair share of ethnic tensions that have produced refugees and displaced persons since independence in 1962. In 1997, for instance, Uganda had 1.8 million displaced persons and refugees because of the violent dealings of the LRA and the Allied

Democratic Forces (ADF). Additionally, Khadiagala (2017) notes that the 1972 to 2001 civil war in Burundi resulted to one of Africa’s largest groups of refugees. Over time, this mosaic of displaced persons and refugees has resulted in the loss of identity of the victims. Consequently, some are willing to take up arms and join the rebel groups and-or support any government as they see fit. The ever-increasing number of these rebel groups as mentioned in the literature review has worsened the situation.

Moreover, Lawrence (2010) informs that the current leaders in various governments are mainly pre-occupied with remaining in power and satisfying their own interests in place of resolving the conflict. In his opinion, conflict resolution seems not to be a top priority on their agenda. Up until the 2018 elections, for instance, Congo’s President Joseph

Kabila of the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) violated the constitution by running for a third term after influencing the authorized institutions to postpone the elections thrice. Similarly, Rwanda’s President Kagame is currently on his third term in office while Uganda’s President Museveni has been continuously in power since 1986 and has persecuted his strongest opposition leader of Forum for Democratic

Change (FDC) president, Kizza Besigye. As for Burundi, President Pierre Nkurunziza controversially also ran and was elected for a third term in office after the 2015 elections

(Al Jazeera, 2015).

N’gambwa (2011) agrees that these presidents have played an impeding role to the peace- building efforts in Congo due to their personal and state interests. He insists that

President Museveni for instance has sabotaged peace efforts on numerous occasions and through many ways, as he is believed to be a direct beneficiary of the Congo chaos, like the other presidents in the region. As illustrated by the Burundi pre-election protests in

2015, presidents in the region have no remorse going against the specifications of their constitutions or the will of their citizenry. The scenario also indicates that remaining in power is the main priority for many Great Lakes Region presidents.

Regardless of the mentioned common features, Congo has had a unique tendency among its political leaders, its presidents, especially (N’gambwa, 2011). The literature reviewed, revealed that from the time Congo gained independence, its leaders have not done much

20 to ensure that the Congo remained peaceful and steady. President Kasa-vubu, for instance guided Congo to political freedom and ruled for five chaos filled years. Afterward, when

Mobutu Sese Seko came into power through military coup in 1965, he too had no development agenda for the country but he instead allocated national resources to himself. Similarly, Laurent Kabila, who ousted Mobutu in 1997 and seemed promising in terms of his enthusiasm to develop the Congo and bring peace and stability, looted the country massively before he was killed by his bodyguard in 2001 after which his son

Joseph Kabila, took over power. This pattern hence demonstrations how Congo has had a problem in generating leaders who put peace and stability as the top priority on their agenda as the aforementioned presidents showed little or no tangible actions towards this end.

N’gambwa (2011) opines that the talks on peace and stability were mere rhetoric. Though the research focuses on the efforts attempted during Joseph Kabila’s reign, the research hopes that the recently sworn-in President Felix Tshisekedi will lead Congo to eventual peace. Democracy as the political system of Congo obviously has a long way to maturity, as its stipulated tenets have not been observed over the years. It would take another study for a discussion on whether Congo should consider an overhaul in its political system but the situation leads to the conclusion that the problem of bad governance is in the Great

Lakes Region is deeply entrenched but nonetheless, leaders are unwilling to let go of power no matter the cost.

2.1.1.3 Structural Violence As aforementioned, mineral rich as Congo is, it ironically ranks among the poorest countries in the world. Due to the high poverty levels, competition for basic needs among

21 the populace has gradually led to deep-seated and long-standing conflict. Gaynor (2016) asserts that conflicts are bound to happen where there are limited resources or the perception thereof primarily because competition leads to threatened human needs.

Failure to address the critical issue of structural violence and poverty in the conflict resolution efforts is among the key findings of this study as a reason for the failure of these efforts to broker lasting peace in Congo.

The Congolese government continues to fuel and manipulate conflicts through corruption as discussed in the previous section. Conflicts cannot be resolved if the main channel through which conflict is meant to be dealt with is corrupt. Political manipulation remains one of the key factors that fuel and perpetuate conflicts within Congo. Peace efforts have primarily looked at the problem at hand but overlooked the root factors that caused the problem. As a result, DRC continues to be vulnerable to conflicts pertaining wealth distribution and basic social amenities. Unlike previous years, the economic context and living conditions of the population slightly improved between 2000 and 2003. In 2002, for instance, the country experienced positive GDP growth rates for the first time since

1995, and the growth rate was above 1% for the first time since 1986. Although the economic improvement is credited to the peace efforts and reunification of the country as well as the resumption of international development aid, the control of public finances and massive International Monetary Aid (IMF) funding, the improved living conditions would no doubt tackle the desperation that causes many citizens to participate in anti- government activities.

The brief upward trajectory was followed shortly by recurring mismanagement of funds hence the maintenance of the initial status quo. To date, the living conditions of the

Congolese population remain extremely harsh. Poverty and the inability to advance in life currently characterize the lives of many individuals residing in the country. Poverty and the inability or unwillingness of the government to help has made locals contemptuous towards the government (Gaynor, 2016).

2.1.1.4 Congo’s Transnational Ethnic Ties Autesserre (2010) conducted a study to understand if ethnicity was at play in instigating conflict in the Congo. In his work entitled “The trouble with the Congo,” he concludes that there was indeed some historical ethnic and social friction founded between the pastoralists and cultivators. He further sought to understand the role of local identity as far as the tensions were concerned, between the “indigenous” communities and the

Congolese with Rwandese ancestry. The study examined the phenomena from two perspectives. First, it sought to trace the local roots of the antagonisms that eventually caused large-scale violence during and after the wars in Congo. Secondly, it sought to illuminate the connection between the causes of violence. Interestingly, the author notes that most of the micro-level conflicts over land, resources, and power involved only a few villages at both the local and national levels. The study confirms that ethnicity, since the onset has been at play between the Congolese of Rwandese ancestry and the indigenous communities of Congo.

In support of the findings of the preceding study, Reyntjens in his study, “The Great

African War”, points out that ethnicity and the struggle for land played a key role in the genesis of the conflict. He illustrates by highlighting the massacre of the Rwandese Hutus and the Tutsi, which occurred at Masisi, a town in North Kivu province in Congo. During this period, houses belonging to the Banyarwanda (Hutu and Tutsi communities with

Rwandese ancestry) were burned and their domestic animals stolen. After the event, the

Banywarwanda accused the indigenous people of chasing them while the indigenous communities accused the Banyarwanda of wanting to claim the territory they allegedly considered part of “ancient Rwanda” (Reyntjens 2009). Their different backgrounds therefore fuelled the conflict along with the struggle for land, their diverse interests and their lack of regard for one another.

Such local struggles, as the study illustrates, were reflected even to the presidential level between President Mobutu of Congo who was pro-Hutu and President Kagame of

Rwanda who was pro-Tutsi. According to Autesserre (2010) however, the root cause of conflict cannot be isolated to ethnicity and, or land issues. He argues that while two groups, indigenous and the settlers had been differing, refugees from neighbouring countries at different periods in the late 1990s also contributed notable to the conflict. He asserts furthermore that some of the settlers had xenophobic tendencies that caused them to prevent other immigrants from using their land. Conflict among different ethnicities in

Congo has been common since the era of Sese Seko.

Though diplomatic peace-building efforts discussed in this study succeeded in ending the some of these conflicts, they have failed to promote a lasting peace. They have focused on reconciling different ethnic groups that were involved or affected by the conflict.

Though the reconciliation process focused on ending the imminent problem by bringing different communities together, the factors that caused, fuelled and perpetuated the conflict remain unaddressed by the processes.

Notably, the role of identity and its ability to create the contrast of privilege and oppression makes a significant contribution to conflict in Congo. . Local struggles also continue to cause instability within the Congo. This study found that because these factors were unaddressed during the diplomatic peace efforts within the stated period

(2001-2018), tension and instability continue to overwhelm Congo

2.1.1.5 Looting of resources and proxy wars Congo, as mentioned through the document, is endowed with high value minerals all over its territory. In recent times, the demand for various minerals has greatly increased because of high technology intake hence the need for minerals such as coltan, which are essential for the manufacture of mobile phones and other technological devices. Demand for these natural resources has been a powerful tool perpetuating war, especially proxy wars in Congo through non-state armed groups. The following map illustrates the natural resources in Congo.

Figure 2.1: The map of Congo highlighting its mineral resources

Most of the non-state actors hail from three bordering countries- Rwanda, Uganda,

Burundi and DRC itself. They have been referred to as the Great Lakes Region in this study. These countries have played distinct roles in perpetrating conflict in Congo. In the case of the Lord Resistance Army, Schomerus (2012) informs that this rebel group was founded in 1987 when Joseph Kony took up arms against Ugandan President Museveni.

The major reason for the creation of the LRA was the re-establishment of competitive multi-party democracy and the endeavour to end the gross abuse of human rights and restore the dignity of Ugandans. On the contrary, however, Schomerus highlights that the

LRA is one of the most ruthless insurgent groups in the world. In Congo, the LRA has been operating in the eastern part of the Congo, a region known for insecurity and

26 impromptu attacks on the locals. He affirms that the LRA history is characterised by horrific tactics as its leader Joseph Kony is an uncompromising fanatic of his own cause who has been impossible to capture even through international efforts (Schomerus,

2012).

Like the LRA, Forces of National Liberation (FNL) and the Forces for the Defence of

Democracy (FDD) of Burundi, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda,

National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), and some factions of the

Congolese Army, among other visible and ‘invisible’ actors worsen the situation to access Congo’s resources. Competition between the existing armed groups mainly from neighbouring countries over these resources significantly escalates conflict in the Congo.

Chakrabarty (2015), informs that there has been a series of reports in recent times showing organized illegal logging activities on large scale by transnational logging corporations in exchange of arms and cash.

These illegal dealings have led to the loss of huge sums of money that the DRC government might have otherwise contributed to the development of the country. Efforts by the Congolese army, FARDC have been futile as the army is proportionately small as compared to the insurgent activities in Congo. To the advantage of the insurgent groups, majority of the country’s vast territory is under-developed hence; the lack of infrastructure, a good road and well-established lines of communication network hinder the FARDC’s operational capability. The insurgents can easily disappear into the vast forests of Congo after committing atrocities. The failure of these efforts to fight the insurgents effectively consequently leads to the inability of the government to exert control over its sovereign territory. This to large extent expounds on why the insurgent

27 groups and their leaders such as Joseph Kony and Laurent Nkunda have been very difficult to capture. It also illustrates how warlords and other violent powerbrokers compete for control of state militaries, armed insurgencies, and resources in an anarchical landscape where social, political and economic motives are often difficult to decipher.

2.1.1.6 Role of armed rebel groups from neighbouring countries As aforementioned, opposition groups from the neighbouring countries thrive in the vastness of unstable Congo. Aside from the LRA, the Allied Defence Forces group is allegedly a coalition force of an Islamist sect known as Tabliqs set to overthrow

Uganda’s President Museveni and his government. ADF is an alliance formed from three groups-the Buseruka (Tabliqs who initially called themselves the Uganda Muslim

Freedom Fighters); the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) as well as the Rwenzururu movement. It has been operational since 1996 and is stationed near the

Ruwenzori Mountains in the South-West of Uganda near the shared border with Congo.

Members of the group comprise of soldiers from the overthrown governments of Rwanda and Congo. They accuse Museveni of being a foreigner trying to establish a Tutsi empire in the Great Lakes Region. Though the alliance stated as a small team, they are said to have strong ties with wider terror networks and were in fact added to the US terrorist group list. They also receive their support from Iran and Sudan. More recently,

Congolese militias have worked with the ADF, which is fighting the Ugandan army in the west of the country. Therefore, the longer the duration of war in the DRC, the more likely this group might gain power to cause more harm such as recruiting child soldiers and committing major human rights violations in Congo, Uganda and the region at large(Stearns, 2012).

Additionally, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, which is credited to bring to an end the 1994 Rwanda genocide, has continued to play a critical role both to perpetrate or to mitigate the effects of the conflict in Congo. By fighting the Hutu- dominated FNL and Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD) from Burundi, the

Rwandese force mitigates the conflict in Congo but at the same time, having in Congo as the fighting ground causes instability and insecurity to the Congolese locals.

The aforementioned FNL and FDD insurgent groups are organised from Burundi so as to overthrow the Burundian government but they recruit members from Uganda, Congo and

Burundi. They pledge to cause havoc for Burundi “until the Burundi government implements democratic tenets, peace and stability”. This slows the development of the

Kivu provinces where the groups are based thus troubling the Burundian and Congolese population in the region. As Wilen (2015) affirms, the magnitude of destruction caused by these two groups in Congo has grown as they have massively recruited ex-soldiers from Rwanda, Burundi and Congo. The failure to prevent the inversion of external insurgent groups can mainly be explained by the lack of credible leadership in Congo.

The weakness of the central government in President Kabila’s era and the massive corruption as well as the obsession with power among the political elite further provides a justification of the prolonged UN and AU presence in Congo as well as the continued instability in the country (Wilen, 2015).

2.2 The Role of International Organizations to resolve the Congo conflict

While countries prefer to solve their internal issues domestically, long standing conflict s have necessitated the intervention of external organizations and states in the resolution of these conflicts. This study uses the Barbara F. Walter’s on Settling Civil Wars Theory,

29 which seeks to investigate why some civil wars end in successfully implemented peace settlements while others continue to decades. It combines historical factors, empirical findings and conceptual intricacies to test wars to draw lessons. The theory was best fit for the study on Congo as the theory uses expansive data on every civil war fought between 1940 and 1993. Moreover, the theory addresses the factors that influence combatants and actors in civil war to initiate negotiations, to compromise and to implement on the agreements eventually.

It holds that third party intervention is crucial to resolving intricate conflicts such as the one in Congo. Additionally, the theory points out that resolving underlying issues of the opposing sides in a conflict is not enough for negotiations to succeed. Instead, parties to a conflict must design guarantees on the agreed terms. In this light; the theory underscores the importance of third party security guarantees and the positive potential of power sharing pacts and outlines that it is a determining factor on whether adversaries decide to negotiate or fight.

The theory asserts that the role of the third party is to reinforce a treaty or to clarify post treaty transition. In addition, it holds that a fruitful treaty convinces the involved parties to shed their partisan groups and surrender conquered territory despite the risk of vulnerability, and their limited ability to enforce the other terms in the treaty (Walter,

2002).

2.3 The United Nations

The Congo conflict presents a mosaic of state actors, non-state actors and stakeholders with diverse interests, goals, capabilities, alliances and foes. These actors are grouped into international, continental, regional and finally country levels. As for the international actors, the UN has been the main actor spearheading peace and stability in the DRC and the Great Lakes Region at large. Having 193 sovereign member states, The United

Nation is by far the most influential organization at the global stage. Expectedly, the UN plays a leading role in global affairs such as conflict resolution and peace-building

(Neethling, 2011). In fact, the organization’s core mandate entails protection of post-

World War generations from the scourge of war. Having lived through the bloody and disastrous world wars, the organization’s founders created it to ensure world peace and security (UN. Secretary-General, 2012).

Since inception therefore, the UN has often been involved in conflict prevention and resolution as well as peace-building initiatives in post-war societies. The first UN peacekeeping mission was set up in 1948 to monitor follow-through of the Armistice

Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. By the 1990s, the UN peace efforts had expanded resulting from the need to halt civil wars after the cold war. The UN acted both directly in mediation and indirectly through collaborative efforts with countries such as Cambodia, Burundi, Namibia, Tajikistan and Sierra Leone among others to end most of these conflicts. Towards the end of the decade, new conflicts led to new operations in different regions such as The Central African Republic, Congo, Kosovo and Sierra

Leone.

Although the UN has historically played a crucial role in mediating peace agreements facilitating their follow-through, which in turn has helped to reduce levels of conflict in various regions, some of these accords have been largely ineffective as in the case of

Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994. In addition, the on-going conflict situations in

South Sudan, Congo and Somalia illustrate the organization’s challenge in conflict resolution. The listed conflicts have resulted in massive displacement of citizens. The conflicts have also heightened the refugee crisis, which in turn has raised security concerns around conflict regions. Despite the growing aversion on the African continent based on notions of double standards and inefficiency when dealing with Africa, many

African countries host UN peacekeeping missions (Neethling, 2011).

Escalated conflict has often led to the conversion of peace missions to peace enforcement military operations, as was the case in the DRC. The main goal of enforcement mechanisms in Congo is to facilitate a democratic system that will then to outlast the conflict. Though the UN set camp in Congo few months after its independence, its role became crucial in 1999 when forces from six African countries intervened in DRC.

Williams informs that the previously mentioned ceasefire agreement, the Lusaka Accord necessitated a UN peacekeeping force to ensure implementation. Here, the UN facilitated the creation of the United States Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(MONUC) under the 1291 UN Security Council Resolution in 2000. The primary mandate of MONUC was to oversee implementation of the accord and ensure successful completion of the required processes such as releasing prisoners of war and improving observance of human rights along with other non-governmental organizations (Williams,

2014). In 2004, UNSC, under Resolution 1565 extended the missions mandate to include

32 citizen protection and protection of all UN personnel and facilities. The mission would also oversee and control the authorized arms embargo and monitor the armed movements and groups throughout the country. Later in 2008, the UNSC under Resolution 1797, authorized MONUC to help organize, prepare and conduct the 2011 elections (Williams,

2014).

With over 18,000 uniformed personnel which include over 16, 0000 troops, 700 military observers and slightly over 1000 police, MONUC is currently UN’s largest peacekeeping force in the world. It is also equipped with over 900 international civilian personnel and slightly over 2,000 local civilian personnel. The mission, as stated, is not only mandated to control violence but to broadly facilitate peace for the social, economic and political development of Congo through programs aimed at demobilization of child soldiers, human rights awareness, civic education on matters of elections, gender equality and health awareness especially with regards to HIV/AIDS. Additionally, MONUC also has staff to facilitate justice and punish genocide offenders and perpetrators of war crimes through the International Criminal Court (Spooner, 2014).

While the military forces aim to reduce the amount of violence in the country, the police force focuses on capacity building initiatives for the National Congolese Police by offering training, and logistical support to ensure efficient coordination of international aid and electoral security (Williams, 2014). According to Spooner, about 90% of UN peacekeeping forces are based in eastern Congo, as the region is most volatile and rife with various rebel factions. Laurent Nkunda, a former general, leads one of such groups.

He is a Tutsi who claims to fight for his ethnic community against attacks from anti-Tutsi

33 rebel groups. Laurent Nkunda hence fights the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) which has a major presence in the Kivu region. The Congolese army has often engaged Nkunda’s group in confrontations that have stimulated further violence including rape, robbery and murder, even on the civilian community especially in large cities around Kivu (Spooner,

2014). More recently, however, western DRC has gradually grown fragile and begun to receive attention for its volatility (Jacob & J. U.-U, 2017).

Lastly, Spooner discusses critics against MONUC and UN peacekeepers who are often accused of engaging in prostitution and rape of locals. In response to the claims, Kofi

Annan while in office maintained that such behaviour is intolerable and goes against UN policy. He expressed disappointment at the happenings but the same trend has continued nevertheless as soldiers are generally under their home countries’ jurisdiction, not the

UN’s. Many countries, such as the United States have questioned their contribution to the peace mission following the UN’s inability to punish and prevent such behaviour.

Largely, this trend has led the international community to question the effectiveness and genuineness of groups like MONUS to protect and build peace (Spooner, 2014).

Regardless of the criticisms however, Spooner, in the Human Right report, holds that

MONUC has achieved great accomplishments such as the prevention of external forces from invading DRC over the past decade. This has enabled some degree of stability in the country, which has consequently led to development and unification of the country.

Furthermore, Spooner praises the mission for helping the country remain whole in spite of the numerous internal conflicts. Additionally, he remarks that the mission, through a disarmament program, has succeeded in reducing the amount of weapons in the country

34 thus increasing security for the citizenry, which in turn has encouraged human and economic development initiatives (Spooner, 2014). Though the UN has not directly spearheaded the diplomatic peace efforts in this research, It has played a major supporting role in each initiative. The 1961 killing of the UN secretary general, Dag

Hamarskjold, in Congo perhaps informs the organization’s hands-off diplomatic engagement with the DRC.

2.4 The African Union

At the African regional level, the African Union (AU), which succeeded the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 2001, assumes various tasks such as development and conflict resolution. Although the OAU Charter stressed on territorial integrity and state sovereignty as well as the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, various conflicts on the continent have forced millions out of their borders, displaced others in their own countries and deprived many more of their means of livelihood, hope and dignity (Hergé, Lonsdale-Cooper, & Turner, 2010).

The numerous conflicts that have marred the African continent have necessitated radical change in AU’s leadership strategy. One of these paradigm shifts, largely informed by the

1994 Rwandan genocide, has been the move from the principle of non-interference to legitimate intervention in member states faced with internal conflicts (Meger, 2016).This shift from indifference to authorized intervention was officiated and harmonized into the

Constitutive Act of the AU in February 2004. The amendment legalized intervention without invitation based on proof of gross violation of human rights and other calamities

(Jacob & J. U.-U, 2017). As in the OAU Cairo Declaration, AU member states

35 committed to collaboratively work in search of speedy yet lasting peaceful conflict solutions for all conflicting areas on the continent (Downs & Masur, 2015).

Both the OAU and the AU have made efforts to resolve the Congo crisis by encouraging mediation through the Lusaka and Sirte summits among others. The two summits are credited for creating opportunities for dialogue and cooperative efforts to end the conflict with both internal and external forces (Danfulani, 2011). Furthermore, the AU has made remarkable progress in development of its conflict and peace building structures by establishing a Peace and Security Council through which the AU has authorized over

64,000 peacekeepers to various continental missions such as Uganda, Nigeria and The

Central African Republic. African scholars have contested subjection of the AU’s constitutive Act to many legal interpretations in comparison to other global protocols, particularly the UNSC. This discontent springs from the seemingly overbearing power of the UNSC as the ultimate body in charge of authorizing deployment of peace-making forces into any region of the world without any regard of the African Union Security

Council in interventions within the African continent. The aversion has also been fanned by the argument that this disregard for instance in Libya’s intervention, illustrates the

UN’s non-observance of territorial sovereignty in Africa (McCauley, 2017).

Although the Congo war started before the African Union’s adoption of the right to protect through intervention principle, Eichstaedt argues that despite the non-interference law, there was the political will to see the war to an end by African states. He emphasizes his point by highlighting the numerous countries involved in the war such as Rwanda,

Uganda, Burundi, Zimbabwe and Chad among others. He asserts that attempts by an

36 overall continental body to end the conflict by then would have been thwarted by the already participating countries in the Congo war. Moreover, the Congolese government was previously not willing to accept any non-French mediator or one with a French background. He also argues that financing and planning peacekeeping initiatives in such a large country would have been quite a tall order for the OAU and the AU at the time

(Eichstaedt, 2016).

The study was confined to analyse the ICD diplomatic peace efforts facilitated by the

AU.As per the sessional paper, Naidoo (2002) informs that the negotiations began on

February 2002, in South Africa. He asserts the ICD had two primary goals as stipulated by the preceding Lusaka Agreement. First, the negotiations were expected to end the conflict that emerged from the 1998 Kabila assassination attempt and to revive and consolidate a democratisation process which had been barred for years by President

Mobutu’s declaration of Zaire (as he renamed Congo) as a one party state, a leadership style Laurent Kabila further endorsed.

The ICD was expected to deliver an all-inclusive transition government to tackle the

“anti-Kabila” conflict, facilitate the arrangement of elections within a set timeframe and oversee formation of a national army. Additionally, the negotiations were expected to formulate a national reconciliation programme and device an economic reconstruction and development blueprint. It was, in summary, expected to end the Congo war and facilitate the birth of a democratic state.

2.5 Role played by neighbouring countries to fuel or resolve conflict

Perhaps resulting from their limited resources, the role of small or medium-sized neighbouring states in conflict resolution is often overlooked in scholarly discussions

(Hermansen, 2017). They are assumed to play a subtle and secondary role in intervention and peace building. These states are also presumed to have little bargaining power for instance in terms of armed forces, economic resources, political influence and diplomatic networks (Tjosvold & Tjosvold 2015). Consequently, crucial matters concerning their contribution to conflict-ridden neighbours are poorly studied such as the rationale used by these countries to inform intervention, the strategies used and their effectiveness. The oversight or failure to observe actions of these neighbouring states during conflict has rendered many peace processes unsuccessful in previous decades (2015). The map below shows the location of Congo in accordance to its neighbours.

Civil wars are detrimental to any country's development prospects. Not only do they rob society of untapped potential through high death rates, they also destroy resources and infrastructure, and largely affect the confidence of the populace in the long-term.

Additionally, civil wars lead to reduced government and foreign direct investments and cause tension from the fear of conflict recurrence in the future (Ness, Lin & C.-L, 2015).

Moreover, conflict to the extent of civil war holds far-reaching effects to neighbouring states of the directly affected country. Some of the consequences include the loss of business opportunities, refugee influx and escalation of conflict to these countries among others.

In contrast, however, evidence reveals that the neighbouring countries to a conflict struck state pose a serious threat to the stability of the country in question (Jakubowski, 2015).

The example of the close linkages in the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea is often cited to support this argument. Similarly, the civil war in Burundi continues to affect Rwanda, Congo and Uganda. In other regions, the same was illustrated by the proliferation of civil wars through the Balkans after the collapse of Yugoslavia. Lastly, in

Asia, the Afghan civil war evidently escalated to the western region of Pakistan (Ness,

Lin and C.-L, 2015).

In a recent study, the Centre for Economic Policy Research in a collaborative effort with other scholars examined all the hotbeds of civil war since the Second World War. The research concluded that civil wars have different tendencies in terms of conflict escalation to neighbouring countries. The authors argue that country-specific factors determine conflict escalation. In this light, the authors assert that only ethnic-based civil wars pose a significant threat to the stability of neighbouring states. Moreover, the research informs that not all countries are at risk of contamination as ethnic civil wars spread only along ethnic lines (Jakubowski, 2015). The research thereby points out that the risk of conflict escalation is only likely among countries with ethnic ties. More specifically, the research affirms that the aforementioned ties increase conflict escalation chances by six percent. In addition, the research found evidence alluding to the capability of rich countries to prevent a neighbouring state’s conflict from spreading to their own territory (Bosker, Ree & Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2014).

In the same light, the research uses various examples to bolster the argument that regions where many ethnic groups live in more than one country are more prone to conflict escalation. The research outlines regions in Central America, the Middle East, Europe and Central Asia, which were susceptible to conflict “infection” in the past when ethnic violence erupted in a neighbouring country.

2.5.1 Neighbouring countries as a source of continued instability in Congo The interventions of Uganda and Rwanda to oust President Mobutu greatly influenced the continuation of the Congo war. As explained, the dissatisfaction with new leadership by

President Kabila caused the Rwandan and Ugandan regimes to aspire for a new compliant leader that would support their interests. Both countries collaborated, with backing of the United States to initiate the war that erupted in mid-1998 (Nzongola-

Ntalaja, 2013). Uganda and Rwanda used rebel militias to overthrow Kabila. The RCD for instance was a proxy rebel group directed from Kigali. Following the anecdote “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, Rwanda and Uganda formed an alliance between

Congolese rebel groups and the Rwandan and Ugandan armies.

Turner (2010) informs that by this time, members of the coalition that sponsored the

AFDL such as Angola and Zimbabwe to oust Mobutu were segregated during the war against Kabila thus further complicating the rebellion against Kabila’s government.

Congo was divided into three major sections. Kinshasa where Kabila, used as his primary base with help from Angola and Zimbabwe, controlled the Southern third of the territory and used natural resources found in this territory such as oil, diamond, cobalt, and other minerals to support his war efforts. The second section was a portion of the north, particularly the Equateur province. The Ugandan backed, Movement for the Liberation of

Congo (MLC) under the leadership of Jean-Pierre Bemba and the Rally for Congolese

Democracy (RCD-ML) controlled and exploited this region. The RCD-Goma and

Rwandan troops controlled and exploited The final section of Congo namely; the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, parts of Katanga, the Kasais, and

Orientale province (Turner, 2010). In each of the three sections, the controlling alliance would tax the mines and the population. The problem of illicit mining was worsened further by the Congolese government’s failure to monitor and control the spread of small- scale mining.

The Ugandan and Rwandan invasion of the Congo combined with the influx of refugees from the concluded Rwandan genocide worsened the for security situation in Congo and thereby led many of the oppressed communities to take up arms and fight for their interests. Many locals thereby took up arms and created or were recruited into rebel groups. Uganda and Rwanda then saw the opportunity and used rebel groups as a tool to pursue their interests. Following this trend, other foreign and domestic backed rebel groups and local militia groups propagated the conflict in Congo.

The unlawful state of Congo worsened and the country became a free for all. At larger scale through the years, militia groups have been used to destabilize the nation through indirect means of fighting. The militia groups comprise of numerous ex-combatants who kept their firearms after the wars and acquired more firearms from external or internal supporters of each specific group. The instability within Congo therefore allowed the involved actors to benefit economically and politically from the conflict. Additionally, it is worth noting that many of the local struggles or the indirect means of fighting would not be effective without the remaining weapons, and the shipment of weapons from

41 external backers. After the 1990s wars in Congo, many combatants remained unemployed as they did not reintegrate into the Congolese national army but they withheld their military weapons.

In his book on disarmament in Congo, Stearns (2012) points out that many soldiers from

Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) and MLC kept their weapons in accordance to a mission that was established in Kinshasa. The disarmament mission by the National Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration

(CONADER)-‘Une arme contre 100 dollars’ outlined that every weapon would be traded for a hundred dollars with an aim to bring stability and support the peace process of the entire nation.

The lack of financial support from the government for this and other disarmament missions left many ex-combatants with their weapons. The concept was the adopted by other militia groups such as one called the Odjani group in Equateur who purchased the firearms and even recruited ex-combatants. Given the abundance of firearms in the

Democratic Republic of Congo, militia groups that purchased the weapons grew in number and capability. In addition to purchasing weapons from ex-combatants, some of these groups also acquired firearms from the police as they tried to intervene and from soldiers in the MLC rebel group that never participated in the reintegration process implemented by CONADER (Stearns, 2012). As incentive to join militia groups like the mentioned Odjani, these groups began to offer payments to the ex-combatants on their recruitment. Gradually, these groups, evolved to a national security threat despite they humble beginning.

Like Stearns (2012), Turner (2013) holds that that one of the key factors contributing to the perpetuation of indirect means of fighting and local conflict is the abundance of firearms in the hands of militia groups after war, as well as ex-combatants who have not been reintegrated within the Congolese national army and society.

Ex-combatants of the 1994 genocide in geographically small Rwanda for instance are said to have further catalysed the of war in Congo. The genocide took part when

Rwanda’s Hutu-dominated government attempted to annihilate the Tutsi community, which comprised of the rich minority. Though the genocide took three months, it resulted to the death of 800,000 Tutsis and non-compliant Hutus. The end of the massacre resulted from the invasion of an exiled Tutsi army that drove the killers off Rwanda into Congo

(Eichstaedt, 2016). Expectedly, the new Tutsi dominated Rwandese government feared the re-grouping of genocide perpetrators as their return would mean continuation of the war. Consequently, Rwanda did not hesitate to oust Congolese President Mobutu Sese

Seko when he appeared to support the genocide perpetrators as Rational Choice theory informs (De Jonge, 2012). In the aim of protecting its citizenry and territory, Rwanda was justifiably obliged to intervene in Congo.

In 2001, through the same Rwanda-backed rebel group that had ousted the former president, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL), installed Laurent Kabila. Contrary to Rwandese government expectations, President

Kabila rearmed the “genocidaires”. Though Rwanda, with the help of Uganda and

Burundi, tried to oust him also, other states such as Angola and Zimbabwe joined Congo to rally against the attempt. Necessitated by the rebels from neighbouring states who

43 camped in Congo's lawless forests as a base from which to launch cross-border attacks, most of the countries that intervened had legitimate interests in Congo. Rwanda, Uganda and Angola for instance intervened because Kabila’s government failed to control their rebel groups based in the country (Reyntjens, 2015).

Though the war ended shortly, foreign armies remained and carried out massive exploitation of resources. Reyntjens highlights that Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda, for example mined diamonds and coltan in Kasai region, southern Congo while Angola joined the Congolese government in an oil venture. Rwanda and Uganda also poached for ivory and harvested timber to the extent of emptying furniture from schools. Though the two were allies, they often collided over their plunder (Reyntjens, 2015). Generally, however, the more all the armies plundered, the less willing they became to fight each other. As outlined by the theory of neorealism whose main proponent is Kenneth Waltz, states operate under the belief that the world is anarchical thereby they will take any action to meet their state interest. (Kazmi, 2016) In this case, Rwanda, Uganda and

Burundi among other countries needed no authorization to access Congo for their national interests.

Other platforms such as The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

(ICGLR), an inter-governmental organization of the countries in the African Great Lakes

Region have continuously been engaged in finding a lasting solution for Congo. The organization has twelve member states, inclusive of the DRC and the neighbouring countries in the region. The organization was established based on the recognition that political instability and conflicts in these countries have a considerable regional

44 dimension and thus require concerted effort in order to promote sustainable peace. The organization has engaged its member states on various ways to resolve the conflict in

Congo through encouraging their participation in both diplomatic and military peace efforts(Diemel & Hilhorst 2018).

Figure 2.2: The map of Congo and neighbouring countries

2.6 Role of religious institutions in the Congo war Contrary to the expectations of secularists, religion has a strong, and probably increasing, significance as a key source of identity for millions of people, predominantly in the developing world. Though muted, religion has made significant impact in the Western development circles, especially regarding the notion that religious divergences and intolerance are responsible for numerous recent and on-going conflicts in the developing

45 world. This section will argue that religion can both encourage conflict and build peace.

The argument is based on growing evidence illustrating the potential of religious institutions to play a constructive role in conflict resolution. In this task, the actors involved are individuals and faith-based organizations who believe in religious ideas. As stated, these people and organizations can cause conflict or be a conflict resolution and peace-building tool by providing early warnings of conflict, participating as good offices once conflict has erupted and contributing to advocacy, mediation and reconciliation during and in the post conflict period (McCauley, 2017).

Hermansen informs that the separation of religion from the state is a notion that emerged at the end of a historical era when Europe concluded its bloody “religious” wars between

1616 and 1648. Conceivably, the resolve aimed at avoiding “religious conflicts” in the future (Hermansen, 2017). Although these wars were dubbed as religious in nature, scholars and revolutionary leaders such as King argued that the war was also a “product of the conflict between old and new regimes of regional power in early modern Europe”.

The need to wholesomely analyse the conflict to include the historical, political, social and power dynamics as opposed to merely focusing on religion as the cause of violence is thereby necessary since both secular and religious institutions can contribute to eruption of violence (Esmail, 2011).

According to a research on post-colonial world civil wars, the generally accepted perception that religion in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa is the cause of violence is highly subjective (Henderson & Singer, 2000). Similarly, Downs and

Masur affirm that though religious factors could be associated with violence, mere

46 religious differences cannot be potential sources of conflict. The authors assert that conflict is often inspired by many more factors besides religion (Downs & Masur, 2015).

Nevertheless, some scholars such as Schmidt do not argue against secularization. They hold instead, that the secular manner of organizing societies and states is an evolution hence development of historical and socio-political structures. Additionally, they point out that though secularization may avoid “religious” violence in one society it may not have the same results in another. Secularization cannot therefore be termed a universal solution for “religious” violence as both secular and religious factors can contribute to peace or violence (Schmidt, 2011). The analysis of a “religious” violent conflict therefore requires a keen understanding of both secular and religious dimensions, and the interplay therein. Case studies of religious peacemakers from Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia demonstrate partially successful attempts to reconcile previously warring communities.

The peacemakers in these regions facilitated greater social cohesion and provided a crucial foundation for enhancing human development (Schmidt, 2011).

On the contrary, a research conducted by the Jesuits review (2015), illustrates the failure of Church leaders to play a decisive role in the 1996 to 1997 Congolese war. During this period, bishops remained divided on to how best to respond. Although the bishops’ conference called for an end to the war, the church played little role in peace building.

Moreover, the church embedded the country’s regional and ethnic divisions even after

Kabila took over power. Bishops from Kabila’s stronghold in south and east Congo as well as those from his ethnic groups generally supported him, while many in western

Congo regions such as Kinshasa, were appalled by the president’s dependence on the

Rwandan army and Congolese Tutsi. Eventually, the growing anti-Rwandan sentiments

47 drove Kabila to exclude Tutsi leaders from his regime and caused fallout with Rwanda.

In 1998, anti-Tutsi violence resurfaced in eastern Congo and, Rwanda once again invaded

Congo, allegedly launching the war that continues today (The Jesuits Review, 2015).

2.6.1 The Role of the Church in the Congo Conflict Though, the role of the church in governance is by some social scientist and theologians citing that it has no role to play in socio-political transformation of communities.,,

Ngolet (2011) refutes by highlighting numerous current and historical evidences of the crucial role of the church in addressing socio-political challenges. He claims that the very existence of the church has historically been associated with times of political crisis. This study will underscore the role of the church as a transnational organization, a globalizing tool and a contributor to socio-political development. In the case of Congo, the fact that

70% of its population is Christian and 96% of Congolese refugees abroad are Christian makes the study of religion in Congo significant. It cannot be underestimated. While most Christians in DRC are Catholic, 80% of Congolese refugees are Protestant, with large numbers of Pentecostal and Seventh Day Adventists. About 3% of refugees identify themselves as Muslim. The Review informs that religion plays an extremely important role in the lives of Congolese in general and even more especially, the refugees. Religion is considered a refuge, a place of great peace and comfort that provides solutions to personal problems. Resulting from the important role of religion therefore, religious leaders are highly respected (The Jesuits review, 2015).

Although few Congolese identify themselves as followers of traditional African beliefs,

Christian or Muslim Congolese naturally incorporate traditional beliefs into religious practice. Divine spirits for instance, inhabit natural objects, such as rocks and trees and

48 ancestors play an active role, for good and ill, in the daily lives of their descendants and in the life of the community as a whole, in most traditional African beliefs. Similarly, even among Christians, beliefs about witchcraft and sorcery surface during periods of illness or death (The Jesuits review, 2015).

According to Katongole (2017), the role of the church is to help governments and peoples who seek to embrace and implement human values. In addition, he asserts that the church must also hold state leaders accountable. It thereby must speak out against tyrannical rule and all forms of oppression and exploitation. He further argues that many churches do not play their role effectively because leaders fail to understand that they too have socio- political responsibilities to assume in the larger community (Katongole, 2017). In their social Justice and Spirituality journal, English and Cameron describe the harmful behaviour of the elite in general and offer propositions and practical suggestions to the church for the empowerment and transformation of the victims of this exploitation. They suggest, for example that church should practice “the politics of the death and resurrection of Christ” by living and leading as the Christ. The authors further explain that the church in DRC has a crucial role to play in equipping Christians to combat individual and collective sins in their communities (English & Cameron, 2016).

On the same note, Mugambi interjects that success in this endeavour, however, is pegged on whether church leaders practice the same principles in their own lives. Additionally, he affirms that the pulpit can be used as a tool for social transformation through transmission of new ideas and change of attitudes, thus making it a viable instrument for the restoration of people’s confidence and hope. He holds that the church certainly has a role to play in the larger community. He stresses especially on the power of prayer to

49 bring about revival in the church, which will in turn result in moral regeneration and community transformation. To add to his argument’s weight, the author cites a number of revival examples throughout history ranging from little villages and towns to cities, and entire nations such as the one in Fiji Island that resulted in a cohesive and prosperous community (Mugambi, 1995).

In his book La Théologie Politique Africaine, Mutombo-Mukendi (2011), analyses the alarming socio-political situation of Africa and its exogenous and endogenous causes; he insists that the African church and leaders have a very crucial role to play in regards to the socio-political transformation of the continent. He outlines that poor and corrupt leadership in both the church and political arenas renders both institutions powerless to achieve this responsibility. He observes that developing ethical and God-fearing

Christians especially church leaders who might develop an effective political theology and the resulting socio-political transformation can immensely lead to the transformation of Africa.

Similarly, Katongole argues that the church must primarily play its role of promoting “the politics of God” which entails producing Christ-like people and equipping them to truly be the “salt of the earth” and “light of the world” unlike the popular anecdote that

Christianity in Africa is miles wide and one inch deep. Considering influence of the

Church in Africa and its stated role, it can be substantially useful in proposing a lasting solution to the socio-political challenge in the DRC (Katongole, 2017)

2.8 The role of SADC in the Congo Crisis

Regional organizations play a crucial role in conflict resolution among their member states. This is informed by the consequential effects of conflict in regional development, which may sometimes affect countries even beyond the region. In Africa, the increasing ownership of primary responsibility towards conflict resolution by African institutions results from the disenchantment with Western interventions due to their alleged double standards and the attached conditions. This has popularized tagline such as “Africans for

Africa”. Notably, single states may not find lasting solutions to conflict hence the preference and need for concerted efforts in resolving conflicts and ending violence such as that in Congo (Swart, 2013).

The last decade has seen a great increase in regional integration projects around the world as well as in few cases, the rise in nationalism. Compared to the rest of the world, Africa hosts several regional institutions, which densely cover its entire region-south, east, west and north. Nevertheless, Africa has been marred by a frequency of violent conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Central Africa, for instance, has experienced some of the most gruesome and bloodiest conflicts in post-colonial history. The conflict in DRC has been the worst of them. To illustrate its immensity, scholars have often referred to it as Africa’s First World War. By far, this conflict has had the most interventions by foreign actors in the region including both the armies of neighbouring states and different rebel factions.

As aforementioned, the series of conflict began in 1996 and has not been sustainably solved despite the countless peace agreements drafted and adopted. The vast wealth in natural resources such as coltan, the mineral used in making mobile phones, is often cited 51 as the reason for Congo’s vulnerability as a target for actors seeking to get access to the minerals. Naturally, the issue of mineral extraction has been an almost dominating factor in the discussion about the on-going conflict. It further contributes to a greater understanding of the numerous intervening states and their dual interests in Congo.

Despite these foreign armies and rebel groups acting as allies sometimes, controlling and maintaining one’s power over these resources has become extremely important for different groups within Congo and their external supporters (Reyntjens, 2014).

Congo is a member of Southern African Development Community (SADC), one of the organizations tasked with regional cooperation in Africa. Having thirteen member states each with diverse economic and socio-political circumstances, SADC largely covers the

Southern part of the continent. Congo joined SADC membership in 1990, and the organization has been immensely involved in its conflict resolution and peace-building efforts. Since its inception, SADC has gradually developed peace and security structures to improve its ability to foster and maintain peace in Southern Africa. Besides military intervention in the 1990s, SADC has also supported mediation and preventive diplomacy efforts in DRC. Notably, Carayannis (2017), highlights that SADC facilitated numerous mediation and negotiation efforts during the first and second Congo War. Various

African leaders including Ketumile Masire, the former president of Botswana, South

Africa’s Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, as well as Zambia’s former president and

Frederick Chiluba among other prominent personalities.

SADC has collaborated with other organizations in peace efforts such as the Lusaka

Peace Agreement and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), which were majorly facilitated by SADC leaders such as in the initial SADC mediation phases between 1996

52 and 1997, President Mandela largely facilitated dialogue between Mobutu and Kabila before Zambia’s former president Fredrick Chiluba succeeded him. The culmination of the process was the July 1999 signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The agreement led to cessation of violence, withdrawal of foreign troops and rebel groups as well as disarming, demobilization and reintegration of combatants and the re-establishment of government control. After the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, SADC facilitated further mediations, through Botswana’s former President Masire, who was succeeded by Thabo

Mbeki. These mediations resulted in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, which involved all local factions involved in the conflict (Carayannis, 2017).

The massive investment of SADC in the mentioned mediation processes illustrated a huge amount of political will by the regional leaders under the organization to resolve the

Congo crisis and bring lasting peace to the country. Informed by SADC mediation efforts in the DRC, Carayannis, in a report for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, observes that regional actors can lead and fruitfully facilitate agreements towards conflict resolution in spite of deep regional divisions. Though these SADC-led mediation efforts have had mixed results, many scholars agree that they have largely contributed to stopping violence and facilitating peaceful installation of the transitional government, which eventually paved the way to the first post-conflict elections in 2006 (Carayannis,

2017).

Shortly after the SADC interventions and the elections however, the conflict in DRC re- emerged. This led to a new and extended SADC intervention in a bid to broker peace.

Two years later, an additional peace agreement was signed between the Congolese government and the rebel factions in January 2008. The agreement, like the previous one,

53 led to the highly anticipated 2011 elections. Furthermore, in 2013, SADC facilitated the

Regional Pact on Peace and Security as well as The Peace, Security and Cooperation

Framework for the DRC popularly labelled the “Framework of Hope” that was signed by

11 of its member states. The pact sought to resolve the Congo conflict by addressing its root causes condoning trust between neighbours. Undoubtedly, these efforts towards peace have contributed to reduced violence though a permanent solution is yet to be found (Carayannis, 2017).

In a bid to be more effective, SADC has adopted other strategies for quicker and lasting peace in Congo. One of such strategies has been cooperation with larger bodies such as the African Union to collaborate in peace and security affairs. In this light, SADC has jointly established an office with the AU in Kinshasa that is mandated to support conflict resolution efforts and peace building initiatives. To date, SADC continues to keep a close eye on the security and political situation in various regions in DRC, especially the conflict ridden eastern areas in a bid to determine political and other courses of action. In

July 2015 for instance, members of SADC’s Interstate Defence and Security Committee

(ISDSC) converged in Pretoria to review the security situation in the Congo (SADC,

2017).

A seminar report by the Centre for Conflict Resolution acknowledges SADC’s efforts to combat violence and make significant contribution towards peace in DRC. It further notes that indeed SADC has illustrated the need to establish strong institutional structures to facilitate conflict resolution, peace building and reconstruction in Congo (Centre for

Conflict Resolution, 2011). More recently, SADC played a crucial role in amassing pressure and facilitating dialogues to ensure the long delayed elections were carried out

54 in December 2019, which resulted in the declaration of Felix Tshisekedi of the Union for

Democracy and Social Progress party, as the new president of Congo. Tamura (2019) informs that the new President is a son of the late opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi who was popular for his strong criticism against President Mobutu. The election, unlike all previous elections was peaceful though contested by a fellow opposition leader,

Martin Fayulu.

Like Hoebeke (2017), Tamura (2019) points out that Kabila’s perks for stepping out still leave him with a lot of power and influence. The parliament has for example approved a large measure of legal immunity for former presidents in regards to financial and political crimes. Additionally, former presidents have been designated “senators for life”. Despite the costly concessions, Tamura affirms that the country will experience some form of change though it is yet to attain democratic maturity. He asserts that indeed the elections imply the crossing of a threshold for Congo.

2.9 Chapter Summary

Review of the literature in this chapter focused on available scholarly material on the area of diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving conflict in DRC and the actors therein. The chapter also notes the limitation of available literature in terms of the Congo conflict to military interventions and the narrow focus on the competition for minerals as the main source of conflict in Congo. The research thereby aims to fill these research gaps by discussing diplomatic peace initiatives and assessing other sources of conflict in the

DRC.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodology of the research. It contains the systematic framework used to conduct the study. It mentions and elaborates the research design, discusses the data collection methods, data analysis and presentation. The study utilized secondary data sources as opposed to collecting primary data, which would involve visiting the field in question. Secondary data is any data that was collected for the purposes of another study but is relevant to the current study. This data is collected from published sources that include public records, books, conference papers, reports, government documents, journals and periodicals among other published material.

Newspaper articles and websites with information related to the study as well as previous researches done regarding the topic provide the required information (Lune

&Berg, 2017).

3.2 Research Design

A research design is a strategy adopted by a researcher to lay out the blue print of how the study will be carried out (Lune &Berg, 2017). There are different classifications of research design based on the purpose of the research, the method of data analysis, or the type of research in question. The blueprint or otherwise referred to as the research plan is the overall program of the research. It includes an outline of what the investigator will do from the onset of the study to the final analysis of the collected data. The research used

56 qualitative research design but included primary data sources for conference documentation.

The research utilized used the qualitative research method as it was concerned with detailed information on negotiators, their actions, periods and tools used in diplomatic engagements. The research design according to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), helps explain phenomena more deeply and exhaustively. It was therefore preferred because the study of diplomacy and the Congo conflict needed thorough description to ensure that there would be minimum bias in the collection of data and to reduce errors in interpreting the data.

As informed by the 2001 to 2018 time frame of the research and the selected diplomatic efforts, the research used the 2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue, The 2013 Peace and

Security Pact and the 2017 CENCO mediation as case studies to analyse form conclusions on the conflict. It expounds on the process, the negotiator, the successes and the weaknesses of the diplomatic efforts. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) affirm the use of the case study methodology citing that the technique in social science involves thorough investigation of an event, a group or individual hence resulting in credible conclusions.

3.3 Data Collection

Though the study mainly used secondary data in the process of understanding its subject matter, it also included primary data sources such as an interview with an expert on the

Congo peace initiatives and original conference documents from relevant organizations such as the African Union and The Southern Africa Development Community.

Secondary data was collected from published and unpublished sources namely books,

57 peer reviewed journal articles, periodicals, public records, government reports, bilateral agreements, historical documents and embassy reports. The logistical aspects involved in collection of primary data inform the researcher’s preference of secondary data.

Collection of primary data would be risky for the researcher as many parts of Congo are still unstable. It would also be costly and time ineffective. Furthermore, the topic has extensive published material making it unnecessary to go to the field. To ensure that the collected data will be sufficient for the study, the study will use diversified the sources of secondary data in order to best get a grasp of the situation underpinning the diplomatic efforts towards lasting peace in DRC.

3.4 Data Analysis and Presentation

The qualitative data was analysed through content analysis. Through this process, relevant information was sifted through, noting patterns of issues that relate to the subject matter. Collected information was checked for recurrences, which consequently informed the inferences made by the study. Content analysis serves as the best method of detecting and citing crucial trends in the qualitative literature regarding the subject matter. Through content analysis, the patterns emerging from the literature were noted for making inferences. The research’s findings were presented in form of thematic outlines and figures informed by the research objectives.

3.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter spells out the research design and methodology applied to gather and analyse research. It dealt with the methods used for the empirical study, the data collection and analysis procedure as well as the data presentation.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 DATA ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to group findings in themes based on the research questions. Congo, as portrayed by the study, is a country busting with potential blurred by the conflict that has lasted for decades, before and after independence despite the intervention of many countries and organizations to resolve the crisis. As the literature revealed the conflict in

Congo has a mirage of causes and should not be simplified as one caused only by the wealth in minerals as academicians have often portrayed it. In this chapter, the research will attempt to discuss the findings based on the four research questions:

1. Why did the Inter-Congolese Dialogue fail to achieve lasting peace in DRC?

2. What were challenges rendered the SADC-led Regional Pact for Peace and

Security mediation efforts fruitless in terms of achieving lasting peace for Congo?

3. Which challenges did the CENCO mediation face in a bid to attain lasting peace

for Congo?

4.2 The AU-led 2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue

As aforementioned, the African Union, unlike its predecessor the Organization of African

Unity, has the mandate to interfere in any of its member country’s affairs to bring peace,

59 when the government is unwilling or unable to resolve conflict within its territory. The

AU was established in 2001 with a mandate to promote peace, security, and stability in

Africa and to facilitate the creation of conditions conducive for sustainable development.

The AU’s right of intervention derives from the philosophy of Pan-Africanism and the principle of no indifference. Those principles stipulated that African countries could not remain indifferent to conflict and suffering occurring in their neighbourhoods. They also underscored that African countries have the primary responsibility for establishing and maintaining the peace and security architecture on the continent (African Union, 2018).

In the Congo conflict, the AU spearheaded the 2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue that addressed the concerns of the rebel groups and those of the neighbouring countries. The negotiations, as Naidoo (2002), illustrates, resulted in four major agreements after fifty- two days in South Africa. The ICD agreed on integrating opposing armed groups, strategies of economic recovery, national reconciliation and lastly, setting up a humanitarian programme.

Among the results of the mediation were the withdrawal of the forces of neighbouring countries through the signing of two peace accords in July 2002 between the government of Congo and both the governments of Rwanda and Uganda respectively. Additionally, the diplomatic efforts encouraged the general adoption of democracy and political pluralism hence paving the way for democratic elections in 2006.The elections considerably strengthened legitimacy of the central government and its parastatals.

Table 4.2 The Role of Neighbouring countries in the Congo conflict

Country Roles

Rwanda • Rwanda ousted President Mobutu Sese Seko because he

appeared to support the Rwandan genocide especially after

Hutu killers were driven into DRC by the Tutsi Army. This

was the justification of Rwanda’s intervention in Congo.

• Through the Rwandan backed rebel group AFDL, Rwanda

ousted Mobutu, installed a new president Laurent Kabila, and

again tried to oust him when he reamed the Rwandese

“genocidaires”.

Rwanda, • They attempted to oust Kabila and his government because he

Burundi, failed to control local rebels, expelled Rwanda and Ugandans

Uganda from public offices and of rearmed Rwandan genocides army.

Zimbabwe, • Zimbabwe and Angola intervened and joined Congo to rally

Angola against the attempt to overthrow Kabila.

Rwanda, • Intervened because Kabila’s government failed to control its

Uganda , rebels

Angola

4.2.1 Outcomes of the 2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue At the end of the 8-week ICD meeting on 19 April 2002, Joseph Kabila was retained as national president for the thirty-month transition period and was assisted by Jean-Pierre

Bemba, a member of an unarmed opposition group who was awarded the position of prime minister. The presidency of the national assembly, a position of less influence than expected, was offered to the Rwanda backed RCD-Goma rebels who controlled a third of

Congo by then. Their election to this position as opposed to their anticipated prime minister office caused their aversion for the ICD. They termed it non-inclusive and even attacked Moliru, the town port of Tanganyika in Congo while the mediation efforts were on going.

Despite the follow-up meetings of the ICD and the tweaking of the agreement to suit as many actors as possible, no inclusive agreement was found on the power-sharing issue and the commissions left out most of the politically sensitive issues. The South African

Department of Foreign Affairs asserted that the agreement laid the framework for the formation of a transitional government. It also affirmed the decision to maintain President

Joseph Kabila as the president of the DRC with the assistance of the prime minister and four vice-presidents from the government of the DRC, the MLC, the RCD-Goma and the unarmed political opposition. Each of the vice presidents was tasked with coordinating a governmental commission and regrouping a number of ministries. Some factions did not appreciate the bargain hence the political crisis was unresolved at that point and the situation was still in a stalemate.

Nonetheless, the MLC and the government delegations, backed by a big part of the civil society succeeded in finding common ground for the power-sharing issue and they invited other representatives to sign their deal. In total, 70% of the representatives agreed on this proposition but the RCD and some of the major unarmed political groups refused to join them because of their dissatisfaction with Kabila staying in power during the transition. The following table outlines different reactions to the ICD.

Figure 4.3: Reactions to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue

International Regional Local Actors community actors

11 rebel groups Rwanda-rejected over 16 Canada-indifferent outcome represented-in support

Uganda-in full RCD-Goma and the US-casually in support of ASD coalition- support outcomes rejected outcome

Belgium-casually in Burundi-in support support of the outcomes

Nonetheless, in 2002, the International Crisis Group (ICG) contended that the inter-

Congolese dialogue was probably the starting point "of a real regional discussion on the security and economic issues at the heart of the Congolese conflict". To bolster the claim,

ICG pointed out the fact that indeed Congo's crisis was directly ingrained in the regional dynamics such as the Rwandan genocide; the circulation of arms and the economic

63 interdependency in the region which are important factors in a lasting peaceful solution for Congo.

PACMT made provisions for a senate, a national assembly whose leadership was given to the non-armed opposition groups, a senior army council as well as courts and tribunals.

Leadership of the election arrangement was given to civil society, as was the responsibility to handle corruption human rights violations. The transitional president,

Joseph Kabila was tasked with the responsibility to enforce national unity and Congo’s territorial integrity. He was also tasked with the responsibility of controlling a national army through the senior army council.

4.2.2 Follow-up work and Commitments: Political Agreement on Consensual Management (PACMT) The All-Inclusive Agreement included a national Follow-Up commission responsible for the preparation of the installation of the new transitional institutions. When the first meeting of the International Committee in Support of the Transition was held, it comprised of diplomatic representatives of the permanent members of the United

Nations, African union, European Union and individual states such as Angola, Belgium,

Canada and Gabon. Its primary role was to supervise the good implementation of the agreement.

Finally, and under the leadership of Moustapha Niasse, a Senegalese politician and diplomat and a Foreign Affairs minister and Sydney Mufamadi, a South African politician and Security minister, discussions around the integration of armed forces were held between Congolese parties and a memorandum on the army and security was signed.

Nonetheless, the dialogue and the follow-up meetings that ended in Pretoria on second

April 2003, a year after the dialogue's main meeting did not address specific problems like ethnic tensions in Congo and the interference of Rwanda in the Eastern part of

Congo. This 'omission' is likely to destabilize once again the situation in Congo (Naidoo,

2002).

In 2016, a historic signing ceremony of the Agreement reached between the Presidential majority, opposition political parties and the civil society took place in Kishasa, DRC. It followed a national dialogue led by the African Union and facilitated by a former AU secretary general, Edem Kodjo from Togo.The aforementioned Support Group comprising of representatives of SADC, ICGLR, EU, AU, the UN Special Envoy and the

International Organization of the Francophone countries (IOF) reinforced the agreement.

The Agreement paved the way for a smooth transition leading to provincial, parliamentary and presidential elections by April 2018.Though the elections were postponed to December 2018, Congo’s elections were peaceful and members of the Support

Group vowed to meet regularly to evaluate progress (Mutusi, 2016).

As per the New Conceptual Framework for Recorded Human History theory, economic growth is a key factor to settlement of conflict. The literature reviewed in this study revealed that from the time the Congo gained its political independence, its leaders have not only neglected peace but also development of the country and its citizenry. President

Kasa-vubu, the country’s first president for instance, guided Congo to political freedom and ruled for five years. During his reign, the country was characterized by chaos. When

Sese Seko came into power through a military coup in 1965 and enriched himself at the expense of development of the country. In 1997, Laurent Kabila ousted Sese Seko. He and seemed to have the enthusiasm to develop the Congo and bring about the peace and

65 stability but was assassinated shortly after three years and his son, Joseph Kabila, took over the government in 2001.

The pattern indicated above shows how the Congo has had a problem generating leaders who prioritize peace, stability and development on their agenda. The trends outlined show that democracy, though championed as the best way to elect leaders into office, may not be the best case in these countries. There is no smooth transition of power and leaders are not willing to let go of the instrument of power even when it is time to do so.

Despite poor governance and the lack of development, political leaders are not willing to let go of power even at the expense of people losing their lives. Because peace and stability are requisites for development, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue should have continuous means of engagement to ensure credible leadership in Congo. The reviewed literature revealed that poor governance is both a cause and result of underdevelopment in Congo. The poor infrastructure, employment and education opportunities of education and self-advancement encourage many to join rebel groups hence continuity of the conflict over the years (Turner 2016).

4.3 The SADC-led 2013 Regional Pact for Peace and Security

Negotiations

In 1992, in a bid to deal with economic, poverty, peace, security, democratic and governance issues, the southern part of Africa decided to establish the Southern African

Development Community (SADC). It established its headquarters in Gaborone,

Botswana with a clear mandate to prevent or to mitigate the impact of civil wars in southern Africa. The breakout of the civil war in 1998 in the DRC was a realistic test of

66 whether or not the SADC could effectively and efficiently handle peace and security matters. SADC, through the AU, spearheaded the peace process through Zambia’s

President Frederick Chiluba who was the chairperson of SADC at the time. Despite these efforts, it was argued by some southern African analysts that SADC failed to pursue its goal of maintaining regional peace and security (Wodrig, 2017).

The 2013 Regional Pact for Peace and Security involved governments from the great lakes region such as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Congo; representatives of international organizations such as the UN, AU and EU as well as member states of

SADC. Though the diplomatic effort involved meeting in different SADC member states,

Angola, especially, the framework was signed in Addis Ababa. The Signatories agreed to address the activity of armed groups in the DRC and that of neighbouring states to aid or halt conflict within the country. The Framework’s intention was to create a plan for establishing peace in the DRC through the establishment of an intervention brigade and monitored intervention. The formulation of the peace pact was necessitated by the conflicts in South Sudan, Burundi and the Central African Republic and more specifically, the political and electoral crises in the DRC which had bred increased tensions and heightened insecurity in DRC as well as the impact of illegal cross-border activities on trust and confidence building between member states (User,2014).

The Pact outlined that signatory countries, individually and collectively, must demonstrate greater political will and intensify their efforts to implement the national and regional commitments. The national and regional commitments involved ensuring sustained efforts to neutralize the negative forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Moreover, these national and regional commitments also called for completing the return of foreign disarmed combatants.

The Pact additionally outlined the critical role of the AU in upholding peace on the continent and that of guarantors to reinforce their collaboration to advance peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region as well as the commitment of international partners to the peace process. Furthermore, the document defined principles of engagement on the national, regional and international level. The Democratic Republic of Congo was mandated to oversee Security Sector Reform (SSR), decentralization and the consolidation of state authority (User, 2014).

Similarly, the principles outlined the responsibility of regional actors to address renewed commitments to state sovereignty, regional cooperation and the administration of justice, including the prosecution of war crimes. The principles of engagement for the international community encompassed the renewal of commitments of both international and regional partners to abstain from the conflict and to review activities of MONUSCO.

4.3.1 Outcomes of the 2013 Regional Peace and Security Pact Just like his predecessor, Joseph Kabila had his own list of promises one of which was to bring forth lasting peace, stability and to reconstruct the country, which was ravaged by a brutal armed conflict. Poor record keeping and the lack of a systematic build up as ex- combatants continually reintegrated into the system was the first challenge to his mandate to seek security sector reform. Though there were varying estimates on the size of the

DRC military, the FARDC had an estimated number of between 144,000 and 159,000 soldiers by the close of 2014. The government has since applied relentless efforts to

68 disarm, demobilize and reintegrate some of the ex-combatants into the FARDC, but this has not yielded results. One of the causes has been the lack of incentive to encourage the ex-rebels to disarm. The hollow Congolese economy has been one of the contributing and critical factor in the failing of reintegrating ex-combatants. Furthermore, troops from

Laurent Nkunda’s National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), have been integrated into the state military in an appeasement process meant to centralize political control of the legitimate armed groups in the capital city of the Congo, Kinshasa

(Wodrig, 2017).

Despite the recognition of the need for Africa to become more involved in its peace and security processes, one of the challenges that SADC interventions in the DRC face is the limited institutional capacity of both the continental and regional organisations to support and sustain conflict prevention, peace-making and peace support processes. For example, while the AU, SADC and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

(ICGLR) have the political will to lead interventions in the DRC, the reality is that these organisations still depend on external support to mobilise resources and drive the peace and security agenda. The focus on “African ownership” of peace and security challenges and processes is likely to remain hollow, particularly if those seeking to drive such processes do not have adequate resources to implement it.

The limited funding has meant that the SADC-led Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC operates under the guidance of MONUSCO, with most funding coming from the UN. While this institutional set-up is reflective of UN-REC cooperation, on the ground it could sometimes present command and control challenges. Against this background, SADC is currently in the process of fully operationalizing the SADC

Standby Force, and it is hoped that this force will be well resourced and capacitated to be readily deployed in situations, such as that of the eastern DRC.

While it is notable that SADC has been significantly involved in processes to facilitate the securing of the Congolese territory though there is still a long way to go for DRC state authority to be reinserted fully. To date, a number of armed groups still remain in the DRC and the majority are markedly localized, with the exception of the FDLR. Other prominent armed groups that are active in the DRC include the Ugandan Allied

Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Burundian Forces National’s deliberation (FNL).

According to Stearns (2014), at least seventy armed groups remain active in the DRC.

The proliferation of armed groups in the DRC could be a reflection, not of the weakness of SADC, but of the limited opportunities of young men, who find opportunity in joining rebellion. This could also point to the challenges of the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) processes that have followed the signing of most of the peace deals since 1999. Discontentment with the reintegration processes has often been accompanied by the re-arming and remobilization of groups hence a relapse into violence and conflict (Wodrig, 2017).

The continuation of armed violence in the eastern DRC might require not only renewed commitment and capacity by the state to secure its territory, but a review of the current modus operandi of regional interventions in the country. It is in this cyclical context of violence that SADC’s conflict prevention, management and resolution processes are being tested, and would require continued exploration of how to design and effect innovative approaches towards peace. Since 2011, the approaches to negotiations have somewhat shifted, with the DRC government no longer keen to offer incentives to armed

70 groups who surrender. While this might reduce the tendency to regroup by armed groups who do not get government positions, it is not clear how such an approach would address the root causes of conflict, as some armed groups often cite political exclusion as a reason for taking up arms.

Another challenge that SADC faces in intervening in the DRC is the multiplicity of actors in the conflict. This, coupled with the lack of any existing system of coordinating peace and security actors, has meant that efforts to bring lasting peace to the DRC are not as coordinated and harmonized as would be expected. Admittedly, SADC institutions in the

DRC currently work despite the limited institutional capacity of both the continental and regional organizations to support and sustain conflict prevention, peace-making and peace support processes. For example, while the AU, SADC and ICGLR have the political will to lead interventions in the DRC, the reality is that these organizations still depend on external support to mobilize resources and drive the peace and security agenda

(User, 2014).

SADC institutions in the DRC currently work closely with the AU Liaison Office in the country, as well as with the UN, especially MONUSCO. Perhaps, what is needed is a regional or country liaison office that could help to coordinate the various political, diplomatic and security processes that are being led by SADC. In addition, a liaison office would also ensure that the work of the SADC Secretariat being undertaken by structures such as the SADC Mediation Unit and the SADC Regional Early Warning

Centre (REWC), among others, is harmonized. Such a liaison office could also provide necessary technical capacity for the various initiatives by SADC member states and

71 coalitions of the willing that are currently involved in conflict interventions in the DRC

(Streans, 2014).

While SADC notably espouses solidarity among member states, based upon a common history of providing an affront against colonialism and foreign domination, in some instances SADC’s interventions in the DRC reveal that it has not always reflected absolute consensus. There are a few instances where member states have sometimes had differing perspectives, priorities and approaches to bringing lasting peace to the country.

For example, the SADC Allies intervention in the DRC in 1998 is often cited as a case reflecting divided opinions among SADC political leaders. For example, Mandela, who was then the chair of SADC, did not initially agree with a military intervention, which was proposed by Mugabe, who was then the chair of the SADC Organ on Politics,

Defence and Security Cooperation. Some SADC member states preferred diplomacy as a strategy to end the DRC crisis, while Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia argued from a standpoint of collective security, highlighting that a military intervention was imperative since the DRC was facing an act of aggression from its neighbouring countries(Wodrig,

2017).

In regards to the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security

Cooperation, SADC members Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola intervened militarily in the DRC, despite the controversy and limited support from the international community.

The aforementioned Treaty and Protocol stipulate that the regional community’s member states have to support any member state facing aggression from one or several foreign forces.

Stearns (2014) outlines that SADC’s interventions in the DRC could be improved by designing more significant approaches to work with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).

While the mediation processes undertaken especially by South Africa (Inter-Congolese

Dialogue) created space for the participation of CSOs, this could be further broadened, especially in the post-conflict reconstruction and development phase. Civil society partners could be key in unlocking potential avenues for achieving sustainable peace, as they are closer to the ground and possess both vertical and horizontal linkages with conflict actors. Therefore, SADC’s efforts in the DRC would be better enhanced through the design and implementation of coherent national peace-building processes, which encourage people-to-people and people-to-state engagements. According to the theory on

Settling Civil Wars and Governance, SADC is a credible third party guarantor as it is not a party to the conflict. This settles the trust concern of conflicting parties, as they cannot trust each other to keep their side of the bargain. Having SADC as a third party guarantee also ensures a higher cost of conflict to the parties and helps the parties tackle the seemingly indivisible stakes in the conflict such as Rwanda’s eviction of rebels from its borders and their detrimental camping in Congo. The Peace expert interviewed on this regard pointed out that SADC member states can indeed work lasting peace solutions as they are richer than all sub-Saharan African countries, citing Angola and South Africa. In his opinion, the key deterrent to this attainment is the lack of goodwill and disunity among SADC member states. However, structures such as the SADC Force Intervention

Brigade established in 2012 to decisively deal with emerging insurgent groups within the

DRC have not been as fruitful as expected due to the inefficient financial and military capacity. Additionally, the theory implies that the coalition with the Congolese army,

FARDC as a measure to enforce peace and stability in the DRC disqualifies SADC as a security guarantee in the conflict. The theory asserts that such a measure implies the alliance of government and the third party. This notion of an alliance thereby nullifies

SADC as an objective third party. Consequently, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, among the countries cannot trust SADC objectively ensure their concerns are catered to hence; they have not been keen on fulfilling their part of the Regional Peace and Security Pact.

4.3.2 Follow-up and Commitments to the Framework

In the year 2018, SADC member states and others parties to the Peace and Security Pact met to review the effectiveness of the stipulated principles. Participants recognized some progress in the implementation of the RPSP (Regional Peace and Security Pact)

Framework, including in the neutralization of some negative forces and in cooperation on security, economic, and judicial matters. The signatory countries’ ownership of the RPSP

Framework has increased, as evidenced by the seventh and eighth Summits of the

Regional Oversight Mechanism which took place in Luanda, Angola and Brazzaville,

Republic of Congo in October 2016 and October 2017.

Like the interviewee, SADC also outlined the importance of youth and of women participants in peace and political processes. Further underscored was the importance of civil society engagement, which was termed as “requiring urgent attention by the countries in the region”. Participants also encouraged a greater role for the private sector in contributing to peace and stability, reiterating the need for countries and regional institutions to create better conditions for investment. Moreover, the participants noted that regional institutions are playing an increasingly key role in the search for lasting peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region and reaffirmed the importance of building 74 confidence and trust in the region, which is critical to achieving peace and stability.

Nonetheless, the signatories stated their concern regarding the persistent violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, but underlined the existence of a window of opportunity for addressing the root causes of the conflict. Lastly, the signatories requested national and regional oversight mechanisms reviewing progress in the implementation of the above-mentioned commitments.

4.4 The church-led 2017 CENCO mediation As demonstrated in this research and stated by the interviewee, the Congolese government as well as the other political actors view the church as the only viable and relatively objective mediator. This caused great success in the CENCO mediations. One of such was the signing of an inclusive political agreement mediated by the Catholic bishops of DRC (CENCO) was signed between the government and opposition in

December 2016. The agreement stipulated that elections be held by the end of 2017, and that a national union government be formed. The current framework for all domestic and international deliberations was strongly supported by the Congo-focused UN Security

Council Resolution 2348 of 31 March 2017 (Shore, 2016).

By December 2018, the new government had not been named. The main stumbling block was how to name a prime minister – the opposition wanted to present one name for the president to approve, while he wanted to select from a three-name shortlist. When

CENCO ended its mediation and left the initiative to President Kabila, the latter organized consultations with the signatories of the agreement. The RCD-G which was the main group in the opposition, refused to participate in these talks. On 5 April 2017, a week following the CENCO’s exit, Kabila addressed a joint session of parliament. In a

75 speech intended to be reassuring, he said that elections would be organized according to a forthcoming timetable. Claiming a consensus between the parties on how to appoint a prime minister the president gave the opposition parties, among whom the prime minister had to be selected, 48 hours to present a list of candidates. He claimed to have established a consensus on the “authority of nomination”, a clear sign that he intended to retain full control over the naming, and potential dismissal of the new Prime Minister (Relief Web.

(n.d.).

The political standstill was feeding into already growing unrest throughout the country.

Tensions increased in cities like Kinshasa, Lubumbashi and Goma, and a protest was widely observed on the third day of April. Violent conflict at the provincial level also intensified. In addition to the conflicts in the eastern provinces, (Ituri, North and South

Kivu) new clashes were reported in Tanganyika, at the border with South-Sudan and in

Congo-Central province. The opposition, in particular the RCD-M, relied on popular dissatisfaction and international pressure to maintain their structures and squeeze concessions from the government.

The December 31 agreement opened the way for the RCD-M to enter office, hoping to supervise the preparation of elections, boost their internal structures, and box in President

Kabila and his majority. Nevertheless, the Congolese opposition, as Shore (2016) informs, tends to splinter when offered the prospect of entering government. Their coherence was shortly challenged by the death of historic leader Etienne Tshisekedi in early February 2017. He was the opposition’s uncontested leader and was to be the chair of the agreement’s follow-up mechanism.

The main opposition group, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress, then began to push for Etienne’s son, Felix to be named prime minister though he did not have the support his father enjoyed within opposition ranks or among the population. The

Rassemblement was not prepared for the end of the CENCO mediation hence their refusal to meet with President Kabila, insisting on a continued role for the CENCO and good- offices by the UN. Prior to 2016, the Catholic bishops of CENCO used their legitimacy and unique national networks to push for respect of the constitution, denouncing the regime’s plans to remain in power. In 2016 they softened, and took on a mediating role when the African Union (AU)-brokered agreement of October 2016 election proved impossible to follow through. The 31 December 2018 election deadline agreement was a solid achievement, getting far greater buy-in from opposition and the population. But events since have shown that the Church’s very strength – its network of local representation – has become its weakness because it is hard to negotiate unanimity across the whole national church, and because it has recently exposed itself to pressure and even violence from the populace.

Despite the end of the Church’s mediation, there was no obvious alternative to the

December agreement, which continued to have broad support. In his 5 April speech, the president said he would move forward with implementation of his responsibility in supporting a transition in government though divisions in the opposition supported his laxity to leave power. The opposition was largely immobilized by the lack strategic or long-term thinking. In that sense, the agreement remained intact despite its fading spirit.

Once President Kabila name Bruno Tshibala of the Congo’s largest opposition group,

UDPS, as the prime minister, different opposition sides anticipated to fight hard and long

77 over the most powerful, and lucrative, the 54 ministerial posts. Tshibala would remain prime minster of the transitional government until elections were held later that year. This did not happen however as elections were postponed until the end of 2018 (BBC,2017).

At the technical level, some progress had been made. Voter registration had reached approximately 50% of its national target. Even in provinces affected by violence, such as

North Kivu, people registered in large numbers. The electoral commission had significant capacity at local level built up over the last two polls (2006 and 2011), and there was a strong desire to see elections happen among citizens. The technical competence however needed political backing and CENCO sought for that. Despite the monetary pressure borne by the election commission and the fears that the government would attempt to delay or cancel elections, the commission continued to plan the election. In this period, the country experienced growing social unrest and large-scale displacement of people which made the process much harder. In such conditions, elections in 2017 were difficult to achieve.

CENCO began mediations afresh despite the risk of long-term stagnation. The momentum generated by voter registration and the strong will of the population were critical factor but the pressure of maintaining progress, including the publication of a realistic and consensual electoral calendar seemed more important than meeting the

December 2018 target. Little by little however, irreversible progress was made, ultimately making elections inevitable. In his remarks earlier in 2018, President Kabila underlined forcefully that he would not accept foreign interference in the management or conduct of upcoming elections, which was clear shot in the direction of the international community and the UN who foresaw an important support role. Eventually in December

2018, DRC held its first ever, peaceful elections with Felix Tshisekedi elected as the newly President of Congo. The peaceful transition was a huge achievement and culmination of many efforts, most especially the CENCO efforts (Africa News, 2019).

Similarly, the respondent in this study affirmed that indeed CENCO mediation marked a beginning of the respect of law, which is crucial for Congolese and other African leaders to step down when their term is over. Though CENCO can be highly credited for the elections, the Settlement of Civil Wars and Governance theory implies that the conference cannot attain lasting peace as long as it is an organization within Congo. As explained in the document, the theory holds that lasting conflicts have to have an external third party mediator for lasting peace to ensure security guarantees.

Table 4.3 Role of International Organizations in the resolution of the Congo Crisis

International Organization Role

United Nations (UN) The UN has mediated peace agreements and facilitated their partial follow through. It has made collaborative efforts with neighbouring countries and others to help end the conflict.

Southern Africa Development SADC collaborated with the AU and UN to facilitate Community (SADC) the 2013 Regional Peace and Security Pact

African Union (AU) AU has encouraged mediation through the Lusaka and Sirte summits. It facilitated the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD).

Church Influential members of the Congolese church such as Bishops were divided as some from Kabila’s strong hold in the South and East as well as some from his ethnic group supported him and his government

Catholic church facilitated and spearheaded the CENCO Mediation to bring the government and opposition to remain in dialogue.

4.6 Chapter Summary

This analysed the literature reviewed using thematic content analysis in order to establish particular causes of conflict in Congo as well as the review of diplomatic efforts to bring lasting peace in Congo since 2001 to 2018. The instability in the Congo was concluded to be maintained by numerous actors and stakeholders. These actors and stakeholders have various interests and goals, which require to be harmonized for the sake of peace and stability in the Congo in order to facilitate a lasting solution to the long-lived conflict.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

The following study was an attempt to find an explanation as to why diplomacy has not managed to offer lasting peace in Congo. The purpose of the research was to evaluate the diplomatic efforts since 2001 to 2018 by the African Union, SADC and the Church to broker peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It also aimed at discussing the challenges faced by the studied initiatives while attempting to establish and maintain security in the country. The situation in Congo, as the research found, is more complex than fronted. The divergent sources of conflict as well as actors increase its intricacy.

Lack of goodwill as many huge players in international organizations have stakes in

Congo thus their skewed, sluggish approach towards the matter,treating it dismissingly as

“the forgotten war”. With its growing share of global electronics production and expanding consumer market, states like China depend on the exploitation of minerals from the Congo hence its immense interest in operating in the country.

Despite the massive looting of minerals from the DRC, the government has yet to set up working systems to track down the involved lawbreakers. Most of these activities happen either with little knowledge of the Congolese government or with assistance from the local administration, as was the case of the Chinese company illustrated by the study. The situation is worsened by the inability of the supply chain to provide regulatory measures to monitor raw materials exiting the country. The Chinese government, for instance,

82 disguises itself in the form of providing developmental projects such as construction of roads while extracting minerals meantime to China (Chakrabarty,2015).

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has nearly 86 million inhabitants spread across its 80 million hectares of arable land. While majority of the population resides in rural areas, fewer than 40% live in urban areas. With and over 1,100 minerals and precious metals, the DRC has the potential to become one of the richest countries on the continent and a driver of African growth if it can overcome its political instability.

The research relied on two theories in the study, which are Barbara F. Walter’s theory on

Settling Civil Wars and North and Wallis & Weingast New Conceptual Framework for

Recorded Human History. The research used BFW’s theory because it offers suggestions and tools that can be used by agents who are involved in peace building. BFW’s theory is also an attempt to understand why violence recurs after a civil war and has practical guidelines on how to design better outcomes. As for, the New Conceptual Framework for

Recorded Human History, the research used it because it explains the frequent eruptions of violence in the natural states and further explains why development policies fail in states. It holds that economic growth will largely solve internal conflicts in a state.

As the research endeavoured to identify some of the causes of the Congo conflict and the reasons diplomatic efforts by AU, SADC and CENCO have been unable to deliver lasting peace solutions, it found that the DRC conflict provided a complex scenario with unique problems. The number of actors and stakeholders with unclear and hidden agendas aggravate the problem as each of them have their own interests, goals, capabilities, weaknesses and enemies. The findings further highlighted that policy-makers need to

83 have a better understanding of the various stakeholders in order to generate effective policies to end the Congo conflict and to ensure peace and stability in the Great Lakes

Region at large. Furthermore, national and international policymakers need to know about this complex region in order to make good policy decisions that support peace and stability.

Despite a decrease in the poverty rate, from 71% to 64% of the population between 2005 and 2012, the DRC still ranks among the poorest countries in the world, at 176 out of 187 countries as per the Human Development Index calculated by the UN (2015). On top of this, the United Nations estimates that, by January 2018, the DRC hosted more than

540,000 refugees, and 4.5 million people displaced inside the country. Moreover, the

DRC has yet to recover from a series of conflicts that broke out in the 1990s, creating an extended economic and social slump. Until recently, Joseph Kabila had been head of state since 2001. Presidential and parliamentary elections, planned initially for November

2016 were delayed due to an out-dated electoral register. Eventually, an agreement facilitated by the African Union's Edem Kodjo, and the Catholic Bishops was signed between the government and the opposition on December 31, 2016. The agreement provided for a period of transition, during which President Joseph Kabila would exercise power jointly with the opposition until presidential elections were held in late

2017.However, the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) issued a calendar in November 2017, pushing back the presidential elections to December 2018, and a controversial draft electoral law was adopted by parliament. Meanwhile, the Roman

Catholic Church and members of the international community insisted the government urgently hold the elections. As tension built up, demonstrations supporting the

84 implementation of the December 2016 agreement led to many deaths at the hands of security forces.

5.2 Conclusions

5.2.1 The AU-led 2002 Inter-Congolese Dialogue Very important lessons can be underlined here because of the analysis of the Inter-

Congolese dialogue that occurred in South Africa in 2002. One interesting element concerns the location. The study illustrates the importance of finding a neutral place to hold a dialogue. From the onset, South Africa was not considered as a neutral place due to its apparent support of Rwanda, hence the subtle unwillingness of participants to join the dialogue. It is only when President Mbeki was elected that it was considered a safer place for the dialogue.

In addition, the preliminary agreements required before any form of dialogue starts were not inclusive of all the parties that ended up participating in the dialogue. This resulted in the view that parties represented were unequal. Furthermore, the facilitation team had tried to settle many conflicts before the conference was held, but some major issues remained present when the dialogue started. These non-addressed issues jeopardized and slowed down the process. This was the case with the selection of participants (who should participate and who should not). Because the tensions between the current government and the opposition groups were high, more attention should have been given to such potentially contentious issues. It is probable that the involved parties used any remaining ambiguity to slow down the dialogue. In addition, facilitators that are more powerful would have been welcomed because they could have discouraged the parties from manipulating the process. The ICG explained that Ketumile Masire could have been

85 easily manipulated in a manner that would not eventually lead to the successful end of the dialogue. He considered himself more logical than political. Consequently, he could not master the key political issues (ICG, 2002)

Thirdly, the role of foreign countries in the Congolese peace process seemed downplayed despite the crucial role played by Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Zimbabwe in the conflict in Congo. The ICG outlined that there should have been a preliminary accord between these countries to support the transitional power-sharing agreement in

Congo. Furthermore, the inclusion of secondary actors like powerful foreign countries could have been a track to follow. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the facilitation team and the pressure from Congolese public opinion and the unarmed opposition representatives succeeded in keeping the parties participating in the dialogue even though conflicts and attacks were on going. Though these attacks prevented the participants from approaching the dialogue with much serenity and concentration, they probably helped reduce the attacks and fights between the protagonists (ICD, 2002).

On the same note, (User, 2014) informs that dialogue should be voluntary. It cannot be forced upon by outsiders because it implies a spirit of tolerance and understanding. It is difficult to assess the part of effort to understand the other's point of view and the part of political strategy used in the dialogue process to create new coalitions. Indeed, the dialogue was an opportunity for the son of former President Kabila to find allies among the opposition and the civil society. Nonetheless, it appears that it was almost impossible for the parties to move away from their positions and their quest for power in Congo.

Furthermore, media was unable to play a uniting role during the process because it was perceived to be biased and compromised (Turner, 2010). The local stations were controlled either by the government or by the rebels and the parties allowed no contact.

No unified national communiqués could be written. This consequently fuelled the disparities between groups and regions. A clear independence of the media in Congo is crucial for the democratic development of the country. Many journalists were viewed as puppets of the ruling authority in their region. The participants did not let the journalists report objectively on what was going on at Sun City.

The UN was not directly involved in the dialogue process, at least at the very beginning.

It became involved after the failure of the first dialogue and organized informal consultations with the facilitation team. The Secretary General Kofi Anan then designated Moustapha Niasse as part of its special envoy. The UN played a crucial role in saving the dialogue. Niasse organized active negotiations and shuttle diplomacy with all stakeholders of the dialogue. He succeeded in holding the dialogue due to the signing of diverse agreements: the All-inclusive Agreement, the Transitional Constitution, the first and second memorandums on military and security issues and the 36 resolutions, which largely concerned military empowerment and called for concerted efforts by neighbouring states to ensure the eventual end of the Congo conflict. The United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) also got indirectly involved in the dialogue process through its active support to the mission of peace and solidarity organized by civil society.

5.2.2 The SADC-led 2013 Regional Pact for Peace and Security mediation efforts

SADC’s intervention in the DRC is rooted in the appreciation of the interconnectedness of African countries, and the recognition of the imperative for mutual dependence. Its response to the DRC conflict has taken several forms, ranging from military intervention, mediation and supporting peace building processes to advocacy with the international community. An examination of the history of SADC’s involvement in the DRC since

1998 reveals a degree of consistency, determination and commitment to securing not only the DRC, but the region. Evidently, SADC initiatives in the DRC seek to secure the state and restore state authority, protect civilians and, ultimately, build long-term sustainable peace.

While SADC has been consistent since the late 1990s in being part of the solution to the

DRC crisis, it has not been an easy journey. The fact that the conflict in the DRC remains unresolved reflects the complex environment in which SADC operates. In addition, there are multiple actors and players in the DRC who sometimes act as spoilers to the peace process, and SADC has to navigate these intricacies with political dexterity. Indeed, while the DRC reflects the multiplicity of conflict intervention actors, ranging from the

UN and AU to other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and bilateral initiatives,

SADC has increasingly recognized that it is not a lone player in the DRC. It has adopted strategies of collaborating not only with the AU, but also with other regional organizations such as the ICGLR, to ensure that there is a harmonized approach to the resolution of conflict in the country. The “Framework of Hope” which resulted from the

Regional Pact for Peace and security signed in 2013 by 11 countries, the UN, AU,

ICGLR and SADC – provides an indication that RECs and members of the international community are increasingly adopting a collaborative approach to addressing conflicts in the region. However, this is still a work in progress.

As discussed, SADC’S Peace Pact for the Congo was majorly stalled by its lack of funding and the required institutional capability to enhance enforcement of the agreements. Going forward therefore, there is a need to design and implement effective

UN–AU–REC modes of cooperation in the DRC to ensure that interventions are harmonised. While the conflict in the DRC might seem daunting, SADC’s interventions highlight the increased engagement of regional actors in promoting peace and security, and is evidence of the evolving nature of regional security cooperation. Indeed, SADC has exhibited a strong sense of solidarity on matters relating to peace and security, and its role in the DRC reflects the increasing primacy of African actors in conflict resolution in the region.

5.2.3 The CENCO mediations

The role as mediator of last resort illustrates the clout of the Church in Congo. Over the years, Catholic leaders have long gone beyond their pastoral duties to fill the void left by an absent state, providing healthcare and schooling and promoting human rights and democracy. In October 2016, Congo’s former president Joseph Kabila appeared to have secured the backing of regional leaders for an African Union-mediated deal with some opposition leaders to remain in power until April 2018, a year and a half after his second and last term in office ended. However, heavyweight rivals such as veteran opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi and millionaire businessperson Moise Katumbi boycotted the process, insisting that Kabila must step aside. 89

Diplomatic and political sources reported that neighbouring leaders allegedly delivered a clear message to Kabila in private at a summit in Angola advising him to seek help from

CENCO, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference in Congo, to get more rivals on board, or risk major unrest. Pascal Kambale, a Congolese human rights lawyer working for the Open

Society Foundation affirmed further that no one was better positioned to be an honest broker-not the discredited AU, nor the Western organizations. On acceptance of the request, Congolese bishops spent a month shuttling between rival camps since in a bid to bridge the gap between those who signed the AU-backed transition deal and those who abstained (Jean-Marie, 2017)

CENCO gained momentum steadily to secure a deal before the end of December 2018, the official deadline for Kabila to leave power despite the hesitation by the presidency and Congo’s high court ruling that the president could remain in office until a new president was elected. Opposition leaders, and many on the streets of Kinshasa, insisted he must give way to an interim administration. Tension ramped up, with hard-line opposition leaders threatening protests, and Kabila’s party, in return, accusing them of preparing revolt. United Nations peacekeepers shifted some troops to the city in anticipation of trouble and many expatriates temporarily moved families abroad.

Tom Perriello, the United States special envoy to the region and one of the strongest international voices calling for Kabila to respect the constitution, affirmed that CENCO’s mediation was the best chance of avoiding wide-scale violence but warned it was required to take a firm line tackling corruption and standing up for democracy and human rights. In the process, CENCO had found itself reined in and seeking compromise partly due to internal divisions and due the fear of being blamed for violence or hijacked by

90 opposition leaders riding on its broad following. After the 2011 elections where Kabila was declared winner, CENCO’s network of 30,000 observers offered their view on the process and the Church called for the results to be corrected.

Kambale, a diasporian human rights activist said CENCO was so deeply divided, with many bishops keen to publish results that would have challenged the official tally that in the end, they decided, “the unity of the church was more important than the truth.” By

2014, a number of pro-Kabila politicians were floating the idea of tinkering with the constitution to allow the president to stay in power. Over Kabila’s visit to the Vatican,

Congo’s Catholic bishops issued an open letter against any such initiative. As Mobutu did before him, Kabila’s government accused the bishops of straying beyond their ecclesiastical role and swaying to foreign influences.

When it became clear that 2016’s elections would be delayed, Catholic leaders planned a major march for February 2016 to remember those killed in 1992. CENCO called it however off before the set date admittedly due to concerns that the event would be hijacked by politicians. Pressure from Rome also played a role as the bishops were reined in as they were seen to be too close to the opposition. CENCO supported the AU- mediated talks but pulled out after security forces killed dozens of protesters in

September 2016. Soon after which Kabila, an Anglican, flew to Rome. The Pope was allegedly “direct and chilly”, as reported by Reuters, citing that the pope asked him to

Congo’s constitution and do things that are in the best interests of his people.( Lewis &

Ross, 2016).

CENCO then also called for the re-negotiation of the deal to make it more inclusive and to clarify that Kabila could not stand for re-election. CENCO successfully secured some

91 concessions in talks, including opposition’s acceptance of Kabila to remain in power until the delayed election, but blockages remained over when it would be held and whether he would engineer a possible re-election. The U.N. Security Council issued a statement supporting CENCO’s efforts and opposition leaders agreed to participate in further talks to break the deadlock. Despite the mixed messages from Kabila’s side, he eventually met

CENCO in his office and asserted that he was supportive of CENCO’s efforts. Shortly afterwards though, Kabila’s political coalition claimed it believed CENCO’s initiative had failed and no more time should be wasted on it. Regardless of CENCO being accused of siding with the opposition and the demands of its church members, it fulfilled a great mandate to see the eventual 2018 election of Congo’s new president. It must however embark immediately on other dimensions of its mediation such as encouraging democracy and the rule of law in Congo. This will ensure that its efforts bring long lived conflict solutions to Congo.

5.4 Recommendations

The first recommendation is for diplomatic efforts to handle leadership as an important matter in the quest for sustainable peace. The research found that credible leadership is crucial to overcoming the instability in the DRC and in the great lakes region in general.

As illustrated through the document, beyond the rhetoric, the presidents of Uganda,

Rwanda and Burundi have not out rightly stated their positions or shown any commitment to stabilize the region, especially through jointly eradicating their rebel groups in Congo. Seemingly, these leaders have different views and interests hence their reserved tendency on the matter. Similarly, the research calls for the strict adherence to

92 the will of the people by the leaders. The wilful defiance of the citizens’ will by amending the constitution to facilitate a third term for the Congolese president was clearly detrimental to the country’s peace and stability. This has seen the establishment of more insurgent groups to overthrow the government hence furthered conflict. To broker lasting peace; democracy has to be strongly promoted and enforced by regional and continental organizations.

The peace process in DRC was focused on issues connected with the implementation of the peace agreements and how the peace agreements would be sustained. In DRC, the sustenance of the peace process was not successful since there was recurrence of the war.

The research therefore recommends the employment of the peace building tools in the

DRC which are broadly framed to connect national and grass root efforts in an attempt to design a more inclusive peace agreement. This means that the conflict resolution efforts should aim for changes not only in institutions, the government and rebel groups but also the in behaviour and attitudes of everyone in the country and not only of the government and the rebel members. In this case, every citizen of the state will have a role to play in the peace building of the country so as to have a more comprehensive peace rather than just containing the conflict for a period of time.

Additionally, having sustained dialogue between the state and the citizens on issues of power, politics and society as a whole could help bring sustained peace in a nation that is coming out prolonged conflict. Such a process is possible if it is developed and carried out with due care. An inclusive process of dialogue framed around developing shared set of visions for long-term peace, can build a consensus and also support the addressing of factors that caused the initial war, a process that mostly goes unaddressed. This kind of

93 dialogue can be carried out independent of the current short-term political priorities but it could also be carried out as a long-term project by the government and other committed stakeholders.

Thirdly, in terms of economic development, there should be profound diversification to alleviate poverty which is a major security threat in DRC even though it has not been the focus of peace talks. Securing food production must be treated with utmost importance as a strategy for economic development. Like other agreement after civil wars, the focus of the peace agreements in DRC focus on issues of political power and building institutions but they should also include economic development. DRC can attain peace if its economic state improves. While the ICD included economic development as one of its agendas; political issues took precedence and the matter was eventually overlooked. As discussed in this study, most citizens join rebel groups because of poverty and unemployment hence the appeal of rebel vandalism. Education and self-development opportunities would therefore largely reduce the number of people participating in rebel activities. In this regard, the research notes delightedly that Congo’s new president has set poverty eradication as his main agenda for his electoral term.

The forth recommendation pertains the concerted effort from all the actors. SADC, with the help of the UN should consider adopting the stakeholder analysis model and co-opt the various actors to resolve the deadlock in Congo. Due to the huge number of actors who have perpetrated the instability, the solution ought to be relentlessly sought by the actors charged with the responsibility to install peace and stability. For instance, Uganda,

Rwanda, and Burundi should focus on attacking LRA, FDLR, and FNL respectively, instead of leaving such an enormous responsibility to the FARDC and SADC’s FIB. No

94 single actor can singly manage to attack all these insurgent groups. Without collective efforts, it will be difficult for peace and stability to reign in Congo and these insurgent groups will continue vandalizing unguarded villages located in Congo. Though SADC has had remarkable progress in its capacity building, it needs to fasten the process, as its potentially excellent pacts cannot be implemented without enforcement.

Additionally, the research recommends that the UN should consider being more proactive in diplomatic efforts rather than reactive in its approach to the Congo conflict. Although the FIB has stepped up in attacking and decimating insurgent groups within the DRC, it is not adequate to cover the vast eastern part. As proposed by the theory on settling civil wars and governance theory by Barbara F. Walters, There is need for the UN to facilitate enforcement of peace agreement as a third party guarantor to ensure commitments such as those made in the ICD and the RPSP are adhered to.

The sixth recommendation calls for employment of more troops by the Congolese government to protect the sovereignty of the DRC as outlined by the 2013 RPSP. The

FARDC is not adequate to cover the volatile borders of Congo, especially the eastern border to prevent the incursion of insurgents. The DRC government has to employ more troops to ensure especially that the eastern part of the DRC is covered. Moreover, the

DRC government must provide adequate equipment and weapons to the troops to enable their operational capability. The conditions of service must also be improved in order to enhance the morale of the troops. The DRC Air Force also requires equipped and augmented machinery in the fight against insurgent groups. The UN forces also need to boost the FARDC efforts by deploying contingents along the Uganda, Rwanda, and

Burundi borders.

The seventh recommendation is for mediation and other diplomatic efforts to address land and other historical sources of conflict as crucial agendas in the quest for lasting peace in Congo. A well-streamlined process for the acquisition of land and subsequently title deeds is likely to reduce the conflict at grassroots level, as one of the causes is the fight over natural resources including minerals. The lack of title deeds among the citizens owning piece of land has brought more harm than good. Many communities protect themselves and the land they own by attacking the neighbouring villages to expand their sphere of influence. This act of expansions eventually leads to active insurgent groups that warrant the attention of the DRC government and the international community.

Official title deeds issued by the DRC government will be the solution to this quagmire.

Lastly, this research concludes that the lack of credible leadership in DRC is both the main cause and result of prolonged conflict in Congo. It thereby recommends further research on the role of the church and other transnational organizations to mentor credible leaders committed to enforce peace and stability in Congo and to rehabilitate hopeless youth who will then seek other growth and employment opportunities as opposed to joining rebel groups.

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Appendix Interview Guide

United States International University-Africa

School of Social Sciences and Humanities

Student Name: Annabel Munga 633498

Instructor: Dr. Leonard Maumo

The interview guide below was used to seek information from an expert of the Congo conflict. The respondent works in the DR Congo Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.

Thesis Topic:

Diplomacy and the Congo Conflict: An Analysis of the Efforts between 2001-2018

Interview Questions

Objective 1: Assessing why the Inter-Congolese-Dialogue (ICD) did not result in lasting peace in Congo

1. Were the mediators viewed as objective by the parties involved? (Tick one of the boxes)  Agree  Somewhat Agree  Strongly Agree  Disagree  Somewhat Disagree  Strongly Disagree  Disagree 2. Was the method of implementation adequate?(The division of responsibilities between the DRC government, states, civil society, local institutions and individuals)  Yes  No 3. The perception that Congo will never attain peace because of the vested interests of different states, organizations, and individuals is strong among the organizations seeking peace in the Congo?  Agree  Somewhat Agree  Strongly Agree

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 Disagree  Somewhat Disagree  Strongly Disagree  Disagree

Objective 2: Analysing why the 2013 SADC Regional Peace and Security Pact failed to bring sustainable peace in Congo

4. Did SADC lack ability to ensure follow through of the commitments made by the different member states?  Yes  No If yes, what, in your opinion impaired SADC’s failure to implement the RPSP resolutions?

 Capacity (structural and financial)  Goodwill (of participating states)

5. Among the challenges cited in diplomatic and military initiatives towards peace in Congo are the numerous organizations with the same mandate. Would having SADC as the central authority of the peace initiatives lead to quicker attainment of peace?  Yes  No If no, would the United Nations help the process if it got more involved in the diplomatic efforts rather than the huge focus on military involvement?  Yes  No Objective 3: Examining why the 2018 Conference of Catholic Bishops (CENCO) mediation did not result in sustainable peace in the Congo

6. The Congolese population views the Church as an objective transnational body credible for peace negotiations. (Tick one box)  Never or very rarely true  Rarely True  Sometimes True

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 Often True  Very often or always true 7. The CENCO mediators have the expertise to carry out the negotiations.  Yes  No If yes, does the organization have the capacity to ensure implementation of agreements they make with the government and other stakeholders?  Yes  No

If yes, who best can they collaborate with to ensure the lasting (not temporal) peace prevails in Congo?

 Civil Society  International Organizations  Grass-root organizations  Transnational Organizations (such as the International Catholic Church) 8. To what extent do the challenges of the three diplomatic efforts differ?  Very Similar  Somewhat similar  Very different 9. Considering the government (2001-2018) was a crucial party in the diplomatic efforts, how much effort do you feel it channelled towards sustainable peace in the DRC?  A lot  Some  A little  Not at all 10. Why hasn’t the inclusion (as in the ICD) of rebel and opposition groups in diplomatic efforts encouraged them to keep their part of the peace agreements?  Feelings of inadequate inclusion  Lack of continuous dialogue  Influence from other states 11. How can neighbouring countries especially Rwanda and Uganda be involved to eradicate their rebel groups from Congo? 12. How can SADC and other regional blocs halt the support by neighbouring countries and other countries with vested interests in the DRC from supporting local armed groups such as the March 23 Movement (M23)

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13. In your opinion, have the very attempts at conflict resolution increased smuggling and led armed groups to seek other sources of income? If yes, how have they done this? 14. What is the major hindrance to success in the three negotiations that the research focused on? 15. Could intensive involvement by the United Nations in these diplomatic efforts have increased their chances at success?

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