DOCSLIB.ORG

Flygtningenævnets Baggrundsmateriale

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Flygtningenævnets Baggrundsmateriale 1096 Flygtningenævnets baggrundsmateriale Bilagsnr.: 1096 Land: Syrien Kilde: Ministeriet van Buitenlandse Zaken Titel: Country of Origin Information Report – Syria Udgivet: 31. juli 2019 Optaget på 28. august 2019 baggrundsmaterialet: Flygtningenævnet • Adelgade 11-13 • DK-1304 København K Telefon +45 6198 3700 • E-mail [email protected] • www.fln.dk Country of Origin Information Report Syria The security situation Date July 2019 Page 1 of 97 Country of Origin Information Report Syria | The security situation June 2019 Publication details Location The Hague Prepared by Department for Country of Origin Information Reports (CAB) Disclaimer: The Dutch version of this report is leading. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands cannot be held accountable for misinterpretations based on the English version of the report. Page 2 of 97 Country of Origin Information Report Syria | The security situation June 2019 Table of contents Publication details ......................................................................................... 2 Table of contents .......................................................................................... 3 Introduction ................................................................................................. 5 1 The security situation .................................................................................. 7 1.1 Political developments ................................................................................... 7 1.2 The security situation ................................................................................... 16 1.2.1 The provinces of Damascus and Rif Dimashq (Rural Damascus) .......................... 17 1.2.2 The provinces of Dara’a and Quneitra ............................................................. 19 1.2.3 The province of Al-Suweida ........................................................................... 22 1.2.4 The province of Tartous ................................................................................ 23 1.2.5 The province of Lattakia ................................................................................ 23 1.2.6 The province of Idlib..................................................................................... 24 1.2.7 The province of Homs ................................................................................... 30 1.2.8 The province of Hama ................................................................................... 31 1.2.9 The province of Aleppo ................................................................................. 33 1.2.10 The province of Hasaka ................................................................................. 37 1.2.11 The province of Deir al-Zor ............................................................................ 37 1.2.12 The province of Raqqa .................................................................................. 39 1.3 Civilian casualties ........................................................................................ 40 1.4 Violence against specific groups ..................................................................... 42 1.5 Human rights violations ................................................................................ 43 1.6 Humanitarian situation ................................................................................. 47 1.7 Travel ........................................................................................................ 53 1.8 Border crossings .......................................................................................... 54 1.9 Ethnic or religious changes of areas ................................................................ 55 2 The Kurdish region .................................................................................... 57 2.1.1 Governance ................................................................................................ 57 2.1.2 The security situation ................................................................................... 58 2.1.3 The position of the non-Kurds ........................................................................ 59 2.1.4 Legal protection ........................................................................................... 60 2.1.5 Travel ........................................................................................................ 61 2.1.6 Population composition ................................................................................. 62 2.1.7 Migration .................................................................................................... 62 2.1.8 Compulsory military service ........................................................................... 62 3 Military aspects ......................................................................................... 64 3.1.1 Military service ............................................................................................ 64 3.1.2 Forced recruitment and recruitment of children ................................................ 66 3.1.3 Amnesty arrangements ................................................................................. 67 3.2 Command structure of army and militias ......................................................... 68 3.2.1 The functioning and control of the YPG and SDF ............................................... 69 3.2.2 The functioning and control of the Free Syrian Army ......................................... 69 3.3 Foreign forces ............................................................................................. 70 4 Displaced persons ..................................................................................... 72 4.1 IDP camps .................................................................................................. 73 4.2 Camps for ISIS fighters ................................................................................ 74 Page 3 of 97 4.3 International organisations ............................................................................ 77 4.3.1 Documents ................................................................................................. 78 4.3.2 UNRWA ...................................................................................................... 79 4.3.3 UNHCR ....................................................................................................... 79 4.4 Repatriation ................................................................................................ 80 4.4.1 IDP returns ................................................................................................. 80 4.4.2 Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries ....................................................... 81 4.4.3 Refugee returns ........................................................................................... 86 5 Appendixes ................................................................................................ 90 5.1 Abbreviations used ....................................................................................... 90 5.2 Sources consulted ........................................................................................ 91 5.3 Map of Syria ................................................................................................ 97 Page 4 of 97 Country of Origin Information Report Syria | The security situation June 2019 Introduction This country of origin information report describes the security situation in Syria. The reporting period runs from May 2018 to May 2019. As far as possible, the most significant developments up to the time of the report’s publication in July 2019 have been included. Given the period covered, this report is therefore an update of the description of the security situation in the country of origin information report (thematisch ambtsbericht) on Syria of June 2018. For an overview of compulsory military service and related subjects, see the country of origin report (thematisch ambtsbericht) issued in December 2016. For information on Syrian documents, see the October 2017 country of origin information report (thematisch ambtsbericht) on this subject. These reports have been published in Dutch only. This report is based on information from both public and confidential sources. Use has been made of information from non-governmental organisations, Letters to Parliament (in Dutch only), specialist literature and media reporting. The public sources consulted are included in the list of references. The report is also based on information obtained on a fact-finding mission to Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, and reports from the Dutch representations in these countries. These findings are treated as confidential sources. Reporting (in public sources) on violent incidents can vary greatly: for example, there can be differences regarding the number of victims. Information about the ongoing struggle, perpetrators, victim tallies and other related subjects is virtually impossible to verify independently and is not comprehensive. Where possible, information has been verified through confidential sources. This report must therefore be read in the context of a very fluid situation, in which, moreover, all the different parties stand to benefit from certain reporting which is favourable to them. In addition, media coverage of Syria regularly uses terms such as ‘extremists’, ‘moderates’, and ‘jihadists’. In this report, the term ‘armed group’ is used in principle, unless a particular
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Security Council Distr.: General 24 August 2016
    United Nations S/2016/738/Rev.1 Security Council Distr.: General 24 August 2016 Original: English Letter dated 24 August 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council I have the honour to convey herewith the third report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. (Signed) BAN Ki-moon 16-14878 (E) 140916 *1614878* S/2016/738/Rev.1 Letter dated 24 August 2016 from the Leadership Panel of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons- United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism addressed to the Secretary-General The Leadership Panel of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism has the honour to transmit the Mechanism’s third report pursuant to Security Council resolution 2235 (2015). The report provides an update on the activities of the Mechanism up to 19 August 2016. It also outlines the concluding assessments of the Leadership Panel to date, on the basis of the results of the investigation into the nine selected cases of the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Leadership Panel wishes to thank the Secretary-General for the confidence placed in it. The Panel appreciates the indispensable support provided by the Secretariat, including the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Department for Political Affairs and the Office of Legal Affairs, and the United Nations officials who have assisted the Mechanism in New York, Geneva and Damascus.
    [Show full text]
  • UK Home Office
    Country Policy and Information Note Syria: the Syrian Civil War Version 4.0 August 2020 Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies: x A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm x The general humanitarian situation is so severe as to breach Article 15(b) of European Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive) / Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules x The security situation presents a real risk to a civilian’s life or person such that it would breach Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules x A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) x A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory x A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and x If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • IMPACT of COVID-19 on MARKETS in NORTHERN SYRIA Snapshot: 6-9 April 2020
    IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON MARKETS IN NORTHERN SYRIA Snapshot: 6-9 April 2020 INTRODUCTION On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization declared the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) a pandemic, urging states to take swift preventative measures for containment and to mitigate the spread, such as isolation, case monitoring, and dissemination of information related to health and safety practices. In the areas of northeast Syria (NES) typically covered by REACH’s monthly Market Monitoring Exercise, authorities began to take precautions to mitigate the risk of an outbreak, including curfews, shop closures, and movement restrictions. Meanwhile, very few mitigation measures were reported in the opposition- controlled areas of northwest Syria (NWS), and markets reportedly continued to function as usual. Border closures affected all regions of Syria, as neighbouring countries implemented mitigation measures, and many of the most significant crossings into northern Syria were either restricted or closed, including limitations at Bab Al-Hawa and Bab Al-Salame border crossings between NES and Turkey and a temporary closure of the Semalka crossing between NES and the Kurdistan region of Iraq (KRI). Due to the lack of detailed, region-specific data about the impact of COVID-19 on markets, REACH launched an assessment in early April 2020 to better understand how markets were responding to the pandemic. The assessment focused on the availability and prices of a few key goods, including plastic gloves and antibacterial gel. It also asked about the functionality of local markets, including vendors' supply and financing challenges. Finally, REACH asked about mitigation measures imposed on communities and taken by shopkeepers to slow the spread, such as limiting crowds and utilising face masks.
    [Show full text]
  • Middle East Program Occasional Paper Series Fall 2016
    MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES FALL 2016 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM FALL OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 2016 From Tribe to Nation: Iraqi Kurdistan on the Cusp of Statehood “For better or nition that after decades of dogged, if at times Amberin Zaman, worse, it is hard unorthodox, efforts to build their own state, Public Policy Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International to escape [the] the Iraqi Kurds are on the cusp of formally de- Center for Scholars conclusion that claring independence. It is no longer a matter future of Iraqi of “if” but “when.” Kurds lies with And the United States, as much as Iraq’s their integration neighbors—Iran, Turkey, and Syria, which into Iraqi state have restive Kurdish populations of their […] In terms of re- own—needs to be ready when Iraqi Kurdis- gional stability, it is probably preferable that tan, the first real Kurdish state in the modern [the] Kurdish independence movement does sense, is born. Most importantly, so do the not succeed.” Thus opined an American dip- Kurds. lomat stationed in Baghdad in a secret cable It will be a premature birth on many dated July 1, 1973.1 counts. The Kurdistan Regional Government Forty-three years on, official U.S. policy— (KRG) remains at war against jihadists of the that Iraq needs to remain territorially intact— so-called Islamic State (ISIS). Collapsing oil has not changed. But there is growing recog- prices have bankrupted the KRG’s rentier 1 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES FALL 2016 About the Middle East Program Director The Middle East Program was launched in February 1998 in light of Henri J.
    [Show full text]
  • Enclave Governance: How to Circumvent the Assad Regime and Safeguard Syria’S Future
    Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper Number 30, December 2020 Enclave Governance: How to Circumvent the Assad Regime and Safeguard Syria’s Future Ranj Alaaldin ENCLAVE GOVERNANCE: HOW TO CIRCUMVENT THE ASSAD REGIME AND SAFEGUARD SYRIA’S FUTURE Ranj Alaaldin The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not determined by any donation. Copyright © 2020 Brookings Institution THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 U.S.A. www.brookings.edu BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER Saha 43, Building 63, West Bay, Doha, Qatar www.brookings.edu/doha Table of Contents I. Executive Summary .................................................................................................1 II. Introduction ..........................................................................................................3 III. Current Challenges to Stability and Peacebuilding ...............................................8
    [Show full text]
  • The Implications of the Covid-19 Pandemic for Human Rights in Syria
    Publication details, including guidelines for submissions: https://rowaq.cihrs.org/submissions/?lang=en The Implications of the Covid-19 Pandemic for Human Rights in Syria Hazem Nahar Academic citation of this article: Nahar, Hazem (2020) ‘The Implications of the Covid-19 Pandemic for Human Rights in Syria’, Rowaq Arabi 25 (4), pp. 109-125. Disclaimer This article may be used for research, teaching and study purposes, as long as it is properly referred to. The Rowaq Arabi editors make every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information contained in the journal. However, the editors and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness or suitability for any purpose of the content. Any views expressed in this publication are the views of the authors and not necessarily the views of the editors of Rowaq Arabi or the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. Copyright This content is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 Licence. Rowaq Arabi, 25 (4) The Implications of the Covid-19 Pandemic for Human Rights in Syria Hazem Nahar Abstract This research is unusual in that it looks at the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic for human rights in a country where basic human rights have deteriorated to an unprecedented degree as a result of the last decade of conflict. The research begins with a theoretical introduction on the right to health and protocols to combat Covid-19 pandemic from a human rights perspective. It then reviews the reality of the Covid-19 pandemic in Syria and its evolution, the state of the health sector prior to the pandemic, and the impact of armed conflict on the sector over the past decade.
    [Show full text]
  • Thematisch Ambtsbericht Syrië De Veiligheidssituatie
    Thematisch ambtsbericht Syrië De veiligheidssituatie Datum Juli 2019 Pagina 1 van 103 Thematisch ambtsbericht Syrië | De veiligheidssituatie juni 2019 Colofon Plaats Den Haag Opgesteld door Cluster Ambtsberichten (CAB) Pagina 2 van 103 Thematisch ambtsbericht Syrië | De veiligheidssituatie juni 2019 Inhoudsopgave Colofon ....................................................................................................... 2 Inhoudsopgave ............................................................................................. 3 Inleiding ...................................................................................................... 5 1 Veiligheidssituatie ....................................................................................... 7 1.1 Politieke ontwikkelingen ................................................................................. 7 1.2 Veiligheidssituatie ........................................................................................ 17 1.2.1 Provincies Damascus en Rif Dimashq (Ruraal Damascus) ................................... 17 1.2.2 Provincies Dara’a en Quneitra ........................................................................ 19 1.2.3 Provincie Al-Suweida .................................................................................... 23 1.2.4 Provincie Tartous ......................................................................................... 24 1.2.5 Provincie Lattakia ........................................................................................ 24 1.2.6
    [Show full text]
  • North and East Syria´S Arab Regions
    BEYOND ROJAVA: NORTH AND EAST SYRIA´S ARAB REGIONS JUNE 2021 BEYOND ROJAVA: THE ARAB REGIONS OF NORTH AND EAST SYRIA JUNE 2021 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 3 0 METHODOLOGY AND REMIT 6 0.1 METHODOLOGY AND LIMITS OF THE INVESTIGATION 0.2 AUTHORS 0.3 KEY FINDINGS 1 OVERVIEW OF THE REGIONS 8 1.1 DEIR EZ-ZOR 1.2 RAQQA 1.3 TABQA 1.4 MANBIJ 1.5 THE SYRIAN REVOLUTION IN NES 2 PRESENT-DAY SITUATION 16 2.1 GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION 2.2 GOS PRESSURE ON ARAB REGIONS OF NES 2.3 HUMANITARIAN SITUATION 2.4 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPS) 3 NEW PARADIGM 35 3.1 POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 3.2 MILITARY STRUCTURES 3.3 ECONOMY AND RESOURCES 3.4 OIL 3.5 JUSTICE 3.6 EDUCATION 3.7 HEALTH SERVICES 3.8 WOMEN’S AUTONOMY AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 3.9 MINORITIES IN THE MAJORITY-ARAB REGIONS 4 SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE 82 5 CONCLUSION 99 6 BIBLIOGRAPHY 108 2 BEYOND ROJAVA: THE ARAB REGIONS OF NORTH AND EAST SYRIA JUNE 2021 INTRODUCTION The political project popularly known as the ‘Rojava revolution’ started in Kurdish-majority (though ethnically diverse) regions of Syria, but soon spread to Arab-majority regions as a result of successive campaigns by the YPG, YPJ and allied forces against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. Victories against these forc- es in Arab-majority cities and regions led to the creation in 2016 of what was then known as the Democratic Federation of North-Eastern Syria (DFNS) and is today united as North and East Syria (NES) under the leadership of the Au- tonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).
    [Show full text]
  • The Ngos Have Access to Rojava Through Semelka River
    April 27, 2020 Statement by Office of the Coordinator for International Advocacy (OCIA) The NGOs Have Access to Rojava through Semelka River Coronavirus has comprehensively and relentlessly targeted almost every spot in the world. Its fatality is growing in a steady trend. Following the partial closure of the borders and airports, health sectors are facing a huge pressure and new challenges. The Fayshkhabur river-also known as Semelka River-is considered a crucial humanitarian crossing point between Kurdistan Region and North East of Syria. The government and a large number of NGO activists are utilizing this river to deliver humanitarian aids to the people in the war-torn spots. With the early stages of the outbreak, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria decided to close Fayshkhabur border with the Kurdistan Region until the viral disease gets under control. They announced that "The Semalka border crossing with the Kurdistan Region will be completely closed from 1 March until further notice; as a precautionary measure to prevent the transmission of the coronavirus to the areas of autonomous administration of North and East Syria, excluding emergency cases." It is noteworthy that the "Semalka - Fayshkhabur" crossing on the banks of the Tigris River, which separates the Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, is normally full of travellers crossing on a daily basis. It is also normally a medium for active commercial movement in both directions, as well as the movement of humanitarian NGOs. The decision to close the crossing between the two borders (Fayshkhabur-Simalka) initially stopped movement of all kinds, including the movement of humanitarian NGOs to help refugees in Syria to send humanitarian and medical aid to them.
    [Show full text]
  • Army Overruns Idlib Crossroads Town Despite Turkey's Warnings
    7 International Sunday, February 9, 2020 Army overruns Idlib crossroads town despite Turkey’s warnings Syrian forces press a blistering assault with Russian support DAMASCUS: The Syrian army took control of the strate- gic northwestern crossroads town of Saraqeb yesterday in the latest gain of a weeks-long offensive against the country’s last major rebel bastion of Idlib. The advance came shortly after Turkey sent additional troops into the African leaders region and threatened to respond if any of its military observation posts in Idlib, set up under a 2018 truce, grapple with failure come under attack. “Army units now exercise full control over the town of to ‘silence the guns’ Saraqeb,” state television reported, over footage of the town’s streets, deserted after weeks of bombardment. Since December, government forces have pressed a blis- ADDIS ABABA: Seven years ago, amid extravagant tering assault against the Idlib region with Russian sup- celebrations marking the African Union’s 50th port, retaking town after town despite warnings from anniversary, the continent’s heads of state declared rebel ally Turkey to back off. The violence has killed more they would “end all wars in Africa by 2020.” But as than 300 civilians and sent some 586,000 fleeing civil- leaders travel to Addis Ababa this weekend for the lat- ians onto the roads, seeking relative safety nearer the est summit of the 55-member bloc - organized under Turkish border the theme “Silencing the Guns” — there is little ques- The United Nations and aid groups have appealed for tion they are doomed to fall well short of their goal.
    [Show full text]
  • Hezbollah Locations SY
    Map Analysis Map of Hezbollah Presence in Syria ABDULWAHAB ASI senior researcher at Jusoor for Studies center Majd Kilany research assistant at Jusoor for Studies center "All rights reserved" Jusoor for Studies Center - 2020 www.jusoor.co Contents Introduction First: Hezbollah’s Distribution in Syria Second: The spread of Hezbollah at the provincial level 1. Aleppo 2. Idlib 3. Hama 4. Homs 5. Damascus and Damascus Countryside 6. Deraa 7. Quintera 8. As-Suwayda 9. Deir Ezzor Introduction Since 2011, the Lebanese Hezbollah started its intervention in Syria, providing advisory services to the regime forces and security apparatus. Hezbollah then began its unofficial military support on the ground for the regime. In April 2013, it launched a large-scale official military intervention during the battle for al-Qusayr near Homs. During the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah strengthened its military presence in the nine Syrian governorates by relying on its direct presence in areas and establishing local networks loyal to it. This study presents the distribution of Hezbollah forces in Syria and their locations with the aim of analyzing the reasons for this distribution and timeframe of events. Determining Hezbullah’s sites of concentration highlights its most important supply routes for weapons to Lebanon as well as the main Hezbollah training, armament and storage facilities in Syria. The report clarifies the strategic objectives Hezbollah has achieved from its intervention in Syria and explains its various military, security, cultural and economic activities. Jusoor Center for Studies’ map of Hezbollah’s military deployment in Syria is the first comprehensive map developed. While other maps of Hezbollah’s positions exist, none are as comprehensive or accurate.
    [Show full text]
  • SYRIA – Meeting Minutes
    SYRIA – Meeting Minutes LOCATION: Damascus, Syria DATE: 23 October 2014 CHAIR: Logistics Cluster Coordinator PARTICIPANTS: FAO, GOPA Worldwide Consultants (GOPA), International Medical Corps (IMC), IOM, Oxfam, Premiere Urgence, Secours Islamique France, UNFPA, UNRWA, WHO, WFP ACTION POINTS: Participants to submit their Service Request Forms (SRFs) for upcoming convoys once confirmed by OCHA. The Logistics Cluster to share the schedule and agenda for the upcoming warehouse management training. The Logistics Cluster to share the translated Customs Bill of 2006 as part of the information brief to partners. AGENDA: 1. Humanitarian Update 2. Common Services Update 3. Joint Humanitarian Convoys 4. Organizations’ Updates and Any other Business (AOB) 1. HUMANITARIAN UPDATE The Logistics Cluster Coordinator welcomed participants and provided a brief update of the Humanitarian situation. Syria Some parts of rural Damascus remain inaccessible, including Qudsaeia, Mouadamiyet, Al Qalamoun, Qutaifeh, Zabadani, East Ghouta, Dareia, and Al Tal. Currently, Deir ezzour, Raqqa, and rural Quneitra are also inaccessible. Approximately 20% of areas of rural Dar’a are currently accessible. Hassakeh governorate in northeastern Syria is still inaccessible by road from Damascus. Official fuel prices in Syria have been raised. The new official prices are 80 SYP for diesel, and 140 SYP for petrol. Neighbouring Countries Lebanon The Beirut-Damascus Main Highway and the International Highway to Al Arida Border crossing are both currently open (21 October). The two routes have been operating normally this week. Beirut Port is operating normally, no congestion has been reported. The Logistics Cluster is updating the Logistics Capacity Assessments (LCAs) for Lebanon and Syria. This will include updated port and airport information, contact lists for government focal points, customs information, road access information, and is useful for the Lebanon Contingency Plan.
    [Show full text]