For three months, it was all the rage. Then its popularity faded fast. What Happened to Shock and Awe?

By John T. Correll

“ HOCK and awe,” Peter Arnett introduced by a 1996 study aimed , March 27, 2003. It intoned over and over. at Pentagon insiders—took it to wasn’t Dresden in February 1945. In S fact, it wasn’t anything like the vast “This is shock and awe.” Arnett was higher levels. Shock and Awe meant of media imaginings. reporting for NBC from Baghdad as an attack so massive and sudden the aerial lit up the that the enemy would be stunned, night sky on March 21. confused, overwhelmed, and para- It was “A-day,” the beginning of lyzed. full air combat operations in Gulf Harlan K. Ullman, principal ar- II. As the live television cam- chitect of the concept, explained to eras watched, coalition airpower was the Long Island Newsday in Febru- obliterating ’s Presi- ary, “What we want to do is to create dential compound on the other side in the minds of the Iraqi leadership, of the Tigris River and other govern- and their soldiers, this Shock and ment and sites in and around Awe, so they are intimidated, made Baghdad. to feel so impotent, so helpless, that Arnett was not alone in calling it they have no choice but to do what “shock and awe.” That term, which we want them to do, so the smartest had burst suddenly into public aware- thing is to say, ‘This is hopeless. We ness in January, was by then in near- quit.’ ” universal usage to describe the US The Department of Defense did strategy for Operation Iraqi Free- not officially or explicitly endorse dom. Shock and Awe, but traces of it could “Shock and awe” was repeated be discerned in statements by top endlessly. In the week the war be- leaders. gan, more than 600 news reports For example, Gen. Tommy R. around the world referred to “shock Franks, commander of US Central and awe,” according to a count by Command, said at a press briefing in . Qatar March 22, “This will be a cam- Military strategists from paign unlike any other in history, a to Clausewitz have understood the campaign characterized by shock, value of destroying the enemy’s by surprise, by flexibility, by the will to resist, but Shock and Awe— employment of precise munitions on

52 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2003 AP photo/Jerome Delay

a scale never before seen, and by the keeping their distance and the analy- thentic intellectuals. Ullman was that application of overwhelming force.” sis concentrated mostly on what went rarity, a scholar in uniform, a line Franks said, “Coalition airmen wrong. officer qualified for command at sea, [will] deliver decisive precision shock, also possessed of one of the best, such as you witnessed beginning last Where It All Began most provocative minds I have ever night.” He said that the attack was It started in December 1996 with encountered.” carried out by “shock air forces.” “Shock & Awe: Achieving Rapid The goal of Rapid Dominance, Popular enthusiasm for Shock and Dominance,” published by National the 1996 NDU study said, “will be Awe was high as the war began. Defense University. The authors were to destroy or so confound the will to However, the Iraqi regime was not Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade resist that an adversary will have no shocked and awed into immediate Jr. It was a product of Defense Group alternative except to accept our stra- . The war entered a second Inc., a beltway consulting firm headed tegic aims and military objectives. week, then a third. by Wade, who had previously held To achieve this outcome, Rapid The questions were not long in many senior positions in the Penta- Dominance must control the opera- coming. Where was the Shock and gon. tional environment and through that Awe? Was the strategy bogging down? Four retired military officers— dominance, control what the adver- Baghdad fell to coalition forces af- Adm. Leon A. Edney, Army Gen. sary perceives, understands, and ter 20 days, but, by then, Shock and Fred M. Franks, Air Force Gen. knows, as well as control or regu- Awe had dropped precipitously in Charles A. Horner, and Adm. Jon- late what is not perceive, under- public opinion. athan T. Howe—took part in the stood, or known.” Among the disillusioned was Pe- study, but the principal author was Four defining characteristics of ter Arnett, who told state-controlled Ullman. Rapid Dominance were listed: knowl- Iraqi television in a cloying inter- Colin Powell, who met Ullman at edge of the environment, view March 30 that “the war plan the National War College, heaped rapidity, control of the environment, has failed because of Iraqi resis- praise on him in his autobiography, and “operational brilliance in ex- tance.” When NBC fired him, Arnett My American Journey (1995). “A ecution.” expressed—what else?—shock and teacher who raised my vision sev- In a Desert Storm-type campaign awe. eral levels was Harlan Ullman, a of the future, Rapid Dominance might Six months later, Shock and Awe Navy lieutenant commander who achieve its objectives “in a matter of had faded badly. It was showing up taught ,” Powell days (or perhaps hours) and not af- as a catch phrase in advertising and wrote. “So far, I had known men of ter the six months or the 500,000 war games, but military people were action but few who were also au- troops that were required in 1990 to

AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2003 53 1991,” the study said. (Emphasis Defense Group Inc. (DGI) on the con- line in the New York Times. It quoted added.) cept of Rapid Dominance. We are of “military officials” as saying “the “Shutting the country down would course interested in further develop- plan calls for unleashing 3,000 pre- entail both the physical destruction ing our ability to strike promptly and cision guided bombs and missiles in of appropriate infrastructure and the induce ‘Shock and Awe’ in future ad- the first 48 hours.” shutdown and control of the flow of versaries.” (“I don’t think I ever used the term all vital information and associated ‘Shock and Awe’ myself,” Myers commerce so rapidly as to achieve a The Bubble Rises said in April, but added, “I’m famil- level of national shock akin to the The first public report of Shock iar with the book and the author” and effect that dropping nuclear and Awe was by CBS News corre- “some of those ideas of his have on Hiroshima and had on spondent David Martin, last Jan. 24, been incorporated into this plan.”) the Japanese. Simultaneously, Iraq’s two months before II be- Fascination with Shock and Awe armed forces would be paralyzed with gan. An unnamed Pentagon official was approaching frenzy. No news the neutralization or destruction of told Martin that the strategy would report was complete without it. its capabilities. Deception, dis- be Shock and Awe. Martin went for Sony applied for a trademark on information, and misinformation comment to Ullman, who was then a Shock and Awe to use as the title of would be applied massively.” senior advisor for the Center for Stra- a video game, but dropped the appli- Ullman and Wade acknowledged tegic and International Studies and a cation in embarrassment when it was they were building on classic mili- columnist for the Washington Times. discovered by the news media. Oth- tary theories but said that, “in Rapid “We want them to quit. We want ers sought to trademark Shock and Dominance, the principal mechanism them not to fight,” Ullman told CBS, Awe for pesticides and herbicides, for affecting the adversary’s will is explaining that the concept relied on barbecue sauce, and fireworks dis- through the imposition of a regime a “simultaneous effect, rather like plays. of Shock and Awe sufficient to achieve the nuclear weapons at Hiroshima, the aims of policy. It is this relation- not taking days or weeks but in min- Cautions and Concerns ship with and reliance on Shock and utes. ... You’re sitting in Baghdad, Ullman made it clear he had no Awe that differentiates Rapid Domi- and all of a sudden, you’re the gen- direct input to the war plan, but he nance from attrition, maneuver, and eral and 30 of your division head- published his views regularly in op- other military doctrines including quarters have been wiped out. You ed columns and he was interviewed overwhelming force.” also take the city down. By that, I often by both print and broadcast One of the early supporters of mean you get rid of their power, media. He told the Washington Post Shock and Awe was a former—and water. In two, three, four, five days in March that one risk of a bold war future—Secretary of Defense, Donald they are physically, emotionally, and plan was that it might be executed H. Rumsfeld. In fact, Ullman later psychologically exhausted.” too cautiously, and expressed con- said, “Rumsfeld was a rump member Martin reported that not everybody cern that “we may not be sufficiently of the original shock-and-awe group, in the Administration was a believer audacious.” so he knew about the concept.” in Shock and Awe. “One senior offi- Shock and Awe alarmed those who Rumsfeld used the expression in cial called it a bunch of bull, but misinterpreted references to Hiro- an April 1999 statement to CNN, confirmed it is the concept on which shima and Nagasaki. For example, criticizing the strategy for the air the war plan is based,” he said. Ira Chernus, a professor of in Serbia as insufficiently force- “You’ll see simultaneous attacks studies at the University of Califor- ful. “There is always a risk in gradu- of hundreds of warheads, maybe nia, charged that Ullman “wants to alism,” Rumsfeld said. “It pacifies thousands, so that very suddenly, do to Baghdad what we did to Hiro- the hesitant and the tentative. What the Iraqi senior leadership, or much shima.” it doesn’t do is shock, and awe, and of it, will be eviscerated,” Ullman “People think that Shock and Awe alter the calculations of the people told the Christian Science Monitor is to destroy cities,” Ullman said. you’re dealing with.” Jan. 30. “That’s not the rationale. The ratio- In October 1999, Rumsfeld joined For the next several weeks, the nale is to bring intense pressure on three other former Secretaries of Shock and Awe phrase was heard the enemy and do minimum damage Defense, Harold Brown, Frank C. periodically, mostly from television to civilian infrastructure.” Carlucci, and James R. Schlesinger, talk show guests who disagreed with Rep. Major R. Owens (D-N.Y.) in commending Shock and Awe to it. References escalated sharply af- read a rap poem, titled “Shock and William S. Cohen, who was then ter a press breakfast on March 4 Awe,” into the Congressional Record, Secretary of Defense. “We are writ- featuring Gen. Richard B. Myers, declaring, “The war against Iraq is ing to you in support and endorse- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of . an unnecessary evil.” ment of the concept of Rapid Domi- “If asked to go into conflict in US leaders did not join in the pre- nance,” they said. “We believe that Iraq, what you’d like to do is have it dictions of instant victory. “It is not the concept of Rapid Dominance has be a short conflict,” Myers said. “The knowable how long that conflict sufficient merit to warrant further best way to do that would be to have would last,” Rumsfeld said in Feb- evaluation and experimentation.” such a shock on the system that the ruary. “It could last six days, six Rumsfeld’s interest apparently con- Iraqi regime would have to assume weeks. I doubt six months.” tinued. In March 2000, Cohen wrote early on the end was inevitable.” In his address to the nation March to Rumsfeld, thanking him “for your “Top General Sees Plan To Shock 19, President Bush warned, “A cam- letter on the work being performed by Iraq Into Surrendering,”said the head- paign on the harsh terrain of a nation

54 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2003 as large as California could be longer had indeed taken the starch out of and more difficult than some predict.” the Iraqi Army’s will to resist. At a Pentagon news briefing March The Nevertheless, Ullman said, “Pub- 20, Rumsfeld said: “What will follow lic reaction to the Pentagon’s ‘Shock will not be a repeat of any other con- slogan and Awe’ slogan was hugely nega- flict. It will be of a force and a scope tive.” It was, he said, “a public rela- and a scale that has been beyond what was tions disaster.” has been seen before. The Iraqi sol- The public continued to support diers and officers must ask themselves the war, but deterioration of regard whether they want to die fighting for short, for the Shock-and-Awe label could a doomed regime or do they want to be tracked in the headlines: survive, help the Iraqi people in the “US Plan To Convince Iraqis To liberation of their country, and play a catchy, Surrender En Masse Has Flopped,” role in a new, free Iraq.” Atlanta JournalÐConstitution, March Coalition aircraft dropped millions 22. of leaflets urging Iraqi military forces “Allies Prewar Assumptions Fall to lay down their arms. Responding ideal for Short as Iraq Resistance Stiffens,” to a tip from the CIA, two stealthy USA Today, March 25. F-117s struck a leadership compound “War Could Last Months, Of- in Baghdad March 19—two days television. ficers Say,” Washington Post, March before A-day—hoping to catch Sad- 27. dam Hussein there. They clobbered “Too Little Shock, Not Enough the compound, but they didn’t get At his Pentagon news briefing Awe,” Los Angeles Times, March 30. Saddam. March 25, Rumsfeld was asked: “Is “No Shock, No Awe: It Never it possible that you did raise expec- Happened,” WorldNetDaily.com, Shock and Awe on Defensive tations beyond reasonable levels by April 3. The full air campaign began on talking about a Shock and Awe cam- March 21. The spectacular bombard- paign? I mean, wasn’t the impres- But Was It Shock and Awe? ment the world watched on televi- sion put out that, you know, 3,000 “What they announced at the be- sion the first night was part of a bombs are going to fall in the first 48 ginning of the war as Shock and Awe broader attack that sent 1,000 strike hours and the regime is going to seems to me was largely PR,” Ullman against military targets in collapse?” told the Washington Times on March Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, and else- “Not by me, not by General Myers,” 31. “It did not bring the great Shock where. Rumsfeld replied. “Why would we and Awe that we had envisaged.” What the fires and explosions seen have put in train the hundreds of “The public misunderstood our on the skyline did not show was the thousands of people to go do this concept of Shock and Awe—and so, extraordinary precision of the strikes task if we thought it was going to be perhaps, did the Pentagon,” Ullman and the care taken to avoid hitting over in five minutes?” said in a signed column entitled the civilian population. The effect “The air campaign that the Penta- “ ‘Shock and Awe’ Misunderstood” on military and government targets gon promised would ‘shock and awe’ in USA Today on April 8. “Our con- was ruinous. Saddam Hussein’s government ap- cept calls for a 360-degree, nonstop However, it was not what the pub- pears to have done neither,” said campaign using all elements of power lic expected, having been spun up by Michael Gordon in the New York to coerce the enemy regime into suc- hundreds of stories about Shock and Times. cumbing rapidly and decisively. Awe. Saddam Hussein’s regime did Professor Robert Pape of the Uni- “That has not happened in this war not fall overnight. versity of Chicago, a frequent critic for two major reasons: The opportu- “On the second day of the war, the of airpower, told the New York Times nity to target Saddam accelerated coalition attempted to deliver a knock- on March 26, “The main thing we’ve the war’s start before all of the mili- out punch with a bombing assault learned from this is that ‘Shock and tary elements were in place, and the strike planners hoped would con- Awe’ hasn’t panned out. The target- decision to pause to see whether vince Iraqi leaders to surrender,” said ing hasn’t broken the back of the Saddam’s generals would choose not European Stars and Stripes. “They leadership.” to fight tempered the intensity of the called it the ‘Shock and Awe’ cam- Actually, the campaign at that initial onslaught. The Administration’s paign. It did not draw the mass sur- point—whether it was Shock and version of Shock and Awe turned renders planners had hoped.” Awe or something else—had broken out to be a strategic air campaign The Washington Times reported a the back of the Iraqi regime. and quick ground advance. This plan “problem of expectations,”noting The ground forces took Baghdad soon will defeat Saddam’s regime, that “the Pentagon did not dispute a in three weeks without a major overwhelmingly, as it now appears, news report that the allies would and meeting little effective resis- but it did not cause its immediate drop 3,000 precision guided muni- tance, mainly because the Republi- collapse.” tions in the war’s first 24 hours. In can Guard divisions in their path had (Rumsfeld and Franks said the reality, after four days of bombing, been demolished by airpower. Inter- “operational pause” never happened.) the coalition had dropped 2,000 PGMs, views afterward with Republican In the June issue of the Royal averaging 500 every 24 hours.” Guard officers indicated that airpower United Services Institute’s RUSI

AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2003 55 Journal, Ullman said, “Despite the is what air forces have been doing struction of the enemy. It may be to prewar hoopla of Shock and Awe,” since I—that is always gain a specific strategic or tactical the campaign was not based princi- the plan. This is the ‘same old.’ We result, such as deterring, neutraliz- pally on obtaining those effects pre- want to believe it is something new, ing, or halting the enemy force. One scribed by the original concept. ... because we want to believe we’re of the Air Force advocates in the “In the run-up to the war, it is always bigger and better. But the early 1990s of Effects-Based Opera- possible that advocates of strategic fact is, if there are new twists and tions was David A. Deptula, now a bombing jumped on the term Shock turns, this won’t be it.” major general and director of plans and Awe as a means of publicizing Those sour assessments did not and programs at Air Combat Com- that approach and in the expectation accurately describe strategic airpower mand. that such bombing alone could in- or Shock and Awe. On March 19, one of Deptula’s deed bring Saddam down. ... Air Force doctrine recognizes (as officers, Col. Gary Crowder, briefed “Had the targeting from the be- Napoleon did) surprise as one of the the Pentagon on Effects-Based Op- ginning of the war been focused on major and lists erations. One of his slides listed the Iraqi Army and the arms of po- shock as one of the products of sur- Shock and Awe as a related concept. litical power, such as the Baathist prise. Doctrine further identifies “You don’t win a war by not in- Party and its infrastructure through- strategic attack as one the functions timidating an adversary,” Crowder out the country, who knows how long of air and space power. In turn, said in response to a question. “I the fight might have lasted? After a strategic attack is directed at both think the effects that we are trying to few days, with the knowledge that the capability and the will of the create are to make it so apparent and his Army and political control of the enemy to continue the fight. The so overwhelming at the very outset country no longer existed, Saddam objectives “often include produc- of potential military operations that might have quit or fled the field in a ing effects to demoralize the enemy’s the adversary quickly realizes that matter of days or a week or two.” leadership, military forces, and pop- there is no real alternative here other Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul ulation.” than to fight and die or to give up. D. Wolfowitz told CBS on April 1, Ullman and Wade in 1996 drew a ...What will happen is the great un- “We never targeted infrastructure. distinction between Shock and Awe known. ... I think there’s going to be We’ve gone to great lengths to avoid and doctrines of strategic attack. In a wide variety of different reactions it, in fact, in contrast to 1991, when 2003, Ullman sometimes sounded as by the Iraqi people and the Iraqi there was some deliberate targeting if he regarded airpower as the antith- military forces.” of those functions that had both a esis of the concept. In Desert Storm in 1991, the Air military and a civilian application.” “As I see it, this air campaign ap- Force also inaugurated the practice Asked about Shock and Awe, pears to come out of a book by strate- of “Parallel Warfare,” attacking all Wolfowitz said, “I don’t care for gic airpower advocates, who have of the enemy’s vital systems and that phrase.” Gen. T. Michael Moseley, argued that you start at the center and assets at once rather than stringing then the Gulf War II combined force work your way out to disrupt and the attacks out over days and weeks. air component commander, was of destroy whatever,” Ullman told the It was only in recent years that tech- similar opinion. “The term Shock Washington Times on March 31. nology made such an approach pos- and Awe has never been a term that “We come up with the opposite sible. I’ve used. I’m not sure where that view,” he continued. “Take away Strategic airpower, Effects-Based came from,” Moseley said at a press [Saddam’s] ability to run the coun- Operations, and Parallel Warfare briefing, April 5. try and the ability to fight. The argu- have characteristics in common with By summer, Shock and Awe had ment is, that may cause a sufficient Shock and Awe, but they are far become a cliche, applied in situa- amount of ‘Shock and Awe’, it will from synonymous with it. tions ranging from the box office force them to surrender. ... As we Lt. Col. John R. Hunerwadel of boom of “The Matrix Reloaded” to a theoretically envisaged it, we would the Air Force Doctrine Center said ninth inning home run by San Fran- have gone straight after the Republi- that the phrase “Shock and Awe” cisco Giants slugger Barry Bonds to can Guard and its leadership and not does not appear in any doctrine docu- (by political activist Tom Hayden) just with precision guided weapons.” ments and that “there is not enough Arnold Schwarzenegger’s announce- Ullman told (UK) ‘meat on the bones’ to merit inclu- ment that he would run for governor on March 25, “The phrase, as used sion in doctrine” at this point. of California. by the Pentagon now, has not been “Strategies that include decapita- helpful—it has created a doomsday tion, isolation, shock-like effects, and The Issue of Airpower approach—the idea of terrorizing coercion against enemy leadership Some critics saw Shock and Awe everybody. In fact, that’s not the are a vital part of Air Force war- as nothing more than strategic airpower approach. The British have a much fighting,” Hunerwadel said. “Such wearing a new hat. “Air Force theo- better phrase for it: effects-based effects have been used successfully rists have long touted strategic bomb- operations.” to achieve objectives in many con- ing as the best way to break the will Ullman was unaware, apparently, flicts. In all cases, however, such and muscle of the enemy,” John Barry that the Air Force was preaching and effects are only part of a larger joint and Evan Thomas wrote in News- practicing Effects-Based Operations or combined strategy designed to week. long before the appearance of Shock manipulate the enemy’s will. They Robert Pape told the Christian and Awe. In Effects-Based Opera- seldom work in isolation and are not Science Monitor that “Shock and Awe tions the objective is not always de- successful in all circumstances—they

56 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2003 are elements of strategy, not doctri- ticipated. For example, the electric- nal principles. ity in Baghdad was still on. “This is an important distinction. The public One report had called it “the most Strategies are specific sets of objec- devastating air raid since Dresden.” tives, courses of action, and tools had been It wasn’t—which the war planners tied to a particular conflict. Doc- had gone to great pains to ensure— trine, on the other hand, is the accu- spun up but it wasn’t what the public had mulated wisdom of many conflicts. been coached to expect. It represents our central and endur- to expect So far as most people could see ing beliefs about how to wage war. over the following week or two, the “What worked for one particular something “campaign unlike any other in his- strategy in one particular conflict tory” looked pretty much like previ- does not necessarily apply to others. ous operations. For example, Shock and Awe-like different There had also been an expecta- effects may have been appropriate tion of fast results. When the con- in Iraq. They were not appropriate flict was a week old, Ullman told the against Serbia, however, where alli- than what Journal News in upstate New York ance concerns precluded them and that people outside the military who evidence suggests that the growing did not understand Shock and Awe pressure against strategic targets over happened. “thought it would be won in two time enabled successful coercion days. That is absurd. If it is done in while preserving NATO’s resolve. two months, that will be remarkably Different places, foes, and times call and water supply—to stun and in- positive.” for different strategies. Shock and timidate the enemy. The Pentagon Many people had contributed to Awe-like effects were merely one ruled out destruction of the civilian that expectation, including Ullman element of one strategy, merely one infrastructure. himself, who told CBS in January tool in the strategist’s tool kit.” In its pure form, Shock and Awe that it might take minutes instead of was probably not a practical candi- days or weeks to yield a “simulta- How To Explain It? date for an operational strategy, but neous effect” with Shock and Awe. A combination of factors seems to the public didn’t understand that, Confidence in Rumsfeld’s war account for the three-month roller- and the people stirring up the excite- plan was undercut by criticism, espe- coaster ride in public opinion for ment didn’t explain it. cially from disgruntled retired offi- Shock and Awe. Although top defense officials cers. Since—according to the talk “Shock and Awe” was short, did not say the strategy was Shock shows—Rumsfeld’s strategy was catchy, ideal for television. Report- and Awe, they left that impression. Shock and Awe, it suffered a full ers and commentators used it as a They may not have been talking about share of whatever damage accrued. shorthand for the strategy. Most of Shock and Awe, but they often sounded Lost in the shuffle was the fact that those mouthing the phrase had only as if they were. They used words like the campaign being executed was not a superficial grasp and interest. “shock” in dramatic context. They UllmanÐWade-style Shock and Awe. The news media and the commen- talked about a “campaign unlike any What now for Shock and Awe? It is tators did not know what the real other in history” (Franks) and con- still alive, but it is back in the insider strategy was. No defense leader— flict “of a force and a scope and a world of studies and analysis, model- and least of all the secretive Rums- scale that has been beyond what has ing, simulation, and wargaming. feld—would announce the war plan been seen before” (Rumsfeld). “One assumes that there will be in advance. It was not the job of the Depart- extensive examination and lessons- Relatively few military people had ment of Defense to correct expecta- learned exercises of this war and its seen the Shock and Awe paper or tions generated by others. Indeed, aftermath done both within Minis- heard the briefing. Most of them who not doing so may have been a form tries and Departments of Defense as used the term in offhand comments of passive . The erro- well as in the press,” Ullman said in quoted by the news media had picked neous expectations were no doubt of his RUSI Journal piece. “It would be it up from television. value in keeping Saddam off bal- unfortunate, based on the negative The Pentagon’s Shock and Awe ance—but they also set up a popular publicity, to abandon any reconsid- was not the same as Ullman’s Shock misunderstanding in the . eration of Shock and Awe as part of and Awe. For the Pentagon, it was Because of the precision of the these exercises.” one element of the strategy—and not attack and the care taken to avoid Defense Group Inc. said that “Rapid necessarily the most important ele- , the destruction in Dominance: Shock and Awe” has ment. For Ullman, it was the most evidence the morning after the ini- continued to mature. Studies for the important thing. Among other dif- tial attack was not as vast as those Department of Defense have ex- ferences, Ullman called for attack- who watched the bombardment on panded on several aspects of it, and ing everything—including the power television the night before had an- DGI is currently working with the Defense Advanced Research Projects John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air Force Magazine for 18 years and is Agency to look more closely at the now a contributing editor. His most recent article, “The Legacy of the Bottom- concept “in operational art and with Up Review,” appeared in the October issue. emerging DARPA technologies.” ■

AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2003 57